THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

CUC-HO330-5 1 027 2368

The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism
Theodore Lowi 5

The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy
David Easton and Jack Dennis 25

Political Dualism and Italian Communism
Sidney G. Tarrow 39

Bar Politics, Judicial Selection and the Representation of Social Interests
Richard A. Watson, Rondal G. Downing, and Frederick C. Spiegel 54

Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model
Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde 72

Soviet Policy in Latin America
Herbert S. Dinerstein 80

An End to European Integration?
Ronald Inglehart 91

Academic Ideology and the Study of Adjudication
Glendon Schubert 106

Research Notes

Causal Inferences, Closed Populations, and Measures of Association
Hubert M. Blalock 130

Politicians' Beliefs about Voters
John W. Kingdon 137

Some Comments on Russett's "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations"
John E. Mueller 146

Communications to the Editor 149

Book Reviews and Notes
Donald R. Matthews (acting ed.) 154

News and Notes
Leo B. Lott (ed.) 227

391
.005

VOL. LXI MARCH, 1967 NO. 1

Published Quarterly by

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

THE REVOLUTIONARY PERSONALITY: LENIN, TROTSKY, GANDHI

By E. Victor Wolfenstein

Why does a man become a revolutionist? What attributes of personality enable him to become an effective revolutionary leader? What psychological attributes enable a man to effect the transition to power? By focusing on the personalities of three important revolutionists the author hypothesizes a model of a distinctive "revolutionary personality." Lenin, Trotsky, and Gandhi are discussed in terms of trust, pride, courage, industry, confidence, and drive—the values that result from the successful management of the problems of the various stages of psycho-sexual growth. A *Center of International Studies* publication. *April. 384 pages. $7.50*

THE RUSSIAN ANARCHISTS

By Paul Avrich

Professor Avrich records the history of the anarchist movement from its Russian origins in the 19th century, with a full discussion of Bakunin and Kropotkin, to its upsurge in the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, and its decline and fall after the Bolshevik seizure of power. While analyzing the role of the anarchists in these fateful years, he traces the close relationships between the anarchists and the Bolsheviks and shows that the Revolutions were conceived in spontaneity and idealism and ended in cynical repression. The Russian anarchists saw clearly the consequences of a Marxist "dictatorship of the proletariat" and, though they had no single cohesive organization, repeatedly warned that the Bolsheviks aimed to replace the tyranny of the tsars with a tyranny of commissars. *Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University.*

300 pages. Illus. $7.50

THE MILITARY ATTACHÉ

By Alfred Vagts

This is both a history of the service attaché, beginning with the Napoleonic era, and a discussion of his changing role, past and present. Professor Vagts shows the military adviser temporarily joined to the diplomatic corps as a person often divided in his loyalties to diplomatic officials and to military leaders. Affected by increasing bureaucratic specialization, he sometimes became a "twilight" figure engaged in political activity and even espionage. Professor Vagts' numerous works on the history of militarism and the military, in both German and English, and his research in the chancelleries of Europe have given him perspective for this book. *425 pages. $10.00*

Princeton University Press

HARPER & ROW ANNOUNCES

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY in World Perspective

William Ebenstein • C. Herman Pritchett • Henry A. Turner
Dean Mann

54

This comprehensive text analyzes American government in the perspective of other democratic systems and contrasts democratic principles and practices with authoritarianism and totalitarianism. Basic theory is stressed, with due consideration given to pertinent historical information, institutional operations, and political behavior. In four full introductory chapters, the text sets democracy against other systems of government and discusses the philosophical, economic, and psychological bases of democracy. General principles and issues are emphasized in the authors' presentation of the process of American government as it functions and the policies that emerge from it. Additionally, the authors point to the major areas of public policy in which changes are likely—or ought—to occur, thus stimulating discussion of controversial issues and illustrating the problems of American government and democracy. The authors focus on such problems as civil rights, political parties and interest groups, the role of Congress and the Presidency, the welfare state, the role of the government in the economy, and the problem of underdeveloped countries in U.S. foreign policy.

Charts, graphs, and cartoons by some of the greatest artists, from Herblock to Feiffer. Brief, practical bibliographies. Instructor's Manual.

Harper & Row Publishers

18 | 17

49 East 33d Street
New York 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

President
ROBERT A. DAHL
Yale University

President-Elect
MERLE FAINSOD
Harvard University

Vice Presidents

ROBERT LANE
Yale University

AVERY LEISERSON
Vanderbilt University

RICHARD SNYDER
University of California

Secretary
KENNETH WALTZ
Brandeis University

Treasurer
MAX M. KAMPELMAN
Washington, D.C.

Executive Director
EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK
1527 New Hampshire Avenue
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

Associate Director
DONALD G. TACHERON

Managing Editor, APSR
AUSTIN RANNEY
University of Wisconsin

COUNCIL

Above-named Officers *ex officiis*

JAMES C. DAVIES
University of Oregon
ALEX M. DRAGNICH
Vanderbilt University
HEINZ EULAU
Stanford University
SAMUEL HENDEL
City College of the City University of New York
WALLACE MENDELSON
University of Texas
LAURENCE I. RADWAY
Dartmouth College
WILLIAM H. RIKER
University of Rochester
VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM
Northwestern University

M. MARGARET BALL
Duke University
WILLIAM BUCHANAN
Washington and Lee University
H. PAUL CASTLEBERRY
Washington State University
HERBERT KAUFMAN
Yale University
CHARLES A. MCCLELLAND
University of Southern California
ALFRED G. MEYER
University of Michigan
CLARA PENNIMAN
University of Wisconsin
CLINTON ROSSITER
Cornell University

FORMER PRESIDENTS

FRANK J. GOODNOW
ALBERT SHAW
FREDERIC N. JUDSON
JAMES BRYCE
A. LAWRENCE LOWELL
WOODROW WILSON
SIMEON E. BALDWIN
ALBERT BUSHNELL HART
W. W. WILLOUGHBY
JOHN BASSETT MOORE
ERNST FREUND
JESSE MACY
MUNROE SMITH
HENRY JONES FORD
PAUL S. REINSCH
LEO S. ROWE
WILLIAM A. DUNNING
HARRY A. GARFIELD
JAMES W. GARNER
CHARLES E. MERRIAM

CHARLES A. BEARD
WILLIAM B. MUNRO
JESSE S. REEVES
JOHN A. FAIRLIE
BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH
EDWARD S. CORWIN
WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY
ISIDOR LOEB
WALTER J. SHEPARD
FRANCIS W. COKER
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE
THOMAS REED POWELL
CLARENCE A. DYKSTRA
CHARLES GROVE HAINES
ROBERT C. BROOKS
FREDERIC A. OGG
WILLIAM ANDERSON
ROBERT E. CUSHMAN
LEONARD D. WHITE
JOHN M. GAUS
WALTER F. DODD

ARTHUR W. MACMAHON
HENRY R. SPENCER
QUINCY WRIGHT
JAMES K. POLLOCK
PETER H. ODEGARD
LUTHER H. GULICK
PENDLETON HERRING
RALPH J. BUNCHE
CHARLES MCKINLEY
HAROLD D. LASSWELL
E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER
V. O. KEY, JR.
R. TAYLOR COLE
CARL B. SWISHER
EMMETTE S. REDFORD
CHARLES S. HYNEMAN
CARL J. FRIEDRICH
C. HERMAN PRITCHETT
DAVID B. TRUMAN
GABRIEL A. ALMOND

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Published quarterly by The American Political Science Association

EDITORIAL BOARD

AUSTIN RANNEY, *Managing Editor, University of Wisconsin*

ROBERT E. LANE, *Yale University*
HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Columbia University*
WARREN E. MILLER, *University of Michigan*
WALTER F. MURPHY, *Princeton University*
J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College*
JOHN E. TURNER, *University of Minnesota*
VERNON VAN DYKE, *University of Iowa*
MYRON WEINER, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

EDITORIAL ASSOCIATES

DONALD R. MATTHEWS, *Acting Book Review Editor, University of North Carolina*
LEO B. LOTT, *News and Notes Editor, University of Montana*
MARY H. GROSSMAN, *Madison*

EDITORIAL OFFICE

Managing Editor, APSR
North Hall, University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Executive Director, APSA
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Individual and institutional memberships are $15.00 a year ($6.00 for graduate and undergraduate students). Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $3.75 per copy; for *back issues* address Johnson Reprint Corp., 111 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003.

Applications for membership, orders for the REVIEW, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of change of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the month before publication.

Address correspondence about contributions to the REVIEW to Austin Ranney, North Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 53706. All manuscripts should be submitted IN DUPLICATE. They should be double-spaced and may be in typed, mimeographed, hectographed, or other legible form. Footnotes should appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the pages.

Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name and affiliations should appear only on a separate covering page. All footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate page.

Address books intended for review to Donald R. Matthews, Caldwell Hall, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C. 27514; *News and Notes items* to Leo B. Lott, Department of Political Science, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana 59801; *advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence* to the Executive Director at the Washington office.

Articles and notes appearing in the REVIEW before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature. The International Political Science Abstracts* and the *International Index to Periodicals* index current issues. Microfilm of the REVIEW, beginning with Volume 46, may be obtained from University Microfilms. 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. A *Cumulative Index* of the REVIEW, Volumes 1-57: 1906-1963, may be obtained from Northwestern University Press, 1735 Benson, Evanston, Illinois.


Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.

Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.

Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

Copyright, 1967, by The American Political Science Association

The superior DAGMAR SUPER Microfilm Reader gives...



printed-page comfort when reading all sizes and types of microfilm

Only the DAGMAR SUPER is so advanced in design as to provide in one unit a means of reading *comfortably* all microfilm forms—rollfilm, aperture cards, microfiches, microfilm sheets and film jackets. Operates silently; image is read at a comfortable, normal reading position in moderately lighted rooms.

NOTE THESE IMPORTANT PRODUCT FEATURES

1 SHARP, BRILLIANT IMAGES Superior Netherlands-crafted optical system projects in moderate light, eliminates need for darkened rooms.

2 COMFORTABLE READING Image can be read in normal position.


3 PORTABLE Lightweight, only 14½ lbs. Closes easily into compact 9" cube.

4 SIMPLE, SILENT OPERATION Uses 115 or 230 volt, 60 cycle alt. current.

5 VERSATILE Clearly projects ALL types and sizes of sheetfilm and rollfilm 16 and 35 mm. Aperture provides full 35 mm. scanning. "Zoom" projection allows adjustment of image size from 12 to 20 times.

6 GUARANTEED FOR 1 YEAR (except for lamps or mishandling).

ORDER WITHOUT RISK— on 10 days approval.



Reader, incl. take-up reels, extra lamp, carrying case **$159.95** F.O.B. Waseca

3" x 5" Microfilm Holder **$16.50** EXTRA with purchase of Reader

$18.50 separately

Prices subject to change without notice.
Inquire about favorable adjusted prices for Canada.

ORDER TODAY—READY NOW FOR IMMEDIATE SHIPMENT

AVR AUDIO-VISUAL RESEARCH

1517 8th St. S.E., Waseca, Minn. 56093

The American Political Science Review

VOL. LXI MARCH, 1967 NO. 1

THE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY: INTEREST-GROUP LIBERALISM*

THEODORE LOWI
University of Chicago

Until astonishingly recent times American national government played a marginal role in the life of the nation. Even as late as the eve of World War I, the State Department could support itself on consular fees. In most years revenues from tariffs supplied adequate financing, plus a surplus, from all other responsibilities. In 1800, there was less than one-half a federal bureaucrat per 1,000 citizens. On the eve of the Civil War there were only 1.5 federal bureaucrats per 1,000 citizens, and by 1900 that ratio had climbed to 2.7. This compares with 7 per 1,000 in 1940 and 13 per 1,000 in 1962—exclusive of military personnel.

The relatively small size of the public sphere was maintained in great part by the constitutional wall of separation between government and private life. The wall was occasionally scaled in both directions, but concern for the proper relation of private life and public order was always a serious and effective issue. Americans always talked pragmatism, in government as in all other things; but doctrine always deeply penetrated public dialogue. Power, even in the United States, needed justification.

Throughout the decades between the end of the Civil War and the Great Depression, almost every debate over a public policy became involved in the larger debate over the nature and consequences of larger and smaller spheres of government. This period was just as much a "constitutional period" as that of 1789–1820. Each period is distinguished by its effort to define (or redefine) and employ a "public philosophy."

Lippmann's term is taken here to mean any set of principles and criteria above and beyond the reach of government and statesmen by which the decisions of government are guided and justified. This is not far removed from Lippmann's usage, except that he had in mind the abstract but quite specific public philosophy of bills of rights and natural law.[1] A country either possesses it or does not, loses it or regains it. We may end up agreeing that what Lippmann had in mind is the only public philosophy worthy of the name. But by altering the definition as above, we can use it analytically and critically in the mainstream of modern political science: A public philosophy is something that every stable polity possesses. It is the "political formula"—the "legal and moral basis, or principle, on which the power of the political class rests."[2] It is something that can and does change over generations. Some types of public philosophy may be better, in various ways, than others. And it is possible to discover what the prevailing public philosophy is and to assess its significance by straightforward interpretation of the policies of government and their impact, real or threatened, on society.

In the constitutional epoch immediately preceding our own, ending in 1937, the perennial issue underlying all debate on public policy—and therefore the key to public phi-

* This article was made possible by a Social Science Research Council Fellowship. Thanks are also due Professors Richard Flathman, L. A. Froman, Jr., George LaNoue, and Grant McConnell for their many helpful criticisms and suggestions. For his considerable encouragement I am grateful to Max Ascoli of *The Reporter*; and to him, to Henry Kariel (in *The Decline of American Pluralism*) and to Grant McConnell I am doubly grateful for their early recognition of problems with pluralism.

[1] See especially Clinton Rossiter and James Lare (eds.), *The Essential Lippmann* (New York: Vintage, 1965), pp. 171ff.

[2] Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 70.

losophy in that period—was the question of the nature of government itself and whether expansion or contraction best produced public good. Liberal and conservative regimes derived their principles and rationalizations of governing and policy formulation from their positions on the question. Expansion of government was demanded by liberals as the only means of combating the injustices of a brutal physical and social world that would not change as long as it was taken as natural. Favoring government expansion became the mark of the contemporary liberal. His underlying assumption was that the instruments of government provided the means for conscious induction of social change; without capacity for such change no experimentation with any new institutional forms or means of expanding rights would be possible. Opposition to such means, but not necessarily those forms or those rights, became the mark of the contemporary conservative.

There was unanimity on the criteria underlying the distinction between the adversaries. All agreed that a man's position was determined by his attitude toward government and his attitude toward deliberate social change or "planning." All agreed (and many persist in agreeing) that these two attitudes are consistent and reinforcing both as a guide for leaders in their choices among policies and as a criterion for followers in their choices among leaders. For example:

> Conservatism is committed to a discriminating defense of the social order against change and reform (liberalism). . . . By the Right, I mean generally those parties and movements that are skeptical of popular government, oppose the bright plans of the reformers and dogooders, and draw particular support from men with a sizable stake in the established order. By the Left, I mean generally those parties and movements that demand wider popular participation in government, push actively for reform, and draw particular support from the disinherited, dislocated and disgruntled. As a general rule, to which there are historic exceptions, the Right is conservative or reactionary, the Left is liberal or radical.[3]

These two criteria arose out of a particular constitutional period, were appropriate to that period, and provided a mutually reinforcing basis for doctrine during the period. After 1937, the Constitution did not die from the Revolution, as many had predicted it would. But the basis for the doctrine of that period did die. Liberalism-conservatism as the source of the public philosophy no longer made any sense. Once the principle of positive government in a growing and indeterminable political sphere was established, criteria arising out of the very issue of *whether* such a principle should be established became extinguished. They were extinguished by the total victory of one side of the old dialogue over the other.

The old dialogue has passed into the graveyard of consensus. Yet it persists. Since it has no real, operable meaning any more, it is almost purely ritualistic. However, its persistence has had its real effects. The persistence of this state of affairs so far beyond its own day, has been responsible for two pathological conditions in the 1960's. The first is that the empty rhetoric has produced a crisis of public authority. Without a basis for meaningful adversary proceedings, there has been little, if any, conflict among political actors at the level where each is forced regularly into formulating general rules, applicable to individual acts of state and at one and the same time ethically plausible to the individual citizen. The tendency of individuals to accept governmental decisions because they are good has probably at no time in this century been less intense and less widely distributed in the United States. This is producing many problems of political cynicism and irresponsibility in everyday political processes; and these problems, in turn, have tended toward the second pathological condition, the emergence of an ersatz public philosophy that seeks to justify power and to end the crisis of public authority by parceling out public authority to private parties. That is, the emerging public philosophy seeks to solve the problem of public authority by defining it away. A most maladaptive "political formula," it will inevitably exacerbate rather than end the crisis, even though its short-run effect is one of consensus and stabilization.

THE OLD FORMULA VERSUS THE NEW TIMES

A brief look at a few hard cases will be sufficient to show how little can really be drawn from the old public philosophy to justify the key modern policies and practices in either the the public or the private spheres. Figure 1 helps to show at a glance just how irrelevant the old criteria are. Diagramming and analyzing policies as "techniques of control" was used to good effect by Dahl and Lindblom.[4] In Figure 1 are arranged a few selected public

[3] Clinton Rossiter, *Conservatism in America* (New York: Knopf, 1955), pp. 12 and 15.

[4] Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics, Economic and Welfare* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1953), Chapter 1.

FIG. 1. SELECTED PUBLIC AND PRIVATE POLICIES ARRANGED ACCORDING TO PROBABLE EFFECT ON SOCIETY

Graduated income tax (potential)						(Kennedy-Freeman farm proposals)
Social Security programs based on graduated income tax	Luxury taxes	Growth fiscal policies Graduated Income Tax (United States)	Counter-cyclical fiscal policies Sales taxes	Social Security programs based on insurance principles (U.S.)	Existing farm programs Restraint of competition (NRA, fair trade, anti-price discrim.)	High tariffs Import quotas Utilities
Civil rights package	Real antitrust		Aids to small business	Direct regulation (e.g., FCC, ICC, CAB, etc.)		Group representation on boards
Low tariffs	"Yardstick" regulation (TVA)				Tax on colored margarine	Strict gold standard with no bank money
				Antitrust by consent decree		
Competition in agriculture	Competitive business	Oligopoly with research competition	Oligopoly without competition (steel, cigarettes.)		Trade associations	Monopoly
New interest groups	Corporate philanthropy		Brand names		Pools Basing points	Old interest groups (NAM, AFL-CIO, TWU, etc.)
	Merit hiring and promotion		Ethnic appeals of political campaigns		Price leadership Fair trade policies	
					Union unemployment and automation policies	

Above the line: Public policies ("liberal")
Below the line: Private policies or practices ("conservative")

Toward the left side: Policies likely to produce change ("liberal")
Toward the right side: Policies likely to maintain existing practices ("conservative")

policies and private policies or widely established practices. They are placed in two dimensions according to the two basic attributes of liberalism-conservatism. Above the line are public policies; below the line are private policies or examples of established business and group practices. This vertical dimension is a simple dichotomy.[5] Therefore, above the line is the "liberal" dimension, and below the line the "conservative" dimension. The horizontal dimension is a continuum. Each policy or practice is placed along the line from left to right roughly according to its real or probable impact upon the society. To the left is the liberal direction, where policies are placed if they are likely to affect a direct change in things. To the right is the conservative direction, where policies and practices are placed if they tend directly to maintain one or another status quo.

If the two criteria—attitude toward government and attitude toward change—were consistent and if together they described and justified programs, then liberal policies would be concentrated in the upper left corner, and conservative policies would be concentrated below the line to the right. Little study of the Diagram is necessary to discover that the inconsistencies between the two criteria are extreme. And little reflection is necessary to see that policy makers are being guided by some other principles, if principles do guide at all. The fact that private and public policies range across the extremes of maintenance and change suggests the simple but significant proposition that no institution with the capacity and resources for affecting the society works always in the same direction.[6] Yet a public philosophy based upon public-private and change-maintenance criteria requires unidirectional institutions. Obviously, the liberal-conservative dialogue made sense only up until, but not after, the establishment of positive government.[7]

Analysis of the real or potential impac public policies shows how incomplete is th between the earlier public philosophy an policies it is supposed to support and ju It shows that those who espouse social ch in the abstract, especially governmen gineered social change, are seldom pe policies that would clearly effect any change. Conversely, it shows that those harangue on principle against governmen change are frequently in real life pushing strong doses of each. If these criteria do really guide the leaders, they offer almos plausible justification for the intelligent lower. A few examples in detail follow.

(1) The income tax. All taxes discrimin The political question arises over the kin discrimination the society desires. The gra ated or progressive income tax is capabl effecting drastic changes in the relations am classes and between man and his prope According to the two criteria in question, t the steeply progressive income tax is "libe both because it is governmental and becau effects social change. Our own income tax st ture can be called only mildly "liberal," if at because it is only mildly, if at all, progress allowing as it does full exemption on inte from public debt, fast write-offs, deple allowances, host of "Louis B. Mayer Am ments," privileges on real estate transacti and so on *ad nauseum*. It is generally un

[5] The distance above or below the line is not meant to convey additional information about the degree of public involvement. However, as Dahl and Lindblom's analysis suggests, that is a desirable and practicable consideration.

[6] Placement along the continuum is gross and informal. However, it is clear that no basis for placing these policies according to impact could reduce their spread. And, differences of opinion as to the placement of specific policies (should antitrust go in the middle or over on the left?) would lead to the very kind of policy analysis political scientists need to get involved in.

[7] Some, especially "liberals," might object, arguing that the true basis of the distinction is public vs. private but that it involves much more than merely change vs. maintenance. Equa and welfare as well as change are the attribut public policies. Adding dimensions to the diagram would overly complicate it, but son sponse to the objection can be made: (1 strong element of the equality dimension i ready present in the sense that those policie the left do represent change and "change tow equality." However, (2) note the fact that least to this observer, "equality" is present a public but also among private policies and tices. Furthermore, (3) many public policie at the reduction of equalizing (as well as ch forces in the private sphere. Those in the right area of the Diagram serve as exam Thus, "equality" is not a basis for distinguis positions any more than "change," with or out consideration of the equality aspect change. I will not attempt to defend the ab of the "welfare" dimension except to say th definition of welfare could possibly show tha strictly within the province of the public private sphere. Any diagram based on *any* tion of "welfare" would show policies abo below the line and to the left and the right.

d that the effective ceiling on taxes is not or 75% but a good deal less than 50%. considering all taxes together, it seems y clear that they comprise a bastion against r than a weapon for fluidity among classes channels of opportunity. This is not an ment in favor of the one tax structure or ther, but rather one in favor of the propo- that no trace of a sign can be found of al-conservative principles underlying tax- n, not even as a guide to compromise. During the legislative action in 1963–64, there as much discussion and debate on the impact f the tax cut on the rate of aggregate economic rowth. But there was almost no consideration the tax structure or the tax cut for its signifi- nce to the society. In fact, plans for large- ale tax reform were withdrawn altogether be- ore the tax bill was ever formally proposed. As consequence, taxation in the United States is government policy to preserve the established conomic relations among people and classes.

(2) The social security system. This is, of ourse, a bundle of policies, and accuracy would equire classification of each. On balance, how- ver, they are "liberal" only because they are governmental; they are conservative in their impact on social structure and opportunity. If they promote welfare, then, indeed, it is important to be able to say that a conservative policy *can* promote welfare. Above all else, old age insurance, unemployment compensation and the like are techniques of fiscal policy. They are, initially, important countercyclical evices, "automatic stabilizers," that work ough the maintenance of demand through- the business cycle and through the main- nance of existing economic relationships with- dislocation. In this dimension, "liberals" good deal less willing to take chances than nservatives."

At another dimension, social security in the ited States is an even more interesting case he gap between the old public philosophy the real impact of established programs. social security programs are techniques of l as well as fiscal control, and as such they early conservative. The American system cial security is based fairly strictly on an rance principle, a principle of the spread- f risk through forced saving. Government's is essentially paternalistic; speaking hly, government raises the minimum wage he amount of the employer's contribu- takes that plus about an equal amount the employee's wages, and says, "This of your income we'll not trust you to ." This principle of contributory social ty does not affect the class structure, the sum total of opportunity, or anything else; on the contrary, it tends to maintain existing patterns. It helps make people a little happier to be where they are doing what they are doing. The social security system is consistent with both criteria of liberalism only to the extent that it is based on a graduated income tax or to the extent that it supports those who did not contribute before entering the rolls. And that is a very small extent indeed.

The medicare program is significant as an addition to the scope and scale of social security, but in no important way does it change the social significance of social security. After President Kennedy proposed a medical care bill limited to the aged and based on "actuarial soundness," there was not even any need to debate the social significance of the bill. Actuarial soundness was a sufficient message that social security would remain altogether what it had been, except for the temporary addition of people who were already old and had made no contribution before entering the rolls. The only surprise in the medicare case was the difficulty of passage. But that was not due to a stalemate between liberalism and conservatism. It was due to a stalemate between the unorganized and apathetic elderly and the intensely felt and highly organized trade union interests of the American Medical Association. A program that originated with Bismarck was simply a while longer being needed in the United States.

(3) The farm programs provide an equally good case of the irrelevance of policy to the old public philosophy. High price supports with crop controls, the center of farm policy for a generation, are supported by "liberals"; but they are "liberal" because and only because they are governmental. The entire establishment escaped death in 1949–50 only with urban-labor support, but that support proves nothing about liberalism.

What has been the purpose and what is the impact of such a program? Basically, the aim was to restore and to maintain a pre-1914 agriculture in face of extremely strong contrary financial, industrial and technological developments. The effect of the program has clearly been as intended, for far larger numbers of farmers and subsistence farms remain than are supportable in strictly economic terms. And the program perpetuates the established sizes of a farm and relationships among farmers by basing present quotas and controls upon past outputs, state by state, county by county, and farm by farm. The New Frontier and Great Society proposals must be ranked as even more "conservative," despite their governmen-

tal base, because they would have delegated to a few leading farmers or farm group leaders in each surplus commodity area the power to determine the quotas, thus allowing those most involved to decide *for themselves* just what there is about agriculture worth conserving. This is elevation of government-by-conflict-of-interest to a virtuous principle. Early in his presidency, Lyndon Johnson called the leaders of the major agriculture interest groups to formulate new policy solutions to agriculture. This was the beginning of the Johnson round. In music, a round is a form in which everything is repeated over and over again.

(4) Business practices. The "conservative" side of the argument comes out no better upon examination. Competitive business enterprise is a highly dynamic force that usually makes change normal, innovation necessary, and influence by ordinary individuals over economic decisions possible. For these reasons many forms of competitive enterprise should be thought of as supported by real liberals despite the fact that government is only in a marginal way responsible for it. But, except for martyrs from Thurmond Arnold to Walter S. Adams who have sought vainly to use government to decentralize industry, the net impact of attitudes toward business from conservatives as well as liberals has been to restrain the system. One might say that the only difference between old-school liberals and conservatives is that the former would destroy the market through public means and the latter through private means. This is very largely due to the fact that, lacking any independent standards, all politicians depend upon those organized interests that already have access to government and to the media of communication. According to the second criterion of liberalism-conservatism, *all established interest groups are conservative.*[8] Government policy is one of many strategies organized interests feel free to pursue. In this respect it is useless to distinguish between NAM and AFL-CIO. Trade associations, for example, exist to "stabilize the market," in other words, to maintain existing relations among members despite any fluctuations in their respective sectors of the economy. They, in turn, are the primary determiners of private as well as public policies toward business and business competition. Holding companies, pools, market sharing, information sharing, interlocking directorships, price leadership, competition through advertising and not prices, and collusion in bidding are typical non-governmental policies, which become inevitable if they are not illegal. On the other hand, they are functionally in no way distinguishable from such governmental policies as basing points laws, fair trade laws, antiprice discrimination laws, NRA codes, and so on. To the extent that liberalism-conservatism is taken seriously as the source of public philosophy, liberals-conservatives become hemmed in by it, too rigid to withdraw their sentiments as new needs become old, vested interests. They are inevitably betrayed by the very groups that profited most by their support.

The enormous inconsistency between what public policy really is and what the old doctrine supposes it to be may turn out to be merely true but still inconsequential. This might be the case if it could be shown that American public men were the original pragmatists and were never in need of any doctrine other than the loose social code that binds us all. This possibility must be rejected. Stable countries, with their highly rationalized political order, have great need of legitimizing rituals, perhaps more so than transitional societies where expectations are not so high. Moreover, the very persistence of the old criteria so far beyond their appropriate hour can be taken as an index to the need American elites have for doctrinal support.

The old public philosophy became outmoded because in our time it applies to the wrong class of objects. Statesmen simply no longer disagree about whether government should be involved; therefore they neither seek out the old criteria for guidance through their disagreements, nor do they really have need of the criteria to justify the mere governmental character of policies. But this does not mean that public men are not now being guided by some other, widely shared, criteria that do apply to the relevant class of objects. The good functionalist must insist upon being guided by the hypothesis that some political formula or public philosophy does exist. If it is obvious that public men are no longer governed by the older public philosophy, then the next logical

[8] They are so placed on the Diagram above. Interest groups are not policies strictly speaking. However, individuals and corporations belong to and support trade associations and other groups as a matter of policy; and each such group formulates relatively clear policies supported by the members. Placing "old interest groups" on the Diagram and to the right is meant to convey two hypotheses: (1) that the existence of the group is itself conservative, and (2) that it is highly probable that the policies formulated by such old groups will be conservative.

proposition is this, that there is some other public philosophy with which public policy behaviors are consistent, but it may be one not clearly enough formulated to be well known yet beyond public men themselves.

I contend that such criteria have emerged in a new and already well-developed public philosophy through which public men are attempting to grapple with the pathologies created by the persistence of the old formula. I contend, further, that the new public philosophy is the source of important new political pathologies in America. I contend, finally, that the new public philosophy is pathological because it emerged not out of an evolution of the older but out of the total and complete silence of the older upon those objects with which any new public philosophy had to deal.

INTEREST-GROUP LIBERALISM

The weaknesses of the old liberalism-conservatism were not altogether clear before the 1960's. This tardiness is due simply to the intervention of two wars and then an eight-year period of relative quiescence in policy making and in the saliency of politics and government to the masses. Truman's Fair Deal agenda, already left over from the end of the New Deal, held fire for over a decade until it became a major part of the Democratic agenda of the 1960's and comprised a very large proportion of the successful record of the 89th Congress, the most actively legislating Congress since 1933. Even the historic *Brown* v. *Board of Education* decision failed to bring about noticeable expansion and intensification of political activity until the Little Rock debacle of 1957. With increasing pace thereafter, new pressures began to be placed upon political institutions, and another round of governmental activity was in the making. In many ways the period that began in 1957 with Little Rock and Sputnik was as much a constitutional revolution as that of the 1930's. In this decade—as measured by Federal budgets, personnel, the sheer proliferation of service and other agencies, or the expansion of public regulatory authority—there have clearly been a civil rights revolution, an educational revolution, and a scientific and technological revolution.

All of this activity proves that there is no end to government responsibility. It is not possible to automate all the stabilizers. The new activity in the 1960's also proves that the political apparatus of democracy can respond promptly once the constitutional barriers to democratic choice have been lowered. However, that is only the beginning of the story, because the almost total democratization of the Constitution and the contemporary expansion of the public sector has been accompanied by expansion, not by contraction, of a sense of illegitimacy about public objects. Here is a spectacular paradox. We witness governmental effort of gigantic proportion to solve problems forthwith and directly. Yet we witness expressions of personal alienation and disorientation increasing, certainly not subsiding, in frequency and intensity; and we witness further weakening of informal controls in the family, neighborhood and groups. We witness a vast expansion of effort to bring the ordinary citizen into closer rapport with the democratic process, including unprecedented efforts to confer upon the poor and ineducable the power to make official decisions involving their own fate. Yet at the very same time we witness crisis after crisis in the very institutions in which the new methods of decision-making seemed most appropriate.

It is as though each new program or program expansion were admission of prior governmental inadequacy or failure without necessarily being a contribution to order and well-being. The War on Poverty programs have become as often as not instruments of social protest. The Watts riots, the movements for police review boards in many cities, the sit-ins and marches even where no specifically evil laws are being enforced against a special race or group, the strikes and protests by civil servants, nurses, doctors, teachers, transport and defense workers, and others in vital occupations—all these and many others are evidence of increasing impatience with established ways of resolving social conflict and dividing up society's values. Verbal and organizational attacks on that vague being, the "power structure," even in cities with histories of strong reform movements and imaginative social programs, reflect increasing rejection of pluralistic patterns in favor of more direct prosecution of claims against society. Far from insignificant as a sign of the times is emergence of a third and a fourth national party movement, one on either extreme but alike in their opposition to centrist parties, electoral politics, and pre-election compromise. Many of these new patterns and problems may have been generated by racial issues, but it is clear that that was only a precipitant. The ironic fact is that the post-1937 political economy, either because of or in spite of government policies and two wars, had produced unprecedented prosperity, and as the national output increased arithmetically the rate of rising expectation must have gone up geometrically—in a modern expression of the Mal-

thusian Law. Public authority was left to grapple with this alienating gap between expectation and reality.[9]

Prosperity might merely have produced a gigantic race among all to share in its benefits. The expansion of the public sector might have increased the legitimacy of government and other public objects through redistribution of opportunities to join the prosperity. Instead, the expansion of government that helped produce sustained prosperity also produced a crisis of public authority. Why? Because the old justification for that expansion had so little to say beyond the need for the expansion itself. The class of objects to which the new and appropriate public philosophy would have to apply should, it seems obvious, be the forms, structures and procedures of government control. There are vast technical, political and ethical questions involved in what are and what ought to be the consequences of the various ways in which power can be administered and employed. What constitutes "due process" in an age of positive government? What impact does one or another administrative process have upon society, upon the specific clientele whose compliance is sought, upon the sense of legitimacy among citizens, and upon the capacity of the next generation to respond, governmentally and otherwise, to the problems of its own time?

Out of the developing crisis in public authority has developed an ersatz political formula that does, for all its problems, offer the public man some guidance and some justification in his efforts to shape, form and provide for the administration of positive laws in the positive state. There are several possible names for this contemporary replacement of liberalism-conservatism. A strong possibility would be *corporatism*, but its history as a concept gives it several unwanted connotations, such as conservative Catholicism or Italian fascism, that keep it from being quite suitable. Another is *syndicalism*, but among many objections is the connotation of anarchy too far removed from American experience or intentions. However, the new American public philosophy is a variant of those two alien philosophies.

The most clinically accurate term to describe the American variant is *interest-group liberalism*. It may be called liberalism because it expects to use government in a positive and expansive role, it is motivated by the highest sentiments, and it possesses strong faith that what is good for government is good for the society. It is "interest-group liberalism" because it sees as both necessary and good that the policy agenda and the public interest be defined in terms of the organized interests in society. In brief sketch, the working model of the interest group liberal is a vulgarized version of the pluralist model of modern political science. It assumes: (1) Organized interests are homogeneous and easy to define, sometimes monolithic. Any "duly elected" spokesman for any interest is taken as speaking in close approximation for each and every member.[10] (2) Organized interests pretty much fill up and adequately represent most of the sectors of our lives, so that one organized group can be found effectively answering and checking some other organized group as it seeks to prosecute its claims against society.[11] And (3) the role of government is one of ensuring access particularly to the most effectively organized, and of ratifying the agreements and adjustments worked out among the competing leaders and their claims. This last assumption is supposed to be a statement of how our democracy works and how it ought to work. Taken together, these assumptions constitute the Adam Smith "hidden hand" model applied to groups. Ironically, it is embraced most strongly by the very people most likely to reject the Smith model applied in its original form to firms in the market.

These assumptions are the basis of the new public philosophy. The policy behaviors of old-school liberals and conservatives, of Republicans and Democrats, so inconsistent with liberalism-conservatism criteria, are fully consistent with the criteria drawn from interest-group liberalism: *The most important difference between liberals and conservatives, Republicans and Democrats*—however they define them-

[9] The preceding two paragraphs were taken, with revision, from the Introductory Essay of my *Private Life and Public Order* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1967).

[10] For an excellent inquiry into this assumption and into the realities of the internal life of the interests, see: Grant McConnell, "The Spirit of Private Government," this REVIEW, 52 (1963), 754–770; see also Clark Kerr, *Unions and Union Leaders of Their Own Choosing* (Santa Barbara: Fund for the Republic, 1957); and S. M. Lipset *et al.*, *Union Democracy* (New York: Anchor, 1962). See also Arthur S. Miller, *Private Governments and the Constitution* (Santa Barbara: Fund for the Republic, 1959).

[11] It is assumed that "countervailing power" usually crops up somehow. Where it does not, government ought to help create it. See John K. Galbraith, *American Capitalism* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1952).

selves—*is to be found in the interest groups they identify with. Congressmen are guided in their votes, Presidents in their programs, and administrators in their discretion, by whatever organized interests they have taken for themselves as the most legitimate; and that is the measure of the legitimacy of demands.*

The assumptions of the model and the concluding behavioral proposition constitute, for better or worse, an important part of the working methodology of modern, empirical political science. However, quite another story with quite different consequences is how all of this became elevated from an hypothesis about political behavior to an ideology about how the democratic system ought to work and then became ultimately elevated to that ideology most widely shared among contemporary public men.

Interest-group liberalism: An intellectual history. The opening of the national government to positive action on a large scale was inevitably to have an impact upon political justification just as on political technique. However, the inventors of technique were less than inventive for justification of particular policies at particular times. Hansen, for instance, has observed that Keynes was no social reformer, nor had he any particular commitments to particular social ends.[12] Keynes helped discover the modern economic system and how to help it maintain itself, but his ideas and techniques could be used, and indeed have been used, to support many points of view. "Collective bargaining, trade unionism, minimum-wage laws, hours legislation, social security, a progressive tax system, slum clearance and housing, urban redevelopment and planning, education reform," Hansen observed of Keynes, "all these he accepted, but they were not among his preoccupations. In no sense could he be called the father of the welfare state."[13]

Nor was the doctrine of popular government and majority rule, which was so important in the victory of liberalism over conservatism, adequate guidance after the demise of liberalism-conservatism. If one reviews the New Deal period and thereafter he will see how little propensity Americans have had to use the majority rule justification. The reasons why are fairly apparent. Justification of positive government programs on the basis of popular rule required above all a proclamation of the supremacy of Congress. The abdication of Congress in the 1930's in the passage of the fundamental New Deal legislation could never have been justified in the name of popular government. With all due respect to Congressmen, little discernible effort was made to do so. Statutory and investigatory infringements on civil liberties during World War II and during the Cold War, plus the popular support of McCarthyism, produced further reluctance to fall back on Congress and majority rule as the fount of public policy wisdom. Many who wished to use this basis anyway sought support in the plebiscitary character of the Presidency. However, "presidential liberals" have had to blind themselves to many complications in the true basis of presidential authority and to the true—the bureaucratic—expression of presidential will.[14]

The very practices that made convincing use of popular rule doctrine impossible—delegation of power to administrators, interest representation, outright delegation of power to trade associations, and so on—were what made interest-group liberalism so attractive an alternative. And because the larger interest groups did claim large memberships, they could be taken virtually as popular rule in modern dress. Interest-group liberalism simply corresponded impressively well with the realities of power. Thus, it possessed a little of science and some of the trappings of popular rule. Political scientists, after all, were pioneers in insisting upon recognition of the group, as well as in helping to elevate the pressure-group system from power to virtue. Political scientists had for a long time argued that the group is the necessary variable in political analysis for breaking through the formalisms of government.[15] How-

[12] Alvin H. Hansen, *The American Economy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1957) pp. 152ff.

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 158–59. Keynes said ". . . the Class War will find me on the side of the educated bourgeoisie": quoted in *ibid.*, p. 158.

[14] No citations are necessary to emphasize the fact that presidential delegation and subdelegation to administrators is just as extensive as congressional. As to the popular basis of presidential authority, see Robert A. Dahl, *Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956); and Willmoore Kendall, "The Two Majorities," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 4 (1960), pp. 317–345.

[15] For pioneer expressions, see Arthur F. Bentley, *The Process of Government* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1908); and E. Pendleton Herring, *Group Representation Before Congress* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1929). More recent arguments of the same methodological sort are found in David Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951); and Earl Latham, *The Group Basis of Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952).

ever, there was inevitably an element of approval in their methodological argument, if only to counteract the kind of recognition of the group that Steffens and other progressives and Muckrakers were more than willing to accord. In 1929, Pendleton Herring concluded his inquiry with the argument that:

> [The national associations] represent a healthy democratic development. They rose in answer to certain needs. . . . They are part of our representative system. . . . These groups must be welcomed for what they are, and certain precautionary regulations worked out. The groups must be understood and their proper place in government allotted, if not by actual legislation, then by general public realization of their significance.[16]

Following World War II, one easily notes among political scientists the widespread acceptance of the methodology and, more importantly here, the normative position. Among political scientists the best expression of interest-group liberalism was probably that of Wilfred Binkley and Malcolm Moos. The fact that it was so prominent in their American government basic textbook suggests that it tended to reflect conventional wisdom among political scientists even in 1948. Binkley and Moos argued that the "basic concept for understanding the dynamics of government is the multi-group nature of modern society or the modern state."[17] Political reality could be grasped scientifically as a "parallelogram of forces" among groups, and the public interest is "determined and established" through the free competition of interest groups: "The necessary composing and compromising of their differences is the practical test of what constitutes the public interest."[18]

The fact that a doctrine has some support in the realities of power certainly helps to explain its appeal as a doctrine.[19] But there were also several strongly positive reasons for the emergence of this particular doctrine. The first, and once perhaps the only, is that it has helped flank the constitutional problems of federalism. Manifestations of the corporate state were once limited primarily to the Extension Service of the Department of Agriculture, with self-administration by the land grant colleges and the local farmers and commerce associations. Self-administration by organized groups was an attractive technique precisely because it could be justified as so decentralized and permissive as to be hardly federal at all.[20] Here began the ethical and conceptual mingling of the notion of organized private groups with the notions of "local government" and "self-government." Ultimately direct interest group participation in government became synonymous with self-government, first for reasons of strategy, then by belief that the two were indeed synonymous. As a propaganda strategy it eased acceptance in the courts, then among the locals who still believed the farmer was and should be independent. Success as strategy increased usage; usage helped elevate strategy to doctrine. The users began to believe in their own symbols.

A second positive appeal of interest-group liberalism is strongly related to the first. Interest-group liberalism helps solve a problem for the democratic politician in the modern state where the stakes are so high. This is the problem of enhanced conflict and how to avoid it. The politician's contribution to society is his skill in resolving conflict. However, direct confrontations are sought only by the zealous ideologues and "outsiders." The typical American politician displaces and defers and delegates conflict where possible; he squarely faces conflict only when he must. Interest-group liberalism offers a justification for keeping major combatants apart. It provides a theoretical basis for giving to each according to his claim, the price for which is a reduction of concern for what others are claiming. In other words, it transforms logrolling from necessary evil to greater good. This is the basis for the "consensus" so often claimed these days. It is also the basis for President Kennedy's faith that in our day ideology has given over to administration. It is inconceivable that so sophisticated a person as he could believe, for example, that his setting of guidelines for wage and price increases was a purely administrative act. Here,

[16] *Op. cit.*, p. 268.

[17] *A Grammar of American Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1950), p. 7.

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 8–9. In order to preserve value-free science, many pluralists ("group theorists") denied public interest altogether, arguing instead that there is a "totally inclusive interest" and that it is served by letting groups interact without knowing what it is. Cf. Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–51.

[19] For discussions of the extent to which group theory is a satisfactory statement of reality, see my "American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies and Political Theory," *World Politics*, 16 (1964), pp. 677–715, and the excellent essays cited therein.

[20] For more on the expansion and justification of these practices in agriculture see my "How the Farmers Get What They Want," *Reporter*, May 21, 1964, pp. 35ff.

in fact, is a policy that will never be "administered" in the ordinary sense of the word. The guidelines provide a basis for direct and regular policy-making between the President (or his agent) and the spokesmen for industry and the spokesmen for labor. This is a new phase of government relations with management and labor, and it is another step consistent with the interest-group liberal criterion of direct access.

The third positive appeal of interest-group liberalism is that it is a direct, even if pathological, response to the crisis of public authority. The practice of dealing only with organized claims in formulating policy, and of dealing exclusively through organized claims in implementing programs helps create the sense that power need not be power at all, nor control control. If sovereignty is parceled out among the groups, then who's out anything? As Max Ways of *Fortune* put it, government power, group power and individual power may go up simultaneously. *If* the groups to be controlled control the controls, *then* "to administer does not always mean to rule."[21] The inequality of power, ultimately the involvement of coercion in government decisions, is always a gnawing problem in a democratic culture. Rousseau's General Will stopped at the boundary of a Swiss canton. The myth of the group and the group will is becoming the answer to Rousseau in the big democracy.

President Eisenhower talked regularly about the desirability of business-government "partnerships," despite the misgivings in his farewell address about the "military-industrial complex." However, explicit and systematic expression of interest-group liberalism is much more the contribution of the Democrats. There is little reason to believe that one party believes more ardently than the other; but the best evidence can be found among the more articulate Democrats, especially in the words of two of the leading Democratic intellectuals, Professors John Kenneth Galbraith and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.[22] To Professor Galbraith: "Private economic power is held in check by the countervailing power of those who are subject to it. The first begets the second."[23] Concentrated economic power stimulates other business interests (in contrast to the Smithian consumer), which organize against it. This results in a natural tendency toward equilibrium. But Galbraith is not really writing a theoretical alternative to Adam Smith; he is writing a program of government action. For he admits to the limited existence of effective countervailing power and proposes that where it is absent or too weak, government policy should seek out and support or, where necessary, create the organizations capable of countervailing. Government thereby pursues the public interest and makes itself superfluous at the same time. This is a sure-fire, nearly scientific, guide to interest-group liberalism. Professor Schlesinger's views are summarized for us in the campaign tract he wrote in 1960. To Schlesinger, the essential difference between the Democratic and Republican parties is that the Democratic party is a truly multi-interest party in the grand tradition extending back to Federalist No. 10. In power, it offers multi-interest administration and therefore ought to be preferred over the Republican Party and:

> What is the essence of a multi-interest administration? It is surely that the leading interests in society are all represented in the interior processes of policy formation—which can be done only if members or advocates of these interests are included in key positions of government. . . .[24]

This theme Schlesinger repeated in his more serious and more recent work, *A Thousand Days*. Following his account of the 1962 confrontation of President Kennedy with the steel industry and the later decision to cut taxes and cast off for expansionary rather than stabilizing fiscal policy, Schlesinger concludes:

> The ideological debates of the past began to give way to a new agreement on the practicalities of managing a modern economy. There thus developed in the Kennedy years a national accord on economic policy—a new consensus which gave hope of harnessing government, business and labor in rational partnership for a steadily expanding American economy."[25]

Interest-group liberalism and public policies in the 1960's. A significant point in the entire argu-

[21] " 'Creative Federalism' and the Great Society," *Fortune*, January, 1966, p. 122.

[22] A third major intellectual of the Kennedy Administration was Professor Richard E. Neustadt. That he is a political scientist makes all the more interesting his stress upon the necessary independence of the Presidency rather than the desirability of presidential partnerships and countervailing power. See his *Presidential Power* (New York: Wiley, 1960).

[23] Galbraith, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

[24] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *Kennedy or Nixon—Does It Make Any Difference?* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), p. 43.

[25] Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days*, as reprinted in *Chicago Sun-Times*, January 23, 1966, Section 2, p. 3.

ment is that the Republicans would disagree with Schlesinger on the *facts* but not on the *basis* of his distinction. The Republican rejoinder would be, in effect, "Democratic Administrations are *not* more multi-interest than Republican." And, in my opinion, this would be almost the whole truth. This principle has been explicitly applied in the formulation of a large number of policies, especially since the return of the Democrats to power in 1961. That is, policy makers have in numerous new programs added elements of official group representation and have officially applied "participatory democracy" to the implementation as well as the formulation of law as part of the justification of their action. There are additional policies where evidence of the application of interest-group liberalism is clear even though not as consciously intended or as much a part of the record of self-praise.

President Kennedy provides an especially good starting point because his positions were clear and because justification was especially important to him. No attention need be paid to the elements of liberalism-conservatism in his program[26] but only to the consistency of his requests with interest-group liberalism. John Kennedy was bred to a politics of well-organized and autonomous units of power. Locally they were more likely ethnic, religious and neighborhood organizations, but they had to be reckoned with as powerful interest groups. The national party he set out to win in 1956 was also a congeries of autonomous factions and blocs; and it has been said that he succeeded by recreating the "New Deal coalition."

[26] By proper application of the old-school criteria, Kennedy was on balance conservative. Most of his programs belong to the right of center (on the Diagram, horizontal axis), and he did an amazing number of things that showed a preference for private sector activity (on the Diagram, vertical axis). Examples include his "actuarially sound" medicare, his investment tax credit and tax cut proposals, his preference for expansion of housing through investment incentives, his reluctance to ask for new civil rights legislation, his appreciation for governmental contracting and other executive powers to deal with civil rights, his opposition to "Powell Amendments" and parochial school aid in federal education legislation, his concerted effort to make agriculture controls work, his support for very permissive depressed areas legislation that would bail out needy businesses and industries while reducing needs or pressures of entrepreneurs to move to some other section of the country.

But there is a vast difference between pluralism inside political parties and legitimized pluralism built into government programs. The one does not necessarily follow from the other, unless leaders believe it is desirable. President Kennedy's proposals and rhetoric mark his belief in that desirability. Many of his most important proposals mark his very real contribution to the corporatizing of the government-group nexus in the United States.

The agriculture problem, high and early on the New Frontier agenda, was to be solved somewhat differently from all earlier attempts, and that difference is much to the point. At local levels, federal agriculture programs had always been corporative, with committees of local farm dignitaries applying the state and national standards to local conditions.[27] President Kennedy proposed simply to bring this pattern to the center and to have the farmers, represented by group leaders, *set* the standards as well as apply them. Essentially, this was NRA applied to agriculture.

There was no attempt to reinstitute an industrial NRA pattern, but there were, just the same, moves toward recognition of the organized side of industry in the "interior processes" of government. First, as earlier observed, by direct presidential act guidelines for profits and wages were set up. Notice was thereby served that henceforth "industrial policy" would be made by direct bargaining between President and each and every leader of an industrial sector. Quite separately, but along parallel industrial lines, this meant the same sort of bargaining between President and union leaders. It is beside the point to argue whether Kennedy or Johnson has been more lenient in applying the guidelines to the unions. It is even beside the point to argue whether this new technique of control means more government involvement and direction than alternative techniques. The point is that the pattern of control and the manner of its impact is basically corporativistic. "Partnership" is the measure of success.

Many other relations of government to industry have tended toward the same pattern in the 1960's, whether they come this way full-blown from President or emerge from Congress this way only at the end. COMSAT is a combination out of 1930's Italy and 1950's France. Like the Italian practice of "permanent receivership," COMSAT is a combine of kept private companies, sharing in stock and risk

[27] See for example, "How the Farmers Get What They Want," *op. cit.*

with the government. Like the many French public and mixed corporations, there is direct "interest representation" on the Board. The "public" stamp is placed on it by adding to the interest-laden Board three presidentially appointed members; but one of these is a representative of Big Labor and one a representative of Big Industry. By the end of 1966, there was already talk among the carriers (the communications industries) of forming a combine within the combine to regularize and stabilize losses suffered by any of them as a result of obsolescence and competition.

The Trade Expansion Act of 1962, for another example, was the first American tariff based upon broad categories of goods rather than single items. From the beginning, categorization of goods paralleled the lines of jurisdiction of the leading trade associations and organized farm commodities groups.[28] The semi-official role of trade associations was expected to increase and expand through those parts of the new law providing relief through subsidy for injuries proven to have been sustained by tariff cuts.

There were, of course, many Kennedy proposals that are economy-wide in intention, but even some of these have one peculiarity or another that distinguishes them less from the interest-group policies than first appearances suggest. The investment tax credit, for example, was industry-wide, but it involved a reduction rather than an enlargement of the governmental sphere. Appalachia involved a bold regional concept overwhelmingly broader than any organized groups; however, the strong veto power given the state governors allows for, and was expected to allow for, maximum return of group representation through the back door. Appalachia is more clearly a case of interest-group liberalism if we include, as we should, state and local government agencies as groups to be directly represented in implementation of policies. This becomes an important characteristic of "creative federalism." In Appalachia the governors in the region commit Federal funds to development plans formulated by state agencies, local agencies, and private groups.

During the Johnson Administration the doctrines and policies of interest-group liberalism have been elevated to new highs of usage and rationalization. It is coming of age by being provided with new and appropriate halo words. The most important is "creative federalism," about which President Johnson and his Great Society team have spoken frequently and enthusiastically. This and related terms—such as partnership, maximum feasible participation, and, above all, consensus—seem to be very sincerely felt by present government leaders. The sentiments are coming to be shared widely among non-government leaders and are at the bottom of the extraordinary business support Johnson received during his most active period of legislative creativity. Probably the most accurate and sympathetic analysis of creative federalism and the role it is playing in the Great Society has been provided by *Fortune Magazine*. As *Fortune* and many other observers would agree, creative federalism is not federalism. Federalism divides sovereignty between duly constituted levels of government. "Creative federalism" is a parceling of powers between the central government and *all* structures of power, governments and non-governments. In fact, little distinction is made between what is government and what is not. It is, according to the enthusiastic definition of *Fortune* writer Max Ways, "a relation, cooperative and competitive, between a limited central power and other powers that are essentially independent of it." The difference between federalism and "creative federalism" is no mere academic distinction. Creative federalism involves a "new way of organizing federal programs . . . [in which simultaneously] the power of states and local governments will increase; the power of private organizations, including businesses, will increase; the power of individuals will increase."[29]

In line with the new rationale, President Johnson and his Administration have expanded the degree to which private organizations and local authorities become endowed with national sovereignty. Corporativistic programs inherited from the New Deal have been strengthened in the degree to which they can share in the new, explicit rationale. This has been particularly noticeable in the power and natural resources field, where policies are now quite explicitly left to the determination of those participants who know the "local situation" best. It is quite at the center of Great Society expansions of existing programs. When still Assistant Secretary for Education, Francis Keppel described federal education policy this way: "To speak of 'federal aid' [to education] simply confuses the issue. It is more appropriate to speak of federal support to special purposes

[28] See Raymond Bauer *et al.*, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton, 1963), pp. 73ff.

[29] *Op. cit.*, p. 122.

. . . an investment made by a partner who has clearly in mind the investments of other partners—local, state and private."[30]

The most significant contribution of the Great Society to the growing ratio such corporativistic programs bear to the sum total of federal activity is the War on Poverty, particularly the community action program. To the old progressive the elimination of poverty was a passionate dream, to the socialist a philosophic and historic necessity. To the interest-group liberal, poverty is becoming just another status around which power centers ought to organize. If one hasn't organized, then organize it. In so organizing it, poverty is not eliminated, but inconsistency in the manner of government's relation to society is reduced. Organizing the poor, something that once was done only in the Threepenny Opera, helps legitimize the interest-group liberal's preference for dealing only with organized claims. The "Peachum factor" in public affairs is best personified in Sargent Shriver. In getting the War on Poverty under way Shriver was misunderstood in many matters, particularly on any insistence that the poor be represented in some mathematically exact way. But one aspect of the doctrine was clear all the time. This was (and is) that certain types of groups should always be involved some way. As he listed them they are: "governmental groups," philanthropic, religious, business, and labor groups, and "the poor."[31] The significance lies primarily in the equality of the listing. "Governmental groups" are simply one more type of participant.

Interest-group liberalism thus seems closer to being the established, operative ideology of the American elite than any other body of doctrine. The United States is far from 100 per cent a corporate state; but each administration, beginning with the New Deal revolution, has helped reduce the gap. And it is equally significant that few if any programs organized on the basis of direct interest representation or group self-administration have ever been eliminated. To the undoubted power of organized interests has now been added the belief in their virtue. There would always be delegation of sovereignty to interest groups in some proportion of the total body of governmental activities. The new context of justification simply means far more direct delegation than the realities of power, unsupported by legitimacy, would call for.

In sum, modern liberals are ambivalent about government. Government is obviously the most efficacious way of achieving good purposes in our age. But it is efficacious because it is involuntary; as one of the founders of modern social science put it, modern government possesses a monopoly of legal coercion in a society. To live with their ambivalence, modern policy makers have fallen into believing that public policy involves merely the identification of the problems toward which government ought to be aimed. It pretends, through "pluralism," "countervailing power," "creative federalism," "partnership," and "participatory democracy," that the unsentimental business of coercion is not involved and that the unsentimental decisions of how to employ coercion need not really be made at all. Stated in the extreme, the policies of interest-group liberalism are end-oriented. Few standards of implementation, if any, accompany delegations of power. The requirement of standards has been replaced by the requirement of participation. The requirement of law has been replaced by the requirement of contingency.

THE COSTS OF INTEREST-GROUP LIBERALISM

For all the political advantages interest-group liberals have in their ideology, there are high costs involved. Unfortunately, these costs are not strongly apparent at the time of the creation of a group-based program. As Wallace Sayre once observed, the gains of a change tend to be immediate, the costs tend to be cumulative. However, it takes no long-run patience or the spinning of fine webs to capture and assess the consequences of group-based policy solutions. Three major consequences are suggested and assessed here: (1) the atrophy of institutions of popular control; (2) the maintenance of old and creation of new structures of privilege; and (3) conservatism, in several senses of the word.

1. In his *The Public Philosophy*, Lippmann was rightfully concerned over the "derangement of power" whereby modern democracies tend first toward unchecked elective leadership and then toward drainage of public authority from elective leaders down into their constituencies. However, Lippmann erred if he thought of constituencies only as voting constituencies. Drainage has tended toward "support group constituencies," and with special consequence. Parceling out policy-making power to the most interested parties destroys political responsibility. A program split off with

[30] Quoted in *Congressional Quarterly*, Weekly Report, April 22, 1966, p. 833.

[31] Jules Witcover and Erwin Knoll, "Politics and the Poor: Shriver's Second Thoughts," *Reporter*, December 30, 1965, p. 24.

a special imperium to govern itself is not merely an administrative unit. It is a structure of power with impressive capacities to resist central political control.

Besides making conflict-of-interest a principle of government rather than a criminal act, participatory programs shut out the public. To be more precise, programs of this sort tend to cut out all that part of the mass that is not specifically organized around values strongly salient to the goals of the program. They shut out the public, first, at the most creative phase of policy making—the phase where the problem is first defined. Once problems are defined, alliances form accordingly and the outcome is both a policy and a reflection of superior power. If the definition is laid out by groups along lines of established group organization, there is always great difficulty for an amorphous public to be organized in any other terms. The public is shut out, secondly, at the phase of accountability. In programs in which group self-administration is legitimate, the administrators are accountable primarily to the groups, only secondarily to President or Congress as institutions. In brief, to the extent that organized interests legitimately control a program there is functional rather than substantive accountability. This means questions of equity, balance and equilibrium to the exclusion of questions of overall social policy and questions of whether or not the program should be maintanied or discontinued. It also means accountability to experts first and amateurs last; and an expert is a man trained and skilled in the mysteries and technologies of the program. These propositions are best illustrated by at least ten separate, self-governing systems (representing over 10 billion dollars per year in spending and loaning) in agriculture alone.[32] There are many other, although perhaps less dramatic, illustrations.

Finally, the public is shut out by tendencies toward conspiracy to shut the public out. One of the assumptions underlying direct group representation is that on the boards and in the staff and among the recognized outside consultants there will be regular countervailing and checks and balances. In Schattschneider's terms, this would be expected to expand the "scope of conflict." But there is nothing inevitable about that, and the safer assumption might well be the converse. One meaningful illustration, precisely because it is an absurd extreme, is found in the French system of interest representation. Maurice Bye reports that as the communist-controlled union, the CGT, intensified its participation in post-war government it was able to influence representatives of interests other than the employees. In a desperate effort to insure the separation and countervailing of interests on the boards, the government issued the decree that "each member of the board must be *independent of the interests he is not representing.*"[33] After a 1964 review of the politics of agriculture and of five major efforts of their post-war administrations to bring the ten separate self-governing agriculture systems under a minimum of central control, I was led to the following conclusion:

> These systems . . . have become practically insulated from the three central sources of democratic political responsibility. Thus, within the Executive branch, they are autonomous. Secretaries of Agriculture have tried and failed to consolidate or even to coordinate related programs. Within Congress, they are sufficiently powerful to be able to exercise an effective veto or create a stalemate. And they are almost totally removed from the view, not to mention the control, of the general public. (Throughout the 1950's, Victor Anfuso of Brooklyn was the only member of the House Agriculture Committee from a non-farm constituency.)[34]

This, I suggest, is a tendency in all similarly organized programs.

2. Programs following the principles of interest-group liberalism create privilege, and it is a type of privilege particularly hard to bear or combat because it is touched with the symbolism of the state. The large national interest groups that walk the terrains of national politics are already fairly tight structures of power. We need no more research to support Michels' iron tendency toward oligarchy in "private governments." Pluralists ease our problem of abiding the existence of organized interests by characterizing oligarchy as simply a negative name for organization: In combat people want and need to be organized and led. Another, somewhat less assuaging, assertion of pluralism is that the member approves the goals of the group or is free to leave it for another, or can turn his attention to one of his "overlapping memberships" in other groups. But however true these may be in pluralistic *politics*, everything changes when some of the groups are co-opted by the state in pluralistic *govern-*

[32] "How The Farmers Get What They Want," *op. cit.*

[33] Mario Einaudi *et al.*, *Nationalization in France and Italy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1955), pp. 100–101, emphasis added.

[34] "How The Farmers Get What They Want," *op. cit.*, p. 36.

ment. The American Farm Bureau Federation is no "voluntary association" insofar as it is a legitimate functionary in Extension work. NAHB, NAREB, NAACP or NAM are no ordinary lobbies after they become part of the "interior processes of policy formation."

The more clear and legitimized the representation of a group or its leaders in policy formation, the less voluntary is membership in that group and the more necessary is loyalty to its leadership for people who share the interests in question. And, the more clear the official practice of recognizing only organized interests, the more hierarchy is introduced into the society. It is a well-recognized and widely appreciated function of formal groups in modern societies to provide much of the necessary every-day social control. However, when the very thought processes behind public policy are geared toward those groups they are bound to take on much of the involuntary character of *public* control. The classic example outside agriculture is probably the Rivers and Harbors Congress, a private agency whose decisions in the screening of public works projects have almost the effect of law. And, as David Truman observes, arrangements where "one homogeneous group is directly or indirectly charged with the administration of a function . . . [in a] kind of situation that characterizes the occupational licensing boards and similar 'independent' agencies . . . have become increasingly familiar in regulatory situations in all levels of government."[35]

Even when the purpose of the program is the uplifting of the underprivileged, the administrative arrangement favored by interest-group liberalism tends toward creation of new privilege instead. Urban redevelopment programs based upon federal support of private plans do not necessarily, but do all too easily, become means by which the building industry regularizes itself. An FHA run essentially by the standards of the NAREB became a major escape route for the middle class to leave the city for suburbia rather than a means of providing housing for all. Urban redevelopment, operating for nearly two decades on a principle of local government and local developer specification of federal policy, has been used in the South (and elsewhere) as an effective instrument for Negro removal. Organizing councils for the poverty program have become first and foremost means of elevating individual spokesmen for the poor and of determining which churches and neighborhood organizations shall be the duly recognized channels of legitimate demand. Encouragement of organization among Negroes and the White and non-White poor is important. Early recognition of a few among many emerging leaders and organizations as legitimate administrators or policy-makers takes a serious risk of destroying the process itself (more on this directly below).

3. Government by and through interest groups is in impact conservative in almost every sense of that term. Part of its conservatism can be seen in another look at the two foregoing objections: Weakening of popular government and support of privilege are, in other words, two aspects of conservatism. It is beside the point to argue that these consequences are not intended. A third dimension of conservatism, stressed here separately, is the simple conservatism of resistance to change. David Truman, who has not been a strong critic of self-government by interest groups, has, all the same, identified a general tendency of established agency-group relationships to be "highly resistant to disturbance." He continues:

> New and expanded functions are easily accommodated, provided they develop and operate through existing channels of influence and do not tend to alter the relative importance of those influences. Disturbing changes are those that modify either the content or the relative strength of the component forces operating through an administrative agency. In the face of such changes, or the threat of them, the "old line" agency is highly inflexible.[36]

If this is already a tendency in a pluralistic system, then agency-group relationships must be all the more inflexible to the extent that the relationship is official and legitimate.

The war-on-poverty pattern, even in its early stages, provides a rich testing ground. I observed above that early official cooption of poverty leaders creates privilege before, and perhaps instead of, alleviating poverty. Another side of this war is the war the established welfare groups are waging against the emergence of the newly organizing social forces. Many reports are already remarking upon the opposition established welfare and church groups are putting up against the new groups. Such opposition led to abandonment of Syracuse's organize-the-poor project and the

[35] *Op. cit.*, p. 462. For a profound appreciation of the public power of private authorities in occupational licensing, see York Willbern, "Professionalization in State and Local Government: Too Little or Too Much?" *Public Administration Review*, Winter, 1954. See also Arthur S. Miller, *op. cit.*

[36] *Op. cit.*, pp. 467–468.

retreat of Sargent Shriver's Office of Economic Opportunity to "umbrella groups" sponsored by City Hall.[37] Old and established groups doing good works might naturally look fearfully upon the emergence of competing, perhaps hostile, groups. That is well and good—until their difference is one of "who shall be the government?" Conservatism then becomes necessary as a matter of survival.

The tendency toward the extreme conservatism of sharing legitimate power with private organizations is possibly stronger in programs more strictly economic. Adams and Gray reviewed figures on assignment of FM radio broadcasting licenses and found that as of 1955, 90 per cent of the FM stations were merely "little auxiliaries" of large AM networks. They also note that the same pattern was beginning to repeat itself in FCC licensing of UHF television channels.[38] The mythology may explain this as a case of "interest group power," but that begs the question. Whatever power was held by the networks was based largely on the commitment the FCC implied in the original grants of licenses. Having granted exclusive privileges to private groups in the public domain (in this case the original assignment of frequencies) without laying down practical conditions for perpetual public retention of the domain itself, the FCC had actually given over sovereignty. The companies acquired property rights and legally vested interests in the grant that interfere enormously with later efforts to affect the grant. Thus, any FCC attempt to expand the communications business through FM would deeply affect the positions and "property" of the established AM companies and networks. Issuing FM licenses to new organizations would have required an open assault on property as well as the established market relations. Leaving aside all other judgements of the practice, it is clearly conservative.[39] Granting of licenses and other privileges unconditionally, and limiting sovereignty by allowing the marketing of properties to be influenced by the possession of the privilege, are practices also to be found in oil, in water power, in the newer sources of power, in transportation, in the "parity" programs of agriculture.

Wherever such practices are found there will also be found strong resistance to change. Already the pattern is repeating itself in form and consequences in the policies regarding our newest resource, outer space. As earlier observed, the private members of COMSAT very early in the life of the new corporation made arrangements to protect themselves against the impact of new developments on old facilities. In addition to that, and more significantly here, the constituents of COMSAT have moved to exclude all other possible entrants and alternative ways of organizing the economics of space communication. In response to Ford Foundation's proposal for a separate satellite system for educational television, COMSAT officially moved to cut off any chance of a rival by (1) opposing Ford vigorously, (2) interpreting the statute and charter to be a grant of trust for the entire public interest in the field, (3) seeking a ruling to that effect from the FCC, (4) showing that stockholders in COMSAT and in the carrier members of COMSAT, such as A.T.&T., would be dealt an unfair blow, and (5) producing an alternative plan whereby the Ford system would be created within COMSAT, being underwritten by all the major carriers and "users" (i.e., the telephone and telegraph companies and the commercial networks).[40]

There are social and psychological mechanisms as well as economic and vested interests working against change. As programs are split off and allowed to establish self-governing relations with clientele groups, professional norms usually spring up, governing the proper ways of doing things. These rules-of-the-game heavily weight access and power in favor of the established interests, just as American parliamentary rules-of-the-game have always tended to make Congress a haven for classes in retreat. For example, as public health moved from a regulatory to a welfare concept, local health agencies put up impressive resistance against efforts to reorganize city and county health departments accordingly. Herbert Kaufman chronicles the vain forty-year reorganization effort in New York City.[41] An important psy-

[37] Witcover and Knoll, *op. cit.*

[38] Walter S. Adams and Horace Gray, *Monopoly in America* (New York: Macmillan, 1955), pp. 48–50.

[39] Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 44–46, and their discussion, from a different point of view, of the "abridgement of sovereignty by grants of privilege." See also Merle Fainsod *et al.*, *Government and the American Economy* (New York: Norton, 1959), pp. 400–404. They observe the same thing happening in television and for the same reasons.

[40] See accounts in *New York Times*, August 2 and August 29, 1966, and *Time Magazine*, August 12, 1966, p. 38.

[41] Herbert Kaufman, "The New York City Health Centers," Inter-university Case Program. Wallace Sayre and Herbert Kaufman in *Governing New York City* (New York: Russell Sage, 1960), Chapter XIX, generalize on this pattern. They

27368

chological mechanism working against change is one that can be found in criticisms of the electoral devices of proportional and occupational representation. PR tends to rigidify whatever social cleavages first provide the basis for PR, because PR encourages social interests to organize, then perpetuates them by allowing them to become "constituencies." This is all the more true as interests actually become not merely groups but parties represented by name and bloc in parliament.[42] Even in less formalized situations, legitimizing a group gives it the advantages of exposure and usage as well as direct power, access and privilege.

INTEREST-GROUP LIBERALISM AND HOW TO SURVIVE IT

Quite possibly all of these developments are part of some irresistible historical process. In that case policy-makers would never really have had any alternative when they created group-based programs. And in that case the ideology of interest-group liberalism simply reflects and rationalizes the realities of power. However, the best test of a deterministic hypothesis is whether real-world efforts to deny it fail. Thus, a consideration of remedies is worthwhile.

We might begin where Truman ended his extremely influential work on pluralistic America. After reviewing several possible "palliatives" Truman concludes essentially that the pluralistic political system is not doomed at all but, to the contrary, is self-corrective:

> To the extent that the kind of dynamic stability that permits gradual adaptation is a function of elements within the system itself, the key factors will not be new. The group process will proceed in the usual fashion. Whether it eventuates in disaster will depend in the future as in the past basically upon the effects of overlapping membership, particularly the vitality of membership in those potential groups based upon interests held widely throughout the society. The memberships are the means both of stability and of peaceful change. In the future as in the past, they will provide the answer to the ancient question: *quis custodiet ipsos custodes?* Guardianship will emerge out of the affiliations of the guardians.[43]

But it is self-corrective only if there is overlapping and confrontation among groups, and too many examples above suggest that (1) there is a strong tendency, supported by a great deal of conscious effort, to keep confrontation to a minimum and that (2) "membership in potential groups" is confined to values about the "rules-of-the-game" about which there is strong consensus in general but, due to their generality, extreme permissiveness in particular, short-run situations. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the conditions necessary for the self-corrective system necessarily exist. It is wrong to assume that social pluralism (which is an undeniable fact about America) produced *political* pluralism.

However, the important question is not whether Truman and others are wrong but whether the conditions necessary for their self-corrective system can be deliberately contrived. The effort here is to propose some such contrivances. Two introductory observations should be made about them. First, it is assumed that positive government is here to stay and expand. Thus, proposals for return to a principle of lesser government and for policies in the lower left-hand corner of the Diagram, while logical and perhaps desirable, are not acceptable. Second, it is assumed that *real* political pluralism is a desirable form of democracy and that it is a desirable democratic antidote to the "incorporated pluralism" which has been the object of criticism throughout this essay.

1. The first part of the remedy is attractive precisely because it is so obvious. This is to discredit interest-group liberalism as official ideology. Essentially, this is the effort of this paper. Unless we are locked in a predetermined secular trend, a change of ideology can affect the pattern of power just as the pattern of power can affect ideology. Certainly the egali-

---

refer to "islands of functional power" as the formal power structure of the city. Each island enjoys considerable autonomy, each is a system of administrators and their "satellite groups," each resists interactions with other islands. The big city is possibly in an advanced stage of what in this paper is observed as an important tendency at the national level. Because of the tragic stalemate in the cities, these pronounced city patterns might serve as a better warning than my illustrations drawn from national practices. See also Herbert Kaufman, *Politics and Policies in State and Local Governments* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), Chapter V.

[42] Cf. Carl Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1950), pp. 291–294. See also a classic critique of occupational representation by Paul H. Douglas, "Occupational versus Proportional Representation," *American Journal of Sociology*, (September, 1923); and David Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 525–526.

[43] *Op. cit.*, p. 535.

tarian ideology has affected the distribution of power in every country where it has had any currency at all. A change of ideology could keep to a minimum the number of programs that merely incorporate the forces responsible for passage. Some other ideology would provide a basis for resisting many of the most outrageous claims for patronage and privilege made by organized interests.

2. The second part of the remedy is institutional and also suggests the direction a new ideology ought to take. This is to push direct group access back one giant step in the political process, somehow to insulate administrative agencies from full group participation. This means restoration of the Federalist No. 10 ideology in which "factions" are necessary evils that require regulation, not accommodation. Madison defined faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, *adverse to the right of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.*" As a manifestation of the ideology prevalent today, it is worth noting that Truman quotes Madison's definition but ends his quote just before the parts I emphasized above.[44] That part of Madison's definition should be returned to full faith and credit, and the only way to do that and to be sure that it and the true self-regulatory character of pluralism can be institutionalized is *to keep group interests in constant confrontation with one another in Congress.* Once an agency is "depoliticized" or "made independent" by handing it over to its organized clientele, the number of "factions" is reduced from a competitive to an oligopolistic situation; competition lasts only until the remaining few groups learn each other's goals and each adjusts to the others. Lippmann is concerned for a "derangement of power" in which *governing* has been drained away from the executive to the assembly and to the electorate, and neither is qualified to govern. The American pattern would suggest another kind of derangement altogether, a derangement brought about by Congress's direct extension of its own principles of representation over into the executive.

Pushing group representation and "participatory democracy" back into Congress and away from the executive requires several relatively traditional steps. The first would be revival of a constitutional doctrine that is still valid but widely disregarded. This is the rule that the delegation of legislative power to administrative agencies must be accompanied by clear standards of implementation.[45] This involves revival of the rule of law to replace the rule of bargaining as a principle of administration. It does not involve reduction of the public sphere. It *is* likely to make more difficult the framing and passage of some programs; but one wonders why any program should be acceptable if its partisans cannot clearly state purpose and means. Revival of the rule of law would also tend to dispel much of the cynicism with which the most active citizen views public authority.

Another way to restore competition to groups and ultimately push them back to Congress is to foster a truly independent executive. Development of a real Senior Civil Service is vital to this in the way it would tend to develop a profession of public administration, as distinct from a profession of a particular technology and a career within a specific agency. The makings of a Senior Civil Service lie already within the grasp of the Civil Service Commission if it has the wit to perceive its opportunity in its Career Executive Roster and its Office of Career Development and its Executive Seminar Center. The independent Senior Civil Servant, who could be designed for weakness in agency loyalty, combined with the imposition of clearer standards and rules governing administrative discretion, together would almost necessarily centralize and formalize, without denying, group access to agencies. In turn this would almost necessarily throw more groups together, increase their competition, expand the scope of that competition, and ultimately require open, public settlement of their differences. This would throw groups back more frequently into Congress and would also increase presidential opportunity to control the bureaucracies. The legitimacy of these institutions would be further confirmed.

3. A third part of the remedy has to do with programs themselves, although the recommendation overlaps No. 2 in that it has much to do with institutional roles. This is to set a Jeffersonian absolute limit of from five to ten years

[44] *Op. cit.*, p. 4.

[45] This rule is made more interesting for the argument here because it was given new currency in the *Schechter Poultry* and *Panama Refining* cases, both of which involved the most extreme instance of delegation of sovereignty to groups, the NRA. For a recent expression, see Judge Henry J. Friendly's *The Federal Administrative Agencies* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), pp. 5ff.

on every enabling act. As the end approaches, established relations between agency and clientele are likely to be shaken by exposure and opposition. This is as important as the need for regular evaluation of the existence of the program itself and of whether it should be abolished, expanded or merged with some other program. There is a myth that programs are evaluated at least once a year through the normal appropriations process and that specialized appropriations and authorizations subcommittees review agency requests with a fine tooth comb. However, yearly evaluation, especially the appropriations process, gets at only the incremental and marginal aspects of most programs, rarely at the substance. Here is an example of the earlier distinction between functional and substantive accountability. The very cost-consciousness and detail that makes yearly review functionally rational is the basis of its weakness as a substantively rational process.

This proposal, like the proposal for a return to a rule of law, injects an element of inefficiency into the system. But our affluence is hardly worth the trouble if we cannot spend some of it on maintaining due process, pluralism and other system values. It also injects instability, but it is the very sort of instability that is supposed to make the pluralistic system work. It is amazing and distressing how many 1930's left-wing liberals have become 1960's interest-group liberals out of a concern for instability.

4. The fourth and final part of a reform program bears some resemblance to an old-line constitutional argument. Restoration of the *Schechter* and *Panama* requirement would tend to do more than strengthen the rule of law, enhance real political competition, and dispel political cynicism. It might also provide a basis for establishing some practical and functional limitations on the scope of federal power. That is to say, if an applicable and understandable set of general rules must accompany every federal program, then, except in some clear emergency, federal power could not extend to those objects for which no general rules are either practicable or desirable. Where regional or local variation is to be encouraged, State Government is really the proper unit. Argument for restoration of State Government is not based on mere antiquarian admiration of federalism or fear of national domination. It is an immensely practical argument. State Governments have been systematically weakened by Home Rule, by federal absorption of tax base and by federal-local relations. Yet the cities, even with federal help, have proven unable to cope because the problems have outgrown their boundaries. The State possesses all the powers of its cities plus the territorial containment of most of the new metropolitan realities. The State may be the only governmental unit capable of coping with contemporary problems. Unconditional rebates of federal revenues to the States and obedience to a rule of law may leave the way open for expansion of federal activities in which there is reasonable chance of success without loss of federal control and without loss of legitimacy.

No individual interest group can be expected to take fullest account of the consequences of its own claims. This is what Presidents and Congresses are for, and this is what will continue to be delegated away as long as the ideology of interest-group liberalism allows. In effect this means that restoring pluralism as an effective principle of democratic politics requires destroying it as a principle of government. If this is to be accomplished, reform must begin with the replacement of interest-group liberalism with some contemporary version of the rule of law. The program of reform must include at least: debate that centers upon the actual consequences of public policies and of their forms of implementation; a legislative process that regularly treats enabling legislation rather than revision; political brokers that have to deal in substantive as well as functional issues; and adaptation of public controls to local needs through choice of appropriate level of government rather than through delegation of the choice to the most interested parties.

THE CHILD'S ACQUISITION OF REGIME NORMS: POLITICAL EFFICACY*

DAVID EASTON
University of Chicago

AND

JACK DENNIS
University of Wisconsin

In its broadest conception, a political system is a means through which the wants of the members of a society are converted into binding decisions. To sustain a conversion process of this sort a society must provide a relatively stable context for political interaction, a set of ground rules for participating in all parts of the political process. We may describe this context variously as a constitutional order, a set of fundamental rules, or customary procedures for settling differences. But however this context is defined, it usually includes three elements: some minimal constraints on the general goals of its members, rules or norms governing behavior, and structures of authority through which the members of the system act in making and implementing political outputs. To these goals, norms and structures we may give the traditional name "political regime" or constitutional order in the broadest, nonlegal sense of the phrase.

We may hypothesize that if a political system is to persist, one of its major tasks is to provide for the input of at least a minimal level of support for a regime of some kind. A political system that proved unable to sustain a regime, that is, some relatively ordered and stable way of converting inputs into outputs, could not avoid collapsing.[1] Each time a dispute arose it would have to seek to agree on means for settling differences at the same time as it sought to bring about a settlement of the substance of the issue, a virtually impossible combination of tasks for a society to engage in continuously.

A major response mechanism through which political systems typically seek to avert any serious decline in the level of support for an existing regime is to be found in the processes of political socialization. Every society introduces its members to the political system very early in the life cycle. To the extent that the maturing members absorb and become attached to the overarching goals of the system and its basic norms and come to approve its structure of authority as legitimate, we can say that they are learning to contribute support to the regime.

This paper explores an early source of support for a fundamental norm of the American democratic regime. "Norms" we take to be expectations about the way people do or will behave. They may be embodied in laws or constitutional codes; they may be simply customary expectations founded in experience with the system. Through data on over 12,000 elementary-school children we are able to turn to an early stage of the life cycle—childhood between the ages of 7 and 13, a period almost totally neglected in the study of the political regime[2]—in order to discover the origins of attachment to one political norm, called political efficacy.

POLITICAL EFFICACY AS NORM, DISPOSITION AND BEHAVIOR

As a concept, political efficacy appears in three separate although by no means independent guises: as a norm, as a psychological disposition or feeling, and as a form of behavior. Failure to distinguish these three implications of the term has left considerable ambiguity about its theoretical status and utility. For

* Research from which this paper was drawn has been supported by a grant from the Office of Education under Cooperative Research Project 1078, Contract SAE 9004. The research design and collection of data were executed jointly by the principal co-investigators, David Easton and Robert D. Hess. The analysis of the political aspects of the data is the primary responsibility of David Easton and Jack Dennis. Jack Dennis is grateful for financial support during the analysis phase of this project from the Research and Development Center for Learning and Re-education at the University of Wisconsin.

[1] For a full extension of these remarks and for discussion of the difference between persistence of a regime, compared to a system as a whole, see D. Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), esp. chapters 12 and 17ff.

[2] Although in this paper we concentrate on a single norm, the research from which the analysis proceeds covers other critical norms of the American regime. For further details on the characteristics of our test population see footnote 8.

purposes of understanding the contribution of socialization processes to the input of support for this regime norm, it is vital to clarify the relationship among these three elements.

As a norm it refers to the timeless theme of democratic theory that members of a democratic regime ought to regard those who occupy positions of political authority as responsive agents and that the members themselves ought to be disposed to participate in the honors and offices of the system. The *norm* of political efficacy therefore embodies the expectation in democracies that members will feel able to act effectively in politics.

In recent years it has been the burden of considerable research to demonstrate that this democratic norm must entail a corresponding *set of dispositions*. If persons are to be able to live up to the norm and to bring their weight to bear effectively on the political process, we would hypothesize that they are more likely to be able to do so if they have become imbued with a sense of political efficacy.[3] Here efficacy identifies a disposition towards politics, a feeling of effectiveness and capacity in the political sphere.

As compared with the simple statement of the norm, political efficacy as a feeling has turned out to be a surprisingly complex phenomenon. It suggests a number of interwoven sentiments. To be efficacious it would appear that a person must sense his competency at the level of his political self-identity. He must construct a psychic map of the political world with strong lines of force running from himself to the places of officialdom. He must come to believe that when he speaks other political actors will listen. He must also so internalize the expectation of competence that his political self-confidence is not easily eroded by what he will take to be the mistaken indifference which the political process frequently exhibits to his desires. The psychological counterpart to the basic regime rule, involving as it will the mutual expectations of the participating member and the responsive authorities, is therefore a firm conviction by the individual that he is in fact politically effective.

The final element embraced by the term applies to the actual *conduct of a person*. He may or may not act efficaciously. Insofar as he is in fact able to influence the course of events and take a hand in shaping his political destiny, he has demonstrated an observable capacity to behave effectively, regardless of whether he is aware of a principle of political efficacy or has a sense of being efficacious. Because we are dealing with children it is appropriate to set aside this third implication of the term and confine our analysis to the first two.

In distinguishing between political efficacy as a norm and as a disposition or state of feeling, we open up the possibility of using two alternative ways for assessing the input of support for the norm itself. On the one hand, through the standard techniques of attitude testing, we might explore the extent to which members of the American political system are willing to express verbal approval of the norm, explicitly stated. If this procedure were adopted we might expect to discover a high level of consensus if only because the norm accords with stereotyped patriotic rhetoric about the expected role of the ordinary person in a democratic regime.

We were precluded from adopting this procedure by the fact that our respondents were children, not adults. Typically, if we ask children whether they should be able to behave in a certain way, they will respond in the affirmative if in fact that is the way they do behave. Expectations and practice are often undifferentiated. Thus a young child is not likely to respond differently whether he is asked: *Should* ordinary people have a say in what the government does, or *do* ordinary people have such a say. This is particularly likely to be true in areas remote from the concerns and awareness of the child, as in the political sphere. We could not expect to find many children, therefore, who could make the intellectual distinction between the expectation that people should be able to master their political environment and a judgment as to whether people do in fact feel they are politically potent. The responses to items tapping both these opinions would be so highly correlated as to be useless.

However, the fact that, in children, norms and sentiments are so closely interwoven that we could not hope to distinguish them empirically can be put to good use. Insofar as children can be brought to provide us with some clue about the state of their feelings in the matter of efficacy, it will provide us with a reliable if indirect measure of their attitudes towards the norm itself. To the extent that we are able to discover the level of their sense of efficacy we will have an important indication of whether they feel that members of the system should expect to be able to influence the course of political life as it affects them.

We can assume, therefore, that, for children, acquisition of sentiments corresponding to the norm will usually represent psychic incorpora-

[3] A. Campbell, G. Gurin and W. E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954), p. 190.

tion and approval of that ground rule of the regime. This enables us to interpret the presence of a feeling of political efficacy as an attitudinal indicator of confidence in and support for efficacy as a norm in the American democratic regime. In this sense we shall accept the degree to which a child expresses a feeling of efficacy as an index of the extent to which he adheres to the norm.[4]

[4] Our interest in the sense of efficacy is clearly and substantially different from concerns that have prevailed in the vast and still growing literature on the subject. For the most part this feeling about politics has been connected with the nature and extent of varying kinds of political participation and involvement, feelings of alienation, anomie and the like. This has reflected the dominant and restrictive interest of political research with allocative problems, the way in which policy is made or put into effect. It has tended to ignore systems persistence concerns, a subject of central theoretical significance. For this see D. Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1965); *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. The literature on political efficacy and its correlates is vast. See for example: G. A. Almond and S. Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); R. E. Agger, M. N. Goldstein and S. A. Pearl, "Political Cynicism: Measurement and Meaning," *Journal of Politics*, XIII (1961), 477–506; B. Berelson, P. F. Lazarsfeld and W. N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); A. Campbell, G. Gurin and W. E. Miller, *op. cit.;* A. Campbell, P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller and D. E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960); A. Campbell, "The Passive Citizen," *Acta Sociologica*, VI (fasc. 1–2), 9–21; R. A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); E. Douvan and A. M. Walker, "The Sense of Effectiveness in Public Affairs," *Psychological Monographs*, 70 (1956) #32; E. Douvan, "The Sense of Effectiveness and Response to Public Issues," *Journal of Psychology*, 47 (1958), 111–126; S. J. Eldersveld, "Experimental Propaganda Techniques and Voting Behavior," *The American Political Science Review*, L (1956), 154–165; H. Eulau, *Class and Party in the Eisenhower Years* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); C. D. Farris, "Authoritarianism as a Political Variable," *Journal of Politics*, XVIII (1956), 61–82; C. D. Farris, "Selected Attitudes on Foreign Affairs as Correlates of Authoritarianism and Political Anomie," *Journal of Politics*, 22 (1960), 50–67; J. E. Horton and W. Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXVII (1962), 485–493; M. Janowitz and D. Marvick, *Competitive Pressure and Democratic Consent* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Bureau of Government, 1956); V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961); A. Kornhauser, H. L. Sheppard and A. J. Mayer, *When Labor Votes: A Study of Auto Workers* (New York: University Books, 1956); R. E. Lane, "Political Personality and Electoral Choice," *The American Political Science Review*, XLIX (1955), 173–190; *Political Life* (Glencoe: Free Press of Glencoe, 1959); *Political Ideology* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1962); M. R. Levin, *The Alienated Voter: Politics in Boston* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960); E. Litt, "Political Cynicism and Political Futility," *Journal of Politics*, XXV (1963), 312–323; H. McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *The American Political Science Review*, LVIII (1964), 361–382; H. McClosky and J. H. Schaar, "Psychological Dimensions of Anomy," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (1965), 14–40; L. W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965); P. Mussen and A. Wyszyinski, "Political Personality and Political Participation," *Human Relations*, 5 (1952), 65–82; D. Riesman and N. Glazer, "Criteria for Political Apathy" in A. W. Gouldner (ed.), *Studies in Leadership* (New York: Harper, 1950), esp. 540–547; M. Rosenberg, "The Meaning of Politics in Mass Society", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 15 (1951), 5–15; "Some Determinants of Political Apathy," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 18 (1954), 349–366; "Misanthropy and Political Ideology," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (1956), 690–695.

DEVELOPMENT OF A SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY AND ITS MEASUREMENT

Young children, until quite recently, have been excluded from the sphere of serious political research. They play no manifest or active part in political processes in the American system, adults consider politics to be an arena of interest peculiarly appropriate to themselves, and they have felt that political conflict may indeed be too sordid a tale to bring wittingly before the tender minds of the young. In addition, the child's normal interest in politics in competition with other activities is extremely low.

But in spite of barriers such as these that prevent the child from reaching over into the political sphere, our research reveals that children gradually do acquire an unexpectedly wide range of attitudes and feelings about various aspects of political life. Indeed, it is transparent that if this were not so, sufficient support could hardly be mobilized for major aspects of the political system. By the time

that members of the system have reached the degree of social maturity necessary for full participation in the political life of a democratic regime it would be far too late to begin to expose them to the orientations essential for any kind of meaningful involvement. From this perspective it is not really surprising to find that even as subtle and complex a sentiment as that of political efficacy has a tap root that reaches down into the very early part of the life cycle.

Meaning of political efficacy

Before we can say when and in what degree feelings of political efficacy are acquired, if at all, we need to clarify the kinds of sentiments included in the idea. Beyond that we will also have to show that in spite of the complexity of the attitudes involved, children do in fact know enough about these matters to be able to express an opinion on them, even during what has wrongly been presumed to be the political void of childhood.

To maintain the continuity and cumulative nature of research, we have followed the description of this sentiment first ventured by the Survey Research Center and reported in *The Voter Decides*, with some necessary modifications. As suggested in this volume,

> Sense of political efficacy may be defined as the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process, i.e., that it is worthwhile to perform one's civic duties. It is the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change.[5]

To measure political efficacy, the authors employed five items calling for a simple "agree" or "disagree."

1. I don't think public officials care much what people like me think.
2. The way people vote is the main thing that decides how things are run in this country.
3. Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things.
4. People like me don't have any say about what the government does.
5. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.[6]

To investigate the child's development of political efficacy, we adapted the S.R.C. questions and added a number of our own in an attempt to form an index. We were not quite ready to accept a priori the view that this attitude complex is unidimensional. Thus we analyzed it initially to unravel its conceptual elements. We have found at least five closely related but separable ideas to be implied.

The first involves a feeling that the government or authorities are responsive to the desires of individuals like the respondent. Here the S.R.C.'s first item ("I don't think public officials care much what people like me think") is the clearest example. This reports the perception by ego that alter (the authorities) is *responsive* to him. Alter is, if not necessarily benign, at least aware of ego's existence and responsively so.

Second, there is the reverse side of the relationship, a feeling that ego is positively and *autonomously* able to affect the course of government, as expressed in items 2 and 4 above. The individual has the capacity to act with an impact upon the political process; therefore civil action is worthwhile and social change is possible. In this element of the feeling, the member of the system does not depend upon the responsiveness of the authorities but rather upon his own inherent powers. It is not simply a case of alter being responsive to ego (for whatever reason), but a case of ego being able to affect alter.

The third closely associated idea is that of the *comprehensibility* of alter to ego, some knowledge about "ruling and being ruled." To be able to comprehend political processes is a highly important part and condition of the sentiment of being an effective participant. In item 5 above we have an expression of this feature of political efficacy. Ego is or is not able to understand what alter is like, to put himself in alter's shoes, and to know what alter does. In part, this is an expression of the psychic distance of ego from alter; in part it reflects a degree of general competence and possession of the means or requisite knowledge to affect alter. Comprehensibility constitutes therefore a third element analytically distinct from the two connected ideas that the individual is an autonomous political actor and that officials are responsive to his demands. All three are contained in the S.R.C. questions.

Two further ideas can plausibly be con-

[5] *Op. cit.*, p. 187.

[6] *Ibid.*, pp. 187–188. "Disagree" responses to items 1, 3, 4, and 5, and an "agree" response to item 2 were coded as "efficacious". The authors combined these items, exclusive of item 2, which was thought ambiguous, by means of Guttman scale analysis in order to produce scale types. Item 2 happens to be the only item running in a positive direction. Thus the resulting scale may be subject to acquiescence response set.

sidered to constitute empirical elements of this attitude complex. One is suggested by the remaining question, "Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things." Here the basic theme is that the means available to the individual either are or are not limited. We can, of course, conceive of a person who is highly efficacious (on the other items) agreeing to this statement, so that some ambiguity is present. The respondent who agrees but is nevertheless efficacious may do so because he sees the real but singular power of the people in the vote. He believes that voting constitutes the only effective monopoly of legitimate force by ordinary people in the political system; but he may conceive that the effects of this power are quite extensive.

A fifth possible element, and one we would add to the S.R.C. assumptions, is the idea of general inevitability or intractability of government. It could be that both the individual member and the officials are perceived to be caught up in a predestined, unalterable pattern of events from which no escape is possible.[7]

What we have said, then, is that we can analytically distinguish a number of elements which might serve as part of the meaning of political efficacy: a sense of the direct political potency of the individual; a belief in the responsiveness of the government to the desires of individuals; the idea of the comprehensibility of government; the availability of adequate means of influence; and a general resistance to fatalism about the tractability of government to anyone, ruler or ruled.


Crystallization of political efficacy

The very complexity and multiplicity of sub-dimensions included in the feeling of political efficacy would seem to militate against any expectation that we could find it in young children, especially as early as 7 and 8 years of age. Before it was possible to probe the nature of the distribution of this feeling among our group of children, we had to assure ourselves that they are likely to have and experience these sentiments, a type hitherto associated only with adults. Furthermore, if they do, we had to discover the age at which we could reasonably anticipate this attitude would take shape and the degree to which it was continuous through childhood. At what age could we say that political efficacy crystallizes as a stable sentiment?

In line with our analysis of the meanings congealed in the idea of political efficacy, we tested eight questionnaire items over our total group of 12,052 children to see whether we would elicit the five major elements distinguished above. These items also represented, in slightly modified form, the S.R.C. questions:[8]

1. Voting is the only way that people like my mother and father can have any say about how the government runs things.
2. Sometimes I can't understand what goes on in the government.
3. What happens in the government will happen no matter what people do. It is like the weather, there is nothing people can do about it.
4. There are some big powerful men in the government who are running the whole thing and they do not care about us ordinary people.
5. My family doesn't have any say about what the government does.
6. I don't think people in the government care much what people like my family think.
7. Citizens don't have a chance to say what they think about running the government.
8. How much do these people *help decide which laws are made for our country:* Very much, Some, Very Little, or Not at all? Put an X for each person or group of people listed below.

For the first seven items, respondents checked one of the options presented in A below. B was used for the eighth item.



[7] Cf. L. W. Pye and S. Verba (eds.), *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 522.

[8] The eight items were scattered through our eight cities' "Citizenship Attitudes #9" questionnaire which was administered to 12,052 pur-

Included with these items in the questionnaire were many others concerned with the domain of participant orientations and political commitment. Among them were items having to do with partisan commitment, political interest, activity, political issue sensitivity and national community identification. We intercorrelated all these items, using tetrachoric correlation, after we had dichotomized each item. We then performed at each grade level (3–8), taken separately, a principal axes factor analysis of the r_t matrices and a varimax orthogonal rotation of the resulting principal components using as a minimum criterion for rotation an eigenvalue of 1.0.[9] This analysis allowed us to probe related political participant and commitment attitudinal dimensions in children. These dimensions in general were highly consistent and distinct across the grades for our respondents. Inasmuch as this analysis is quite voluminous, we present here only the

posively selected white, public school children, both middle class and working class in origin, in eight large metropolitan areas (two of each of the four major regions of the U.S.). The questionnaire was administered to the children in their regular classrooms in late 1961 and early 1962. These items were located as follows: 1. p. 16 #72, 2. p. 16 #74, 3. p. 17 #18, 4. p. 19 #29, 5. p. 19 #31, 6. p. 22 #43, 7. p. 22 #45, 8. p. 30 #27. Question 8 was part of a series: p. (#22–29).

[9] The computations were performed at the University of Chicago on an IBM 7094 using a variable N tetrachoric correlation routine.

TABLE 1. THE POLITICAL EFFICACY COMPONENT IN GRADES 3–8*

	Grade					
	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. "What happens in the government will happen no matter what people do. It is like the weather, there is nothing people can do about it."	.37	.44	.66	.69	.69	.59
2. "There are some big, powerful men in the government who are running the whole thing and they do not care about us ordinary people."	.74	.73	.69	.70	.76	.73
3. "My family doesn't have any say about what the government does."	.71	.67	.72	.73	.72	.70
4. "I don't think people in the government care much about what people like my family think."	.73	.74	.79	.76	.75	.76
5. "Citizens don't have a chance to say what they think about running the government."	.65	.69	.78	.80	.70	.71
Other Items with Factor Weights above .30						
6. "If the Democrats and Republicans disagreed on important things, it would be bad (or good) for the country."	—	−.31	—	—	—	—
7. "How much does the average person help decide which laws are made for our country?"	—	—	—	—	—	.33
8. "Voting is the only way that people like my mother and father can have any say about how the government runs things."	—	—	—	.32	.34	—
Percent of communality over all components	6.1	8.4	12.2	12.6	11.5	13.0
Percent of communality over rotated components	9.5	14.1	20.1	20.9	18.9	21.0

* Rotated factor weights $\geq .30$.

one portion (and a summary of that) having to do with the dimension we have labelled "sense of political efficacy." In Table 1 appear the rotated factor weights of items correlated with this component at each grade, at the .30 level or above.[10]

The content of the four items which load highest at all grade levels pertains to the responsiveness of officials (items 2 and 4) and to the autonomous power of ordinary people (items 3 and 5). These are the elements evidently at the heart of the early learning of the sense of political efficacy and they are from the beginning closely inter-connected orientations. By the middle of this age span they also become bound up with an associated element, the (lack of) inevitability of government (item 1).

Of the eight items originally devised as measures of political efficacy, seven at some point do load on the component as defined at every grade by the five best items. The item "Voting is the only way . . ." loads, if low, at grades 6 and 7 at least. "The average person helps make the laws of our country" item loads low at grade 8. The item which is not weighted at the .30 level or above on this compenent has to do with *comprehensibility* (item 2, p. 29 above), and this may be an artifact of our measure. But it may also simply relate to the fact that the government *is* incomprehensible sometimes to every child, even to those who may otherwise have absorbed into their consciousness the regime norm and who correspondingly feel politically efficacious.

One might be tempted to argue that the five high-loading items are associated simply because of response set. Although we cannot discount this possibility entirely, we have tried to guard against it in a number of ways. We stated these questions negatively for the most part thus making it harder for children who will agree to almost anything that "sounds" right. We also varied the format of the intervening items and spread the efficacy items throughout the questionnaire, as a further measure to guard against response set. More compelling, however, is the fact that an item with the same format which has a priori to do with a sense of political efficacy (the incomprehensibility item) in effect does not load on the "political efficacy" component. This suggests that children *are* differentiating the meanings of the items and not simply responding in a set fashion. In addition, other items running the same way do not correlate with this factor nor do items running the other way (except the one partisanship item) load negatively. Of course, as better measures of these attitudes are developed, we expect that a better understanding of response-set factors will result.

[10] In error, we included two of our independent variables, reading achievement and I.Q., among the items used for this series of factor analyses. It turns out that these two measures of intellectual ability "load" on this component at grades 5, 6, and 8 (but not at grades 3, 4, and 7). The loadings of these two variables were as follows: reading achievement, .50, .50 and .37 at grades 5, 6, and 8 respectively; I.Q., .37, .41, and .32 at grades 5, 6, and 8 respectively. These have been omitted from Table 1.

Summary

The most important conclusion emerging from our principal component analysis is that by grade 3 children have already begun to form an attitude, as revealed in the five high-loading items, which we could call a sense of political efficacy. This basic orientation is likely to become crystallized early in the life of the individual and to be maintained at least through these grades. This does not say, of course, that the third-grade child has developed a *high* sense of political efficacy, nor does it assert that any particular proportion of them experience this sentiment at any level of intensity. It only says that an attitude structure has begun to take shape among the children in their early years.

This development apparently does not depend upon the child's ability to understand the government and to interpret the citizen's role within it. This understanding in any full sense comes later. Nor does this general political attitude depend upon the state of the child's information—scarce and confused as it is—even though cognitive awareness may have important effects upon the later course of efficacy. It would appear that this development is an outgrowth of a general understanding which pervades the child's early environment. For whatever reason, young children in our society begin to develop this attitude by third grade.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE MEASURE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY

It would be going too far to suggest that in measuring political efficacy in the child with items that resemble those used for adults, this orientation has exactly the same meaning for children. The situation is considerably more complex than that and it testifies to the extreme caution necessary in speaking about any kind of political attitudes and activities among children. At most we have here a projective measure; from the way we discover the child to think about adults, we infer something about the probable state of his own emergent feelings.

On scrutinizing the five index items—those

that load highest—we see that we would not be justified in construing them to refer directly either to the child respondent or, projectively, to other children. Rather, they ask the child to make judgments about adults. Thus items 1 and 2 speak vaguely about "ordinary people." Interviews with children of this age group indicated that they are likely to think of these people as adults, particularly when discussion occurs in a political context. Items 3, 4, and 5 inquire about the relationship between government and the child's family or citizens and, in both cases again, unless the child is directed to think otherwise, adults are evoked by the statements.

The reason for pointing the child's attention to efficacy among adults was simple but compelling. Interviews gave us few grounds for believing that we could sensibly expect children to see themselves as having power over such awesome figures as the President, Congress, or the Supreme Court—some of the first concrete political objects to appear on their cognitive screens.[11] It was realistic only to try to get the child to project whatever nascent attitudes he might have onto adults. We are confronted, therefore, with interpreting the meaning of this projective device for eliciting information about the child's own attitudes toward political efficacy, as a sentiment and as a norm.

Although it would be easy to suggest that his opinions on the extent to which adults seem to him to feel efficacious, as measured by our index items, are accurate projections of his own sense of efficacy, this would be putting the matter too bluntly and too sanguinely. It is preferable to begin by taking the child's responses at their face value and to attempt to arrive at a more modest assessment of their significance.

We do not need to interpret the child's perceptions as an indication that even though he is projecting his own feelings onto adults, the items must therefore indirectly measure a developed sense of political efficacy in himself. It would not seem reasonable to expect a child, by age 13 or 14, to develop the fully formed feelings in this area that we find in adults. His political experiences would appear to be too limited. It is more reasonable to interpret the child's responses as an indication that he is learning to think about adults and politics in a certain way. If the child is to become socialized to political norms, it is vital that he learn how to think of adults with respect to their potency in the political sphere. It is this factor that is initially suggested by our index.

But the fact that the child can think of adults in these terms is only half the story. What is even more revealing for our purposes is that it opens up the possibility that, as he learns from adults and patterns himself after them, the child will even begin to think of himself in similar terms as he learns about the political sphere. In this sense only does the index become a projective device to obtain some hint of how the child himself may be learning to feel about his relationship to control over the political sphere.

We can therefore interpret the attitudinal component represented in the index items only as a first but critical step in the child's acquisition of an orientation to political efficacy *as it relates to himself*. He is building up an emotional frame of reference or loose attitudinal structure through which he has come to think about and view expected relationships between adult members of the system and the authorities. Although in the process of norm and attitude crystallization he has not reached a point where he himself necessarily has fully acquired either a norm or sense of efficacy, his capacity to think of adults in these terms represents a vital preparatory stage in his general political socialization. At some point, perhaps towards late adolescence, he may well begin to think of himself as possessing feelings about his capacity to exercise effective control over government.[12]

The level of the child's sense of political efficacy

Now that we have identified this dimension as having empirical reality in these early years, a score can be assigned to each respondent in order to estimate the distribution of feelings, high or low, on political efficacy at various

[11] See our earlier report, "The Child's Image of Government," in R. Sigel (ed.), "Political Socialization: Its Role in the Political Process," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 361 (1965), pp. 40–57.

[12] We are brought to such a cautious and somewhat intricate interpretation because here we are examining a set of attitudes and cognitions still in process of formation rather than in the full-fledged state usually encountered and tested among adults. With children we need to revise our conception of survey research and expect to handle materials much less tractable, in part because they are less well-defined and certainly less stable. Political orientations in process of formation are less easily investigated with instruments designed to detect and measure developed ones. But an exciting aspect of our data is that in spite of this we have been able to discover in children a structure of attitudes towards efficacy that shows a persistent identity as they move from third through eighth grade.

TABLE 2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY IN GRADES 3–8

Grade	Low Efficacy	Medium Efficacy	High Efficacy	Total %	Mean	N Scored*	N not Scored	% not scored†
3	56%	28%	16%	100	8.0	1244	433	26%
4	55	27	18	100	8.4	1427	321	18
5	35	29	36	100	10.0	1622	180	10
6	29	27	44	100	10.6	1602	146	8
7	23	29	48	100	11.1	1624	98	6
8	17	29	54	100	11.6	1615	79	5

* Used as a base for percentages.

† Percent not scored is of the total N at each grade level.

grade levels and for various subgroups.[13] On computing the proportions of children scoring high, medium or low in sense of political efficacy, we find a substantial shift over grades 3–8, as shown in Table 2.

A marked change occurs in these years in the degree of the child's sense of political efficacy. In fact, we see a change consisting of two parts: (1) An increasing number of children at each succeeding grade level is willing to venture an answer other than "I don't know" to the items which compose the index. Thus we can infer that the child is likely to have more and more of an attitudinal basis for responding to these questions the older he becomes. It is noteworthy that only around 5 per cent were not scorable by grade 8 whereas about 26 per cent had been unscorable at grade 3. (2) The shift for those expressing opinions on these questions is distinctly in the direction of a development of a higher sense of political efficacy in these years. Only about 16 per cent of the grade-3 children are high in political efficacy on our index, but about 54 per cent of grade-8 children could be so classified. Correspondingly, those classified as having a low sense of political efficacy show a drop from 56 per cent to 17 per cent over the grades.

[13] Our procedure in scoring was to cluster-score the five highest-loading items, weighting each item equally and giving the child a score from 1 to 16. The precise scoring procedure was to add up the scores on each of the items, which could range from 1 to 4 (eliminating the middle or "don't know" option). For children who answered three of the five questions other than "don't know" we multiplied his three-item score by 5/3. A similar procedure was used for children answering four questions other than "don't know" (i.e., multiplying by 5/4). Children who failed to answer at least three of the five items were not scored. Scores ranged from 5 to 20. Final scores, after subtracting 4, ranged from 1 to 16.

The child comes, therefore, both to an awareness of the role of the ordinary individual in the political process and possibly even to some emergent sense of his own mastery of the political world as well. This is not to say that he sees himself as synonymous with the Leviathan of the state. Yet he begins to carve out a small piece of political authority for himself—at his own level of consciousness. He is still far away from any actual role that he normally would have in the political process. Even so he begins to feel his political power when it still involves a high degree of projection to those around him and to his future role as an adult member of the system.[14]

[14] Our findings that this norm appears relatively early in childhood and that there is a fairly rapid growth of positive feeling in relation to it suggest that what several other observers have speculatively proposed, with less direct evidence, is true. Lane, for example, noted in *Political Life* (p. 151) that the S.R.C. data in *The Voter Decides* show a steady distribution of political efficacy over the (adult) age span to the middle fifties. From this he conjectured that "it appears that the standard of influence, then, is established relatively early—and is not the product of occupational experience so much as of the family and strata where one is reared, plus the personality support which such an attitude implies." The authors of *The Voter Decides* (p. 187) themselves refer to political efficacy as a "broader and more enduring" political value and attitude. In *The American Voter* the authors went even further when they argued that "variables of this sort, in contrast to measures of involvement in the current election, may be conceived as lying at a relatively 'deep' level in any hierarchy of dispositions. That is, they represent highly generalized orientations toward the world of politics and could be expected to remain rather stable over a period of time. In this sense they are approaching 'personality' status" (p. 516). This statement suggests that the disposition is likely to

GROUP VARIATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL EFFICACY

What is there in the processes through which the child becomes socialized in relation to a regime that helps him to acquire these emergent feelings about political efficacy? We may find that among adults the sense of control over political processes is related to such matters as whether their party has consistently won or lost, or whether they have themselves been successful in any attempt to influence public officials or politicians.[15] But children have no such direct experiences. The influences contributing to their reflected feelings about political efficacy must come from other sources.

Due to the limitations of large-scale survey research and the exploratory nature of our inquiry, we did not find it possible to follow up many conceivable lines of explanation. But it is clear that there are three major directions from which influences might impinge on the general political socialization of the child. First, as he matures he will undoubtedly develop certain personality characteristics relating to his general sense of effectiveness in mastering and manipulating his social environment. We might expect that this would have a substantial impact on whether he would attribute like qualities to relevant adults and the rate at which he would absorb political efficacy norms. Our data do not bear frontally on this dimension of the problem. Adequate measures of personality in children, applicable to survey research, do not exist. But one significant variable influencing individual exposure to politics, and possibly related to some aspects of personality could be readily obtained, namely, I.Q.; and it proved to be a significant predictor of attitudes.

Second, as in other areas of socialization, undoubtedly the major sources from which a child draws his political attitudes and convictions are those persons and institutions in his environment that are capable of transmitting to him explicit or subtly implicit messages about the political sphere. Parents, family, schools, mass media, peers and the like are agents of socialization. For reasons related to the index and the pioneer nature of our research we had to forego a detailed inquiry into the operations of these determinants, important as they undoubtedly are.

But third, it is possible to obtain some gross and aggregate measure of the direction in which these agencies carry the socialization of children by examining differences of socialization associated with the particular social class and sex roles which the child performs. Family, schools, and peers operate in a class environment and although cross pressures of many sorts may arise when agents cut across categoric groups—as when middle-class teachers instruct working-class children—we can expect that the broad consequences of class location will not be lost or even effectively masked. In addition to I.Q., our data shed some light on the possible effect of social class and sex on the socialization of the political norm under consideration.

Exposure potential: I.Q.

One of the general reasons why we might expect a child to acquire any norm of democracy which involves a fairly complicated and in large part abstract set of relationships—as does efficacy—is the child's relative receptivity. We could, of course, in theory apply this to the whole content of political socialization, except for the fact that some "messages" are more difficult to receive and assimilate than others. We would argue that the resources in political communication that the child has are especially likely to affect such acquisition as political efficacy. And our data support this contention when we relate our index of political efficacy to I.Q., as in Table 3.

The relationship between political efficacy and I.Q. is fairly constant over the grades, particularly from grade 5 on. The child who has greater intellectual abilities—as measured by I.Q. tests—is more likely to acquire the norm early and maintain thereafter a greater positive feeling towards it. Probably two things are at work in this relationship, beyond the simple capacity to deal with the abstractions that our questions involve. One is the greater exposure potential of the child with higher intelligence. Although we can only guess as to where cues from his environment originate, the greater the mental capacity of the child the more easily will these cues filter through to him. He is likely to have other supporting informational resources as well. He will have greater facility in recognizing the positive role of the individual in the world of politics if society is teaching that the individual has a role to play.

Secondly, the brighter child will probably enjoy a greater sense of general confidence and effectiveness, other things being equal. He is more likely to maintain the feeling that he can cope with various aspects of his environment successfully and thus with politics. From this perspective his feeling that the ordinary member of the political system has influence is a natural accompaniment of his own greater ego

---

begin to form in childhood, when personality development is at its peak, a suspicion that is now reinforced for the first time by data.

[15] Cf. *The American Voter*, p. 516.

TABLE 3. THE RELATIONSHIP OF I.Q. TO SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY IN GRADES 3–8

Grade	I.Q.	Low Efficacy	Medium Efficacy	High Efficacy	Total %*	N†	N Not Scored	Pearson r‡
	Low	61%	26%	13%	100	361	110	
3	Medium	53	29	18	100	427	126	.14
	High	48	32	20	100	203	67	
	Low	69	22	9	100	467	105	
4	Medium	50	30	20	100	490	124	.28
	High	38	32	29	99	302	59	
	Low	50	29	21	100	475	74	
5	Medium	34	31	35	100	538	63	.33
	High	20	26	54	100	420	24	
	Low	42	26	32	100	522	66	
6	Medium	28	31	41	100	527	52	.35
	High	14	21	65	100	414	14	
	Low	36	34	30	100	543	41	
7	Medium	19	27	53	99	588	33	.35
	High	9	24	67	100	362	12	
	Low	25	35	40	100	559	41	
8	Medium	15	30	55	100	511	23	.33
	High	5	23	72	100	392	8	

* Percentages fail to add to 100% in some cases due to rounding error.
† Used as base for percentages.
‡ Computed over the uncollapsed distributions.

strength and trust in his capacity to deal with the world. This fits with the adult-level findings.[16]

Social location

A related independent variable, socio-economic status,[17] shows a similar if weaker relationship to the sense of political efficacy. This is presented in Table 4.

The child higher on the social ladder is at every grade level likely to be a step or two higher in relative sense of political efficacy. Probably a somewhat similar set of background variables are at work in this relationship as is the case for I.Q.[18] The child whose share of social resources is larger is thereby in a more favorable position to receive relevant information, communications, and reinforcement for adherence to this standard. His position and that of his family in the social structure expose him more frequently to events and interests congruent with this sense. His parents are more likely themselves to be interested and participate in politics and to have a higher sense of political efficacy.[19] The consonance of such a

[16] Cf. *The American Voter*, p. 515 n.; E. Douvan and A. M. Walker, *op. cit.*

[17] We used as an indicator of socio-economic status the occupation of the respondent's father or guardian obtained either from the child in the classroom questionnaire administration or from the school files. In cases where neither was available, an estimate was used based on the average rank of the occupations of the fathers of the child's classmates in the child's own grade and school system.

[18] The first-order partial correlations of I.Q. with efficacy, holding SES constant are as follows (where 1 = Eff., 2 = I.Q., 3 = SES):

Grade	3	4	5	6	7	8
$r_{12.3}$	.10	.24	.30	.31	.31	.28

The first-order partial correlations of SES with efficacy holding I.Q. constant are:

Grade	3	4	5	6	7	8
$r_{13.2}$	.13	.15	.15	.10	.10	.13

[19] Cf. *The Voter Decides; The American Voter;* L. Milbrath, *op. cit.*; R. Lane, *Political Life;* H.

TABLE 4. THE RELATIONSHIP OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC STATUS TO SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY IN GRADES 3–8

Grade	SES	Low Efficacy	Medium Efficacy	High Efficacy	Total %*	N†	N Not Scored	Pearson r‡
	Low	62%	26%	12%	100	302	96	
3	Medium	56	27	16	99	673	241	.16
	High	47	34	19	100	269	96	
	Low	70	20	10	100	325	71	
4	Medium	54	28	18	100	678	159	.21
	High	43	31	25	99	424	91	
	Low	50	25	24	99	383	48	
5	Medium	33	32	36	101	745	89	.22
	High	25	30	45	100	494	43	
	Low	40	26	34	100	355	49	
6	Medium	32	28	40	100	738	64	.20
	High	17	26	57	100	509	33	
	Low	33	28	39	100	388	37	
7	Medium	24	31	45	100	728	43	.20
	High	14	26	60	100	508	18	
	Low	25	34	41	100	364	37	
8	Medium	18	31	51	100	753	27	.22
	High	10	24	66	100	498	15	

* Percentages fail to add to 100% in some cases due to rounding error.
† Used as base for percentages.
‡ Computed over the uncollapsed distributions.

milieu of efficacy and involvement, for the child's own acquisition, is therefore apparent.

Both intellectual ability and social status therefore affect the rate and level of the child's incorporation of a belief that the individual has some force in government. These are quite constant relationships over the grades. They are built into the differential response of children to this norm from the beginning of this form of political awareness. The adult-level findings on social class thus probably reflect a difference which was present in the first learning of this kind. Of course, later experiences related to social class must also have an effect; but we suspect that the effect of social class is a continuing one and something that has roots as deep as the attitude itself. This also leaves the hint that unless I.Q. differences wash themselves out at a later age, it may be that some adult differences in political efficacy are also a product of socialization during childhood. Childhood I.Q. scores of adults may well turn out to be associated with their sense of political efficacy.

Sex

Sex stands as one of the major social categories that distinguishes efficacy among adults. In *The Voter Decides*, for example, it was found that 35 per cent of men but only 20 per cent of women were high in political efficacy.[20] In our data we fail to observe this difference in any marked and consistent way over the grades. Table 5 shows that the sexes come close to being equal. There is a very slight advantage for boys in grades 3–7 but this is reversed in grade 8.

At the very least these data indicate that the sense of political efficacy in females does not begin to drop below that of males before grade 8. Girls show little less confidence than boys that adults are able to handle the complexities of political life and that their involvement in the political process has some significance;

Eulau, *op. cit.*; R. Dahl, *op. cit.*; J. E. Horton and W. Thompson, "Powerlessness and Political Negativism"; A. Kornhauser, *et al.*, *op. cit.*

[20] p. 191.

this reflects for young girls a kind of sentiment almost universally less associated with grown women than with men. Yet the strange thing about the finding that girls rate just about as high as boys across the grades is that in other areas of political involvement, in which we test for such attitudes as political participation and interest, we find girls to be markedly lower. In these areas they definitely foreshadow their roles as less politically oriented adults.

These data lend themselves to an interesting interpretation, at least until additional information about adults becomes available. Something must happen between childhood and later phases of the life cycle that leads females into becoming disenchanted with their earlier expected role in political life that they once shared with boys. It may be that when, in succeeding years, it is gradually revealed to maturing girls that male judgments do in fact command dominant attention and respect in the political sphere, a slow, creeping disillusionment results. The shift during adolescence may be imperceptible but in its outcome the disparity between learned expectations and later opportunity for the expression of political concerns will plausibly lead to some sense of helplessness. This is at least a possible pattern of political evolution from girlhood to womanhood that helps to explain the similarity between boys and girls in our data and the later differences between men and women in the realm of political efficacy. Boys, on the other hand, find their expectations fulfilled and with this reinforcement of the norm, feelings of political effectiveness have a better chance of taking root and growing.

But even though women may rank somewhat lower on a political-efficacy scale than men, this does not justify a conclusion that they are any the less supportive of the efficacy norm than are men. If we accept the preceding interpretation as possessing some plausibility, it suggests that the higher feelings of political impotence in women may arise in part because of the expectations girls had been led to apply to *all* adults and subsequent disappointment with their fulfillment. In childhood, females may have learned their political lessons only too well, that is to say, as well as boys. By adulthood, the evidence reveals only that women have developed a lower sense of efficacy then men. But they may still retain their expectation that in a democratic system all adults should have the opportunity to exercise some influence in political life. In fact, long ago the suffragette movement, and its continuation in many indirect ways today, demonstrated that at least some women took the regime norms of democracy literally. Thus, even though women may feel less efficacious than men, it is consistent with this finding that women may continue to be supportive of efficacy as a regime norm, an attitude that a majority of women may learn in childhood. Unfortunately, research on adults deals only with

TABLE 5. THE RELATIONSHIP OF SEX TO SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY IN GRADES 3–8

Grade	Sex	Low Efficacy	Medium Efficacy	High Efficacy	Total %*	N†	N not Scored
3	Boys	55%	28%	17%	100	669	164
	Girls	57	29	14	100	576	269
4	Boys	52	27	20	99	764	131
	Girls	57	27	16	100	663	191
5	Boys	35	28	37	100	825	86
	Girls	34	31	35	100	798	94
6	Boys	31	24	45	100	819	64
	Girls	28	30	43	101	784	82
7	Boys	23	28	49	100	805	48
	Girls	23	30	47	100	820	50
8	Boys	18	30	52	100	762	37
	Girls	16	29	55	100	854	42

* Percentages fail to add to 100% in some cases due to rounding error.
† Used as base for percentages.

their feelings of efficacy, not with the degree of their attachment to political efficacy as a norm.

CONCLUSIONS

The fact that from a tender age children are able even to mirror adult feelings of mastery over their political environment and that this feeling gradually takes on a high positive value for increasing proportions of children has vital implications for the input of support for a democratic regime. This is especially so if we are willing to assume that, like imprinting, what is learned early in the life cycle is more difficult to displace than what is learned later[21] —a not unchallengeable proposition, however— and that for children, acquisition of efficacy as a sentiment implies its acceptance as a norm.

The process of interiorization of this norm is of course a complicated matter. As McClosky and Schaar have observed in connection with the learning of social norms, "what is learned is a function of many things: what is actually 'out there' to be learned; the nature and quality of the teaching process; the learner's own ability and motivation; the strength and frequency of reinforcement; the amounts and kinds of impediments to learning, and so forth."[22] In an exploratory study like ours, we cannot hope to comprehend these several facets of the learning process regarding the efficacy norm. As a beginning, however, we can suggest that early attachment to this particular regime norm does not occur in a uniform fashion for all children. The learner's own ability level bears a definite relationship to the process, particularly for the rate of norm acquisition. The child's I.Q., that is, fosters or inhibits his growth of a sense of political effectiveness and the related norm. Similarly his social status, or that of his parents, produces this effect. The acuity of his mental, antennae, together with his general social resources, affect how quickly he responds to efficacy cues.

On the other hand, placement in one or the other of the sex roles only marginally influences his orientations to the norm in childhood. The culturally defined, differential political capacities of the sexes which are apparent in adulthood have still to make their appearances. But our findings leave as a moot point whether the high level of childhood attachment of efficacy as a norm may not continue unabated into womanhood. The data on adults refer only to the low sense of efficacy in women and bear little obvious relationship to our understanding of their continued attachment to the regime norm.

The fact that there are differences for groups defined by I.Q. and socio-economic status has important implications for where we may expect to find the strongest initial ties to the regime. But the further fact that by grade 8, 83% (Table 2) of our children felt moderately or highly efficacious does suggest some important possible consequences for the functioning of the American political system. This early acquisition of the norm may operate as a potent and critical force in offsetting later adult experiences which, in a modern, rationally organized mass society, undermine the political importance of the ordinary member. But for the inculcation of this norm at an early and impressionable age, later adult political frustrations in modern mass societies might be less easily contained; disillusionment with this norm of democracy might well find more favorable conditions for growth.

In leading to an early attachment to political efficacy as a legitimate expectation, childhood socialization may thus have central significance for the persistence of a democratic regime. It provides a reservoir of diffuse support upon which the system can automatically draw both in normal times, when members may feel that their capacity to manipulate the political environment is not living up to their expectations, and in special periods of stress, when popular participation may appear to be pure illusion or when political outputs fail to measure up to insistent demands.

The implications of our findings may extend far beyond the particular regime we have been examining. Our study suggests that we need not look only to conflicts and cleavages among interests in the political sphere for the basic sources of persistence and change in that aspect of the political system we have designated as the regime. Rather, a concurrent element contributing to the growth or erosion of support may be found in the orientations to norms acquired very early in the life cycle. We recognize that the early development of support for regime norms such as political efficacy may be unique to the American system, or at least to industrialized systems underpinned by popular education and mass communication. But the probability is otherwise. Our research strongly argues for the need for comparative research as a way of revealing the part played by primary political socialization in the growth and decline of support for political systems in their various aspects.

[21] Cf. O. G. Brim, Jr., and S. Wheeler, *Socialization After Childhood* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 8, 21 and 35ff.

[22] *Op. cit.*, p. 19

POLITICAL DUALISM AND ITALIAN COMMUNISM*

SIDNEY G. TARROW
Yale University

The poverty of philosophy, for Marx, was its formalism. The social sciences, in contrast, are blessed with the ability to adjust theory to experience. In our study of Marxist movements, however, we lack precisely the marxian flexibility we need to overcome a patrimony of ideology, misinformation and rigidity. Writers like Duverger and Selznick, for example, talk about "devotee parties" and "organizational weapons" without considering that their terminology may in some cases be misleading.[1]

The devotee party, writes Duverger, "represents a change from the conception of the party as a class; it is the party conceived as the elite." Its members pledge their "whole human being" to the party while its structure focuses upon "unceasing propaganda and agitation," to the detriment of parliamentary activity.[2] Duverger leaves no doubt that his archetype of the devotee party is the Communist Party. What he never asks, however, is whether a Communist Party may be anything *but* a devotee party.

With a similar focus, Philip Selznick describes "the combat party," whose peculiar property is its "competence to turn members of a voluntary association into disciplined and deployable political agents," and its "adoption of subversion" and "penetration and manipulation of institutional targets."[3] While the model is most relevant in societies in which Communist doctrine is remote and unappealing to the population, Selznick, like Duverger, holds that it "provides a fair interpretation of the Communist vanguard or combat party, wherever it is found."[4]

Each of these approaches extrapolates a marxist party model out of a single political setting—the West before 1950—and a single party strategy—the Leninist strategy of *What is to be Done?* Neither writer considers the elementary marxian proposition that both party strategy and political setting can vary greatly, and that a model of a marxist party can emerge only from the interaction of the two. This article is an attempt to elaborate this proposition in one rich empirical setting: Italy, and particularly southern Italy, where the Italian Communist Party (PCI) is very different from the party of devotion and combat envisaged by Duverger and Selznick.[5] I hope to show (1) that the party's role differs sharply between advanced, industrial North and backward, traditional South; (2) that these variations can be ascribed both to Italy's dualistic political setting and to party strategy; and (3) that these two variables—political setting and party strategy—are the key to understanding marxist parties wherever they are found.[6]

I. THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

When we turn to the Italian Communist Party, we find most students close to the Selznick-Duverger view. For example, in his paper "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," Giovanni Sartori shares Selznick's emphasis on the party's capacity to withdraw members from other group loyalties ("the ability of the party's organizational network to produce a culturally manipulated isolation of given social groups in given areas") and his concern with the dual nature of Communist organization—a party of elite with mass following. He also shares Duverger's emphasis upon organization

* The research upon which this article is based was supported by grants from the Ford Foundation and from the Committee on Faculty Research of the Concilium on International Studies of Yale University. I wish to thank my colleagues Donald Blackmer, Joseph LaPalombara, Roger Masters, James Mau, Gianfranco Poggi, and Giovanni Santori, who read the manuscript and contributed many helpful criticisms.

[1] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties*, 2nd. rev. ed., North translation (New York: Science Editions, 1965); Philip Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon*, 2nd. ed. (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960).

[2] *Op. cit.*, especially p. 70, p. 2, and p. 58.

[3] *Op. cit.*, pp. xii, xv.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. vi.

[5] These data are presented systematically in the author's *Peasant Communism in Southern Italy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.)

[6] Intra-nation comparative analysis is creatively used by Juan Linz and Amando de Miguel, "Eight Spains," in Richard Merritt and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); also see Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, "Regional Contrasts in Norwegian Politics," in Eric Allardt and Yijo Littunen (eds.), *Cleavages, Ideologies and Party Systems* (Helsinki: The Academic Book-Store, 1964).

but implicitly recognizes the weakness of the cells ("the organizational incapsulation and cultural saturation that a Communist *network* is capable of producing").[7] And while both Selznick and Duverger concentrate upon the subversive aspects of Communist activity, Sartori concludes that the PCI is outside the system altogether. He writes, "We thus come to the uncomfortable paradox that the Communist party would make for an excellent opposition if it were an opposition, i.e., a possible alternative government. But since it would replace the *system* as well as the people, the net result is that the country is deprived of its best potential elites. . . ."[8]

While no one would deny the Italian Communist Party's opposition to the present Italian regime, we gain nothing by substituting the scientific word "system" for the less inclusive term "regime." Secondly, Sartori overstresses the disruptive effect of the PCI. In a series of manipulative hypotheses, he maintains that "an extreme centrifugal development is very likely wherever the political system accepts not only as legal but also as a legitimate and somewhat equal and normal competitor a party . . . which opposes the very system, such as a Communist Party." He adds that "Such a centrifugal development will not necessarily follow . . . if the existence of anti-system parties is legally prohibited."[9]

Apart from the fact that these "hypotheses," if realized, would not make for a very democratic theory,[10] are we justified in concluding that the PCI is a devotee party and an anti-system party simply because it is the PCI? I would argue that, so contrary is the evidence and so rare the historical examples of flourishing parties of the type Duverger and Selznick describe, the burden of proof is on the other side.

What is the PCI like in very general terms?[11] Under the guidance of Togliatti and Longo its strategy since 1944 has been a broad national one, rather than the strategy of proletarian revolution and hegemony developed by Togliatti's predecessor, Antonio Gramsci. Returning from Moscow in 1944, Togliatti said "We are the party of the working class; but the working class has never been foreign to the nation," thereby launching what has come to be called the *Via Italiana al Socialismo*. Its general characteristics are: (1) constructive participation in parliament and in elections and local government; (2) a strategy of alliances which has at the same time emphasized the party's proximity to the Socialists, "sincere democrats" and the progressive wing of the Christian Democratic Party; (3) an ideology of "reform of structure" as the preferred means of constructing socialism in Italy; and (4) activity in local government, cooperative associations and stores, which both develops an efficient class of PCI administrators and ties the economic interests of large numbers of people to the party.[12]

Three general points should be made about the *Via Italiana al Socialismo*. First, it was developed by Togliatti as a strategic response to a particular political setting: a modern, industrial society which had been torn by twenty-two years of reactionary extremism. It was possible to interpret the party line in merely tactical terms in 1944 when the presence of Allied troops made revolution impossible, but the party's revisionism has, if anything, increased between that time and the present.

Second, it is not clear that there is anything about the PCI which would justify its classification as an anti-system party or a centrifugal force. I would argue that the symbiotic

[7] Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 145–147, emphasis added.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 147, emphasis added.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 170.

[10] See Sartori's excellent *Democratic Theory* (New York: Praeger, 1965). The problem of the efficacy of a legal prohibition of anti-system parties may perhaps be settled by a consideration of the impact of prohibition upon the German Social-Democratic Party in the nineteenth century. The ban failed to interrupt its growth but did succeed in turning it into an anti-system party. See Douglas A. Chalmers, *The Social Democratic Party of Germany* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 4.

[11] The party is analyzed in detail in Chapters Five and Six of *Peasant Communism, op. cit.* For a sensitive analysis of its external relations and policy line, see Donald Blackmer, *Italian Communism and the International Communist Movement* (Cambridge: M.I.T., mimeo.), 1966.

[12] Togliatti's important speeches and writings have been collected in three volumes: *Il Partito; La Via Italiana al Socialismo;* and *Sul Movimento Operaio Internazionale*, all published by Editori Riuniti of Rome in 1964. See in particular his "Promemoria sulle Questioni del Movimento Operario Internazionale e della sua Unita," published post-humously in 1964 in *Sul Movimento Operaio Internazionale*, pp. 361–376.

stability of the Italian political system (which is often confused with the instability of the French Fourth Republic) depends precisely upon the existence of a Communist Party like the PCI. Its broad, popular strategy and stress upon reform have both prevented the formation of radical leftist groups and forced a conservative government upon a path of reform that it would have avoided if left to its own devices.

Third, and most important, it is impossible to talk reformism for twenty years and then carry off a revolution. What we see in the PCI is something we may tentatively call the institutionalization of strategy.[13] The communication of its militants, its image among the population and the structure of loyalties at the local level have been conditioned by the party's strategy over the last two decades. Once a commitment to vote-getting is made, a political party, marxist or otherwise, routinizes certain roles and behaviors and endows them with legitimacy. Were these roles and behaviors to suddenly shift, a complicated structure of loyalties based upon personal and group interest, and not upon the devotion of militants, would come tumbling down.

The party's strategy has had an impact upon its membership, its organization, its behavior and its internal unity. First of all, the typical party member is not a dedicated militant whose entire life is devoted to party work. Interviews and questionnaires carried out with PCI federal secretaries in 1964 showed that only 10 to 15 per cent of party members are full-time activists. Moreover, the number of party members has decreased sharply since 1956 and the ratio of members to voters has changed from one member for every three voters in 1956 to one member for every 4.8 voters in 1963.[14] Finally, the ideological preparedness of even the most militant party cadres is very weak. In 1962, a party report concluded that "the problem of launching an elementary activity of ideological education in the party on a wide scale remains an urgent one."[15]

Second, the classical unit of disciplined party activity—the cell—has been progressively weakened in the post-war years, while the party section has become more prominent. The shift is not coincidental; the *Via Italiana* is geared more closely to the loose, horizontally-linked party sections than to the narrow, vertically-linked cells. Between 1950 and 1963, the number of PCI cells decreased from 54,000 to 33,000 while party sections increased from 10,200 in 1951 to 11,000 in 1961.[16] Factory cells have become less important in contrast to the more heterogeneous neighborhood cells and sections.

Third, the PCI pays *primary* attention to parliamentary and electoral activity and has not been observed to dedicate itself to conspiratorial activities more than any other Italian party in the rather Byzantine Italian Party system. The increased importance of the party section is related to this emphasis, for the traditional cell structure is useless in winning elections, while the section functions as a typical party club.[17] In the trade-union field, the party-dominated Confederazione Generale Italiano del Lavoro (CGIL) now shuns the political strike weapon and concentrates upon bread-and-butter union issues. The infiltration of non-Communist organizations, which Selznick postulates as an essential element of combat party strategy, is nowhere evident in Italy, despite the party's substantial popularity.

While the PCI is by far the most disciplined party group in Parliament,[18] its voting patterns in secret parliamentary committees are far less rigid. A research group at Bologna recently estimated that PCI parliamentary committee members vote with the government on a large majority of committee votes. This high level of compromise voting was maintained even during periods of maximum intransigence in the Chamber.[19]

[13] The concept of institutionalization as used here is similar to its usage in Philip Selznick's *Leadership in Administration* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1957).

[14] See *Dati sull'Organizzazione del PCI* (Rome: PCI, 1964), p. 4.

[15] See *Organizzazione del Partito* (Rome: PCI, 1962), p. 59.

[16] See "Modificazioni Strutturali e Politiche del PCI al suo IX Congresso," *Tempi Moderni*, 2 (April, 1960), p. 50; also see the official party statistics in *Forza ed Attività del Partito* (Rome; PCI, 1954); *Organizzazione del PCI* (Rome: PCI, 1961); *Dati sull'Organizzazione del PCI* (Rome: PCI, 1964).

[17] "Modificazioni Strutturali e Politiche del PCI," p. 30.

[18] Giovanni Sartori, *Il Parlamento Italiano* (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1963), p. 105. Most of the interviewed Communist deputies felt that parliamentary discipline was not excessive, while the members of other parties interviewed were not at all satisfied with the constraints placed on their voting by the parties.

[19] The author is indebted to the Carlo Cattaneo Research Institute of Bologna for allowing him to refer to its as-yet unpublished study, *La Partecipazione Politica in Italia*. This multi-volume

The party administers over eighty communes in the central provinces of the country—the so-called "Red Belt." These local units perform all the typical functions of local government and maintain majorities which depend upon the satisfaction of concrete personal and group interests. The party administers a whole range of profit-making cooperatives which are essential to relations with workers and peasants. Major dislocations would occur in the economic life of thousands should the PCI suddenly turn to revolutionary strategy. Despite the possible tactical origin of its pattern of participation in Italian politics, the institutionalization of these tactics transforms them into commitments.

Several attitude studies have suggested that Communist leaders and followers have developed political attitudes which correspond to the party's broad strategy. A study of Italian parliamentarians carried out in 1963 revealed that Communist deputies scored lower on the Rokeach dogmatism scale than Christian Democrats.[20] Further evidence was provided by a CISER public opinion survey in the same year which demonstrated, first, that PCI supporters reflect the reformist doctrinal line of the party and, second, that certain key divergencies may be seen within the sample with regard to their presumed support for the PCI in a hypothetical two-party system; for example, only 60 per cent of the sample would choose the PCI in a bipolar choice between their own party and the Socialists![21] Third, Almond and Verba have pointed out that supporters of the left are more likely to be "open partisans" than supporters of the right. They write, "Opposed to the Constitution is a left wing which, at least in part and at the rank-and-file voter level rather than among the party elite, manifests a form of open partisanship that is consistent with a democratic system."[22]

In other words, the following of the PCI is far more pluralistic than has been generally acknowledged. The same appears to be true of the leaders, if the factional strife currently raging in the party is any indication. The right, led by Giorgio Amendola, would go further than Togliatti in examining the crimes of Stalin, in condemning the Chinese and in adapting the PCI to a reformist strategy. The left, on the other hand, returns ideologically to Gramsci's emphasis upon the factory and the trade unions, but seeks more internal democracy in the party and wants to empower the party Congress to make theoretical decisions in place of the bureaucratic Central Committee.[23]

Two facts are indicative of the relationship of the two factions to the PCI's *Via Italiana al Socialismo*. First, the left is neither the old sectarian Stalinist left, nor, as is sometimes imagined, a pro-Chinese group. It arose out of the crisis generated by the anti-Stalin campaign and the Hungarian Revolution and does not criticize the fundamentals of the *Via Italiana*.[24] Second, the new left arose in part with a basis of support in the Communist Youth Movement (FGCI), in whose publication, *Nuova Generazione*, they found an excellent forum, and in the trade unions, whose late leader, Giuseppe de Vittorio, was fond of telling Togliatti that the labor movement is *not* the transmission belt of the party. In other words, the internal diversification of a party which takes up the tasks of day-to-day operation in a parliamentary system encourages the development of internal differences which, if not themselves democratic, are at least competitive.

But the internal differentiation of the PCI is not merely ideological; it is structural and behavioral as well. The *Via Italiana* strategy opens the way to a variety of influences from the political setting. The most important such influence is the dualistic nature of the Italian political system itself. If the analysis up to this point has indicated that the PCI is not a devotee or combat party, it is only an analysis of what happens to the *Via Italiana* strategy in its two political settings which can suggest what the party *is*.

II. THE CONTEXT: THE TWO ITALIES

"Italy," Joseph LaPalombara writes, "represents two distinct cultures, the relatively dynamic and industrial North and the rela-

study will be published in the United States in shorter form under the auspices of the Twentieth Century Fund.

[20] Di Rienzo, *A Study in Political Dogmatism* (unpublished doctoral thesis, Notre Dame University, 1963).

[21] These data are reported in Istituto Carlo Cattaneo, *Il Comportamento Elettorale in Italia alla Luce di Alcune Ricerche Condotte Direttamente sugli Elettori* (Bologna, mimeo, n.d.), pp. 150–153.

[22] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, rev. ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 115–116.

[23] See Pietro Merli-Brandini, "La Crisi del Pensiero Comunista," *Conquiste del Lavoro*, 18 (November 14–20, 1965) pp. 9–20.

[24] See Blackmer, *op. cit.*, on the important distinction between the old sectarian left and the new left and on the contrast between left and right within the PCI today.

tively stagnant South."[25] The disparity between the regions is not merely one of degree; it is a structural cleavage, observed by generations of statesmen and intellectuals, extending into the economic, social and political systems and presenting concrete obstacles to political integration.[26] While exhaustive analysis of Italian dualism is impossible in this context, several basic indicators may suggest the breadth of the economic, social and political gap between North and South.[27]

Economically, Italy has long been a "dual economy," with a dual labor market and a dual structure of industry.[28] The North is industrial, the South agricultural: out of fifty-eight northern provinces, thirty-five have more than half of the working population in non-agricultural activities, while in the South only four provinces out of thirty-two have more than 50 per cent of the active population outside agriculture.[29] In the industrial sector, most southern workers (500,000 in 1951) work in the small-scale traditional sector, while only 200,000 are employed in the large-scale modern sector.[30] In agriculture, the stable and productive commercial and family farms of the North contrast sharply with the unstable tenancies and *latifundia* of the South.

Socially, we find a rather mobile highly organized society in the North and a fragmented developing society in the South. Briefly, what the latter term designates is a social structure which has lost the functiona coherence of tradition and has not yet achieved a modern organization of social roles. Historically, we can trace the emergence of modern social organization in the North to the typical western processes of commercialization and industrialization; commercialization set up a marketing and credit network while industrialization re-shaped social stratification through the discipline of the factory process.[31]

The South, in contrast, remains a fragmented developing society because commercialization, caused by the influx of northern goods after national unification in 1861, was not accompanied by industrialization; traditional social roles were undermined by commercialization, but in the absence of industrialization, they remained transitional and disorganized. Without industry, the attention of all major social groups focused upon the land, with results that soon became pathological.[32] The middle class, urban, aggressive and entrepreneurial in the North, was unproductive, provincial and land-oriented in the South.[33] The family retains an importance in socialization and economic allocation in the South far greater than its equivalent in the North; in a society in which modern forms of social organization have failed to crystallize, the family is a solidarity unit of almost pathological consistency.[34]

If we search for indicators of the South as a fragmented developing society, we can find them in the atomization of business enterprise and in the network of unstable and transitional roles in agriculture. The average industrial firm in the South employs 2.4 workers, as opposed to 7.5 workers in the North; only 13 per cent of southern firms have joint-stock ownership, as compared to 46 per cent in the North; and twice as many southerners (27.3 per cent) working in industry are owners and directors

[25] Joseph LaPalombara, *Interest Groups In Italian Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 37.

[26] The classical sources on the cultural cleavage between North and South are found in Gaetano Salvemini, *Scritti Sulla Questione Meridionale* (Milan: Einaudi, 1955); Francesco Saverio Nitti, *Scritti Sulla Questione Meridionale* (Bari: Laterza, 1958); Giuseppe Fortunato, *Il Mezzogiorno e lo Stato Italiano* (Bari: Laterza, 1911). The most important works on the historical development of the South are collected in Bruno Caizzi (ed.), *Antologia della Questione Meridionale* (Milano: Comunitá, 1955); and Rosario Villari (ed.), *Il Sud nella storia d' Italia* (Bari: Laterza, 1961).

[27] A statistical analysis of economic and social indices has been collected in *Un Secolo di Statistiche Nord e Sud, 1861–1961* (Rome: SVIMEZ, 1961).

[28] Vera Lutz, *Italy: A Study in Economic Development* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), Ch. V.

[29] Istituto Centrale di Statistica, *Compendio Statistico Italiano, 1958* (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1959), p. 17.

[30] Lutz, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

[31] David Apter writes, "Industrialization is that aspect of modernization so powerful in its consequences that it alters dysfunctional social institutions and customs by creating new roles and social instruments, based on the use of the machine": *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965), p. 68.

[32] See the analysis of southern Italian brigandage by Eric Hobsbawm in *Social Bandits and Primitive Rebels* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959).

[33] Gaetano Salvemini, "La Piccola Borghesia Intelletuale," in Caizzi (ed.), *Antologia della Questione Meridionale*, pp. 383–405.

[34] Edward Banfield and Laura Fasano Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958).

than in the North (12.8 per cent),[35] suggesting the dominance of the family enterprise over modern forms of business.

In agriculture, the situation is still more symptomatic. Until the agrarian reform of 1951, much of the land was operated by small renters, share tenants and day laborers on plots with no farmhouse or equipment. These marginal operating units are not "farms" in any significant sense of the word, nor they are commercial operations. Many peasants shift from one occupational role to another, while others (*figure miste*) hold several occupational roles at once.[36] The fragmentation of contractual ties between owners and peasants prevents the formation of horizontal secondary organization, inhibiting both economic development and political aggregation.

In the political system, the fragmented nature of southern Italian society has critical effects. Politics in the North have long been organized according to typical western patterns, with groups and parties growing out of the broad functional and class groupings of an industrial society. In the South, in contrast, a formal representative system disguised what amounted to a massive system of clienteles. *Clientelismo* grew out of the narrow vertical ties of a fragmented agricultural system. Organized by the liberal middle class of the provinces, which held a strategic role in landholding, it used the fulcrum of local government for patronage, and sent local notables to parliament to make up willing majorities for regional politicians. The ties between leader and follower are highly personal; an American research group found that in seventy-six towns of the South where the vote had shifted greatly,

> . . . the voters were motivated by strictly local and personal issues, that ideology and national issues played little part in determining their voting behavior, and that many shifts were simply the result of *clientelismo*, voters following a personal leader from one party to another.[37]

Structurally, the clientele pattern means that broad functional interests are not readily represented in politics, where personal favors and patronage are dominant. The failures of the system are patent; one reaches the apex of authority not by merging one's demands in a horizontal membership group, but by linking up to a hierarchical chain of personal acquaintance which may begin in the network of neighborly relations and reaches up to the state bureaucracy with little adjustment in structure.[38] The clientele chain soon grows too long for effective political allocation. It is this, and not a conspiracy by the industrialists of the North, which has made the South ineffective in the national political arena; faced by the well-organized interest groups of Milan, Turin and Genoa, southern clienteles are unable to bargain effectively since they can trade only in personal favors. The lack of political integration between the regions is not simply a matter of political culture, but is a *structural* factor; the clientele system is actually congruent with the South's fragmented social structure and resists or modifies the forms and techniques of a modern party system. Even a "monolithic" party like the PCI is profoundly affected by the dualism of the political system in Italy.

III. DUAL POLITY AND DUAL PARTY

Four dimensions are particularly interesting in comparing the PCI in northern and southern Italy: (a) the composition of the membership; (b) the party organization; (c) the leadership; and (d) its ideology.

(a) *Membership.* The membership of the PCI in northern Italy is concentrated in the medium and large-sized cities, while party membership in the South is dispersed in the countryside. Northern membership is consistent as well as concentrated: new members in the North composed less than six per cent of regional membership in 1961. In the South, in contrast, the party suffers from rapid turnover, with new members amounting to 13.9 per cent in 1961, during a period in which it was losing an average of 45,000 members a year.[39]

The sharpest difference in the membership of the PCI in North and South stems directly from the different social composition of the two regions: a working class cadre is strong in the North and weak in the South, while the peasantry is the bulwark of the party in the South (with 42 per cent of the members) and much weaker in the North (30 per cent). A historical factor colors the composition of the PCI membership in the South: the absence of an impor-

[35] SVIMEZ, *Un Secolo di Statistiche, op. cit.*, pp. 336–338.

[36] Vera Lutz writes: "The peasant is almost always what is called a mixed figure—small proprietor, tenant, share-cropper, wage earner. In the past, at least, the link between him and that part of the land which he farmed but did not own was in many cases a precarious one": *op. cit.*, p. 105.

[37] Cited in Joseph LaPalombara, *Interest Groups in Italian Politics, op. cit.*, p. 65.

[38] Cf. Julian Pitt-Rivers, *People of the Sierra* (Chicago: Phoenix, 1961), p. 154.

[39] *Dati sull'Organizzazione del Partito, op. cit.*, p. 21.

tant labor movement to provide the experience and the cadres for political activity today. In this reversal of historical roles, the Communist Party in southern Italy resembles many marxist parties in non-western nations. In northern Italy, the PCI profits from the long experience of labor organization in the region.[40]

Secondly, Communist Party membership in southern Italy differs radically in its composition from the northern wing of the party in the relative importance of intellectuals and students in its membership. While 25.8 per cent of the PCI's members live in the South, 40 per cent of the intellectuals registered in the party and 60 per cent of its student members are southerners.[41] The importance of intellectuals in the South increases as we move up the hierarchy from ordinary members to active cadres. Figures released in 1954 indicate that over 30 per cent of the members of the party's federal committees in the South were students, technicians, intellectuals or other professionals, as compared to less than 18 per cent in the North.

Turning to youth in general, we find that 34 per cent of the members of the party's Federations of Young Communists of Italy (FGCI) are found in the South, 10 per cent higher than the region's share of total party membership.[42] This factor perhaps reflects the deep frustration of youth in a developing society, where the symbols of affluence have recently become visible but the means of achieving them are not available. Women members of the party, in contrast, are concentrated in the North. Eighteen per cent of the party's female members live in the South as opposed to 82 per cent who live in the North. These figures reflect the traditional role of women in the South and their relative emancipation in the North.[43]

Perhaps because of its largely peasant composition, PCI membership in the South is less closely related to electoral success than in the North. Relating the percentage of the population registered in the PCI to the party's share of the provincial vote, we find that membership rises rapidly with electoral success in the North, while it is almost unresponsive to the polls in the South. Party membership ranges from 0.3 per cent of the provincial population in the lowest voting province to 17.4 per cent in the highest province in the North, but from 1.7 per cent in the lowest province to 3.5 per cent in the highest voting province in the South. Moreover, the rise in party members bears an almost geometric relation to the vote in the North when the vote is above 30 per cent, suggesting that the *Via Italiana* in that setting is a successful organizational and electoral strategy. In the South, in contrast, at no point in the electoral curve does membership rise above 4 per cent of the population, even when the vote is as high as 37 per cent.

The paradox of the *Via Italiana* in southern Italy is that the PCI has as its largest member-

TABLE 1. PCI FEDERAL COMMITTEES PROFESSIONAL DISTRIBUTION BY REGIONS, 1954*

		North	South	Italy
Workers	(N)	1323	402	1725
	(%)	44.9	30.8	40.6
Agricultural workers	(N)	120	92	211
	(%)	4.1	7.1	5.0
Peasants	(N)	245	114	359
	(%)	8.3	8.7	8.5
Artisans	(N)	134	78	212
	(%)	4.5	6.0	5.0
White Collar	(N)	452	143	595
	(%)	15.4	11.0	14.0
Professionals, students and technicians	(N)	506	392	898
	(%)	17.2	30.1	21.1
Housewives	(N)	60	52	112
	(%)	2.1	4.0	2.6
Others	(N)	104	30	134
	(%)	3.5	2.3	3.2
Total	(N)	2943	1303	4264
	(%)	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: PCI, *Forza del Attivita del Partito* (Rome, 1954), p. 67.

* More recent figures on the professional composition of federal committees are not available.

[40] While 42 per cent of the membership in the North are members of the working class, 32 per cent of the southern PCI members are workers. In the North, even in the agricultural regions, Emilia, Tuscany and the Marches, 36 per cent of the members are workers, more than the working class portion of the party in any southern region. See PCI, *Dati Sull'Organizzazione del PCI* (Rome: PCI, 1964).

[41] Calculated from *ibid.*, pp. 22–27.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 74, pp. 15–17.

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 22–27.

ship bloc a group with the poorest organizational potential. Rather than a popular mass party based upon the organized support of the urban proletariat, the PCI has the membership outline of a poor peasant's party in a fragmented developing society, with an intellectual leadership group and a scattering of worker and middle class groups on either side. Not only is its major membership group dispersed and poorly organized; unlike the urban and rural proletariat of the North, it is a group whose social aspirations belong to a rearguard and not a vanguard. The effects of this conservative center of gravity in the PCI membership group in the South can be noted in the inertia of its programs, which still insist upon the need for an agrarian reform at a time when thousands of peasants want only to escape from the land to the cities.

(b) *The Party Structure.* In its network of party sections, cells and factory cells, clear differences within the PCI between North and South are directly linked to the socio-political structure of each region. Seventy per cent of its party sections, 68 per cent of its cells and 92 per cent of its factory cells are found in the North.[44] In the large-scale industries of the major cities and the commercialized agriculture of the central provinces, these units operate with relative regularity and precision. Moreover, a panoply of secondary units—recreational groups, adult classes, and economic organizations—are articulated around the nucleus of the party cell and section. The relevance of these secondary organizations to the economic life of the worker creates the natural basis for the differentiation of program between party and mass organization—one of the bases of the Leninist party.

In the South, party organizations are less numerous and less articulated than in the North, and the differentiation of program between party and mass organization is far less clear. While 30 per cent of the party sections are in the South, only 11.4 per cent of its cells, and less than 8 per cent of its factory cells are found there. The decrease in articulation from level to level means that the PCI organizational pyramid is virtually inverted with respect to that of the North. In many places, there are more sections than cells, and the cells are far too large to permit their political use.[45]

Secondly, the number of secondary and mass organizations surrounding the party cells and sections is far smaller than in the North. In the absence of these groups, the section is often the single manifestation of the party in the southern village. The party member goes there to meet his friends and gossip, to play cards and watch television. Surprisingly, 42 per cent of the PCI sections in this impoverished region have television sets, as opposed to only 16 per cent in the North.[46] It is significant that the only PCI units in which the southern portion of the party carries its organizational weight are the *Circoli* of the Communist Youth Federation: 22.1 per cent of the national total are found in the region. Women's cells, on the other hand, are extremely underrepresented in the South, with 7.1 per cent of the national total. To one party leader, this results not only from the modesty of women in the region, but from resistance from PCI leaders. He writes, "Conceptions which assign to women a subaltern and a marginal role in society are not yet overcome by the PCI."[47]

A third organizational characteristic of the PCI in southern Italy which contrasts sharply with the North is the lack of the strategic differentiation between the programs of the party and the policies of the mass organizations. Launched in the region in an organizational vacuum, the party was compelled to recruit many members spontaneously and to fulfill many of the functions which normally fall to labor and other mass secondary groups. A number of party front groups were formed, but these inevitably drew upon the same cadres, and "very often the Communist Party, the Socialist Party, the Chambers of Labor and the Cooperatives were nothing but different faces of a single popular movement."[48] In some provinces, the membership of the party exceeds that of the unions and in others the reverse is true. The division seems to depend upon which group arrived first after Fascism. "One of the defects in our organization is that the party today pursues directly many of the activities which should be fulfilled by the secondary mass organizations."[49]

Organizational difficulties are encountered by

[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 29–63, *passim.*

[45] *Ibid.;* also see Celso Ghino, "Aspetti della Struttura della Organizzazione," *Rinascita*, 7 (March, 1950), p. 163.

[46] *Dati sull'Organizzazione del Partito, op. cit.*, p. 45.

[47] Pietro Valenza, "Alcuni problemi del Rinnovamento del PCI nel Mezzogiorno," *Cronache Meridionali*, 7 (January–February, 1960), p. 7.

[48] P. di Pasquale, "Dalla Politica di Salerno alla Crisi del Frontismo Meridionale," *Rinascita*, 13 (October, 1956), p. 543.

[49] Pietro Secchia, "Relazione," in *VII Congresso Nazionale, Atti e Risoluzioni* (Rome: PCI, 1951), p. 146.

all militant political parties in their early phases, but the PCI in southern Italy appears to have been permanently affected by these problems. Why this should be so relates to the socio-political milieu of southern Italy. As a party document states: "Experience has shown the great difficulty in organizing the masses of the southern peasants and, above all, of grouping them in organizations by category, because of their indeterminate social character."[50] This is particularly true in the backward areas of the region. As a Sardinian leader writes, "Every social category is fragmented in a guise which is difficult to locate. . . . More than twenty or thirty people in a village who are tied to a clear identity of interests cannot be found."[51]

The Communist Party in southern Italy has developed a style of organization distinctly different from its style in northern Italy. A resolution of the Central Committee defines it: "A multiplicity of popular assemblies, of committees for the land and other democratic organizations of an elementary type are necessary to give a primary and simple form of organization to masses of the people who are not socially concentrated and homogeneous."[52] This pattern of organization reached its apogee in the PCI-led movement for the occupation of the *latifundia* in 1950. Yet twenty years after the party began its activity in the South, its organizations still have an amorphous and fluctuating character.

(c) *Leaders and Leadership Roles.* As might be expected when dealing with political leadership in dualistic political settings, the backgrounds and career patterns of Communist leaders in northern and southern Italy differ sharply. Southern Italian Communist leaders are mainly middle- or upper-middle-class individuals with urban backgrounds. In the North, 48 per cent of the party's national level leadership are of lower- or lower-middle-class origin, while only 34 per cent of the southern leaders come from these groups. Eighteen per cent of the northern leaders are of middle-class status, compared to 28 per cent in the South; and 19 per cent of the northern leaders are of upper-middle or upper-class origin, compared to 32 per cent in the South.[53]

TABLE 2. PCI NATIONAL LEADERSHIP SOCIAL STATUS OF FAMILY, BY REGION

	Lower	Lower Middle	Mid. & Up. Middle	Upper Class	Total
North (203)	18.2%	41.4	26.1	10.8	100.0%
Center (134)	16.8%	37.9	28.5	10.2	100.0%
South (107)	13.1%	25.2	35.5	23.4	100.0%
Islands (66)	7.6%	22.7	42.4	19.7	100.0%

Source: Istituto Carlo Cattaneo, unpublished data collected from PCI parliamentarians and national officers, 1964.

Northern and southern leaders differ in the size of the city of their origin, too. Northern leaders parallel the distribution of the population of the North in the cities of their birth; 15 per cent come from villages up to 5,000 in population, 26 per cent are from towns of 5,000–20,000, 12 per cent are from cities from 20,000–100,000 and 36 per cent are from large cities of more than 100,000 population. Most southern national leaders were born in the large towns and the cities from 20,000–100,000 population (31 per cent in the former and 36 per cent in the latter) with only 11 per cent from the small villages and only 20 per cent from cities over 100,000 in population. This distribution of southern leaders is hardly in keeping with the preponderantly rural membership of the party in the region.

Additional data on the leadership were collected by the author in a series of questionnaires and interviews with party secretaries on the provincial level.[54] Social origins on this level do not differ significantly between leaders in North and South, with lower-middle-class backgrounds predominant in each group. Educationally, however, marked contrasts are apparent; while provincial secretaries in the North are evenly divided between elementary or medium level education and secondary or college backgrounds, almost two-thirds of the southern leaders have graduated from high school or college, and little more than a third ended their education in elementary or high school; indeed, there is a chronic overabundance of intellectuals in the PCI in this backward region.

The geographic (and presumably social) mobility of the leaders differs between North and South, too. Forty-three per cent of the

[50] Comitato Centrale, PCI, *Documenti*, 1951, p. 197.

[51] Velio Spano, "La Sardegna alla Vigilia delle Elezioni Regionali," *Rinascita*, 6 (March, 1949), p. 103.

[52] Comitato Centrale, PCI, "Risoluzione della Direzione," *Documenti*, 1951, p. 230.

[53] The data which follow on the PCI national elite were graciously provided me by Professor Gianfranco Poggi of the University of Edinburgh and of the Instituto Carlo Cattaneo.

[54] For a more extensive treatment of the data on the PCI provincial elite, see *Peasant Communism*, *op. cit.*, Ch. IX.

southern provincial leaders grew up in cities other than those of their birth, while 25 per cent of the northern leaders changed residence during the formative period of their youth. The northern leaders are characterized by greater career localism; 38 per cent hold positions in the cities and provinces of their childhood, 47 per cent work in a different city but in the same province, and 15 per cent hold a post outside the province of their childhood. In the South, half as many (19 per cent) work in the city and province of their childhood, 52 per cent hold posts in the same province but in different cities, and twice as many (29 per cent) have positions in entirely different provinces. Related to this factor is the greater breadth of experience of the southern leaders; 40 per cent have held positions in two or more provinces, while only 28 per cent of the northerners have worked in several provinces.

The southerner is a relative newcomer to politics. Turning again to the national leadership, we find that 58 per cent from the South are full-time professional politicians, as opposed to 67 per cent from the North. Half as many southern national leaders are the sons of Communist Party members, and very few have siblings, wives and children who are members of the party. On the provincial level once again we find that 53 per cent of the northern leaders entered the party from the Resistance movement, compared to 24 per cent in the South. The largest group of southern provincial leaders were recruited into politics while in college or during professional careers (28 per cent), or from the peasant or labor movement (36 per cent). In the North, in contrast, 11 per cent came from intellectual pursuits and 19 per cent joined the party from the labor movement.

The roles assumed by the leadership differ between North and South. Since fewer paid officials are available in the South, the provincial leaders in that region function more as generalists than in the highly-articulated federations of the North. Interview and questionnaire responses indicate that 45 per cent of the southern federations employ only one to five persons, 40 per cent employ six to ten persons and only 15 per cent employ over ten. In the North, in contrast, only 13 per cent of the federations employ less than five full-time officials, 45 per cent employ six to ten, and 42 per cent employ over ten.

While the southern membership of the party is spread out in the countryside, the leadership tends to cluster in the cities. The most dynamic party workers gravitate to the federations, where they can find greater social prestige and better positions. In fact, party leaders have often noted that the dispersion of party cadres in the villages has slowed up the process of formation of a leadership group, since organizers forced to live in the villages become demoralized and isolated, frequently becoming involved in "clientelistic relationships with local figures."[55] A disproportionate number of the full-time leaders of the PCI in the South are now stationed in the provincial capitals. Party sections in the villages often have a merely formal existence; they form and dissolve according to the issues of the moment and the season of the year—the peasant organizations are only truly militant in seasons when the planting and harvesting have been completed.

The disjunction between city and countryside, between middle class intellectual leaders and peasant members, is attitudinal as well as organizational. Southern leaders tend to view the peasants paternalistically. The failure of a substantial peasant cadre to develop in the party may be linked to such attitudes. As national leaders critical of the southern leadership maintain, "The party must advance further to liberate itself courageously from any elements of clientelism and paternalism which still exist here and there."[56] As one leader complained, "The formation of a new type of cadre of popular extraction is bound to meet or even instigate a certain resistance and danger of distortion from the residues of clientelism in the bosom of the popular movement."[57]

Southern provincial leaders are far more "political"—understanding "political" as public activity-orientation—and less "organizational" than their northern colleagues. There appears to be considerably more flexibility, less ideological closure and more discussion than in the northern federations. Southern leaders, one informant suggested, "have more political sensitivity than leaders in the North."[58] Another informant, a member of the party secretariat said,

> The cadres in the South are more politically sensitive, more flexible, more sensitive to the political nature of their problems. In the South, traditionally, everything is decided politically, for in a disorganized society, it is the relations between individuals which solve problems. In the North, in

[55] Pietro Valenza, "Alcuni Problemi del Rinnovamento del PCI nel Mezzogiorno," *op. cit.*, p. 10.

[56] PCI, *IX Congresso Nazionale* (Rome: PCI, 1960), Vol. I, p. 231.

[57] Pietro Valenza, "Aspetti del Fanfanismo in Lucania," *Cronache Meridionali*, 5 (December, 1958), p. 865.

[58] Interview F-1, Naples.

contrast, we deal more with concrete classes and opposing groups, and less with contacts on a personal level. In the leaders of the South, therefore, political sensitivity and ideological subtleties are more important.[59]

Yet the greater political capacity of the southern leaders, according to these informants, is damaged by their organizational incapacity: As another informant in the national party organization said,

The differences between northern and southern leaders are the differences in the characteristics of the regions. The northerner is more of a formalist; the southerner is more versatile but he is less organizationally oriented.[60]

The characteristic described as "political sensitivity" by party informants shades into personalism in relationships with followers and with the opposition. In interviews, provincial leaders in the South stressed such qualities as "prestige," "honesty," and "seriousness" as the factors which recommend them to the admiration of their fellow citizens. In the North, party leaders are more concerned with presenting a united face to the opposition. Southern leaders were far more conscious of the need to establish a network of ties with local elites than northerners, who interpret the Leninist policy of alliances as the affair of the party organizations themselves, pointing to relations with the Vatican rather than interaction with village priests.

In their relations with the rank and file, the southern leaders are personally oriented too. They spend much of their time helping job seekers, writing letters of recommendation for students and trying to resolve the legal disputes of the peasants. A leader writes, "There is a need to overcome the personalism, the tendency to divide into groups around one or another personality. This derives from the type of social organization of the South, and is a reflection of its social dis-aggregation in the files of our party."[61]

Southern leaders perceive their federations as more autonomous with relation to the party national office than do their northern colleagues. Each secretary was asked his opinion on the role a party secretary should play in relation to the national party organization. There were five alternatives presented, representing different degrees of autonomy or central direction. Northern leaders were ranged heavily on the side of central direction (66 per cent), with 17 per cent perceiving their role autonomously and another 17 per cent expressing moderate positions. In the South, in contrast, only 42 per cent were centralists, as many as 42 per cent were autonomists and 16 per cent were moderates.

TABLE 3. PCI FEDERAL SECRETARIES INDIVIDUAL ROLE PERCEPTIONS (N = 80)

		Political	Labor Oriented	Organizational	DK NA	Total
North	(N)	8	4	31	4	47
	(%)	16%	9%	66%	9%	100%
South	(N)	20	3	5	5	33
	(%)	61%	9%	15%	15%	100%
Italy	(N)	28	7	36	9	80
	(%)	35%	9%	45%	11%	100%

Source: *Peasant Communism*, *op. cit.*, Chapter IX.

In order to further explore the perceptions of their roles held by northern and southern leaders, provincial secretaries were asked in questionnaires and personal interviews: "In your work as party secretary, what are the most important things you do, in the order of their importance?" Responses were not contextually coded because of the small number of respondents, but were classified according to their political orientation, their labor orientation and their organizational content. The results are recorded in Table 3.

Naturally, all the responses contained a strong political element, but many incorporated elements which were specifically labor oriented, while many others were organizationally oriented. As the Table shows, two-thirds of the northern respondents perceive their roles predominantly in organizational terms, while almost two-thirds of the southerners include mainly political factors in their role perceptions.

(d) *Ideology.* Unlike French communism, which has been wholly dependent upon imported theory, the PCI was fortunate to possess its own theorist in Antonio Gramsci, whose writings in prison under the Fascists later became an important source for today's leaders.[62]

[59] Interview S-1, Rome.

[60] Interview S-4, Rome.

[61] *Cronache Meridionali*, 5 (May, 1958), p. 305.

[62] Gramsci's works are collected in the six-volume series, *Opere di Antonio Gramsci* (Torino: Einaudi, 1955), and selected in Carlo Salinari and Mario Spinella (eds.), *Antonio Gramsci: Antologia degli Scritti* (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1963). A recent study of Gramsci's influence on the early period of the party is John M. Cammet, *Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of the Italian Communist Party*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967).

What is most interesting, however, is the extent to which the *Via Italiana al Socialismo* in both North and South was formulated *without* Gramsci's aid, for he died in prison and his writings were not publicly disinterred until 1948.

Gramsci contributed two important ideas to his party's future ideology: the idea of the party as the modern Prince, and the concept of the alliance of northern workers and southern peasants. Both were Leninist in inspiration if not in tone.

Gramsci saw in *The Prince* "a creation of concrete imagination which could work upon a dispersed and disintegrated society to stimulate and organize its general will."[63] The modern equivalent of Machiavelli's Prince is the political party and its sublime role is organizing a new collectivity.

> The modern Prince, the myth-prince, cannot be a real person, a concrete individual; it can only be an organism . . . the political party, which, time and again . . . knows how to form a new type of state.[64]

The party is a creative agent of education and revolution, "a collective intellectual," developing a new class of leaders out of an old and divided society.

A second aspect of Gramsci's thought regarded the backward and "dis-aggregated" nature of southern Italian society and its role in the future revolution. To Gramsci, North and South were not united nationally, but colonially; "The bourgeoisie of the North," he wrote, "has subjected the South of Italy and the Islands to the status of colonies for exploitation."[65] The South is ruled by an agrarian bloc of landed proprietors and intellectuals who are paid off by their northern bosses through parliamentary deals. The peasant is helplessly tied to the agrarian bloc through clientele relations with the landholders. Semi-feudal contractual relations dominate economic life, preventing the peasantry's emergence as a modern social force.

Left to themselves, the peasants of the South will dissolve into a "disorganized mass, a chaotic disorder of exasperated passions." Organized by the proletariat of the North, they are the motor force of the revolution. "The proletariat," Gramsci wrote, "will destroy the southern agrarian bloc in the degree that it succeeds, through its party, in organizing ever larger masses of poor peasants in autonomous and independent organizations."[66]

Several points are significant about this formulation of Gramsci. First, it separates North and South theoretically and admits that special factors condition the organization of the southern peasant. Second, the relationship is bilateral. "The workers of the factory and the poor peasants," he writes, "are the *two energies* of the proletarian revolution."[67] Third, the alliance is revolutionary and socialist, rather than tactical and democratic and there is no doubt about proletarian hegemony. Instead of what he calls the "magic formula" of the division of the *latifundia*, Gramsci proposes a "political alliance between workers of the North and peasants of the South to overthrow the bourgeoisie from the power of the state."[68]

The "organizational weapon" which emerged from these two central ideas—the party as the modern Prince and the alliance of northern workers and southern peasants—would have had a strong potential for revolution in an underdeveloped area like the South. Gramsci wanted the peasants to start an insurrection in the countryside to occupy the army, thereby leaving a clear field for a proletarian revolution in the cities. With allowance made for his unique style and sensitivity to Italian conditions, he is quite close to Lenin's model for a revolutionary party in a backward society. "Spontaneity" is rampant in the "dis-aggregated" southern peasantry, while the party as modern Prince is the embodiment of "consciousness." The parallel to Lenin's model, we may assume, was not lost on Gramsci.

In the North, Gramsci concentrated upon the factory. He wanted to transform society *from within*, as a preparation for the revolution. Gramsci's group in Turin wanted to establish the *Consigli di Fabbrica*, workers' councils which aimed at eventual assumption of the control of production. In 1919, he wrote:

> The socialist state already exists potentially in the institutions of the social life of the exploited working class. To tie these institutions together . . . means creating from then on a true and real workers' democracy.[69]

These ideas, actually of anarcho-syndicalist derivation, were denounced as "reformist experiments" by Gramsci's extremist opposition in the party.

The essence of PCI ideology since 1945 is

[63] Gramsci, *Note sull Machiavelli* (Torino: Einaudi, 1955), p. 3.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[65] *Antologia degli Scritti*, vol. II, p. 50.
[66] *Ibid.*, p. 79.
[67] *Ibid.*, vol. I, p. 52, emphasis in the original.
[68] *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 51.
[69] *L'Ordine Nuovo*, Torino: Einaudi, 1955, p. 10.

the cross-fertilization of Gramsci's ideas with Togliatti's *Via Italiana al Socialismo*. And since the latter is essentially reformist in nature—calling for action within the constitutional system through structural reform—the combination ranges from the comic to the bizarre, with a good deal of practical common sense in between.

Gramsci's idea of the party as the modern Prince has, in North and South, lost its Leninist components and is now interpreted almost entirely in terms of Togliatti's emphasis upon national solidarity. Togliatti wrote in 1944:

> The central idea of the political action of Gramsci was the idea of unity: unity of the working class parties in the defense of democratic institutions and the destruction of Fascism; . . . unity of the socialist working masses with the Catholic working masses of the city and countryside; unity of the workers; unity of workers and peasants; unity of workers of the arm with those of the mind. . . .[70]

In the North we find the PCI operating with an increasingly reformist political ideology, with excellent results. For the *Via Italiana* is a strategy for industrialized societies. Emphasis is increasingly placed upon trade union action and structural reform within the capitalist system. Theoreticians have virtually adopted revised views on the evolution of capitalism, and party leaders talk of "insertion" in the processes of neo-capitalism to influence its direction. As a leading labor intellectual writes:

> The CGIL does not try to prevent the modernization of Italian capitalism. Instead of opposing neo-capitalist solutions *a priori*, we each time oppose more advanced and equally realistic and concrete solutions.[71]

In the South, the synthesis of the *Via Italiana* with Gramsci's formulations has been less happy. The party has obliterated his concept of a creative working class impelling a peasant motor force to revolutionary action in a bilateral relationship directed by the party as a modern Prince. Instead, it calls for a pluralistic *system* of alliances between many social groups which *suppresses* the insurrectionary force of the peasants. A partnership-turned-coalition is expanded into "a system with the working class at its head . . . and an alliance with the southern peasants, first, with the petit bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and the progressive medium bourgeoisie, isolating the conservative and the large bourgeoisie."[72]

The alliance also loses its revolutionary character. We learn retrospectively that "Gramsci reaffirmed the real unity between workers and peasants in the common battle for the *structural renewal* of the Italian state."[73] There is a theoretical problem in the admixture of Gramsci and Togliatti: the first is revolutionary, the second reformist; taken together they are contradictory.

For example, the party inevitably impels the peasant "motor force" to action which is not revolutionary, for it simultaneously seeks the support of social groups whose interests would be threatened by a peasant insurrection. Moreover, lacking the "organizational weapon" of the Leninist party, PCI initiatives for the peasants do not enlist them in the battle for socialism, but support the peasants' own struggle to become petit bourgeois landowners. Hence, the limited agrarian reform which the party demanded in 1950 has aided the peasants of the South immeasurably, but not the party.

With neither a Leninist organizational weapon nor its revolutionary goals, the PCI in the South falls prey to the "objective conditions" of its political setting in a backward and fragmented society. The whole concept of the party changes from the creative catalytic agent envisaged by Gramsci into an amorphous movement which casts its net through diverse social strata, seeking issues which can unite them. As Togliatti wrote in a key theoretical article:

> Because of the social disorganization of the South, we need an organization of a conspicuously broad, popular nature, more than is necessary in the large industrial centres.[74]

As a result, the PCI in southern Italy shares the personalism, disorganization and ideological weakness of other political parties in that setting. Having applied a strategy well-designed for the industrial North to the backward South, *where the same conditions do not obtain,*

[70] *Rinascita*, August 29, 1944.

[71] "Report on the Debate of the Central Committee of the PCI on the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU," *New Left Review*, nos. 13–14 (June, 1962), p. 153. For the re-interpretation of capitalism, see Istituto Gramsci (ed.), *Tendenze nel Capitalismo Moderno* (Rome: Ed. Riuniti), 1962.

[72] Mauro Scoccimaro, "Dottrina Marxista e Politica Comunista," *Rinascita*, May–June, 1945, p. 138.

[73] Franco Ferri, "Questione Meridionale e Unitá Nazionale," *Rinascita*, 9 (January, 1952), p. 10, emphasis added.

[74] Palmiro Togliatti, "L'Azione Democratica e Socialista nel Mezzogiorno," *Cronache Meridionali*, 1 (June, 1954), p. 412.

the PCI in the South is *neither* an effective Leninist party *nor* a well-organized mass party, but something very different again.

IV. AN INTERPRETATION

Neither in North nor South does the Italian Communist Party have the attributes of the devotee-combat party described by Duverger and Selznick. This illustrates two things, one that we should have known all along and another that requires a great deal more thought and elaboration. First, the role and structure of marxist parties cannot be derived abstractly as Duverger and Selznick attempt to do. Second, a theory of Marxist parties will only result, in true dialectical fashion, from analysis of the interaction of party strategy and political setting under many different conditions. Turning to this second consideration, we may well ask, "What then are the 'models' with which we may understand the Italian Communist Party in North and South?" In the North, Duverger provides us with an answer: the mass party. In the South, we must turn to the experience of marxist parties in the underdeveloped world.

It is ironic that Communism in northern Italy at mid-twentieth century should vindicate the nineteenth century Western European Social-Democratic tradition. By 1900, the advances made in western society had negated many of the assumptions of Marx in the *Communist Manifesto*. These assumptions had "presupposed a pattern of events which experience had shown to be no longer possible in Europe—*or indeed in any advanced country.*"[75] The chauvinistic behavior of the Social-Democratic parties in 1914 and the failure of the revolution to spread to Western Europe in 1917 gave the finishing touch to Western European revolutionary socialism. Since then, every flourishing western socialist party has been a constitutional mass party, recruiting broadly and emphasizing parliamentary and electoral activity instead of the barricades and the *putsch*. The idea of the vanguard party, with which Marx had toyed in 1850 and Blanqui developed more fully, did not appear again until 1905 in Russia.[76]

For just as advancing conditions in Western Europe caused the transformation of European Socialism, "the obverse also applied: where the pre-1848 situation still existed, the fire that had gone out in the West might still burst into flames."[77] Lenin's double-edged contribution was to recognize the connection between political backwardness and revolution, and to develop an organizational weapon and a strategy tailored to these conditions. The Leninist party was the ideal weapon for making the revolution in a backward country, for it bypassed the weak and "spontaneous" proletariat and seduced the disorganized but potentially revolutionary poor peasantry. This is essentially the strategy Gramsci wanted to develop for southern Italy.

Lenin was convinced that the conditions of all backward societies demanded the strategy he had utilized in Russia. He told a group of Asian Communists:

> It is imperative for you to make a success of applying Communist theory and practice under conditions where the peasant is the primary class of the masses, where the task of struggle pending solution lies in the fight against the remnants of mediaevalism, but not in the fight against capitalism. . . .
>
> The solution to the above tasks . . . can . . . be seen in the over-all struggle already started in Russia.[78]

Yet he failed to conclude the obvious corollary: that the strategy used in Russia *would no longer do* in the advanced nations of the West, where capitalism and liberal democracy had already proceeded too far in satisfying the masses.

It is Togliatti's great contribution to have recognized this "bright side" of Leninism and to have responded with the idea of the *Via Italiana al Socialismo*. His statement that "It is impossible to conceive realistically of the advance towards socialism outside the fabric of Italian democratic life, outside of the struggle for the objectives that interest the whole society,"[79] is typical of this attitude.

When we examine the membership, the organization, the leadership and the ideology of the Communist Party in northern Italy, we can only be impressed by its successful adaptation and struck by its essential similarity to the "sociological type" of the mass party presented by Duverger: membership is broad and

[75] George Lichtheim, *Marxism* (New York: Praeger, 1965), p. 125, emphasis added.

[76] *Ibid.*, pp. 124–127.

[77] *Ibid.*, p. 125.

[78] V. I. Lenin, "Report Before the Second All-Russian Representatives Congress of the Communist Organizations of the Eastern Peoples," *Sochinenya* (Works) (Moscow: 1932), vol. XXIV, pp. 542–551, quoted in Lucian Pye, *Guerilla Communism in Malaya* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 26.

[79] *Rinascita*, August 29, 1944.

relatively unselective; loyalty is class-based and weak as compared to the religious loyalty of the devotee party; the cell is replaced in importance by the section, and formal centralization disguises factionalism and ideological rivalry; and party strategy focuses upon parliament, the trade unions and the mass media, in contrast to conspiracy and infiltration.

The proof of the essential compatability of the PCI's *Via Italiana* with the conditions of an advanced industrial setting is found in its incompatability with the conditions of the backward agricultural South. Here membership is inconsistent and weak; commitment is personal and interest-oriented; neither the cells nor the sections are well articulated; leadership reflects the clientelistic nature of southern politics; and party ideology is dispersive and "catch-all" in nature.

If the PCI in the South cannot be described as either a Leninist party or a mass labor party, what then is its nature? Here we must turn to the experiences of marxist parties in today's developing areas; in the combination of an underdeveloped setting and a non-Leninist strategy, the PCI in southern Italy has emerged as a type very similar to political movements in the new nations. David Apter writes:

> The central characteristics of the movements, whatever their forms, are their spontaneous and populist qualities, the direct relationship between the leadership and the people, the high degree of emotional appeal of their programs, and the simplicity of their aims.[80]

Not only does the PCI in southern Italy reflect many of these characteristics, it also reflects the failure of this type of movement to grapple successfully with many of the needs of the underdeveloped areas. The problem is one which a careful reading of Lenin could have predicted to party leaders: a marxist party in a backward country which lacks a Leninist organization will advance the (not necessarily progressive) goals of the peasant population without advancing the goals of the party. It thus appears as a sophisticated structure of patron-client relations fortified by an ideology that is more populist than marxist and led by intellectuals who are more bourgeois than proletarian.

All this leads us back to the question of the relevance of Duverger and Selznick and other western theorists to the study of marxist movements. The foregoing analysis shows that *neither* in northern nor southern Italy do we find the devotee or combat party. In the first, the combination of a highly developed setting and an open strategy have led to the emergence of the PCI as a mass party. In the second, the same open strategy in a fragmented developing society leads to another sociological type—one closely related to the political movements we now see in the new nations. Had the party in southern Italy been more rigorously Leninist in its strategy, as Gramsci was, we would have seen a third sociological type: the vanguard party, which can overcome the "spontaneity" of a backward society with the "consciousness" of a revolutionary leadership.

Where does this leave the devotee or combat model developed by Duverger and Selznick? It leaves it a poor fourth, a historical mutant in which a strategy designed for underdeveloped societies was mistakenly applied to the West in its high stage of industrialization. That this combination was an unhappy one may be seen in the sorry history of the Communist Party in both Germany and the United States, where an elite of revolutionaries became a sect of devotees persecuted for their beliefs and "outside the system" in a scientific, as well as in a political way. Such a pattern is not inevitable however, as is evident upon examination of marxist parties in places like Italy.

[80] *The Politics of Modernization*, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

BAR POLITICS, JUDICIAL SELECTION AND THE REPRESENTATION OF SOCIAL INTERESTS*

RICHARD A. WATSON, RONDAL G. DOWNING, AND FREDERICK C. SPIEGEL
University of Missouri

In modern political systems, parties undertake the prime responsibility for nominating public office holders, while interest groups attempt to influence public policy by seeking access to the centers of governmental power.[1] Yet recent developments in the selection of state judges have given a private interest group, the Bar, a role in choosing members of the Bench which, in essence, parallels that of traditional party organizations.[2] A Plan developed by the American Bar Association and the American Judicature Society, first adopted by Missouri in 1940,[3] grants the legal profession a direct, formal role in the selection process;[4] under its provisions, commissions, composed of lawyers, judges and laymen, nominate panels of names from which the governor of the state makes his judicial appointments. As the system works in actual operation,[5] the Bar becomes the key group in the nomination process, since the lawyers and judges on the commissions possess superior knowledge about potential candidates for judgeships, and also outnumber the lay members of these bodies. Beyond this, the Plan restricts the discretion of the governor, who must make the ultimate appointment from among the three nominees.[6] It also protects judges from ordinary political forces once they are in office, because subsequent judicial elections are in reality plebiscites in which appointees run "on their records" with no opponents.[7]

Heralded by one of the leaders of the American Judicature Society as the "greatest single

* The material for this article is drawn from a general study, *The Politics of the Bench and the Bar: Judicial Selection Under the Nonpartisan Court Plan*, conducted by the authors with the assistance of grants from The Social Science Research Council and The Research Center of the University of Missouri. The forthcoming, full-length study is to be published by John Wiley and Son.

[1] See V. O. Key, Jr. *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1964), pp. 18 f.; and Hugh Bone, *American Politics and the Party System*, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 549. Gabriel Almond and James Coleman suggest that "the development of a modern party system means that the performance of the political recruitment function by other structures, such as interest groups and the media of communication, tend to pass through and be processed by the party system before they emerge as acts of political recruitment": *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 18.

[2] Initially the leaders of the profession sought to minimize the power of party organizations in electing judges through such devices as judicial nominating conventions, nonpartisan judicial ballots and separate judicial elections, and to enhance their own influence by means of referenda in which bar associations evaluated the capabilities of the various judicial candidates and passed on their recommendations to the electorate. When these approaches failed to bring the desired results, the leaders sought to substitute the Bar for the party organizations as the major agency in the recruitment process.

[3] Jack W. Peltason, *The Missouri Plan for the Selection of Judges* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1945), Ch. II, contains an excellent account of the judicial reform movement in the United States and the role of various organizations and individuals in its development.

[4] The role of the Bar in this selection system is to be compared with the one exercised recently in the appointment of federal judges. The ABA Committee on Federal Judiciary has established working relationships with the Senate Judiciary Committee, which possesses the confirmation power, and the Attorney General's Office, which helps to investigate nominees; but the Committee's function is informal and advisory, and whatever influence it exercises is at the sufferance of the Committee and the Attorney General. See Joel B. Grossman, *Lawyers and Judges: The ABA and the Politics of Judicial Selection* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965).

[5] This conclusion is based upon our general study of the Plan in which we analyze the relative influence the lawyer, judge and lay members of the commissions have exercised on nominations over the years.

[6] This situation is to be contrasted with that in California where the Governor makes initial choices of judges to be appointed to the appellate courts, subject to confirmation by a Commission on Judicial Appointments, composed of members of the Bar.

[7] In the twenty-five year operation of the Plan, only one judge has been voted out of office. This occurred in 1941.

event of this century in the field of judicial administration,"[8] this Plan (referred to as the Nonpartisan Court Plan and the Merit Plan, as well as the Missouri Plan) has become the model of a national movement designed to eliminate the election of state and local judges. Since 1956, voters in four states, Alaska, Iowa, Kansas and Nebraska, have accepted the Plan, and features of it apply to courts in six other states.[9] Moreover, in some areas where the Plan has not been legally adopted, its principles have been put into effect. Governors Scranton of Pennsylvania and Love of Colorado as well as Mayor Wagner of New York City, have voluntarily utilized nominating commissions for their appointments.[10] Meanwhile, the Plan is being debated in bar associations and state legislatures in other states, and has recently been suggested for the selection of federal judges as well.[11]

The number of jurisdictions affected by this movement makes it an important issue of current public policy. But beyond this, the Plan raises a key question in democratic theory: to what extent is the role played by the Bar in choosing judges consistent with the tenet that the selection of policy-making officials should not reflect only the desires of a particular private group, but that broader social interests should also be represented in the process?[12]

The answer to this question can only be determined empirically with reference to the actual participation of the Bar in the selection process. This paper examines the nature of that participation in Missouri over the period of the past quarter-century, by analyzing that part of the system's operation on which the interest of the legal profession is most clearly focused, and in which no other groups participate, namely, the elections in which lawyers choose their representatives to the nominating commissions. Since the persons selected in these contests play such an important role in determining who will ultimately be appointed as judges, these elections stimulate interest and activity among lawyers, and also reveal varying perspectives concerning judicial selection held by different segments of the legal community.

As the paper demonstrates, these elections have spawned a party subsystem operating in the legal community similar to a general party system existing within the larger political order. The first four sections of the paper, therefore, analyze Bar politics within the conceptual framework of a general party system, namely, what bar groups constitute the competing "parties," and what are the social and ideological differences between them; how they go about marshalling their resources in the electoral contests and what they conceive to be the "stakes" of such contests. The final section relates this party subsystem to the theoretical question involving the representation of social interests in the selection of policy-making officials.

I. CLEAVAGES WITHIN THE MISSOURI BAR

The Nonpartisan Court Plan has most relevance for the Kansas City and St. Louis areas in Missouri. Lawyers in these communities elect members to the separate commissions which nominate candidates to the circuit courts (those of original, general jurisdiction in Missouri) in Jackson County and St. Louis City;[13] judges in the remaining forty-one "outstate" circuits

[8] Address by Glenn R. Winters, Executive Director of the American Judicature Society, before the Lawyers' Association of Kansas City on April 8, 1964, at page 8.

[9] The Plan is utilized to choose judges to courts in Birmingham, Alabama, Dade County, Florida, Denver, Colorado and Tulsa, Oklahoma. In addition, California and Illinois utilize the tenure aspects of the Plan whereby judges run in non-competitive elections.

[10] *Journal of the American Judicature Society*, 48 (1964), p. 133. Mayor Lindsay has made a pledge to continue the practice in New York City, and to work for the permanent establishment of a nominating commission by constitutional amendment: *ibid.*, 49 (1965), p. 124.

[11] The American Judicature Society published in the August, 1965 issue of its *Journal* (at pp. 47–52) a speech by Royce H. Savage, General Counsel of Gulf Oil Corporation, suggesting that the Plan be extended to the federal courts. Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania introduced a bill in the Eighty-Ninth Congress to accomplish this objective.

[12] The rationale for the use of the political party rather than the interest group as the recruiter of personnel in a modern democratic society is that the party "aggregates" interests, that is, it combines, accommodates and takes into account a variety of social interests in the course of the recruitment process: cf. Almond and Coleman, *op cit.*, pp. 38 ff.

[13] Each circuit nominating commission is composed of two lawyers elected by members of the Bar residing in the circuit court jurisdiction, two laymen from the jurisdiction appointed by the Governor and the presiding judge of the Court of Appeals of the area, who serves as *ex officio* chairman.

are chosen by popular election.[14] All attorneys in the state are eligible to vote for members of the Appellate Commission which nominates candidates for the three intermediate courts of appeal in the state, as well as for the supreme court,[15] but since about three-fifths of the state's attorneys practice law in the two largest urban centers, the "city" vote is the most crucial in these contests. Therefore, this paper concentrates on the politics of the Kansas City and St. Louis Bars relating to judicial selection.

Prior to the 1930's, there was only one bar association in Kansas City and one in St. Louis,[16] but lawyers in both communities developed schisms in their ranks during the depression period. Accounts indicate that a fight over the enforcement of canons of legal ethics, a matter that has caused difficulties in other metropolitan areas as well,[17] triggered the split. A concerted campaign against "ambulance chasers" and criminal attorneys by certain leaders of the Kansas City and St. Louis Bar Associations, polarized the Bar in both cities. Lined up on one side of the issue were "plaintiffs' lawyers," those representing injured persons in personal injury cases, and on the other, "defendants' lawyers," those having as clients the parties (primarily insurance companies and business concerns) being sued. Included as allies of the former were criminal attorneys; joining the ranks of the latter group were lawyers representing primarily corporations, particularly established economic institutions such as railroads, banks, insurance companies and public utilities, in all kinds of legal matters, not just those involving personal injury cases.[18]

As a result of this cleavage in the Bar, a power struggle took place in the bar associations in both cities, with the plaintiffs' group seeking to gain influence at the expense of the established defendants' attorneys that had traditionally been in control of both organizations. In the case of the Kansas City Bar Association, the plaintiffs' lawyers won the battle by joining the Association in numbers, and once in, winning its leadership positions. This caused the defendants' group to bolt the organization and form a new one called the Lawyers' Association of Kansas City. On the opposite side of the state, the reverse situation occurred. The St. Louis Bar Association "establishment" succeeded in excluding many plaintiffs' lawyers from its membership altogether and maintained firm control over the key offices of the organization. This led the plaintiffs' attorneys there to form another organization, known as the Lawyers' Association of St. Louis. The end result of these developments was the division of the Bar in both communities, with the plaintiffs' lawyers in control of the Kansas City Bar Association and the Lawyers' Association of St. Louis, and the defendants' attorneys in the driver's seat of the St. Louis Bar Association and the newly-formed Lawyers' Association of Kansas City.

This division of the Metropolitan Bar has had direct relevance for judicial selection in Missouri over the years. In the late 1930's, when the elective system was still in effect, the two St. Louis associations conducted separate bar polls which often resulted in the voters' securing conflicting advice from the legal profession concerning qualified candidates for the Bench. When the campaign for the adoption of the Nonpartisan Court Plan was launched, leaders of the defendants' organizations in both

[14] *The Constitution of the State of Missouri*, 1945, Art. V, Sec. 29 (b), provides for the adoption of the Plan by voters in other judicial circuits, but the Missouri Supreme Court has ruled that this section is not self-executing and requires legislation to make it effective: *State ex rel. Millar v. Toberman*, 360 Mo. 1101, 232 S.W. 2 d 904 (1950). Several attempts to pass such legislation have failed.

[15] The appellate nominating commission includes three lawyers elected by members of the Bar (one from each of the Court of Appeals' jurisdictions into which the state is divided), three laymen from the same jurisdictions appointed by the Governor and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who serves as *ex officio* chairman.

[16] The Bar Association of St. Louis was established in 1874. See *The Bench and Bar of Missouri: History of the Bar Associations of St. Louis and Missouri* (St. Louis: The St. Louis Star, 1899), p. 7. The exact date of the formation of the Kansas City Bar Association is undetermined, but Roscoe Pound notes in his study, *The Lawyer from Antiquity to Modern Times* (St. Paul: West Publishing Company, 1953), p. 315, that it was listed in an official report of the American Bar Association issued in 1887.

[17] Jerome Carlin deals with problems of legal ethics in Chicago in *Lawyers on Their Own* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1962), and in New York City in *Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966).

[18] Some lawyers refer to this latter group as "defendants' lawyers," while others prefer to be more precise and call them "corporation attorneys." In any event, all parties agree that they belong with the defendants' group with respect to this division within the Bar.

cities campaigned for its adoption, while their counterparts in the plaintiffs' groups generally opposed it.[19] Once the Plan was adopted, the rivalry between the Bar and Lawyers' Association in each metropolitan community shifted so as to take place within the framework of the new selection system, with the respective bar groups' backing separate candidates in the lawyer elections, as discussed subsequently in this paper.

These historical developments provide some important clues concerning the kinds of cleavages in the legal community which have had an impact on judicial selection in Missouri. They suggest that the plaintiff-defendant dichotomy has been a key factor in the polarization of the metropolitan Bar. With this as a starting point, we extended our current analysis to a broad exploration of the differences between the attorneys in the respective bar associations in the two communities. In doing so, we found that certain concepts developed by students of the sociology of the legal profession relating to "styles" of law practice[20] were very relevant to our study. As social and economic differences between Republicans and Democrats serve to illuminate the nature of our general party system, so similar distinctions between Bar and Lawyers' Association lawyers help explain the nature of the "two party system" that has developed in the metropolitan legal community for electing representatives to the judicial nominating commissions.

We gathered our data for this analysis from two major sources. The first was a series of personal interviews with the attorneys in both communities we thought would have the best insight into the schism in the Bar, namely, officers of the respective Bar and Lawyers' Associations, prominent plaintiffs', defendants', and corporation lawyers and certain essentially "neutral" members of the legal profession whose practices tended to remove them somewhat from the conflict. We supplemented this information with data elicited in a mailed questionnaire to a sample of the Missouri Bar.[21]

The first facet of differences in the bar associations we explored related to specialties of legal practice. Our interviews indicated that the plaintiffs'-defendants' split that led to the establishment of the two associations in both Kansas City and St. Louis is still salient in Bar circles. In fact, it has been exacerbated in recent years by the formation of the National Association of Claimants' and Compensation Attorneys, an organization designed to make personal injury lawyers more effective opponents of attorneys representing employers and insurance companies.[22] The aggressive policies of this national interest group[23] and its affiliate Missouri state chapter, serve to rally the plaintiffs' lawyers (the "NACCA" and "MACCA" men), and alarm the defendants'

[19] Peltason, *op. cit.*, Ch. III.

[20] The major studies utilized were Carlin, *Lawyers on Their Own*, *op. cit.*; his *Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession* (New York: Bureau of Applied Social Research, Columbia University, August, 1962, mimeographed); Edgar Smigel, *The Wall Street Lawyer* (London: Free Press of Glencoe, 1964); and two articles by Jack Ladinsky, "Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice and Legal Institutions," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (1963), pp. 47–54, and "The Impact of Social Background of Lawyers on Law Practice and the Law," *The Journal of Legal Education*, 16 (1963), pp. 127–144. Richard Wells refers to these studies as relating to "styles" of practice in "The Legal Profession and Politics," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 8 (1964), pp. 166–190.

[21] Since the Missouri Bar is integrated, we were able to use the membership of the State Bar Association as our "population." In May of 1964, we mailed a questionnaire to every other member of the Bar (3303 of 6606) and received 1233 replies, a 37 per cent response. This means that almost one-fifth of the lawyers in the state are included in our sample. Moreover, a comparison of the sample with the total population of Missouri lawyers analyzed in *The 1964 Lawyer Statistical Report* (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1965), indicates that it is very representative in such characteristics as geographical location of practice, law school education, and kind of practice arrangement. The age composition of the sample also reflects that of the State Bar with the exception that older lawyers are slightly underrepresented.

[22] The organization was established in Portland, Oregon in 1946 by 11 men, and six years later had a membership of 2,000 lawyers located in every state in the nation. One of the leaders of the group, Samuel B. Horowitz, explains its origins, purposes and activities in "NACCA and Its Objectives," *NACCA Law Journal*, 10 (1953), pp. 17–43. Recently the name of the organization was changed to the American Trial Lawyers' Association.

[23] In addition to the publication of its journal, NACCA has been active in establishing lectureships at law schools, writing articles for law reviews, developing a library on the rights of injured workers, and lobbying before legislative bodies. See Horowitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 25ff.

attorneys,[24] a development which naturally intensifies the rivalries of the two segments of the Kansas City and St. Louis Bars. We also were told that the basic division of the plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers into the respective associations still persists, although a spokesman for the defense attorneys in the St. Louis area volunteered the information that many of their group had joined the Lawyers' Association there in recent years "to keep an anchor on the plaintiffs' boys to prevent them from completely taking over the organization."

We also expanded our analysis beyond the plaintiff-defendant dichotomy to ascertain other differences in practice specialties associated with Bar and Lawyers' Association memberships. We wanted to determine whether the corporation lawyers still ally themselves with the defendants' counsels, as was true with the 1930's, and if criminal law specialists continue to join forces with plaintiffs' attorneys as they did when both groups were targets of the legal ethics campaign in the depression years. We also explored the possibility that other practice specialties that divide the legal profession were relevant, that is, whether lawyers handling domestic relations and labor matters for unions tend to identify with the plaintiffs' attorneys, while probate and trust lawyers find common cause with those on the defendants' side of the Bar schism.

Our source of data to test these matters—as well as others that follow—is the sample survey referred to above. Lawyers were asked to indicate the bar associations they belonged to, and on this basis, the respondents in the Kansas City and St. Louis areas were each divided into two groups, the Bar Association and the Lawyers' Association.[25] Information on practice specialty was elicited by an inquiry requesting each lawyer to select from a list of ten possibilities, the fields (up to three), in which he had earned most of his income or salary since being admitted to practice.[26] Table 1 shows the way in which the specialties are divided between the bar groups in each city.

Table 1 indicates that, generally speaking, the practice specialty divisions are as anticipated. Plaintiffs' lawyers constitute a greater proportion of the memberships of the Kansas City Bar Association and the Lawyers' Association of St. Louis than of their rival associations; the defendants' attorneys tend to be a more important group in the Kansas City Lawyers' Association than in the Bar Association of that city. The latter pattern is not true, however, with respect to the St. Louis Bar organizations, and apparently there is some inclination for defense attorneys to also join the Lawyers' Association there today as was suggested in our interviews. The corporation lawyers identify with the defendants' bar groups, and the attorneys handling domestic relations and criminal matters with the plaintiffs' associations. The remaining specialty divisions explored, namely, probate and trust, and labor, are in the directions expected. That is, lawyers with the former kind of practice tend to side with the defendants' bar groups, and the latter with the plaintiffs', but the differences are not as marked. The survey data also indicate that lawyers representing unions constitute a very small group in the total practice picture.[27]

While an analysis of the Bar along practice specialty lines gives some valuable clues into significant cleavages in the profession, it also has some distinct limitations. As Table 1 indicates, many lawyers do not concentrate all

[24] For an article expressing this concern, see Robert P. Hobson, "NACCA—As Viewed by Defense Counsel," *Kentucky State Bar Journal*, 20 (1956), pp. 170–172.

[25] Although there were a considerable number of lawyers in each community who belonged to both the Bar Association and the Lawyers' Association, those with overlapping memberships were similar in characteristics to those belonging to the Lawyers' Association alone. Combining the two groups, therefore, does not distort the analysis, and we did this under the category of Lawyers' Association. Apparently, as our interviews seem to indicate, the decision to join the "rebel" organization (the Lawyers' Association in each city) represents the important associational commitment on the part of a lawyer, and a simultaneous membership in the older, official Bar Association tends to be a matter of tradition and form.

[26] In addition to those discussed in this article, the fields included real property, municipal and administrative law, and negligence and/or compensation, equally for plaintiff and defendant. In developing the list, we were guided by the approach to this same subject in an official State Bar study entitled, *The Missouri Bar—Prentice-Hall Survey: A Motivational Study of Public Attitudes and Law Office Management*, 1963.

[27] A recent article, "The Lawyers of Labor," *Fortune* (March, 1961), p. 213, estimates that some 500 American attorneys serve unions, either as salaried "house counsel," or as lawyers in private practice who are on a retainer fee. *The 1964 Lawyer Statistical Report, op. cit.*, p. 26, sets the total number of lawyers in the United States in 1963 as 296,069.

TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF SELECTED FIELDS OF LEGAL PRACTICE AMONG MEMBERS OF MAJOR BAR ORGANIZATIONS IN KANSAS CITY AND ST. LOUIS AREAS

Field of Practice	Kansas City Bar Assn. (N=137)	Lawyers' Assn. of Kansas City (N=178)	St. Louis Bar Assn. (N=260)	Lawyers' Assn. of St. Louis (N=157)
Plaintiffs'				
Only field*	14%	2%	5%	14%
One of 2 or 3 fields†	30	8	7	29
Defendants'				
Only field	8	12	10	11
One of 2 or 3	1	11	7	7
Corporate and Business				
Only field	7	18	23	10
One of 2 or 3 fields	27	37	29	21
Domestic Relations				
Only field	0	0	0	0
One of 2 or 3 fields	20	6	7	20
Criminal				
Only field	1	0	0	3
One of 2 or 3 fields	10	1	2	5
Probate and Trust				
Only field	6	8	3	1
One of 2 or 3 fields	21	28	38	34
Labor				
Only field	1	0	0	2
One of 2 or 3 fields	2	2	2	3

* Only field of practice selected by lawyer.

† Field listed by lawyer as one of two, or one of three, major fields of his practice.

their practice in one field. This means that these attorneys cannot be neatly categorized on this basis.[28] Moreover, some of the specialties are broad, and obscure important distinctions between kinds of practices included within them. For example, some attorneys with a corporate and business practice represent huge corporations, while others service partnerships or individual concerns. Likewise, the size of decedents' estates handled by probate lawyers varies greatly. Other important distinctions can be made on the basis of the complexity of the tasks performed for a client: one lawyer may handle small routine matters for a corporation, while others may provide business concerns with complex advice involving a thorough knowledge of taxation and finance.

Perhaps the best index of the kinds of clients a lawyer services, and the complexity of the legal work he handles, is the organizational setting in which he practices law. The arrangements run the gamut from the solo practitioner, who has his own office, or shares an office, and common overhead expenses as well, with other attorneys, to the array of partners and associates of the larger law firms. Lawyers we interviewed often cast the distinction between the members of the Bar and Lawyers' Associations in these terms. Moreover, such differences are highly significant for a social analysis of the Bar, since Carlin found in New York that size of firm was the "single most significant indicator of status" in the legal profession.[29]

Another factor generally related to social status is income. Although the Law ranks as one of the three most lucrative professions in our society,[30] there is a considerable disparity in

[28] Our survey data do show, however, that lawyers tend to combine certain practice specialties such as corporate and probate and trust, and plaintiffs' and domestic relations.

[29] Carlin, *Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[30] *The Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1965* (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of the Census, U. S. Department of Commerce, 1965), p. 230, lists the median income of dentists, lawyers and physicians as over $10,000 a year. No other professional, technical or kindred occupation reaches that level.

earnings among lawyers.[31] Moreover, such income differentials have been indentified as an important source of cleavage in the Bar.[32]

We gathered information on organizational setting for the practice of law and income in our sample survey to determine whether differences in these matters were relevant to Bar and Lawyers' Association memberships in both Kansas City and St. Louis. We asked each respondent to select from among nine alternatives, the kind of practice arrangement in which he had spent most of his time since being admitted to practice.[33] The questionnaire also requested information on average yearly net income during the period of the past three years. Replies to these inquires are categorized by bar association in Table 2.

Table 2 indicates the differences in the practice arrangements of members of the rival bar associations in both communities. The disparities are greatest at the opposite ends of the private practice spectrum, that is, between solo attorneys and those in large firms. The former dominate the plaintiffs' associations and the latter (both partners and associates) identify with the defendants' bar groups. The differences in size of firm are most evident when partnerships reach the size of six or more. In fact, the smaller firms, those with two to five partners, are represented fairly equally in the respective bar associations. Lawyers not in private practice, that is, those working for corporations or government agencies, also fail to identify clearly with either bar group, and whatever preferences do exist for the former group, differ between the two cities.

Income differentials are relevant for the Kansas City bar group divisions, although not quite as pronounced as those relating to size of firm. The attorneys with the more lucrative practices tend to be concentrated in the Lawyers' Association. Twice as many of them as Bar Association members earn $20,000 a year or more, and fewer have net incomes below $10,000. However, the same situation does not apply in the St. Louis area. The distribution of incomes below $10,000, $10,000–$20,000, and above $20,000 are almost identical between members of the two associations there. Thus practice arrangement is a more important factor than income for Bar association identification in both metropolitan communities.

We explored two other factors pertaining to social status, partisan affiliation and education, to determine whether they have any relevance for the associational cleavages in the Metropolitan Bar. Some of our interviewees, particularly on the plaintiffs' side of the Bar, saw the differences in the bar groups in partisan terms, and linked Republicanism to what they termed a "silk stocking," that is, a high status, practice. Few persons commented on law school ties in our interviews, but students of the sociology of the legal profession have found this to be an important factor differentiating elements of the Bar.[34] Data on these matters elicited in our questionnaire[35] are categorized by bar group in Table 3.

Table 3 indicates that there are far more Republicans in the Lawyers' Association of Kansas City and the St. Louis Bar Association than there are in the rival bar groups, where Democrats predominate. The fact that half or more of the members of the former organizations identify with the Republican party is

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 229, categorizes attorneys' salaries in seven work levels in terms of duties and responsibilities. The average salaries of the seven levels range from $7,248 to $24,288. Maurice Liebenburg in "Income of Lawyers in the Postwar Period," *Survey of Current Business*, 36 (1956), pp. 26 f., finds that in 1954 the median income of lawyers in the United States was $7,833, but one-third received incomes below $5,000 and one-fifth over $15,000.

[32] Carlin in *Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession, op. cit.*, pp. 11 ff., and Ladinsky, in his *Journal of Legal Education* article, *op. cit.*, pp. 135 ff., analyze income as a factor in the stratification of the Bars of New York City and Detroit respectively. Henderson and Sinclair in their study, *Judicial Selection in Texas: An Exploratory Study* (Houston: Public Affairs Research Center, 1964), Vol. 1, at p. 17, identify the disparity in incomes of lawyers in Texas as a source of cleavage in the urban Bar there.

[33] We elicited similar information on the practice arrangement of each respondent during the past year, but there was almost no variation between the two kinds of data. This accords with the findings of Carlin in *Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession, op. cit.*, pp. 16 ff., and Ladinsky, in his *Journal of Legal Education* article, *op. cit.*, pp. 132 ff., that lawyers' career histories show that they tend to remain in the same general social strata of the Bar in which they begin the practice of law.

[34] Carlin, *Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession, op. cit.*, pp. 25 ff.; Ladinsky, *American Sociological Review, op. cit.*, pp. 49 ff.; David Riesman, "Law and Sociology: Recruitment, Training, and Colleagueship" in William M. Evan (ed.), *Law and Sociology: Exploratory Essays* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), pp. 12 f.

TABLE 2. LAW PRACTICE ARRANGEMENT AND INCOME OF MEMBERS OF MAJOR BAR ORGANIZATIONS IN KANSAS CITY AND ST. LOUIS AREAS

Characteristic	Kansas City Bar Assn. (N = 137)	Lawyers' Assn. of Kansas City (N = 178)	St. Louis Bar Assn. (N = 260)	Lawyers' Assn. of St. Louis (N = 157)
Arrangement				
Solo Practice	36%	14%	16%	47%
Two-man partnership	14	11	7	12
Partnership 3–5	12	11	14	17
Partnership 6–9	4	9	10	4
Partnership 10–19	1	12	6	1
Partnership 20 or more	0	8	3	0
*Salaried employee-law firm	9	17	20	6
Salaried employee-corp.	12	9	12	7
Salaried employee-govt.	5	2	4	4
Not ascertained	7	7	8	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
Income				
Less than $5,000	7%	1%	4%	6%
$5,000–$9,999	22	17	22	20
$10,000–$14,999	26	25	21	22
$15,000–$19,999	24	14	17	15
$20,000–$29,999	14	24	14	21
$30,000–$49,999	5	13	15	12
$50,000 and above	0	3	3	2
Not ascertained	2	3	4	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

* Generally referred to in Missouri as Associates.

significant in a state as Democratic as Missouri has been in recent years.[36] The data also show that the number of political independents in any of the groups is negligible, indicating that at least in these two metropolitan areas, lawyers are party identifiers.[37]

The education data demonstrate that differences in kinds of law schools attended which lawyers and sociologists have considered important are also very relevant for the Bar divisions. The contrasts are greatest in the Kansas City area where almost one-half of the members of the Lawyers' Association attended law school outside the state, some 24 per cent of them at one of the five prestigious "national" schools of Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan and Yale.[38] On the other hand, nearly one

[35] In eliciting information on party identification, we patterned our approach after that utilized by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan.

[36] A state-wide survey conducted in the Spring of 1965 by the Public Opinion Survey Unit at the University of Missouri showed that 60 per cent of Missourians identify with the Democratic party, compared to 26 per cent who are Republicans. The large urban centers of the state are somewhat more Democratic: in Jackson County, the percentage ratio is 64 to 20, and in the St. Louis area (St. Louis City and St. Louis County combined), it is 62–24.

[37] The 1965 state-wide survey also revealed that about 10 per cent of persons living in the two large urban areas in Missouri, as well as the state as a whole, consider themselves Independents. The Survey Research Center's 1964 study showed an identical figure for the national population. See Hugh Bone, *American Politics and the Party System*, 3rd ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 480.

[38] We realize there are no completely satisfactory criteria by which to evaluate law schools. We

TABLE 3. PARTISAN AFFILIATION AND LEGAL EDUCATION OF MEMBERS OF MAJOR BAR ORGANIZATIONS IN KANSAS CITY AND ST. LOUIS AREAS

Characteristics	Kansas City Bar Assn. (N=137)	Lawyers' Assn. of Kansas City (N=178)	St. Louis Bar Assn. (N=260)	Lawyers' Assn. of St. Louis (N=157)
Party Affiliation				
Republican	19%	41%	44%	24%
Independent Republican	6	8	10	8
Democrat	63	41	35	54
Independent Democrat	6	3	7	9
Independents	3	2	2	3
Not ascertained	3	5	2	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	10
Law School				
Instate				
University of Missouri	29%	24%	9%	4%
Washington University	4	2	41	31
St. Louis University	2	1	21	39
Kansas City	44	19	0	0
Other Instate Schools	0	0	1	12
Outstate				
Prestige Law Schools*	5	24	16	2
Other Outstate Schools	14	24	7	5
Not ascertained	2	6	5	7
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

* Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, Yale.

half of the Bar Association members got their legal education at a distinctly local law school, the University of Kansas City,[39] today an approved law school with a mixed program (that is, both night and day classes),[40] but which until the mid 1930's was a "proprietary" law school not sanctioned by the American Bar Association.[41] In the St. Louis area, the differences are not as great, but more Bar Association members there also go out of state for their legal education, particularly to the prestigious national schools. Also, there are important distinctions between St. Louis lawyers who were educated in local schools. The Bar Association

decided on these five on the basis of general reputation. Moreover, it is an objective fact that the latter four law schools, as of 1954 at least, had the largest law libraries in the nation. Albert P. Blaustein and Charles O. Porter, *The American Lawyer*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 206.

[39] Recently this law school, along with the University itself, was absorbed into the University of Missouri system. It is now known as the University of Missouri Law School at Kansas City.

[40] Such law schools are sometimes called "multiple division" law schools and frequently just "night" law schools. In 1963, about 90 per cent of the students enrolled in schools are not approved by the American Bar Association were attending night classes compared to less than 10 per cent in morning classes. See *Law Schools and Bar Admission Requirements in the United States* in the *U. S. Review of Legal Education* (Chicago: American Bar Association, Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, 1963), p. 19.

[41] Proprietary law schools were generally founded as private profit-making institutions, but today many are incorporated not for profit. They have no University affiliation. See Carlin, *Lawyers on Their Own, op. cit.*, p. 26. The Kansas City School of Law was not approved by the American Bar Association until it became affiliated with the University of Kansas City.

attorneys are more likely to have gone to Washington University, a full-time school, and Lawyers' Association members to St. Louis University, a Catholic school with a mixed program,[42] or to one of the formerly unapproved proprietary night law schools located in the St. Louis area.[43]

Thus our study of the memberships of the rival bar associations in both Kansas City and St. Louis indicates that they generally vary in such factors as practice specialty, income, party affiliation, practice arrangement and legal education, with the latter two matters showing the most pronounced differences. This is significant, since size of firm and kind of law school attended are among the important indicators of social status in the legal profession.[44] Moreover, a separate analysis of the backgrounds of the officers of the four associations over the period of the last twenty-five years[45] shows that the leaders of the rebel bar groups are even more likely to possess distinct status characteristics than the rank-and-file members of their organizations. For example, 39 per cent of the officers of the Kansas City Lawyers' Association attended one of the five prestige law schools as compared to 24 per cent of its general membership. Similarly, 67 per cent of the leaders of the Lawyers' Association of St. Louis have been single practitioners, while only 47 per cent of the members of that group practice law by themselves. The analysis also showed that the officialdoms of the rival bar groups were distinct, since lawyers serve in official positions in only one of the two associations in their community.[46] The way in which these Bar leaders rally the support of their respective members in the election of lawyer members of the nominating commissions is discussed in the next section of the article.

II. CONDUCT OF CONTESTS FOR LAWYER SEATS ON JUDICIAL NOMINATING COMMISSIONS

As with elections generally, the contests for lawyer seats on the judicial nominating commissions in Missouri are shaped by three major factors. The first is the set of legal rules which provides the framework under which the elections are conducted. The second is what Key calls the "standards of campaign etiquette,"[47] that is, what the particular political culture feels is and is not proper in the realm of politics. In this case, of course, the standards are set not by the society at large, but by a special segment of it, namely, the legal profession itself. Finally, there is the nature of the constituency, in this case, the members of the Bar, who collectively form the electorate for these contests. Campaigns aimed at this electorate must necessarily take into account the nature of the various divisions of the profession, just as political leaders analyze the various groupings in the general electorate. These three factors constitute the "givens" of the electoral situation, and thus serve to dictate the nature of the strategies employed in the contests for the lawyer seats on the nominating commissions.

The legal rules for the elections[48] provide that lawyer candidates for both the circuit and appellate commissions be nominated by petition. Since only 20 signatures are necessary,[49] there is the possibility of having several candidates for a position. However, the nature of the Bar rivalries has become so institutionalized, that, at least since the period of the early 1950's, there have been only two candidates in each election, one representing the Bar Association and one the Lawyers' Association, in both Kansas City and St. Louis. Each group has evolved a practice of nominating its candidate in a caucus usually attended by officers of the association and other Bar "actives" outside the

[42] Carlin includes Catholic and proprietary schools with "mixed" programs in the same category in his analysis of law schools, *ibid.*, p. 25.

[43] Today all the law schools in Missouri are approved by the ABA, but in the depression period a number of unapproved schools operated in St. Louis, including Benton College of Law, City College of Law and Finance and Missouri Institute of Accounting, Law and Law Department.

[44] See footnotes 29 and 34, *supra*. Of course, the two factors are interrelated. The processes of self-selection and firm recruitment result in graduates of prestige law schools joining law firms. See Ladinsky, *American Sociological Review*, *op. cit.*, p. 49; Blaustein and Porter, *op. cit.*, p. 197; Smigel, *op. cit.*, pp. 39 ff.

[45] A yearly publication by Martindale-Hubbel, Inc., contains certain basic data on lawyers in all states. Volume II has the information on Missouri attorneys.

[46] Of the 138 individuals we identified as officers in the two bar groups in Kansas City, only 3 held office in both; a similar number of officers of the two associations in St. Louis contained only 2 individuals who had served as officers in both organizations.

[47] V. O. Key, Jr., *op. cit.*, p. 463.

[48] *Constitution of the State of Missouri*, 1945, Art. V., Sec. 29(d) and Supreme Court Rule 10.

[49] In appellate commission contests, at least 10 of the signatures must be those of attorneys residing in a different judicial circuit than the nominee. Supreme Court Rule 10.10.

formal power structure. Such meetings are not official because, as one interviewee explained, "Lawyers are an independent group and would resent any formal endorsement of either side." Nevertheless, word goes out as to the man who will represent each group in the election, and organizational loyalty is sufficient to prevent other nominations that would serve to split the vote of members of the association. It is particularly important that this eventuality be avoided as it may lead to the opposition group's candidate receiving the necessary majority vote on the first ballot, or force a run-off election[50] with its attendant uncertainties.

The selection of a nominee is governed by certain general principles of what might be termed, Bar "availability." As in our general party system, each association starts with certain "hard-core" supporters as outlined in the previous section: one group can count generally on the loyalty of solo practitioners, educated in local law schools, with a plaintiffs' practice or one involving domestic relations or criminal matters; the other draws its followers primarily from the ranks of attorneys from the larger firms, many of whom have been educated at out-of-state prestige law schools, who specialize in corporate or defense work. But because, as discussed in the following section, the system is highly competitive, each group must be concerned with attracting the support of those in the middle of the Bar spectrum, that is, the attorneys who are not committed to either group. The concern with the "vital center" of the profession is revealed in the tendency of three of the four bar associations to draw their candidates particularly from lawyers in the smaller firms.[51]

The closeness of the contests puts a premium on selecting a candidate who not only avoids the negative feature of having an "extremist" kind of practice, but who also possesses positive availability qualities as well. It is particularly important that he be widely-known in the profession. There is the danger that a group's leaders will become myopic and assume that a man well-known in their legal circles will have a wide acquaintanceship in the Bar at large. This is a particular hazard for defendants' organizations, which may fail to take into account that "office" lawyers who seldom appear in court may have only a fairly close-knit group of lawyer friends, and that their contacts with many members of the profession may be non-existent, or occur only through the highly impersonal medium of a telephone conversation at which clients' affairs are discussed. Some observers of a recent circuit commission contest felt that this was a strategic error which contributed to the defeat of the defendants' candidate in that election.

The groups often select trial attorneys as their candidates because lawyers with this kind of a practice have a wide acquaintanceship in the profession involving face-to-face contact with a number of attorneys. Lawyers also look favorably on their candidacies because they feel that trial attorneys with extensive courtroom experience may be in the best position to evaluate the merits of prospective judges and that, therefore, they should sit on the nominating commissions. At the same time, the best trial attorneys are often those who are the toughest fighters in the courtroom, and there is the risk that if such a person is selected, his candidacy will not be favored by attorneys whom he has not only bested, but more importantly, "worked over" or belittled, in court.[52] Thus a premium is placed on selecting a person who is both a trial attorney and a gentleman.

Other factors affect how well-known an attorney is in the profession. He should have been in the practice long enough to have come in contact with a number of attorneys and, for that reason, young lawyers are generally excluded as candidates, as are attorneys with specialized practices that put them in contact with only a relatively few members of the profession. It is helpful if an attorney has been active in bar association work in which he has been exposed to a wide range of his fellow lawyers. This is particularly important in appellate commission races in which attorneys living outside the two major cities have the franchise. Attorneys active in the Missouri Bar Association are more likely to be known to the "outstate" lawyers, as are attorneys with appellate court practices that put them into courtroom contact with lawyers in all parts of the appellate court jurisdiction.

As availability factors affect the kinds of candidates nominated, so Bar folkways shape the character of the campaign for the commission posts. There is a strong tradition that the position should seek the man: all the candidates we interviewed stressed the fact that others had come and asked them to make the race. Many said they agreed to do so only on the understanding that they themselves would not have

[50] Supreme Court Rule 10.14.

[51] The exception is the Lawyers' Association of St. Louis, which tends to nominate lawyers in solo practice.

[52] Henderson and Sinclair, *op. cit.*, at page 16 note the same courtroom animosities among Texas lawyers.

to do any campaigning. Part of the reluctance to do so is based on a concern with the time a personal campaign takes from the individual's law practice. But beyond this, there is something repugnant to some lawyers about politicking for a position they feel should be decided upon the basis of legal ability. This is particularly true of persons on the defendants' side of the Bar. Plaintiffs' attorneys are less sensitive about pushing themselves forward, perhaps because they are more used to hustling for legal work than are firm lawyers with more stable clientele.[53]

In the early days of the Plan, some candidates enjoyed such popularity and stature in the profession that no concerted campaign was necessary to ensure their election to the commission. However, the increasing specialization in the law as well as the sheer growth in the number of lawyers practicing tend to circumscribe legal acquaintanceships; this means that it is difficult for any individual to be so widely-known as earlier. The realities of metropolitan Bar politics today require that the candidate's supporters, if not himself, take to the legal "hustings." Typically, this involves solicitation of votes through personal contacts, telephone conversations and, particularly in appellate commission races, communication by letter with fellow members of the Bar. One appellate commission candidate on the defendants' side complained, however, that his opponent in a recent race had almost beaten him by throwing cocktail and beer parties to gain support, and that if he had it to do over again, he himself would wage a vigorous campaign. Thus the aggressive tactics of the plaintiffs' group may be bringing about some important changes in the traditional rules of campaign etiquette.

Since the two sides draw their support from different elements of the profession, their campaign techniques differ. Over the years, the defendants' side has possessed certain electoral advantages. One is that traditionally, more leaders of the Bar have come from this side of the legal constituency. This fact has led the defendants to use "endorsements" as a campaign device. (The word is passed that certain pillars of the Bar are supporting a particular candidate with the idea that this will swing the votes of some of the doubtful lawyers.) Another lies in the concentration of their hard-core support in the large law offices where it can be tapped with a minimum of effort.[54] Senior partners of law firms often act as precinct captains in the campaigns. As one explained, "I'm the Bar Association's representative in our office, and it is my job to line up the support of the other senior as well as junior members of the firm." The ecology of the law offices is also such that the firms themselves are fairly well concentrated geographically in the heart of the central city business district, and this also minimizes campaign "leg-work."

In contrast to this situation, the electoral support of the plaintiffs' groups lies with the isolated single practitioner or small-firm lawyer, which means that precinct captains cannot be called upon to "deliver" the vote. Moreover, the offices are frequently scattered geographically, not only in the downtown area, but also in the outlying neighborhoods where more solo attorneys and small firms are now locating. Thus a special effort is required to marshal their votes through such devices as dividing up buildings by floors among campaign workers, or utilizing telephone campaigns based upon divisions of the Bar directory. The endorsement device is not utilized by the plaintiffs' lawyers because they lack the leaders with the traditional standing in the profession, and also because such a "silk stocking" device runs counter to the "democratic" philosophy of some members of the "little man's" segment of the profession.

Both sides use the campaign technique of lining up the support of "fellow travelers," that is, members of the Bar who are engaged in other pursuits besides the private practice of law, but who are generally sympathetic to their respective causes. Thus the plaintiffs' lawyers contact government attorneys involved in such matters as workmen's compensation, and those on the legal staffs of labor unions as potential allies. The defendants' associations look to lawyers working in claims departments of insurance companies and to

[53] Plaintiffs' lawyers' business is generally on a "one shot" basis, that is, individuals who come to see them just once in connection with a personal injury. (See Carlin, *Lawyers on Their Own*, *op. cit.*, Ch. 3, for a discussion of methods of getting this business through the use of "brokers" or "middlemen" such as policemen, ambulance drivers, etc.) In contrast, corporate and defendants' attorneys generally do their legal business on a long-term basis, often through "retainer" fees whereby clients pay to have time reserved for their affairs.

[54] For an analysis of the analogous way in which shop size in the printing industry affects the internal politics of the two party system of the International Typographical Union, see Seymour Lipset, Martin Trow and James Coleman, *Union Democracy* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1956), Chs. 8 and 9.

house counsel of corporations for support in the elections. As one defense attorney put it, "There are twenty lawyers on the legal staff of Monsanto Chemical who represent potential allies for us." Defense firm clients such as industrial corporations, banks, public utilities, etc., who employ lawyers in non-legal work, are also frequently asked to solicit their support for the defendants' candidate. Lawyers operating on the periphery of the profession are less likely than private practitioners to be interested in Bar activities[55] from which basic loyalties arise, and hence both sides make special efforts to get out their vote in the lawyer elections. The results of these elections over the years, together with the "stakes" or "payoffs" involved in them, are treated in the following sections.

III. OUTCOMES OF CONTESTS FOR LAWYER SEATS

Although normally both groups field candidates for the lawyer-seat elections, on occasion some candidate runs unopposed. This does not appear to result from any prior negotiation between the rival organizations. What seems to be more prevalent is for a group seeking to win the "middle" segment of the Bar to put up a candidate who turns out to be acceptable to the other side. This may occur because the latter group feels it has no real chance of defeating the candidate, and so, to avoid antagonizing him, enters no nominee against him. Or they may feel that he really is neutral in the plaintiffs'-defendants' rivalry and so go along with his candidacy. Moreover, there are some attorneys who, even though they clearly have a plaintiffs' or defendants' practice, acquire a reputation for fair-mindedness and hence are acceptable to the other side. This is most likely to happen if such a lawyer goes out of his way to cultivate friendships and socialize with his courtroom opposition. The "eras of good feeling" in Bar politics are rare, however: we were able to uncover only three unopposed candidacies since the elections began a quarter of a century ago.

The results generally reveal the presence of a competitive situation in both communities. In Kansas City, of the six contested races for the circuit commission, the Lawyers' Association candidate emerged victorious on four occasions and the Bar Association man won twice. In St. Louis the scales tipped slightly in the opposite direction: the Lawyers' Association nominee won six times as compared to five victories for the Bar Association. (Deaths and resignations of commissioners in the latter community have necessitated holding more elections than in Kansas City.) Our investigation of the appellate commission elections indicates, however, that the defendants' groups do somewhat better at this level than for circuit commission races. They have won two of the three clear-cut contests in Kansas City, and three of the four in the St. Louis Court of Appeals district.

The relatively few elections that occur under the Plan make it difficult to assess definite trends, but the plaintiffs' group has been winning more in recent elections. Some attorneys attribute this to NACCA and MAACA, which serve as important organizational ralliers of the plaintiffs' lawyers. These interest groups have thus provided the single practitioners and the small firm lawyers with a leadership and *esprit de corps* they formerly lacked. Moreover, the high professional quality of the activities of these organizations, together with the rise in size of judgments awarded in personal injury cases, have made plaintiffs' work both more respectable and more lucrative than it used to be.[56] All these factors have contributed to strengthening the cause of the plaintiffs' lawyers.

There are also some indications that the legal rules for the elections are working at the present time in favor of the plaintiffs' bar associations. Under these rules, lawyers serving on the commissions, as well as those voting in the elections, must not only practice law in the court's jurisdiction but must also reside there.[57] Thus attorneys living in suburban areas outside Jackson County and St. Louis City are disfranchised as candidates or voters in circuit court elections, and if they live across the state line, they are similarly affected in appellate commission races. All four bar groups are handicapped by these legal provisions, but our survey data show that the defendants' organizations are affected more because a greater proportion of their members live outside the jurisdictions of the circuit court in both metropolitan communities and, in the Kansas City

[55] An analysis of the respondents from both communities who do not belong to either the Bar Association or the Lawyers' Association in their area shows that a considerable number of them are employed by the government or by private corporations.

[56] A number of defendants' lawyers in the Kansas City area recently have begun also to handle some plaintiffs' cases. This development has not yet occurred to any significant extent in St. Louis.

[57] *Constitution of the State of Missouri*, 1945, Art. V, Sec. 29(d) and Supreme Court Rule 10.14.

area, beyond the appellate court jurisdiction as well.[58]

Despite these developments favoring the plaintiffs' organizations, the defendants continue to do well in races for the appellate commission.[59] The suburbanization process affects them less at that level, particularly in the St. Louis area where few lawyers live outside the state. As previously suggested, attorneys active in Missouri Bar Association activities with outstate reputations and acquaintanceships tend to make strong candidates, and such persons have tended over the years to be more associated with the defendants' than the plaintiffs' bar associations. Moreover, the type of law business of some of the larger firms is such that the courts of appeals and Supreme Court arenas (the judges of whom are nominated by the appellate commission) are far more important to their clients' economic interests than are the circuit courts.[60] Hence they tend to place more emphasis on, and work harder in, elections to the appellate nominating body than those to the circuit one.

IV. STAKES AND CONSEQUENCES

It is this latter consideration which constitutes the "payoff" for the participants in the elections of lawyer members of the commission. The ultimate stakes in these contests are the judges that go on the circuit benches in Kansas City and St. Louis and the appellate courts of the entire state. Both sides seek to influence that decision by insuring that "their" kind of lawyers sit on the commissions that nominate the candidates from whom the governor makes his selection. While some attorneys are interested in judgeships personally,[61] and work to get commission members selected whom they think will favor their candidacies, most are concerned with "policy payoffs," not patronage—that is, they want to get persons on the bench who will be sympathetic, or at least not hostile, to their clients' interests.

As the developer and applier of rules of law, the judge shapes the outcome of litigation. This is particularly true in appellate cases and nonjury cases at the lower court level, but even when there is a jury that "finds the facts," the man on the bench has an important role to play in the law suit. The manner in which he interprets the "rules of the game" under which the trial proceedings are conducted often helps to tip the scales of justice in one direction or the other. For example, the plaintiffs' lawyers seek to have the rules of evidence liberally construed so they can get the maximum evidence introduced into the law suit; defendants' lawyers hope that much of the evidence on which plaintiffs base their cases will be excluded by the courts.

The struggle proceeds throughout the course of the law suit, with important decisions made all along the way that affect the economic interests of the parties to the litigation. After the plaintiff's case is presented, will the judge grant the defendant's motion for a direct verdict in his favor, or will he let the case go to the jury? After the arguments are heard, what kinds of instructions will he give the jury? And after the jury has finally reached a verdict and assessed damages, will the judge let the amount of the judgment stand, or will he reduce it? The discretion he has in decisions of this nature (a trial judge can, of course, be reversed on appeal, but the overwhelming proportion of cases end in the lower court)[62] makes the kind of person he is, and the way he looks at such matters, of vital concern to the litigating parties.

The stakes in the lawyer elections are most important to trial attorneys, particularly plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers—that is, those involved in personal injury litigation—because such cases constitute a great share of the court docket, particularly at the trial court level.[63] However, attorneys who do little or no

[58] Almost one-fifth of the members of the Lawyers' Association of Kansas City reside outside the state according to our survey data.

[59] A recent Kansas City Appellate Commission race, however, was won by the plaintiffs' group.

[60] Carlin, *Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession*, *op. cit.*, at p. 11, states that firm lawyers in New York City spend more time in appellate courts, while individual practitioners come in contact mainly with lower courts. Our survey data on appearances before circuit and appellate courts in Missouri indicate that the circuit courts are more important to members of the plantiffs' bar associations and the appellate courts to lawyers belonging to the defendants' bar groups.

[61] Our survey data show that about 10 per cent of the attorneys practicing in both Kansas City and St. Louis have let their names come before one of the nominating commissions for consideration as a judge.

[62] The Report of the Judicial Conference of Missouri for the period beginning June 16, 1964 and ending June 15, 1965, indicates that the Supreme Court and three intermediate Courts of Appeal handled 1229 cases, while the lower courts of the state disposed of 88,792 cases.

[63] No exact figures are available for Missouri on

trial work must necessarily consider the kinds of judges who sit on the bench, since conceivably their clients' affairs may become involved in litigation even if they personally do not handle the case in court. Beyond this, it would appear that the contests for the lawyers' seats on the commission entail other considerations besides the concrete stakes of judgeships. The elections also serve as an outlet for basic rivalries between the social divisions of the Bar previously discussed. The fact that the plaintiffs' and defendants' groups also contest for positions in the integrated state bar association,[64] where the stakes are far less concrete than judgeships, would seem to bear out the supposition that frequently matters of prestige, rather than substance, are involved.[65]

The rivalry between the two bar groups is fed by the ideologies each has developed to support its cause. Many lawyers we interviewed described the nature of the clash as one between "liberals" and "conservatives." (This is interesting since, as a group, lawyers often tend to resist generalizations and what they deem to be stereotyped thinking.) One defense attorney expressed it more precisely as "a battle between property interests and those who want to acquire property interests but have not yet done so." Essentially, then, one side represents the "haves," the other the "have nots." This is particularly true in personal-injury litigation in which the injured party, often a person of modest means, is trying to collect damages from corporations or insurance companies.

In the process of representing their clients, attorneys often are guilty of what Talcott Parsons calls, the "sentimental exaggeration of substantive claims of clients."[66] For example, defense and corporation attorneys are inclined to wax eloquent over the rights of property. One attorney we interviewed pointed out that one of the older members of his firm simply could not conceive of a legitimate plaintiff's claim, that all were simply attempts to get "something for nothing" by blackmailing established institutions into settling claims rather than bearing the cost and inconvenience of litigation. In contrast, the plaintiffs' lawyer thinks of himself as protecting "the working man" or "little guy" against the "vested interests," particularly unscrupulous insurance companies and claims adjusters who try to get injured persons to settle claims out of court at far below their real value. He is more inclined to emphasize "human" rights than those of property. Thus each lawyer sees the legal world through what might be termed "client-colored" glasses.

Many attorneys go further and view with hostility not only opposition litigants but opposing counsel as well. The disparate styles of practice of the two major divisions of the Bar, and the fact that they have so little contact in the profession with each other,[67] leads them to regard each other with what one author calls "mutually derogating images."[68] Plaintiffs' lawyers are inclined to think of defendants' and corporation lawyers as "blue-bloods," or as individuals "without a heart" or "cold-blooded with a banker's icy stare," (as one of our interviewees expressed it). They also criticize the defendants' bar organizations as "exclusive clubs run by cliques" which restrict their memberships, in contrast to their own "democratic" groups that accept everyone for membership who applies. Plaintiffs' lawyers are particularly scornful of corporation lawyers as "office" or "banker's attorneys" who "never try a law suit," an interesting twist on the business executive's contempt for anyone who has "never met a payroll."

---

the amount of personal injury cases in the various levels of courts, but many of the trial lawyers we interviewed set the circuit court figure at two-thirds or more. This is generally consistent with studies that show that 60 per cent of the cases in New York and over one-half of those in New Jersey in recent years involved such litigation. See Maurice Rosenberg and Michael I. Sovern, "Delay and Dynamics of Personal Injury Litigation," *Columbia Law Review*, 59 (1959), p. 1117.

[64] The Missouri Bar was integrated by court order in 1944. For a general study of the subject, see Dayton McKean, *The Integrated Bar* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1963).

[65] It is only recently that the plaintiffs' lawyers have succeeded in having one of their group elected to the Presidency of the Missouri Bar Association. Although the President can conceivably affect the kinds of activities the Association carries on, most of our interviewees felt that this factor was not nearly so important to the plaintiffs' lawyers as the feeling that one of their men had "made it."

[66] "A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession" in Parsons (ed.), *Essays in Sociological Theory* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1954), p. 377.

[67] Carlin, *Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession, op. cit.*, at p. 19, discusses the lack of professional and social contact between the various strata of the New York Bar. The same general situation prevails in the two metropolitan communities in Missouri.

[68] Smigel, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

Defendants' and corporation lawyers are less inclined to condemn their opposition in social-class terms, but many display a kind of patronizing attitude toward those who "have never quite made it in the profession." Moreover, they are openly contemptuous of lawyers who run "divorce mills," and even more, of "ambulance chasers," that is, attorneys who solicit clients through means that run counter to the canons of the profession.[69] Many accuse the plaintiffs' lawyers of exploiting their clients with contingent fee arrangements.[70] Also, there is some tendency for defendants' and corporation lawyers to categorize all attorneys on the basis of the lawyers with whom they have practiced law over the years; this brand of guilt by association means that professional sins of practitioners are often visited on their partners and associates.

All these factors undoubtedly contribute to the great interest which plaintiffs' lawyers take in the lawyer elections. As suggested previously, the concrete stakes of the kinds of judges who go on the court are very important to them in their trial practices. But beyond this, they feel what Carlin calls "the pinch of the status structure"[71] more keenly than other groups in the Bar. Frequently, men of considerable ability and ambition with lucrative practices, they are strongly motivated to compete in electoral contests with those they feel deny them their rightful place in the profession.

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Bar politics examined in this article demonstrates that significant cleavages have developed in the Missouri legal community on the matter of choosing judges. In both Kansas City and St. Louis, a practice has evolved whereby rival bar groups nominate candidates and mount campaigns to get their men elected as lawyer members to the circuit and appellate commissions which nominate candidates for the bench. These lawyers' elections have taken on many of the features of a general party system. The bar organizations not only assume the role of parties in the election process, but they also possess characteristics that differentiate them from mere "factions": they are durable and visible; they have not been dependent for their existence upon individual personalities or cliques; and they represent important economic and social divisions in the Bar supported by conflicting ideologies.[72] Moreover, a competitive "two-party" system has developed, since no other group enters candidates, and both the Bar Association and Lawyers' Association have been able to elect their candidates at reasonably frequent intervals over the years.[73]

The development of this two-party system within the legal community means that diverse elements of the Bar are represented in the selection process. The concern of some persons that the Bar is inevitably conservative is disproven by the Missouri experience.[74] The fact that all attorneys, and not just the leaders of the American Bar Association, are involved in the selection process, makes for a more adequate representation of the Bar than is involved in the profession's attempt to influence the choice of federal judges.[75]

[69] Missouri Supreme Court Rule 4.28 prohibits the stirring up of litigation directly or through agents. For a discussion of the problem of enforcing compliance with such canons of legal ethics, and the way in which the stratification of the Bar affects attitudes towards them, see Carlin, *Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar*, *op. cit.* and Kenneth Reichstein, "Ambulance Chasing and the Legal Profession," *Social Problems* 13 (1965), pp. 3–17.

[70] Under such arrangements, a lawyer receives a certain percentage (usually one-third in Missouri) of the judgment awarded his client; if none is awarded, he receives no fee.

[71] Carlin, *Lawyers on Their Own*, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

[72] V. O. Key talks of "factionalism" in his *Southern Politics in State and Nation*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1949), and William N. Chambers distinguishes between factions and parties in his *Political Parties in a New Nation: The American Experience* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 17–33.

[73] For methods of classifying state party systems on the basis of competitiveness see Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, "The American Party Systems," this REVIEW, 48 (1954), pp. 477–485; and Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States Accord-REVIEW, 49 (1955), pp. 1120–1128.

[74] De Tocqueville, in his classic study, *Democracy in America*, referred to lawyers and judges as the American "aristocracy" which acted as a check on the democratic element in the society. For a discussion of the reasons underlying the alleged conservatism of lawyers, see Walter F. Murphy and C. Herman Pritchett, *Courts, Judges and Politics* (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 126f.

[75] Grossman's analysis of the composition of the Committee on Federal Judiciary in his study, *op. cit.*, shows that it represents primarily the conservative elements of the profession. For a discussion of the conservative public policy stands of the ABA over the years, see John Schmidhauser,

This inclusion of a broad spectrum of the Bar in the choosing of judges has direct relevance for the theoretical issue raised earlier in this paper, namely, whether the role of the Bar in judicial selection is compatible with the tenet that broad social interests should be represented in the selection of policy-making officials in a democratic society. For one of the key conclusions to be drawn from this study is that lawyers' perspectives on judicial selection are shaped to a great degree by the kinds of clients they serve. Attorneys want judges on the bench who will interpret rules in a particular way because such matters affect their individual law practices. However, generally speaking, what advances an attorney's own personal professional interests, also advances those of persons and organizations he represents.

In other words, in judicial selection, as in the handling of legal affairs generally, attorneys act as surrogates of the social and economic interests they represent. Thus, contests between plaintiffs' and defendants' lawyers over matters relating to judicial selection insure that the interests of injured parties of the lower classes, as well as those of wealthy corporations, will be represented in choosing judges.

What is suggested here is that the issue of the role of the Bar in judicial selection has been examined on the wrong basis. The question is not whether the legal profession as a group can serve as unbiased spokesmen for the "public interest"[76] in choosing judges, as its leaders sometimes claim to do; the fact that lawyers are lined up on opposite sides of economic and social issues in our society makes this hope unrealistic. Rather the question is whether lawyers as "client caretakers"[77] adequately represent the various "publics" that utilize the courts, that is, the social and economic interests involved in litigation.

It is our judgment that in Missouri the rival Bar Associations and Lawyers' Associations have acted as effective surrogates of the respective interests they represent. While this study is restricted to one state, there are indications that the cleavages which exist in the Bars of Kansas City and St. Louis are found elsewhere in the United States. Rival bar organizations exist in other metropolitan communities,[78] and the basic ingredients of the Bar politics discussed in this article, namely, the social stratification and internal conflicts of the legal profession, as well as the importance of personal injury litigation in modern society,[79] are present generally in our urban areas. Certainly the national scope of NACCA's activities, and the fact that it has affiliate chapters in every state in the Union, testify to the general nature of the plaintiffs' lawyers' concern with adequately representing their clients.

The findings reported here raise serious questions about the one-sided conception of the legal community which is often found in the literature. Hurst has sketched the lawyer's role in American society through a series of historical stages as the impact of industrialism changed the attorney from a courtroom man representing individuals to a counselor for the corporate world.[80] In the same vein, Adolf Berle has referred to the lawyer as "an intel-

The Supreme Court: Its Politics, Personalities and Procedures (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), Ch. 4.

[76] For a critique of this concept, see Glendon Schubert, *The Public Interest* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1960).

[77] Pound uses the phrase, "client-caretaker," at p. 184, *op. cit.*, as does James Willard Hurst in his study, *The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1950), p. 366.

[78] Pound, *op. cit.*, pp. 281ff., lists Lawyers' Associations or Lawyers' Clubs (in addition to the traditional Bar Association) in Atlanta, Los Angeles, and New York. (Carlin *Current Research in the Sociology of the Legal Profession*, *op. cit.*, p. 20, states that membership in the two New York associations is highly correlated with size of firm, with the large firm lawyers tending to join the City Bar Association, and solo and small firm practioners, the County Lawyers' Association. It is possible that other such rival organizations exist, since less than 12 per cent of the local bar associations in the United States returned the questionnaire on which Pound based his study. For example, the Lawyers' Association of St. Louis is not listed, presumably because its officials failed to provide information on the organization.

[79] See footnote 63, *supra*. *The Statistical Abstract of the United States*, 1965, *op. cit.*, at p. 572, estimates that automobile losses paid in 1963 totaled some four-and-one-half billion dollars, or about 60 per cent of the premiums written. One study of the subject in New York City, Marc A. Franklin, Robert H. Chanin and Irving Mark, "Accidents, Money, and the Law: A Study of the Economics of Personal Injury Litigation," *Columbia Law Review*, 61 (1961), states at pp. 32ff. that in a recent year there were an estimated 193,000 claimants in the City in personal injury litigation, with some payment made in 84 per cent of the cases. When the claimant retains an attorney, the rate of recovery is 90 per cent.

[80] Hurst, *op. cit.*, Chap. 13.

lectual jobber and contractor in business,"[81] and a number of other persons have echoed that sentiment.[82] While none can deny the importance of these facets of legal practice in our corporate world, the development of NACCA and its state affiliates may portend a rise in importance and status of those who represent other economic interests in modern-day society, as a kind of revolution of the legal "proletariat" develops in the profession. Certainly our study demonstrates that such groups are beginning to develop a kind of "countervailing power" in the legal market place.

Of course, much remains to be accomplished in the matter of providing legal services for all elements of our society, particularly persons in the lower classes.[83] However, recent developments, including the Supreme Court's ruling that defendants accused of serious state crimes must be represented by counsel,[84] Congress' appropriation of money for legal services to low-income groups,[85] as well as changes occurring in modes of legal practice,[86] all show considerable promise in assisting "underdog" groups with their legal problems. Such advances should serve to broaden the publics that presently utilize the judicial process, and the concomitant role of the Bar in representing social and economic interests in judicial selection.

[81] A. A. Berle, Jr., "Modern Legal Profession," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, IX (1933), p. 340.

[82] Included are C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 289; Fred Rodell, *Woe Unto You Lawyers* (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1939), pp. 3f.; Karl N. Llewellyn, "The Bar Specializes—With What Results?", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 167 (1933), pp. 177ff.; and Harlan Stone, "The Public Influence of the Bar," *Harvard Law Review*, 48 (1934), pp. 6ff.

[83] One study of the use of lawyers by lower class persons showed that many of them were not aware of their need for legal services, and of those that were, only a small proportion actually went to a lawyer because of a concern with fees. See Earl Koos, *The Family and the Law* (Rochester: National Legal Aid Association, 1949, mimeographed). Personal injury matters, however, are an exception, since contingent fee arrangements mean that a client has everything to gain and nothing to lose by consulting a lawyer. A study in New York City showed that among automobile accident victims, lower class respondents were just as likely to retain a lawyer as higher class respondents. See Carlin, *Lawyers on Their Own*, *op. cit.*, p. 154, citing Roger B. Hunting and Gloria S. Neuwirth, *Who Sues in New York City* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).

[84] *Gideon v. Wainwright*, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The courts are now involved in deciding a line of cases relating to the particular stages of the arrest and detention process for which counsel must be provided, and whether the principle of the case should be applied to criminal misdemeanors as well as felonies. One law professor has suggested that the decision will force more and more lawyers into criminal cases, and this will require that the organized Bar try harder to relate canons of ethics to criminal-law practice. See B. J. George, Jr., "A New Approach to Criminal Law," *Harper's*, 231 (1965), p. 185.

A related development is the passage of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, which provides for compensated counsel in federal courts for indigent defendants charged with felonies or serious misdemeanors.

[85] The funds are administered by the Legal Services Program of the Office of Economic Opportunity. The first annual report of the organization, dated August 1966, indicated that over 160 programs proposed by local communities and groups had been funded. Forty-three of the states had programs, as did 37 of the nation's 50 largest cities. Of the remaining 13 cities, nine had applications pending at that time. The agency also reported that over 500 new law offices serving the poor were funded, and over 1000 full-time attorneys and countless volunteer lawyers enlisted in the War on Poverty.

[86] Including the increased usage of lawyer referral services, legal clinics and group legal service plans, as well as improvements in legal aid programs. See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., "The President's Annual Message: The State of the Legal Profession," *American Bar Association Journal*, 51 (1965), pp. 823ff.

TOWARD A COMMUNICATIONS THEORY OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A CAUSAL MODEL

DONALD J. MCCRONE AND CHARLES F. CNUDDE*
University of Wisconsin and University of California, Irvine

The construction of an empirical theory of democratic political development is dependent on the formulation of causal propositions which are generalizations of the developmental process. To date, several essential steps in the process of constructing such a theory have been taken. First, concept formation and clarification by students of political development has led to an emphasis upon political democracy as one of the dependent variables for the field.[1] Second, the gathering and publication of quantitative indicators of social, economic, cultural, and political phenomena provide a firm basis for subsequent empirical inquiry.[2] Finally, correlational analysis has identified numerous variables which are closely associated with the development of democratic political institutions.[3]

The next major task is the formulation and testing of empirical models of democratic political development which provide a basis for inferring causal relationships by distinguishing between spurious correlations and indirect and direct effects.[4] The accomplishment of this task would enable us to derive explanatory propositions concerning the process of democratic political development.

The purpose of this essay is to suggest the combined utility of two similar theory-building techniques in the accomplishment of this task and to take a modest step in the direction of constructing an empirical model of democratic political development.

I. CONCEPTS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Seymour Martin Lipset explicitly adopts democratic political development as his dependent variable. He defines political democracy as:

> a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of the problems of societal decision-making among conflicting interest groups which permits the largest to choose among alternative contenders for political office.[5]

For Lipset, this definition of democracy implies three key specific conditions: first, one set of political leaders who occupy official governing positions; second, one or more sets of competing leaders who do not occupy governing positions, but who act as a loyal opposition; third, widespread acceptance of a "political formula" which specifies the legitimate political institutions for the society (political parties, free press, etc.) and legitimizes democratic political competition.[6] European and English-speaking nations are classified as stable democracies or unstable democracies and dictatorships on the basis of whether they fulfilled these specific conditions in the period since World War I. Lipset also adds the condition that there be an absence of Communist or Fascist parties (i.e., political movements opposed to the democratic "political formula") garnering more than twenty percent of the vote in the last twenty-five years.[7]

Lipset's measurement of political democracy unfortunately has severe limitations. His "all-or-nothing" requirement transforms political democracy from a continuous variable into an attribute. Theoretically, democracy may be most usefully conceived of as a continuum. A political system is not democratic or non-democratic—democracy is not present or ab-

* This article is the second of a series on which we are alternating the order of authors' names to indicate that the studies are in every way joint enterprises.

[1] For an interesting discussion of this material as well as important findings on factors which relate to democracy, see Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," this REVIEW, 53 (1959), pp. 69–105.

[2] Bruce M. Russett, *et al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).

[3] Phillips Cutright, "National Political Development," in Nelson Polsby, *et al.* (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), pp. 569–582.

[4] For an example of this type of model testing in political science, see Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," this REVIEW, LX (1966), pp. 66–72.

[5] Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 71.

[6] *Loc. cit.*

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 73–74. Latin American political systems are classified somewhat differently, but still dichotomously.

sent—rather a political system is more or less democratic. Moreover, even if democracy were best conceived to be an attribute, the problem of selecting nonarbitrary cutpoints would still present severe problems.[8] Finally, a dichotomous dependent variable places strains on the power of the statistical techniques that may be applied.

Philips Cutright, on the other hand, attempts to define political development in terms which do not rely explicitly on liberal democratic standards.

> The degree of political development of a nation can be defined by the degree of complexity and specialization of its national political institutions.[9]

Nevertheless, a careful examination of Cutright's political development scoring procedure indicates a reliance on the same standards utilized by Lipset. In fact, Cutright's measurement procedure is an excellent operationalization of Lipset's concept of political democracy. Points are assigned to a political system on the basis of one set of officials in office, one or more sets of political leaders out of office, and reliance on political parties and free elections as the legitimate political institutions for the society.[10] The virtue of the Cutright measure is that it transforms Lipset's democratic attribute into a continuous variable, thereby avoiding the problems cited above. Pending further refinements in this field, democratic political development may best be conceptualized in Lipset's terms and measured by Cutright's procedures.[11]

Both Lipset and Cutright have established correlations between socio-economic factors and democratic political development. Lipset finds that indices of *wealth* (per capita income, thousands of persons per doctor, and persons per motor vehicle), *communication* (telephones, radios, and newspaper copies per thousand persons), *industrialization* (percentages of males in agriculture and per capita energy consumed), *education* (percentage literate, and primary, post-primary, and higher education enrollment per thousand persons), and *urbanization* (percent in cities over 20,000, 100,000, and in metropolitan areas) are all strongly related to political democracy.[12]

Cutright, using product-moment correlation analysis, identifies indices of *communication* (summed T scores of newspaper readers, newsprint consumption, volume of domestic mail, and number of telephones per capita), *urbanization* (T score of the proportion of the population in cities over 100,000), *education* (combined T scores of literacy and number of students per 100,000 in institutions of higher education), and *agriculture* (T score of the proportion of the economically active labor force employed in agriculture) as being closely associated with political development.[13]

Regardless of the imaginativeness and utility of these studies, they do not constitute theoretical formulations of the process of democratic political development. They remain studies of the correlates of democratic political development.

II. A COMMUNICATIONS DEVELOPMENT MODEL

Communications development suggests itself as a variable around which a theory of the process of democratic political development might be constructed for several reasons.[14]

---

[8] For the pitfalls involved in choosing cutpoints, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964).

[9] Cutright, *op. cit.*, p. 571.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 574. Scores may vary from 0 to 66 based on a total of three for each of twenty-two years (1940–1961).

[11] Of course political scientists' interest in democracy includes more than the existence and maintenance of democratic institutions. Two lines of further refinements have relied upon system-level democratic "behaviors" to make additional distinctions among political systems with democratic institutions. One of these developments deals with Dahl's concept of polyarchy, the other with political equality. While extremely meaningful, these concepts require much ingenuity to operationalize, especially on a cross-national level. For the concept of polyarchy see Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 84. For operational measures of the concept see Deane E. Neubauer, "Some Conditions of Democracy" (forthcoming), and Haywood R. Alker, Jr., "Causal Inference and Political Analysis" (forthcoming). For an operational measure of political equality within the United States, see Charles F. Cnudde, "Consensus, 'Rules of the Game' and Democratic Politics: The Case of Race Politics in the South" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of North Carolina, 1966).

[12] Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 76–77. He relies on means and ranges to establish the relationships.

[13] Cutright, *op. cit.*, p. 577.

[14] For theoretical contributions which indicate the central role of communications systems in more general types of political development, see Lucian W. Pye, (ed.), *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).

First, both normative and empirical theory point to communications as a prerequisite to a successfully operating political democracy. Normative thinking gives communications networks the role of providing an informed citizenry, while more empirical scholarship sees communications as integrative, producing the social cohesion necessary to prevent disintegration in the face of democratic policy conflict.[15] Second, Cutright finds that communications development is by far the strongest socio-economic correlate of political development.[16] Third, the most ambitious attempt at a theoretical formulation of the process of democratic political development views communications development as the final prerequisite for a successfully functioning democratic political system.[17]

Daniel Lerner theorizes that the process of democratic political development (which he defines as the "crowning institution of the participant society") is the consequence of a developmental sequence beginning with urbanization.

> The secular evolution of a participant society appears to involve a regular sequence of three phases. Urbanization comes first, for cities alone have developed the complex of skills and resources which characterise the modern industrial economy. Within this urban matrix develop both of the attributes which distinguish the next two phases—literacy and media growth. There is a close reciprocal relationship between these, for the literate develop the media which in turn spread literacy. But, literacy performs the key function in the second phase. The capacity to read, at first acquired by relatively few people, equips them to perform the varied tasks required in the modernizing society. Not until the third phase, when the elaborate technology of industrial development is fairly well advanced, does a society begin to produce newspapers, radio networks, and motion pictures on a massive scale. This, in turn, accelerates the spread of literacy. Out of this interaction develop those institutions of participation (e.g. voting) which we find in all advanced modern societies.[18]

Lerner's thesis is not satisfactorily confirmed by his data, but his conceptualization of political development as a developmental sequence provides a basis for a causal formulation of the process of democratic political development.

Figure 1 represents our initial causal model based on the conception of democratic political development as a developmental sequence.




FIG. 1. Initial conception of democratic political development as a developmental sequence. (U—Urbanization, E—Education, C—Communications, D—Democratic political development.)

This four-variable causal model is, of course, only one of a whole family of logically alternative models utilizing the same four variables. A means for testing the adequacy of this particular causal model and for eliminating alternative models is clearly needed.

III. TESTING THE MODEL

Two interrelated theory-building techniques are applied in this study in an effort to eliminate logical alternative models and to provide a basis for inferring the adequacy of the postulated model of democratic political development. First, Simon-Blalock causal model analysis is utilized because it enables us

> to make causal *inferences* concerning the adequacy of causal models, at least in the sense that we can proceed by eliminating inadequate models that make predictions that are not consistent with the data.[19]

Prediction equations based on the correlation coefficients between variables are computed for each alternative model. Models that make prediction equations inconsistent with the actual relationships between the variables in the system are rejected.[20]

[15] Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963); Karl W. Deutsch, "Communication Theory and Political Integration," in Phillip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.), *The Integration of Political Communities* (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), pp. 46–74. For the relationship between communication and civic cooperation at the individual level in nations which vary in the degree to which democracy is successfully institutionalized, see Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 378–381.

[16] Cutright, *op. cit.*, p. 577.

[17] Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958).

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

[19] Blalock, *op. cit.*, p. 62. Also see Herbert A. Simon, "Spurious Correlations: A Causal Interpretation," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 49 (1954), pp. 467–479.

[20] Blalock, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–94.

Second, path coefficients are computed for the causal model that is inferred by use of the Simon-Blalock technique. In causal analysis, we are primarily concerned with changes in the dependent variable(s) which are produced by changes in the independent variable(s). The correlation coefficients used in the Simon-Blalock prediction equations only measure the goodness of fit around the regression line. Path coefficients which may be viewed as being analogous to beta weight(s), are used because they measure changes in the dependent variable produced by standardized changes in the independent variable.[21]

The data to be utilized in this study consist of Cutright's previously published intercorrelations computed from four aggregate indicators for seventy-six nations. The four variables are urbanization, education, communication, and political development.[22]

Prior to the analysis of alternative causal models, several fundamental assumptions on which this analysis is based must be explicitly set forth. First, political development is assumed to be the dependent variable and urbanization is conceived not to be dependent on any other variable in the system. Second, relationships between the variables in the system are assumed to be additive and linear. Third, other causes of each of the four variables are assumed to be uncorrelated with the other variables in the system. And fourth, it is necessary to assume uni-directional causation.

Unfortunately, assumptions of this nature are usually left implicit. Yet whenever correlational analysis is attempted with the assumption of which are independent and dependent variables these other assumptions logically follow. The techniques to be applied in this paper merely make the assumptions more explicit. However, this state of affairs should not obscure the basic similarity between making causal inferences from a variety of techniques, whether they be correlation coefficients, regression coefficients, path coefficients, or the Simon-Blalock technique.[23]

[21] Sewall Wright, "Correlation and Causation," *Journal of Agricultural Research*, 20 (1921), pp. 557–585.

[22] Cutright, *op. cit.*, p. 577.

[23] Social scientists are becoming increasingly aware of the similarities in the logic of these techniques. Boudon, for example, subsumes them all under a more general formulation which he calls "dependence analysis": Raymond Boudon, "A Method of Linear Causal Analysis: Dependence Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (1965), pp. 365–374.




FIG. 2. Seven logically possible causal paths between the four variables, including correlation coefficients.


Perhaps the least satisfying of these assumptions is that of uni-directional causation. While several respectable hypotheses involving reciprocal effects could be constructed, they would considerably complicate the analysis. We will therefore tentatively exclude such possibilities here. In a subsequent analysis we will attempt to evaluate these possible reciprocal relationships with a technique devised by one of the authors.[24]

Figure 2 shows the seven logically possible causal relationships between the four variables in the model under the assumptions as set forth above.


IV. ALTERNATIVE CAUSAL MODELS

Restricting our attention to the first half of the democratic political development model (the relationships between U, E, and C), Figure 3 notes three logically alternative causal relationships. Model Ia predicts that the relationship between E and C is spurious due to the causal effects of U on both variables. If Model Ia were to fit the data, both educational and communications development would be inferred to be the common consequence of the rise of urbanization with no causal link between education and communication. Model Ib, on the other hand, predicts that the developmental sequence from U to C to E interprets the relationship between U and E. If the prediction equations for Model Ib were correct, urbanization would be seen as producing the spread of communications which would, in turn, produce widespread growth in literacy and education levels. The spread of mass media would be inferred to be a prerequisite to the spread of mass education, rather than the reverse. Model Ic, based on our original model, predicts that the causal links proceed from U to E to C and ac-


[24] See Charles F. Cnudde, "Legislative Behavior and Citizen Characteristics: Problems in Theory and Method," (a paper delivered at the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Chicago, Ill., April 29, 1966).



Model Ia. No direct causal link between E and C.



Model Ib. Developmental sequence from U to C to E.



Model Ic. Developmental sequence from U to E to C.

FIG. 3. Alternative causal models—First half.

count for the original relationship between U and C. The success of Model Ic in predicting the actual relationships between these three variables would confirm the notion that urbanization is the prerequisite to the widespread growth of literacy and education. The consequent educational development would then provide the mass public necessary for the growth of the mass media of communication.

The prediction equations for Ia, Ib, and Ic in Table I show the Simon-Blalock test of each of these alternative models. Clearly, the excellence of the fit between the predicted and actual correlations for Model Ic, as opposed to the results for Ia and Ib, provides a basis for eliminating the latter two alternatives and inferring that the direction of causation is indeed from urbanization to education to communication.

Turning our attention to the second half of the democratic political development model (the relationships between E, C, and D), Figure 4 indicates that only two logically alternative causal models can be posited. This is due to the fact that we have already inferred the direction of causation between E and C from Model Ic. Model IIa predicts that the relationship between C and D is spurious due to common causation by E. If this model were to fit the data, education, not communication, would be confirmed as the final prerequisite to a successfully functioning political democracy. Model IIb posits a developmental sequence from E to C to D as interpreting the original correlation between E and D. If this model is confirmed, communications development will be seen to be the final link in the chain of causation. The spread of mass education creates an informed public that supports the growth of a system of mass communication which penetrates and integrates the society thereby laying the basis for democratic political competition.

Table 2 shows the prediction equations for Models IIa and IIb. These prediction equations confirm the inference that the relationship between education and democratic political development is an indirect one through communications.


One final link, the direct original relation-

TABLE 1. PREDICTION EQUATIONS AND DEGREE OF FIT FOR MODELS OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT—FIRST HALF


Predictions		Degree of Fit	
Models	Predicted	Actual	Difference
Ia. rUErUC = rEC	(.75) (.71) = .53	.85	.32
Ib. rUCrCE = rUE	(.71) (.85) = .60	.75	.15
Ic. rUErEC = rUC	(.75) (.85) = .64	.71	.07

TABLE 2. PREDICTION EQUATIONS AND DEGREE OF FIT FOR MODELS OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT—SECOND HALF

Predictions		Degree of Fit	
Models	Predicted	Actual	Difference
IIa. rECrED = rCD	(.85) (.62) = .53	.80	.27
IIb. rECrCD = rED	(.85) (.80) = .68	.62	.06



Model IIa. No direct causal link between C and D.



Model IIb. Developmental sequence from E to C to D.

FIG. 4. Alternative causal models—Second half.

ship between U and D, remains to be tested. A final logically possible model would postulate that the developmental sequence from U to E to C to D accounts for the entire relationship between U and D. If Model III were to be confirmed, the inference would be that there is no direct relationship between U and D. Figure 5 and Table 3 illustrate and test this possible alternative respectively. The relatively poor fit (over .10 difference) indicates that Model III can be rejected and the direct link between U and D should be maintained.

Before settling on the final system of causal relationships indicated by use of the Simon-Blalock technique, let us briefly evaluate the direct effects of each of the remaining paths through the computation of path coefficients. The correlation coefficients utilized in the Simon-Blalock analysis, it should be recalled, only measure the degree of association between variables. We found above, for example, that the association between U and D is maintained even when the effect of the path from U to E to C to D was taken into account. Correlation coefficients, however, do not measure the amount of change in the dependent variable which is associated with changes in the independent variable. Our primary concern at this stage is with the measurement of changes in the dependent variable produced by changes in the independent variable path coefficients, therefore, are utilized because they measure the amount of *change* in the dependent variable produced by *standardized changes* in the independent variable.

Figure 6 shows two paths from U to D remain in associational terms. First, there is the developmental sequence from U to D with three links—U to E, E to C, and C to D. Second, there is the direct link between U and D. Path coefficients for each of these links in the causal model of democratic political development are computed in Table 4.

An examination of the path coefficients




FIG. 5. Model III—Developmental Sequence from U to E to C to D.




FIG. 6. A causal model of democratic political development including path coefficients.

TABLE 3. PREDICTION EQUATION AND DEGREE OF FIT FOR A MODEL OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT—FINAL LINK

	Predictions		Degree of Fit	
	Model	Predicted	Actual	Difference
III.	rUErECrCD = rUD	(.75)(.85)(.80) = .51	.64	.13

TABLE 4. SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS AND PATH COEFFICIENTS FOR THE CASUAL MODEL IN FIGURE 6

Path	Equation	Path Coefficient
a	bUE+rUE=0	.75
b	bEC+rEC=0	.85
c	bCD+rCD=0	.80
d	bUD+(bCD×rUC)+rUD=0	.07

placed on each link in Figure 6 indicates that the overwhelmingly important causal links in the process of democratic political development are contained in the developmental sequence from U to E to C to D. The direct effect of urbanization on democratic political development (as indicated by the use of a broken line) is negligible.

The remarkable correspondence between this empirically derived causal model of democratic political development and the original causal model postulated in Figure 1 is clear.

V. CONCLUSION

This causal model, because it represents the beginnings of a parsimonious theory of, rather than mere correlates of, the process of democratic political development enables us to derive a series of empirical propositions concerning this crucial process.

1. Democratic political development occurs when mass communications permeates society.
   Education affects democratic political development by contributing to the growth of mass communications, therefore:
2. Mass communications occurs when literacy and educational levels rise in society.
   Urbanization affects democratic political development primarily by increasing educational levels, which then increase mass communications, therefore:
3. Education and literacy development occur in urbanizing societies.

This causal model, then, is a series of interrelated causal propositions which link urbanization through a developmental sequence to democratic political development.

Since the causal relationships specified in the model are not perfect, the model and the propositions derived therefrom are probabilistic in nature. The r^2 between U and E (.56), E and C (.72), and C and D (.64) leave a significant proportion of the variance unexplained. For this reason, deviant cases (in terms of the model) can be found. Basically, there are two kinds of deviant cases. First, there are those cases where the nation is "overdeveloped" in one of the variables included in the model. For example, Cutright discusses nations with a relatively low level of communications development which are defined as being relatively highly developed politically.[25] In this case, the democratic political system does not have sufficient communications development to maintain the regime. In terms of our model, this nation is likely to experience severe difficulty in maintaining democratic political competition and may even collapse. The dangers of attempting to impose a democratic regime on socio-economically underdeveloped nations in the post-World War II world are indicated by this type of analysis.

Stepping further back in the chain of causation, we may also find nations which are experiencing communications revolutions, but without prior developments in urbanization and education. In this case, disruption of the regime may occur because the citizenry has not been prepared for the sudden exposure and communications development may bring social disintegration, rather than social cohesion. The examination of such deviant cases may give us insight into other factors that produce changes in these four variables and bring such disruptions. Moreover, we may also ascertain the explanatory power of the model by examining the reliability of predictions about disruption based on these discontinuities.

The second type of deviant case is the nation that has fulfilled the requirements for development, in terms of the model, yet fails to maintain a democratic regime. Germany, for example, would seem to have fulfilled the prerequisites for a democratic regime long before the present Federal Republic. Nevertheless, Germany has experienced severe difficulty in establishing and maintaining a democratic regime in the twentieth century. Apparently, the developmental sequence can be disrupted by influences outside the model. Cutright, for example, examines the impact of foreign invasion and war on political development. He finds that such events seem to intervene to upset the normal sequence of events.[26] The examination of this type of deviant case and of time series data may subject our propositions to further tests. For example, the effect of urban growth over time may be quite different

[25] Cutright, *op. cit.*, pp. 577–581.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 580.

from that of variations in urbanization at one point in time. In general, additional research should shed light on other variables that might be included in a more complete model of the process of political development.[27]

A major virtue of this form of causal model analysis is its capacity to elaborate and extend the model by the inclusion of new variables. This type of elaboration may take two forms. First, when variables outside the system are identified and hypothesized to be causal variables in the process of democratic political development, they can be explicitly introduced into the model. The introduction and testing of such variables provides a test of both the causal nature of the specified variable and the adequacy of the existing model. As additional causal variables are identified and included, the model of democratic political development will begin to match the complexity of the phenomenon it seeks to explain.

A second form of elaboration is the introduction and testing of new dependent variables. In this manner, we can gauge the effects of democratic political development. By the introduction of measures of welfare, education, and military expenditures into the model, we can measure the effects of both democratic political systems and the causal factors in development on public policy. More specifically, answers might be obtained to these questions: what is the independent effect of democratic politics on welfare expenditures? What are the effects of education on welfare expenditures? Are the effects of education interpreted through political development? Answers to questions such as these require the testing of several alternative models including welfare expenditures as a new variable.

In a previous study, on an unrelated substantive matter, the authors have expressed the belief that

> in regard to the subject of theory building in political science, the cumulative nature of empirical model building needs to be stressed. By explicit articulation of the model of constituency influence and emphasis on establishing empirical relationships, the Miller-Stokes study provides a basis for further development. The application of new techniques and the possible inclusion of new variables is thereby facilitated.[28]

We can only hope that this particular causal model of the process of democratic political development may also facilitate the elaboration and testing of models of development by the application of new techniques and the inclusion of new variables. In this manner, a cumulative body of development theory may arise.

[27] Clearly, there is no incompatibility between Cutright's technique of using the prediction equation based on the regression line and this type of causal analysis. In fact, Cutright's technique applied at each stage of the developmental process would effectively isolate the deviant cases at each stage. His present research on historical trends in political development should also shed light on the adequacy of this causal model. See *ibid.*, pp. 577–581 for a discussion of Cutright's techniques and research.

[28] Cnudde and McCrone, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

SOVIET POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA

HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN
The Johns Hopkins University

I. INTRODUCTION

The general conclusions of the study will be stated at the outset in the broadest terms to aid the reader in his evaluation of the argument as it is unfolded in more detail.

The Soviet leaders expected to make great advances in the underdeveloped world as it decolonized. They hoped that the Communists would lead the nationalist rebellions and convert them into Communist states. Only in the North of Indochina has the Communist party been able to do so; the South is still in contest. High hopes in Indonesia, Algeria, and the Congo have come to naught. The successful seizure of power in Cuba has taken place in an unanticipated manner.

In this case, a non-Communist revolution converted itself into a Communist one. Before Castro's assumption of power in Cuba, the Soviet Union viewed Latin America in general, and the Caribbean in particular, as an area where American power severely limited Communist opportunities. The overthrow of the Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954 seemed to prove the point. But for a time after the Bay of Pigs episode, the Cubans believed, and seemed to have convinced the Soviets, that the Cuban revolution could be exported. But the failure of several attempts to do so, and the outcome of the missile crisis in the fall of 1962, caused first the Soviets and somewhat later the Cubans to revise their hopes for new Communist states in Latin America in the near or foreseeable future. Now several years after the windfall of Castro's conversion, Soviet attention is increasingly centered on the costs to be borne. First, although Castro will probably remain a Communist, he will continue to be as defiant as he can afford to be. Second, Castro has cost the Soviet Union a great deal of money[1] and, although these contributions have been reduced, the end is not yet in sight. Third, the appearance in Latin America of regimes seemingly on the road to communism has been shown to provoke United States intervention. Such intervention is less costly to the Soviet Union when the loss of a Communist state is not at issue than after the Soviets have made large commitments, or after a Communist regime has been established. For this reason, and because the Soviets do not foresee the victory of traditional Communist parties in Latin America and have all sorts of reservations about parties headed by "Johnny-come-lately" Communists like Castro, they prefer a long transition from coalition governments to communism, and indeed favor an extended period of national democracy in which many social elements participate. As long as the situation is one which might be called "creeping revolution," the Soviet Union's commitment, economic and military, can be kept within the bounds of what the Soviets are willing to invest. But once a country labels itself Communist, the Soviet options are greatly restricted. Hence the Soviet Union's preference for a gradual transition in Latin American countries to such rapid communization as in the case of Cuba.[2] But the Soviets are not free to follow their preferences if they want to maintain influence, let alone control, over revolutionary parties. In Central America, particularly in Guatemala, Venezuela, and Peru, there are partisan movements, most of which are run by indigenous, non-Communist revolutionaries who are willing to take greater risks and resort more readily to violence than do the traditional

[1] No authoritative figure is known to me, but a million dollars per day has often been mentioned.

[2] The following is an expression of Soviet preferences in the form of a prediction: "Some developing countries have already begun their noncapitalist development. It would be more accurate to say of those who have followed this path consistently that they occupy a 'special place,' not in the capitalist world system, but rather in the socialist world system. This means that the appearance and establishment of world socialism can no longer be represented only by the unity of countries where socialism has already been completely victorious and where the political form is the dictatorship of the proletariat or the government of the whole people which has developed from that form. The world socialist system can also include not completely socialist or semi-socialist links. The passage of the developing countries from the world capitalist to the world socialist system is possible not only in the form of a comparatively rapid action, such as occurred in Cuba in 1959–1960, but also in the form of a prolonged process stretching over many years." S. Tiul'panov, "Osnovnye problemy politekonomii razvivaiushchikhsia stran" (The Basic Problems of the Political Economy of the Developing Countries), *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia* No. 9, 1965, p. 72.

Communist parties. The Cubans and the Chinese are potential sponsors of these movements and thus a threat to Soviet influence. To preserve its influence, the Soviet Union has to grant these movements greater autonomy, and this in turn creates conflicts with the traditional Communist parties in Latin America, which stand to suffer as a result of Communist support of violence in any one country.

It is unlikely that the Soviets will be able to have revolutions in Latin America when and how they want them. Much more likely, in any future case, the Soviet Union will be confronted with a revolutionary situation where it will have to either support or reject the incipient Communist revolution. Soviet doctrine, which is to be examined in the next pages, does not enable us to predict which choice Soviet leaders will make, but it can furnish a better notion of the intellectual atmosphere in which Soviet policymakers move.

II. SOVIET DOCTRINE ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Soviet scholars writing on the underdeveloped world recognize that its political problems represent a special category and that Communist revolutions in these areas will differ from earlier Communist revolutions elsewhere. Few go as far as did a young French Communist writing in a Cuban weekly, who said, in effect, that the history of the Communist revolutions of the past was a poor guide to the future. "The true value of the Cuban revolution is perhaps more forcefully perceived within the revolution itself: it dispenses with the revolutionary models of the Soviet Union, China, and *even Cuba*. . . ."[3] If one reviews American and even Soviet accounts of the revolution in Russia itself, and of the creation of Communist states in Eastern Europe and China, it becomes obvious that all the peering into the entrails of a political situation to see if the pattern of Moscow 1917, Peking 1947, Prague 1948, or Havana 1959 is being repeated has been wasted effort. Some such realization seems to inform Soviet analyses of the underdeveloped world, as we shall presently see.

Not only is any future seizure of power likely to follow different rules, but the model of the development of the Soviet Union has little relevance for underdeveloped countries.[4] For years before and after the Second World War, the experience of the modernization of a backward part of the Soviet Union, Soviet Central Asia, was compared to the situation in colonial countries. By almost any definition, Soviet Central Asia was an underdeveloped country. In almost fifty years of Soviet rule the situation has changed radically. But how was this achieved? Enormous amounts of Soviet capital and trained personnel (a special form of capital) have been invested in this area over a period of fifty years. The equalization of living standards between the backward and the more advanced areas of the Soviet Union was one consequence of planning on an all-Union scale. But who is going to provide the capital for the four hundred millions of India? For the six or seven hundred millions of China?

Such questions throw into sharp relief the dilemma that foreign economic development poses for the Soviet Union (and indeed for the United States). It is becoming increasingly evident that the present situation in almost all the underdeveloped countries makes both the Soviet and the American model only marginally relevant.

Marxian analysts can neither expect the underdeveloped countries to undertake industrialization on the model of capitalist development, nor can they expect them to follow the example of the Soviet Union. The latter, paradoxically, has followed Marx's model of capitalist industrialization more closely than any other country. Capital was accumulated almost exclusively on the basis of forced savings, for the Soviet leaders made an early decision to go it alone and refused to permit foreign capital to be invested in their state. Although some leaders of the underdeveloped world believed that their only course was to follow the Soviet example, political realities in their own countries have ruled this out. It is possible to force present generations to sacrifice themselves for the future, but only if the state is run by ruthless leaders who are convinced that immutable laws of economics exist and that they alone understand them. Thus far, only Communist regimes have met these criteria.

[3] Emphasis in original. Regis Debray, "America Latina: Algunos problemas de estrategia revolucionaria" (Some Problems of Latin American Revolutionary Strategy), *Bohemia*, Havana, Nos. 57 and 58, November 19 and 26, 1965. The article also appeared in *Politica*, Mexico City, November 15, 1965, Supplement, p. 7.

[4] Tiagunenko, V. L., *Problemy sovremennykh natsional'no-osvoboditel'nykh revoliutsii* (Problems of Contemporary National Liberation Revolutions) Moscow, 1966, pp. 175–178. After stating that Soviet Central Asia is a model for underdeveloped states, the author gives an excellent exposition of all the factors which have made it a unique case rather than a model.

If regimes of this kind should continue to appear, they would present a peculiar problem to the Soviet Union because of the political and economic demands they would make on it. Even had it desired to do so, the Soviet Union obviously would have been incapable of helping China on the same scale that it did its own Central Asian republics. Therefore, successful Communist revolutions in poor and overpopulated countries hereafter will not be able to emulate the Soviet experience without aid from the Soviet Union of a magnitude far beyond that nation's resources. Thus a new problem has emerged, the problem of "premature communism."

The Soviet Union has contributed to the Cuban economy, but reluctantly and without any genuine choice in the matter. Yet Cuba is smaller and has a much better articulated infrastructure than many other underdeveloped countries. There is a limit to the potential number of new Communist states which could expect economic support from the established Communist powers, and "premature" Communist regimes that could not count on Soviet economic support might well founder. In a sense, the Soviet Union has been forced into the very position for which it criticized the Mensheviks in 1917. It prefers that capital be accumulated before the socialist revolution so that the new Communist states will have a better chance of success and not make embarrassing demands upon the Soviet Union. Naturally, the Soviet formulation is not so blunt but the meaning is clear.[5] As we go on to examine Soviet doctrine on the economic and political development of underdeveloped countries, the basis for so radical a shift in Soviet preferences will emerge.

Soviet economists argue that improving labor productivity is a better way to accumulate capital than concentrating on large capital installations with scant reference to productivity.[6] Therefore, some underdeveloped countries are advised against following the Soviet example of developing large steel mills and all the paraphernalia of heavy industry, but are urged instead to develop whatever pays best and use the profits from that to capitalize. Thus, Che Guevara, who created a mystique of sacrifice and was willing to industrialize Cuba without regard to whether it was economically expedient, was overruled by the Soviets, who would have had to foot much of the bill. The Cubans were advised to industrialize by starting with what they could do most profitably, which was to grow sugar.

The Soviets have also stressed the need for agricultural reforms, particularly for Latin America, as a way to increase the size of the internal market. Their argument, familiar enough in Western economic writings, is that large segments of the peasant populations of the world produce so inefficiently that they can do little more than feed themselves and are unable to buy any of the products of industry, thereby putting a ceiling on the expansion of domestic manufactures. To expand the internal market, therefore, agricultural reforms (not argicultural revolutions, it should be noted) are advocated. Given such reforms, the peasants will have some surplus; they will enter the market; the bourgeoisie and the proletariat will expand; and economic progress will have begun.[7]

Soviet economists advise underdeveloped

[5] Krasin, Iu. A., and V. F. Li, "O zakonomernostiakh nekapitalisticheskogo razvitiia osvobodivshikhsia stran" (Rules Governing the Noncapitalist Development of the Liberated Countries) *Voprosy filosofii* (8) 1964, pp. 29–40. On pp. 30–31 the authors say: "The noncapitalist stage of development, which is the specific form of the metamorphosis of the democratic revolution into the socialist, creates the social and economic base for the subsequent progress of the country without the participation of private capitalist elements. . . . "; Ul'ianovski, R., "Sotsializm i natsionalnoosvo-boditel'naia bor'ba" (Socialism and the national liberation struggle), *Pravda*, April 15, 1966, warns that in addition consumer demands must be met during this stage or else the non-capitalist path is discredited, as happened in Ghana.

[6] For a summary of the Soviet literature, see my "Soviet Doctrine on Developing Countries: Some Divergent Views" in Kurt London (ed.), *New Nations in a Divided World* (New York, 1963), pp. 80–84.

[7] Eliutin, Iu., "Latinskaia Amerika: Krizis pomeshchichei oligarkhii" (Latin America: The Crisis of the Landholding Oligarchy), *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* (2), 1963, pp. 52–61. See pp. 56–57 for a version of this formulation; also see Kuznetsov, V. O., *Agrarnye reformy v razvivaiushchikhsia stranakh i stranakh vysokorazvitogo kapitalizma* (Agrarian Reforms in the Developing Countries and the Highly Developed Capitalist Countries), Moscow, 1965, p. 155; and Danilevich, M. V., "Agrarnye otnosheniia i bor'ba za agrarnuiu reformu v stranakh Latinskoi Ameriki" (Agrarian Relations and the Struggle for Agrarian Reform in the Latin American Countries), in A. M. Rumiantsev, *Agrarnyi vopros i natsional'no-osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie* (Agrarian Question and the National Liberation Movement) (Moscow, 1963), pp. 432–458.

countries to get their capital from both the Soviet Union and the United States. They say, in so many words, that the Soviet Union has neither the capital nor the skills to help the entire underdeveloped world, and that these countries therefore must have recourse to Western capital.[8]

Soviet writers profess to see an important political difference between countries that are on the path to socialism and those that are not. Since many of the leaders of the underdeveloped world reject the capitalist system and tend to take out much of their frustration on the capitalist world, Soviet writers expect that in the transition period many of these countries will be adjuncts to the Soviet diplomatic system rather than the capitalist. If countries espouse the doctrine of socialism, say the Soviet writers, even if it is not socialism in the Soviet sense, this represents an important predisposition for socialism and against capitalism. If medium-term gains from a policy can be anticipated, it is not necessary to make a strong case for the long-term gains.

A crucial factor in this new type of socialist revolution is the concept of what the Soviet writers call intermediate, or interstitial, strata and what Western scholars would call the technocratic elite: a service class composed of people with skills rather than property. Its members may belong to the military, the bureaucracy, or the professional classes. According to Soviet theory, in a country developed on a state-capitalist rather than a private-capitalist basis this new class grouping will have a vested interest in pushing toward a state-managed system rather than a traditional, capitalist state. As the political power of private capital will be small, the "new class" will meet little opposition as it moves toward socialism. When the prince becomes a Christian, the people follow; when the managers become Communists, so does the state. These intermediate groups, then, are unwittingly preparing a socialist revolution.

In practice, the foregoing is used to justify the Soviet support of transitional regimes by a modest program of loans and grants, as the Soviet Union can argue that history will help bring the new countries into the socialist camp. As might be expected, the Chinese have mocked the theory that nonsocialists will make socialist revolutions despite themselves.[9] Soviet concentration on intermediate rather than ultimate goals (a counterrevolutionary tendency, in Chinese terms) is not the result of ideological reassessment alone but the consequence of successive defeats. Except in Cuba, Soviet intervention in the underdeveloped world has brought very little but headaches. Recent events in Algeria and Indonesia demonstrated how precarious even the most touted "national democracies" can be.

III. SOVIET DOCTRINE ON LATIN AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Before World War II, Moscow had little success in Latin America and great difficulty in controlling Communist parties. In the immediate postwar period, this pattern continued; Soviet leaders believed the influence of the United States to be controlling, and the ease with which the Guatemala of Arbenz, a govern-

[8] According to one Soviet scholar who has written on the subject for many years, "The countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America cannot, naturally, count on the socialist states' being in a position to provide all their requirements for capital, equipment, and technical assistance. A significant portion of their requirements has to be satisfied through the agency of the imperialist states." V. Tiagunenko, "Aktual'nye voprosy nekapitalisticheskogo puti razvitiia" (Current Problems of the Non-capitalist Path of Development); *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 11, November 1964, p. 17. See also the same author in an article entitled "The Future of the Liberated States" in the more official *Kommunist*, No. 4, March 1965, p. 113, and Iu. Potemkin and V. Sandakov, "Razvivaiushchiesia strany: nekotorye aspekty problemy nakopleniia" (The Developing Countries: Some Aspects of the Problem of Accumulation); *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, No. 4, 1965, p. 43, for a similar statement with particular reference to Latin America, and most recently Ferenc Varnai, "Whither the Third World?" *Nepszabadsag*, Budapest, March 16, 1966.

[9] The Chinese have singled out for particular ridicule the following Soviet formulation of this idea: "The leading role of the proletariat on a world scale finds expression in part in the circumstance that under the influence of its ideology the transition to socialist transformations in some countries can take place even without the direct leadership of the working class and—at least in the initial stage—under the leadership of the progressive forces which gradually go over to the position of scientific socialism," B. N. Ponomarev (ed.), *Mezhdunarodnoe revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie rabochego klassa* (The International Revolutionary Movement of the Working Class) (Moscow, 1964), p. 325. The very same statement appears in the revised 1965 edition. The 1964 edition was printed in 50,000 copies, the 1965 edition in 25,000 copies.

ment friendly to the Soviet Union, was overthrown in 1954 confirmed their conviction. The Communist phrase that described this state of affairs was "geographic fatalism." For this reason the breakneck speed of the radicalization of Cuba after January 1, 1959, startled Soviet observers. Theodore Draper's *Castroism: Theory and Practice* demonstrates conclusively that neither the Soviet Union nor the Cuban Communists viewed Castro as an ally until very late in the game, when the Communist Party of Cuba established liaison with him and assisted him in his victory, very much as a last-minute junior partner. Even after Castro entered Havana, the Soviets and the Cuban Communists regarded him as another petit-bourgeois leader, more promising than most, but still a man who might make his peace with the United States and continue the social structure essentially unchanged.[10] However, as 1959 wore on and Castro became more radical in his internal policies, and as his relations with the United States worsened, the Soviets began to believe that here indeed was a new political phenomenon: a genuine social revolution in Latin America, seemingly tolerated by the United States. Moscow now supported him, first verbally and then economically, and even gave very carefully qualified assurances of military aid. When Castro seized upon these vague Soviet formulas and tried to make them more specific, Khrushchev replied that his promise of missile support had been only figurative. But Castro was inexorable in his pursuit of the reluctant Soviets and insisted that he had always been a Marxist-Leninist—one of many untruths. Castro's becoming a Communist meant two things. First, it would now be harder for the Soviet Union to evade helping him both politically and economically; and second, it put the Communist Party of Cuba under his discipline. Castro did not hesitate to alter the Communist Party of Cuba to his own needs and to establish his dominance by eliminating many of the old Communist Party members from positions of power.

Here, then, was yet another kind of Communist revolution. It began as an essentially middle-class revolution (with only a rudimentary, but much-advertised, rural base) against a tottering dictatorship. The middle-class revolutionary, who had studied the lessons of Guatemala and Cuba very carefully, came to power with the conviction that the United States would not let him go very far. Castro wanted to be the Bolivar of the Caribbean. If he were to be only a more liberal Batista, he could not realize such a dream. In the assessment of the Latin American Left, the Guatemalan revolution had failed because it had left the army intact and had not really enlisted the peasants' support. It was the exigencies of holding power, not doctrinal conviction, that drove Castro leftward. By expropriating the large landowners, by moving rapidly to appropriate foreign property, and by forming a new army, Castro systematically did all the things that Arbenz had not done.[11] In addition, he forced a reluctant Soviet Union to become his ally.

Once Castro had made these important changes in the political structure of his country, it needed more than a trumpet to blow down the walls of that Jericho. A small action from outside could not have the catalytic effects in Cuba that it had in Guatemala. This was the lesson of the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961.

The Soviets were confronted with an unexpected victory and an unusual new Communist. Castro at first tried to export his revolution, but had little success. As the prospects for further Castroite revolutions in the Caribbean went glimmering,[12] the Soviets had to take on the costs of fortifying the existing enterprise and to see if they could get more than political advantage from it. The cost in money was high, and money was hardly in abundant supply in

[10] "On 13 February [1959] the position of Prime Minister of the revolutionary government was taken over by Fidel Castro, leader of the rebel army. This meant that 'the principal role in the government went over into the hands of the petty radical bourgeoisie'," Konstantin M. Obyden, *Kuba v bor'be za svobodu i nezavisimost'* (Cuba in the Struggle for Freedom and Independence), Moscow, 1959, in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service (hereinafter cited as JPRS): 3563, 18 July 1960, p. 6.

[11] See Luigi Roberto Einaudi, *Marxism in Latin America: From Aprismo to Fidelismo* (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1966), especially pp. 160–250 for a convincing account of Castro's analysis of the Guatemalan experiences.

[12] Before the missile crisis, expectations were very high. "Latin America today is rapidly being converted into one of the most revolutionary regions of our planet" was the concluding phrase of an important article. See K. Tarasov, "Gavanskaia deklaratsiia-prizyv k bor'be protiv imperializma" (The Havana Declaration is a Summons to the Struggle Against Imperialism), *Kommunist*, No. 4, 1962, p. 89. See also Milos Vesely, "Latin America on the Move," *Nova Mysl*, July 1962, No. 7, Prague, in JPRS 15606, No. 254, p. 1.

the Soviet Union. Another and far from negligible cost was the complication of relations with Latin American Communist parties, which will be considered later.

Some time in the spring or early summer of 1962, the Soviets began planning to put medium- and intermediate-range missiles into Cuba. The frustration of that scheme was a great defeat for the Soviet Union and Castro. After the missile crisis, both the Soviet Union and Cuba had to lower their sights. To be sure, communism in Cuba was a considerable accomplishment, even if the most optimistic hopes had not been realized. But Cuba had cost, and continued to cost, a great deal of money, and the very existence of a Communist Cuba had provoked an American response which reduced the likelihood of new Cubas. It was clear even before the Dominican crisis that a new Castroite revolution would not be tolerated by the United States. However, even if this judgment had been mistaken and such a revolution might have succeeded, could the Soviet Union have afforded it? Brazil in 1964 offers a good hypothetical case. The Soviets, unlike most American political analysts, believed that the chief purpose of Goulart's approaches to the Communist Party and to the Soviet Union was to enable him to extract better terms from the United States.[13] But even if they hoped that Goulart might follow the Castroite path and change his political color once he had consolidated power in Brazil, they could not have viewed such an eventuality with any enthusiasm. Cuba is a country of about seven million people; Brazil has a population of over seventy-seven million. Obviously, the Soviet Union could not support Brazil economically on anything like the scale on which it was supporting Cuba. A Communist regime under Goulart would pose very serious problems for the Soviet Union while it existed, and its viability was uncertain. Perhaps in this case, as in many others, the wish was father to the analysis, leading the Soviets to believe that Goulart could not come to power.

Whether their diffidence is cause or effect, Soviet writers on Latin America are hardly sanguine about the prospects for revolution on that continent. The starting point of their analysis is that, by comparison with other underdeveloped areas, Latin America has a better-developed middle class, which opposes the assumption of power by the proletariat or by modernizing revolutionaries like Castro. Given the connection of this middle class with American imperialism and the immediate benefits that it derives from the relationship, so the Soviet theory goes, members of this group can be relied on to suppress Communist revolutions in Latin America. But some sections of the middle class suffer more from America's dominance than they gain from being its agent. From the Soviet point of view, the growth of this sector of the middle class is to be encouraged, and a precondition for doing so is the expansion of the internal market. In time, then, the *comprador* (middleman between foreign imperialism and native business) is expected to yield political power to the national, and nationalistic, bourgeoisie. For the latter to flourish, the internal market must grow, and to this end there must be land reforms (*not* an agrarian revolution). As the nationalistic, patriotic components of the bourgeoisie in Latin American countries become preponderant, Soviet writers expect that they will break with the United States, the first step being the confiscation of American property.[14] This process will take much longer in Latin America than in Africa, say the Soviet analysts, precisely because the *comprador* class is so strong in Latin America. Although in Africa the economy as a whole is less developed, the prospects for the transition to socialism are better because a concomitant of backwardness is a weak middle class.

At best, the Soviet prediction for Latin American communism is not wildly optimistic. Also, there remains the question of why Latin American radical nationalists, once having shaken loose from the United States, should turn to socialism rather than to new types of government which do not fit present categories tidily. Of course, if the Soviets insist on calling whatever system emerges a variety of communism, they are assured of victories; conversely, if we do the same, we are assured of defeats. But on the basis of any reasonably ob-

[13] The Communist Party of Brazil took the position, revised after his overthrow, that "Goulart came to power as a result of a compromise between the national bourgeoisie and the forces of reaction." See Manuel de Souza, "Communism in Brazil in 1965," *Est & Ouest*, No. 357, Paris, pp. 16–18 February 1966, in JPRS 35051, No. 823, p. 137.

[14] K. S. Tarasov, *Soiuz radi grabezha* (The Alliance for Looting), Moscow, 1965, a pamphlet, pp. 27–28; I. Sheremetyev, "Latin America's Social and Economic Problems," *International Affairs*, Moscow, 2, 1965, pp. 43–48; Victor Perlo, "U.S. Monopolies and Latin America," *International Affairs*, Moscow, 5, 1965; A. Shulgovsky, "Political Trends in Latin America," *International Affairs*, Moscow, 11, 1965, pp. 43–49.

jective definition of communism, one must agree with the Soviets' pessimism about their opportunities in Latin America, especially when one recognizes that the Soviet Union is not prepared to grant large-scale economic assistance to the development of these new, presumably anti-American, governments. The dominant and unvarying theme of all Soviet analysts is that Castroism will not be the model.[15] Why, they never say. One could imagine another situation in which a non-Communist leader, once having taken power, finds it opportune to turn Communist. It appears, however, that this alternative is never discussed in Soviet literature, as much, one suspects, because the Soviets find it unpalatable as because the United States is not expected to permit such a development.

IV. THE SOVIET POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA

Actual Soviet policy toward Latin American states and their Communist parties conform generally to the theoretical analysis just summarized, but, naturally, with many modifications to meet local situations. The variations are most obvious in the differentiated policies toward Latin American Communist parties. One of the consequences of the Sino-Soviet competition has been that the Soviet Union is holding Communist parties on increasingly loose strings in order to be able to hold them at all. But it has not been possible to satisfy one party, or group of parties, without dissatisfying another. Thus far, Cuba has presented the most awkward case. The Cuban revolution cannot be popular with such long-established Communist parties as those in Uruguay, Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, whose leaders have held their offices for years, in some cases more than a quarter of a century, and do not relish the prospect of being displaced, humiliated, and expelled from the Party by a Communist of such recent vintage as Castro. For them, Castroist infiltration in their respective countries is not only subversive of their authority within the Communist party, but it furnishes a pretext for hostile state authorities to declare the party illegal. Since they share the Soviet view that the best course is to rely on growing nationalism to further the movement toward communism, they want to retain the legality of their position so as to be able to exert maximum influence on the radical nationalists. The old Communist leadership does not want to frighten the nationalists into making their peace with the United States and spurning the cooperation so eagerly offered by the Communists. Thus far, although the Soviet Union has had problems in balancing the interests of Castro against those of the traditional Latin American Communist parties, it has succeeded on the whole.

A major adjustment in this complex relationship seems to have taken place in a secret meeting in Havana in the latter part of 1964. Following Togliatti's recommendation to convene regional meetings of Communist parties,[16] the Soviets had called the meeting in Havana, which presumably was to be attended by all the Communist parties of Latin America but which excluded the pro-Chinese splinters. In agreeing to such a meeting, Castro went a long way toward estranging the Chinese. The communiqué of the conference, published in Moscow in January, 1965, gave some indication of what the compromise between the Soviet Union, Castro, and the other parties must have involved. The critical issue was the employment of violence at that time in Latin America. On this issue Moscow's position had been changing. Two articles in consecutive issues of *Kommunist* in the summer of 1964 signaled the change.[17]

[15] "The unity of the Latin American Revolution does not exclude but on the contrary presupposes various national processes, a wealth of tactics, dissimilar tempos of development, various levels of the sharpness of the class struggle, and an endless gamut of political struggle in each country, region, or group of countries." Rodney Arismendi, "Latinskaia Amerika vykhodit na avanstsenu" (Latin America Comes to the Front of the Stage), *Kommunist*, No. 5, March 1961, p. 73; and A. M. Rumyantsev of the authoritative *World Marxist Review* said: "It is clear that the position with regard to the national bourgeoisie is not the same in Cuba, as, let us say, in Colombia. The revolutionary movement in Latin America, as in all other continents, develop unevenly." "Building a United Anti-Imperialist Front," *World Marxist Review*, VI (1), January 1963, p. 83; and in the context of a discussion of the example of Cuba, the old Communist leader, Corvalan, said: "Any tendency towards a mechanical copying of one or another revolutionary process by regarding it as a universal pattern is, at best, subjectivism." "The Peaceful Way—A Form of Revolution," *World Marxist Review* VI (12), December 1963, pp. 8, 9.

[16] "Pamiatnaia zapiska Palmiro Togliatti," *Pravda*, September 10, 1964.

[17] M. Kudachkin and N. Mostovets, "Osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie v Latinskoi Amerike" (The Movement of National Liberation in Latin America), *Kommunist*, No. 11, July 1964, pp. 121–

In their dispute with the Chinese the Soviets had never taken the position that a peaceful parliamentary transition was the only path to Communist revolution. They always insisted that both the violent and the nonviolent paths were possible and that the choice in any given case depended on the circumstances, but Communist parties that did not consider the armed struggle suitable for their countries were cited as examples.

The first *Kommunist* article follows the pattern just described. The second article repeats the generalization that the choice of means must depend on the local situation, but then specifically approves armed struggle and guerrilla activity in some Latin American countries and peaceful means in others. The two articles are, of course, logically consistent, but an important policy shift has been signaled.[18]

At an undisclosed date at the end of 1964, the Communist party of the Soviet Union and the Communist parties of Latin America met in Havana and adopted a resolution which reflected the policy change which the CPSU had initiated in the summer or, more likely, had accepted at Castro's urging. The resolution called for "support in an active form to those who at present are subjected to severe repression, such as the Venezuelan, Colombian, Guatemalan, Honduran, Paraguayan, and Haitian fighters." It took the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet conflict and called for the unity of each Communist party.[19] Since none of the Chinese splinters among the Latin American Communist parties had been invited to the meeting, it was obvious that unity within each of the Latin American parties was to be interpreted as applying to parties which followed the Soviet lead. In addition, Castro, after his initial reluctance, agreed to come to the Moscow Party meeting scheduled for March, 1965, which was directed against the Chinese.

What seems to have happened at Havana is that the Soviet Union on the one hand secured the support of Cuba and other Latin American parties against the Chinese, but on the other hand made support of its position on China easier for those parties by making explicit that there were several Soviet lines in Latin America. The Havana communiqué called for a further meeting, or meetings, of groups of Latin American Communist parties, implying that they should either concert their activities or agree to pursue different policies in different areas. Unity of the Latin American parties was restored by the explicit endorsement of diversity of policy.

At first sight, the Soviet Union's encouragement and support of guerrilla movements in Latin America, whether grudging or spontaneous, seems to contradict its estimate of the prospects for revolution in Latin America. But if the Soviet Union is to maintain its influence over Latin American parties (control being no longer in question), it must be responsive to their needs. When guerrillas are active in Latin American countries, the Communist parties find themselves in a quandary. (Castro's guerrilla movement from 1957 to 1959 is a good example of this.) The guerrilla leaders often are not Communists. Sometimes only a minority of them are Communists; in no case in the past have they all been Communists. Typically, the guerrillas operate in the countryside and are thus relatively elusive; only in exceptional cases will they be active in the cities, as they were for a while in Venezuela. The established Communist parties often are opposed to guerrilla activity because they are convinced

130; A. Sivolobov, "Krestianskoe dvizhenie v Latinskoi Amerike" (The Peasant Movement in Latin America), *Kommunist*, No. 12, August 1964, pp. 100–107.

[18] The first article said (p. 127): "A study of the programs of the Communist parties of Latin America shows that the form of struggle has not been absolutized by the Communists and that they change according to the situation in one or another country.

"Latin American Communists consistently support the implementation of the line indicated in the programmatic documents of the international Communist movement and reject the position of the Chinese leaders who are trying to impose on all the parties the strategy and tactics which they worked out in the specific conditions of their country [viz., armed revolution and civil war]." The article then went on to cite statements from the Chilean and Salvadorean Communist parties, both of which are opposed to violence in their own countries at present. The second of the two articles said in its last paragraph (p. 107): "An analysis of recent events established that in countries where dictators are in power, dictators who are the henchmen of foreign monopolies, the development of the struggle on a broad front, including armed struggle, and the creation of partisan detachments in some areas, is a completely justified course." Then follows a warning that this does not apply to liberal reformist regimes.

[19] "Communicado: Conferencia de los Partidos Communistas de América Latina" (Communiqué: A Conference of the Communist Parties of Latin America), *Revolución*, Havana, January 19, 1965.

that it will fail and that their support of any movements which they do not control may uselessly jeopardize whatever legal rights they have. However, in weighing their own opposition, they have to take into account the danger of losing the support of young militants who admire those who are fighting. Most typically, the relations between the Communist parties and the guerrillas are very strained. In one unusual case, Castro denounced the Sosa movement in Guatemala as a political mistake.[20] But more commonly, Communist parties will furnish limited support to the guerrillas and some personnel, in an effort to ensure some control over them and to avoid the onus of being against those who are "fighting with weapons in their hands." The police often arrest and harry the Communists, a circumstance which impels them to try to get the guerrillas to desist. As one can imagine, such alliances are fearsomely complicated, constantly shifting, and almost always embittered. Generalizations are of course perilous, but apparently the Cubans have remained more optimistic about the prospects of guerrilla movements than the Russians, and the relations between the Russians and the Cubans seem to include agreement on particular cases, concessions by one to the other, as well as agreements which one or both seek to subvert—the marks of a normal alliance, in other words. The Cubans are showing signs of greater discrimination in their support of guerrilla movements, and the Soviets still seem to be chasing the guerrilla movements leftward without being able to overcome the contempt of the guerrilla leaders for the old-line Communists.

Such a situation, while hardly ideal for the Soviets' point of view, is tolerable as long as their thesis that the guerrillas really have no chance of seizing power proves correct. If, however, in some small country where relatively few people participate in political life, a modest guerrilla force were to seize power, the Soviet Union would have to make the hard choice between supporting and scuttling a guerrilla group in power which it had previously been helping. Either choice would entail unpleasant consequences for the Soviet Union. If it supported the guerrillas' seizure of power with more than vague statements of support, it would lose heavily in prestige if the United States intervened successfully; a policy of inaction, on the other hand, would furnish ammunition to those guerrilla elements who have contended that the Soviet Union does not want them to succeed. Perhaps the Soviets are willing to risk having to make such a choice because they are convinced that the likelihood of the event is very small and that the objective of preserving their influence over the Communist movement in the face of the Chinese challenge is worth such a risk.

Although Soviet attention to guerrillas has increased, in most of the populous countries of Latin America the Soviet Union has adopted a vigorous united front policy, and it is doing so also in other parts of the world. In Europe, alliances with left and moderate parties have been projected. Even *rapprochement* with the Catholics has been advocated in the pages of the *World Marxist Review*. The policy of the united front is essentially a policy of broad alliances for limited ends. Given the Soviet Union's low estimate of the likelihood, or perhaps desirability, of Communist revolution at the present stage, its emphasis throughout the world is on alliances with other parties.

In Latin America the goal is clear: the isolation of the United States and an end to its influence in Latin America. In pursuit of this goal, the large Communist parties all over Latin America have been instructed to give conditional support to nationalist reformist movements. For instance, the Communist party of Chile in coalition with the Socialists, after losing the last election to the Christian Democrat Frei, has now moved to a position in support of Frei. At the last congress of the Communist Party of Chile it seemed as if the party would have supported Frei even more vigorously if its socialist allies had permitted it. In the Soviet analysis, Frei is pursuing a triangular policy in trying to balance off the United States by making arrangements with Europe, and in this endeavor the Communists wish him well. The Soviets are aware that Latin American politicians will try to use Europeans, including the East Europeans, as a way of getting better terms in their bargaining with the United States. The Soviet Union, for one, is quite willing to be used in this way, and the political color of the regime with which it is so dealing makes little difference. Thus, the Soviets were prepared to go along with Goulart, and are now willing to arrange trade agreements with his successor, Castello Branco.[21] This policy has the virtue of being extremely cheap, and almost automatically assured of

[20] Havana Domestic Radio, January 16, 1966.

[21] V. Kobysh, "Uspekhov tebe, Braziliia" (We Wish You Success, Brazil), *Izvestiia*, September 7, 1965, congratulates Brazil on the day of her national holiday and says that countries with different social systems can cooperate to mutual advantage.

success because its objectives are so modest. The Soviets understand as well as others that the most powerful political force in Latin America today is radical nationalism, which is naturally antiforeign. As a foreigner who is far away, with very little "presence" in Latin America, the Soviet Union is not the target of Latin American radical nationalism. The favorite target is the United States. Therefore, the Soviet Union, simply by continuing to talk generally about national liberation movements, and by encouraging native Communist parties, wherever it has influence over them, to cooperate with nationalist movements, is swimming with the tide. This is not a policy that promises the transition of the Latin American states to communism in the near or approximate future, but it has the virtue of avoiding embarrassing complications for the Soviet Union.

The same issues were reexamined at the Tricontinental Conference in Havana in January, 1966, where the main actors—the Chinese, the Russians, the pro-Soviet Communist parties, and representatives of the guerrilla groups that are in uneasy alliance with Communist parties —were able to confront each other in the flesh. Information on the proceedings of the conference is still incomplete, and the statement of its results that follows may have to be revised in its details, and perhaps even in its essentials, when the full data are available.

The Chinese in attacking Castro pushed him closer to the Soviet Union, although he is still not in agreement with the latter on all issues. Apparently, the central issue between Cuba and China has been the treatment of the guerrilla movement. The Cubans have rethought the problems of the guerrilla movements in Latin America, and the aforementioned article by Regis Debray, published in Havana on the eve of the conference, is primary evidence of their rethinking. Debray makes the general point that no models for revolution really exist, but that each revolution in the past has found its own strategy and tactics in action. Many attempts at an exact imitation of the Cuban revolution in Latin America have failed, says Debray, because they were unsuited to local conditions, but also, more generally, because the very precedent of the Cuban revolution has made its repetition difficult if not unlikely. The opponents of Communist revolution in Latin America are now alert to the possibility that a non-Communist guerrilla movement may become Communist after taking power. As one Colombian guerrilla leader told Debray, "Herbert Matthews will not interview me nor will a Betancourt send me arms." Debray does not present a formula for successful revolutions growing out of guerrilla movements in Latin America; the main burden of his argument is that the formula will emerge from the struggle. "Engage the enemy and then play it by ear" is his prescription. But he foresees that battles may be lost, and he does not specify how many enemies should be engaged. One may conclude from Debray's article that the Cubans are less sanguine than they once were about the possibility of revolution but that they still favor assistance in selected cases.

The drama of the conference itself and the pressure on Castro determined the form in which Castro conveyed this new line. Sino-Cuban relations reached their lowest point when China refused to continue to barter rice for sugar. This refusal would appear to have been a mistake, because Castro's estrangement from China has sharply reduced his bargaining power with the Russians, now that he can no longer play the Russians off against the Chinese. Castro is properly very sensitive about the charge that he is a Soviet puppet, and frequently talks and acts in a way calculated to demonstrate his independence. A journalist who had talked with Castro for several hours after the Havana conference then quoted an unnamed high Cuban official as saying: "It is the USSR which has attached itself to the Cuban line."[22]

On the guerrilla movement the Cubans demonstrated their difference with the Soviets in two cases, and their agreement in another. Their varying positions most probably reflect the Cubans' appraisal of the situation, but they also serve to demonstrate Cuban independence. Let us first examine the instances of disagreement with other Communist parties (including, presumably, the Soviets). Cuba was in charge of the invitations to the Tricontinental Conference. She invited, as members of the Peruvian and Venezuelan delegations, persons who were critical both of the Communists in their respective countries and of the Soviet Union. In a recent article, the Peruvian delegate, who came under the assumed name Roberto Garciá Urrutia, is quoted as frankly admitting that the Peruvian guerrillas do not enjoy wide support and have suffered reverses. But if the guerrilla movement continues, he maintains, conditions for wider support will be created because, as the movement grows, American intervention will follow, and the guerrilla struggle will then become identified with the patriotic struggle of the whole Peruvian people.

[22] Carlos Nuñez, "Y ahora, en que campo está Cuba?" (And Which Camp is Cuba in Now?), *Marcha*, Montevideo, February 18, 1966.

The Americans, because they fear that the Peruvian middle class will aid the guerrillas, support the conciliatory reformism of the ruling party. And the writer adds: "Certain leftist parties [read, the Communists] . . . have the illusion that in making an agreement with the bourgeoisie which permits them to publish four or five periodicals—which only the militants read anyhow—they have discharged their revolutionary duty. In reality this is an attitude of collaboration with imperialism. . . ."[23]

By inviting Garciá to the Tricontinental Conference, Castro was clearly intervening in the affairs of the Communist party of Peru and departing from the practices of fraternal and friendly conferences among the Latin American Communist parties. The Soviets were forced either to swallow this defiance or try to change Castro's mind.

In Guatemala, on the other hand, Castro took the opposite course. For a long time he favored the MR-13 wing of the Guatemalan guerrilla movement led by Sosa, a non-Communist who typically is more strongly committed to extensive guerrilla warfare than is the Guatemalan Communist party. In a speech right after the Havana conference, Castro switched the Cuban position and attacked Sosa possibly because he disapproved of this policy but more likely because he was resentful of his connection with the Trotskyites. Latin American Trotskyites have criticized Castro very sharply, and apparently effectively, for the change of policy which they connect with the disappearance of Che Guevara.[24]

The Trotskyites interpret Che Guevara's eclipse as meaning that Castro has ceased to be a genuine revolutionary. He failed to offer vigorous opposition to the American landing in Santo Domingo, they say; perhaps he murdered Guevara; he is really opposed to guerrilla movements in Latin America; he has withdrawn arms from the militia because he is afraid that the "Guevara group" might use them to overthrow him. Nothing could be better calculated to infuriate Castro than to be accused of having the same relationship to the guerrilla movements of Latin America that the Cuban Communist party had to his movement. Only time will tell whether the uneasy Cuban-Soviet agreement on policy toward insurrection can be maintained at the present level or whether it will deteriorate.

In the above pages, Soviet foreign policy objectives in Latin America have been described as more limited and realistic today than in the period before the missile crisis. Soviet Latin American policy is of a piece with the changes in Soviet policy the world over. The Soviet Union has lowered its sights and now aims for more modest but more realistic goals. The question in Latin America as in the rest of the world is whether this is a temporary, a medium-range, or a long-range trend. Given a Soviet military inferiority that is now recognized as likely to continue, and given the Soviet Union's preoccupation with an unsatisfactory domestic political situation and with the Chinese problem, one would expect this tendency to be of longer rather than shorter duration. But these projections are always uncertain because, in the Soviet-American confrontation, events unexpected by either side, sometimes undesired by either side, often push matters into new directions.

It is on this note of caution and ambivalence that this paper ends. Although the Russians may prefer and expect to pursue limited objectives in Latin America, unexpected events could force them to take sides in an unanticipated crisis.

[23] Marta D. Solis, "Peru, la guerrilla es su signo," (Guerrilla Warfare is Peru's Motto), *Siempre*, Mexico City, February 2, 1966.

[24] E.g., see S. Posadas, "The Expulsion of Guevara from Cuba is a Blow to the Development of the Cuban Socialist Revolution," *Voz Proletaria*, Buenos Aires, October 27, 1965, JPRS 33,204, No. 785, pp. 116–139.

AN END TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION?*

RONALD INGLEHART
University of Michigan

"European Integration has slowed down since the mid-50's, and has stopped or reached a plateau since 1957–58."[1] This is Karl Deutsch's first major conclusion in a recent summary report of findings from a study which he and a number of colleagues have been executing over the past few years.[2] The study appears to be one of the most ambitious and interesting political research projects undertaken in recent years; its findings should be widely useful. In reaching this conclusion, Deutsch's interpretation is not merely that integration has stopped in the relatively narrow realm of formal government decisions; on the contrary, he contends that the process has come to a halt in the "European political environment" as a whole.

Deutsch bases his case on an analysis of trade flows and other transactions, content analysis of the elite press, public opinion surveys and elite interviews. An examination of much the same data, in connection with a study of political socialization in Western Europe, has led me to a radically different conclusion. Far from finding a stagnation of integrative processes since 1958, I would argue that, in some respects, European integration may have moved into full gear only *since* 1958. In this article I will first present some new evidence concerning attitudes among the younger generation in The Netherlands, France, West Germany and Great Britain; I will then review Deutsch's findings in this context.

I. ATTITUDES AMONG WESTERN EUROPEAN YOUTH

I hypothesize that important changes in political socialization may have been taking place in recent years, as a result of the post-war European movement, the increases in trade, exchange of persons, and the erection of European institutions. If this is the case, we might expect to find differences between adults and youth in their orientations toward European integration. To test this hypothesis, I made a secondary analysis of two cross-national studies of adult attitudes, made in 1962 and 1963. I will compare these data with material which I collected in 1964 and 1965 through surveys of the school populations of France, The Netherlands, West Germany and England.[3] My sampling technique consisted of selecting several schools in each country which were considered representative of the important social and economic groups, on consultation with educational authorities in the respective countries. Self-administered questionnaires were given to all members of specific classes in these schools, under the supervision of a teacher.[4] The questionnaires incorporated

* I wish to thank Samuel Barnes, M. Kent Jennings, Warren Miller and David Segal for their valuable criticisms of an earlier draft of this article. I am also grateful to Karl Deutsch for generously giving access to research reports from his study. The interpretations reached here are, of course, my own.

[1] "Integration and Arms Control in the European Political Environment," this REVIEW, 60 (1966), p. 355. Deutsch's collaborators are listed in a footnote on p. 354. The same footnote indicates that fuller versions of the findings will be published in two forthcoming books.

[2] Deutsch does not seem to be alone in taking this general view. Sen. Frank Church suggests that "European sentiment may have shifted toward a different arrangement, that what might have been achieved in the vision of such men as Jean Monnet when Europe lay prostrate after the war may no longer represent a practical possibility," see "U.S. Policy and the New Europe," *Foreign Affairs*, 45 (1966), p. 52.

[3] The data collection was supported by a Fulbright grant, with additional aid from the Dutch Ministry of Education. The analysis has been supported by a National Science Foundation Cooperative Fellowship.

[4] Total numbers of questionnaires obtained are as follows: France: 700; The Netherlands: 3,100; West Germany: 700; England: 500. Each social type is not included in proportion to its occurance in the overall population. In order to correct for this fact, I will base my comparisons on samples which are weighted to compensate for the relative shortage of working-class students. I weighted our SES groups according to the proportions of manual to non-manual occupations indicated in the adult surveys (approx. 2:1). My estimates, therefore, can only be regarded as a spot check on the overall distribution of attitudes. I resorted to this approach because funds did not permit obtaining a probability sample, and no alternative data were available. In a more extensive analysis, I examine other factors which seem to influence support for European integration, and attempt to control for them also. See Ronald Inglehart, *The Socializa-*

a number of items from the two adult surveys just mentioned. The data indicate that a gap does exist between adults and youth in relative degree of "Europeanness."

In response to the question, "To what extent are you in favor of, or opposed to, the efforts being made to unify Europe?" adults compared with youth (ages 13–19) as follows:

TABLE 1. OVERALL PERCENTAGE "STRONGLY FOR" OR "FOR" EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

	Netherlands	France	Germany	Britain
Adults—				
1962	87%	72%	81%	(65%)[5]
Youth				
1964–65	95	93	95	72

Among youth of the three European Community countries, this is about as near to a unanimous verdict as one is likely to come in survey research. The response is overwhelmingly favorable to European unification by a majority which swamps all differences of social class, sex, religion, etc. Among adults in these three countries, a substantial degree of hesitation exists, especially in France; it virtually vanishes among the younger generation. English youth is far from unanimity, but does give a fairly solid majority in support.

The foregoing question merely indicates support or opposition to European "unification" as a general idea. What happens when we pin our respondents down to specific measures? A series of questions was asked concerning concrete proposals for European integration. We find that the favorable percentage declines in every case; a strong majority gives lip service, at least, to the general idea of "unification" but is less emphatically in favor of given specific proposals. A factor analysis of our secondary school data revealed that a number of these responses clustered together, evidently indicating a "Europeanness" dimension. Using the four highest-loading items which are common to both surveys, let us compare the responses of youth with those of adults in 1963:

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE "FOR" FOUR PROPOSALS: ADULTS V. YOUTH

	Netherlands	France	Germany	Britain
1. "Abolish Tariffs?"				
Adults	79%	72%	71%	70%
Youth	87	83	89	74
2. "Free Movement of Labor and Businesses?"				
Adults	76	57	64	52
Youth	64	65	75	65
3. "Common Foreign Policy"				
Adults	67	50	30	41
Youth	80	71	74	56
4. "Use 'Our' Taxes to Aid Poorer European Countries?"				
Adults	70	43	52	63
Youth	82	68	72	57

TABLE 3. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE "FOR" FOUR MEASURES

	Netherlands	France	Germany	Britain
Adults	73%	56%	62%	57%
Youth	78	72	78	63
Difference	+5	+16	+16	+6
Normalized Difference[6]	19	36	42	14

The Netherlands (in which the adult population already displayed a relatively high level of support for European integration) shows a relatively small age group difference; but over the four measures, our samples of French and German youth show pronounced increases in Europeanness relative to the adults in those countries. English youth lag behind here, as in our other comparison, although there is an indication of some increase in Europeanness relative to the adult population of Britain.[7] Strik-

tion of "Europeans" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1967).

[5] In the three most recent surveys in which this question was asked of British adults (1955, 56, and 57) the percentage favorable ranged from 64% to 66%.

[6] Normalized according to the Effectiveness Index described by Carl I. Hovland *et. al.* "A Baseline for Measurement of Percentage Change" in Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Morris Rosenberg, *The Language of Social Research* (Glencoe, 1955), pp. 77–82.

[7] Does this imply that youth is more cosmopolitan than adults as a general rule? Not necessarily. The example of the Hitler youth might be cited as an indication that the reverse relation-

ing as these generational differences are, they become even more interesting when we break down the adult responses according to age group:

TABLE 4. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE "FOR" FOUR MEASURES, BY AGE GROUP

Age Groups	Netherlands	France	Germany	Britain
55 and over	70%	47%	52%	49%
40–50	73	58	63	57
30–39	71	59	64	61
21–29	72	58	67	60
16–19 (youth sample)	77	72	78	63

In the Netherlands, the most notable feature of this pattern is its stability among different age groups. Dutch youth are more European than the oldest adult group (55 and over), but the difference is one of only 7 percentage points: an average of 77% "For" among the teenagers, as compared with 70% among the oldest group. The gap between the "55 and over" Germans and the teen-age Germans is much larger: fully 26 percentage points separate the two groups, building from a base of 52%. This seems to confirm other findings of striking differences among age groups reported for that country. One hears less talk of a "generations conflict" in France, yet in regard to the European issue, my data indicate that among the French there is almost as great a change from middle-agers to teen-agers as in the case of Germany: an increase of 25 percentage points in over-all support of the four European integration measures. The increase from oldest to youngest age group in England is intermediate: 14 percentage points.

While the average levels of support for these concrete proposals are considerably below the landslide approval of European "unification," we might tentatively draw the conclusion that the youngest generation in each of these countries is significantly more favorable to European integration than the group 55 and over—the age group which now holds most top-level positions of political power in these countries. Two relative discontinuities are particularly interesting in the age-group pattern: first, we notice that in France, Germany and Britain, the "over 55" group is markedly less European than the group immediately bordering it: there is a sharp drop of 8 to 11 percentage points. On the other hand, we find no sizeable gap between the oldest *Dutch* group and the next younger group, in regard to Europeanness. Indeed, the "over 55" group in that country is within 2 points of the "21–29" group. This contrast between Dutch stability and the rather sharp changes in the age group patterns of her neighbors cannot readily be interpreted in terms of a life cycle explanation and it leads us to a very interesting alternative interpretation.

The age group which was 55 and older in 1963 was at least 10 years old at the end of World War I. These individuals were exposed to the period of intense nationalism which preceded that war, and to the powerful fears and suspicions the war aroused during a relative impressionable stage of life. Alone among these four countries, Holland did not participate in World War I—nor was she deeply involved in the preceding great-power rivalries. If one's concept of nationality tends to be established early in life,[8] then the sharp decline in Europeanness which we find among this age group in each country *except* the Netherlands might be attributed to a residue from experiences in childhood and youth. It seems plausible that the effect of a major war on one's feelings of trust and kinship with the "enemy" people (e.g., the French toward the Germans) is strongly negative.

The "over 55" group in France, Germany and Britain had a powerful dose of the influences of World War I in its early years: the corresponding group in Holland was much less affected by them. And the next younger group (this time in all four countries) also shows less of the effect which we might attribute to that period: the median year of birth for this group is 1916. The oldest members of the younger group would have had some exposure to World War I (and their Europeanness would be lessened accordingly); but to a large extent this group was too young to be directly aware of

ship is also possible. My interpretation is simply that, because of the specific influences present in their early socialization, this *particular* crop of youth has been oriented in a more European and less nationalistic direction than preceding age cohorts.

[8] See, for example, Jean Piaget, "Le developpement chez l'enfant de l'idée de patrie et de relations avec l'étranger," *Bulletin Internationale de Science Sociale*, UNESCO, 1961, pp. 3, 605, 621. Piaget concludes that the concept of nationality is fully developed by age 14. Cf. Robert Hess, Judith Torney and David Jackson, *The Development of Basic Attitudes and Values Toward Government, Part I* (Chicago, 1965), p. 380; and Gustav Jahoda, "Children's Ideas about Country and Nationality" *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, June, 1963.

World War I, and had reached adulthood before the outbreak of World War II. Karl Deutsch reports a phenomenon which seems to fit in with this interpretation. Drawing on data from a series of elite interviews in France, he reports:

> Typically, age accounts for less than 5 per cent of the variance in the answers found. Within these limits, the "middle elites"—those in their fifties and hence the generation of the 1930's and World War II—tend to differ from both their elders and juniors, who in turn often resemble each other. This middle elite group is somewhat more nationalistic and more closely identified with the de Gaulle regime. The junior elite—those under 50—are more internationalistic, more in favor of alliances, and still more opposed to an independent foreign policy for France.[9]

While Deutsch refers to the relatively nationalistic group as "the generation of the 30's and World War II," they might also be described as "the generation of World War I": in their fifties in 1964 (the time of the interviews), the Great War was probably felt as *the* important event of their childhood. They were 4 to 14 years old at the War's end. The next younger group was unaware of the war, while most of the older group had already passed through their most important years of political socialization by that time.

Moving down the age group tables, we notice little further increase in Europeanness among the adult population. This would be surprising if we were to work on the assumption that younger people are naturally more open to new ideas (a favorite assumption of intuitive life-cycle interpretations). Again we would attribute this peculiarity to the psychological residue of a major event—in this case, World War II. The median year of birth of the youngest adult group is 1938: by 1945, its members were 3 to 11 years old, and had experienced Blitz, Occupation, and devastation during the most impressionable years of life. The "European" atmosphere of the post-war years should *also* have made a relatively great impact on this youngest adult group—but apparently not enough to make them significantly more European than the older adult groups.

Except for the oldest group, none of the age groups discussed so far is a "pure" category from the standpoint of historical experiences. To some extent they overlap, containing individuals who were socialized during periods which we would consider optimal (from the standpoint of developing Europeanness) as well as individuals who were exposed to powerful negative influences during the years of childhood and early youth. The youngest group of all (those in the 16–19 year old category) do constitute a "pure" group in this sense. All of these individuals were born in 1945 or later; they have gained their first political perceptions in a world where European organization seems natural and right, and nationalism seems archaic and dangerous. It is among this youngest group that we find (as we did with the oldest group) a relatively great discontinuity from the level of Europeanness of the adjacent group. This discontinuity is most marked in France and Germany; it exists also in The Netherlands; but it is very slight in England. The latter finding may be highly significant. I conclude that at least two elements are necessary for the establishment of a strong sense of Europeanness:

1. The absence of divisive memories (but this is not enough in itself).
2. A sense of positive participation in substantial common activities. Britain has not participated in the institutions of the European Community. Youth in the other three countries, however, have grown up with some awareness of a common endeavor, and this may explain, at least in part, their greater degree of backing for European integration measures.

II. AGE, COHORT AND HISTORICAL PERIOD

Projecting from the foregoing data, we might anticipate that the current generation of youth in these countries will manifest a relatively "European" outlook when they become adults, because this accords with conditions obtaining at that point in time when their basic political orientations were instilled. At this point, let me introduce an hypothesis which will make more explicit the relationship which I believe exists between certain distinctive aspects of the attitudes of a given age cohort and the period in which the group received its early socialization. The central element in this hypothesis is something which we might call "structural inertia" in concept formation. Taking this view, we would regard the socialization process as one in which perceptions become ordered into increasingly complex conceptual structures. Only a few of the infant's earliest perceptions—those related to basic needs—will give rise to subjectively important symbols. Most other stimuli will be disregarded as "noise." Subsequent perceptions which are regularly associated with these symbols may take on a derivative importance; these will tend to become relatively permanent, to the extent that a rela-

[9] Deutsch, "Arms Control," *op. cit.*, p. 358.

tively large number of perceptions are associated together around a given basic symbol. To change a central part of the system would require a disassembly and reintegration of the whole structure. Accordingly, adult learning has been contrasted with infant learning as the "recombination of a smaller number of larger subassemblies of memories or habits. . . ."[10] When one has reached adulthood, only a very important event, making a deep and continuing impact on the individual's life, would justify the cost of such a conceptual reorganization.

My expectation on the basis of this hypothesis, is that the full impact of the post-war European movement has not yet manifested itself among the adult population. I would anticipate a time lag between certain types of major political outputs and the resulting feedback into the political system, because of the gap in time between the early political socialization of individuals,[11] and the point at which they become politically relevant. We might diagram the basis of this time lag as follows:




FIG. 1. Time lag and attitude development.

A major event (war, or the establishment of new political institutions let us say) occurs at time X—during the adult years of generation "1," bringing about a relatively superficial attitudinal change in that generation. It has occurred during the late childhood of generation "2" and influences the basic political orientation of that age group. Its political feedback, however, may not be felt until time Y, when that generation "surfaces" into political relevance. (This point is arbitrarily indicated as age 21.) Such a time-lag effect would only be expected to operate in connection with relatively early-established and persisting aspects of political socialization. Provisionally, I interpret these data on development of a sense of European political identity according to this model.[12]

[10] D. O. Hebb, cited in Karl Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York, 1963), p. 166.

[11] That is, the socialization which takes place in childhood and youth.

[12] The concept also seems useful for interpreting political activity in other areas—notably Red China. Peking's recent mobilization of teen-agers to enforce conformity on the part of their elders may be linked with differences in the early political socialization of youth as contrasted with the adults. Fragmentary as our evidence is, there seem to be indications of a wide cleavage between the older and the youngest generations in the population at large, regarding their degree of commitment to the Maoist vision for Chinese society. It is probably noteworthy that the current teenage group has received its basic political socialization entirely since 1949, the year of Communist victory on the Mainland. This regime has given intense attention to the indoctrination of a new set of societal values. Apparently, the program of thought reform has not achieved the desired degree of communist piety through reorientation of

It is, of course, impossible to predict with certainty what attitudes a given age group will express in a decade or two. My interpretation would be far more convincing if I were able to support it with longitudinal data based on national probability samples made at *several* different points in time. This is a goal for further research. On the basis of the evidence we have examined, however, we might infer tentatively that the younger generation has a stronger *tendency* to support the concept of a federal Europe than do older age groups in these countries. The Europeanness of the youth samples presumably represents a basic orientation, rather than a re-orientation in conformity with current experience.

III. DECAY OR STABILITY IN AGE GROUP DIFFERENCES?

We find age group differences, then, as predicted by our model. But will these differences persist? From the perspective of the exceptionally stable American political community (which has experienced a relatively slowly changing political consensus for about a century) one may be tempted to assume that these age-group differences will decay—that by the time the current European youth are as old as today's adults, they will hold the same attitudes. To be sure, a life cycle interpretation may provide a valid explanation for many or most of the age group differences which have been found in survey research, especially among societies which are not undergoing rapid social change. On the other hand, it is clear that this is not true in *all* cases, even in Western societies.[13]

The relative importance of decay in age group differences probably varies according to at least three sets of circumstances: (1) The type of attitude involved. Preferences in popular music, for example, may be very largely governed by life cycle factors; political party preference, or matters of even more fundamental self-identification may be much less so. (2) The age at which the given orientation is established. According to our concept of structural inertia, those attitudes which are earliest established should be hardest to change. Orientation toward the political community seems to be established relatively early in life. (3) The causes of the given set of age group differences: are they attributable to different reactions to the same environmental conditions at different points in the life cycle, or are they due to different conditions of early socialization? If the latter, we might expect decay to be relatively unimportant, particularly if the changed conditions persist.

If Europeanness were a matter of teen-age rebellion, for example, we might be justified in assuming that it would diminish with increasing maturity. Our interviews gave little indication that Europeanness was regarded by youth as a form of rebellion.[14] On the contrary, it seemed

---

adults in the general population. Its efforts have only now begun to reach fruition in the production of a highly-committed age cohort, capable of being used as guardians over less firmly Maoist groups. A parallel to the European phenomenon also seems to exist in the American context; it could be interpreted as due to a differential impact of this country's post-war internationalism on different age cohorts. A nation-wide survey of high school seniors and their parents in 1965 produced evidence of a possible intergenerational shift in the direction of more cosmopolitan political attitudes. Ranking the relative salience which four levels of government had for them (international, national, state and local), fully 65% of the students rated international politics in first or second place; only 42% of the parents did so. See M. Kent Jennings, *Pre-Adult Orientations to Multiple Systems of Government* (paper presented to the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists, Chicago, April 1966).

[13] There are indications that an age-specific pattern in American political party preferences may be linked to the differential impact which the Great Depression had on different age groups. These differences apparently have not decayed. See Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), pp. 153–156.

[14] The relative Europeanness of the youth in our samples probably springs from naiveté or adolescent rebellion to only a very limited degree. The fact that they have a relatively pessimistic (and perhaps realistic) view of how long it will take for Europe to become "unified"—and the fact that they have a level of knowledge which compares favorably with that of adults—tends to make an explanation in terms of naiveté somewhat untenable. Our interviews indicated, moreover, that rebellion is not an important theme in connection with European integration. Despite the widespread prevalence of a stereotype of youthful rebellion, the available evidence suggests that it is important only in exceptional individual cases, as far as political views are concerned. See M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, *Family Structure and the Transmission of Political Values* (paper presented at the 1966 annual meeting of the American Political Science

to be generally regarded as an enlightened and highly respectable orientation. Analysis by social status reinforces this impression; far from being a deviant position, "Europeanness" is likely to be found among those of higher status and those who are most integrated into the community. My interpretation links the age group differences which seem to exist regarding Europeanness with the following differences in the conditions of early socialization:

a. Absence of a major intra-European war from the younger individuals' experience.
b. A marked increase in intra-European transactions, with a possible reduction in the psychological distance between the groups concerned.
c. Development of European institutions which perform important functions and are widely regarded as beneficial.

All these factors have distinguished the early socialization of European youth from that of the older generations. Moreover, they continue to operate; we might well argue that their impact is likely to *increase* rather than disappear as the current crop of youth grows older. These do not appear to be transient stimuli, felt only at a certain stage of life, but persisting factors. Although they probably reach their greatest degree of effectiveness in orienting (presumably malleable) children, they may also have some effect in resocializing adults in the same direction. The fact that adult age cohorts appear to have become somewhat more European during their mature years suggests that one might reverse the question about decay, and ask "How much *more* European are these younger people likely to become by the time they are 30 or 40 years old?" By their very nature, our data can not give a conclusive answer to this question (or its reverse). It would be rash, however, to flatly assume that a decay in Europeanness will take place.

Association, New York City, Sept. 6–10). Cf. Eleanor Maccoby *et. al.*, "Youth and Political Change," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring 1954), pp. 23–29.

IV. STABILITY OF ATTITUDES OVER TIME

At this point one might reasonably ask if it is plausible that individuals respond to survey questions such as these because of events in their childhood and youth: just how stable are these attitudes? To deal with this point, let us review the manner in which public support for European integration has varied over a decade's time. During that period, the question about "making efforts toward uniting Europe" has been aksed repeatedly in three of the countries included in our survey. The following percentages of adult samples responded that they were "for" these efforts:[15]

TABLE 4. PERCENT OF ADULTS "FOR" EFFORTS TO UNITE EUROPE

	Sept. '52	Oct. '54	Feb. '55	Dec. '55	Apr. '56	Oct. '56	June '57	Feb. '62
W. Ger.	70%	82%	73%	69%	79%	82%	79%	81%
Britain	58	78	67	66	65	—	64	—
France	60	63	49	45	53	67	55	72

As we see, support for European integration fluctuates from year to year, even from month to month. Are we justified in attributing variations in Europeanness among different age groups to the effect of events which took place as much as 50 years ago? Despite the manifest fluctuation, there is a certain underlying stability. Although varying proportions of the population favored "efforts toward unifying Europe" at varying times, in every case the German adults gave the highest level of favorable response among these countries; and in five of the six cases where comparative data are available, the British adults ranked second.[16]

[15] 1952–57 figures from USIA surveys cited in Donald Puchala, *Western European Attitudes on International Problems*, 1952–61 (New Haven, 1964), p. 9; 1962 figures from European Communities Information Service survey cited in *Sondages*, #1, 1963, p. 8.

[16] Prior to the establishment of the EEC, British adults were consistently more favorable to European unification than were the French (see Table 4). Participation in a common (and successful) endeavor seems to have brought the French adults about even with British adults in Europeanness, while a reversal of the earlier relationship seems clearly reflected in the outlook of

The levels of support for European unity rise and fall simultaneously in the three countries—perhaps in response to important events in the international environment.

There is also a degree of consistency in response patterns when we break them down according to social categories within these countries. In nearly every case, the upper socio-economic groups give a stronger favorable response than do the lower groups.[17] Moreover the adherents of certain political parties have consistently been more favorable to uniting Europe than those of other parties. Although the overall level of support rises and falls, the same social groups (and, I infer, the same individuals) tend to be relatively strong or relatively weak in support for European unification. Certain major events come to mind as plausible causes of this rise and fall: I will make a few conjectures about them.

The first two polls in the above series were made in 1952 and 1954—immediately after the Korean War, formation of the E.C.S.C. and during the efforts to form a European Defense Community. There was, probably, a sense of common danger, and a feeling that European unification was moving ahead successfully. Optimism about the imminence of European unification seems to be associated with expressions of support for European unification.[18] The collapse of the E.D.C. project (and perhaps a diminishing sense of military danger) had the converse effect—leading to a decline in pro-European sentiment in 1955 and early 1956.[19] Subsequent rises in the level of sentiment supporting European unification might be associated with the impact of the Hungarian revolt and the Suez invasion in late 1956; and with a generally optimistic climate created by the establishment and rapid implementation of the Common Market, by 1962.

The question about "efforts toward unifying Europe" was not asked in the 1963 cross-national survey of adults, but there are strong indications that de Gaulle's veto of British admission to the Common Market dispelled the mood of high expectations, bringing a period of relative pessimism which perhaps persists today. One piece of evidence consists in the fact that there was a sharp drop in levels of support for the four key European integration proposals discussed earlier in this paper. Average levels of support for the four measures declined as follows:

TABLE 5. LEVELS OF SUPPORT FOR INTEGRATION PROPOSALS, 1962–1963

	(Feb.) 1962	(Feb.) 1963
The Netherlands	78.5%	73.0%
West Germany	68.2	61.8
France	58.8	54.4
Great Britain (data not available)		

Between January, 1961 and December, 1965, the percentage of Germans who "expect some day to see the countries of Europe united to constitute a United States of Europe" dropped from 36% to 29%. This decline in optimism was especially marked among people over 45 years of age.[20] Moreover, despite the proverbial

youth in the two countries. States of public opinion apparently can be outputs as well as inputs in relation to government decisions.

[17] The patterns of age group responses cannot readily be compared due to the variety of categories used from survey to survey, and because of the excessive breadth of the categories.

[18] In the factor analysis of responses from youth in the four countries, an item tapping the student's estimate of the length of time which will elapse before Europe is "united" had consistent (although only moderately high) loadings on the "Europeanness" factor; the direction of the relationship was always such as to indicate that an optimistic time estimate was linked with support for integrative measures.

[19] There is an apparent flaw in this timetable: the defeat of E.D.C. in the French legislature came *before* the October, 1954 survey. However, at that time it was widely believed that the London Conference establishing the Western European Union would produce an even greater measure of European unification than would have emerged from the E.D.C. (a union which would, moreover, include Britain). An IFOP survey in October, 1954 found that 52% of the Frenchmen surveyed thought that the London Conference was a move toward European unification, as against 17% who thought it was a simple military alliance. A plurality of the former group felt that W.E.U. would go farther in this direction than E.D.C. These expectations were, of course, false; they seem to have produced a short-lived bubble of optimism about European unification. See IFOP surveys cited by Jean Stoetzel, "The Evolution of French Opinion" in D. Lerner and R. Aron, *France Defeats E.D.C.* (New York: 1957), p. 101.

[20] *Jahrbuch der offentlichen Meinung* (Verlag fur Demoskopie, Allensbach, 1957); and *Informationsdienst*, Institut für Demoskopie, January, 1966, cited in Jacques-René Rabier *L'Opinion Publique et l'Europe* (Brussels, 1966), p. 19.

optimism of youth, the young people in our samples are much less likely to view European unification as something which will be attained in the near future than were adults in the 1962 samples. In response to the question "Do you believe that Europe will become unified? . . . If YES, in how long a period of time?" the following responses were obtained:

TABLE 7. AVERAGE PERCENTAGE "FOR" FOUR MEASURES

	Netherlands	France	Germany
Adults—1963	78%	59%	68%
Youth 1964–65	77	72	78

TABLE 6. EXPECTATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

	NETHERLANDS		FRANCE		GERMANY	
	"Never" or "over 20 yrs."	Within 15 yrs.	Over 20 yrs.	Within 15 yrs.	Over 20 yrs.	Within 15 yrs.
Adults (1962)	57%	43	51	49	42	58
Young (1964–65)	82	18	83	17	78	22

The adults were about evenly split (in 1962) between those who saw European unification as something quite close at hand, and those who felt it would come only in the remote future or never. About four-fifths of the youth in all three countries saw it as something relatively remote (and the stalemate which existed in European politics at the time of their responses made their position seem fairly realistic). We believe that this factor probably acted to deflate the level of support for European integration expressed by the younger people in 1964–65. Nevertheless, despite an apparent realization that European unification had bogged down, the youth in our samples gave a relatively strong measure of support for "European" proposals. This shows up even when we compare their responses in 1964–65 with the adult responses from 1962.[21] Basing our comparison on the same four key proposals described earlier in this paper, average levels of support were as follows:

[21] Let me emphasize, however, that in my opinion the comparison with the 1963 adult data is definitely the more appropriate intergenerational comparison. Unfortunately, a different set of age-categories was used in coding this adult data, from those which were used with the 1963 adult data; we cannot make direct comparisons between adult groups. These age categories, of course, have a different relationship to periods of socialization than did the previous data.

In this comparison, the youth in our Dutch sample are actually slightly less European than the adults; I attribute this to a reaction to the veto of British admission (and other lesser events) which intervened between the times when the two surveys were taken. In the other two comparisons, the younger generation is substantially more European than the adult age groups, despite the fact that the outlook in 1964 was decidedly less auspicious than it had been in 1962.

V. RELATIVE STABILITY OF ATTITUDE AMONG DIFFERENT AGE GROUPS: THE IMPACT OF THE DE GAULLE VETO

The existence of data from two cross-national surveys of attitudes toward European integration, made within a year of each other but giving responses both before and after the veto of British admission to the Common Market, gives us an opportunity to check the relative stability of support for "Europe" among different groups in the adult population of Western Europe. And some intriguing patterns emerge when we compare responses to nine questions which were asked in both the 1962 and 1963 international surveys.

Over the six EEC countries there is a net decline of slightly more than 6% from 1962 to 1963 in the average level of support for the nine European integration proposals. For the most part, this does not reflect a movement into op-

position, but a shift from being "for" to "no answer." The percentage giving no answer increased an average of about 8 points from the first survey to the next, so that the percentage "against" actually *declined* slightly.

The increase in the proportion not answering, from 1962 to 1963, seems to be an emotional response to a discouraging event; it can scarcely be attributed to a decline in knowledge or public interest. On the contrary, during the year intervening between the two surveys, the negotiations for British entry brought forth very extensive coverage of the European integration question by the mass media, and almost certainly increased public interest in the topic. Viewed in this context, the rather large increase in the percentage not answering (which would normally seem paradoxical) makes sense: apparently a number of new converts had been made to the European cause during the course of the negotiations. They were recruited largely from among the previously uninformed—and were the least stable adherents.

The veto of British admission on January 14, 1963, suddenly made the outlook for the cause seem bleak. Reacting to this, many of those who had been "for" Europe were apparently jolted off the bandwagon (especially the newer converts, I hypothesize). They were discouraged, but they did not go so far as to register an opinion *against* European integration, however. Instead, they abstained from answering. This is reflected in the substantial and consistent increase in "no answer" responses in each country. By abstaining, these individuals avoided the psychic pain of acknowledging that they were "for" what appeared to be a losing cause.

In which countries was the shock most keenly felt? Expressed as a percentage of those originally "for" each measure, the average decline for the respective nations was: Germany, 15.0%; Belgium, 13.6%; The Netherlands, 10.4%; France, 6.2%; and Italy, 5.1%. In the 1962 survey, the most European country was The Netherlands, followed closely by Belgium and Germany, with France and Italy lagging behind. To an extent, the most European countries suffered the greatest decline from one survey to the next (which I will refer to as "fall-out").

We might explain this phenomenon as follows: a large share of the population of any nation is more or less apolitical; the consensus favorable to a given measure in such a country will therefore contain a higher proportion of fair-weather friends, who have been only faintly interested in the measure, but indicate that they favor it because it is perceived as widely accepted. If 90% of the population of a country expresses itself as favorable to a given proposition, we may be sure that a good share of them—perhaps 20% or 30% of those favorable—have only the vaguest attachment to the measure.

In this connection, we may note that the French level of support was already relatively low in 1962, apparently fairly near a level where only persons with some genuine conviction would express themselves as favorable to a given proposal for integration. France was thus less vulnerable to a decline in support, as a result of a discouraging event, because sufficient opposition was being voiced within the political culture so that apoliticals were less sure which was the "proper" response.[22]

But when we look at the data more closely, we find that the relative attrition is not simply due to having had a comparatively large proportion of the population giving nominal support; some persisting element of a nation's political culture seems to be equally important. For we find a relative stability in The Netherlands (the most European country in 1962) as compared with Germany. In 1963, the latter country had dropped sharply, to a level below France although still ahead of Italy.[23] By contrast, Holland was still clearly in the lead after the veto. While she did experience considerable decline, it was substantially less than that in Germany: I hypothesized that "fall-

[22] It may also be speculated that the French were relatively less discouraged by the de Gaulle veto because it was, in a sense "their" veto; it was the French who were keeping the British out, and who could, perhaps, reverse themselves. To the Germans and Dutch, on the other hand, there may have been a greater sense of helplessness. A measure they strongly favored had been defeated by a man over whom they had no political control.

[23] The Italian case is somewhat special. This country had a considerably lower level of political information than did any of the other EEC countries. A rather large "non-mobilized" segment of the Italian population had never pronounced itself as favorable to these measures in the first place, and hence did not fall away from supporting them in the face of the veto. Germany continues to rank ahead of France on the most important European measures in 1963, however (i.e., those loading highest on the Europeanness factor). We eliminate Luxemburg from this analysis because of the small sample size for that country.

out" is caused chiefly by defection of the band-wagon riders; but this group may contain two types of individuals: those whose commitment to a given position is relatively superficial because they are weakly involved politically; and those whose commitment is unstable because they are expressing agreement with a popular or fashionable trend without its being in harmony with the outlook instilled in their primary political socialization.

Our previous analysis has pointed to The Netherlands as an example of stable internationalism, over the three generations for which we have data. Internationalism has deeper historical roots there than among her neighbors.[24] Non-participation in World War I may be an additional factor which would help to maintain a relatively even pattern among the Dutch adult age groups. This may explain the relatively small degree of "fall-out" in The Netherlands, despite the fact that disappointment there must have been especially sharp in reaction to de Gaulle's veto: Holland was the country which was most keenly in favor of British admission, among the Six.[25]

The relative importance of "fall-out" is greater in Germany. Apparently the German consensus favoring Europe was a particularly vulnerable one, containing a relatively large proportion of persons who were expressing internationalistic views which were not in harmony with their primary attitudes.

To check the validity of this interpretation, let us examine the responses of different age ity of Dutch adults polled immediately after the groups within these countries, and the degree to which they shifted from 1962 to 1963. This age group analysis so far has suggested that the adults who received their primary political socialization in the interwar period, and the youth socialized after World War II, are relatively strongly European. According to my interpretation, it is these age groups which have underlying concepts of nationality which are most nearly akin to the currently-expressed Europeanism. I would predict, therefore, that these age groups should show the least "fall-out."[26]

Let me point out that a normal expectation would be that the older group would show less "fall-out" from one year to the next: (1) they would be expected to have a relatively inflexible mentality; (2) they have held their opinions longer, and should be relatively "immunized" to change.[27] My prediction, however, is to the contrary: I hypothesize that the older group has a more nationalistic basic concept of political identity, and that these individuals are consequently more vulnerable to change as the result of a blow to a band-wagon mentality.

A comparison of relative rates of "fall-out" indicates that there is very little difference between the older and the younger groups in The Netherlands—once again reflecting her history of a relative internationalism over the past three generations. Since both groups had about the same inner orientation, Dutchmen of 40 and over suffered just about the same degree of set-back as did the younger Dutch adults. On the other hand, the older Frenchmen and Germans suffered a substantially greater degree of "fall-out" than did their younger compatriots. This suggests that they experienced a greater degree of dissonance between expressed and inner orientation than did the younger group.

Note that the younger German group is more stable in its Europeanism than the younger Dutch group: evidently nationalism in Germany exists mainly among those aged forty and over.[28]

This analysis suggests that the younger adults (particularly in France and Germany) have a more stable commitment to European

[24] She has, for example, favored a free-trade policy ever since the end of the Napoleonic Wars; her interest in international law dates back to Grotius, and was recognized (and perhaps strengthened) by the location of the World Court in The Hague.

[25] This was true of public opinion, as well as of official Dutch policy. Indeed, an absolute majority said they would prefer a Common Market with Britain but without France, if it were necessary to choose. See *Sondages*, #1, 1963, p. 108.

[26] I select this 28% of respondents from this age group at random, since there is no finer age-identification available. To the extent that the predicted age-group differences hold true within this 15-year age group, this method will result in underestimating the age group contrasts—for I will be including a certain number of cases which dilute the differences between the younger and older halves. This is a fairly close approximation to recoding according to consistent (and more usable) age groups—and despite its imperfection, a fairly striking set of age group contrasts does result.

[27] See *The American Voter*, *op. cit.*, pp. 161ff.

[28] This holds true of the younger French group as well; as indicated in the foregoing pages, the situation in that country is not quite comparable with the Dutch and German cases in relation to the veto of British admission.

TABLE 7. "FALL-OUT" FROM 1962 TO 1963 BY AGE GROUP, FOUR KEY MEASURES

	Netherlands		France		Germany	
	20–39	40+	20–39	40+	20–30	40+
Abolish Tariff:	−10%	−14%	−5	−15	− 5	−11
Free Movement Labor, Bus.	+ 8	—	+9	− 1	− 2	− 8
Common Foreign Pol.	−13	− 5	−8	−11	−13	−11
Aid European Countries	−10	− 7	+8	− 1	+ 2	− 1
Average Points of "Fall-Out"	− 6.3	− 6.5	+1	− 7	− 4.5	− 7.8

integration than do the older adults. Despite the fact that (under favorable conditions) both groups may express approximately the same level of support for "European" proposals, there appear to be fewer bandwagon-riders among the younger group. I attribute this phenomenon to differences in the early socialization of the different age categories.

VI. THE EVIDENCE OF OTHER INDICATORS

Let us return now to the question posed at the start: has European integration *in general* come to an end? If not, why is it that two analyses (Karl Deutsch's and mine) have come to such opposite conclusions?

Deutsch, of course, does not draw upon political socialization data in concluding that European integration has levelled off or come to a halt; not having this material available may have led him to underestimate the degree to which the integrative process has continued. But the difference in results cannot be attributed to this alone. My own analysis relies partly on an assertion that the overall European political environment is currently favorable to formation of a European outlook, and that it has grown more, not less so since 1958.

In making his argument, Deutsch draws on some imaginative and sophisticated analysis; it is worth reviewing in detail. He bases much of his case on an examination of "structural integration." He states: "An analysis of trade data going back as far as 1890 suggests that in the 1957–58 period Europe reached the highest level of structural integration it ever had," Deutsch argues, in effect, that although the total amount of trade among the members of the European Community has increased since 1958, this fact must be discounted because the rate of increase has been no greater than the general rise of trade and productivity. His interpretation might be debated on a variety of grounds. In the period 1958–62, total trade among the countries of the European Community increased by 73%.[29] At the same time, these countries experienced their most impressive four years of economic growth in modern history[30]—a growth which may have been stimulated in part by the extraordinary increase in Community trade. Are we to discount the importance of the trade increase because of the simultaneous occurrence of economic growth? This line of reasoning by itself would lead us to conclude, for example, that the United States was less than half as "integrated" with Western Europe in 1957 as it was in 1929—at the height of isolationism.[31] America's foreign trade increased substantially during the intervening period but GNP increased even faster.

In regard to the economic sphere, Deutsch's argument is useful, though not compelling.[32]

[29] E.E.C. Statistical Office, *Foreign Trade Monthly Statistics*, No. 4, Brussels, 1962, p. 9. This was a considerably higher rate of increase than obtained in the four years preceding 1958, See *Econimische Statistiche Bericht*, Rotterdam, Jan. 16, 1964.

[30] O.E.C.D. *General Statistics 1958–62* (Paris, 1963).

[31] U.S. Department of Commerce, *Historical Statistics of the U.S.* (Washington, D.C., 1960), pp. 550, 552.

[32] As presently constructed, the "index of relative acceptability" of foreign trade may reflect a general tendency for foreign trade to decline in proportion to GNP, as nations become highly industrialized. A primitive extractive economy, selling a few plantation crops or raw materials abroad and importing nearly all manufactured items, will be relatively dependent on foreign trade; a large and advanced industrial economy may be less so. As indicated by the American record, isolationism can accompany the early stage, and internationalism the latter stage. This is not accidental: America's high degree of involvement in world affairs at the present time is not weakened by her high domestic productivity —on the contrary, to a large extent, it is made possible by it.

When he shifts the analogy to other spheres, however, his conclusions become dubious, particularly where the psychological dimension of the transaction is crucial. Deutsch states, "The absolute increases after 1958 in trade, travel, postal correspondence and the exchange of students are accountable for from the effects of prosperity and the general increase in the levels of these activities. There have been no increases in integration in regard to all these transactions beyond what one would expect from mere random probability and the increase in prosperity in the countries concerned."[33]

Does the fact that these changes have been accompanied by rising prosperity mean that "integration" has not been taking place?[34] I would argue that the chief significance of these trends lies not in the extent to which they have produced "structural integration" in the sense in which Deutsch defines it, but in the degree to which they reshape the political aspirations of the major groups in the society. For example, are we to regard an increase in the number of students being educated abroad as offset by the fact that there has been an increase in higher education within these countries? On the contrary, there is every reason to believe that both tendencies are contributing to the process of European integration. Virtually every opinion survey from which data are available indicates that a relatively high level of education is associated with a stronger degree of support for European unification.[35] Assume that we were able to demonstrate that increases in the exchange of students and in higher education generally *both* encourage the development of a sense of European citizenship; assume also that these increases in educational activities can be attributed entirely to rising prosperity. We would then have demonstrated the (unsurprising) point that prosperity encourages political integration; we would not have shown that integration is not taking place.

Similarly, let us assume that travel in other EEC countries makes an individual more favorable to European integration; is this effect nullified by travel in other places? The absolute increase in exchange of tourists among EEC countries since 1958 has been very sizable; the influx of EEC tourists in 1963 compares with that in 1958 as follows: Italy, 176%; France, 348%; Germany 139%; Belgium-Luxemburg, 138%; The Netherlands, 146%.[36] There are indications that this trend is strongly favorable to the process of European integration.[37] In 1963, over six million German tourists visited Italy (equal to the *total* influx of tourists into the U.S. from all nations that year), a figure which represents one out of every nine Germans. At the same time, there were about three million visitors from France, a million from The Netherlands, two-thirds of a million from Belgium. To be sure, the rate of increase has levelled off in recent years. But this may be because the process is reaching a saturation point. Overall, in 1963, and again in 1964, about one out of every twelve citizens from her EEC partner countries visited Italy. This is comparable to the proportion of Americans who visit Florida in a given year.[38]

It is also true that rates of travel to countries outside the European Community have increased markedly since 1958; presumably this should act to encourage integration with those countries as well. But there is no reason to assume that an increase in "Europeanness" can come about only through a relative exclusiveness vis-a-vis the outside world. Conceivably, the two might increase concomitantly. In fact, as we shall see presently, this seems to be the case.

Deutsch's distinction between structural integration and probabilistic integration is useful; but he tends to overstress the former at the expense of the latter. Furthermore, he seems to overlook the possible existence of a threshold effect. Deutsch would, no doubt, agree that the E.E.C. area has already reached a relatively high level of structural integration (his data indicate that, in general, a 70–80% level has been attained). It is quite conceivable that this is a high enough level for political integration to take place, even if further in-

[33] *Op. cit.*, p. 355.

[34] Political "integration" has been defined as the attainment within a territory of a "sense of community"—a belief that common social problems must and can be resolved by a process of "peaceful change"; and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a "long" time, dependable expectations of "peaceful change" among its population. Karl Deutsch *et. al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton, 1957, p. 5.

[35] See, for example, Gallup International, *L'Opinion Publique et l'Europe des Six* (Paris, 1962), pp. 29–32.

[36] Calculated from OECD, *Tourism in Member Countries, 1965* (Paris, 1965); and OECD, *Tourism in Europe, 1959* (Paris, 1959).

[37] See *Sondages* (1963), #1, p. 38; cf. Inglehart, *op. cit.*, Ch. 8.

[38] About one in fourteen out-of-state Americans visited Florida in 1961. See Florida Council on Economic Development, *Statistical Abstract of Florida* (Tallahassee, 1962), p. 90.

creases in these exchanges do not rise above random probability rates. Deutsch would further probably agree that the development of a sense of community is central to the process of integration.[39] Material on "structural integration" provides a relatively indirect indication as to whether this process is taking place. Nevertheless, although Deutsch himself uncovers a more direct kind of evidence of such crucial changes in orientation, he tends to underplay its importance.

Let me cite some of these cases: he finds that "Friendly feelings in French mass opinion about Germany, and in German mass opinion about France, increased substantially to roughly one-half of the Germans and Frenchmen polled in 1963–4. Feelings of mutual trust increased much less, to about one-fifth of the respondents in each country."[40] He also finds an increase in agreement on accepting European unity between the two countries since 1958; and that elites in the two countries agree on most major issues—and furthermore, seem to be converging over time. Deutsch states that, "Factor analysis of many French and German opinion poll results between 1954 and 1962 indicated a marked increase in the similarity of image between the two countries . . . In particular, there was a marked increase in the importance of an image of a United Europe in both French and German opinion. Most of this increase occurred between 1957 and 1962." He then notes that "In regard to accepting European unity, at least in general terms, Frenchmen and Germans agreed to a greater extent in 1962 than they had done in earlier years."[41]

Deutsch tends to discount this primarily on the basis of three points: first, the people of the two countries trust the U.S. more than each other; and Britain trusts both of them more than they do each other. Here again we encounter in its most explicit form an assumption which also seems to underlie Deutsch's reasoning about "structural integration." It might be legitimate to discount indicators of increased European integration on the ground that these interactions have also risen with regard to the outside world; this could be justified if, and only if, European integration and Atlantic integration (and international integration in general) take place in different psychological directions, one tending to develop at the expense of the other. If "Europeanness" were a traditional form of nationalism, this assumption might be justified. But, in fact, the available evidence indicates that this is not the case: they seem to lie on a common psychological dimension. As an individual is converted to a European (or Atlantic) point of view, he tends to become more favorable to other forms of internationalism as well. An openness to Atlantic unity and toward rapprochement with Eastern Europe has characterized the Monnet Europeans for a number of years;[42] this orientation also seems to characterize the pro-Europeans among the general population. My survey of youth in Western Europe found the following correlations between relatively strong support for European federation and for U.S. association with the E.E.C.:[43]

	Netherlands	France	Germany	Britain
Q=	+.38	+.70	+.58	+.51

The tendency for partisans of European federation to favor world government was generally weaker, but consistently positive:

	Netherlands	France	Germany	Britain
Q=	+.42	+.38	+.49	+.29

If this is true, the relevant question is whether two given countries are in fact coming to trust each other and agree with each other to a greater extent as time passes. The existence of relatively high levels of trust for the U.S. is certainly interesting but it does not diminish the significance of the increasing levels of trust and agreement on European unification between France and Germany.

Deutsch's second reason for discounting the foregoing evidence is that elites in France and Germany show different levels of support for NATO and arms control proposals. But the process of integration implies a continuing convergence—not necessarily that the integrating partners have reached the same absolute level at a given time.

The third point which Deutsch cites centers on the decline of interest in NATO and in arms control proposals—by governments, in the press, and among the general public. In view of the decline of a sense of threat of Russian invasion, this change in attitude is perfectly comprehensible: the problem is less interesting because it seems less important. In the early

[39] See his definition, footnote 34.

[40] Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control," *op. cit.*, p. 357.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 357.

[42] See, for example, Declaration of the Action Committee for a United States of Europe, June, 1962.

[43] See Ronald Inglehart, *op. cit.*, Ch. 3. I use Yule's Q as a measure of association. Figures are for middle class youth only.

1950's, European "unification" was largely manifested in NATO, a military response to a military threat. Today it connotes economic and social integration to a much greater extent, as exemplified by the European Community. Deutsch's elite interview data indicate that at present support for European integration is not dependent on a sense of military threat.[44] Nevertheless. he uses evidence of declining interest in military matters to support his contention that European integration has come to a stop. One might hazard the guess that Deutsch's conclusion may have been unduly influenced by the study of top-level decision-making. It is at precisely this level that European integrative activity has been most effectively blocked since 1958 (but even here one cannot overlook such important bits of progress as the agreement to unify the three European Community executive bodies, and the agreement on a common agricultural policy). In broader spheres of European society, I would argue, the process of integration has been going on.

At least a limited amount of reorientation in favor of "Europe" seems to have taken place among the adult population since 1958. But perhaps more important are the changes which seem to characterize the outlook of the generation which has been undergoing formation since the end of World War II, and especially since the creation of the European communities. There are indications that their Europeanness is more stable than that of older age cohorts, and it seems to persist even under rather adverse conditions. I would argue that this is true because, for them, a European outlook is not a superficial reorientation, but reflects their earliest political perceptions. Before the end of the 1970's, a majority of the voting population in the Common Market countries will consist of people who entered primary school after World War II. It is not inconceivable that the entry into political relevance of new elements will tend to further change the political environment in important ways.

[44] See Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control," *op. cit.*, p. 361.

All of the foregoing calls into question the projections which have been made concerning the likelihood of further progress toward erecting the institutional framework for a United States of Europe. At this level, I agree, there has been relatively little progress in the last several years. But there are, after all, certain blocking factors which currently act to prevent much change in this sphere—the most important being the attitude of the present French government.[45] It is dubious whether de Gaulle will remain in power much beyond 1970. Deutsch's evidence indicates that French elites on the whole are a good deal more favorable to European integration than is de Gaulle himself;[46] it therefore seems quite conceivable that with the passing of the General from supreme power, they may be considerably more responsive to the pressures for European political unification than he himself has been.

[45] Leon Lindberg goes so far as to argue that de Gaulle's boycott of the EEC in 1965–66 does not even represent an attempt to halt the process of integration; it is, rather, a struggle over the form and content of decision-making procedures among actors who accept the European Community system. He presents persuasive evidence that the Common Market has developed such powerful support among economic elite groups that it is now irreversible—and recognized as such by de Gaulle. If Lindberg is correct, this is a highly significant development—and one which, necessarily, must have taken place since 1958. See Leon Lindberg, "Integration as a Source of Stress on the European Community System," *International Organization*, 30 (1966), pp. 233–266.

[46] A plurality of them favor *supranational* European integration (Deutsch, "Arms Control," *op. cit.*, p. 358); 72% of French leaders agree that the military security of their country rests upon the deterrent force of the U.S. and "the idea of a national deterrent is unpopular among the elites in France, where it is official government policy." (*Ibid.*, p. 363.) Finally, "a large majority of French leaders (63%) agree that Britain ought to be included in an integrated Europe." (*Ibid.*, p. 360.)

ACADEMIC IDEOLOGY AND THE STUDY OF ADJUDICATION*

GLENDON SCHUBERT
University of Hawaii

This paper proposes a theory about the differences in perspective that political scientists bring to bear upon their teaching, research, and writing. It also suggests a method which can be used to study such differences. The particular empirical example discussed relates to only one of the subfields of political science, but this report may encourage parallel investigations into the structure of professional academic values in other component areas of the discipline. Such a result would not merely confirm or refute the applicability of the theory as a generalization about political science; it also would enhance our present meager and unsystematized understanding of the extent to which our professional knowledge is affected by our quasi-professional (personal) biases. The development of such understanding evidently ought to be assigned a high priority in any normative schedule of goals relating to the social ecology of scientific inquiry.

The phenomenon of analyst value predisposition is by no means peculiar to social science, and most certainly it is not idiosyncratic among political scientists. Psychologist Silvan S. Tomkins recently has called attention to the universality of the problem of academic ideology in all scientific work:

> At the growing edge of the frontier of all sciences there necessarily is a maximum of uncertainty, and what is lacking in evidence is filled by passion and faith, and hatred and scorn for the disbelievers. Science will never be free of ideology, though yesterday's ideology is today's fact or fiction.[1]

This proposition's particular pertinence for political scientists has been pointed out by a law professor, in the context of his evaluation of the legal implications of some recent behavioral research in adjudication theory. Although Arthur S. Miller was writing for an audience of lawyers, the shoe fits us political scientists just as well—and in view of the quotation's personal allusion to me, there can be no doubt of my own implication:

> [I]t is a great fault of behavioral scientists (and lawyers), [to] believe that statements may be made about such very human activities as the official settlement of disputes in adjudication without the intrusion of the biases or prejudices of the observer or commentator. . . . In *Judicial Behavior*, Professor Schubert . . . [says] nothing at all about the mental attitudes and backgrounds of commentators upon the judicial process. Are we to understand that the selection of facts, the organization of data, the construction of theories, and the presentation of conclusions are all value-free? As I have said previously, "the idea that personal values inevitably accompany—and color—research in human affairs (including law) is widely accepted by leading social scientists of the era. In like manner, a 'disinterested legal science' . . . is nonsense. It is unattainable. What this requires, accordingly is avowedly 'facing the valuations' which are present in all commentary" on the judiciary. Another part of the environment in which courts operate is the scholarly community. Those who write about courts and law should "face their valuations" in order to give us as scientific an explication as possible.[2]

The present article might well be viewed as an attempt to remedy the deficiency denoted by Miller. Such a rationale is so pat that perhaps I should let it go at that, but the genesis of my inquiry into academic bias was in fact earlier and in response to other stimuli.

I. THE HYPOTHESIS

From its beginnings following the Civil War until about a dozen years or so ago, the study of public law in American universities was closely linked with law school instruction and research; and the orientation which guided the approach to the acquisition of knowledge about and understanding of the subject, by political science

* I wish to thank Charles B. Poland, a doctoral candidate in political science at Michigan State University, for his assistance in preparing the data for computer analysis, and in related statistical tasks; and I wish especially to thank the twenty-six political scientists, all of whom are identified in the paper, for their participation in the research described: this is a report of what is in a most real sense our common labor, and I am deeply indebted therefore to these colleagues in the field, whose cooperation made it possible.

[1] "Affect and the Psychology of Knowledge," at p. 73 in Silvan S. Tomkins and Carroll E. Izard (eds.), *Affect, Cognition, and Personality* (New York: Springer, 1965). Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 75, 97.

[2] "On the Interdependence of Law and the Behavioral Sciences," *Texas Law Review*, 43 (1965), p. 1098.

and by law professors alike, was legalistic.[3] Out of the Court-packing episode of 1937 came more than a reform of the Supreme Court, however; the same set of events led also to some modest reforms in theory and method, as well as in the content, of professional discourse about the judiciary. The substantive change, which emphasized the political involvement of courts and the political effects of judicial decisions, came first and soon became the new orthodoxy among most political scientists. The reform in theory and method began with Pritchett's early work,[4] but it was not until a decade ago that several other persons began to follow the trail that he had blazed.[5] After it had become clear that more than a passing fancy was involved, the various departures from traditional public law pedagogy began to attract rebuttal, and for a while it doubtless seemed to most observers (including participant-observers) that the significant difference in points of view lay between the defenders of the "leading case" approach in public law (and their allies who use the great books approach to political philosophy), and the rest of the political science profession.[6] Such a simplistic rationalization of the conflict seemed adequate to account for the critique that emanated from spokesmen whose point of view readily could be identified with parochial defense of the research modus operandi (or lack thereof) of the humanities,[7] or with the inculcation of virtue and the promulgation of justice,[8] or with the retention of Oldspeak as a tactic for helping to embalm preferred aspects of the historical images of selected judicial personalities.[9] But the rationale failed utterly to account for the position assumed by persons whose professed orientation is passionately political, and who purport to see no important difference between the workways and standpoints toward data collection of groups of their colleagues who perceive *each other* as defenders of the *ancien régime* (on the one hand) and as harbingers of a Brave New World of Juridical Robots (on the other hand).[10]

In an initial attempt to canvass the principal objections that had been raised against behavioral research in legal institutions and processes, I suggested that it might be more useful to conceptualize the academic chorus (or at least those who are performing the adjudication oratorio) as a trio of groups,[11] in lieu of the behavioralist-versus-antibehavioral duet which prior discussion seems to have taken for granted. But if there are three standpoints, how do they relate to each other? The simplest hypothesis, which ought perhaps to be preferred on grounds of parsimony, assumes as a model a linear ideological continuum (ranging from behavioralists through judicial processors to public lawyers). This hypothesis requires, however, not only that students of the judicial process consider themselves to be equivalently distinguished from the other two types, but

[3] See Schubert, "The Future of Public Law," *George Washington Law Review*, 34 (1966), pp. 593–614.

[4] C. Herman Pritchett, "Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939–1941," this REVIEW, 35 (1941), pp. 890–898; and *The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial Politics and Values, 1937–1947* (New York: Macmillan, 1948).

[5] Joseph Tanenhaus, "The Uses and Limitations of Social Science Methods in Analyzing Judicial Behavior," (a paper read at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1956; mimeographed); Fred Kort, "Predicting Supreme Court Decisions Mathematically: A Quantitative Analysis of the Right to Counsel Cases," this REVIEW, 51 (1957), pp. 1–12; Schubert, "The Study of Judicial Decison-Making as an Aspect of Political Behavior," this REVIEW, 52 (1958), pp. 1007–1025; and "From Public Law to Judicial Behavior," in Schubert (ed.), *Judicial Decision-Making* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 1–3.

[6] A recent survey of the profession reports that when asked to evaluate the significance of research contributions in seven fields of the discipline, political scientists ranked public law (sixth) and political philosophy (seventh) as "least significant." See Albert Somit and Joseph Tanenhaus, *American Political Science: A Profile of a Discipline* (New York: Atherton, 1964), pp. 56, 58.

[7] John P. Roche, "Political Science and Science Fiction," this REVIEW, 52 (1958), pp. 1026–1028.

[8] Walter Berns, "Law and Behavioral Science," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 28 (1963), pp. 185–212.

[9] Wallace Mendelson, "The Neo-Behavioral Approach to the Judicial Process: A Critique," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), pp. 595–603.

[10] Martin Shapiro, *Law and Politics in the Supreme Court* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964), chapter 1; Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines, "The Role of the Judiciary in American State Politics," in Schubert (ed.), *op. cit.* ftn. 5, *supra*, at pp. 245–246; and cf. Theodore L. Becker, "On Science, Political Science, and Law," *American Behavioral Scientist*, 7:4 (December, 1963), p. 12.

[11] *Judicial Policy-Making* (Chicago: Scott, Foresman, 1965), pp. 158–165.

also that the public lawyers and behavioralists each feel greater affinity for the judicial processors than for each other. The available evidence, consisting of the expression of professional opinion (in books, articles, papers, conversation, panel discussions, and correspondence) seemed to me to support the proposition that most persons in each type consider themselves to be about equally different from persons whom they would identify with either of the other two types. This interpretation suggested the alternative hypothesis that the relationship among the three types is better represented by an equilateral triangle (or the circle on whose perimenter the three points of such a triangle lie) than by a straight line.

The typology, and the hypothesis of a circular ordering of types, provided me with a frame of reference which could be used to guide a more intensive inquiry into some of the more recent criticisms of psychometric research in judicial decision-making, while at the same time supplying an explanation for the affective overtones which typically accompanied the perceptual and cognitive misunderstandings that underlay much of the critique.[12] But the proof of the pudding is in the eating; and anyone who has enough confidence in his theoretical constructions to be willing to publish them ought also to be eager to have them put to the empirical test.[13]

Figure 1 summarizes the set of relationships, among the three ideologies, which was hypothesized.[14] The figure shows the traditional ideology to be centered in the humanities (History—Law—Philosophy) with a focus upon *law*. The conventional ideology centers upon the social sciences (Economics—Political Science—Sociology) and focuses its investigations upon *courts*. The behavioral ideology is centered in the behavioral sciences (Psychology—Biology—Anthropology) and upon the study of *judges*. The three ideological positions divide the perimeter into three segments which designate the overlapping concerns of the major standpoints; thus, the traditional approach merges into the conventional in the *judicial process* segment; the conventional changes into the behavioral in the *political jurisprudence* segment; and the behavioral in turn leads back into the traditional approach in the *jurimetrics* portion of the continuum. The relationship among all three approaches is portrayed as a continuous one, in which an infinite variety of discrete positions can be denoted, indicating particular proportions of emphasis as between any *two* of the ideological standpoints. The figure is completely determinate, it assumes (and indeed suggests) closure, and it precludes the portrayal of ideological syndromes consisting of combinations (in varying proportions) of all three standpoints; but it does afford a theoretical explanation for the tendency, for judicial politics enthusiasts, to view *all* decision-making analysis (whether on logical or psychological grounds) as apolitical.[15] The specification of a




FIG. 1. Academic ideologies toward adjudication.

[12] See my "Ideologies and Attitudes, Academic and Judicial," *Journal of Politics*, 29 (1967), pp. 3–40.

[13] In this instance, the design for the empirical research reported herein was roughed out the day after an oral presentation was made expounding the hypothesis: "Academic Ideologies, Judicial Attitudes, and Social Change," (a paper read at the 37th annual meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, November, 1965; mimeographed), especially pp. 1–8 and Figure 1.

[14] Figure 1 here is reproduced from Figure 1 of the article cited in ftn. 12, *supra*, and except for the minor modification of changing Economics from third to first in the sequence of Social Sciences is the same as Figure 1 in the paper. For further discussion of the a priori theory of academic ideologies in relation to Figure 1, with examples of writings which exemplify the three standpoints, see that article.

[15] As Harry Stumpf has remarked, "there are a good many scholars who . . . cry out for a political approach to constitutional law while at the same time denouncing most or all behavioral techniques." See his "The Study of Public Law: A Plea for Consistency," (n.d.; mimeographed), p. 6 ftn. 7.

circular sequence of ordering for the nine academic disciplines denoted in the figure is intended to be suggestive only, and it is not assumed that such a manifestly oversimplified and overly rigid rank ordering corresponds, except as a very rough approximation, to empirical reality; but at the same time, the ordering suggests the central tendencies that tend to define the core content, in terms of academic fields, of the major standpoints, and this definition of the modes in relation to the disciplines may have heuristic value.

II. THE RESEARCH DESIGN

A. Theory

If anyone (including oneself) were to take seriously the hypothesis implicit in Figure 1, then the obvious next step would be to attempt to test with empirical data the propositions that:

1. Political scientists with a primary interest in the study of adjudication are divided among three distinct groups;
2. Each group consists of persons who identify with one of the three corresponding ideological positions (traditional, conventional, or behavioral, as defined above); and
3. The three groups are equidistant in psychological space (*i.e.*, their position in two-dimensional space defines an equilateral triangle).

A possible way of obtaining empirical data relevant to the above propositions would be to ask some of the political scientists who work in the field of the judiciary where *they* think others are in relation to themselves, and where they would locate themselves in Figure 1.

The answers to the first question might be converted into data in such a form that it would be possible to intercorrelate the responses of the various individuals in the sample; and if this were done, it occurred to me that I might very well be able, in analyzing the correlation matrix, to take advantage of the theory and methods with which I recently had worked in carrying out a study of *judicial* ideology.[16] If one had any confidence in the interpretation that had been based upon the application of these theories and methods to data collected from official sources in libraries, then one ought to be willing to put them to the test of a design that would involve experimental research, survey-type "field" data, and a bevy of dynamic, "live" respondents who would be in a position to comment critically upon the interpretation made of their replies. Most human sources of data for such reasons as lack of status, ignorance, and inaccessibility to the relevant communication channels, have no chance to correct the mistakes that researchers have made using the data supplied by those sources; and most researchers thereby lose the advantage of exposing their findings to meaningful feedback from their subjects.

The answers to the second question would then make it possible to make a three-way correlational check upon the degree of consistency among several different measures of the cognitive structure attributed to the socio-psychological field of the attitudes of these professionals toward their academic work. First, there would be the researcher's own conception of where the others are, in relation to themselves and to himself. (He would need to generate this information for purposes of drawing the sample of respondents in any event.) Second, there would be the consensual conception of the ideological position of each individual in the sample, in the opinion of the *others*, as derived from the answers to the first question. Finally, there would be the self-conception of each individual of his own position, which the answers to the second question would provide. It would then be possible to examine the relationship among the a priori hypothesis of the researcher, the others' consensual conception of egos, and the egos' individual conceptions about themselves.

B. Procedures

1. The Raw Data. Thirty-two persons were chosen, on the basis of criteria to be discussed below, for a mail survey. Each of these persons was sent the letter and the questionnaire which are reproduced as appendices to this article, together with a copy of Figure 1. The letters were individually typed, although their content make it perfectly clear that they were part of a mailing *en masse*; and the questionnaires were mimeographed. Together the letter and the questionnaire purported to explain to the respondents the objectives of the investigation and the information sought by the two questions; to assure respondents that the raw data for the first question would be kept secret; and to promise them an opportunity to comment critically upon a draft report of the research before the latter was submitted for publication.

Question 1 of the questionnaire asked each respondent to rank all of the other persons listed on the basis of his own perception of how closely they agreed with him in their approach to the field in which, as it was presumed, they had some common interests. The arbitrary assumption was made that each person was in closest agreement with his own point of view.

[16] Schubert, *The Judicial Mind* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965).

It is recognized that for some types of inquiries and for some types of respondents, the findings would be hopelessly biased by such an assumption. In regard to this particular population of respondents, and the topic under investigation, the assumption of non-schizophrenia seems justified. If cognitive structure in the field of public law-judicial process-judicial behavior (or in any other subfield of political science, for that matter) is so weak that professors have no consistent point of view with which they identify, at least during some reasonably limited span of time, then our whole enterprise as teachers of political science is a kind of madness; and no amount of rational investigation is going to be able to make any sense out of it. So the respondent was asked to rank himself first; the person whom he thought was in closest agreement with him as second; and so on until the individual (among those sampled) with whom his disagreement was maximal was ranked as thirty-second. If the list contained persons with whom the respondent felt that he was insufficiently well-informed to make a decision, the directions specified that ranks of zero were to be assigned to such persons. No particular model of space was specified, nor needed to be specified, as a criterion for respondents in answering the first question. Each could hypothesize a space of any dimensionality and structure that suited him; all that was required of him was that he establish a decision function which would permit him to discriminate degrees of proximity to his own position in the space.

Question 2, to the contrary, specified a circle, upon whose perimeter positions were to be denoted using a clock metric, as a guide to answers. Figure 1 was suggested as one possible hypothesis about the ideological relationships that might be subsumed by a circular model, and respondents were directed to orient themselves in relation to the three major standpoints (at two, six, and ten o'clock, respectively) denoted by Figure 1. It was explicitly pointed out, however, that the positions—and therefore, of course, the sequence—of academic disciplines, as shown in Figure 1, were intended only to suggest one possible theory of the underlying gross associations of the three standpoints; and it was stated that respondents should not choose their own positions because of either their agreement (or disagreement) with the relative positions of the academic fields in the paradigm. The raw data consisted, therefore, of the two types of responses made, and marked on the questionnaires which were returned by the respondents. For the first question, the raw data consisted of the sets of rankings of all or part of the list of names specified by the question. For the second question, the raw data consisted, in each case, of the respondent's specification of a number, ranging from zero to twelve, which would locate a position for him on a circular continuum.

2. Coding. Coding was necessary for several purposes: to assure the promised secrecy of the raw data; to correct technical mistakes in the responses; and to transpose the replies to machine-readable cards. The first objective was accomplished by having only the author handle the questionnaire returns, to each of which was assigned a code number which identified the respondent (but only to the author) in subsequent manipulations of the data for the first question. An example of the kind of technical mistake that had to be corrected would be the omission of a rank from those assigned, or the failure to adjust for ties by omitting a corresponding number of intervening ranks between the tied rank and the next to follow in sequence. (Inspection of the returns suggested that a few of the respondents were not very experienced in the use of ordinal measurement; but all managed to indicate their decisions with sufficient clarity to preclude the necessity for eliminating any set of rankings on grounds of ambiguity.)

3. Measures. In order to calculate the correlation between each pair of rankings, the coded data were input for computer anaylsis, using both rho and tau rank correlation programs.[17] These coefficients are not directly comparable numerically because at any given level of association, the value of rho will be greater. Either coefficient measures, for any two respondents, the degree of similarity or of difference in their answers to the first question. The theoretical range for both tau and rho is from plus one (indicating perfect agreement) to minus one (indicating perfect disagreement); but the effect of requiring each respondent to rank himself as first was to place an empirical limit upon the positive range. Since this limit is well above +.99 for both coefficients, however, it was concluded that such a trivial difference could have no practical effect upon either the analysis or the resulting interpretation of the data. Either coefficient also can be used to measure the degrees of association among the

[17] John Morris, *Technical Report No. 40* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, Computer Institute for Social Science Research, 1966). See also Maurice G. Kendall, *Rank Correlation Methods* (London: Charles Griffin, 1955, rev. ed.); Sidney Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), pp. 202–223.

hypothesized, the consensual, and the autogenous conceptions of the sequential ranking of the respondents on a circular continuum.

4. Factor Analysis. Some inferences could be based directly upon visual inspection of the correlation matrices. But one major objective of the research would be to isolate and to identify the principal dimensions which, while accounting for a major proportion of the variance, would define a space in which points representing the respondents could be located in a psychologically meaningful configuration. This objective implied the use of a statistical procedure for multivariate analysis, such as factor analysis. I decided to use an available computer program for principal axes analysis, and to call for both quartimax and varimax rotation[18] of (successively) the first two through the first ten factors.

C. Data

1. The Sample. The criteria for choosing the sample were visibility, accessibility, and balance. Visibility meant that the persons selected must be sufficiently well known generally *and to each other* that the probability of significant non-response due to ignorance would be low. I assumed that persons would know each other primarily, but not exclusively, through their writing; and it would by no means be adequate that persons merely "know who others are" by their names and general reputation. What would be required would be familiarity with other persons' ideas in some depth, and in particular concerning their beliefs about how—in relation to theory, method, and kind of data—it is best to study the subject (adjudication).

Accessibility required that the persons selected know the author personally, so that it could be assumed that they would at least read his letter circulating the survey instrument, and the probability that they would reply would be maximized. Balance required that there be approximately an equal number of persons chosen to represent each of the three hypothesized points of view; and further, that the persons selected be dispersed throughout all segments of the postulated circular continuum.

It might have been possible to restate at least the first of these criteria in a form that would have permitted objective and quantified selection procedures, but I decided to proceed instead upon the basis of what was presumed to be my adequate personal knowledge, resulting from recent bibliographical activities which had required me to survey (and resurvey) the research literature in the field.[19] What was sought, after all, was not a random or probability sample, but instead a highly biased (in terms of those statistical concepts) sample which would consist of almost the entire universe of the elite leadership for one subfield of an academic discipline. The design included a check upon the author's bias, however: the extent to which his judgment about the persons selected corresponded with the group's responses. If many persons with poor visibility were included in the sample, the rate of non-response would be high. If persons were not accessible, they would not bother to respond at all. If the author's judgment concerning the subgroup (*i.e.*, ideological) identification of persons deviated from either the consensual understanding or their own autogenous judgments, then the correlations between his ranking of the sample (Fig. 2) and theirs would be low or even negative.

The advice of colleagues was sought concerning an initial proposed sample of thirty, and as a result one younger person was deleted (for presumed failure to meet the visibility criterion) and three others were added (of whom two turned out to be non-respondents, presumably because of poor accessibility). The revised and final sample of 32 persons is listed in Appendix B. Table 1 shows that it was assumed that the sample would include approximately equal numbers of persons of each major point of view; and the outer circle of Figure 2 shows that it was further assumed that these persons were spread throughout the continuum. The observed distribution of persons among the three types, based upon the responses to the

[18] The purpose of quartimax rotation is to simplify the variables (respondents), by making the extreme loadings tend toward unity or zero on every factor; the purpose of varimax rotation is to simplify the factors (the columns of the factor matrix) by making all loadings tend toward unity or zero on each factor. Harry H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960), pp. 294–308; Rudolph J. Rummel, *Applied Factor Analysis* (Evanston: Northwestern University, forthcoming 1967), chapter 13.4.2.1–2.

[19] "Bibliography" in *Judicial Decision-Making*, *op. cit.*, ftn. 5, *supra*, pp. 257–265; "Bibliographical Essay: Behavioral Research in Public Law," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), pp. 433–445; *Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964); "Judicial Behavior," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan, rev. ed., forthcoming, 1966–67); "Judicial Process and Behavior" in James A. Robinson (ed.), *Political Science Annual: An International Review*, Vol. 3 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, forthcoming, 1968).

TABLE 1. EXPECTED AND OBSERVED BALANCE AMONG IDEOLOGICAL TYPES, IN THE SAMPLE

		Observed[b]					
		Behavioral	Conventional	Traditional	Idiosyncratic	Non-response	Totals
Expected[a]	Behavioral	7	2			1	10
	Conventional		7		1	2	10
	Traditional		2	7	1	2	12
	Totals	7	11	7	2	5	32

[a] See the outer sequence, Fig. 2.
[b] See Fig. 3.




FIG. 2. Hypothesized and autogenous ideological positions.

first question and the correlation and factor analyses that we shall presently discuss, indicates that the sample was somewhat biased in favor of the conventional point of view, primarily because two of the persons whom I had assumed to be behavioral in their orientation, and two others whom I had assumed to be traditional, were consensually deemed to be conventional.

It was assumed that although there would be considerable qualitative variation in visibility, any instances of exceptionally low visibility could be handled by "purifying" the sample and deleting relatively "unknown" persons, at least as items, in the generation of the correlation matrix. Accessibility seemed likely in all except three or four instances, although it was recognized that a few persons might be blocked by their own emotional reactions from responding to the intended query, as a consequence of previous professional interaction which had entailed affective side-effects for them; but it was assumed that almost all persons in such an elite group of professionals would distinguish between their private and their public attitudes toward the project, at least to the extent that their evaluation of its merits would induce them to respond.

2. The Survey. The only person in the sample who refused to acknowledge either the initial letter or subsequent correspondence was also the one person whom the author never had met personally; he was one of those added to the sample on the advice of colleagues. The mailing went out to all persons in the sample on November 22, 1965; and positive responses to Question 1 were received from 25 of the 32 during the ten day period November 29 - December 8. Three of the seven who had not responded to the first question, by the latter date, had replied declining to do so; subsequent endeavors to follow up with a second mailing evoked responses from two of the four persons who did not reply to the initial mailing. There were, therefore, a total of 27 replies to the first question. All except three of the persons who answered the first question replied also to the second question; and there were no persons who replied to the second but not to the first. An attempt was made to follow up with the three persons who had answered the first question but declined to answer the second, by directing their attention to that part of the instructions which emphasized that response to the question did not require one to accept the location of academic disciplines that is suggested in Figure 1; and as a result, two of them did answer the question. The 26 responses to Question 2 are reported in Figure 2. The rate of response was 84% for Question 1, and 81% for Question 2.

In addition to the five persons who refused to give any response to the first question, the instructions anticipated that there would be partial non-response in the form of omitted rankings, for those persons to whom respondents assigned ranks of zero. Actually, there was much less partial non-response than had been expected. Almost half of the total of 48 omitted rankings (out of a possible total of $27 \times 32 = 864$) were due to a single respondent, who ranked only the half-dozen persons with whom he was in closest agreement and the other half-dozen persons with whom he was in least agree-

ment. By thus reporting only the tails of his distribution, he provided a useable reply; his deletion of a score of other persons in the sample was a reflection, no doubt, of the less intense affect, or the less adequate information, that he entertained with regard to them. Five of the respondents were responsible for an additional 25 of the omitted ranks; three respondents omitted one each; and the remaining seventeen persons all were able to rank the entire sample. It is noteworthy that 79% of the omitted rankings were attributable to four of the seven persons whom we shall, shortly, discuss as affiliates of the traditional viewpoint; the seven behavioralists, on the other hand, made no omissions. One possible inference is that there is a consistent differential in the quality of information input by these two groups of persons: behavioralists seem to think that they are familiar with all of the literature produced in the field, but at least several of the traditionalists appear to be unaware of at least part of the behavioral and conventional research; the pattern of zero ranks, for one traditionalist, is B:4, C:4, T:0; and for another, it is B:3, C:4, T:0[20]. (As one distinguished affiliate of the traditional standpoint remarked at a panel meeting of the American Political Science Association just a decade ago, the then editor of this REVIEW had asked him to read a manuscript which was about courts and judges but was "full of numbers"; so the eminent reader proceeded to advise the editor, as he jovially remarked to the panel audience, to "send the paper off to some mathematics journal.")

3. Other Feedback: Two-thirds of the persons who answered the questions also volunteered comments, ranging from a sentence or two to long letters, in which they discussed their responses and their opinions concerning the utility and probable findings of the survey.[21] Many were skeptical concerning the possibility that anything meaningful would emerge from the study, and often these persons explained in some detail the difficulty that they had experienced in replying to the questions. Typically they pointed out that they perceived themselves to be very complicated persons, with multivariate systems of academic values which could not possibly be projected onto some crude one- or two-dimensional space without gross distortion of their feelings. In replying to these comments, the author attempted to point out that there was no specified dimensionality for response to Question 1; and that the problem, with regard to Question 2, was to find the space with the minimal dimensionality adequate to account for most of the common variance among the respondents. To the extent that they were as idiosyncratic (*i.e.*, unarticulated with the prevailing academic cultural norms) as many believed themselves to be, the question of the dimensionality of the space was irrelevant, since their idiosyncracies could not, by definition, be measured in any common frame of reference. In any event, their answers should make it possible to test the validity of their objections: gross distortion in the enfolding of many n-dimensional spaces into the hypothesized circle ought to produce a randomized pattern of autogenous positions for the respondents upon that circle, thus facilitating the rejection of the hypothesis that Question 2 was designed to test. It was also explained that the space selected for Figure 1 was two-dimensional because the effect of attempting to portray or otherwise suggest a space of higher dimensionality would almost certainly be to increase non-response to the second question even more than the widespread feeling of vexation at its seeming oversimplification. The two-dimensional model corresponded, of course, to the relevant dimensionality of the physical apparatus (*i.e.*, a piece of xerox paper) that was employed for purposes of presentation; and more importantly, many of the persons in the sample might be assumed, on the basis of their previously published remarks, to entertain little empathy for the extension of a psychological/statistical model to its Euclidian limits of dimensionality (*viz.*, three), let alone going beyond that into conceptions of

[20] Walter Murphy suggests as an alternative inference "that behavior[al]ists are acquainted with the work of traditionalists more than vice versa because so many of the behavior[al]ists were trained in a traditional fashion by traditionalists; but few [if any] traditionalists have been trained by behavioralists"; personal communication to the author, May 4, 1966.

[21] In addition, a draft of this report was circulated among some seventy persons, including the 25 respondents who had indicated their wish to see a copy (by inserting a check in the query at the close of the questionnaire form, Appendix B). Twelve of the respondents replied in writing, some more than once and some in considerable detail. Three other respondents conveyed their views to the author orally in direct conversation, as also did several of the persons who had commented in writing on the draft. So the views of 60% of the respondents were taken into consideration, in revising for publication the draft report. Only one person suggested that it would be better to suppress the report of this research.

space that could be perceived only through mathematical intuition. Even if the sample had been limited to persons who would have understood a question keyed to an explicit model of multidimensional space, the explanation of how to operationalize and to execute a decisional function for such a more complicated space would have required a covering letter of considerably more than two pages. Again the greater demands that such a question would have made upon a set of (in)voluntary respondents almost certainly would have entailed significant reduction in the level of response.

Several persons pointed out, in volunteered comments when they returned the survey instrument, that they had found Question 1 to be difficult but Question 2 even more so. This is readily understandable. What the first question requires is some procedure for partitioning the universe of items (persons in the sample) into sets which will be, in turn, successively further subdivided into subsets and subsubsets; it is further necessary that the subsets scale, both internally and in relation to each other, along a linear continuum. Few respondents, doubtless, were able to sit down and ask themselves: "Now, who is closest?" and then, "Who comes next?" and so on, through a list of over thirty names, with a resulting sequence that would represent a very reliable decision for them. Some persons attempted to do this, however, as evidenced by a few answer sheets which were returned with many crossings-out and changes in the initial ranking that was contrived. Doubtless it was naive of me, but I guess I had assumed that responding to Question 1 would not be too difficult, basing my assumption on my own (and my colleagues' apparent) ease in making decisions for departmental elections over the course of the past decade, using a preferential ballot to rank a group of about thirty members. After the survey materials had been put in the mail, however, and I faced the task of explicating my own response to the first question, I better appreciated the extent to which I had become accustomed to relying upon a host of clues and information in depth that were available for the face-to-face group to a much greater extent than for the synthetic one.[22] Moreover, the task of ranking persons in order to attempt to assure or to preclude their selection to serve the group in some representative capacity (e.g., as members of a committee) is not the same as the task of evaluating all members of the group in relation to a single selected and highly abstruse criterion. So I fell back upon the "equally noticed difference" (or equal-appearing intervals) method[23] to guide my own responses. This involved sorting all thirty-two names (including my own) into three groups (+[like me], 0 [yes and no], −[different from me]) and then, by the same procedure, dividing each group into three subcategories. This placed each person in a subcategory of three or four persons; the subcategories already were scaled; and the few persons within each subcategory could then be ranked on the basis of man-to-man discriminations.

The first question presumed no structure in particular for a respondent's own psychological space, but the second question clearly demanded that he accept, as the basis for making a response, at least three assumptions of mine. Many of the respondents went out of their way to record in their volunteered comments their disagreement with these assumptions, which were that: (1) persons active in the field today can be classified into one of three positions, or into a combination of any two, but not of all three, of them; (2) the three positions are related to each other in a scalar order; and (3) the scale is a circular (determinate, psychologically closed) continuum rather than a linear (indeterminate, psychologically open) one. It should be clear by now that I did not necessarily "believe in" all three of these assumptions; but I did consider it essential to make them in order to construct the frame of reference within which to ask the question. Evidently some common space would have to be hypothesized if the respondents' self-perceptions were to be denoted and measured in relation to a metric that would permit commensuration. No doubt this question was easy for me, not only because the assumptions were mine but also because I was aware of the limited purposes that they were designed to subserve; it would be much more difficult for other respondents to say, in effect, "this is where I am," particularly if they felt that they were being asked to specify their location in some strange place that they had never visited and did not recognize. But it is doubtful, also, that the differences between traditionalists and behavioralists, and between both of them and certain other persons who rejected either affiliation, was really all that novel a conception for

[22] Cf. Barry E. Collins and Harold Guetzkow, *A Social Psychology of Group Processes for Decision-Making* (New York: Wiley, 1964), chapter 2.

[23] Cf. Louis L. Thurstone and E. J. Chave, *The Measurement of Attitude* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1929).

very many of these thirty-odd persons. The sample, it bears repeating, was of what one would have to presume to be the most (not the least) aware members of this field of the profession.

4. The Data Matrix. The raw data cannot, because of my explicit prior commitment to the respondents, be divulged; but they certainly can be described. They were coded in the form of two-digit numbers in the cells of a 27 ×32 rectangular matrix. Each respondent initially was assigned a two-digit identifying number (from the sequence 01–32); this set of numbers identified the columns of the matrix, and the respondents in their role as *items* to be ranked by others. Those twenty-seven persons who answered the first question also were assigned two-digit identifying numbers (from the sequence 01–27); and this second set of numbers identified the rows of the matrix, and the respondents in their role as *rankers* of the items (other persons). The cell entries in any row include a continuous sequence of numbers ranging from 01 to as many persons as the ranker ranked: all cells in that row contain either a number from that sequence or the entry 00 (signifying that this item was omitted by this ranker). All (and only) entries for self-ranking (the cell identified by a person's columnar number as an item, and by his (other) row number as a ranker, are unity (01). The only constraints upon the total of entries for any column, of course, are that each includes only one entry of unity, and that other numbers be 00 or else range from 02–32—and either 00 or any particular number within that range may appear several times or not at all.

Either the tau, or the rho, matrix is calculated by comparing the sequences of rankings for any two *rows* of the raw data matrix. In making comparisons between rankers with rankings of different lengths, it is necessary to delete from either sequence any items that are not included in both, and to renumber either or both sequences of rankings accordingly. The rank correlation coefficient (rho or tau) measures the differences, between two sets of rankings, of items common to both. Consequently, the empirical correlations are based upon discrete data pools of differing sizes, depending upon non-response; but this entailed no serious problem for the subsequent analyses of the correlation matrices, because of the generally very high proportion of complete or almost complete response. To the slight extent that non-response did affect a few of the correlations, this shows up in the testing of their statistical significance, as discussed below. The computer program that was used to calculate the rank correlations evaluated their significance, and it also accommodated non-response (*i.e.*, to the differing lengths of row sequences).

III. THE SOCIOMETRIC RANKINGS

A. The Correlation Matrices

Table 2 reports the correlation matrix, with rho coefficients below and with tau coefficients above the major diagonal (the self correlations of unity). It is evident that the rho and tau matrices are equivalent, in the sense that although the values of rho are larger (in both directions), the same patterns of relationships are explicit in both matrices. Either matrix denotes three groups of respondents. The first group includes eight persons, ranging from Kort through Krislov, among whom the correlations are all positive, at a minimal level of .33 for tau (with all intercorrelations significant at less than .005) and of .39 for rho (which is significant at .014; otherwise all are below the .002 significance level). A second group of seven persons, at the opposite end of the major diagonal, ranges from Roche through Mendelson. All correlations among persons in this second group are positive, at a tau minimum of .13 and a rho minimum of .31, and all are significant at less than .07 except for two correlations involving the three individuals who accounted for almost three-fourths of the total non-response, so the reduced rankings available for comparison readily explain the lack of statistical significance in the low positive correlations for these two pairs.

The 56 intercorrelations between the eight members of the first group and the seven members of the second group all are negative at a minimal level of .15 (for tau, with $p = .142$; and .20 for rho, with $p = .168$) for Krislov/Roche. Five other pairs (all involving one of the three persons, with high non-response, in the second group) also have marginal significance values (.050 to .075 for tau, and .050 to .090 for rho); the remaining fifty correlations all are significant at less than .05, for both coefficients.

The average correlation among the eight persons in the first group is +.53; among the seven persons in the second group it is +.45; and the average correlation, between persons in the first group and persons in the second, is −.40. It seems reasonable to infer that there are two distinct and cohesive groups. Each group consists of persons who are in very substantial agreement with each other, and in very substantial disagreement with persons in the other group.

A third group, adjacent to the Kort-Krislov group, extends from Vines through Chase. All

TABLE 2. THE RANK CORRELATION MATRICES

Kort	Nagel	Tanenhaus	Danelski	Ulmer	Schubert	Spaeth	Krislov	Vines	Grossman	Becker	Peltason	Shapiro	Pritchett	Murphy	Chase	Schmidhauser	Rosenblum	Vose	Scigliano	Roche	McCloskey	Bartholomew	Tresolini	Abraham	Berns	Mendelson	
	46	54	56	59	51	41	44	35	32	25	32	25	30	27	21	26	12	*08*	*06*	*37*	*43*	*29*	*33*	*50*	*62*	*67*	Kort
65		62	57	46	48	33	47	47	54	59	37	34	20	26	16	31	13	*05*	*06*	*28*	*55*	*32*	*49*	*51*	*50*	*40*	Nagel
70	81		71	58	58	47	58	44	49	36	36	31	37	35	15	27	07	06	00	*21*	*41*	*22*	*49*	*54*	*44*	*58*	Tanenhaus
75	78	87		67	65	57	58	46	42	36	40	35	33	30	16	21	09	04	*08*	*32*	*37*	*25*	*44*	*53*	*53*	*80*	Danelski
79	67	77	85		59	57	45	42	27	24	33	34	37	31	07	18	*02*	*10*	*05*	*26*	*36*	*53*	*43*	*36*	*51*	*58*	Ulmer
70	67	76	84	79		51	47	38	36	38	30	34	46	25	23	12	18	04	05	*21*	*31*	*32*	*38*	*40*	*39*	*52*	Schubert
57	39	58	76	72	71		33	30	26	07	30	30	35	31	11	11	*05*	15	*07*	*21*	*28*	*34*	*31*	*38*	*35*	*48*	Spaeth
61	68	77	75	66	64	49		53	44	46	58	36	43	46	29	25	25	24	*05*	*15*	*25*	*28*	*32*	*36*	*39*	*33*	Krislov
51	64	60	62	60	54	47	70		42	45	62	43	22	22	27	29	18	13	03	*25*	*29*	*36*	*39*	*36*	*36*	*31*	Vines
49	74	69	59	42	52	36	59	59		52	51	49	49	31	41	25	21	14	*03*	*02*	*17*	*25*	*31*	*31*	*42*	*39*	Grossman
39	80	52	51	32	53	12	60	61	67		40	23	21	29	30	09	29	08	13	*18*	*22*	*32*	*43*	*38*	*29*	*18*	Becker
46	59	53	57	50	44	49	76	80	70	57		53	28	46	32	26	31	22	*13*	*06*	*12*	*34*	*27*	*29*	*37*	*30*	Peltason
37	48	45	48	46	47	42	51	61	68	34	73		31	39	35	20	28	12	*14*	03	07	*23*	*12*	*24*	*30*	*27*	Shapiro
41	27	52	46	52	63	51	59	36	37	32	42	45		36	29	06	19	22	14	22	08	*16*	*09*	*17*	*12*	*24*	Pritchett
37	37	44	44	39	39	44	65	49	43	46	62	54	48		30	12	31	35	*02*	05	09	*32*	*01*	*13*	*18*	*15*	Murphy
31	21	21	19	09	34	16	38	39	54	42	46	51	42	44		20	42	31	14	12	17	*08*	11	10	*16*	21	Chase
36	44	38	30	26	16	15	35	45	39	20	40	27	07	16	27		12	06	*03*	*17*	*13*	*05*	*15*	*15*	*41*	*03*	Schmidhauser
17	24	10	13	*02*	24	*05*	37	26	33	48	39	42	26	44	63	18		34	*07*	12	11	*03*	10	13	*07*	09	Rosenblum
05	*08*	04	05	*18*	02	16	37	18	20	16	31	17	30	49	48	12	49		12	03	18	*06*	18	24	11	30	Vose
08	*09*	*00*	*11*	*08*	08	*13*	*07*	05	*04*	23	*16*	*20*	21	*07*	21	*04*	*12*	15		04	06	*19*	*06*	*01*	22	24	Scigliano
45	*44*	*28*	*41*	*39*	*28*	*32*	*20*	*33*	*14*	*28*	*11*	*05*	32	04	15	*27*	19	07	04		58	13	32	37	43	64	Roche
55	*59*	*54*	*55*	*53*	*43*	*36*	*36*	*44*	*29*	*32*	*20*	07	14	08	23	*20*	14	28	12	75		28	55	54	41	68	McCloskey
40	*40*	*29*	*34*	*50*	*45*	*45*	*36*	*48*	*33*	*40*	*46*	*31*	*28*	*16*	*05*	*07*	*01*	*08*	*25*	31	40		41	39	22	17	Bartholomew
48	*70*	*68*	*62*	*57*	*53*	*39*	*50*	*56*	*44*	*55*	*42*	*21*	*15*	*07*	15	*21*	13	26	*10*	48	77	55		69	27	58	Tresolini
67	*71*	*73*	*74*	*73*	*61*	*40*	*54*	*57*	*46*	*46*	*47*	*36*	*26*	*19*	12	*23*	17	34	*01*	55	70	49	87		42	64	Abraham
79	*71*	*61*	*69*	*67*	*51*	*46*	*53*	*54*	*60*	*44*	*56*	*41*	*15*	*24*	*20*	*56*	*11*	15	27	46	59	36	42	62		67	Berns
83	*77*	*79*	*87*	*77*	*72*	*70*	*57*	*55*	*64*	*40*	*49*	*40*	*38*	*18*	35	*07*	20	38	24	81	83	42	75	84	83		Mendelson

NOTE: The numbers above the major diagonal are tau coefficients; those below are rho. All numbers are two-place decimals; the self-correlations, which have been omitted above, all are 1.00. The italicized correlations are negative.

eight of these persons are positively intercorrelated (at a minimal level of .21 on tau, and .32 on rho) and with very few exceptions (three for tau, and two for rho, which have probability values between .04 and .06), all are significant at less than .03. The intercorrelations of this group with persons in the Nagel-Krislov group all are positive, but somewhat lower than that group's correlations among its own members; and the intercorrelations of this third group with the Roche-Mendelson group are mostly negative (of the 56 correlations, 45 of the tau, and 46 of the rho, are negative) but again at a lower level than the negative intercorrelations between the first two groups. These findings suggest that there is a third group which falls in between the first two, but which is more closely aligned with the first than with the second.

The three groups, which together account for 23 persons, leave only four individuals who are not clearly aligned with any of the groups. Schmidhauser is positively correlated with everyone in the two groups to his left, and negatively correlated with members of the Roche-Mendelson group; but many of his correlations are weaker, in both directions, than those of persons in the Vines-Chase group: Schmidhauser has one tau correlation of $-.41$, another of $+.31$, and nine in the plus twenties, but his other fifteen correlations all are less than $\pm.20$—which means that his common variance with most persons is less than five percent ($\pm.20^2=.04$). The correlations for Rosenblum and for Vose are no higher, and they tend to agree—but not very enthusiastically—with everybody else; of the fifty-one correlations for them both, only nine are negative, and the highest of their negative correlations is $-.10$. Unlike Schmidhauser, who seems to lean toward the two groups to his left, the remaining individual, Scigliano, appears to lean toward the group to his right. His highest correlations are $+.24$ and $+.22$, with Mendelson and Berns respectively—who are at the right wing of the correlation matrix. Scigliano's correlations with the Kort-Krislov group all are within the $\pm.08$ range, and six are negative; with the Vines-Chase group, the range is $\pm.14$, and half are negative; while with the Roche-Mendelson group, the range is $\pm.24$, and a majority are positive.

In the light of the hypothesis associated with the sampling assumption (Fig. 2, outer perimeter), it seems reasonable to note the general correspondence between the composition of these three groups, and the ideological typology which was hypothesized. Although we shall make a more precise test of the relationship in Part IV of this article, it will be convenient henceforth to refer to the Kort-Krislov group as "behavioral," the Vines-Chase group as "conventional," and the Roche-Mendelson group as "traditional." On the basis of only these correlation data, we should have to conclude that the remaining four individuals are not clearly identified with any of the ideologies for which the three groups stand.

B. Factor Analysis

Initially, a principal axis analysis was made of both matrices. The eigenvalues drop very rapidly after the second: for the rho matrix, the first axis is 12.27 and the second 4.21, the next five range between 1.83 and 1.04, and all factors beyond the seventh have eigenvalues of less than 1.00. Similarly, for the tau matrix, the first axis is 9.18, the second 3.41, the next five range between 1.64 and 1.00, and all factors beyond the seventh have eigenvalues of less than 1.00. It is clear that interpretation ought to be confined to the first two factors.

The research design called for successive output, for both matrices and for both quartimax and varimax rotations, of the first two, then the first three, and so on through the first ten factors. Two-dimensional plots were made of the first four factors, for both rotations based upon both matrices. These plots confirmed that the rotations limited to the first two factors provide the most information with the greatest parsimony. The only notable difference between the rho and the tau plots is that the vectors are longer in the rho configuration (because the correlations are larger). It makes no difference which is chosen; we shall select tau and focus attention upon the two-dimensional rotations shown in Figure 3, the coordinates for which are reported in Table 3.

The varimax rotation is the one which provides the reference axes for the configuration in Figure 3. It is evident that three clusters are discriminated by these two dimensions: a behavioral group consisting of Ulmer, Kort, Danelski, Nagel, Tanenhaus, Spaeth, and Schubert; a conventional group, consisting of Vines, Krislov, Becker, Grossman, Peltason, Shapiro, Pritchett, Murphy, Chase, Rosenblum, and Vose; and a traditional group composed of Roche, McCloskey, Mendelson, Tresolini, Abraham, Berns, and Bartholomew.[24] The first dimension scales these groups in the

[24] These groups agree with the clusters apparent in the correlation matrix, except that this factorial configuration shows Krislov to be conventional rather than behavioral, and it also shows two of the four isolates from the correlation clusters (Rosenblum and Vose) to be conventionally oriented.




FIG. 3. Ideological positions in factor space.

sequence B, C, T; the second dimension, in the sequence of C, B, T. All three groups are discriminated without intransitivity on both dimensions. The most cohesive (*i.e.*, tightly clustered) group is the behavioral, next is the conventional, and the least cohesive is the traditional. In other words, the seven behavioralists appear most similar in their point of view, and the seven traditionalists share a distinctive but a much more diversified academic ideology.

Two individuals do not lie in any of the three clusters. Their independent positions imply that their views tend to be idiosyncratic, in the sense that whatever is represented by the two ideological dimensions which are common factors for 25 of the 27 respondents, these two individuals tend to conceptualize their respective approaches to the subject in other terms. In a statistical sense, this finding is expressed by their communalities, the sums of the squares of their correlations with the two factorial dimensions, which are much lower for the two isolates than for the other respondents. Scigliano's communality is .01, and Schmidhauser's is .13, while the average communality for the twenty-five affiliates of the three groups is .50 (with Mendelson's .85 maximal).

Both the varimax and the quartimax rotations represent orthogonal repositioning of the principal axes, and it is easy to suggest in Figure 3 how the configuration appears in relation to the quartimax rotation. The perimeter points labelled "*Q*I" and "*Q*II" identify the termini of the quartimax axes. Axis *Q*I separates the configuration as follows: the seven persons whose points are in the traditional cluster, plus Scigliano, all have negative correlations (*i.e.*, are to the left of *Q*II) on *Q*I, while all others have positive correlations. Thus, the quartimax rotation suggests the best *one*-dimensional array of the ideological differences, along the first quartimax axis, with the traditional ideology distinguished from the conventional and behavioral views entertained by the other persons in the sample; and the 8-to-19 split implies at least a rough index of the relative importance of the traditional approach, in relation to the rest of the field, at the present time. The point configuration remains invariant, of course; it is only the frame of reference (the set of orthogonal axes) that is rotated. Therefore, the apparent gap between the traditional and the conventional groups does does not change under any rotation, although it is the quartimax rotation which directs attention to the fact that the conventional group is closer to the behavioral than to the traditional one.

The proportion of the total variance that is accounted for, by the first and second axes, is .466; for varimax, it is .263 (I) plus .203 (II),

TABLE 3. FACTOR LOADINGS

Variable	Varimax		Quartimax		Smallest Space		
	I	II*	I	II*	I*	II	III
Abraham	−78	−10	−70	38	−82	20	−36
Bartholomew	−37	−27	−46	00	−47	35	−66
Becker	32	51	55	22	34	24	33
Berns	−64	−27	−68	15	−81	−11	−53
Chase	−19	69	25	67	−13	19	17
Danelski	71	43	83	−07	52	−16	10
Grossman	32	61	62	31	36	14	21
Kort	65	33	72	−11	56	−09	−05
Krislov	39	66	70	30	35	−11	19
McCloskey	−77	15	−53	57	−74	04	−28
Mendelson	−92	−05	−77	50	−84	10	−33
Murphy	04	67	42	52	01	−19	26
Nagel	62	42	75	−02	55	06	15
Peltason	26	69	61	41	25	−02	32
Pritchett	10	57	42	40	11	−37	−02
Roche	−63	17	−41	51	−68	−14	−30
Rosenblum	−22	58	17	60	−21	27	28
Schmidhauser	20	29	33	12	34	45	−18
Schubert	55	46	71	05	46	−23	06
Scigliano	−10	04	−05	09			
Shapiro	16	64	50	42	14	−11	36
Spaeth	50	33	61	−02	41	−41	−01
Tanenhaus	64	45	78	−01	52	−08	09
Tresolini	−72	−06	−62	37	−75	26	−38
Ulmer	68	33	74	−13	55	−25	03
Vines	41	56	66	21	40	−02	31
Vose	−32	51	04	60	−43	−01	27

NOTE: All numbers are two-place decimals.

* Means the factor has been reflected. All factors except Smallest Space II have been rotated.

while for quartimax it is .340 (QI) and .126 (QII). These data confirm the suggestion above that the first axis on the quartimax rotation (viz., the third data column of Table 3), which accounts for 34% of the total variance, provides the best one-dimensional solution of the correlation matrix. (For the rho matrix, the first two factors account for 61% of the total variance, and of this 45% is attributable to the first quartimax factor.) The rho quartimax two-factor rotation, incidentally, is *identical* with the first two principal axes; and for tau it is virtually so—none of the corresponding correlations of any of the respondents on either of the first two axes differ, as between the principal axes and the quartimax factors, by as much as |.015|. The extension of the analysis to include the third and fourth factors did not prove particularly fruitful: the total variance accounted for was increased only by .11 (.14 for rho), and the effect of adding the additional factors was of course to add quite weak factors for quartimax (neither the third nor the fourth factors added as much as 7% additional variance, for either rho or tau).

C. Interpretation

The interpretation of any factorial data involves reliance upon some extrinsic criterion which can be related to the variables in such a way as to provide a basis for defining the substantive content of the factors. In other words, what the factor analysis does is to denote the important patterns of relationships among the variables; the task of interpretation then becomes, on the basis of what are otherwise the known characteristics of the variables, to identify the factors. In the case of our present data, there is one factor which is by far the most important in explaining the observable relationship among the variables. As Figure 3 shows, this is the first factor, which separates

over 90% of the variables into three clusters. The observed clusters conform so closely to the predicted clusters that we cannot, on the basis of this evidence, reject the working hypothesis, which assumed that the persons in the sample represent three distinctive standpoints.

If the first factor distinguishes between the behavioral and the traditional approaches to the study of adjudication, with a third (conventional) group arrayed between the other two because of its relatively much more moderate correlations with the factor, what does such a dimension stand for? I submit that this factor is one of method, which relates to *how* one studies his subject. Behavioralists advocate a scientific approach with the goal of developing systematic theory out of research that has been carefully designed in advance, that operationalizes the relationships among variables, that employs an articulate methodology, and that relies upon quantification and (so far as possible) statistical measurement. Traditionalists reject all of these goals, in favor of a more subjective, speculative, and literary approach which, in their opinion, avoids the many undesirable byproducts that the behavioral approach necessarily entails. This dimension, therefore, posits a continuum with modern "political science" at one extreme, and "political philosophy" at the other. In its most pristine terms, the conflict is that between physics and metaphysics. In the context of the development of the rest of the discipline of political science during the past half century, this is a factor of academic liberalism and conservatism.[25] In terms of the present study, the behavioral group is liberal, and the traditional group conservative, in its academic ideology.

The second factor is one upon which all of the members of the conventional group are strongly loaded. The behavioral group is moderately correlated, in the same direction as the more extreme conventionalists, but the traditionalists are only weakly correlated with the second factor. In the light of the conventionalists' insistence upon the importance of observing and describing political action—the facts of the judicial process in the context of the larger political process—it seems reasonable to identify the second factor as one of theory which is concerned with *what* is to be studied. The conventionalists are empiricists who seek to build a theory of the judicial process out of observations—preferably made in the field or laboratory—of the politics of the judiciary. The negative pole of the second factor represents a rational approach to the study of law. Although our sample includes no persons who can be described as adhering strongly to the ideology of legal rationalism, the behavioral group is less enthusiastically political in its orientation than are the conventionalists, and the traditional group is least so.

We now are in a position to ascribe ideological content to the four quadrants of the space described by Figure 3. Designating them in the usual manner,[26] the first quadrant, which evidently can appropriately be described as the behavioral quadrant, is scientific empiricism, emphasizing the scientific study of political action; and a majority of the conventional group also fall in this quadrant. The second quadrant, the literary study of political action, is much less densely populated than the first, but includes minorities from both the conventional and traditional groups, plus (weakly) Scigliano. The third quadrant, the literary study of non-political action—or, as we can put it in relation to this particular field, the speculative study of legal norms—is where most of the traditional group falls. The fourth quadrant would, of course, be the scientific study of legal norms; but it is unpopulated in our sample. To summarize: in terms of the typology of academic ideologies that I have attributed to the factorial space of Figure 3, the behavioral group are scientific empiricists; the conventional group are political empiricists; and the traditional group are non-scientific rationalists.

One final aspect of that space warrants consideration. Our hypothesis (Figure 1) requires that we observe a configuration of points that lie, at least roughly, in the pattern of a circle. It is manifest, in Figure 3, that this is not the case; what we do observe is a *semicircle*, extending from Kort and Ulmer on the extreme right through Nagel, Schubert, Vines, Grossman, Shapiro, Murphy, Rosenblum, Vose, Roche, and Tresolini, to Berns at a position diametrically opposed to that of Kort and

[25] The author is indebted to David Danelski for having pointed out that the first factor also appears to discriminate among the respondents on the basis of age: *all* persons with negative loadings on *VI* (*i.e.*, to the left of the middle of Figure 3) are (when this is written, in May, 1966) over 40 years of age, and the average age of these eleven persons is 46.4 years; while half of the remaining persons (*i.e.*, those with positive loadings on *VI*, to the right of the middle of Figure 3) are under 40, and the average age of these sixteen persons is 39.4 years: personal communication to the author, April 24, 1966.

[26] I+/II+ = 1st; I−/II+ = 2nd; I−/II− = 3rd; I+/II− = 4th.

Ulmer. Figure 3 suggests the positioning of another axis, whose termini on the perimeter of the space are identified by the symbol: PS/L. This axis, whose position was determined by the method of visual (or "graphical") rotation, discriminates almost the entire configuration—everyone except Bartholomew—from the empty space that otherwise lies below the axis. Above this axis, the configuration of our sample arches in a semicircle, with the points representing persons located at least roughly (it would appear) in the sequence that had been hypothesized for them by Figure 2 (the outer perimeter).

We are now in a position to infer why our hypothesis of a circular configuration turned out to be only half-right. The position depicted in Figure 1 at six o'clock is for the academic discipline of law. We included no law professors in the sample; and Figure 3 suggests that there is an important difference between even those political scientists who have been designated as traditional in their approach, and the law professors. Evidently, the spacing of the academic disciplines is different than Figure 1—in the absence of empirical data—presumed. Political scientists are more closely allied in their ideological range than was assumed; and conversely, the legal approach preempts a much larger segment of the total relevant ideological continuum than was expected. In order to have obtained a circular configuration, it would have been necessary to have included in the sample some law professors—preferably, a dozen or two, so as to maximize confidence in the discriminating power of the factorial analysis—so as to be able to populate the fourth quadrant. Then we might find representation for the rationalist academic ideology, advocacy for the scientific study of legal norms, and allies for those relatively few political scientists who specialize in the speculative study of legal norms. Unfortunately, however, we would have encountered immediate technical problems, which would have precluded the extension of the present study to a broader sample that included a goodly representation of law professors. Neither the sampling criterion of visibility nor that of accessibility could have been satisfied, if a dozen law professors had been added to our sample. Probably something could be done to alleviate, or to correct for, the accessibility problem; but the difficulty in regard to visibility appears to be almost insuperable. Political scientists and law professors simply do not read enough of each other's work for a mixed sample to be able to avoid producing overwhelming quantities of either non-response or uninformed response. Given the differences that continue to obtain in the respective socialization experiences of members of the two professions at both the graduate and post-professional-degree levels, it is understandable that the motivation of most political scientists to read the typical writings of law professors should be low, and vice-versa. Perhaps, however, an independent replicative study, but using a sample consisting only of law professors, would produce the missing semi-circle; and then the two halves might be fitted together.

D. Smallest Space Analysis

In order to provide an additional perspective of the sociometric relationships implicit in the correlation matrix, I shall report also the results of a Guttman-Lingoes "Smallest Space" (a non-metric factor) analysis.[27] This approach might be deemed particularly suitable for our data, since it calculates a set of Euclidean coordinates for points so that the distances among them correspond to the rank order differences among the coefficients in the correlation matrix, which in turn are functions of the intersubjective rankings (of the members of the group) of each other. The two-dimensional solution was computed, but it is not reported here because it is almost identical with the first two factors of the three-dimensional solution, which is much more interesting.

In Table 3, the output values for dimension coordinates have been converted to the usual metric for factorial space (*viz.*, ranging from +1.00 to −1.00), and the first and third factors have been rotated orthogonally 27.5° clockwise with the second factor remaining unrotated and orthogonal to them both. Figure 4 shows the two-dimensional factor plots for

[27] J. C. Lingoes, Kevin Kay, and Susan Spear, *Technical Report No. 29* (East Lansing: Michigan State University, Computer Institute for Social Science Research, 1965). I am indebted to David J. Peterson, then a graduate student at Michigan State University, for assistance in the use of the program to analyse the rho matrix (with Scigliano omitted because of his exceptionally low communality, as evidenced by the principal axis factor analysis). See also: James C. Lingoes, "An IBM-7090 Program for Guttman-Lingoes Smallest Space Analysis—IV" (Computer Program Abstract), *Behavioral Science*, 11 (1966), p. 407; and two articles by Louis Guttman that have been announced as forthcoming in *Psychometrika*, "A General Nonmetric Technique for Finding the Smallest Euclidean Space for a Configuration of Points," and "Smallest Space Analysis with Unknown Communalities."




FIG. 4. Ideological positions in small space.

SI/*SIII* and *SII*/*SIII*. The first and third factor plane shows almost exactly the same configuration as does Figure 3, the only exception worth noting being Pritchett's appearance as an isolate. Just as do the first and second varimax axes, both the first and third small space dimensions discriminate absolutely among the three clusters; and the rotation of the latter two was made so as to bring the dimensions into alignment with the axes.[28] Hence the psychological content of *SI* must be the same as *VI*, and *SIII* the same as *VII*. What the smallest space analysis adds to the picture is the second dimension, *SII*, on which most of the traditional group are positive, the conventional group are divided about equally, and most of the behavioral group are negative, although there is (as Figure 4b shows) considerable overlapping among groups, unlike the differentiation provided by the other two dimensions. Examination of which members of each group are most positive, and which are most negative, suggests that this is a factor of positivism versus nomism—that is, of a primary concern for the study of what are conceptualized to be facts, as distinguished from a primary concern with values. Such a distinction is quite independent of what may be deemed to be the appropriate substantive content of either facts or values. Thus, we might expect to find some persons preoccupied with political facts and others with legal facts; some with political values and others with legal values. And cross-cutting all of these categories is the question of methodology, since either type of fact or value can be studied scientifically, and it can also be studied belletristically.

SI reveals the latter orientation; and the plane of *SII*/*SIII* (Figure 4b) indicates both the predisposition and the relative intensity of persons in our sample, toward the dimensions of empiricism/rationalism and of positivism/nomism. Starting in the first quadrant, the persons who emphasize the factual study of judicial politics are Becker, Rosenblum, Chase, and Grossman. The empiricists, who are more concerned with politics than whether it relates to facts or values, are Shapiro, Peltason, Vines, and Vose. Political values is the focus of Murphy, Krislov, Danelski, and Tanenhaus.

[28] A counterclockwise rotation of 60° produces the same result as the quartimax rotation of the principal axes: that is, the traditional cluster then is negative on the first dimension, and everyone else is positive.

Spaeth, Pritchett, Ulmer, and Schubert are interested in values, irrespective of whether they relate to political or legal variables. A shift to a concern for legal values characterizes Roche and Kort, while Berns and McCloskey are rationalists whose primary concern is with law. Bartholomew, Tresolini, Abraham, and Mendelson are more concerned with legal facts; and the only positivist, interested in facts whether they be legal or political—although leaning toward the former—is Schmidhauser. The validity of this interpretation can, of course, readily be checked against the content of the writing of these persons, which in most instances is prolific.

IV. THREE VIEWPOINTS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL STRUCTURE

Figure 3 also can be used to provide a consensual ranking of "others" by "egos." We have noted that the configuration of points lies in a rough semicircle. The semicircle is "rough" because the vectors, which project (from the origin of the space) the points representing the variables, are of differing length; they vary in length precisely according to the communality differences among the variables. Thus, it is apparent from Figure 3 that if Schmidhauser's vector were extended to double its present length, he would then clearly be a member of the conventional group. Similarly, if Scigliano's vector were quadrupled in length, he would then be in the traditional group. But we can extend all vectors to unit length, in which event all points will be arrayed in sequence along the semicircular perimeter of the factorial space above the PS/L axis. We can then use that sequence of points as a ranking of the variables, assigning the first rank to Ulmer, the second to Kort, and so on until we reach Berns, who will be twenty-sixth, and Bartholomew, twenty-seventh. By so doing, we shall have used the responses to Question 1 in order to provide a consensual ranking of the respondents along a circular continuum which we already have construed to be the empirical equivalent of the continuum depicted in Figure 1. This ranking can then be compared with the rankings which can be inferred from Figure 2, which shows the postulated boundary between the "traditional" and "behavioral" segments to be at about 4:30 o'clock. We can measure both the inner and the outer circles of Figure 2, proceeding in a counter-clockwise direction, just as we did in the case of Figure 3. Evidently, we should begin each ranking with the person who appears in the "behavioral" position that is closest to the boundary between the behavioral and the traditional segments. For the inner ring of self-preceptions, Krislov is in the first rank, and Kort is in the second; while for the outer ring of the sampling assumption (the hypothesis to be tested), Kort, Nagel, and Becker all are tied for the initial (and therefore, for the second) rank. The three rankings are reported in Table 4.

The non-respondents are classified (in brackets) along with the respondent members of the sample, in the outer ring of Figure 2, since the non-respondents of course were included in the sampling assumption. It is equally evident that we cannot include the non-respondents in the

TABLE 4. A PRIORI, GROUP, AND SELF-PERCEPTIONS OF RANKINGS ON THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTINUUM

Variable	Hypothesized[a]	Consensual[b]	Autogenous[c]
Abraham	24	25	19.5
Bartholomew	26.5	27	25
Becker	2	10	8
Berns	26.5	26	22.5
Chase	19	17	11
Danelski	6.5	3	6
Fellman	T	T*	NR
Grossman	19	12	11
Horn	C	T*	NR
Jacob	C	C*	NR
Kort	2	2	2
Krislov	16	11	1
Lasswell	B	B*	NR
McCloskey	21.5	22	16.5
Mendelson	24	24	22.5
Murphy	10	16	14
Nagel	2	5	7
Peltason	13	13	16.5
Pritchett	13	15	11
Roche	21.5	21	22.5
Rosenblum	16	18	26
Schmidhauser	11	9	11
Schubert	6.5	7	4
Scigliano	19	20	NR
Shapiro	13	14	11
Spaeth	4	4	4
Tanenhaus	6.5	6	16.5
Tresolini	24	23	22.5
Ulmer	6.5	1	4
Vines	9	8	16.5
Vose	16	19	19.5
Westin	T	T*	NR

[a] See Fig. 2 (the sampling assumption).
[b] See Fig. 3 (Q. 1 responses).
[c] See Fig. 2 (Q. 2 responses).
* See Table VIII.
NR = No response.

autogenous ranking, since they did not supply us with their self-perceptions. It is possible, however, to make a nominal consensual classification of the non-respondents, by a procedure that will be explained in the next part of this article; so the non-respondents are classified, in the first two rankings of Table 4, by ideological type rather than by rank.

Inspection of the table suggests that the different rankings are at least roughly similar. In considering the rows—the set of three ranks for each of the twenty-seven respondents—the range of rank differences is four or less for a majority, and the average range is less than five. There are only two really big discrepancies, and both of these involve self-perceptions—those of Krislov and Tanenhaus—which deviate markedly from both the sampling hypothesis and the consensual perception. Reference to Figures 2 and 3 shows that Krislov appears to consider himself to be much more behavioral[29]—while Tanenhaus, conversely, considers himself to be much *less* behavioral—than others seem to think. Examination of the inner ring of Figure 2 shows that except for Tanenhaus, the behavioralists are about where they are hypothesized to "belong"; but the conventionalists are bunched together in the narrow segment spanning 11:00 and 12:00 o'clock, and all of the traditionalists except Bartholomew are similarly escalated towards what was hypothesized to be the conventional segment. Of course, this does not indicate that the self-perceptions are inaccurate, but rather it refutes the a priori assumption of equal spacing along the continuum. The bunching of the conventionalists up close to the behavioralists, the gap between the conventionalists and the bulk of the traditionalists, and the latter's selfplacement near the boundary between the "traditional" and the "conventional" segments, all of these are precisely in accord with the configuration of points in Figure 3. Hence we should conclude that, in general, it appears that the perceptions of selves by selves, and of selves by others, are in very good agreement.

We can, of course, confirm these intuitive judgments by subjecting the three rankings to the more rigorous statistical test of correlating the pairs of rankings; and the results of this test are reported in Table 5. The rho coefficient of .92, for the correlation between the hypothesized and the consensual ranking, is exceptionally high; and we should have to conclude, on the basis of this evidence, that the a priori assumptions about the ideological content and structure among political scientists working in this field tend to be strongly supported.[30] The rho coefficient of .78, for the correlation between the autogenous and consensual rankings, is high enough to tend to confirm our subjective judgment that the respondents' perceptions of their own ideological positions are in close accord with the perceptions about them that their co-workers in the same field entertain. Incidentally, the feeling of many of the respondents, as articulated in their comments to the author, that their attempts to comply with the author's request, by "forcing" themselves to commit themselves to a single point in two-dimensional space when they felt their positions to be much more complicated than that, should be somewhat assuaged, perhaps, by the results reported above. It seems clear, now at least, that their replies make a lot more—and more consistent—sense than they thought

TABLE 5. INTERCORRELATIONS AMONG HYPOTHESIZED, CONSENSUAL, AND AUTOGENOUS RANKINGS OF THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTINUUM

tau / rho	Hypothesized	Consensual	Autogenous
Hypothesized		.92	.74
Consensual	.80		.78
Autogenous	.57	.65	

[29] Subsequent to the writing of this sentence, Samuel Krislov has reported that "my self-perception is not so out of line as might appear. . . . I did not then and, alas, still do not, quite understand the clock metric and what I was trying to indicate was that I was at the middle or the right wing of the behavioral group expecting such stalwarts as yourself to be at '5:30' or so,": personal communication to the author, April 7, 1966.

[30] We can make an equivalent extension to unit length of the vectors in Figure 4a and then observe their rank order. The rho correlations for the small space ranking are .97 with the consensual ranking derived from Figure 3, and .88 with the hypothesized ranking of Figure 2. (Pritchett, Scigliano, and Schmidhauser were deleted from the rankings for these computations, because of their low communalities in either or both of the factor spaces from which the rankings were derived.)

possible. Of course, persons more familiar with psychometric theory would have anticipated the likelihood of such an outcome. The problem is strictly analogous with the one we faced, in interpreting the factorial output, in choosing whether to employ one, two, three, or four or more factors as a frame of reference. We could have settled for a four-factor, rather than a two-factor, solution of the correlation matrix. This would certainly have afforded a richer, more complicated, and more difficult-to-conceptualize space; and if the payoff, in terms of the quality as well as the quantity of information thereby provided, had justified recourse to a four-dimensional interpretation, then this is what we should have preferred. We found, however, that in fact the dimensions beyond the third were so relatively weak that we passed the point of diminishing returns just as soon as we added a fourth factor. We could also, of course, have settled for the first factor alone, because the first varimax factor did offer a linear solution that arrayed the three groups in sequence. Evidently, however, that would have been oversimplification, because we then would have been foreclosed from studying the second respect, in relation to *what kind* of data should be studied, by which these three groups differ; and we also would have been unable, of course, to say much about the validity of the assumptions about ideological structure that are explicit in Figure 1. This is why, in correspondence with respondents, I attempted to suggest that the question of the dimensionality of the relevant space is an empirical rather than a theoretical question; and that although it might be helpful to formulate a hypothesis about the number of dimensions—as was, in fact, done—that hypothesis should be subjected to the test of the empirical data collected—as we have done.

The third correlation in Table 5, between the inner and the outer ring of Figure 2, is also high enough to support the intuitive judgment that they are in fairly close agreement. Finally, it should be noted that in Table 4 the consensual ranking should be considered to be the norm from which both the hypothesized and the autogenous rankings deviate in varying degrees.

V. CONCORDANCE AND IDEOLOGICAL AFFINITY

A. Concordance

The raw data matrix can supply evidence bearing upon another and quite different type of question relating to the responses to Question 1. Given a set of rankings, we might wish to know how consistent are the judgments expressed by the persons making the rankings. Ordinarily, with psychological data, persons are asked to rank some extrinsic objects, and our expectation is that, if their perceptions and judgment are similar, then their rankings ought to be in close agreement. Hence, W, the coefficient of concordance, which ranges between .00 and 1.00, usually is interpreted so that a high score signifies high agreement among the subjects, and a low score poor agreement. With sociometric data, however, the situation is very different. When each subject is evaluating the position of others in relation to himself, the criterion is a shifting rather than a presumably fixed one. If we were to array a dozen persons along the perimeter of a circle, or along a line, and to ask each to rank the others in terms of his perception of their physical proximity to himself, we should anticipate a set of rankings in a very different pattern. If everybody were spaced equally in a circle, and each exercised perfectly consistent perception and judgment, then the sums of the ranks for each column of the data matrix ought to be equal to each other; and the value of a coefficient of concordance, calculated from such data, ought to be .00. Consequently, with our data matrix, we should interpret a low value of W to mean high concordance—that is, that there is very considerable consistency among the persons in our sample, and in their conceptions of their ideological relationship to each other and to the non-respondents in the sample. A high value of W, to the contrary, could only mean that a considerable number of the persons in the sample all thought that they perceived the others, not only in the same way, but also *from the same base position*—that is, both their conceptions of others, and their self-perceptions, would have to be identical, or at least very similar. In effect, we could anticipate a high W coefficient only if there were a *single* ideological standpoint, which practically all of the respondents shared. We know that, impirically, neither of these conditions obtains; and the coefficient of concordance substantiates our judgment.

The available computer program for W[21] does not accommodate to, and could not readily be adjusted to, the missing data occasioned by the double zero entries in the raw data matrix. In order to get around this difficulty, the following procedure was adopted in order to calculate a value for W. Ranks were substituted for the correlation coefficients in each row of the corre-

[21] Morris, *op. cit.*, ftn. 17, *supra*.

TABLE 6. AVERAGE RANKINGS

Rank	Subject	Ranking
1	Danelski	9.24
2	Murphy	10.00
3	Schmidhauser	10.65
4	Grossman	10.92
5	Pritchett	11.34
6	Peltason	11.50
7	Schubert	12.14
8	Krislov	13.15
9	Tanenhaus	13.24
10	Jacob	13.36
11	Vose	13.68
12	Vines	14.34
13	Shapiro	15.24
14	Rosenblum	15.52
15	Westin	15.55
16	Lasswell	15.60
17	Abraham	15.69
18	Ulmer	15.69
19	Nagel	16.34
20	Chase	16.41
21	Spaeth	17.08
22	McCloskey	17.37
23	Scigliano	17.58
24	Becker	18.20
25	Horn	18.64
26	Fellman	19.55
27	Kort	19.61
28	Tresolini	21.00
29	Mendelson	21.11
30	Roche	21.73
31	Bartholomew	23.08
32	Berns	24.52

lation matrix—it would not matter whether the rho or the tau matrix were used for this purpose. This provided a complete set of rankings, with no missing data, for a new 27×27 matrix. It seems intuitively reasonable to assume that, if the ranks of the raw data express a respondent's judgment of how close another person is to him, then the correlation coefficient for the two persons can be viewed as an expression of their conjoint perception of this relationship. This assumes that a person will feel closest to the person with whom he is most highly (and positively, of course) correlated; and this is, indeed, precisely the assumption that underlies the point configuration of the factor analysis. The value of W calculated by the computer, for the data matrix described above, was .13. It was possible, of course, also to calculate, by hand, the value of W for the complete 32-column raw data matrix; this was done, and the coefficient obtained was .17. Although both of the observed values are low, they doubtless reflect the substantial homogeneity of viewpoint among the behavioralist cluster and among several subclusters of the conventional group.

TABLE 7. RANKINGS ACCORDING TO IDEOLOGICAL TYPES

Types*	Rankings	
	1–16	17–32
Conventional	9	2
Behavioral	3	4
Traditional	0	7

* See Fig. 3.

B. Classifying the Non-respondents

Although five persons in the sample did not reply to either question, it was inherent in the research design that these persons nevertheless would remain a part of the project, at least in the status of items whom the respondents ranked along with themselves and each other. As in the calculation of W, we shall use the means of the columns of the raw data matrix, for purposes of the present analysis. These average rankings, for each column, are reported in Table 6, which ranks all persons in the sample accordingly from lowest to highest. If one analyzes the upper and lower halves of this ranking, in relation to ideological groupings, then we can observe the relationship shown in Table 7. Persons in the conventional group are "in the middle" (as in Figure 3), and therefore tend to seem closer to persons in both of the other two groups than do the latter to each other. The traditional group, as it appears in Figure 3, is the most isolated, as evidenced by the fact that all seven of its members had average rankings (as items, it will be recalled) in the bottom half of the sample.

TABLE 8. AVERAGE RANKINGS OF NON-RESPONDENTS, BY IDEOLOGICAL TYPES

Types*	Non-respondents				
	Lasswell	Jacob	Horn	Westin	Fellman
Behavioral	10.9	17.7	21.8	23.4	27.4
Conventional	17.2	9.2	20.0	18.3	24.9
Traditional	20.7	19.5	12.0	5.3	4.9

* See Fig. 3.

Another approach to these data is to consider the rankings, *of* each of the non-respondents and *by* each of the respondents, by ideological groups. As before, we are precluded from reporting the raw data, but we can report the averages, after describing more precisely how they were derived. A new data matrix was established, with five columns (one for each of the non-respondents.) The twenty-five respondents who fit the types then were listed in column to designate the rows of the matrix. The respondents were grouped exactly as they appear in Figure 3: first the seven behavioralists, and an extra row in which to accumulate totals and averages for them; then, similarly, the eleven conventionalists; and then the seven traditionalists. The cell entries were the ranks assigned, in their responses to Question 1, by each respondent to each non-respondent. Thus, there were a total of 125 cells, grouped into fifteen subcolumns. There were only five double zero entries in the entire matrix, which suggests that the visibility of these five non-respondents was excellent, albeit their accessibility was poor. These five omitted ranks occasioned no problem for the analysis, which is based upon the average rankings for each of the fifteen subcolumns (*i.e.*, for each non-respondent by each ideological group). The resulting data are reported in Table 8.

The pattern of consistency seems very high; the only intransitivity in the Table is the slight difference by which Horn's average ranking, by the conventional group, exceeds Westin's. The table shows clearly that Fellman is ranked lowest (*i.e.*, perceived as being most exemplary of the type) by the traditionalists, followed by Westin and Horn. Jacob, on the other hand, is clearly preferred by the conventional group, and Lasswell is clearly preferred by the behavioralists. Indeed, it goes further: Fellman, Westin, and Horn are ranked least by the traditionalists, next by the conventionalists, and highest by (indicating they are perceived as being furthest away from) the behavioralists. This is just what we should expect, on the basis of Figure 3. Similarly, Jacob is ranked least by the conventionalists, next by the behavioralists, and highest by the traditionalists; and Lasswell is preferred most by the behavioralists, next by the conventionalists, and least by the traditionalists. All these findings are in perfect accord with the scale of preferences that we ought to expect from these three groups, for these five persons, assuming that Fellman, Westin, and Horn are consensually perceived *by all three groups* to be traditionalists, that Jacob is consensually perceived to be a conventionalist, and that Lasswell is consensually perceived to be a behavioralist. It does appear to be so; and my sampling assumption, which classified Horn with the conventional group, must be considered to have been erroneous.

VI. SUMMARY

The purpose of this investigation was to collect and analyze empirical evidence which would make it possible to test my a priori hypothesis about the structure and content of the approaches of different persons in the field of public law-judicial process-judicial behavior, to the study of their subject. The hypothesis is that there are three distinctive ideological standpoints, and that these ideological positions are commonly recognized, to the extent that a sample of persons chosen from the field would correspond to these standpoints.

The major findings are that there are three such ideological groupings: the traditional, the conventional, and the behavioral. Most persons in the sample identified with the latter two groups, which are much closer to each other than to the traditional group. Factor analysis suggested that the three groups are arrayed, in scalar order, upon two dimensions. The first is a major factor of academic liberalism and conservatism, which is concerned with *how* to do research, the scientific versus the philosophical approach. The second factor is empiricism versus rationalism, and it relates to *what* to study, the empirical field data of political action versus legal norms. The interpretation made of the position of the groups, in relation to these two factors, is that the traditional group consists of academic conservatives, who strongly favor the philosophical approach but who take no particular position on the second dimension. The conventional group consists of empiricists who strongly favor political analysis of judicial acts but are much more diverse and moderate in regard to methodology, and who therefore assume a more neutral position on the first dimension. The behavioral group strongly supports a scientific approach with systematic theory and explicitly quantitative methods, and favors, but is less strongly committed than is the conventional group to, the analysis of data based upon field observations. The sample did not include persons who strongly favored the rationalist position of legal norm study, and it was inferred that it would have been necessary to have included law school professors in the sample in order to have been likely to have obtained representation, in the study, for that point of view.

The analysis also showed that there is a close correspondence between persons' self-perceptions, and their perceptions of the ideological

positions of others working in the field—and this irrespective of whether the others are persons with whom the persons making the evaluation are in close agreement or in substantial disagreement about the proper approach to the augmentation of knowledge in the field. The close correspondence between the relationships that were hypothesized, and those that are observed on the basis of these field data, lead to the conclusion that there is a considerable degree of consensual understanding of the standpoints common to the field today; and that, in substantive terms, the conventional academic ideology is the modal one, the behavioral ideology is the most cohesive, and the traditional ideology is the least cohesive and most isolated.

So far as is known, there is no precedent for this study, and therefore no body of related knowledge to which comparisons might be made. It is tantalizing to speculate whether similar ideological groupings of persons—not necessarily, of course, in the same proportions as are suggested by this single sampling of this single field—would be observed in related subfields of political science. It would certainly be of interest if the three basic ideological types hold for the political science profession in general, and indeed, conceivably, for other of the social sciences as well. Further scientific research may make it possible either to confirm or to refute such conjectures, and should in either event help us to comprehend better how (and how much) our academic ideologies bias our professional inquiries.

APPENDIX A

November 22, 1965

Dear ————————:

I am writing to you in the hope that you will be willing to aid me in making an exploratory study of academic ideologies toward the study of judicial decision-making. An enclosure to this letter lists the other persons to whom I am writing at this time. I selected this group because of my assumption that (1) all of these persons know each other; (2) they represent collectively a variety of orientations toward adjudication; and (3) they all are sufficiently interested in contemporary pedagogical and research trends, in relation to adjudication processes, to want to participate.

The first enclosure (Fig. 1) suggests one possible hypothesis about the latent structure which underlies our disparate attitudinal similarities and differences. Although it is crude and doubtless much over-simplified, this model might be used as a basis for attempting to scale a set of respondents, or selections from among their writings. By making the present empirical investigation, I propose to substitute, for my own intuitions about our conjoint relationships in regard to the question of academic ideology, your own replies to the enclosed two questions.

The first question asks you to rank *yourself* as number 1 (indicating that you are in closest agreement with your own point of view), and to rank as last (*i.e.*, #32, if you rank all) the person whose approach is most different from your own. The others on the list should be ranked from 2–31, depending upon your perception of how closely the view of each toward the subject of adjudication processes is similar or dissimilar to your own. It will be much more helpful if you are able to rank everybody; if you feel that the list includes a person (or persons) whom you simply do not know, assign him (or them) the rank of #0.

The second question asks you to specify your own relative position on the perimeter of the circle depicted in Fig. 1. Using a clock metric, please specify as closely as you can a point that approximates "where you are." The sequence of academic disciplines which is apparent in the space between the two circles is intended only to be *suggestive* of the content of the three approaches, and *not* to specify directly positions on the perimeter. Therefore, you should orient yourself in relation to the three major approaches: the traditional at 6:00 o'clock, the conventional at 10:00 o'clock, and the behavioral at 2:00 o'clock. The hour hand of the imaginary clock is capable of denoting position to the nearest minute as well as marking the hours, and therefore you should feel free to make your designation either roughly (to the nearest hour) or more precisely as a point between two hour-loci.

It is possible that the replies to the first question could be used in a manner that might prove to be embarrassing to some individuals. There is no way of assuring that respondents will remain anonymous to the analyst, for the structure of the answers provides a quick identification. However, I will not publish nor otherwise reveal to any other person the individual responses to the first question; and the sample size is sufficiently small that I can code these raw data myself. We happen to have a recently debugged tau program for our computer, so I shall use it to calculate a matrix of rank correlation coefficients, which will measure the extent to which each pair of respondents agree in their evaluation of the psychological distance separating them from each other and from the other persons in the sample. *Only these correlation*

oefficients and measures based upon them (and explicitly *not* the individual sets of rankings) will be used and reported in the published analysis.

The replies to the second question will, of course, be reported; and I plan to compare the findings with those which result from the analysis of the first question. This will make it possible to compare self-perceptions with others' perceptions. Conclusions based thereon should contribute to a much better common understanding of whatever degree of cognitive structure may obtain in our orientations towards the substantive professional field in which we labor. It will then be possible to base our future discourse upon more valid and reliable knowledge than the idiosyncratic and unsystematized intuitions of individuals (including my own present intuitions).

With luck, I hope to be able to complete the analysis and write the research report early next winter, and then after revision (see below) to submit the ms. for possible publication in the *Law and Society Bulletin*, the new journal of the Law and Society Association, which is perhaps a particularly appropriate forum. At the bottom of the second enclosure you will note a place which you should check if you would like to have me send you a copy of the draft paper, thereby providing you with an opportunity to comment critically upon, and suggest revision in, the ms. before I do submit it for publication.

I have tried to include in the sample persons representing a variety of different points of view. It is of course my hope that everyone replies to both questions, so that the sample available for analysis does not become biased by either the over-representation or the under-representation of persons who represent any of the major perspectives which characterize our field today.

Please use the stamped and addressed envelope that is enclosed for your reply. Now that you have read the letter, only a few more minutes will be required to answer the two questions.

With my sincere appreciation,

Glendon Schubert

APPENDIX B

PLEASE RETURN THIS SHEET IN THE ENCLOSED REPLY ENVELOPE

QUESTION #1. Rank the following individuals from 1 to 32. Place the number "1" after your own name, the number "2" after the name of the person whose point of view (concerning how to study law, courts, and judges) is most similar to your own, and so on with the person whose viewpoint is most different from yours ranked last.

Abraham	____	Jacob	____	Nagel	____	Shapiro	____
Bartholomew	____	Horn	____	Peltason	____	Spaeth	____
Becker	____	Kort	____	Pritchett	____	Tanenhaus	____
Berns	____	Krislov	____	Roche	____	Tresolini	____
Chase	____	Lasswell	____	Rosenblum	____	Ulmer	____
Danelski	____	McCloskey	____	Schmidhauser	____	Vines	____
Fellman	____	Mendelson	____	Schubert	____	Vose	____
Grossman	____	Murphy	____	Scigliano	____	Westin	____

QUESTION #2. Your own position on the perimeter of Figure 1 is best approximated by a point at about ____:____ o'clock.

Check here __ if you would like to receive a copy of the draft of the report.

CAUSAL INFERENCES, CLOSED POPULATIONS, AND MEASURES OF ASSOCIATION*

HUBERT M. BLALOCK
University of North Carolina

Two of the most important traditions of quantitative research in sociology and social psychology are those of survey research and laboratory or field experiments. In the former, the explicit objective is usually that of generalizing to some specific population, whereas in the latter it is more often that of stating relationships among variables. These two objectives are not thought to be incompatible in any fundamental sense, but nevertheless we lack a clear understanding of their interrelationship.

One of the most frequent objections to laboratory experiments turns on the question of generalizability, or what Campbell and Stanley refer to as "external validity."[1] In essence, this question seems to reduce to at least two related problems: (1) that of representativeness or typicality, and (2) the possibility of interaction effects that vary with experimental conditions. In the first case, the concern would seem to be with central tendency and dispersion of single variables, that is, whether the means and standard deviations of variables in the experimental situation are sufficiently close to those of some larger population. The second involves the question of possible disturbing influences introduced into the experimental setting that produce nonadditive effects when combined with either the experimental variable or the premeasurement.[2] These same variables may of course be operative in larger populations. But presumably they take on different numerical values, with the result that one would infer different relationships between major independent and dependent variables in the two kinds of research settings.

* I am indebted to the National Science Foundation for support of this research.

[1] See especially Donald T. Campbell and Julien S. Stanley, "Experimental and Quasi-experimental Designs for Research on Teaching," in N. L. Gage (ed.), *Handbook of Research on Teaching* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963), pp. 171–246. See also Leslie Kish, "Some Statistical Problems in Research Design," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (1959), pp. 328–338.

[2] For a systematic discussion of the handling of various interaction effects in experimental designs see John A. Ross and Perry Smith, "Experimental Designs of the Single-Stimulus, All-or-Nothing Type," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (1965), pp. 68–80.

As a sociologist who is only superficially acquainted with trends and developments in quantitative behavioral political science, it is my impression that, with the exception of simulation studies, the overwhelming emphasis has been on stating generalizations appropriate to specific populations rather than stating general laws of political behavior. Consistent with this has been the frequent use of correlation coefficients as measures of degree of relationship, as contrasted with the use of unstandardized regression coefficients as measures of the *nature* and form of relationships appropriate for general structural equations representing causal laws. One reason for this emphasis on particular populations is perhaps that the kinds of populations dealt with by political scientists are often of more inherent descriptive or practical importance than many of the (usually smaller) populations sampled by sociologists. I shall return to this question in discussing the Miller-Stokes study of constituency influence.

The question of whether or not one is generalizing only to specific populations or attempting to state scientific laws has created considerable confusion in the sociological literature, and I hope that political scientists will be in a position to benefit from this confusion so as to by-pass controversies such as those concerning whether or not one should make tests of statistical significance when data for the entire population are available. The purpose of the present paper is to bring this general issue into sharper focus. In doing so, I shall take a position with which many political scientists will undoubtedly disagree.

Rather than taking as the ultimate objective the goal of generalizing to specific populations, I would maintain that it is preferable to attempt to state general laws that interrelate variables in terms of hypothetical "if-then" statements. These could be of the form, "If X changes by one unit under conditions A, B, and C, then Y should change by b_{yx} units." In effect, then, I would consider generalizations to populations as means rather then ends. But given the limitations imposed by most data collection techniques, it is often necessary to carry out studies on specific populations at a single point in time, or at most several points in time. If so, then what must one assume about these populations? Since no real populations will be completely isolated or "closed," what

kinds of assumptions concerning less than completely closed populations can realistically be made? And what bearing does this have on choice of measures of association? Let me first consider the question of the closure of populations.

CLOSED POPULATIONS AND CLOSED THEORETICAL SYSTEMS

A completely closed theoretical system would be one in which no variables have been omitted, and which (if mathematically formulated) would imply perfect mathematical functions with no stochastic or error terms. Obviously, such completely closed systems are impossible to find in the social sciences. Furthermore, our approximations to this ideal are not even close. The error terms one finds empirically are usually too large to be considered negligible. Therefore one is faced with the necessity of making assumptions about these errors and why they occur. Such assumptions will become quite complex whenever one is dealing with theoretical systems involving reciprocal causation, time lags, interaction terms, and the like.

Let us therefore confine our attention to simple recursive equations of the form:

$$X_1 = e_1$$
$$X_2 = b_{21}X_1 + e_2$$
$$X_3 = b_{31}X_1 + b_{32}X_2 + e_3$$
$$X_4 = b_{41}X_1 + b_{42}X_2 + b_{43}X_3 + e_4$$

One can show in this case that unbiased estimates of the regression coefficients can be obtained by assuming that the error terms in each equation are uncorrelated with each other and also with all of the *independent* variables that appear in their respective equations.[3] Thus e_2 is assumed uncorrelated with X_1 and also the remaining error terms e_i. Similarly, e_3 is unrelated to X_1 and X_2, and so forth.

What do these assumptions mean in terms of the behavior of outside variables not explicitly contained in the model? In brief, if one assumes that outside variables have a direct effect on *only one* of the explicit variables, then the assumptions can be met. Notice that an implicit variable might have an *indirect* effect on some variable through one of the remaining X_i without violating the assumptions. But if an implicit factor *directly* affects two or more explicit variables, then it will ordinarily be correlated with one of the independent variables in its equation, and the assumptions will not be met. If this is the case, least squares estimates will be biased, and one's inferences will be incorrect. Such a variable should be explicitly included in the system. At some point one must stop and make the simplifying assumption that all remaining implicit factors operate (in a major way) on only one explicit variable.

Analogously, a completely closed population is one which is subject to no outside influences including immigration or emigration. A completely closed theoretical system that implied a stable equilibrium could be tested in such a closed population by collecting data at a single point in time, provided it was assumed that stability had actually been reached.[4] But given that such completely closed populations can never be found empirically, the major problem seems to be that of specifying a satisfactory analogue to the imperfectly closed theoretical system that allows for error terms in the equations.

It seems to me that in order to state and test theoretical generalizations based on population data, one must assume that the lack of closure of the population does not violate the above assumptions regarding error terms.[5] That is, disturbances that systematically affect one variable should not affect the others in a major way. For example, migration factors that directly affect X_2 should not also affect X_1, nor should they affect X_3 or X_4 except through the operation of X_2. This means that migration processes (or other disturbances emanating from outside populations) should not affect *relationships* among the variables, though they may very well affect measures of central tendency or dispersion for *single* variables.

For example, individuals obviously migrate

[3] See Herman Wold and Lars Jureen, *Demand Analysis* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1953), Ch. 2.

[4] There will of course be numerous dynamic models all of which predict the same stability conditions. Ideally, theories should be formulated in dynamic terms in such a way that time enters in in an essential way (as in difference equations). The approach of "comparative statics" can then be used to study equilibrium conditions. For a very readable discussion of this question see William J. Baumol, *Economic Dynamics* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959). See also Paul A. Samuelson, *The Foundations of Economic Analysis* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1947); and Herbert A. Simon, *Models of Man* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1957), Chs. 6–8.

[5] Of course somewhat less restrictive assumptions concerning the error terms might be used. Whatever set of assumptions are used, however, it would seem necessary to assume that the population is "closed" in the sense of meeting these assumptions.

for economic reasons. Certain cities will have higher income or occupational levels than others, or may be more homogeneous economically than others. Individuals will of course also migrate for other reasons as well—to join relatives, or for cultural or recreational purposes. In many instances, however, it will be plausible to assume that these additional reasons are "idiosyncratic" and that, when aggregated, do not systematically distort relationships among variables. If, however, large numbers of persons move for *combinations* of reasons, then one's inferences regarding relationships among variables may very well be misleading. For example, suppose that high-income liberals move into communities containing large numbers of low-income conservatives (e.g., rural college communities). A study relating income to conservatism could lead to erroneous conclusions if based solely on this community.

I assume that many objections to "atypical" populations are based on this kind of concern about selective migration. Detroit is certainly not typical of metropolitan centers with respect to income distribution. Whether or not it is considered objectionable, from the standpoint of generalizations to other populations, however, would seem to depend on whether or not Detroit is peculiar with respect to combinations of characteristics of interest to the investigator. Ideally one should define the boundaries of his population in such a way that such selective migration (by several variables) is reduced to a minimum. Thus he might prefer to use an entire metropolitan area, rather than the central city, arguing that although migration *within* the metropolitan area may be selective, this will not be the case *between* such larger units. Had he used central cities, he might have found this assumption much less plausible. For example, high-income Negroes might be more likely to remain within the city, as might also be true for certain extremely high-status families (e.g., the "Proper Bostonians").

AN EXAMPLE: CONSTITUENCY INFLUENCE

Before proceeding with a rather general discussion of standardized and unstandardized coefficients, I should like to introduce as a concrete example the study of constituency influence in Congress by Miller and Stokes.[6] The authors give correlational data based on a sample of 116 congressional districts and then interpret these data in terms of a causal model as indicated in Figure 1. The direction of influence between the representative's attitudes and his *perceptions* of the constituency's attitudes is left unspecified, though the authors discuss the implications of the two limiting models in




FIG. 1.

which the one or the other of the two arrows is erased. Cnudde and McCrone suggest some possible revisions of this model, based on the magnitudes of the coefficients.[7] In particular, they suggest that the data are compatible with a model in which (1) the arrow from constituency's attitude to representative's attitude is erased, and (2) it is assumed that the representative's perception affects his own attitudes, rather than vice versa. There is no need, here, to concern ourselves with this particular substantive issue.

The basic problem with which Miller and Stokes deal is that of measuring the relative importance of the two major paths from constituency's attitude to roll-call behavior. In the case of civil rights they conclude that the path via the representative's perceptions is more important than that via the representative's own attitudes. The measures they display in the paper are correlation coefficients, but they also make use of path coefficients (which will be discussed below). The conclusion reached is that in the case of civil rights roll-call behavior, and the least favorable assumptions regarding the importance of the representative's perceptions, the path via perceptions accounts for more than twice as much of the variance as does the path involving the representatives' own attitudes.

This is an excellent example of a study in which there is inherent interest in generalizing to a single population, since there is only one U. S. House of Representatives. Once inferences have been made from the sample of 116 districts to this total population, one might then take the position that there is no point in attempting to formulate more general "laws"

[6] Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), pp. 45–56.

[7] Charles F. Cnudde and Donald J. McCrone, "The Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Congressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model," this REVIEW, 60 (1966), pp. 66–72.

of constituency influence. But there are a number of respects in which the data are not completely general. First, only a sample of political issues could be studied. Second, the study is obviously time-bound, and it might be desirable to compare results (for these same issues) over a period of time in order to ascertain whether or not the basic processes have remained unaltered. Third, one might wish to compare these results with those of legislative bodies in other countries. Had the Miller-Stokes data pertained to legislative behavior within a single state, then one would obviously be interested in comparing results across states. For example, one might determine whether the coefficients for Southern and Northern states were similar with respect to civil rights issues. If different with respect to civil rights, they might be similar with respect to other issue areas. These types of problems require one to formulate propositions more abstractly than in terms of specific populations and periods of time.

The question of the possible lack of closure of a population may not be as relevant for this type of substantive problem as would be the case in voting behavior studies. Legislative bodies are closed at least in the sense that, with minor exceptions, persons are elected for specified periods of time and do not migrate into and out of such "populations." In developing measures of constituency attitudes, one likewise need not be too concerned about lack of closure since presumably representatives are concerned about the makeup of *present* constituencies, and ordinarily assume that the distribution of attitudes will not be modified in any major way by migration. Each constituency, however, will be influenced by neighboring districts, and it will undoubtedly be necessary to make simplifying assumptions about how this influence process affects the closure of these smaller units.

With this example in mind, let us return to the question of one's choice of appropriate measures. I shall then comment briefly on why I believe that unstandardized measures would be more suitable for certain purposes for which the Miller-Stokes type of data might be used.

STANDARDIZED VERSUS UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS

The method of "path coefficients" or "dependence coefficients" has been recommended as an important methodological tool for measuring the relative contributions to associations between pairs of variables in multivariate analyses. Raymond Boudon implies that sociologists may have failed to use such coefficients because of a certain confusion over the meaning of regression coefficients in simultaneous equations, and also because of the identification problems that may arise.[8] It is important, however, to be well aware of the major differences between standardized measures, such as correlation and path coefficients, and unstandardized regression coefficients. The former seem most appropriate for describing relationships in particular populations; the latter for comparing populations or stating general laws.[9]

It is instructive to examine the relationship between correlation and regression coefficients by conceiving of the numerical value of a correlation coefficient as a dependent variable, being a function of (1) the causal law connecting two (or more) variables, and (2) the relative amounts of variation that happen to exist in any particular population or that may be induced in experimental manipulations. Making the assumptions necessary for least squares, we may write

$$r_{xy} = b_{yx}\left(\frac{s_x}{s_y}\right)$$

Let us assume that the sample size is sufficiently large that we can ignore sampling error. Similar expressions can be written in the case of three or more variables; for example:

$$r_{xy \cdot w} = b_{yx \cdot w}\left(\frac{s_x}{s_y}\frac{\sqrt{1 - r^2_{xw}}}{\sqrt{1 - r^2_{yw}}}\right)$$

I shall confine the discussion to the simple two-variable case, as the extension is straightforward.

The coefficient b_{yx} (or $b_{yx \cdot w}$) represents the change in Y produced by a unit change in X and is appropriate for use in a general statement of a causal law.[10] Such a law is expressed

[8] Raymond Boudon, "A Method of Linear Causal Analysis: Dependence Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (1965), pp. 365–374. See also Sewall Wright, "Path Coefficients and Path Regressions: Alternative or Complementary Concepts?," *Biometrics*, 16 (1960), pp. 189–202; and Dudley Duncan, "Path Analysis: Sociological Examples," *American Journal of Sociology*, 72 (1966), pp. 1–16.

[9] This position is basically similar to that taken by John W. Tukey in "Causation, Regression, and Path Analysis," in Oscar Kempthorne *et. al.* (eds.), *Statistics and Mathematics in Biology* (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State College Press, 1954), Chap. 3.


[10] The numerical value of b_{yx} is of course also affected by one's choice of units of measurement. Unlike the expression s_x/s_y, however, these units

in the hypothetical "if-then" form. There is no assertion that X has changed, or will change, by a given amount. But in order to apply or test such a law one must deal with specific populations or manipulations in particular experiments. The factor s_x/s_y, or its extensions in the multivariate case, involves *actual* variations in X and Y. Assuming that there are no measurement errors in either variable, we would presume that variation in X (e.g., constituency attitudes) is produced by factors not explicitly considered, and that variation in Y is jointly affected by X plus additional factors left out of the theoretical system. Least squares procedures will give unbiased estimates of the true regression coefficients in causal laws only if certain assumptions are met concerning the effect of variables left out.[11] Ordinarily, however, one is in no theoretical position to specify a priori the *amount* of actual variation produced by omitted factors in real populations. In the case of populations that are not completely closed, the existence of migration makes such assumptions even less plausible.

Thus the amount of variation in X relative to variation in Y produced by factors not considered may be taken as "accidental" from the point of view of one's theory. Of course one may take X as itself being determined by other variables, in which case variation in X may also be partly explained. But we are here considering X as "exogenous," and it is of course necessary to have some such exogenous variables in one's theoretical system. These are the "givens" that the theorist makes no effort to explain. In terms of the coefficients, he cannot account for the numerical values of the variance in exogenous variables. In this sense they are taken as accidental, and are unique to each population even where the same causal laws are operative on all populations.

Let me illustrate with a simple example. Suppose one finds stronger correlations between constituency's and representative's attitudes in the North than is true in the South. It is quite conceivable that the same laws are operative, giving the same values of b_{yx} in each region. Yet there may be more variation in constituency's attitudes in the North, and if extraneous factors operated to the same extent in both regions this would account for the larger correlation. Fortunately, the amount of variation in X can be measured and the regions compared in this respect. But uncontrolled and unknown disturbing influences cannot, and one would have no way of determining whether or not these also varied more in the North than in the South. It would therefore be more meaningful to compare the slope estimates than the respective correlations.

The same basic issues concerning standardization arise in the case of more complex causal models. As Miller and Stokes have noted, the method of path coefficients provides a simple and useful way of representing a total correlation between any two variables as a function of the causal paths that connect them. Consider, for example, the following model:



Letting p_{ij} represent the path coefficient from X_j to X_i, we can write down expressions for each of the r_{ij}. For example:

$$r_{23} = p_{21}p_{31}$$

and

$$r_{14} = p_{21}p_{43} + p_{31}p_{43}$$

These expressions can either be derived algebraically, as indicated in Boudon's paper, or they can be obtained directly by following certain rules or "algorithms" for tracing paths. The latter method has more intuitive appeal, and is easier to apply in simple models, but may lead one astray in more complex situations. The general rule is that one can trace paths by proceeding backward and then forward, or forward only, but it is not legitimate to move forward and *then* backward. Thus in the case of the paths between X_2 and X_3, one finds a path through X_1 (going back against the direction of

---

of measurement are interrelated by purely a priori or definitional operations (e.g., 100 pennies = one dollar). It is true, as McGinnis notes, that one can transform r_{xy} into b_{yx} by multiplying by a simple scalar quantity. It does not follow, however, that correlation and regression coefficients are essentially interchangeable as McGinnis implies. For this scalar quantity s_y/s_x is a function of standard deviations peculiar to each population. A reader who is given only the correlation coefficient is therefore likely to be misled in interpreting results of comparative studies. For a further discussion of this point see H. M. Blalock, *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), Ch. 4. See also Robert McGinnis, "Review of *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research*," *Social Forces*, 44 (1966), pp. 584–586.

[11] In particular, one must assume that the error terms in each equation have zero means and are uncorrelated with each other and with any of the independent variables that appear in their respective equations.

the arrow, and then forward), but *not* through their common effect X_4 (which would require going forward and then back).

One can then attribute a certain proportion of the total correlation to each component path, thereby obtaining a measure of the relative contribution of each variable to this correlation. But why take the *correlation* between two variables as something to be explained? According to my previous argument, this should be a function of variation in exogenous variables peculiar to particular populations. Breaking up a correlation coefficient into component parts would seem to require that these parts, themselves, be peculiar to the population. This is in fact the case, as can be seen from the definition of a path coefficient.

A path coefficient p_{ij} is defined as the ratio of two quantities. The standard deviation in the dependent variable X_i is in the denominator. The numerator is essentially an adjusted standard deviation, being the standard deviation in X_i that would result if X_j retained the same amount of variation, but if all other causes of X_i (direct and indirect) remained constant. In symbols:

$$p_{ij} = \frac{s_{i \cdot j}}{s_i}$$

where $s_{i \cdot j}$ represents the standard deviation in X_i that can be attributed to X_j, with the other variables held constant. It is possible, therefore, that a path coefficient can take on a value greater than unity, though this is not likely in most realistic examples.

Notice that this definition of path coefficients, from which the simple algebraic relationships with correlations can be derived, involves a combination of the hypothetical and the real. On the one hand, the *actual* variations in both X_j and X_i are accepted as givens. On the other, we are asked to imagine what would happen if the remaining variables were held constant. This mixture of real and hypothetical poses some interesting questions. How, for example, would one retain the same variation in X_3, while holding constant X_1 which is one of its causes? To do so would require one to manipulate some *other* cause of X_3 not included in the model. It is of course possible to imagine experiments in which this could be accomplished. The real question, it seems, is: "Why combine these hypothetical manipulations with the actual variations peculiar to a given population?" Put another way, if one were interested in controlling some of the variables, why would he insist that the independent variable under study retain the same amount of variation? This might make sense if the so-called independent variables were not themselves causally interrelated, but the rationale seems to be less clearcut in more complex situations.[12]

Unstandardized regression coefficients provide direct answers to the kind of hypothetical question that I believe to be more appropriate. For example, one could ask what would be the expected change in X_4 produced by a unit change in X_1, given that X_1 affects both X_2 and X_3, and assuming that outside factors produce only random variation. Suppose, for example, that a unit change in X_1 will increase X_2 by three units, and decrease X_3 by four units. Suppose also that unit increases in X_2 and X_3 will increase X_4 by two and four units respectively. Then an increase of one unit in X_1 should increase Z_4 by $3(2) = 6$ units via X_2 and change X_4 by $(-4)\ (4) = -16$ units via X_3. The total expected change would then be ten units in the negative direction.

Notice that nothing is being said here about actual changes in a given population. The population data are used to *estimate* the regression coefficients, but the formulation is purely hypothetical. I have used a simple numerical example for illustrative purposes, but the general procedure is quite straightforward *provided* one assumes one-way causation and no feedback, plus the usual least squares assumptions regarding error terms. Turner and Stevens provide both an algebraic procedure and an algorithm for tracing paths similar to that given by Wright for the standardized path coefficients.[13]

Returning to the Miller-Stokes data, the reason why the path via the representative's perception was found to explain more than twice as much of the variance as the other

[12] If interest is in generalizing to a population, it might make more sense to use a measure that does not involve any hypothetical manipulations. One may of course break down $R^2_{4.124}$ into the components r^2_{14}, $r^2_{24.1}$ $(1-r^2_{14})$, and $r^2_{34.12}(1-R^2_{4.12})$. Since x_1, x_2, and x_3 are intercorrelated, these components cannot be directly associated with these variables. However, the exogenous causes of the X_i are assumed orthogonal in the case of simple least squares, and therefore one may—if he wishes—link the above components of $R^2_{4.123}$ with the respective error terms, given these assumptions about the causal ordering of x_1, x_2, and x_3. This of course raises the question of why one would want to associate components with exogenous variables that have not been included in the theoretical system.

[13] Malcolm E. Turner and Charles D. Stevens, "The Regression Analysis of Causal Paths," *Biometrics*, 15 (1959), pp. 236–258.

major path was that the correlation between constituency's attitude and perception was .63, whereas that between constituency's and representative's attitudes was only .39. The correlations between the two intervening variables and roll-call behavior were almost identical (being .82 and .77 respectively). Let us rule out the possibility of sampling error and assume that these correlations adequately describe the magnitudes of the relationships for this particular population, at this given time (1958), for civil rights issues.

Suppose, now, that additional data were available for other populations, time periods, or issues. To be specific, suppose one wished to compare the Miller-Stokes results with those for several different periods of time, posing the question as to whether or not basic changes in influence processes were occurring. As noted above, it is entirely possible that the basic laws, as measured by slopes, would remain unchanged whereas the relative magnitudes of the correlations could be altered. In the case of constituency attitudes, which are the starting points for both paths, an increase in the variance would be expected to increase *both* correlations with the two intervening variables. But it is quite possible that outside or exogenous factors affecting the representative's attitudes might produce a smaller variance in subsequent periods, though they might continue to create essentially random disturbances. If so, the correlation between constituency's attitude and representative's attitude would increase, perhaps to a level comparable to that between constituency's attitude and representative's perception. With reduced variation in representative's attitude, the correlation between this variable and roll-call behavior might also decrease, again with no basic changes in the slope coefficients.

The general point, of course, is that both the simpler correlation coefficients and more complex path coefficients are functions of the nature of the underlying processes *and* the relative magnitudes of disturbance terms. As long as one is dealing with a single set of data—as is true with respect to the Miller-Stokes example—the use of path coefficients will not be misleading. When one is interested in making comparisons, however, he should become sensitized to the differences between the two types of measures.

CONCLUSIONS

I suspect that one reason why both standardized and unstandardized regression coefficients have not found favor with sociologists and political scientists is a general reluctance to work with interval-scale assumptions and an understandable resistance to committing oneself to specific causal models. I would hope that we will begin to move more and more in these directions. In doing so, however, we must keep clearly in mind the distinction between working with causal laws and unstandardized coefficients, and attempting to measure relative importance of variables in specific populations. We must recognize that relative importance cannot be evaluated in the abstract: the contribution of each factor to the total variation in a dependent variable is a function of how much the various independent variables happen to vary in that given population. Since I am arguing against the advisability of generalizing to populations, at least as an ultimate objective, I must also argue that we would not be interested in these standardized measures except for descriptive or practical purposes.

Tukey has taken essentially the same position and has recommended working with unstandardized coefficients.[14] Wright has pointed out that, like the ordinary correlation coefficients, standardized path coefficients have much simpler properties than the unstandardized measures.[15] I would agree with Tukey, however, who suggests that the price of simplicity may be too high. It would seem preferable to make use of unstandardized coefficients that have some chance of being invariant from one population to the next, rather than measures that have admittedly simpler descriptive properties.

[14] Tukey, *op. cit.*

[15] Wright, *op. cit.*

POLITICIANS' BELIEFS ABOUT VOTERS*

JOHN W. KINGDON
University of Michigan

The pattern of communications between representatives and constituents has become a matter of central concern to many students of legislative behavior. As Lewis A. Dexter points out, the statement that a Congressman "represents" his district is only shorthand for the fact that the Congressman "represents his image of the district or of his constituents." This image is established, according to Dexter, by the communications between representative and constituents: "what he hears from the district as he interprets it."[1] Miller and Stokes explore directly Congressmen's images of their constituents' opinions.[2] The representative's image of his district is significant because it may constitute part of the explanation for various important types of behavior, such as his roll call voting, the stands he takes on issues of public policy, and the formulation of his campaign strategies.

A portion of a representative's image of his district is composed of his beliefs about voters, his explicit or implicit theory of voting behavior. Because his position is contingent upon the approval of a majority of voters in an election, he is likely to consider at least to some degree the effect that various of his decisions might have on election outcomes. In making such judgments, the representative probably makes some assumptions, conscious or not, about the manner in which voters make their choices. If he believes, for example, that voters pay close attention to his actions, he probably feels more constrained by his district's likely opinions than if he does not hold that belief.[3] Thus his beliefs about voters may be an important part of his image of his district, which in turn affects his important decisions on roll-

* I am indebted to many for helpful comments, among them Ralph Huitt, Austin Ranney, Leon Epstein, Philip Converse, Donald Stokes, Warren Miller, and Jack Walker.

[1] Lewis Anthony Dexter, "The Representative and his District," *Human Organization*, 16 (1957), pp. 2–13.

[2] Part of this research is reported in Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), pp. 45–56.

[3] Fortunately, data are available which can be easily adapted to indicate the importance of these beliefs about voters. In 1958, the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan collected data designed to explore the subject of the relations between Congressmen and their constituents. In each of 116 congressional districts, the incumbent Congressman, his general election opponent, and a sample of voters were interviewed. Some of the findings, methodological considerations, and procedures have already been reported in Miller and Stokes, *op. cit.*

A secondary analysis of these data suggests that Congressmen who believe that their constituents are interested in and informed about issues of governmental policy are more likely to reflect constituency attitudes in their voting in Congress than those who believe that their constituents are less politically aware. When one separates Congressmen into two groups, those who perceive a relatively high degree of voter interest in issues and those who perceive relatively low voter interest, according to their answers to the question, "How many people would you say there are in your district who are really interested and who keep up-to-date on issues like those we've talked about?", the Pearsonian product-moment correlation between constituency attitudes on social welfare policies and the Congressmen's roll call votes on these policies is .32 for those with a low estimate of voter interest in issues and .60 for those with a high estimate of voter interest. If one considers only the majority element in the constituency rather than the whole constituency, the correlation between the majority element's attitude and roll call vote for those with a low estimate of voter interest is .57; for those with a high estimate of voter interest, .87.

The same picture emerges when Congressmen are again divided into two groups on the question, "How much do you think the people of your district know about your stands on issues like those we've talked about?" The correlation between the whole constituency's attitude and roll calls on social welfare measures for those with a low estimate of voter knowledge of incumbent's stands is .34; for those with a high estimate, .59. The correlations between the majority element in the constituency and roll call for those with a low estimate is .56; for those with a high estimate, .94. Even though the figures may somewhat overestimate the strength of the relationships, due to the effect of a correction introduced for the small samples of constituents, comparison of Congressmen with high estimates of voter awareness with

calls policy stands, campaigns, and the like. This paper, part of a larger study, investigates politicians' beliefs about voters, their theories of voting behavior.

Politicians' beliefs about voters have been considered important for another reason: they may account for the campaign strategies which candidates adopt and perhaps for the success of these strategies in winning votes. Ranney and Kendall maintain that politicians base their campaigns on "reflective analysis of past experience, i.e. theory," their theory of how to win votes.[4] After each election, there is much commentary which suggests that the successful candidate in the election had a theory of voting behavior different from that held by the loser. The unsuccessful candidate, the argument runs, lost because he made several crucial mistakes, many of them involving his judgments about voters. We are told, for example, that Adlai Stevenson apparently overestimated the degree to which voters were interested in the issues he was discussing. Again, the study of the 1964 election by Converse, Clausen, and Miller states that Barry Goldwater's campaign "assumed an electorate with near-total ideological comprehension and sensitivity," that his actions were based on "a sort of chronic miscalculation of electoral reality."[5] A comparison of winners' and losers' beliefs about voters, therefore, might prove fruitful in terms of explaining campaign strategy and even some election outcomes.

This paper first considers the differences between the beliefs of winning and losing candidates for public elective office. The concluding sections then outline alternative explanations for the results and suggest several theoretical implications of the findings.

METHOD

In this study, a portion of which is reported in this paper, structured interviews were conducted with a sample of successful and unsuccessful Wisconsin candidates in the 1964 election[6] for offices ranging from U.S. Senator and Governor to the lower house of the state legislature.

The sample. Districts in Wisconsin, rather than individual candidates, were sampled, and the winning and losing candidate in each chosen district was included in the sample. A census was taken of the candidates for U.S. Senator, U.S. Congressman, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, State Treasurer, and State Attorney General. The other half of the sample was composed of candidates for the state legislature (Senate and Assembly) drawn on a probability basis at the ratio of one to eight in order to equal the number of candidates for the "higher-level" offices mentioned above. This sub-sample of state legislative districts was stratified by area of the state, which approximates a stratification by population density, since the South-east part of Wisconsin is more densely populated than the rest of the state.

TABLE 1. THE COMPOSITION OF THE SAMPLE

	Districts	Individuals
U. S. Senator	2	4
U. S. Congressman	10	20
State-wide offices	5	10
State Senate	4	8
State Assembly	12	24
Totals	33	66

A summary statement of the sample appears in Table 1. The total of 66 possible candidates was eventually reduced by four. Two of the Assembly candidates had no opponents, and two of the state-wide candidates refused to grant an interview, which resulted in a 97% rate of return. In order to test and revise the interview schedule before it was used in the production interviewing of the 62 candidates in the sample, eight pretest respondents were also interviewed.

The interview. A structured interview was used in this research, with the same questions asked of each respondent in the same order. The most significant advantage of this technique is that it enables the researcher to compare one respondent with another with some degree of assurance that their responses were elicited by the same stimulus. The cost of such

those with low estimates still decidedly suggests that a politician's theory of voting behavior does influence his decisions on matters of public policy to an important degree.

I am indebted to Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, the directors of the project, for the use of these data.

[4] Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956) pp. 340–344.

[5] Philip E. Converse, Aage R. Clausen, and Warren E. Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election," this REVIEW, 59 (1965), pp. 332 and 335.

[6] In two districts with terms longer than two years, the 1962 candidates were chosen.

a method in terms of inability to explore interesting tangents and the like was recognized and deliberately paid, in order to obtain comparable and complete answers to all the questions of interest.

Respondents were interviewed during the months of March and April of 1965, about five months after the election. This period of time allowed the candidates to reflect a bit on the election, while not being so distant from the event that recall would be drastically impaired. The timing of the interviews, however, renders statements about the pre-election beliefs of the respondents tenuous, as will be evident below. Most respondents were extremely generous with their time, and the mean length of interview was one hour.

FINDINGS

The questions asked the respondents were formulated with survey research studies' conclusions about voting behavior in mind. These studies have discovered that a relatively small proportion of voters are highly interested in and informed about politics, so respondents were asked to indicate how politically interested and informed they thought voters are.[7] The voting studies have also identified a number of variables which influence voters' choices, including relatively static ones which are stable over time, like party identification, and relatively dynamic ones which change from election to election, like the voters' attitudes toward the candidates and the issues of a particular election.[8] Questions concerning these variables were structured according to the analysis in *The Voter Decides*, where the authors identify three variables which heavily influence voters' choices: party identification, issue partisanship, and candidate orientation. Respondents were therefore asked to assess the importance of party, issues, and candidates.

Politicians in the sample were first asked to rate and rank the importance of the three variables which influence voters' decisions. Table 2 gives the rating made by winners and losers on each of the three. Both winners and losers downgrade issues and upgrade personal characteristics to some extent. But the unsuccessful candidates heavily emphasize the importance of party label, while decidedly downgrading the importance of issues of the election as determinants of voters' choices. Winners, on the other hand, while splitting roughly equally on party label and issues, tend to believe that their own personal characteristics are very important influences on voters' behavior. To characterize what may be their patterns of thought, the winners tend to believe more than the losers

[7] The exact phrasing of questions appears in footnotes to the tables.

[8] For the survey studies on these points, see Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954); Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960); and Angus Campbell and Donald E. Stokes, "Partisan Attitudes and the Presidential Vote," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Broadbeck, *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959).

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF WINNERS AND LOSERS ON THE IMPORTANCE THEY ATTACH TO PARTY, ISSUES, AND CANDIDATES[a]

Importance	Party		Issues		Candidates	
	Winners	Losers	Winners	Losers	Winners	Losers
All or very important	44%	80%	42%	27%	84%	63%
Of some, little, or no importance	56	20	58	73	16	37
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	32	30	31	30	32	30

[a] Respondents were handed a response card with party identification, issue orientation, and candidate orientation stated in layman's English at the top of the card: "Party label, issues of the election, personal characteristics of the candidates." The following evaluational categories were at the bottom of the card: "All important, very important, of some importance, of little importance, not important." Respondents were then asked the following question: "Consider the three factors at the top of this card. Would you tell me how important each of these is in determining the choice of the voters? You can use the categories at the bottom of the card."

that the voters in their district decided how to cast their ballots not by blind party voting, but according to the issues of the election and the man who was seeking the office. They tend more than the losers to congratulate the electorate for deciding on the "right" bases because, after all, the electorate made the right choice. Relative to the winners, on the other hand, the unsuccessful candidates blame the electorate for their loss by emphasizing the importance of the party label, and by downgrading the importance of issues and the candidates. They deprecate the electorate's decision because, after all, it was not the wise decision.

The same conclusion emerges from the respondents' ranking of the three factors. Each respondent was asked to rank party label, issues of the election, and personal characteristics of the candidates in order of importance in determining the ways voters cast their ballots. Table 3 shows how many winners and losers ranked each of the three factors as first in importance and how many ranked each of them as least important. Again, winners tend to place great emphasis on their own personal characteristics as determinants of voters' decisions and to assign party label a relatively low place. By comparison, losers tend to upgrade party label and downgrade the personal characteristics of the candidates. While both groups tend to place little emphasis on issues, the winners tend more than the losers to congratulate the electorate for "voting for the man," while the losers tend more than the winners to blame the electorate for "blindly voting for party labels."

TABLE 3. COMPARISON OF WINNERS AND LOSERS ON THE RANK WHICH THEY ASSIGN TO PARTY LABEL, ISSUES AND CANDIDATES' CHARACTERISTICS[a]

Variable	Most Important		Least Important	
	Winners	Losers	Winners	Losers
Party Label	21%	59%	47%	17%
Election Issues	17	7	50	55
Characteristics of the Candidates	62	35	3	28
	100%	101%[b]	100%	100%
N	29	29	30	29

[a] The response card outlined in the footnote to Table 2 was again used. The question: "If you were to rank the three factors, which would you say is most important in determining the choice voters will make? Which is second?"

[b] Rounding error.

A breakdown of the successful candidates indicates that the congratulation effect shown in the figures on the importance of party and issues in Table 2 and the "least important" ranking in Table 3 is actually due to the beliefs of the marginal winners, those who won by under 55 per cent of the two-party vote. While "safe" winners tend to stress the importance of party label and downgrade the importance of issues in approximately the same proportions as both marginal and decisive losers, two-thirds of the marginal winners think that issues are all or very important and that party label ranks last in importance, while 80 per cent of them rate party label as of some, little, or no importance. But regardless of the decisiveness of the win or loss, both types of winners still tend to rate the personal characteristics of the candidates as more important than losers do (Table 2), and also tend to rank personal characteristics of the candidates as the most important of the three variables while losers rank party label as the most important (Table 3). These differences between marginal and decisive winners are especially accentuated in the case of successful candidates for the state legislature.

It seems evident that marginal winners in some instances are making judgments not about the motivations of voters in general, but rather about the sorts of variables which are thought to influence votes at the margin where they are of crucial importance. Because their districts tend to be evenly balanced between the parties, issues are thought to be of great importance and party identification of less importance because it has less effect on "swing" votes in the middle. The safe winners, on the other hand, probably because their districts obviously favor one party or the other, emphasize the importance of party label.

Respondents were also asked how interested in their campaigns and how informed about the issues of the election they thought voters were. The results of the comparisons between successful and unsuccessful candidates[9] appear in Table 4. The cross-tabulation on information is clearly another case of the congratulation-rationalization effect. Losers are inclined very strongly to believe that voters are not informed about the issues of the election, while winners tend to believe that voters are much better informed. A full quarter of the winners even think that voters are very well informed about the issues, most of these being safe winners. Differences between successful and unsuccessful candidates are especially pronounced at the state-wide and federal levels, as opposed to the state legislative level.

[9] The decisiveness of the win or loss has no substantial impact on these results, except where noted.

TABLE 4. COMPARISON OF WINNERS' AND LOSERS' BELIEFS ABOUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH VOTERS ARE POLITICALLY INTERESTED AND INFORMED[a]

Degree	Interested		Informed	
	Winners	Losers	Winners	Losers
Very	32%	43%	26%	3%
Some	42	20	42	27
Not	26	37	32	70
	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	31	30	31	30

[a] The question: "Generally speaking, would you say that voters in your district are interested in your campaign, or not?" If the respondent said they were interested, "Would you say they're *very* interested?" About information: "Do you think that voters in your district are informed about the way the candidates stand on the issues of the election, or not?" If informed, "Are they *very* well informed?"

The picture in the case of voters' interest in the campaign is less clear. Winners tend to believe that voters are somewhat interested in their campaigns and losers tend to believe that voters are either not interested or very interested. Most of those losers who believe that voters are very interested in their campaigns have never held any public elective office. This finding may be due to the tendency on the part of some inexperienced unsuccessful candidates particularly for the state legislature to believe that they did accomplish at least one thing: they got people interested, and at least feel the satisfaction of having aroused the electorate.

It is interesting to observe the congratulation-rationalization effect *within* the same politicians as well as between winners and losers, making the effect intra-individual as well as inter-individual. Respondents were asked to summarize the major factors which led to their wins and defeats over the years. As Table 5 shows, respondents attributed their wins to factors under their own control: their hard work, personal service to constituents, matters of campaign strategy, building a reputation, and publicizing themselves and becoming known thereby. Respondents attributed their losses, on the other hand, to factors beyond their control: the party makeup of the district, the familiar name or other unbeatable characteristics of their opponent, national and state trends, lack of money, or other uncontrollable circumstances. It was a comparatively

TABLE 5. RESPONDENTS' BELIEFS ABOUT THE MAJOR FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THEIR WINS AND DEFEATS[a]

Factors	Wins	Defeats
Factors beyond R's control	25%	91%
Factors within R's control	75	9
	100%	100%
N	40[b]	44[b]

[a] The question: "Could you summarize the major factors that have contributed to your wins and defeats over the years?"

[b] The total number is lower than the sample size of 62 because many respondents either had never won or had never lost.

rare respondent who would attribute his wins to his good political name, for instance, or to the predominance of his party in his district, and respondents rarely attributed their defeats to their laziness, their failure to service constituents, their mistakes in campaign strategy, and the like.

It is possible that the type of office sought by the candidate might be relevant—that those who ran for the state legislature might have different beliefs about voters from those who ran for state-wide or federal offices. Respondents were therefore divided into two groups: those who had run for the state legislature and those who had run for higher-level offices, including U.S. Senate, U.S. House of Representatives, Governor, and the other state-wide elective offices.

Type of office sought has no substantial effect on the basic congratulation-rationalization effect reported above. Winners differ from losers in the manner described at both the higher level and the state legislative level. But when the winners at the higher level are compared to the winners at the state legislative level and the losers at the two levels are also compared, some differences between the two levels emerge. In general, party label is believed to be more important and issues less important at the state legislative level than at the higher level.[10] Winners at the higher level also

[10] The proportion of state legislative winners saying that party label is all or very important is 56%; the same proportion of higher-level winners is 31%. The proportions of winners saying that issues are all or very important are: legislative—33%; higher level—50%.

believe that voters are more politically interested and informed than do winners at the legislative level.[11] But the congratulation-rationalization effect is still noticeable at both levels.

EXPLANATIONS

The research reported here has discovered that winning and losing candidates have divergent beliefs about the behavior of voters, the winners believing that voters are more informed, more issue- and candidate-oriented and less party-oriented than the losers do. In some cases, these differences between winners and losers are especially pronounced in competitive districts.

The findings have been explained in terms of a "congratulation-rationalization effect." To state this explanation more fully here, I have maintained that winners develop complimentary beliefs about voters and losers develop rationalizations for their losses simply by virtue of the outcome of the election. Winners, the argument runs, believe the voters did a good job of choosing. Voters in their view are well informed about politics and vote according to the issues and the candidates, rather than blindly following their party affiliation. Losers, on the other hand, rationalize their defeat by saying that voters are ill-informed and vote according to party label rather than the issues or the men who are running for office. Both winners and losers, in other words, rearrange their cognitions about voters to take account of the outcome of the election, winners congratulating the voters and losers rationalizing their defeat. This might be expected to occur to some extent even before election day, since some candidates probably anticipate the outcome. This congratulation-rationalization effect can be conceived as a mechanism for reducing the cognitive dissonance between beliefs about voters and election outcome.[12]

Alternative explanations for the findings are available. The belief that voters are interested in and informed about politics and vote on the basis of the issues of the election, for example, is probably a socially acceptable belief in the American culture. Incumbent office-holders, therefore, may feel somewhat obliged to hold the "correct" beliefs, while the losers, because they may not confront the prospect of facing the voters in subsequent elections, may not feel similarly bound. This explanation does not simply dismiss the findings as the incumbents' conscious distortions of their beliefs for the benefit of the interviewer. This sort of conscious deception seems unlikely, since the respondents were assured of their anonymity and the questions were not particularly sensitive. This alternative explanation instead maintains that unsuccessful candidates have in a sense been rejected by their society, and therefore no longer feel obliged to give the socially acceptable response.

Another alternative may be labelled the "incumbency" explanation. Incumbent office-holders, after all, live in a highly politicized world. They regularly deal with those who are highly involved in at least some aspects of government, they may think of themselves as the center of attention to an extent, and they simply extend these experiences with elite citizens to the voters at large. Because everyone with whom they come into contact is involved in the affairs of government, in other words, they may come to assume that this is also the natural state of affairs with voters.

Another possible result of incumbency might be a tendency to concentrate on determinants of voting behavior which can be manipulated by the politician. Marginal winners in this study may have rated the dynamic variables of issue and candidate as particularly important not because they believe these factors influence voters more than party identification does, but because issues and condidates change from election to election and hence are capable of being manipulated by the politician more than are stable party loyalties. In their districts, furthermore, because party loyalties tend to balance one another, marginal winners may believe that party is "not important" in the sense that it cannot account for shifts from election to election, which are of vital interest to them. So another explanation for some of the findings may be that these marginal winners, far from being "unrealistic" in some absolute sense, instead choose the "reality" which is most relevant to their election and re-election. Marginal losers, on the other hand, now freed from such a concern and perhaps personally threatened by the possibility that they lost because their issue positions or personal characteristics were unacceptable to the majority of the electorate, rationalize their defeat by concentrating on party label. There may be more rationalization than congratulation.

[11] Of the state legislative winners, 13% say that voters are very interested in their campaigns, while 50% of the higher-level winners say so. The proportion of state legislative winners saying that voters are very well informed is 13%; of higher-level winners, 38%.

[12] For the general theory upon which this statement is based, see Leon Festinger, *A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1957).

In sum, there are alternative explanations for the findings, and this study cannot adequately determine which of these explanations or combinations of explanations accounts for the results. Whatever the explanation, however, the crucial question of the political consequences of these findings still remains. The next section considers some of these consequences.

IMPLICATIONS

Politicians' theories of voting behavior investigated here have political implications on which we may speculate in the hope that they will be tested in future research. This final section states some hypotheses which, while not established here, may be of interest to political scientists and suggest some of the agenda for future investigation.

Election success. One explanation for some election outcomes, set forth at the beginning of this paper, is that the winning candidate based his campaign on a more accurate perception of voting behavior than the loser did. This proposition cannot be adequately tested in this paper, since pre-election interviews, which were not taken in this research, would be necessary.

Considering only the post-election interview data presented here, it would be difficult to maintain that winners have more accurate beliefs about voting behavior than losers do, once election day is past. Survey research studies of voting behavior have discovered, generally speaking, that a rather small proportion of the electorate is highly interested in and informed about politics, even in Presidential elections.[13] This minimal voter awareness and involvement seems doubly true of Congressional elections, where the voters' images of the candidates and their knowledge of the election issues are considerably weaker.[14] Both Presidential and Congressional compaigns are probably more salient than contests for the state legislature.[15] Against this backdrop of evidence about the actual degree of voter interest and information, it seems clear that at least after the election, successful candidates tend to overestimate the degree to which voters are interested in politics, informed about governmental matters, and conscious of election issues.

The relative perceived importance of party, issues, and candidates is more difficult to consider. In this case, it appears that winners and losers are both selecting a version of "reality" which is consonant with their post-election situation. Winners tend to emphasize the dynamic, manipulable variables which affect votes at the margin, while losers tend to emphasize party label. Both of these responses could conceivably be considered "realistic," depending on the frame of reference evoked by the analyst. Especially in view of the data on the respondents' beliefs about the degree of political interest and information in the electorate, however, it would still be difficult to maintain that after the election, the winners have *more* accurate beliefs about voters than the losers do.

The pre-election beliefs of these respondents are probably considerably different from the post-election beliefs which are reported in this paper. One might perhaps expect that the potential winners' and losers' beliefs about voters would be similar, with the congratulation and especially the rationalization occurring after election day. Or one might expect that the potential winners would have a higher estimate of voter political involvement than the potential losers because both are anticipating the outcome to some extent, even though the differences between them would be greater after election day. The hypothesis of greater perceptual accuracy on the part of the winners, however, would require that the pre-election potential winners would have a lower estimate of voter interest, information, and issue and candidate awareness than candidates who subsequently become losers. There seems to be little reason to expect such a pre-election configuration, precisely the reverse of the post-election case. So while the data presented here are not measurements of the candidates' pre-election beliefs, they nevertheless suggest that it is difficult to account for election success in terms of the winning candidate's more accurate perception of voting behavior.

This does not imply that successful candidates conduct less effective campaigns than unsuccessful candidates do, that winners succeed in spite of their campaigns rather than because of them. Such a conclusion would assume that campaigns are oriented toward voters, an assumption which may not hold in fact. It could be, indeed, that political campaigning is carried on according to considerations relatively far removed from voters: the requirements of the media, the timing of the campaign, the actions of one's opponent, the demands of non-mass, elite elements such as party activists, campaign contributors, and interest group leaders, and like considerations.

[13] Campbell, *et. al.*, *The American Voter*, *op. cit.*

[14] Miller and Stokes, *op. cit.*

[15] See Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), p. 29.

A successful candidate may base his campaign largely on such non-voter variables and still conduct a campaign which is effective in winning votes. We might speculate, however, that whatever campaign strategies may account for election success, these strategies do not appear to be based on beliefs about voters which correspond to the conclusions about voter awareness and involvement drawn from survey research studies of voting behavior.

State-National Differences. We have discovered that candidates for the state legislature tend to believe that voters are less interested in their races, less informed about the issues, and more party-oriented than the candidates for state-wide offices or the U.S. Congress do. This felt isolation from voters on the part of state legislative candidates may have several important political consequences. First, if state legislators believe that voters in their districts are highly party-oriented, this may influence the high degree of party cohesion found in many state legislatures.[16] Election success in such cases might be thought to be a function of standing with the party, but U.S. Congressmen might not feel similarly bound by their party.

It has also been maintained that interest group activity on the state level is quite different from that on the national level. Several of Milbrath's respondents, for example, think that lobbying is "cleaner" in Washington than in their state capitols.[17] Perhaps one restraint on interest group activity is voter involvement in politics as perceived by legislators. According to Huitt, for example, one of Senator Proxmire's beliefs about politics is that a "strong hold on the electorate, which can control him only in the most general sense, enables him to resist any group (including his staunch supporters) which might seek to exercise specific influence."[18] This paper has presented data suggesting a difference between state legislators and U.S. Congressmen in the degree to which they think that voters are involved in their campaigns, and this difference might be part of an explanation for the differences in interest group activity.

It appears, then, that politicians' theories of voting behavior may be related to the whole style of politics found in different political systems. More research is needed which systematically compares similar phenomena at state and national levels, so these remarks must be considered highly tentative.

Communications. Let us return to the broad problem of communication between representative and constituents with which this paper began. Bauer, Pool, and Dexter state that even in the case of relations with his constituents, who have the powerful sanction of re-election at their disposal, "the congressman is quite free," within the limits of "what is morally or sociologically conceivable."[19] The research reported here, including the data in footnote 3 above, suggests that the representative's freedom may vary according to his theory of voting behavior, that the representative who believes that voters pay attention to election issues probably is less free of his constituents than one who does not.

To elaborate a bit, the rearrangement of a politician's cognitions by virtue of the fact that he has won an election may have important implications for his behavior while in office. The incumbent is more likely than if he lost to believe that voters are watching him, that they are better informed, and that they make their choices according to his own characteristics and even according to the issues of the election. Because of these results of electoral victory, the incumbent may be easier to influence than if there were no congratulation-rationalization effect. He might pay greater attention to his constituency than otherwise, because he believes that his constituents are paying greater attention to him than he might think if he had lost.

Constituency influence on an officer-holder need not depend on the reception of direct cues from the district. The politician acts not only according to the cues such as mail which reach him directly from his constituents, but also according to his conception of their reaction to various alternatives he might choose. This notion that incumbents anticipate the reactions of people who are important to them, particularly the electorate in the case of elective officials, is common to a number of writers in political science, and has been set forth by Friedrich as the "rule of anticipated reactions."[20] The

[16] Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

[17] Lester W. Milbrath, *The Washington Lobbyists* (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963), pp. 301–304.

[18] Ralph K. Huitt, "The Outsider in the Senate: An Alternative Role," this REVIEW, 55 (1961), p. 568.

[19] Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, *American Business and Public Policy* (New York: Atherton Press, 1964), p. 423.

[20] Carl J. Friedrich, *Constitutional Government and Democracy* (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1950), p. 49. Other writers have also used essentially the same concept. These include V. O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York:

congratulation-rationalization effect described in this study probably heightens the importance of these anticipated reactions. By virtue of his electoral victory, an office-holder and especially a marginal winner believes that the eyes of the public are on him, that voters cast their ballots according to his actions and characteristics, and that they are comparatively well informed about the issues of an election. If the incumbent thinks the electorate is watching him, whether they are or not in fact, he will attempt to anticipate their reactions to his decisions. The congratulation-rationalization effect, in short, may increase the influence which a constituency has on an office-holder.

Alfred A. Knopf, 1961) p. 263, "latency of public opinion"; David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 34, "potential groups"; and Robert A. Dahl, *Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 132.

SOME COMMENTS ON RUSSETT'S "DISCOVERING VOTING GROUPS IN THE UNITED NATIONS"

JOHN E. MUELLER
University of Rochester

Factor analysis, a statistical technique of growing popularity in political science, has recently found application in the June, 1966 issue of this REVIEW in an attempt to identify U.N. voting blocs. The hand is that of Professor Bruce M. Russett, the author of a number of outstanding contributions toward the systematic and quantitative study of international relations. The following paragraphs are designed to be cautionary in nature, not destructive, and endeavor to suggest: 1) that factor analysis has questionable value as a tool for the study of complex phenomena; 2) that even if acceptable as a tool, it has peculiar faults when applied to U.N. bloc voting; and 3) that even if acceptable as a tool for the study of bloc voting in the U.N., an application somewhat different from the one chosen by Professor Russett might have been more profitable. In the process it will be argued that the procedures of the sort profferred by Professor Arend Lijphart for determining U.N. voting blocs are preferable.[1]

1. If appealing in its seeming promise to make order of disorder and sense of nonsense, factor analysis proves to be exasperating in practice. For while it is true, that, as Professor Russett has noted elsewhere, "the method is completely *objective*"[2] in the sense that the decision as to which variables are to "load" on which factors is made entirely by the impartial machinery, the criteria which the machinery applies in arriving at this decision are manipulated by the operator—and depending on these criteria, the outcome can vary widely. Thus factor analysis can generate not one, but a number—in fact an infinite number—of solutions to the same problem. In choosing among these solutions the one most likely to represent truth (if that is what one is interested in), the analyst is commonly urged to select the solution which makes the most "sense"—in other words to embrace the objective solution which is most subjectively appealing. Therefore, one can get out of factor analysis almost whatever one wants to get. For example, in an argument a few years ago over such central psychological concerns as agreement response set, anal expression, social desirability, and (of course) the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, two teams of psychologists factor analyzed the same sort of data, selected different solutions, and came to precisely opposite conclusions.[3]

Claims that factor analysis is an "economical" procedure (e.g., Russett, p. 328) therefore should best be cautiously weighed. For the process of sorting through several exasperatingly different factor matrices is a tedious and frustrating process and at the same time one which is likely to be less conclusive than a form of cluster analysis of the sort Lijphart advocates.

Of course it is possible to assign a single set of criteria, based on grounds of mathematical and statistical elegance and parsimony, and to seize upon the first factor solution that pops out of the machinery as the most likely approximation to truth. This ploy, widely adopted by political scientists including, apparently, Professor Russett, has the advantage of reducing the paper work. The profound arbitrariness of this approach however must be duly appreciated.

The problems of interpreting the factor solution even after one has been decided upon have often been noted. Professor Russett for example brings forth a U.N. voting alignment dubbed "Brazzaville Africans" in which Haiti and Bolivia are important members and Israel is a fellow traveler. In another equally valid factor solution these nations might well appear allied with an entirely different group of associates and contribute therefore to a strikingly different interpretation of the data.

Faced with dilemmas of this sort Lijphart's approach, which keeps the investigator much closer to the data, seems far less elusive and far more interpretable: one is confronted simply by a set of descriptive statistics giving the degree of cohesiveness of a series of inductively-located voting blocs.

Professor Russett's claim then that factor analysis is a technique which is "given to a means of presentation which is readily *inter-*

[1] "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A Critique and a Proposal," this REVIEW, 57 (1963), pp. 902–917.

[2] *Trends in World Politics* (New York: Macmillian, 1965), p. 68. Emphasis in the original.

[3] Arthur Couch and Kenneth Keniston, "Agreeing Response Set and Social Desirability," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 62 (1961), pp. 175–179; and Allen L. Edwards and Jerald N. Walker, "Social Desirability and Agreement Response Set," *ibid.*, 62 (1961), pp. 180–183.

pretable" and which "reliably *identifies all the groupings"* (p. 328) is surely overly sanguine.

2. If one shrugs aside these objections on the grounds perhaps that the gain in mathematical elegance is worth the cost in decisiveness of result (after all, no method is completely free from arbitrariness), there are still certain special problems which attend the application of factor analysis to bloc voting patterns in the United Nations.

First, because the voting choices of two nations correlate reasonably well with a particular factor, it does not follow that the voting preferences of the two countries correlate well *with each other*. In fact the correlation between two voting units which have loadings of .50 on a single factor could be anywhere between 0.00 and +1.00. Professor Russett finds that Madagascar, Togo, and Liberia all load .62 on the "Brazzaville African" factor. Using some data that is at hand I find that at the same session, on plenary session votes at least (Professor Russett also includes committee votes in his analysis), Madagascar correlates .84 with Liberia but only .35 with Togo. Or, to order the problem in reverse, I find that Algeria and Burundi correlate .85 on plenary votes—they vote in complete agreement 90 per cent of the time; yet Algeria is disclosed to be an enthusiastic member of the "Afro-Asian" bloc while Burundi is not. Since the definition of a voting bloc insists that all members of the group agree with all other members at a specifically designated level, factor analysis would appear to be faulty as a selection device.

To sort out those pairs within a factor "bloc" which correlate well with each other from those which do not, the analyst must deal with the mammoth correlation matrix, something factor analysis was specifically adopted to avoid—but which Lijphart's method embraces from the beginning.

A second special problem in applying factor analysis to U.N. voting arises from the use of the Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient as a measure of agreement. Because abstention is a meaningful voting option in the United Nations (unlike the U.S. Congress), the voting relationship between each pair of states can be represented in a 3×3 table of the sort exemplified in Tables 1–3. Lijphart's proposed index of agreement (IA) is based on the idea that any entries on the principal diagonal of the table represent cases of agreement between the states—they agree either in affirming the resolution, in opposing it, or in adopting a middle position by abstaining. Entries in the upper right and lower left cells are treated as instances of utter disagreement—in each case one state favors while the other opposes. (Entries in the four non-diagonal cells are regarded as cases of half-agreement.)

TABLE 1

		State A		
		Yes	Abst	No
State B	Yes	10		
	Abst		80	
	No			10

r = 1.00
IA = 100%

TABLE 2

		State A		
		Yes	Abst	No
State B	Yes			10
	Abst		80	
	No	10		

r = −1.00
IA = 80%

TABLE 3

		State A		
		Yes	Abst	No
State B	Yes	5		5
	Abst		80	
	No	5		5

r = 0.00
IA = 90%

However, the Pearson coefficient when applied to the Tables does *not* treat the middle cell in a consistent manner. To make the point with a somewhat extreme example, consider Tables 1, 2, and 3. In each case 80 per cent of the time the states agree to cast joint abstentions. Nevertheless, depending on the distributions of the remaining twenty votes, the value for the Pearson r varies wildly: the entries in the middle cell are treated in Table 1 as cases of utter agreement, in Table 2 as cases of utter disagreement, and in Table 3 as cases neither of agreement nor of disagreement. At the same time Lijphart's index remains relatively unperturbed.

To be sure all summary measures will at times distort and muddle information. One might question whether the Lijphart index is justified in treating entries in the middle cell as instances of as strong agreement as those in the two corner cells of the principal diagonal. But the flaws of the Pearson coefficient in application to the 3×3 table seem far greater.

3. One of the numerous mysterious decisions one must muddle through in applying factor analysis (assuming one is not dissuaded by the arguments above from using it at all), is whether to demand that the final factors be correlated or uncorrelated with one another, that is, whether to demand an oblique or an orthogonal solution. When in doubt it is probably safest to do both, although of course this leads to yet more factor matrices to ponder over and choose among.

Professor Russett has apparently chosen to ask for and adhere to a single orthogonal solution. There are good reasons to believe that this is not a wise choice. While in some applications of factor analysis it may be argued from the nature of things that factor solutions only make sense if the factors are uncorrelated, in the analysis of voting blocs such reasoning seems distinctly invalid. In searching for blocs, the analyst expects to be able to pick out a number of clusters of like-minded voters and he expects each cluster to possess a certain unity and meaning, but he does *not* demand that each bloc be utterly unrelated to all of the others. Indeed most analyses of U.N. voting find hierarchies of blocs, some quite closely linked to each other, some only remotely associated. Indications that this is the case can be seen in Professor Russett's data. He finds that there are a number of states, mostly Latin American, which load on his first factor above the level arbitrarily chosen to be significant, .50, while at the same time they load rather well on the second factor. From this it is argued that these states have "similar voting patterns" and comprise a "separate group" distinct from those states which only load on either factor one or factor two. But the arguments of the previous section are especially relevant here, for while these states do seem to be distinctive in that they load (at relatively low levels) on two factors, it cannot be argued from the data presented that they have high correlations among themselves and thus are a separate group. What the data *do* suggest is that some (or perhaps all) of these nations will line up rather neatly on a factor which is somewhere in between the first two factors determined by the orthogonal solution. Thus, if one wishes to use factor analysis to ferret out blocs in United Nations voting, it would seem on both intuitive and empirical grounds that an oblique solution is more likely than an orthogonal one to prove satisfying.

Other problems arise from the use of the Pearson r and its well-known tendency to do peculiar things when the marginals are extreme. In many sessions of the U.N. it is simply the case that the vast majority of votes taken are strongly affirmative and thus there are a fair number of states which have extremely affirmative voting patterns—of the African states in 1963, for example, ten did not vote negatively on a single measure in plenary session. It would seem wise to eliminate such cases from consideration or at least to watch carefully over them (or else adopt another method for roll call analysis). Professor Russett does eliminate all unanimous or near-unanimous *votes* from consideration, but in a bloc analysis the important distorting component will be "unanimous" or near-"unanimous" *voters*.

It is doubtful that the actual impact of these comments, even if the whole array were applied in series, would radically alter some of the bloc patterns uncovered by Professor Russett: Poland and Czechoslovakia for example will doubtless always emerge in the same bloc. On some of the more subtle levels of investigation however, where the most interesting and non-obvious distinctions lie, the application of factor analytic procedures does appear to have caused distortions which might well alter the interpretation of bloc voting in the United Nations significantly.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: For Professor Russett's comments on Professor Mueller's criticisms, see *Communications to the Editor*, pp. 149–150.)

COMMUNICATIONS

TO THE EDITOR:

Recent letters of protest against articles in the REVIEW move me to come to the defense of the Editor, albeit on grounds which have not occurred to the critics—C. W. Harrington, Robert Strausz-Hupé, and others.

The complaints have to do with computers, with the irrelevance of evidence to conclusions, and with failure to communicate. They are echoed in Barbara Tuchman's plea (NYT, January 1, 1967) to the American Historical Association: "Let us beware of the plight of our colleagues, the behavioral scientists, who by the use of a proliferating jargon have painted themselves into a corner—or isolation ward—of unintelligibility. They know what they mean but no one else does. Psychologists and sociologists are the farthest gone in the disease and probably incurable." Mrs. Tuchman should read the APSR.

Quite so. The articles in question are meaningless, even to mathematicians. Among so many candidates for honors in the September and December issues, distinctions are invidious. But typical is "Transaction Flows in the International System." Here, after 18 pages of neologisms, nonsense terms (e.g., "decomposition of coincidentally salient linkages"), and impressive equations, graphs, and charts, a startling conclusion is reached. In English translation: States have closer relations with some States than with other States. Q.E.D.

Criticism of the Editor misses the point which, to coin a phrase, came to me as a blinding flash of the obvious. Let the Editor not deny the point, lest we be faced with another "credibility gap." His purpose, unacknowledged but honorable and necessary, is to present a *reductio ad absurdem* of the new faddists of "behavioralism" and "empiricism." When the medium is the message, there is no message. Congratulations are in order. May the task so well begun continue until the absurdity is complete. It may then again become possible to resume research and writing in Political Science.

FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN
Williams College

(EDITOR'S NOTE: My horror of opening another "credibility gap" is exceeded only by my obligation to disclaim the editorial subtlety Professor Schuman so generously imputes. It must be confessed that we publish what we publish because my referees and I think the articles make significant contributions—even if couched in language unfamiliar to some. As for the latter:

> Men ever had, and ever will have, leave
> To coin new words well suited to the age.
> Words are like leaves, some wither ev'ry year
> And ev'ry year a younger race succeeds.
> Horace, *Ars Poetica*)

TO THE EDITOR:

It is useful to be reminded of the limitations of factor analysis and that one must never mechanically report computer output as an immutable substantive finding. But in this instance the conclusion is derived not from a rigorous evaluation, but merely from numerical examples that are inappropriate and often purely hypothetical.

Certainly one should not conclude that because two variables have the same loading on *one* factor they are very highly correlated with each other. That is why I reproduced the entire factor matrix for all *six* major factors. While Madagascar and Togo indeed both load .62 on Factor 2, they load .39 and .09 respectively on Factor 1, and .05 and .49 respectively on Factor 3. Thus by looking at factors other than the one with the highest loading, it is possible to discriminate differing variables *without* having to go back to the mammoth correlation matrix.

When making a methodological comparison of two indices it is necessary to examine the same data in each case. Professor Mueller cites only plenary votes, whereas my analysis employed both plenary and committee roll-calls. Although Algeria and Burundi do vote in complete agreement on about 90 per cent of the 24 *plenary* roll calls, they differ on fully one-third of the 42 *committee* ballots. Hence it is not surprising that in the factor analysis their loadings differ.

His rejection of the product-moment correlation coefficient (r) depends upon an essentially irrelevant numerical example. The dramatic differences between the Pearson r and the Lijphart index of agreement in Tables 1–3 rely on what he himself calls an extreme case; namely on having the great bulk (*80 per cent* in the example) of the votes concentrated in the *middle*, or abstain, category. In real UN voting data the distortion is very much less; absences

and abstentions together were well *under 30 per cent* of my total. Later he talks about the distortion caused by countries which nearly always cast *affirmative* votes. Even this would be much less damaging than the kind of thing in his numerical example, and in fact there are in the data of my article *no* countries which vote affirmatively as much as 85 per cent of the time—absences and abstentions are more common in committee than in plenary session, as are initiatives which fail of majority support. Finally, there is some literature on the essential toughness and resistance of factor analytic procedures to whatever distortion in the *correlation matrix* is produced by the Pearson r. Mueller's point, however, is technically correct and warns us all that it is essential to know what one's data look like before deciding what statistical manipulations will or will not be tolerable. One should be especially careful with a collection composed exclusively of plenary roll-calls.

The caution against accepting any one analytic solution as completely satisfactory before seeing others, including various oblique rotations, is perhaps the best-grounded. To discuss the matter experientially rather than hypothetically, I did also perform some oblique rotations, but they did not change the basic pattern nor affect the grouping decisions in more than a half dozen of the most marginal countries, and were not reported in the article. This has usually been my experience, yet I agree that before staking too much on the conclusions it is still wise to try not just oblique rotations, but actually quite different grouping or clustering techniques. The longer study from which the article was drawn, my *International Regions and the International System* (in press) considers this problem at some length.

BRUCE M. RUSSETT

Yale University

TO THE EDITOR:

The rigor and seeming logic of the theory of the budgetary process presented by Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky (this REVIEW, September, 1966) will likely attract widespread attention. At first glance the theory appears to provide a clear conceptual notion of the budgetary process and to lay the basis for cumulative knowledge. Carefully judged against the criteria for a successful scientific theory, however, the theory of the budgetary process is a failure.

Three sets of criteria are normally satisfied by a "good" theory: (1) *internal criteria* (is the theory internally consistent? somewhat plausible on its face? interesting? etc.); (2) *external criteria* (does the theory in some sense "fit" reality?); and (3) *promise* (does the theory open up interesting new research possibilities?). I take it as self-evident, in this period of paradigm confusion in the social sciences, that proposed conceptual innovations have to be taken seriously and assessed seriously, and I therefore shall examine the proposed budgetary theory in terms of these criteria.

1. The theory fails to survive even the initial requirements of theoretical promise. Its dynamics are sadly deficient. There are only "outputs" with no adequate explanation of how the outputs are produced. The dynamics of the theory rest exclusively, following Lindblom's incrementalism, on the factor of the human being's limited cognitive capacities. The theory posits that decision-makers will move in a gradual step-by-step process away from a specific problem rather than trying to "solve" the problem in its complex totality. Now it may be conceded that rules-of-thumb or decision rules are inevitable when decision-makers face a complex problem. But it does not follow from this that the rules-of-thumb will necessarily be of an incremental nature. That assumption follows only if one considers the factor of limited cognitive capacities in a vacuum. If the process is placed in a relevant political context, it becomes apparent that the decision-makers may adopt a decision rule which embraces the possibility of distinctly non-incremental activity (e.g., satisfy the intense grievances of a vocal group whatever the cost in short-run policy consistency). Incrementalism should be expected as the norm only in the society free from conflict—in short, in a society which has no politics.

The theory, moreover, aims at a range of behavior which is essentially static. The "base" points from which incrementalism proceeds are not accounted for in the theory: they are somehow supplied by exogenous forces, rather as an irritating distraction, so that the authors can get down to the business at hand of modeling the incremental process. What results, then, are separate slices of static reality unconnected by any explanatory scheme for showing how we get from one stage to the other. In fact, the type of behavior which *is* explained approaches triviality, and the type of behavior not considered within the framework of the model is mainly what the student of politics wants to know. It is surprising that, at a time when other social science disciplines have shed a static functionalism and when questions of political development have attracted increasing interest within political science, so static a theory should be trumpeted as an important conceptual innovation.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the theory amounts to little more than an elaborate tautology. The authors' summary of the advantages of the theory (p. 545) makes it clear that there are no advantages aside from accepting the definitional framework of the theory and being able to talk in those terms. One only knows where he is "within this larger scheme" if he accepts the scheme. One only knows what is a "normal" or "deviant" case if he accepts the theory as the only legitimate way to look at the data. The applicability, fruitfulness, and relevance of the theory are precisely the points at issue. It is inadmissible to accept the theory on a priori grounds, and then to go on to argue that the theory is sound because, among other things, it enables one to distinguish "normal" from "deviant" cases—these concepts are built into the definition of the theory. Indeed, the theory is structured so as not to allow for disconfirming results.

2. The "test" of the theory is basically misconceived for the reason just mentioned. A built-in perceptual bias, resulting from the way the theory has jumbled around the political universe to exclude the interesting phenomena and to define as "data" only uninteresting phenomena, has led the authors to favor bureaus or subagencies with relatively low-intensity involvement in the political process. One does not know for sure until more complete data are published, but a logical guess is that the data come disproportionately from bureaus like the Battle Monuments Commission or Bureau of Indian Affairs. Even if one sets aside this basic objection, numerous difficulties still exist with the empirical test. The authors exclude the defense agencies. Why? Since defense expenditures constitute the biggest part of the budget, it seems at least odd that no effort was made to gather such data. The main reason why the authors skirted the defense area so completely probably stems from the fact that this is a realm of experience totally unfathomable within the theoretical blinders of incrementalism. In defense, under the impact of an accelerating technology, programs evolve, dissolve, and change direction with bewildering rapidity. There are few stable base points to provide a convenient frame of reference for the theory. One can sympathize with the desire to avoid a domain that is so refractory to simple modeling, but the impact of science and technology cannot really be ignored. (This is perhaps why they have also excluded NASA—another non-incremental program—from the data.) Excluding defense, moreover, means that the whole subject of rational management aids (program budgeting, cost effectiveness, systems analysis) is avoided. The authors at least have to consider the possibility that new aids to calculation will give decision-makers greater ability to make comprehensive budget choices.

Furthermore, the authors are equivocal on the issue of how close the "fit" with the data must be in order to constitute support for or verification of the hypothesis. They use unsatisfactory phrases like the data support the hypothesis up to a random error of "reasonable" magnitude, or "little" of the variance is left statistically unexplained. The processes of deciding acceptable standards of verification have to be visible and precise. The authors, on occasion, are simply careless. It is observed, for example, that (p. 539) "the data are not deflated for changes in the price level during the early years." If one is not dealing in constant dollars, the results may show nothing but trends in prices. The authors do not elaborate, and it is unclear whether the data *were* deflated for price changes in later years (and only the early years ignored), or whether no effort at all was made to develop a measure of constant dollars.

Last, the whole idea of treating annual appropriations as independent events is suspect. Often appropriations in succeeding years merely implement the policy objectives of earlier, more fundamental decisions made at critical turning points. Thus abstracting each year's budget decisions from the larger program context and using them as "proof" of the number of instances which support the theory amounts to stacking the cards in their own favor. In the end, it is not even clear that the authors have found a good fit with their own data. The existence of fifty-five apparently disconfirming instances (p. 540) should be a very serious matter for anyone wishing to find "laws" of the budgetary process.

3. The theory's promise is dim because it points the way only toward an ever more baroque embellishment of an essentially trivial theme. It can only explain short-term policy outcomes of programs insulated from significant conflict, and further work can only lead to a more detailed burrowing into the minutiae of a scheme that is of little interest in the first place. In contrast, if the Davis-Dempster-Wildavsky theory becomes accepted as a paradigm to guide further research, certain other bodies of literature that are theoretically incompatible will have to be displaced. And while not much can be gained by acceptance of the theory, a great deal would inevitably be lost. The whole body of literature on Presidential leadership will be sacrificed, becoming of

merely antiquarian interest and giving way to a "dummy variable" term allowing for different degrees of intensity of Presidential interest in proposed appropriations. Interesting experiments in rational aids to management will be brushed aside as irrelevant to the policy outcomes of the budgetary process. Studies of the strategies employed by agencies to build public support, to form stable coalitions with congressional allies, or to aggrandize their influence within the executive branch will appear worth doing only insofar as they illustrate the detailed workings of incrementalism. There will be no way to tie the new research to the growing literature on political development or to build any bridges to the comparative government literature on highly-unstable, low-consensus political systems. Indeed, even within the framework of American politics, there would be no way to get a grip on any but the most uninteresting political phenomena.

I regretfully conclude that Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky have not presented an acceptable theory of the budgetary process. As it now stands, the theory is apolitical—a curious state of affairs for one of the co-authors who started out to analyze the "politics of the budgetary process."

BRUCE L. R. SMITH
Columbia University

TO THE EDITOR:

We sympathize with Bruce L. R. Smith's desire to save the profession from a theoretical disaster and we appreciate the extraordinary importance he ascribes to our work. But we think that his remarks are insufficiently critical. The usual task of criticism is to expose the major fallacies of the work under consideration. A logical error is discovered. Incorrect inferences from the data are revealed. The statistical methodology is demonstrated to be invalid. Basic assumptions are shown to be inappropriate. Smith's remarks bear on none of these matters.

Consider Smith's three criteria for a good theory. First, the *internal criteria*, or the logical consistency and plausibility of our theory, are not questioned. Second, the *external criteria*, or the "fits" between the theory and empirical data, are not seriously examined, since no contradicting empirical evidence is offered. Third, the *promise* of the theory is not a question that can be resolved by polemics, but must await the results of future research.

Smith says that "A Theory of the Budgetary Process" is apolitical. Our theory, however, does NOT lead away from the discovery of points of political change but toward them. We did not propose to end empirical work but to begin it. A hypothesis we tested was that organizational behavior in the federal budgetary process is essentially random. If this were true, it would be impossible to develop any theory; change could not be studied because it could not be distinguished from other phenomena. Instead, we demonstrated that the budgetary process follows certain probabilistic laws that stand up well against other hypotheses. Then, when behavior was observed to change, we were able to determine "shift points" as a focus for future research. One aspect of the fruitfulness of any theory is to be able to lead to such new questions. Far from being upset by knowledge of a small percentage of deviant cases, we looked upon this (in the context of a stochastic model) as an invaluable opportunity to search for variables to extend our theory. Since both deviant cases and shift points clustered around years of change in the Presidency and Congress, this strongly suggested the advisability of reformulating our equations to include a variable on party control of these institutions. In this way we expect to account better for known change. Our theory is not static but dynamic; it shows the budgetary process to be stable over periods of time but not for all time. Whether or not budgetary decisions (during the period studied) were incremental can only be established by empirical evidence and not by assumption. Our study explicitly demonstrates the dependence of current appropriations on past events, supports incrementalism for short-term description, but centers attention on the points of political change. The theory does not imply, therefore, that it is irrelevant whether agencies build public support or aggrandize their influence within the executive branch. Rather, it provides a framework within which these important strategic relationships may be studied.

What can be said about the buckshot commentary on our procedures? We had informed readers in the original article that the statistical methodology and the empirical results were reported in much greater detail in *Papers on Non-Market Decision Making.** Whether only agencies like the Battle Monument Commission were considered is evident for all to determine (especially a critic) in this paper. If we

* "On the Process of Budgeting: An Empirical Study of Congressional Appropriation, Gordon Tullock (ed.), *Papers on Non-Market Decision Making* (Charlottesville, Va.: Thomas Jefferson Center for Political Economy, University of Virginia, 1966), pp. 63–132.

had known enough to choose 56 agencies that would fit our equations on an *a priori* basis, we would hardly have had to conduct any research. Appropriations are made in dollars, not in deflated dollars, so that dollars are appropriate units of analysis for behavioral models. We would have been happy to include NASA if we could conjure up a time series of moderate length for an agency that has been in existence for only a few years. In order to test our models on a new set of data, we are currently analyzing agencies in the remainder of the non-defense sector for which adequate time series are available. For reasons of cost and time and inability to ascertain precisely what is included in defense appropriations, we are not studying that sector. But we are certain other researchers will rise to the challenge.

It is doubtful that our theory will (and it certainly should not) deter efforts to improve the economic rationality of the budgetary process. We are surely given too much credit (and other scholars too little) when Smith suggests that acceptance of our work might literally put an end to interesting theorizing in political science. Naturally, we do believe that our research will lead to better knowledge of budgeting as a political process. We plan to convince other scholars not by exhortation but by performance.

Otto Davis
M. A. H. Dempster
Aaron Wildavsky

To the Editor:

I am a bit perturbed by John Porter East's comments (this Review, December, 1966, pp. 1004–1005) on my review of his book because, although he notes accurately my many favorable remarks, he apparently fails to grasp some other points. East recognizes (p. 89) that Childs produced a "mechanistic model." Why then does he insist on infelicitously referring to a "machine model," since that phrase has a very distinct meaning to Childs and students of city politics?

An objective reader would find in my review not opposition to scientific comparison of theory and behavior but praise for Professor East's contribution in this regard. I said that Childs and his supporters (among whom East includes me without foundation) would not care, because their theory was intended to persuade people to adopt council-manager governments, not to explain how things work. Childs' success is part of the facts and my analysis of the distribution of his system was relevant.

In his letter, East appears the complete empiricist. In his book, the empiricism could have been expanded by inquiry into why some communities adopted Childs' form while others did not. Professor East is a more thorough behavioralist in his correspondence than in his research.

Jay S. Goodman
Wheaton College

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Editor's Announcement: Discontinuation of Bibliographies 155

Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life. Bertram M. Gross 156

Dahl, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. Harry Eckstein 158

Latham, The Communist Controversy in Washington. David Fellman 160

Ardrey, The Territorial Imperative: A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations. James C. Davies 161

Brecht, Aus Naechster Naehe—Lebenserinnerungen 1884–1927. Carl J. Friedrich 163

Young, The Washington Community 1800–1828. Nelson W. Polsby 164

Jacob and Vines, Politics in the American States, A Comparative Analysis. Duane Lockard 165

Fliess, Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity. Bruce M. Russett 166

Schurmann, Ideology and Organization in Communist China. John W. Lewis .. 167

BOOK NOTES

Political Theory, History of Political Thought, and Methodology 169

American Government and Politics 182

Comparative Government and Politics 194

International Politics, Law, and Organization 213

EDITOR'S ANNOUNCEMENT: DISCONTINUATION OF BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Beginning with this issue, the REVIEW will no longer publish the bibliographies of selected articles and documents formerly included in the Book Reviews and Notes section. The Managing Editor's Annual Report for 1965–66 mentioned this possibility, and the decision announced here has been made after consultation with both the Editorial Board and Executive Committee.

The principal reasons for discontinuing the bibliographies are as follows. In recent years the growth in the profession's numbers, range of interests, and research competence and support has greatly increased the pressures on the REVIEW's space, while rising printing costs have made it substantially more expensive to produce. Consequently, we have had to limit the number of articles published in each issue to keep within our budgetary limits. Yet we are now receiving about 50 percent more article manuscripts than two years ago; and even though less than one in five are accepted for publication, our space limitations have piled up a substantial and growing backlog: at the present writing all issues are filled through that of March, 1968, and I estimate that within eighteen months the article space will be claimed for two years ahead. Moreover, the number of books appropriate for review is increasing rapidly, and the Book Review Editor informs me that he too is accumulating a substantial and growing backlog.

Accordingly, we have decided to eliminate some service features so as to permit the publication of more articles, book reviews, and book notes per issue within our cost limits. We do so because we agree with the great majority of the respondents to our questionnaire of autumn, 1965, that articles and book reviews are professionally more significant and useful than the service departments, helpful though the latter have been.

We believe, moreover, that the technological revolution now taking place in cataloguing, indexing, and annotating offers high promise of more comprehensive and useful bibliographical services than we can now provide in the REVIEW. Following are brief descriptions of the principal services available now or in the near future.*

POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE BIBLIOGRAPHIES

1. *International Bibliography of Political Science*, 1953– (Paris: UNESCO, 1954– ; issued annually). This classified bibliography lists books, pamphlets, and pertinent government documents as well as indexing over 1800 periodicals in most major languages. Between four and five thousand entries are included each year. There are both author and subject indexes. Comparable bibliographies are published by UNESCO for Economics, Historical Sciences, and Sociology, all containing a number of items of interest to political scientists.

2. *Public Affairs Information Service* (New York: Public Affairs Information Service 1915– ; issued weekly from September through July and fortnightly in August, cumulated annually). PAIS lists by subject books, pamphlets, and articles in over 1000 English language periodicals in the fields of sociology, economics, and political science.

3. *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*, formerly the International Index (New York: Wilson, 1916– ; issued quarterly and cumulated periodically). Indexes select English language periodicals published in the United States and abroad. Most of the major American political and social science journals are indexed here but a few are covered only in the companion *Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.*

COLLECTIONS OF ABSTRACTS

1. *International Political Science Abstracts* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1951– ; issued quarterly). This abstracting review contains between 1400 and 1500 abstracts, each year taken from over a hundred periodicals published in all major countries and in most languages. Abstracts are arranged by author under broad subjects. Each issue contains a subject index and a list of the periodicals abstracted, and there is an annually cumulated subject index.

2. *The ABS Guide to Recent Publications in the Social and Behavioral Sciences* (New York: Sage Publications, Inc., 1965– ; monthly and annual supplements). Lists abstracts of over 6500 books, government reports, pamphlets, and periodical articles, arranged alphabetically. It

* This list was prepared with the assistance of Professor Jack A. Clarke, Assistant Director of the University of Wisconsin Library School, to whom I wish to express my thanks.

is kept up to date by *New Studies*, published monthly from September through June under the direction of *The American Behavioral Scientist*.

3. *The Universal Reference System* (New York: Universal Reference System, P. O. Box 262, Cooper Station, New York, N. Y. 10003). A computerized documentation and information retrieval system designed by Professor Alfred de Grazia. It covers books, articles, and documents, annotated and indexed in depth (an average of 16 cross-references per document). Ten volumes will be cumulatively published on a two-year rotation cycle in these fields: International Affairs; Legislative Processes, Representation and Decision-making; Bibliography of Bibliographies in Political Science; Administrative Management: Public and Private Bureaucracy; Current Events and Problems of Modern Society; Public Opinion, Mass Behavior and Political Psychology; Law, Jurisprudence, and Judicial Process; Economic Regulation, Business, and Government; Public Policy and the Management of Science; and Comparative Government and Cultures. The first volume of 3040 documents was published in 1965, and an updated version with various format improvements will be published in May, 1967. The second volume will be published in June, 1967, and the remaining volumes by the end of this year. Semiannual supplements are planned for June and December, carrying document listings as late as a month before issue.

4. *The ACLS Constituent Society Journal Project.* The American Council of Learned Societies, in conjunction with New York University's Institute for Computer Research in the Humanities, is establishing a Bibliographical Data Processing Center. One of its first projects is to compile author-prepared abstracts from leading journals in the social sciences and humanities (including the *American Anthropologist, American Economic Review, American Historical Review,* AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, *American Sociological Review, Daedalus, Journal of Legal Education, Philosophical Review,* and *Speculum*). The data will be processed to produce both an annual index of constituent society journals and specialized indices for interdisciplinary concerns.

5. *Bulletin Analytique de Documentation Politique, Economique, et Social Contemporaine* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1946– ; issued bimonthly). Under the auspices of the Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, this is a classified index to cover 1300 French and foreign journals dealing with social and political questions. Contains descriptive annotations on articles treating political affairs.

* * *

These are the principal bibliographical aids presently available, and many, especially the collections of abstracts, provide more comprehensive and useful services than the REVIEW can with its selected bibliographies. Most bibliographers are convinced that the next decade will see major improvements in the coverage, utility, and lower costs of these services and the development of new ones. Insofar as the American Political Science Association can and should provide bibliographical and other services to its members, it should surely use the best technology it can; and the officers and National Office are presently exploring the question of what the Association might do to provide these services more efficiently and economically. It is my hope that the valuable contributions made in the past by the REVIEW's overworked and underpaid bibliographers will be matched and exceeded by services made possible by the new technology.

BOOK REVIEWS

A Systems Analysis of Political Life. By DAVID EASTON. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 1965. Pp. xvi, 507. $8.95.)

A major step in recent political theory was the publication in 1953 of David Easton's *The Political System.* Unquestionably the best political science work of the year (and, indeed, too original to qualify for formal awards at a time when "system" and "systems analysis" had not yet become fad words), this book provided a tightly argued clarion call on behalf of a new conceptual framework that would both (1) "specify the varieties of data involved in the analysis of any political relations" and (2) provide "categories for examining the moral premises out of which the theory itself emerged" (p. 319).

It also became the basis of the author's long-range work plan. His *Framework for Political Analysis* (1965) went beyond exhortation by sketching in the bare bones skeleton of a "systems" framework for the analysis of political life. The present book, the third in a series that hopefully will be much more than the author's

announced tetralogy, begins to put flesh on the bones.

The first of these three books helped political scientists in many countries appreciate the difference between genuine theory and the textual exegesis or disorderly moralizing that have so often been passed on to students as "political theory." The detailed concepts in *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* will help illuminate inquiry into *any* of the traditional fields of specialization: from legislative to judicial or administrative behavior, from comparative government to international relations, from constitutional law to parties and elections. They have already been—and will increasingly be—of great value to careful fact gatherers, narrow gauge theorists and broader gauge theorists. The book has already become, in my judgment, "must reading" for any serious students or investigators of political action—no matter what their disciplinary base. A scholar's ability to use Easton's ideas on the input of demands and support, on outputs, and on feedback (together with an awareness of their limitations) will probably become an "acid test" differentiating between those engaged on the frontiers of creative political research and theory and the "obsolescents" (including many chronologically younger men) who shrink from the personal re-tooling required for the absorption of new concepts.

Moreover, the Eastonian system concepts represent a technologically-advanced take-off into historically higher levels of conceptual sophistication and theoretical discourse. Easton goes far beyond the simpler models found in physical, chemical, machine and biological systems. He is not led astray by "scientoid" ideas of a system as something that must necessarily be expressed in mathematical symbols or become the basis of computerized data processing. Distinguishing carefully between *outputs* and their consequences (which he calls *outcomes*), he helps unravel one of the knots that the Rand Corporation econometricians tied into the Federal government's new budgeting system (PPBS) by clumsily equating information on outputs with information on benefits or outcomes (David Novick, *Program Budgeting*, 1965, p. xii).

In the give-and-take of academic discourse, any presumably comprehensive treatise provides a built-in weakness for its readers and a built-in line of defense for its author. The weakness is that its grand sweep will stimulate attentive readers to think of new ideas, improve some old ones and then ungratefully use both to charge the author with sins of omission. The defense—particularly with someone who has publicly announced a serialized version—is "Wait for the next volume—or the one after that. . . ." For this reviewer, such a defense is highly plausible—particularly since Easton's theoretical output over the past dozen years has been an invaluable input in converting me from a "primitive Bentleyian" (and politico-bureaucratic activist) into a "primitive social systems analyst." Accordingly, I shall briefly identify four areas in which much greater progress is needed if a systems analysis of political life is to be made more fruitful.

First of all, it is essential to provide a conceptual framework for dealing directly with the changing structure of a system as well as its activities (or "performance" or "functioning"). Reacting against static oversimplifications dealing only with structure, Easton has gone to the other extreme of postponing direct concern with structural elements. As a result, his entire approach to structure is over-static, ignoring the possibility that both structure and performance may be viewed as aspects of social process. (Gross, *The State of the Nation*, in Bauer, ed. *Social Indicators*, 1966). Through the back door, he brings various aspects of structure into the joints and crannies of his model. While suggesting certain structural components of a political system as a whole (the political community, the regime and the authorities), he has not yet provided the analytical concepts needed to analyze the concrete subsystems of a system.

Second, it is essential to deal with many other dimensions of performance beyond a system's mere persistence. We need concepts that allow us to answer—and, indeed, ask in very specific terms—the question: "How does a system perform in producing various kinds, quantities and qualities of output that may meet the needs (or satisfy the interests) of such-and-such kinds of people and groups?" We must be able to distinguish between those aspects of a system that remain more stable and those that change more rapidly. We must be sophisticated enough to recognize that often a system may persist—as the American political system has done—only by major changes in many fundamental aspects. The Easton model would need some drastic surgical operations, I would suggest, if it were applied to the past and/or future performance of the American system.

Third, it is essential to deal explicitly and substantively with the kind of interests, or values, that may be served by political action. Otherwise, it is impossible to recognize the tremendous power of the vast network of common (as well as changing and conflicting) in-

terests that help hold a society together and induce change in it. Otherwise, interest group theory becomes a recipe for "sterile negativism or formalism" rather than a tool for analyzing or shaping "the profusion of common interests, a profusion so rich that it can never be expressed, without serious distortion, in any single formula" (Gross, *The Managing of Organizations*, 1964, pp. 525–530). Unfortunately, Easton has thus far deferred action on his 1953 objective of providing "categories for examining the moral premises out of which the theory itself emerged." Indeed, firmly rejecting his 1953 prescription that the student of general theory seek "moral clarity" by devoting "serious attention to a constructive approach to his values," his two subsequent volumes rate high on the scale of moral *unclarity*.

Fourth, it is essential to deal with political life in all important dimensions. Here, one may accept the traditional assumption (as Easton has done) that nature is organized into disciplines the same way as universities are. This allows him to distinguish between a polity, an economy, a culture, and so on. But then one should also be expected to provide the conceptual equipment for dealing with the interrelations among these disciplinary "entities." This Easton has not yet done—as illustrated, for example, by the inadequacy of his model to deal with the role of wealth in American politics or the political aspects of such economic objectives as economic stability, economic growth or a "Great Society." Another alternative is to embark on the more difficult effort to deal with—in the words of Lasswell and Kaplan—"the political aspect of the social process in its entirety" (*Power and Society*, 1950, p. xvii). To do this, however, one must go much further than Easton has yet attempted in utilizing, and improving upon, concepts from other disciplines. If one accepts to some extent the Aristotelian dream of political science as a master science, one must work toward mastering at least some aspects of other disciplines. One must abandon the bureaucratic illusion that one can understand political life without looking directly at the society as a whole, its subsystems, its environment and the political aspects of all three. Here is the major weakness in the Easton tetralogy. *a pre-sputnik model, conceived of in disciplinary terms, has been rigidly adhered to at the very time when the forward thrust in systems analysis, is inter- or supra-disciplinary.*

These four areas are something more than gaps to be filled by plugging up some holes with mortar or putty. I hope that the Easton model will persist in time not by mere embellishment of the original blueprint but by creative adaptations that will, among other things, deal more explicitly with system structure (and structure-performance interrelations), with the multi-dimensionality of performance (in terms that will allow one to appraise all significant changes, whether for better or worse), with the interests of people and groups, and the "social process in its entirety." Finally, I believe that the author can deal most fruitfully with the many items on his own agenda of unfinished model-building business only by subjecting his improved concepts to the test of specific application to political change in at least one or two countries.

BERTRAM M. GROSS
Syracuse University

Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. EDITED BY ROBERT A. DAHL. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. xix, 458. $10.00.)

In this volume ten eminent authors from seven countries discuss the nature of, and trends in, political opposition in nine Western European nations and the United States. Most of the stock-in-trade of symposium reviewers applies: the contributions follow no standard format, are uneven in quality, and so on. Nevertheless, the book is an unusually meritorious example of the genre. All of the case-studies are at least good and some (e.g., Dahl on America, Rokkan on Norway, Daalder on the Netherlands) outstanding; nothing has been included solely because it could not, in good grace, be excluded. Best of all, the editor, Dahl, does not supply only the usual perfunctory preface but makes an extensive effort at generalization that is simultaneously summary, original theorizing, and an agenda for further work. This effort consumes about seventy large pages, constituting virtually a book in itself, and alone deserves a more extensive review than the present space permits.

* * *

Since the ten case-studies reveal no single pattern of "Western democratic opposition," Dahl begins his summing up with a typology of oppositions, not, incidentally, confined to the cases covered in the book. The least to be said for this exercise in classification is that it is carried out in the proper form, even if not altogether well in content. For once we do not simply get a set of arbitrarily selected and vaguely defined labels to attach somehow to phenomena. Dahl's procedure is to ask on what dimensions patterns of opposition vary, how they vary on these dimensions, and to what

extent and in what ways variations on the dimensions cluster. The result is a conceptual scheme allowing one to distinguish specific patterns of opposition in detail and with precision, yet in a way immediately suitable to comparison and generalization. Other taxonomists would do well to follow suit.

Dahl's first dimension is *concentration*—the number of political "firms," as it were, in the political market and their internal unity. Four variations on this dimension are given: two-party sytsems with high unity, two-party systems with low unity, and multiparty systems with high/low unity. This does not strike me as satisfactory. It pertains only to parties, and since opposition is defined by Dahl as attempting to "change the conduct of government" in some manner, his subject includes also other units (e. g., pressure groups, political movements, revolutionary organizations) which, in fact, play a role elsewhere in the discussion. Moreover, the first variation, while logically possible, is empirically dubious. Britain is cited as an example, but much good work, especially Richard Rose's, warns us against taking too seriously parliamentary appearances; besides, it seems on the face of it unlikely that in a large society any two political "units" representing virtually all interests and opinions could really be "unities." It might be better to use the concentration dimension to distinguish tendencies to combine and cooperate as durable strategies for changing the conduct of government in a more general sense. Some interesting things then turn up: for instance, that the Scandinavian and British pressure group systems are very similar (one organized national group for every major "interest") despite differences in the party systems.

The second dimension is *competitiveness*—in effect, the extent to which parties actually oppose one another so that a single "winner" is identifiable in key electoral and parliamentary contests. Again, four variations are supplied: strictly competitive party systems (Britain), cooperative-competitive ones (USA, France, Italy), coalescent-competitive (Austria) and strictly coalescent ones (Uruguay). Here too there are difficulties additional to the restriction of the scheme to parties. The first variation happens to be very unlikely because, as Dahl himself says, it requires, at a minimum, a very rare kind of party system. The fourth is incongruous, because strict coalescence surely equals the absence of opposition. And the other two only distinguish inter-party cooperation and coalescence, which may not be much of a distinction. To make the competitiveness dimension more discriminating, and useful beyond the study of parties, it could perhaps be divided into two: *scope of competition*, referring to how much is contested in a polity, i.e., how extensive the political market is, and *competitive power*, referring to the likelihood of opposition units realizing their goals, much as one might speak of the competitive power of economic firms. (In fact, since Dahl has written so widely and well on political economy, it seems surprising that he did not make more general use of analogies between economic and political "markets" and "firms.")

The other dimensions Dahl uses are *site* (i.e., the decisive arenas of political competition), *distinctiveness* (a product of the first three, hence perhaps dispensable), *goals* and *strategies* (which are self-explanatory). These are all handled well, despite room for improvement; they are not confined to parties and make distinctions that discriminate. And it should be added that Dahl is agile and elegant in interrelating his variables, although he does not, in the end, identify overall typological clusters of them.

* * *

The next step in the analysis is to ask what causes different patterns of opposition. Dahl's answer is complex. Five "primary conditions" are discussed: (1) *constitutional structure and electoral systems*, including the existence of a separation of powers, federalism, and P R, and changes in the formal powers of the executive; (2) *shared cultural premises*, i.e., whether people are on the whole allegiant to or alienated from their polity, trustful towards others, cooperative or not, and pragmatic or "rationalistic" (abstract, dogmatic, deductive) in problem-solving; (3) *the existence of distinct subcultures*, especially ethnic, religious, linguistic, and regional ones; (4) *the record of grievances*, i.e., output successes or failures by the authorities and the extent of civic incorporation of low-status groups; and (5) *social and economic cleavages*, such as class, status, occupation, religion, ethnicity, and language—these, presumably, if not foci of actual subcultures. The primary conditions operate on politics through an "intervening factor," the *specific pattern of cleavage, conflict, and agreement in* (political?) *attitudes*, including their distribution, coincidence, intensity, and institutional aggregation. (Dahl actually lists a second intervening factor, *polarization*, but this surely is just one form that patterns of conflict and agreement may take.) These factors are not merely listed but their effects on patterns of opposition are specified in an impressive array of exact hypotheses and less-exact speculations.

Without doing much research it is difficult to argue against any of Dahl's hypotheses, all being at least plausible. One may feel qualms, however, about the whole. Dahl presents a kind of multivariate analysis that has lately been very popular in political sociology, but raises serious misgivings. Not only are a great many explanatory variables cited, but each is considered capable of varying independently of the others (anyway "within limits" that are not specified), including even, within narrower limits, the intervening variable; and interplay between any two or more of them, it is argued, may be reinforcing, offsetting, or non-existent. If this is really so, it is unlikely that any generalization based on the scheme could be falsified even with much research. If opposition pattern X is attributed in one system to variable A, it will be useless, as falsification, to show that A did not lead to X in others, for that may be due to B, C, or D, or the different interplays of A with B, C, D in different cases. Multivariate theories of this type display a becoming modesty and sense of complexity, but they also work against testing and may be used too readily for an immodest purpose: saving any pet generalization. Hence, especially early in inquiry, it may be better to use fewer variables, and/or to assume their close interdependence, and/or to specify an order of potency for them. Dahl says, in defense, that the case-studies identify the variables he uses and point to their independence or erratic interplay. So they do; but perhaps only because they are done in so many different ways and, on the whole, less systematically than his own contribution.

Nevertheless the analysis teems with hypotheses, all eminently testable if we ignore or modify the overall approach. And some of them are very intriguing—for example, the argument that intense conflicts, in certain forms, encourage heterogeneous and conciliatory coalitions.

* * *

The final chapter deals, refreshingly for a work of this kind, mainly with normative problems, specifically with how much opposition and what kinds are most desirable in democracies, assuming numerous value standards that range from liberty of thought and expression to the effective resolution of urgent policy problems. This is a model exercise in relating political sociology to political evaluation—just as the whole book may serve as a model for the useful conduct of symposia among senior political scientists representing rather divergent political-science "cultures."

Despite its great merits, however, it left me wondering about which is the better approach to collaborative work: using a diversified team of established All-Stars who, inevitably, each go largely their accustomed ways, and do it very well—or using a less eminent group, more harmonious and more amenable to direction. Athletic coaches, I believe, have strong and well-founded views on which of the two tends to make the stronger team.

HARRY ECKSTEIN
Princeton University

The Communist Controversy in Washington —From the New Deal to McCarthy. BY EARL LATHAM. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 446. $7.95.)

While one may be certain that such a tremendous historical experience as that which passed into history as McCarthyism will be written about from many angles of vision by many scholars—and indeed much has already been published on this subject—it will be a long time before a scholar produces a better study than Professor Earl Latham's recent book on *The Communist Controversy in Washington*. Of course no one would venture to suggest that this book is the last word on the subject, but it certainly supplies the best scholarly analysis we now have of an important period of American history, the inner meaning of which has, from the beginning, been debated by observers and students of the American scene.

This volume is the tenth in a series on Communism in American life which was sponsored by the Fund for the Republic under the general editorship of Professor Clinton Rossiter of Cornell University. These ten books, including two notable volumes by Theodore Draper and one by David A. Shannon, add up to an important analysis of the Communist problem in the United States. Among them Latham's book stands out as a learned and sharply analytical study of Communist activity in the federal government from the beginning of the 1930's to the sudden demise of McCarthyism with the condemnation of the Wisconsin Senator by the Senate for unsenatorial conduct on December 2, 1954.

The historical record which Latham has spelled out rests upon a close study of innumerable public documents, and a vast miscellaneous literature which includes magazine articles, newspaper items, books and pamphlets. The documentation is full and very impressive. Obviously the book was written with great care and with close attention to accuracy in detail. While the author records the

story of an historical epoch, albeit a recent one, this book is not straight history, but is, rather, history as told by an experienced, reflective political scientist who brings to his work a large body of knowledge about the structure and style of American government and politics. Latham has not only attempted to write up the historical record of Communism in Washington since the early New Deal days, but has also asked important questions as to how and why things happened and what they meant.

One of the basic conclusions of this book is that there had been, during the pre-war years, no planned and premeditated infiltration of federal agencies, according to some master plan, by the Communists. But the growth of the civil service which began with the swift expansion of governmental services in 1933 did facilitate the entry of members of the Communist Party into federal agencies, and finding them there, the Party found things for them to do. These Party members, who formed study groups, were scattered about in various agencies, and the total before the war was not very large; Chambers guessed there were about 75 among the half-million federal workers in Washington. There were small concentrations in a few key spots, such as the Department of Agriculture and the National Labor Relations Board. The aim of these groups was to promote left tendencies in governmental policy; they were not organized primarily for espionage, though there was some later on; and they did not succeed in achieving their objectives. Nevertheless, speaking generally, Latham concludes that even if exaggeration is discounted, there was "substantial" Communist activity in the government which may be characterized as "not negligible." It is recalled that during the war the Soviet Union was our gallant ally, and that this created a "hospitable public attitude" towards the Soviet Union. It should be added that as this story is developed, one is impressed by the ability of some of the Communists who held responsible positions in the government; they may have been dupes, but they were not dopes.

It is against the background of Communist activity in the federal government, and the "loss" of China, an event which Latham surveys in great depth, that Senator McCarthy rose to sudden prominence in 1950. The painful story of the McCarthy activities is reviewed, and while Latham concludes that there were Communists and fellow travelers in or near the State Department, that there was unwarranted access to classified information, and that security procedures in the forties were sadly lax, he rejects the notion that there had been a subversive conspiracy in the making of foreign policy. The thesis that conspirators in the State Department were responsible for "giving" China to the Communists is rejected not only as untenable, but as tending to detract from a true appreciation of what actually happened. Latham's general conclusion is that McCarthy's hearings turned up very little that was not previously known, and contributed nothing to the national security. On the other hand, he encouraged an "American Underground" in the government to feed to him and his staff "information, rumors, gossip, spite, and malice," thus maintaining "a state of high neurotic tension," and encouraging administrative disloyalty in several agencies.

What was the central meaning of McCarthyism? As we look back over the recent past, this is the most arresting question posed by Latham. Taking his cue from the astonishingly abrupt and complete deflation of McCarthy after the Senate voted its condemnation in 1954, the author concludes that the explanation is to be found primarily in the general pattern of American party politics. He argues that after the New Deal had run its course, the conservative forces in both political parties were frustrated in their quest for national power for an unusually long time—in 1940 by FDR's third term, in 1944 by the war and the fourth term, and in 1948 by Truman's wholly unexpected victory in a badly divided electorate which couldn't make up its mind. Thus the Republican victory of 1952 was very late in coming, and the cutting edge of all the frustration that had accumulated by then was the Communist issue. But once Eisenhower came to power, the issue disappeared. Of course, other scholars have offered other explanations for the phenomenon of McCarthyism—such as those which were couched in terms of mere demagoguery, or incipient totalitarianism, or latter-day populism, or status politics—but Latham offers very persuasive reasons for rejecting them, just as he rejects right-wing explanations, such as the simplistic notion that McCarthyism was merely a slanderous invention of its pro-Communist enemies. Latham does not assert that McCarthyism was nothing more than a narrowly political phenomenon, but he does make a very convincing argument for the proposition that it was a political phenomenon, and that as such it was largely an agent of fundamentalist conservatism, long frustrated in its search for power. This is a wholly sensible thesis, one which Latham has spelled out in a very impressive book.

DAVID FELLMAN
University of Wisconsin

The Territorial Imperative. A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations. By Robert Ardrey. (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1966. Pp. 390. $6.95.)

There is some ground for dismay in noting the large number of books that have had enormous impact in political science but have been written by outsiders, by those who did not dwell in academia or if they did, made and tested their constructs with tools unfamiliar to political scientists. A classic case is Thomas Hobbes, who was mostly despised and rejected by Oxonians and Cantabrigians. Others include Roberto Michels for his *Political Parties*, Sigmund Freud, the Lynds and their *Middletown*, Erich Fromm with his *Escape from Freedom*, Else Frenkel-Brunswik and her collaborators in *The Authoritarian Personality*, Eric Hoffer with his *True Believer*, and Erik Erikson with his identity crisis—so exquisitely elaborated in the *Young Man Luther*. Ardrey's *Territorial Imperative* is another such analysis, written by a former playwright whose academic qualifications rest on his graduation, Phi Beta Kappa, from the University of Chicago in 1930. The book hammers away at a thesis and in the process forges another basic, hitherto neglected unit of analysis for politics.

Ardrey's central thesis is this: that man is so constituted by his genetic inheritance as to require the possession of territory in order to fulfill his most basic needs. Territory is not one of these needs but a condition for their fulfillment. He strongly suggests that this demand for land is more basic than for a sex partner, that it is the antecedent for marriage among men and is necessary to assure the care of the young. And he strongly declares that the territorial imperative underlies the behavioral syndrome called international war. He cites, as evidence of the depth of the impulse to defend one's own, the tenacity during the Second World War of the Finnish resistance to the Soviet armies and the Greek struggle against both Italian and German troops. He describes how American public opinion, disjointed with doubts and indecision, suddenly articulated and moved to action within hours after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

The tenacious roots of this human attachment to delimited space Ardrey finds in the long process of evolution. He describes what he calls territorially defined nations among some primates, and suggests but does not insist that the origins are much more protean, observable among ants and perhaps in colonies of protozoa. He repeatedly emphasizes that territory is not a cause but a condition of both cooperation and conflict, not a basic need but a necessary means of satisfying needs.

The basic needs are three: security as opposed to anxiety, stimulation vs. boredom, and identity vs. anonymity. All activity—including sex, the acquisition of land, and by inference all political activity—relates to the frustration and satisfaction of these basic needs. Love is not a need but a response to a need. There may be a bit of innate amity in man, but roughly in the proportion of gold suspended in seawater.

In his thesis about territoriality, Ardrey is on what appears to be solid ground. It isn't just that he has spent many years in field research among higher vertebrates in Africa and in library research among the journals. These facts lend a vigor and freshness to his writing. It is also that his thesis is plausible and helps untangle many puzzling political phenomena.

But there is a more fundamental argument in the book which merits, if anything, closer attention than the territorial hypothesis. This is the argument that man is not only physically—i.e., in his anatomy—the product of millions of years of evolution but that he is also mentally a product of evolution. Some would consider this a grave charge. I consider it a serious assertion, for and against which the evidence needs to be gathered and appraised.

There has been a long series of blows to the pride of men, notably since the mid-nineteenth century. Darwin asserted our bodily continuity with lower animals. Freud asserted that our actions were determined to an enormous extent by our unconscious impulses—by forces of which we were largely (and remain largely) unaware. Ardrey now asserts a mental, behavioral continuity of man with the lower animals. And unfortunately his knowledge of the work of psychologists studying human behavior does not match his knowledge of animals.

René Spitz studied the sometimes lethal effects of maternal deprivation on children; Harry Harlow similarly studied the effects of substituting wire-and-cloth mothers for real mothers among rhesus monkeys. The many-linked chain between infantile emotional deprivation and political behavior has been unexamined, also by Ardrey. But he boldly reminds us that links between human and animal behavior exist, whether or not we examine them, and that if we fail to do so, we will be basing not only our private law but also our public law and public policy—foreign as well as domestic—on ignorance. Specifically, Ardrey is amazed at the ignorance which led to the savage land collectivization program in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and -30s and amused at the acknowledgment of the critical role for food production of the non-socialist private family plot. And he is amazed that the United States policy in Vietnam should be expected to

succeed when Vietnamese see it as a defense of their own land against external, Occidental aggression.

Ardrey's writing is at times polemical. He blames both John B. Watson and Freud for the tendency of people to blame society or someone other than themselves for their actions. He blasts Rousseau as an incredible optimist for his fancies about the state of nature and yet Ardrey describes himself as optimistic. He fears the tendency to link the environmentalists with liberalism and hereditarians with conservatism. What with the conservatism of J. B. Watson and the liberalism of Rousseau and Jefferson—the latter two hereditarians if I ever heard of any—his anxiety is ill-founded. And he ignores the frightful consequences of racism for politics, perhaps because this would becloud his argument about the evolutionary (i.e. genetic) origin of territoriality.

His concluding argument is that man is not the only but the latest moral agent in the process of genetic evolution. He logically implies that some of our morality is indeed more than convention and indeed is attuned to our genetic, unnurtured nature. Whatever portion of the morality of the unbuttoned 1920s was indeed attuned to our human nature, we political scientists can not in the 1960s escape the scientific and moral responsibility of recognizing and appraising the hypothesis of territoriality. As Ardrey says, we may not only be scientifically wrong but also end up physically dead, because conquest is against each man's natural tendencies to defend his own and a worldwide testing of the proposition could be quite lethal.

JAMES C. DAVIES

University of Oregon

Aus Naechster Naehe—Lebenserinnerungen 1884–1927. By ARNOLD BRECHT. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1966. Pp. 528. DM 38.)

These reminiscences of the justly famous author of *Political Theory* possess an unusual interest for the political scientist. For they contain a detailed account of the author's practical experiences in the Germany not only of the Weimar Republic where he occupied offices of high responsibility, but of the last decade of the moribund empire as well. Not all of his experiences are related; for another volume is to follow which will cover the years up to the seizure of power by Hitler and his work as a teacher and scholar after his emigration to America in 1933. Here is a life to inspire the political scientist by its impressive combination of theory and practice, the life of a truly great man whose depth of feeling, sincerity and strength can be sensed on every page, and whose real modesty is the true measure of his moral stature.

The work is divided into seven parts which deal with his youth, far removed from politics (politikferne Jugend); his political awakening; followed by three stages of "political education": the end of the war, the revolution and Weimar Republic's beginnings. He further discusses, in Part VI, the problems created for new German democracy by the disappearance of a majority in favor of democracy, and in the last part he describes his labors as a reformer and high official in the Reich Ministry of the Interior. The ongoing tale of his life and works is at times halted for a broad and philosophical look around, as in Ch. 23 where Brecht discusses in basic terms the problem "democracy and constitution," or Ch. 30 which addresses itself to "thoughts on the disappearance of democratic majorities under a democratic constitution." But the author's theorizing is not limited to these broader reflections, but turns up at many points, always interesting, at times challenging.

Brecht tells us in his preface that he was much torn between writing either this book (and its sequel) or the second volume of his *Political Theory* or a "constitutional history of mankind," and that he finally decided to give preference to this work, since at the age of eighty one has to reckon that the decision for one is the decision against the other, and that only *he* himself could have written *this* book, whereas the others might be written by someone else; a capable political scientist might carry out his ideas on political theory, for example. While this reviewer doubts that anyone could, or if he could, would, he is still satisfied that Brecht made the right decision, especially if he should succeed in completing the work. For in these pages one encounters such a happy marriage of theory and practice, so many differentiated judgments on very concrete practical situations in the light of theory, and such penetrating theorizing based upon concrete practical experience, that these memoirs are in the best sense a work of applied theory.

Take for example Brecht's discussion or rather his "thoughts" on the loss of prodemocratic majorities under a democratic constitution (Ch. 30). This was in his view the situation in the Weimar Republic after 1920. He comments that the truly astounding thing is not that "formal democracy collapsed thirteen years later in Germany," but that "this did not happen much sooner." In any case, it was the "deadly worm which caused its death." He believes that the main reason for formal democracy's surviving for so long was that the antidemocratic majority was split into two or

more parts. Even so, the situation was desperate, and the prodemocratic minority had only two possibilities of operating under the democratic and parliamentary system: they either had to form a minority government which could be overthrown any day, or they had to form a coalition with antidemocratic and antirepublican parties. This latter "solution" was bound to produce weak governments, because such a government could not pursue an unequivocally prodemocratic, prorepublican, antiauthoritarian and antimonarchical policy. It is therefore a mistake to condemn or ridicule the political leaders of the Weimar Republic: anyone who was prepared to follow the democratic rules of the game was at the outset condemned to appear "weak," no matter how able he was and how great his capacity for political leadership. Stresemann illustrates the point; others never got a chance. Brecht defends the Social Democrats particularly against the recurrent claim that they should have erected a true democracy; for the democracy which they had instituted was condemned to failure by the disappearance of prodemocratic majorities.

I am not quite sure that this defense is wholly adequate. For the appearance of the antidemocratic majorities—only after 1920—is itself part of the argument. I am not convinced that much more vigorous, and indeed revolutionary proceedings against the old "establishment" in the high bureaucracy, the army and business leadership might not have made a difference. I am inclined to think also that what might have encouraged the prodemocratic elements among the younger generation was a radical transformation of such preserves of reaction as the universities—the prodemocratic professor of public law in my university was prevented from lecturing in the winter of 1919/20 by a minority of nationalist rowdies among the students without any attempt made by the authorities at maintaining even mere public order.

Take the case of Rathenau, the brilliant exponent of the policy of fulfillment (of the Versailles treaty's provisions on reparations), who was murdered by the same elements cynically described by von Salomon in his too little-known *Die Geaechteten*. Some of the most moving pages in Brecht's book are devoted to this man who was an admired friend of the author and to his policy. Brecht invites the reader to look at these events from the point of view of a high civil servant. He rightly stresses the antisemitic aspect. He does not tell of that horrible view, reported by von Salomon, that when one of these murderers greatly impressed by a speech of Rathenau raised the question whether it would be right to kill him, another answered: just *because* he is so great, we must kill him. But Brecht says rightly that "Rathenau's 'elimination' became the typical example for the kind of thinking and acting and of the lack of resistance which later occurred under the National Socialists." This is true, and it seems to me the basic political problem, when the weakness of democracy after 1919 is at issue. Brecht contributes much to a better understanding of this absorbing topic. At the same time, he has left not only to his many friends but to generations to come a moving story of the political education of an outstanding German-American of our generation.

CARL J. FRIEDRICH
Harvard University

The Washington Community 1800–1828. By JAMES STERLING YOUNG, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 307. $7.95.)

Among our enduring myths about the American past is a belief that political parties, though not mentioned in the Constitution, and alluded to only disparagingly in the 10th Federalist, quickly established themselves in the new Republic, one group coalescing around Alexander Hamilton in the Washington Administration, and the other around Thomas Jefferson. Rivalry between these groups extended over a substantial number of issues (bankers vs. planters, England vs. France) and back into the states, where local political organizations sprang up. At the seat of government, rivalry was focused in particular in Congress, where caucuses of copartisans from the earliest years effectively organized legislative programs and also met to determine their respective Presidential nominations.

To those attentive to the struggles of contemporary new nations in establishing political institutions on some sort of firm footing, this must seem an incredible success story. No one has ever satisfactorily accounted for the astounding rapidity with which American political parties were supposed to have established themselves. And so, in retrospect, it should not come as too great a shock to learn that a new, hard look at the available evidence at the national level suggests that the American party system got off to a much slower start than we had formerly thought.

Among the many virtues of *The Washington Community 1800–1828* is the fact that it is genuinely a reconstruction of the origins of American national politics, using materials that had been in plain sight, but neglected by a

long generation of scholars intent upon establishing continuity between the present and the past. The perspective of this book relies less upon the tunnel vision of hindsight; it summons up a Jeffersonian era in which the future is open and the present filled with risks, alternatives, and possibilities.

The national government in the Jeffersonian era is described in this book as insignificant, removed from the sight of ordinary citizens, small, ill-housed, inefficiently run by transients and moonlighters, lacking in resources and physically planned so as to minimize easy concourse between its branches. Politics without institutions is invariably ideological politics. The prevailing ideology of the Jeffersonian era prized independence and intransigence, despised political professionalism, and adhered to the view that constitutional separations of power were proper prescriptions for informal behavior.

Thus the book is, in a way, a tribute to the statecraft of Thomas Jefferson, the first genuine consensus politician under the Constitution who, for a brief time, by great intelligence, charm and exertion overcame the disintegrative tendencies of the system sufficiently to enact what was, after all, predominantly a conservative program. But after Jefferson came "subdivisions and factions," "embarrassments of government," the impairment of public confidence (the quotes are from Secretary Gallatin), the entire panoply of ills that we have come to associate with the pre-institutionalized politics of new nations.

The Executive branch for the last two decades of the Jeffersonian era featured not Presidential leadership, but the "separate battalions"—social and political—of the cabinet, each officer making his own deals with Congress. On Capitol Hill, if there was party government or party cohesion or party organization, Professor Young cannot find it in the record. Congress at the time seems to have been run by cliques from the various boarding houses in which Congressmen made their homes while temporarily in the capital without their families, there to perform their hasty and meagerly rewarded duties as part-time representatives. To be sure these cliques were formed partially along sectional and partisan lines but Young is able to demonstrate that these primary groups were important in the lives of Congressmen independent of section and certainly of party.

All these disintegrative tendencies make for pessimistic reading; the one ray of hope at the end is a premonition that as the new government blunders from crisis to crisis, and gathers popular attention, people will begin to see the possibilities in a political vocation, ambitions will begin to focus upon the machinery of national politics, and institution-building can begin. But this process is not really a part of the Jeffersonian era as Young portrays it; the birth of national political institutions must await a later moment in history.

Too briefly, this is what *The Washington Community 1800–1828* seems to me to be about: it is a comprehensive description of Congress and the Excutive during the Jeffersonian era, an ingenious theory of why they were as they were, and a major critique and revision of current conceptions of the growth of American political institutions. It will be a long while before the insights of this book are thoroughly digested, mastered, debated and superseded by further research. In the meantime *The Washington Community* will be indispensable as a guide and a challenge to serious students of American national politics.

NELSON W. POLSBY
Wesleyan University

Politics in the American States, A Comparative Analysis. ED. BY HERBERT JACOB AND KENNETH N. VINES. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965. Pp. xv, 493. $7.00.)

More than a dozen years have elapsed since Oliver Garceau wrote his influential paper, "Research in State Politics," for the Social Science Research Council. He urged more effort toward systematic comparative study of state politics and suggested some plausible approaches and some caveats. A few of his proposals have been pursued with good results but in some respects we are just about where we were when Garceau wrote his paper. We know more about the recruitment of candidates and legislative behavior than we did then but we are not much ahead on such problems as interest group roles or the variations in operational characteristics of governorships. (Indeed the author who has the greatest difficulty in this present volume is the one who writes on interest groups; he devotes much of his space to the Almond and Verba survey research findings on attitudes about interest groups which do not allow for any significant comparative state analysis at all.)

Thus it is one of the problems of this book that the call to duty on state politics research has not produced enough usable data on the workings of state politics. There are a few regional comparative volumes, some that achieve systematic comparative analysis (like V. O. Key's *American State Politics: An Introduction*), but the total output is still very limited.

The lack of adequate descriptive monographs on state politics leaves us with glaring gaps in our information. We have had many case studies and several analyses of state legislatures, but we still founder when it comes to making firm generalizations about the operational aspects of these wondrously inefficient agencies. We can only say that one observer reports this for one state and another says that about a second, third, or fourth state. The easily gleaned statistical information about legislatures we have in good supply, but the more elusive data—such as the degree of intra-party cohesion in legislatures—are unavailable for almost half the states where it would be meaningful.

In the absence of such data and in the presence of the newer techniques of political science analysis the new generation of researchers do two things: rely on monographic accounts as far as they will take them (and that reliance can be heavy at times: one chapter here has over a hundred footnotes) and then to see whether correlation calculations can reveal factors that significantly affect state politics. Several of the present authors rely heavily on this methodological tool. (Interestingly none of the authors is credited with any publications prior to the time Garceau wrote his S.S.R.C. paper—unless they published works not cited in their brief biographies in this book.) In some cases these approaches produce some new and interesting observations; in others the reader is left in some doubt about the validity of inferences drawn because the statistical evidence seems to prove points that cannot be substantiated by evidence based upon close observation of operational politics.

This is particularly true with regard to the impact of political factors on policy making as opposed to the influence of socio-economic factors. In several chapters the impact of party competition on policy-making is shown by correlational analysis to be unimpressive, but there is little effort to look more closely at the "deviant" cases—states which have high party competition and low welfare allowances, for example, or states with non-competitive parties and relatively high pay-offs. The deviations are often more interesting than the correlations. Only by examining the operational realities of the states will we be able to do what Thomas Dye sets as the objective of his chapter on state legislatures: "... not only to describe these differences from state to state but, more importantly, to explain these differences."

The importance of supplementing statistical inference with direct evidence of political behavior may also be illustrated by the several references to the relatively unimportant role of malapportionment in state policy making. If the statistical rankings lead to doubt that apportionment methods have an effect, should one on that basis conclude that it probably is unimportant? I believe the reality is too complex to be so easily handled. The effects of malapportionment are felt in more ways than through simple rural overrepresentation; malapportionment also affects the chances that there will be divided party government between the governor and one or more houses of the legislature. Or the effects of malapportionment may be dampened by strong party leadership that persuades or pushes the overrepresented elements to go along with policies for the sake of compiling a record for the next gubernatorial election. Malapportionment is therefore not a static and uniform political factor—its consequences may be entirely different in various states, and the measurement of its impact will require us to do more than to rank policy outputs against the degree of malapportionment. For one thing it will be necessary to see in a number of specific cases whether policy-making is significantly affected by divided party control of government, and also what *quid pro quos* the overrepresented areas get as conditions of consent.

The work of the dozen scholars represented here is, for all the criticisms raised, a useful contribution to the long term project of achieving an understanding of state politics on the one hand and for moving toward more sophisticated methods of comparative analysis generally through the examination of fifty similar-but-different states. The authors not only bring some new and interesting evidence to light, they have also shown imagination and inventiveness in their treatment of materials. There is enough descriptive background material to make it quite useful for an advanced course textbook and enough use of new research tools (and appropriate language in analysis) to introduce the student to the argot he will need if he is to be able to read this journal in the years ahead. Indeed I suspect that the book will be useful for two kinds of instructors: those who adhere to and those who suspect the methods employed—the one to illustrate the methods' potential and the other their shortcomings. Finally, the book will have served a highly useful purpose if it spurs more research and monograph writing to test in operational situations the findings that these methods here abundantly provide.

DUANE LOCKARD
Princeton University

Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity. By Peter J. Fliess. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 194. $6.00.)

This is a book on a fascinating topic. It concerns the "international" system of the Greek city-states during the Peloponnesian War, and the characteristics and causes of that conflict. Professor Fliess pursues an analytical study from an explicitly systemic viewpoint. He shares Thucydides' conclusion: "the real though unavowed cause I believe to have been the growth of Athenian power, which terrified the Lacedaemonians and forced them into war." Thus the war stemmed from the nature of the power relationships in the system and not from any deliberate or readily avoidable events, which should be relegated merely to the category of proximate "causes."

There are many obvious points of reference for comparing the Greek city-state system of this period with the international system of the first two decades following 1945. The author carefully resists the temptation to articulate facile comparisons, but the elements of similarity cannot be missed. Most striking is, of course, the bipolar distribution of power in what he establishes was, for the Greek world much as for the present global ordering, essentially a closed system. The role of the barbarians and the Persians was discernible, but never central during these years. The differences between the two major powers, or better the blocs that they led, also strike familiar notes. There are cultural differences (Ionians vs. Doric peoples); constitutional differences (the Athenian-led league was predominantly composed of democratic states with an attractive ideology, the Spartan group by oligarchies); a difference in the organization of the blocs (the Athenian being rather hierarchically organized, the Lacedaemonians more pluralistic among the city-states, though, says the author, Thucydides exaggerated the difference); a naval power against a land based one; and there is also a basically status quo power (Sparta) arrayed against an imperialistic revisionist state (Athens).

Athens' foreign policy difficulties were, he suggests, compounded by the strains a long bipolar struggle imposed upon popular government and mass opinion, leading to rash and emotional commitments to unsupportable adventures. While the pattern of these characteristics does not make a full parallel with the recent past (the democratic states, for instance, are not now the revisionists) it is clear that in recent history great importance has attached to much the same *variables*. Other characteristics of the *total* system also are familiar, such as the critical risk of imbalance and thus an extreme sensitivity by the bloc leaders to any threatened shift of allegiance by an ally or a neutral. Furthermore, his conclusion that the war stemmed inherently from the tensions of such a bipolar system makes irrelevant any attempt to identify either side as aggressor or victim and renders the ideological and constitutional conflict secondary or derivative.

I believe that Professor Fleiss was correct in avoiding any rigid drawing of parallels; his decision merely to make the analogies in fairly low key (especially with his chapter subtitles, such as "Unconditional Surrender or Peace?," and "Power or Principle?") serves his purpose well. But there is a great deal of information and insight both here and in his major source, Thucydides' work itself. Some of the major proponents of simulation maintain that the chief function of simulating the international system is to generate hypotheses. If so, close analysis of the behavior of *actual* political decision-makers in the Greek setting should prove to be an extraordinarily fruitful supplement or substitute for simulation.

My principal objection to the book is that, for all its thought-provoking qualities, it is not systematic enough. Many of the analyses would benefit from tighter logic or definition. He interchangeably describes the system as bipolar and balance of power, and it is only after quite a bit of reading that it becomes clear he intends bipolarity to apply at *all* times, and balance of power is equated not with multipolarity as much of current usage implies, but merely with an unstable equilibrium, Furthermore, his discussion of the role of neutrals is not consistent. At some points we are told that there were few neutrals of any importance; at others the shifts of neutrals to and from alliance are clearly critical and his basic map shows a great deal of territory occupied by neutrals. Partly this inconsistency is due to true change over time, but not all of it. More careful logic here, perhaps with rigorous attention to theories of tight and loose bipolar systems, would add to the value of the book. In fact, a striking omission in this volume by a political scientist is the complete absence of reference to any modern theoretical work on the international system. With this omission the author lost a great opportunity, though the interest provoked by his treatment presents such an opportunity to another scholar. It provides a vital message that may be obvious to the classically trained members of the profession but is often forgotten by younger scholars who lack interest in political philosophy—

Greek theory (Thucydides' is more implicit than a modern writer's would be) and history are very relevant to international politics, especially that of the post World War II era.

BRUCE M. RUSSETT

Yale University

Ideology and Organization in Communist China. By FRANZ SCHURMANN. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966. Pp. xlvi, 540. $12.50.)

This extremely valuable book constitutes a major contribution to the literature of social science and Chinese studies. A professor of history and sociology, Franz Schurmann has brought to bear the best of several disciplines and a panorama of comparative illustrations—drawn largely from relevant Soviet experience—for illuminating Chinese data. His writing reflects painstaking scholarship and demonstrates the intellectual harvest that may be reaped by the systematic treatment of documentary materials and Chinese refugee information.

This, in my judgment, is not a book for the undergraduate or casual reader. In part this stems from the fact that Professor Schurmann has elected to write a very personal study. Organized around several long chapters, the themes flow from the active concerns of the author more than from the subject matter itself. The book does not provide a general theoretical framework as one might expect to find in a sociologist's work or even the careful chronological presentation of an historian. As the author explains, it was necessary for him to operate first on the level of intuition and only after sensing the relevance of China's problems could he decide how to "use the ordering capacities of the mind to construct patterns." He read, listened and discussed his insights until his "confidence in intuition was strong enough." Thereafter he was led to select seven chapter headings: Ideology, Party, Government, Management, Control, Cities, and Villages. Although intellectually valid, this approach to Chinese materials leaves one with the feeling that he has read a series of extremely intelligent essays rather than a well-integrated book. It also means that the reader is presented with the same topical focus in varied contexts and often with radically different methodological assumptions being used. When the wide-ranging comparative data are added, the result is to place an especially heavy burden on the reader.

Nonetheless, this should not be regarded as a serious fault. Rather, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* enters the unique realm of the second-stage studies of Chinese society and these are precisely the type of studies that are most needed. Moreover, few scholars in the field are likely to match the intellectual level of this volume, and we thus owe a considerable debt to Professor Schurmann.

The author's discussion of ideology reveals some important changes from his earlier well-known articles on the subject. As before in his writings the theme of contradictions serves as the leitmotiv, but he seems to have reconsidered fundamentally some aspects of the theory of contradictions as applied to organizations. Most important in this regard, perhaps, is his careful placement of Chinese Communist ideology (*szu-hsiang*) between pure or universal Marxist-type theory and practical operation. In the light of Peking's recent panegyrical descriptions of Mao Tse-tung's thought as having universal significance, that ideology, the author notes, may be undergoing a radical recasting. The chapter on ideology ends with an examination of ideology in action (largely devoted to its function in communications) and "the dialectical conception of Chinese society." The latter section analyzes much of the thinking that went into the Great Leap Forward.

The selection of emphases for the chapters on party and government is a familiar one: structures, membership, meetings and leaders. One of the author's best analyses comes in his differentiation of the concepts of vertical and dual rule in government agencies (pp. 188ff). There then follows an examination of the Communist attempts at decentralization on the eve of the Great Leap Forward. It is in this context that Professor Schurmann sets forth a slightly modified view of leadership factions ("cleavages of opinions"). His argument of this view would seem reasonably persuasive were it not for the fact that the assumptions underlying it seem to have been so thoroughly upset in the recent "great cultural revolution." We cannot in the light of the discrepancies between public speeches and private attitudes revealed in that "revolution" any longer take for granted, as Professor Schurmann does, that such speeches may be legitimately gleaned for solid evidence of the private, even oppositionist, opinions of the speakers.

The discussions of control and cities in Chapters V and VI are also concerned with the predominantly formal aspects of the two subjects. On controls, for example, the author deals especially with economic controls and with the interrelationships between economic and political controls. His study of the little known Harbin system of control work—a network of

powerful accounting offices set up in 1954—is the most thorough presentation of this subject anywhere in the literature.

Though these chapters on ideology, party, government, control and cities will attract a considerable interest among political scientists, by far the most impressive chapters are those on management and the village. Here Professor Schurmann is at his best in comparative analysis and sociological theory and here his contribution is the most original. Although he has written widely and knowledgeably on both these subjects before, his discussion of management and the village marks a significant and often brilliant advance over his previous writings.

In his chapter on the village, for example, the author highlights the effects of the alternating use by the Chinese Communist elite of the "natural" and administrative villages in the political and social transformation of the rural society. This forms the basis for his analysis of the three stages of the social revolution on the land—land reform, cooperativization and communization. Mr. Schurmann concludes with an assessment of these Communist programs in the countryside and notes: "there can be no further phase to the social revolution. The three phases, each of which was aimed at one of the key social groups on the land (landlords, rich peasants, and poor peasants) have exhausted their revolutionary targets. The only revolution that can now follow is the economic revolution which will transform the technological basis of agriculture." The basis has been laid in the past acts of political and social revolution, the author states, for entering into a process of economic development. He considers the foregoing revolutions to have produced the kind of unity and social transformation that are the foundations of further technical and economic progress.

JOHN W. LEWIS

Cornell University

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics. BY MICHAEL WALZER. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. x, 334. $6.95.)

While setting out ostensibly to "make Puritan radicalism, so unattractive to my contemporaries, humanly comprehensible" (p. ix), Professor Walzer has in fact developed a wide-ranging series of conclusions, formulated into a general 'model' intended to complement the Max Weber typology of the emergence of modern systems of rational-legal social organization out of the traditional world. Setting aside at the outset the usual emphasis on the writings of Machiavelli, Luther, Bodin and Hobbes, each of whom in his own way had forcefully described what were still only dimly-perceived characteristics of the new political forms that were emerging out of the breakdown of feudal society, Dr. Walzer brings a knowledge of present day sociological theory to bear on a different aspect of 16th and 17th century intellectual history. His subject is a re-examination of Calvinism, in an attempt at demonstrating its close relationship to the foundation of the specifically modern politics of systematic ideas or ideology, and to the subsequent translation of the notion of politics from one of passivity into another emphasizing its likeness to a form of work, and requiring constant diligence on the part of a group of 'saints' or chosen (or choosing) men, set off from their fellows by a common dedication to the ultimate goal of radical reform.

While the leaning of Luther's theology had been towards a "privately cultivated communion" (p. 25) between God and the Protestant believer, Calvin's speculations, according to Walzer's reading of the *Institutes* and the *Fifth Book of Moses*, tended always to the "practical and social, programmatic and organizational" (pp. 25–26). His teachings appealed as an intellectual balm to remedy the spiritual alienation of the new 'masterless man' in an age of institutional confusion, by offering a fanatical religious discipline based upon a systematic, if equivocal, doctrine of voluntary obedience, expressed within and buttressed by the vigilance of a Christian Commonwealth of the elect. In two "case studies in Calvinist politics," Walzer first shows how in France the movement found its leadership among elements of the aristocracy, and thus the thrust of Huguenot political doctrine tended towards a moderate politics posited on the assumption of "self discipline . . . in the service of constitutional order" (p. 68). In contrast with this line of French Huguenot development, which subsequently provided the notion of "the saint-in-office" (p. 110), Walzer suggests that the English Marian exiles, who settled in Geneva after the accession of the Roman Catholic Mary, found their spiritual authority in a clerical intellectual elite, led by John Knox. Humble men without station, exiled from their country and heritage, they gave expression to their isolation in more extreme political terms, and thus, in Walzer's analy-

sis, "another modern figure was [being] shaped: the saint-out-of-office, the oppositional man, the political radical" (p. 110).

Walzer sees a direct connection between these continental movements and the restatement and culmination of Calvinist inspired political radicalism in 17th century England, an assumption he makes little effort to substantiate. He believes that by refining this new Calvinist political imagery and metaphor, and propagating it through the skilled use of politico-theological sermons, the Puritan clergy of England continued the attack on the traditional imagery of social hierarchy, organic connection and family tie, replacing these with elements of the new ideological firmament. Walzer argues for example that the medieval belief in a 'great chain of being,' joining all things in nature and spirit to a fixed order, was thus chiefly undermined by Puritan manipulation of the notion of a consciously willed covenant that bound together the true believer in the new artificial family of the elect. In place of the time honoured imagery of organicism and cyclical regeneration, the Puritan ideology substituted the analogy of a ship of state, sailing forever the endless sea of statecraft, and finding safe and secure harbours only at the arbitrary will of God. In his advanced view of marriage as an institution founded on rational covenant freely entered into by the participants, and in which obligation stemmed from self-discipline, the Puritan saint was bound further to subvert yet another cherished old belief, the pervasive patriarchal imagery of authority based on the family tie, that was a mainstay of the traditional world-view. Moreover, the alliance of the Puritan clergy with the new English gentry class found ideological expression in the refined Calvinist doctrines of vocation and magistracy, which undermined the political position of the city-based courtier, by creating an intellectual atmosphere in which achievement came to be valued over ancestory. Concurrently, the persistent sermon theme of the saints as a well-disciplined army, engaged in a ceaseless crusade to safeguard the Commonwealth against the forces of Satan, a spirit best represented in Joseph Mead's *Clavis Apocalyptica* (1627), gained steadily until the imagery was transformed into a real military force for repression in practical politics. Ultimately, then, the closed system of Puritan ideas was applied to practice, led to the Civil War, justified the 'legal' execution of Charles I, and formed the religious guide for the foundation of a secular Commonwealth under the watchful eye of the saint.

This extremely compelling and well-written book is bound to appeal more to those who like their history on the grand scale than to those who feel more comfortable closer to the particularist school. It is a work that will be most profitably approached after a good preliminary grounding in the standard histories of political thought for the period, for it is avowedly interpretive. At the most general level of criticism, Dr. Walzer often falls short of adequately placing his subject matter in a specific historical focus, leaving the reader without appropriate terms of reference either for fully understanding the development of his argument, or for a critical assessment of his frequently wide-ranging inferences. Moreover, there is a tendency throughout the book for the author to view his discussion as one of "Calvinist *politics*," when he is in fact confining his attention to a body of reflective literature, only partly political in character, and existing outside the actual arena of politics. These criticisms aside, Walzer's general contribution is to provide evidence of the force of ideas in shaping events during this period of great social upheaval that effectively illustrates the incompleteness of an exclusive attention to the economic determinism of Weber and Tawney. And his enterprising adaptation of the work of recent theorists of political development and revolutionary politics points to further opportunities in related fields of historical investigation that have tended to be neglected by political scientists.
—GEORGE A. FEAVER, *University College London.*

A Survey of Marxism: Problems in Philosophy and the Theory of History. BY A. JAMES GREGOR. (New York: Random House, 1965. Pp. x, 370. $4.95.)

The ABC of Communism. BY N. BUKHARIN AND E. PREOBRAZHENSKY. New Introduction by Sidney Heitman. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966. Pp. 422. $2.95, paper.)

Professor Gregor's book presents us with a survey of Marxist philosophy in its evolution from the young Marx, through the mature Marx, then Engels, Lenin and contemporary Soviet philosophy. In similar fashion, he treats Marxist sociology and history; and, finally, in much more summary fashion, he discusses the reciprocal impact which contemporary natural science and Marxist philosophy had on each other. In this last field, Mr. Gregor has published some interesting articles, but was probably wise in keeping his treatment of this troubled issue to a minimum in the present volume.

His style is brisk and forthright; his attitude critical but sympathetic; his approach is that of analytical philosophy tempered by a commitment to liberal humanist values; his summary, in fine, is eminently competent. This competence, at times, comes close to being a liability, because the author's familiarity with his subject matter prevents him from communicating to the beginning student. Reviewers face similar handicaps: this

reviewer found Mr. Gregor's book lucid and easy to read; but his students complained about its difficulty. Only when he was confronted with these complaints did the reviewer conclude that it might have been useful if Gregor had made a more extensive effort to translate Hegelian into English. A little Hegel is indeed a dangerous thing.

The author's aims are relatively modest: he wishes to provide an introductory survey of the subject. Surprisingly, such a survey has been needed, and the book therefore fills a gap. To be sure, we already have a wealth, if not glut, of one-volume introductions to Marxism. But, with its own judicious combination of simplicity, comprehensiveness, critical detachment, sympathy, and competence, Gregor's volume comes closer to the ideal than any other work I know.

Although its aims are modest, the book makes some original contributions, if only by stating some things with refreshing clarity and forthrightness. Such contributions include a clear and convincing presentation of the argument that Lenin turned Marx upside down and an even clearer marshalling of all support for the thesis that the views of Engels depart significantly from those of Marx. The complications resulting from the attempt made by Engels to incorporate the sexual urge into Marxist sociology and natural evolution into dialectics are shown very ably indeed. In summarizing the evolution of Marxist philosophy and sociology from the young to the mature Marx, Gregor shows far more convincingly than anyone before him the importance of Feuerbach's contribution to Marxist theory. Indeed, Feuerbach, not Marx, emerges as the man who stood Hegel on his feet.

No summary treatment, of course, will ever please another specialist, because some of his favorite topics will inevitably be slighted. This reviewer, for instance, misses a treatment of Marxian economics and, more specifically, the economic analysis of capitalism. Further, he thinks that the concepts of base and superstructure have been presented too skimpily; and, for a professional philosopher like Gregor, it is to be regretted particularly that the concept of ideology, or false consciousness, was not discussed. Finally, the jump from Engels to Lenin seems too wide; it might have been better to discuss the various Marxist schools contending with each other around the turn of the century, partly as background for Leninism, and partly as a bridge to contemporary Western reinterpretations of Marx. These criticisms are petty when compared with the over-all positive appraisal of the book.

The re-issue of the Bukharin-Preobrazhensky classic will be welcomed by all students of communism. For two decades, this book served a similar function for the parties of the Third International as *Anti-Dühring* had served for the parties affiliated with the Second: it was a Marxist primer, written in simple words which tried to translate Marxist jargon into common-sense language. In a way, Bukharin and Preobrazhensky tried to do for younger party members what Gregor sought to do for non-Marxist beginners in the study of communism.

The *ABC of Communism* is a commentary to the Program adopted by the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1919. Like that Program, to which, theoretically, the Party was committed until 1961, the book was written at a dramatic moment—in a period of violent civil war and near-total chaos and ruination, when the new Soviet regime was desperately struggling for survival. Its spokesmen, however, seemed confident that victory would not bring mere survival, but would lead to an instantaneous chain reaction of proletarian revolutions and thus spell true deliverance. In short, the Communist Party, during the Civil War, was drunk with revolutionary euphoria. Its utopian expectations for the immediate future were ludicrously out of tune with reality. Yet its leaders also faced practical problems of management, organization, education, and mobilization; and they had begun to realize the complexity of these tasks and the tremendous weight of the obstacles in the way toward even the most modest solutions.

Both the Party Program and the commentary provided by the authors reflect this mixture of utopia and pragmatism which characterized Bolshevik ideology in the first years of the revolution. Hence it is a summary, and a most able and readable one, of Marxism-Leninism at an important stage in its development, perhaps its major turning point.

In retrospect, the authors appear naive in their assessment of the difficulties, and vague in their prescriptions. Their party had hardly begun to take the first steps in governing the country. Moreover, comparisons with the most recent ideological primer of the USSR, the *Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism*, would reveal the distance which Soviet ideology has traveled since 1919; some of the achievements of Soviet industry and science may be beyond anything expected by Bukharin and Preobrazhensky. The entire society has been transformed, though not always as the authors of this book imagined; the stratification of Soviet society and the total bureaucratization of life, to say nothing of the Stalinist style of ruthlessness, would doubtless repel them. In the realm of ideology, utopia has all but withered away. Expectations have been toned down. The new Program of the Party defines communism in terms, compared to which the hopes of 1919 appear to be both more democratic and more anar-

chic. Needless to add, the authors, as well as most of the authors they cite in their bibliographical notes, have long ago been liquidated as Enemies of the Revolution.

In its totality, therefore, the book serves to dramatize the curious pattern of great revolutions, which fulfill some of their promises beyond expectations, betray and explain away other promises, and kill off their own heroes.—ALFRED G. MEYER, *University of Michigan.*

Hobbes's Science of Politics. BY M. M. GOLDSMITH. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. xv, 274. $7.50.)

Hobbes Studies. EDITED BY KEITH C. BROWN. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. xi, 300. $6.75.)

Hobbes's Science of Politics is a good study not because it is without flaws, but because Professor Goldsmith knows and is committed to his subject. For him it is Hobbes and Hobbes alone who is at issue, and though necessarily drawn into the controversies that bemuse specialists, he manages to keep Hobbes in focus. And this is indeed refreshing. But more importantly, he understands the need to rescue Hobbes from his reputation. At his best (in the chapter on "Sovereignty and Government", pp. 175–227) or at his worst (discussing metaphysics, pp. 1–47, with additional references scattered throughout), Goldsmith appears to have this mission in mind and attempts to carry it out in a manner that cannot fail to win both notice and admiration.

Why the concern to rescue Hobbes? In part, as Goldsmith says in the Preface, because the English philosopher has neither been understood nor taken seriously enough. Perhaps then the substance of Hobbes's work, properly explicated, justifies the effort. But beyond that, other reasons can be suggested, or so it seems to me, even if the traditional errors ascribed to Hobbes ultimately stand. In the history of political philosophy, Hobbes appears, if not as an innovator, then at least as a subverter who undertakes a radical transformation of political discourse. In his treatment, political life which had been dependent upon or authorized by God becomes an artifice necessitated by human nature (though yet sanctioned by scripture); natural laws which had been seen as reflections of the inherent reason of the universe become possible natural theorems rooted in the right reasoning of man (though still consistent with the word of God); and men, who have been regarded as sinners as well as aspirants to the good, become endeavourers, driven by the passions, using reason as "a spy" at the service of fears and hopes (though they still sin). It is this tendency to challenge customary modes of discourse which makes Hobbes appealing, especially at a time when, once again, the traditional dialogue shows signs of breaking down. Moreover, Hobbes demands that men must act if they are to preserve themselves. And the basis for action, he implies, as well as the medium through which action takes place, is political life. As Goldsmith notes (pp. 176–177), Hobbes believes that "the function of government is the preservation of order or peace, the conditions necessary for the existence of human beings." In addition, Hobbes insists that men act reasonably and by means of "certain rules," and his quest for certainty, for "The skill of making and maintaining Commonwealths [which] consisteth in certain Rules as Arithmetique and Geometry; not (as tennis-play) on practice onely. . . ." (*De Cive*, Chapter XX), contrasts sharply with our own uncertain political theories and practices.

It is this quest for certainty that seems to provide Professor Goldsmith with both thesis and title. And there is little doubt that Hobbes is at one with Galileo, viz., that he seeks regularities in the physical or natural universe, but goes one step further and reduces the human universe as well to uniform tendencies; and that to do both, he employs "motion" (by analogy from Euclidean geometry) to construct a dynamics, thus producing propositions that in his judgment constitute 'the skill of making and maintaining Commonwealths.' But Goldsmith nowhere sets this pattern out clearly, not even in the section entitled "Hobbes's Science" (pp. 38–47), though his book is replete with information that suggests it; nowhere does he finally pull the system together. Rather, in concluding, he assesses Hobbes's political science of law, religion and history, and finds it untestable by any criterion of falsifiability. Hobbes's "science of politics" becomes an attempt which, though brilliant, is, in the light of Goldsmith's thesis, unsuccessful.

There are a number of difficulties in the book which may have driven its writer to this uneasy conclusion. Three of them—the problem of a systematic exposition of Hobbes's system; the question of the choice of terms employed to describe aspects of the system; and the need to clarify usage of common terms—will be illustrated.

Goldsmith's own thesis demands that he demonstrate that Hobbes is indeed systematic, and to do this he must not only attempt to link up each part of the system with every other part, he must also fully explicate each part. An example of the failure to do so, though not necessarily fatal to the entire book, is Goldsmith's treatment of Hobbes's ontology of space (and therefore of body). He argues that Hobbes cannot accept real space, either empty or full, though Hobbes in *De Corpore* (see Chapter VIII) repeatedly equates "magni-

tude" and "real space" and discusses both real and imaginary space. Maintaining that the ontology requires neither vacuum nor plenum, he says (pp. 16–20) that Hobbes uses only imaginary space for describing both how the world "is" and how men think about it. However, both sections he cites from *De Corpore* can be read differently. In discussing "imaginary space" (*English Works*, I, pp. 93–94), Hobbes warns the reader that he is about to consider "things . . . not as really existing but appearing only to exist, or to have a being without us." He is talking about place or our conception of space, that is, about appearance, phantasm, or, in this context, imagination. But to talk about imaginary space and to explain it is not to preclude the existence of real space. What it does mean is that to Hobbes, knowledge is ultimately dependent on sense and phantasm and therefore on imaginary space, viz., that it is within the context of "what can be known" that all inquiry proceeds (*Ibid.*, pp. 410–411). Furthermore, in the other section cited (*Ibid.*, pp. 414–426), Hobbes declares at pp. 414–415, that he takes one experiment concerning vacuity "for a sign that all space is full." If Goldsmith insists that Hobbes does not assume real space, he is also asserting that Hobbes is not really a materialist, and so it appears when he argues (p. 21) that Hobbes believed that "Body actually possesses real magnitude . . . [but] does not displace space as it would if space were something real; it occupies space." However, Hobbes appears to believe that if body possess real magnitude, it is (really) extended and it occupies (real) space. Since Hobbes appears to have spoken both of real and imaginary space, Goldsmith's dismissal of real space makes Hobbes's position either confused or incorrect. It therefore leaves unanswered the question of whether or not Hobbes was indeed systematic.

Secondly, Professor Goldsmith's choice of terms is also occasionally problematic; for example, when he discusses the laws of nature. He reduces them to necessary logical propositions derived from Hobbes's hypothetical construct of human behavior, and thus calls them scientific rules. They tell us "certain things that are causally related to war" (p. 109) and "provide a means of eliminating this danger", i.e., "the danger of death at the hands of other men" as well as the "means of minimizing discord" (p. 125). In Hobbes's sense of the term "science," it may be proper to call the laws of nature scientific rules, for they are derivative rules drawn from the knowledge of consequences. But if they are also moral precepts is Goldsmith also claiming that Hobbes attempts a science of morality and that moral precepts (natural law) are *its* derivative rules? If so, Goldsmith ought to demonstrate it. If not, he has damaged an otherwise excellent attempt to discuss natural laws as hypothetical imperatives by not more clearly indicating to the reader what the limits of his use of the terms "science" and "scientific rules" are.

Finally, Goldsmith either refuses to clarify or does not acknowledge any distinction between the social and the political. He describes (p. 172) the state of nature as "imaginary political space," non-social in character, in which there can be no society, no security of person, no property, etc. Men, in his reading of Hobbes, hypothetically move in a single step from a non-social or even anti-social and non-political condition into a condition which is simultaneously civil (political) and social. Yet he also correctly suggests (p. 199) that society, according to Hobbes, is not founded upon the right of the individual to property, but upon the desire of the individual to preserve his life, and elsewhere, as already noted, that this is the central function of the polity or sovereign. Is not the polity, on Goldsmith's own reading of Hobbes, therefore a precondition for the "living" of which society is the expression? Whatever the answer may be, it is not discussed in the book.

Hobbes Studies, a collection of reprints edited by K. C. Brown, all but one written since the Second World War, cannot in the usual sense be reviewed. In it, papers are reproduced by nearly all the celebrated contemporary Hobbes scholars, grouped so that their major confrontations come readily to hand. For beginners *Hobbes Studies* is no substitute for the study of Hobbes; for scholars it is a necessary and invaluable collection. Both beginners and scholars will, however, find much to profit from in Professor Goldsmith's *Hobbes's Science of Politics*.—ERWIN A. JAFFE, *University of New Hampshire*.

Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation. By ANATOL RAPOPORT AND ALBERT M. CHAMMAH. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1965. Pp. 229. $7.50.)

Two-Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas. By ANATOL RAPOPORT. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966. Pp. 214. $5.00, cloth; $1.95, paper.)

Of these two books the first is a highly interesting original contribution to experimental gaming and to the construction of mathematical models of human behavior, while the second is a relatively brief and not completely satisfactory introduction to two-person game theory.

Neither book is particularly addressed to the political scientist, sociologist or psychologist, although either can be read for the most part by those who have considerably less mathematical sophistication than is required to read *Games and Decisions* by Luce and Raiffa.

Professor Rapoport is one of the very few individuals who both understands and appreciates the mathematical basis of game theory and who at the same time is seriously concerned with trying to exposit and demonstrate its uses to the behavioral scientist. He writes with considerable conviction and yet at the same time stresses the difficulties involved in, and the enormous amount of work needed for the construction of an adequate applied theory of games.

The book on the Prisoner's Dilemma reports on a series of experiments on a simple but paradoxical game which has been much discussed in the literature on game theory. The paradoxical feature of the game is that actions which appear to be entirely consistent with any reasonable view of individual rationality lead to outcomes in a two-person game which are far from being jointly optimal. The game may be used as a paradigm to illustrate problems in negotiation and in trust.

The first part of the book describes the experiments with sequences of plays of the Prisoner's Dilemma for different stakes. The second part is devoted to the development of several different mathematical models. These are respectively: Markov chain models; equilibrium models with adjustable parameters; stochastic learning models; and classical dynamic models in the style of Richardson. The third part deals with tests and interpretation of these models. Seven hundred and forty subjects were used and some games were played up to six hundred times.

In a relatively brief review it is not possible to go into a detailed discussion of the experimental results and their interpretation. Some fascinating interpretations were given. It appears that the interaction among the players causes them to behave more or less in the same manner. Women subjects, however, appeared to be less cooperative than men.

This reviewer is highly sympathetic to the type of experiment run by Rapoport and Chammah. The criticisms of the experiments are more in their interpretation than their execution. On page 26 the authors state that, "The theory of nonzero-sum games distinguishes between cooperative and non-cooperative games." This is so but unfortunately it is precisely in the situation where the same game is played many times that the distinction, so handy for the analysis of static situations, breaks down.

On page 40 the authors state that game theory "assumes 'rational players,' that is, 'perfect players.'" Unfortunately, rationality (at least group rationality) is not a well defined concept when there is more than one individual involved in a non-constant sum game. This is a central problem in game theory and the many solution concepts which have been investigated represent attempts to deal with this problem.

No adequate discussion is given of the utility assumptions in the experiment. Were the subjects assumed to have utilities which were, at least as a first order approximation, linear with regard to the payoffs? Were their utilities or evaluations of the payoffs meant to be comparable? For example, had the payoffs to one side been multiplied by a factor of ten would the authors have expected any effect on the results?

How good a paradigm is the Prisoner's Dilemma? The authors offer several dynamic theories and some evidence. They do not include theories which depend upon the sum or discounted sum of earnings; nor do they experiment with or consider the effect of games in which the Prisoner's Dilemma paradox still exists but in which the players have more than two choices. (Bidding games have this property.) It is this reviewer's opinion that the authors would have made their task easier for themselves had they used programmed dummy players as one of the members of most of their pairs.

The above comments should not be interpreted as negativistic criticisms of the work. On the contrary there is much to be done. Rapoport and Chammah have made a significant start; however, as they had expected, their work raises more questions than it answers.

The expository book on two-person games by Rapoport is a disappointment. It is hard to conceive of the audience for whom it is suited. It is not sufficiently mathematical for those with mathematical training and it is not sufficiently rich in relevant examples to provide the much needed expository text for the political or other behavioral scientist. However, owing to the extreme lack of expository material this book will still serve a useful purpose.

There are a few technical comments which need to be made. On page 20 it is stated that a game must have a termination rule. This is true of the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory but not in general. Games with indeterminate ending are probably better models of many human activities than games with end rules.

On page 28 the statement is made that "the player's preference scale used in game theory must be stronger than the ordinal scale." This is false, as the work of Aumann, Peleg, Scarf, Shapley, Shubik, and others has shown. It is true enough for the examples Rapoport has in mind but this is sloppy exposition. (There should have been at least a footnote for the unwary.)

Chapter 8 on the negotiated game could have been made far stronger had the general problem of fixed threats been discussed. On page 144 the author states, "It is commonplace to view the theory of games as the logical foundation of a theory of rational conflict." It may be commonplace by those who do not know game theory;

however, for those who do, the meaning of rationality in situations involving two or more players is the central problem.

On page 128 the author states that "J. Nash has shown (1951) that every nonzero-sum game has at least one equilibrium point." This is not strictly true. Nash imposed some important restrictions on the type of game he was considering.
—MARTIN SHUBIK, *Yale University.*

The Age of Keynes. By ROBERT LEKACHMAN. (New York: Random House, 1966. Pp. vii, 324. $6.00.)

It is difficult for an economist to review an important book by another economist, when both the book and the review are intended primarily for non-economists. The task is made more difficult when the reviewer is sympathetic toward the point of view of the author and protective of the purity of the substance to be conveyed. Consequently, this review will be concerned with the benefits and the *caveats* for political scientists who seek in this book a basic understanding of Keynesian economics and its impact on contemporary economic theory and policy.

Professor Lekachman is one of a handful of academic economists who can clearly and simply explain in words the abstract theorizing of other economists. An historian of economic thought by speciality, he writes best, perhaps, when he is recounting the intellectual history of men and ideas, and *The Age of Keynes* is no exception. The first two-thirds of the book surveys the entire "life, times, and thought" of John Maynard Keynes, while the last third seeks to establish the "triumph" of his ideas in the two decades after his death. This is an enormous undertaking for a book of 300 pages (in contrast, the standard biography of Keynes, also written by an economist, is more than twice as long). Historians will doubtless be angered by the author's breathless (but always incisive) recounting of 20th century English and American economic and social history.

The chapters on Keynes' early life in Cambridge, his role in the Treasury during World War I and at Versailles, the reparations and international monetary reform controversies of the 1920's, and the events leading to the publication of *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* in 1936 are the best written of the book and positively defy attempts to skim. There are some real insights into Keynes' character here, e.g., attributing his Treasury successes to "Keynes's possibly unique combination of the guts of a burglar and the intellect of a first-class economist" (p. 27).

Lekachman's verbal summary of *The General Theory* is adequate, although some of the discussion of the efficacy of wage cuts and the relation between aggregate supply price and demand price could be confusing to the unwary. Further, the author fails to get across the crucial importance of Keynes' theory of interest rates; the general sluggishness of interest rate movements in a Keynesian model is precisely what undermines the monetary and fiscal policy prescriptions of his Cambridge forebears.

The chapter on the New Deal is interesting but lacking in depth. The main purpose is to demonstrate that the prewar Roosevelt years were "Keynesian only by occasional coincidence" (p. 123). Two additional biographical chapters then recount Keynes' involvement in war finance, in the creation of the International Monetary Fund, and in negotiating the postwar loan from the U.S.

The final third of the book ("The Keynesian Era") is, perhaps, the least satisfactorily done. With digressions on such subjects as U.S. economic growth, automation and unemployment, cost-push inflation, and federal tax and expenditure policy in the 1960's, the author is really attempting to validate two important propositions:

1. "Keynes does not cease to be relevant. He becomes relevant in different ways and in different company" (p. 202).
2. ". . . Keynesian economics is not conservative, liberal, or radical. The techniques of economic stimulation and stabilization are simply neutral administrative tools . . ." (p. 285).

With regard to the first proposition, the author's discussion of postwar economic problems is deficient in two respects: the explicit relevance of Keynesian economics is rarely mentioned, and the exposition, particularly of economic growth and cost-push inflation, is based on too few and not always representative sources.

The second proposition leads the author to identify such creatures as the "twentieth-century liberal" (or "liberal expansionist") and "twentieth-century conservative" (or "conservative expansionist") and such doctrines as "commercial Keynesianism" ("the faith of modern businessmen," which constrains the range of consensus over appropriate tax and expenditure policies). On the other side are the "economic Neanderthals" espousing "antediluvian wisdom" and "ancient ideas" (the 1964 Goldwater campaign gets a total of seven or eight sentences in the book, while President Eisenhower is charged with holding "firmly to the simple moralistic opinions appropriate to the graduate of an Abilene boyhood"). Among other things, the nature of the 1964 tax cut, medicare, and the antipoverty program are all attributed to the acceptance by the electorate of "commercial Keynesianism."

Despite the book's many virtues as an emi-

nently readable introduction to the basic arguments and applications of Keynesian economics, readers who might rely on the book as an adequate "Keynes for beginners" (Lekachman's phrase) should be warned of two serious shortcomings. For one, the author is discomfortingly charitable to the originality in Keynes' theoretical work and to what has survived without the need for substantial modification. Further, he makes mention neither of the widespread "neoclassical counterrevolution" to the "Keynesian revolution" (which reasserts the validity of neoclassical conclusions about even a *Keynesian* economy's automatic full employment tendencies) nor to many areas of theoretical or applied economics where Keynes' ideas have been of crucial and lasting significance. The construction of econometric models of the economy and their use in forecasting and quantitative policy planning and modern theories of international trade and economic growth are particular cases in point. —WILLIAM P. YOHE, *Duke University.*

Democracy and the Majority Principle: A Study in Twelve Contemporary Political Theories. BY ELIAS BERG. (Göteborg: Akademiförlaget-Gumperts, Scandinavian University Books, 1965. Pp. 166. Sv. Kr. 25; paper.)

If one starts with the premise that democracy is to be understood primarily and exclusively as a system of popular government, then the majority problem becomes to what extent and in what ways does the majority principle contribute to the realization of popular government. This, I think it is fair to say, is the focus of this closely reasoned and carefully researched book by Swedish political theorist Elias Berg.

In order to clarify the issues involved Berg begins by examining the treatment of the majority principle by twelve contemporary writers. Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, Harold J. Laski, Hans Kelsen, Bernard R. Berelson, T. V. Smith, Ernest Barker, Carl J. Friedrich, David B. Truman, Robert A. Dahl, G. D. H. Cole, Christian Bay, and John H. Hallowell are chosen—not because they are necessarily the most significant contributors to democratic thought, but because together they present a broad spectrum of answers to the problem of majority rule. Berg treats each theorist by first summarizing his particular treatment of majority rule and then by subjecting the argument to close analysis. This section is on the whole very well done and would alone make the book valuable.

In the second and final part of the book, Berg brings together various components of the twelve theories as elements in a systematic inquiry into the majority problem. This section is also carefully and intelligently done and is illuminating in a number of ways. In discussing the relationship of political equality and majority rule Berg makes what I found to be a particularly helpful distinction between equality of participation and equality of influence. The implications of this distinction are by no means fully exploited, but to do so would have taken Berg far beyond the scope of his present study.

Inevitably, the impact of a book so intricate and complex cannot be adequately summarized, but certain of Berg's major conclusions can be presented. If we "take as the starting point of the analysis an etymologically derived ideal concept of democracy as a system of popular government, in the sense of governance by all the citizens equally," then governance "by *all* the citizens can be approximated by maximizing the number of citizens who have any share in the governance, while governance by the citizens *equally* can be approximated by reducing the differences between their shares." Berg finds "first, that, with certain technical qualifications, the use of the majority principle is a prerequisite of maximization. Furthermore, having distinguished two types of political equality, we have found, second, that (within its area of application) the use of the majority principle implies equality of participation. . . . Yet finally, we have found, third, that there is no positive relationship between the use of the majority principle and equality of influence."

Although there is no *positive* relationship between the majority principle and equality of influence, equality of influence presupposes equality of participation which in turn involves the use of the majority principle. Thus, Berg continues "we can justify the majority principle (1) by its non-discriminatory character, which, by providing each individual within its sphere of application with the same share in formal governance, makes the use of the majority principle a *necessary condition* of both (a) government by all the citizens and (b) government by the citizens equally, as well as (2) by its maximizing character, which means that (applied to the whole people) it tends to produce an *approximation* to government by all the citizens (though not to government by the citizens equally)."

Berg's book, given its premises and its intentions, is quite a good one. My quarrel with it—and with most of contemporary democratic theorizing—is that the acceptance of what Berg quite correctly calls the "etymologically derived ideal concept of democracy as a system of popular government, in the sense of governance by all the citizens equally" leads to a lot of talk that is not really very important and may indeed be seriously misleading. If one holds up before his mind a simplified ideal in which men through the application of the majority principle literally govern

themselves—whether this model is called democracy, polyarchy, or something else—and if one then examines this ideal in the light of contemporary political experience, one will certainly conclude with Berg, Dahl, and a number of others that the majority principle cannot fulfill the egalitarian promises of the democratic ideal.

Berg refers to these egalitarian promises in the last sentence of his book as "admittedly reckless." If they are reckless, as indeed I think they are, then why focus an analysis of the majority problem around them? When the democratic theorist concentrates his attention on the ideal of *self*-government, he tends to lose sight of the fact that what we know as modern democracy is above all a system of *government*. Of course, it has something to do with an eighteenth-century revolutionary ideal, but much more pertinently it is a set of institutions which process demands for change and which provide governors with feedback from the governed. What is the role of the *majority principle*—even if minorities *do* rule—in processing demands for change, in providing leaders with feedback on public policies and in forcing them to listen to it and, most interestingly perhaps, in stimulating followers to provide feedback? Of course, *these* questions about the relationship between democracy and the majority principle never even arise when one tests the majority principle against an ideal of popular government which almost everyone admits is unrealistic.—THOMAS LANDON THORSON, *University of Toronto.*

A Republic of Equals. By LESLIE W. DUNBAR. (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 132. $4.00.)

Every major social movement generates a body of literature which seeks to articulate the purposes and justify the goals of its proponents. When the rhetoric of the leadership is sufficiently inspired in its appeal to nourish and enlarge the constituency committed to reform it becomes incorporated into the ideology of the movement. With the civil rights movement the focus of students of ideology has quite naturally been on the speeches and writings of such articulate Negro leaders as Martin Luther King, Jr., A. Philip Randolph, Whitney Young, Roy Wilkins, James Farmer, Stokely Carmichael and Floyd McKissick. A less conspicuous, although perhaps in the long run equally significant, body of literature has been developing however which also articulates the course of contemporary social change. This is the literature of the white, liberal Southerner. Leslie W. Dunbar's *A Republic of Equals* is a work in this genre.

Leslie W. Dunbar has a particularly good set of credentials to qualify him to write on this subject. A former research director and later executive director of the Southern Regional Council, he is now executive director of the Field Foundation. As a statement of political values, a witness so to speak, *A Republic of Equals* is both lucid and effective. Yet, for a political scientist, testament, however satisfying, is not enough; the book lacks a theoretical underpinning which would bolster persuasion and distinguish it from elevated assertion. In defense of the author, however, it should be noted that this manuscript was based upon a set of public lectures and therefore was initially intended for a listening rather than a reading audience. Still the over-all effect is one of fuzziness.

Such criticism may be offset in part by the author's uncommon gift of expression, his almost poetic sense of similitude and metaphor. As a sensitive kind of regional introspection, from the perspective of the white liberal Southerner in search of identity, this book is particularly effective. "Perhaps the wisest discovery of James Baldwin was that no American, Negro or white, has a given identity, that we have always been and are now a people in search of ourselves" (p. 24). In the past, however, the South has always given a sense of identity to those from that region. The attributes of this identity were, as Dunbar notes, best stated twenty five years ago by W. J. Cash in *The Mind of the South.* But even as the Southern veto in national politics is passing, so Dunbar observes is the South of W. J. Cash coming to an end.

> "The South is drawing to its close as a discrete political power. Its civilization also is ending, or, rather, is headed toward sameness with all America. No writer of a decade or so hence will need to explore the mind of the South, as Cash did, for it is about to become as mindless as New England or the mid-West and in the near future will have finally found its rest in the American union. One says this with sorrow. Gross as have been her sins and uncouth as have been many of her ways, the South inspired her sons and daughters, even her suffering black ones, to love her. What other region did that, and in doing it gave dimension and stamina to human spirits?" (Pp. 25–26.)

Among other things, what the Negro civil rights leaders have taught the rest of America, Dunbar declares, is that segregation is not "a condition of life but a policy adopted anew each day," a policy which could be altered by responsible action. In his indictment of Southern politics Dunbar writes: "The South furnishes an instructive example of the moral and social ravages of a political order based on ideology" (p. 41). The revolution which was overthrowing the ideology of white supremacy, was in turn restoring the country to its true heritage. "These are strange revolutionaries. They come as defenders of the land and its values. They come, as one prominent white Southerner once put it to me, to give us back our country" (p. 54). Assuredly, *A Republic of Equals* is not precisely political science; but it is a hu-

mane and reasonable statement of high purpose in a period of rapid social change.—ALAN P. GRIMES, *Michigan State University.*

Free Activities and Interpersonal Relations. By C. W. CASSINELLI. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. Pp. vi, 116. Guilders 15.75.)

This study aims at explicating the idea of freedom by relating it to the concepts of political influence, control, power, authority, leadership, and legitimacy. The author shows that these are four term relations (two actors and their respective actions), that the control action is a sufficient, but need not be a necessary, condition for the respondent's behavior, and that having control, etc., unlike exercising control, etc., refers to contrary-to-fact conditionals. All this is said clearly, although most of it has been said before.

It is the more surprising that the author fails to point out that the concept of interpersonal freedom, too, designates interaction relationships, i.e., that A can be said to be unfree to do x only with respect to some other actor B. Furthermore, he claims that someone is unfree to violate a law only if he complies in order to avoid the penalty (pp. 87, 89); "but if he broke the law he was obviously free to commit the illegal act" (p. 35, fn.4). "The existence of a threatened punishment does not in itself create unfreedom. To say that a man is unfree to perform an activity that he in fact performs is logically most cumbersome" (p. 34). Perhaps, but this is precisely the way we use the term. To say that a government restricts freedom of speech means that it makes the propagation of certain views punishable, and that citizens are officially unfree to spread them whether they do and are punished or whether they comply, and whether they comply to avoid punishment or because they agree with the official doctrine. If B makes it impossible or punishable for A to do x, A is, with respect to B, unfree to do x, regardless of his actual behavior and motives. It is not illogical to say that I did something which I was unfree to do.

The author evidently fails to distinguish between interpersonal freedom and freedom of choice. If A is unfree to break a law, he may nevertheless have freedom of choice to act illegally or legally: i.e. he *can* break the law. If A lacks freedom of choice, i.e., *cannot* do x, he is unfree *to do* x only if the impediment has been caused by another actor B. It is therefore misleading to claim that "a man who has inadvertently fallen into a natural pit with unscalable walls is unfree in the same sense as the prisoner at night in his cell" (p. 28). Both *cannot* get out; the latter is also *unfree* to get out (with respect to wardens, police, government); but the former's freedom to leave has not been restricted by anyone. There are things I am free to do, yet cannot do, and there are actions I am unfree, yet able to perform. The distinction between inability and unfreedom to do something is of central importance to the analysis of political power relationships.

In this study, the terms "free" and "unfree" occur indiscriminately in yet another sense, namely as characteristics of actions, and again in a sense which unnecessarily deviates from common usage. "Activities are unfree when and only when there exist impediments to alternative activities" (p. 19). It would follow that my driving within the speed limits is always an unfree activity, even when I do so to enjoy a leisurely ride. Actions are usually considered unfree if they are motivated by fear of sanctions. I may do freely what I am unfree not to do (e.g., keeping within the speed limits), and I may do freely what I am unfree to do (e.g., speeding). The author assumes that most people prefer to obey the law rather than to risk punishment, and therefore holds that an action is unfree if the probability that similar actions will occur under similar circumstances is great, and free if it is small (p. 42). However, some tend to drive slowly, *predictably and freely*, while others may speed (freely) today but slow down tomorrow, *unpredictably and unfreely.*

When dealing with freedom, the author fails to meet his own standard that "the developed concepts should remain as close as possible to the essential meanings of the ideas [they express]" (p. 3). To do so, it is necessary to distinguish between interpersonal (or intergroup) freedom, so called freedom of choice, and free actions, and to provide an adequate explication for each of these concepts.—FELIX E. OPPENHEIM, *University of Massachusetts.*

Democracy or the Scientific Method in Law and Policy Making. By FREDERICK K. BEUTEL. (San Juan, Puerto Rico: Editorial Universitaria Universidad de Puerto Rico, 1965. Pp. 269.)

This is a disturbing book. It should be unsettling to anyone who reads it on at least two counts.

In the first place, it is the product of long years of thought and research by an author who is familiar with government as both student and practitioner, and his conclusions about democratic policy-making are harsh. In one of Beutel's most penetrating passages, he points out that the public and those who study democratic processes take for granted the intrinsic merit of the concept of "equality." He suggests that this is a blind acceptance, particularly in the face of accumulating evidence that equality is not workable either in theory or in practice, and, in fact, to insist on equality is perhaps to perpetrate injustice by demanding more of some persons than of others. While the argument may be vulnerable, it is one to which political theorists and researchers ur-

gently need to turn their attention.

In the second place, the reader will be disturbed by the author's conclusions and recommendations as a general posture. Beutel argues (apparently to his satisfaction, if not to mine) that democracy might once have worked, but cannot anymore. Since democracy does not work, he recommends that we replace it with a "Scienstate," that is, a form of government which relies on the empirical methodologies of modern science and technology to analyze the basic needs and demands of the populace and which will respond to these needs through controlled social experimentation. Although the author sensibly avoids attempting to delineate the precise structure of the Scienstate, it is obvious that The Scientist is to be the new ruling class, neutrally applying his neutral methods to arrive at public policy. Since Science is self-correcting, rule by The Scientists will be self-controlling.

If this book is read as data, it well expresses the enormous impact that the phrase "scientific method" has made on a whole generation. There is real magic in those words. And Beutel is openly advocating adopting the magic as an ultimate solution to governmental problems. The troublesome side of all this is that aside from the fact that scientists themselves become modestly vague when they try to describe their method, there is the problem that The Scientist, as neutral, self-denying arbiter of the truth, simply does not exist. Too many scientists, when given the opportunity to scramble for government grants, act dismayingly like the rest of us. In effect, Beutel is trying to prevent control by other special interest groups through promotion of one interest group (or a congeries of loosely confederated interest groups) to pre-eminent power. As a controlling pressure group, it might well be that scientists would do a better job than, say, businessmen, union leaders, or historians, but we may hesitate at the idea of accepting and institutionalizing the control of any single set of interests, whatever their manifest virtues.

As propaganda for scientists as a pressure group, this book is at least interesting. As a study in perhaps the final goal of a certain brand of intellectualism it is even more interesting. But, unless taken as a series of only semi-articulated propositions about the nature of democracy and the role of science in government, it is unconvincing as either a serious work in social science or as a polemic.—S. J. MAKIELSKI, JR., *University of Virginia.*

Propaganda Comes of Age. By MICHAEL CHOUKAS. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965. Pp. viii, 299. $5.00.)

Professor Choukas, Chairman of the Department of Sociology at Dartmouth College, believes propaganda directed toward the citizens of the United States is out of control. He says, "Both at home and abroad our society is in a crisis, has been for some time, and from all indications will remain in such a state for some time to come" (p. iii). Much of this crisis, according to his view, can be attributed "to our relative ignorance about the role of propaganda in these tense and trying times" (p. iii). Considering the current talk of "credibility gaps" in domestic politics, and the continuing escalation of international propaganda this is a timely book which researches an area of some importance.

The definition of propaganda and a brief history of its use are considered for two chapters. Then the author differentiates between propaganda as an art and as a science and then points out the distinctions between black and white propaganda, strategic and tactical propaganda, and preparational and operational propaganda. Later chapters develop Choukas' ideas about the impact of propaganda on the individual and the group, and emphasize the nature and role of propaganda in the democratic society. Examples of the techniques of propagandists are given throughout, and these examples constitute the main contribution to the general field of public opinion and propaganda which the author makes in this work.

Professor Choukas assumes that the individual in a democratic society not only has an inherent rationality, goodness, and decency developed to a degree which is considerably beyond that accepted by many social scientists, but, also, he assumes that the individual in the democratic society is inherently superior in these respects to individuals in other societies. These assumptions, plus his view of propaganda as acting directly on individuals with little emphasis on intermediary situational factors, cause him to use a conceptual framework somewhat closer to the stimulus-response scheme of the early behaviorists than most social scientists accept today.

Due to the inadequacy of this theoretical framework, Professor Choukas views the propaganda audience as a mass of disparate and independent individuals overpowered by the impact of the propaganda. He does not adequately take into account either apathy (and consequent lack of information-seeking or information-receiving on the part of significant proportions of the populace in large scale societies—even democratic ones) or the varied group cocoons surrounding individuals. These cause propaganda to have differential impacts on the same individuals at different times, or on different individuals at the same time. Failing to take this into account, the author becomes overly concerned about the ability of propagandists to seduce the individual and thereby convert the individual to dangerous doctrines.

Some recent examples of propaganda tech-

niques are given, but throughout much of the book World War II examples are used to the virtual exclusion of current techniques. Also, the author has used few recent theoretical works. (Less than ten of approximately one hundred and fifty footnote entries are dated later than 1959.) It is helpful that the author brings his experiences in the Office of Strategic Services to his research effort, but the value of the examples gleaned from that era suffers because he has not up-dated those experiences in light of recent work on the subtle relationship between propaganda and propaganda audiences.

To add to its inadequacy, the book is poorly written and has no index. Probably most frustrating from a readability point of view is the fact that many direct quotes, from one-fourth to one page in length, are run directly in with the text rather than being off-set. Because of this, one wonders at many points whether one is reading Choukas or someone else.

When compared to much of the recent work in this field (J. A. C. Brown's book, *Techniques of Persuasion: From Propaganda to Brainwashing.* Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1963, for example) Professor Choukas' book has little to offer the serious student of propaganda.—R. LEWIS BOWMAN, *University of Virginia.*

The Velikovsky Affair: The Warfare of Science and Scientism. EDITED BY ALFRED DE GRAZIA. (New York: University Books, Inc., 1966. Pp. 260. $5.95.)

In September 1963 the editors of *The American Behavioral Scientist* devoted a whole issue to examining the events in the scientific world surrounding the publication in 1950 of Immanuel Velikovsky's *Worlds in Collision.* The present book is a republication of that issue with some additions to bring it up to date. It represents a most significant contribution to the sociology of science.

In *Worlds in Collision* Velikovsky challenged the assumption of uniformity in the solar system. He suggested, in brief, that the solar system has not always been in its present state—that it has a history. This history consists of a series of vast disturbances, lasting sometimes for several centuries, the most recent of which happened within recorded time. The effect of these events on Earth was cataclysmic: mountain ranges were pushed up or pulled down, oceans advanced or receded, and civilizations were wiped out. In *Worlds in Collision* Velikovsky concerned himself with one of the most recent of such cataclysms. In early biblical times, he argued, an eruption on Jupiter threw a large comet into an erratic orbit around the sun. This comet came into recurring contact with Earth and Mars before eventually settling down to become the planet Venus. Its impact was powerful enough to tilt the Earth on its axis and to bring total destruction to most parts of the planet.

The contributors to *The Velikovsky Affair* argue most convincingly that Dr. Velikovsky was not accorded the reception from the scientific community that his ideas merited. That reception was almost wholly negative, but went considerably beyond the ideal of unimpassioned scientific discourse. In two introductory chapters, Ralph E. Juergens documents a history of unconsidered rejection, ridicule, and attempted suppression. The anti-Velikovsky campaign got under way even before *Worlds in Collision* was published. Once it *was* published, pressure was brought to bear on the Macmillian Company—by way of its vulnerable text-book division—to make it drop the book from its lists, despite the fact that it had rapidly become a bestseller. This pressure was successful, and the rights to the book were transferred to the Doubleday Company, which did not have a text-book division. In the following years, Velikovsky was unable to gain access to the accepted scientific journals or to persuade those with the necessary scientific resources to perform a few relatively simple tests of his hypotheses.

The theme common to the five articles in this volume is that, while Velikovsky adhered closely to the various dictates of the scientific credo in his writings and at every stage of the following dispute, his detractors did not. The book argues that he presented ample evidence for his ideas to have been taken seriously, that his evidence was well documented and that he made explicit, testable predictions from his theory. On the other hand, Velikovsky's critics frequently attacked him without ever having read his books (they often took pride in the fact); they misrepresented his ideas, and paid no serious attention to his predictions. That various Mariner space probes brought startling confirmation of several of these predictions emphasized the plausibility of Velikovsky's theories, without increasing his respectability in the scientific community. Velikovsky was condemned out of hand as a crank.

Several elements appear to have contributed to this rejection. The breadth of the theory Velikovsky propounded is undoubtedly one, for he challenged accepted notions in half-a-dozen fields of academic inquiry. By questioning the theory of uniformity, these authors suggest, he was questioning an assumption on which a great deal of psychic security depended. Further, there is the question of Velikovsky's style and the eclectic character of the evidence he saw fit to bring to bear on the problem. His heavy reliance on mythology as data, not to mention his straightforward literal interpretation of biblical events—

such as the parting of the Red Sea—presented an unfamiliar face to physical scientists.

Yet these considerations are inconsistent with the scientific credo by which scientists claim to live. Probably the most valuable chapter in *The Velikovsky Affair* is that by de Grazia entitled "The Scientific Reception System." In it de Grazia postulates four models of the scientific community as a sociological reception system. The first is the "rationalistic" model that conforms to the formal criteria of the scientific method. De Grazia suggests, of course, a poor degree of fit between this model and the case under consideration. The next is the "indeterminacy" model by which "truth" is selected randomly from incoming ideas. In the "power" model ideas are accepted or rejected by a scientific "power elite" depending upon the impact they have on the position of the powerful individuals. Finally, the "dogmatic" model involves the acceptance of ideas in proportion to their conformity with prevailing theories and norms. In its reaction to Velikovsky, de Grazia argues, the behavior of the scientific community reflected elements of the latter three models, and especially the latter two.

Behavioral scientists might be expected this time to have been on the side of the angels; they were, after all, nearly alone among scientists in not having some fundamental notions challenged by Velikovsky. We can only hope that de Grazia is not unduly optimistic when he advocates behavioral insights as an antidote to this kind of unfortunate performance.—JOHN M. ORBELL, *Ohio State University.*

The Psychology of Power. By RONALD V. SAMPSON. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1966. Pp. 247. $4.95.)

This is a curious book and one that I neither fully understand nor appreciate. Consider the following statements that appear in the first paragraph:

> It will be the central argument and purpose of this book to deny that there is more than one plane of reality in which the moral judgment functions. . . . In other words, what is morally right cannot be pragmatically wrong or politically wrong or invalidated on grounds of apparent futility. . . . The nature of this moral law is, moreover, understood to some degree by all rational men; it is the only sure source of their welfare in this world; it can be spelt out and be clearly understood by all, and will be found to hold good at whatever point of human experience we seek to test it.

There is a Lockean air about these statements, and indeed Mr. Sampson owes a good deal to Locke although his name does not appear in the index. Like Locke and most of the Enlightenment thinkers, Mr. Sampson assumes that moral issues and choices are always clear-cut. Reasonable men perceive these issues without much difficulty, and resolve them in accordance with *the* (not *a*) moral law. The law commands us to love our neighbor as ourselves, and above all to avoid relationships based on either dominance or submission.

This latter emphasis may fall short of an *idee fixe* but it does manage to give the book its constant and somewhat repetitious theme. For Mr. Sampson, who lectures in politics at the University of Bristol, is unreservedly against dominance-submission relationships whether they occur in marriage, or between parents and children, or among states. He especially has no use for those who put women down (and hence takes issue with Freud, among others), or who argue that national interest rather than morality should guide foreign policy (a category of strategist that includes almost all foreign policy experts although Mr. Sampson singles out Hans Morganthau as his awful example).

The ideal standard, in accordance with the moral imperative, is love, equality, and maturity. On the other side, of course, is selfishness, inequality, and a debased lust for power. Mr. Sampson has no doubt that power corrupts and that the urge to power, in one form or another, is what destroys marriages and entire families, health and creativity, and peaceful relations between nations. We are doomed, he insists, unless power is tamed in every area of human endeavor.

I am inclined to think that he is right, but perhaps paradoxically I find it difficult to say exactly what he is right about. It is probably correct to believe that the urge to dominate in the home has some bearing on the urge to make war abroad (could Lyndon Johnson be a case in point?), but whether it does or not, what is to be done about the sick, the cruel, the morally maimed, and the cynically corrupt who 'govern' so many homes, institutions, and nations? Mr. Sampson's solution is the moral law and reason, but surely he is aware that such exhortation, characteristic of so much political philosophy from Locke to Bertrand Russell, is always listened to and rarely followed. While his analyses of disturbed relationships, particularly the literary ones (Elizabeth Barrett, Samuel Butler, John Stuart Mill, and others) are instructive, they do not lead to a conclusion that can be applied to families as such, let alone to nations and power politics.

It is possible that Mr. Sampson's argument would have been substantially aided by a psychodynamic theory of interpersonal and international relations. To be sure, there are chapters on "The Psychoanalysis of Power" and "The Divided Self," but I did not find these distinguished by either breadth or depth. The author, for example, seems totally unaware of advances in psychoanalysis since Freud, and he apparently is un-

familiar with *any* recent American political science research having to do with political behavior. Perhaps the unfortunate Professor Morganthau is the only American student of politics known to Mr. Sampson. Perhaps. As mentioned earlier, Locke does not appear in the index, either, but that is hardly because he is unknown.—ARNOLD A. ROGOW, *City University of New York.*

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

The National Election of 1964. EDITED BY MILTON C. CUMMINGS, JR. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966. Pp. xi, 295. $5.00.)

The aim of this volume, editor Milton Cummings tells us, "is to present several interpretive and analytical essays that probe into selected aspects" of the most recent presidential election. To this end seven well known political scientists have contributed papers, each in his own field of expertise.

The late Paul Tillett—who taught so many of us what nomination politics was all about through the National Convention Fellowship program—drew upon material prepared by several 1964 Fellows to trace the pattern of events in San Francisco and Atlantic City. He suggests the Republicans may be taking on characteristics (factionalism, open disagreements openly arrived at) long associated with the Democrats, but genuinely associated with the minority party.

Stanley Kelley, Jr., gives us a tightly written account of what the candidates said and how they spent their time. This is built around some suggestive generalizations about campaign strategy: ". . . the way the candidate's time is distributed among the states should reflect the allocation of other scarce resources which can be transferred from state to state. . . ." "The initial strategy of a political campaign may be usefully regarded as an investment plan in which the level of investment in the several undertakings is set in accordance with estimates of the likely return of votes from each."

Nelson W. Polsby discusses the strategic alternatives open to a minority party, calls attention to the lack of evidence supporting the "hidden vote" hypothesis accepted by many Goldwaterites, and offers an explanation for the Goldwater nomination. After a brief discussion of the Democratic strategy and post-election events, Polsby takes up certain implications of the election: new evidence on the ability of the Democrats to govern because of the 89th Congress, the possibility that we are moving from a two-party system to a party-and-a-half system, and the increasing importance of a long pre-convention campaign in the outparty.

Charles A. H. Thomson discusses several aspects of the performance of the mass media. He gives considerable attention to one non-event of 1964, televised debates between the presidential candidates, and to important new developments in election reporting, the Network Election Service and the Vote Profile Analysis.

Herbert E. Alexander, the Certified Public Accountant of our profession, continues his task of detailing who spent how much for what purpose in a campaign he estimates to have cost $200 million. He points out that the "financing of the presidential campaigns of 1964 contrasted sharply with the voting patterns: the victory of Lyndon Baines Johnson was built on a narrow financial base but a broad electoral base; the Barry Goldwater candidacy had a broad financial but a narrow electoral base."

Milton Cummings contributes two chapters, one on the Senate elections and one on the House elections. The Republicans, Cummings says, lost a fine opportunity. Given the number of marginal seats, 1964 could have been a year for Republican gains. Instead the Democrats won 10 close victories which virtually assured them Senate control until 1971. In the House, Cummings finds Democratic gains in formerly Republican Eastern Suburban Districts, Democrats coming out on top in 1964 in the volatile Plains States, a continuation of Democratic growth in the West, and a mixed pattern in the South with Democrats doing better in the Peripheral South and Republican gains in the Deep South. All of this, he notes, added up to a major shift in Congressional power. Because of the number of conservatives defeated in both parties, the 89th Congress was the most liberal in a generation.

Angus Campbell presents some first findings from the 1964 study of the Survey Research Center. In these pages are the basic data on candidate image and party image for 1960 and 1964. He also analyzes the effect of the Goldwater nomination, and offers an estimate of 25% of the Goldwater vote (about 7 million votes) as the approximate size of the "conservative" vote, Campbell concludes by wondering whether the new Democratic advantage in party identification will be temporary or permanent. If it does persist, he notes, this will have profound consequences for the nature of party competition.

All in all, this is a fine book. The contributors know what they are about, and call attention to

the right things in their allotted pages. The professor who wants to update his lectures to include developments of 1964 will find what he needs right here. Still there are a few questions which should be raised. The only major factual matter in need of challenge is whether Barry Goldwater embraced a Southern strategy and whether he won in the Deep South because of his stand on civil rights. There are assertions to this effect in four of the essays. However, the Goldwater campaign was not dominated by a Southern strategy and there were other attitudes motivating Southerners besides those concerning race.

The organization of the book makes it easy to relate the findings to existing knowledge about political parties, but I wonder if it facilitates an understanding of 1964. One chapter contains the facts on campaign finance, another what the candidates had to say, still another data on the voters' attitudes, and so on. Not only does it require a heroic act of imagination to reassemble these bits and pieces into one flesh-and-blood set of events, but there are many important questions about relationships *between* these categories. For example, what happens when the fund raisers decide they are experts on strategy? What sort of impact does the candidates' strategy have on the voters' attitudes? What sorts of anguishing strategy decisions had to be made by Republican congressional candidates in the Northeast and Democratic congressional candidates in the South because of the nature of the presidential campaign? When a number of important questions drop through our analytical screen, we should at least ask whether we are being well served by our organizing concepts.

Finally, there is an interesting contrast in the essays by Professors Kelley and Polsby. Kelley argues that much of the Goldwater campaign "was not very different from the kind of campaign one would have expected on behalf of a moderate Republican" while Polsby found "the Senator's campaign represented a sharp departure from Republican tactics of the recent past." Kelley tells us the "Democratic strategy was a carefully constructed response to the Goldwater experiment and was characterized, therefore, by a kind of mirror image unorthodoxy" while Polsby informs us "the Democratic strategy was a model of orthodoxy and scarcely needs either description or explanation." I happen to believe there were unique aspects to both campaigns, but this conclusion obviously is open to debate. When as many people are involved as in a presidential campaign, *no one* knows "the real story." It exists only as an ideal. The challenge and the fascination lie in trying to understand these complex phenomena on the basis of the fragmentary data available to us. And in this respect, Milton Cummings and his colleagues have done a fine job.—JOHN H. KESSEL, *Allegheny College.*

Midwest Politics. By JOHN H. FENTON. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966. Pp. ix, 244. $3.95, paper.)

The book treats the historical development of party politics and office-seeking in each of six states within the framework of a central typology. Michigan, Minnesota, and Wisconsin are classified as "issue-oriented" two-party states, exemplifying "programmatic" politics. Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio are described as traditional "job-oriented" two-party systems. The central proposition of the work arises out of the literature on inter-party competition, wherein several authors have focused upon the effects of the degree of inter-party competition upon political outcomes. Fenton has introduced a modification: Political outcomes will vary in relation to the degree to which state political systems are "job-oriented," or "programmatic." Given the fact that the most recent literature has minimized the significance of the effects of party competition (a point that Fenton does not make) in deference to the effects of socio-economic variables upon political outcomes, Fenton's modification may come to the rescue and open up an important line of inquiry. Many researchers in comparative state politics would be happy to find a truly political variable with a high degree of relevance for the many facets of state and local expenditure and effort.

The central typology of Fenton's work is an interesting one, but unless it is treated in relation to specific indices of political behavior, the relative value of the notion for explaining political behavior cannot be assessed. Fenton does provide a fairly persuasive argument that the typological distinction is a meaningful one, but, from beginning to end, the concepts of "job-oriented" and "issue-oriented" are treated as an amorphous dichotomy. In what ways and to what extent can the concepts be sharpened? One avenue of clarification would lead to lower order typologies of party structure, administrative organization, campaign technique, etc. A second alternative would lead to the introduction of concrete indices, such as the number of patronage jobs available to the governor, or the percentage of state employees protected by a merit system. Either route would have its value. The first would provide a systematic and more sophisticated conceptual apparatus, and for many scholars such an enterprise would perform a useful function. The second route would provide a cluster of operational referents that would relegate the dichotomy to a pedagogical tool (an inevitability if the basic distinction is meaningful). Fenton has not taken

either route, and this is perhaps the most disturbing feature of the work.

If the typology were operationalized through the use of specific indices implied by the concepts, and if such indices were matched against a series of political output measures, then the analysis would certainly go a long way toward giving more plausible, cumulative, and balanced knowledge of the six states. Furthermore, the central proposition of the work would be exploited more fully—to the extent that such a proposition can be tested by looking at only six states. At one point (Table 8.1), the reader is told that the central proposition of the work is borne out by an examination of political output data, but only three output indices are employed. It would have been helpful to the reader if a larger number of specific indices were developed, giving some idea of whether there were differences in state effort not detected by gross measures of taxation and expenditure.

Midwest Politics is a study of the history and political subject-matter of each state, treating states individually more often than comparatively, based upon interviews with knowledgeable persons in each state as well as the works of several other authors. If the reader wishes to be introduced to the party politics of any or all of the six states, then this work will provide a beginning. If he wishes to be convinced that the basic argument of the work is meaningful, deserving further research, he will find the chapters persuasive. If he wishes to find a full examination of what appears to be the central hypothesis, he is likely to be disturbed by the book's shortcomings. It is not difficult to find events that contradict the typology (such as the Republicans coming to the 1963 Indiana legislative session with a series of legislative proposals based upon their party platform) and thus, without a comparative presentation of data linking concepts to indices of events, the reader is left in a state of uneasy curiosity. Data for six states would not satiate that curiosity, but at least our sense of discontent would be tempered by the consideration that not everyone should be forced to study fifty states at once.—WAYNE L. FRANCIS, *Syracuse University.*

House vs. Senate: Conflict in the Appropriations Process. By JEFFEREY L. PRESSMAN. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. xvii, 133. $4.50.)

For most of the second session of the 87th Congress, the Appropriations Committees of the House and Senate conducted a highly publicized feud which stalled legislative activity and eventually left some federal agencies without the money to pay salaries. In the press, the battle was interpreted as a contest between the chairmen of the two committees; Representative Clarence Cannon and Senator Carl Hayden—each in his mid-eighties and each (so the story went) a little stubborn, senile and paranoid. In his intelligent, flavorful and nicely written little book, Jeffrey Pressman convincingly demonstrates the total inadequacy—indeed, the wrong headedness—of such a highly personalized interpretation of this intracongressional conflict. And in so doing, he provides us with an excellent example of just what it is that political scientists have that newspapermen do not—a perspective long enough and broad enough to encompass a cohering network of relationships and the desire to generalize about these relationships across individual cases.

The author argues that the 1962 contretemps should be viewed as one manifestation of a deep-seated, long-standing conflict between the House and Senate generally and their appropriations committees particularly. The point is that the two committees are quite different political systems and they are as Cannon's successor, George Mahon, put it "contentiously juxtaposed" by the bicameralism of the Constitution. Their disputes are explainable in terms of fairly durable, stable institutional and ideological factors, and not in terms of individual idiosyncracies.

Pressman describes the appropriations process, the differences between the two committees and the various sources of their conflict. His study then focuses upon the conference committee as the normal arena in which House-Senate disputes get settled and as the place where, predictably, the 1962 argument came to a head. (Neither committee would go to conference with the other.) Using a number of theoretical constructions to good advantage, he illustrates some conference committee strategies. And while his treatment is quite sketchy, it is sufficient to indicate the special attractiveness of the conference committee for anyone who wishes to apply bargaining theory to the congressional world. The book closes with a very sensible assessment of some perennial reform proposals—to which Pressman adds his own, a staff attached to the conference committee. Such a device, he speculates, could be the nub around which some unifying sentiments and loyalties might form.

This reader's major regret is that in a book whose logical centerpiece is the treatment of the conference committee, the author decided not to look at any conference activity himself. (This may have been part of a decision, also regrettable, not to research any primary source documents—hearings, reports, debates—since no indication of such usage appears in the book.) Conference reports are available, as are House floor debates on the adoption of conference reports. And, where appropriations are involved, it is easier than it is in other legislative areas to reconstruct the bar-

gains (at least the money bargains) that were struck in conference. A few such reconstructions would have informed the pivotal description of the conference immeasurably; and they would have strengthened (or weakened?) the author's case for his conference-centered reform proposal. This book gives us a helpful overview; but the elementary task of description remains where it was when Gilbert Steiner left off 15 years ago.—RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., *University of Rochester.*

Congress and Lobbies: Image and Reality. BY ANDREW M. SCOTT AND MARGARET A. HUNT. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966. Pp. xv, 106. $4.50.)

This small volume is an example of how a useful research design of limited dimensions can run aground of its authors' propensity to engage in academic polemics.

A major unfulfilled research task of the so-called "group theory of politics" is the specification of the conditions under which groups exert influence upon authoritative allocations of values and resources. The problems are familiar and formidable—both conceptually (e.g., what is "access" and "influence"?) and evidentially (e.g., how to uncover the group-relevant premises of decisions).

Presumably addressing themselves to this question, the authors interviewed a sample of 34 House Members during the 88th Congress. Their inquiries were designed to elicit a Member's perceptions of interest group activity in an area of his policy specialization, as well as in an area where he had only peripheral concern. Additionally, the Members were asked to assess the impact of groups and the effectiveness of various lobbying techniques.

With such a small sample of respondents, the cells in most cases are inadequate for confident generalizations. Tabular material is often fleshed out beyond reasonable limits; categories could have been collapsed and tables combined to lend greater impact to the findings. Still, several generalizations are advanced which are congruent with what we already know about the legislative process: (1) Congressmen have clearer perceptions of groups in their own field of specialization; in areas of peripheral concern, the general public image of the group seems controlling. (2) Low-seniority Members see groups as more important and influential than do high-seniority Members. (3) Democrats apparently hold a more congenial view of groups than Republicans (though, as the authors recognize, party affiliation may mask other variables, such as recruitment patterns or constituency differences).

Not content with these accomplishments, however, the authors seek to employ their evidence to destroy the straw-man of group omnipotence. For readers whose knowledge extends no further than the writings of certain gossip-columnists, this may provide a useful antidote. But for students familiar with the literature on interest groups, the effort is at best redundant.

Indeed, the authors themselves display some uncertainty about the locus of the myth they are attacking. True, pressure groups are the *eminences grises* of a considerable body of popular literature; but how widely is this belief infused into public ideology? The authors assume this to be a significant aspect of public ideology, but they adduce no evidence. Indeed, the evidence is spotty and inconclusive. Recently-published and forthcoming studies cast doubt on the myth that Americans distrust politics and politicians. Is it possible that there are other mythical myths about public attitudes toward politics?

When they seek to construct their straw-man out of the scholarly literature, the authors encounter greater difficulty. They charge that scholars have sought self-serving examples of group power and ignored contrary evidence. This may well be the case, but the reasons are not those implied by the authors and would constitute the material for an interesting essay on the sociology of scholarship. (And in this light, how is the reader to interpret the interviewer's injunction to her respondents that "It is my idea that while these groups play a role, the extent of interest group influence is often greatly exaggerated and, therefore, the actual workings of the House are seriously misunderstood.")

A second charge is that, in group research, "Congressmen almost invariably emerge as papier-mache figures" (p. 10). Thus, in spite of his explicit declarations to the contrary, David Truman is put down with the remark that "presumably, when one has dealt with the pressures exerted on Congress, there is not much left to say about that body." (*Ibid.*) The objection, one gathers, is simply that Truman dealt with Congress from the perspective of the group process rather than the other way around (though it must be observed that *The Governmental Process* is not Truman's last word on the subject of Congress). And, by the last chapter, the authors interpret group theory to require "virtual monopoly of access to Congress. . . " (p. 87).

Having thus fashioned group theory, the authors construct an equally implausible model of influence. Thus, influence (the authors find the word "pressure" semantically useful) is apparently equated with the use of coercive mechanisms and limited to the "lobbying" situation (pp. 14–15, 58–59, 87). Group potency can be demonstrated, they contend, only if demands are pressed which reflect values not internalized

by legislators, and then are met because of coercion, either implicit or explicit. This is somewhat curious, since influence apparently proceeds most commonly through "mutual adjustments" (Lindblom) or "coordinated expectations" (Deutsch); and, indeed, the employment of threats might be thought to indicate the breakdown, rather than the effectiveness, of normal patterns of influence.

It is not surprising, then, that the authors find little "pressure" going on. Having excluded from traditional theory those elements of influence which psychological and political studies would suggest are most important (e.g., creation of predispositions to act throughout the entire socialization process; reinforcement of those predispositions; etc.), the authors are able to re-discover some of these elements and unveil an "altered perspective." One wonders why the authors did not take themselves more seriously when, in an unguarded moment, they observe that "it may seem strange that the interpretation of Congressional behavior in terms of interest group activity should have to be combatted when it was never established in the first place" (pp. 17–18).

The data from the study, moreover, are simply not sufficient to, as the authors put it, "shrink interest groups to life size." Besides excluding most group-related factors which may impinge upon the legislators' attitudes and values, the data permit no assessment of the strength of group influences relative to other factors. Nor do the data give any picture of the play of forces in such nonlegislative tasks as constituency casework. A more comprehensive audit of incoming cues would be required to answer this question with any certainty. Even accepting the authors' findings, however, it is entirely plausible to argue (for example) that: (a) the volume of external cues *from all sources* is smaller than one might assume; (b) group-related (and other) cues—in the form of information, policy claims, or whatever—enter Congress largely through the policy specialists and are communicated *by these Members* to their colleagues, either explicitly or implicitly; and (c) group-related cues are thus infused into the intralegislative communications network without being perceived by most Members as group "pressures" at all. These are merely propositions, but they are entirely plausible and illustrate the insufficiency of the authors' evidence for the task they set for it.

In brief, this book offers some suggestive findings of a limited nature concerning Congressional perceptions of interest groups. But as for its "altered perspective" of the role of groups, it has all been said before, more cogently and more systematically, by other observers—and not least by "group theorists" themselves.—ROGER H. DAVIDSON, *Dartmouth College.*

Slums and Community Development: Experiments in Self-Help. By MARSHALL B. CLINARD. (New York: The Free Press, 1966. Pp. xvi, 395. $7.95.)

This is an interesting and good book. It could be more helpful to those who are struggling to find solutions to slum problems. I confess to some frustration on this score.

Perhaps my frustration stems from the fact that I am one of those people whose profession calls for spending a lot of time searching for ways out. This is a desperate and unrewarding pursuit and the solutions are still eluding us. It is therefore disappointing when a new work on the subject doesn't seem to advance the front line much beyond where we are.

Maybe it's not supposed to do that.

The book does do a good job a) of describing the essential characteristics of slums (in many cultures); b) of presenting various theories about their formation and maintenance; c) of defining urban community development ("the development of effective community feeling with an urban context and the development of self-help and citizen participation, of individual initiative in seeking community integration and change"); d) of presenting various formulations of the principles of community development including the author's own; e) of describing in detail and analyzing an important and large scale community development program in India; f) of advocating community development as essential in changing or eradicating slums. On the last point I would have wished that Clinard's advocacy were a little less detached, cool and placid. This tone throughout the book ("Many people say. . . . " "It has been suggested. . . . " "On the other hand. . . .") makes the reader wonder how sure the author is of his own case.

My main criticisms of the book are several. First, it does not weigh urban community development techniques against alternative or complementary strategies of change. This is a crucial matter for decision makers (including ultimately the voters) who have to decide on the allocation of resources. Where is the payoff most likely to be? What are the priority objects and policies for investment? Should money and personnel be thrown into community development, building schools and training teachers, subsidizing economic enterprise, building new towns or improving municipal services and with what relative level of investment?

Second, Clinard fails in his analysis to encompass the entire urban system in assessing the forces that make slums and have potential for changing them. He tips his hat to it in a number of places and in the final paragraph of the book says, ". . . certain aspects of the slum problem

. . . reach far beyond small areas and the possibilities of self-help. . . . In both affluent and poor countries there is a need for more equitable distribution of wealth, elimination of poverty, improved housing conditions . . . [in] . . . less affluent societies there are problems of increased industrialization, overcoming widespread unemployment, and increasing health facilities." To change the slum, many facets of the total urban system are going to have to be manipulated, sentimentalists to the contrary notwithstanding, and community development is manipulation just as much as anything else. We need more analysis of the interaction of the elements of the urban system of which local citizen participation and determination is but one. The book doesn't do this.

Third, a little romanticism creeps in every now and then. Any good democrat, this reviewer included, wants democratic participation, community integration and self-help. It is possible to over-simplify this precept, however, and to be naive about how great things will be when we get it. For instance, Clinard says, "Change can be effectively accomplished only with the cooperation of the citizens as a group and through their perception of the need for change and their desire to cooperate with outside agencies in bringing about social change." This is doubtful dogma. Did the citizens as a group perceive and desire the electric light, the computer, Henry Ford and Robert Moses? Would not the distribution of higher income among the residents of slums produce change?

Fourth, even within its chosen arena the book would be more useful if it gave us more practical and earthy suggestions about how to accomplish some of the things it says are essential—such as demonstrating respect for uncultivated people, or developing effective communication between middle class people and lower class people, and inducing felt needs among the slum people and escalating them to levels of sophistication that hold real promise of changing their lives.

Now. Having vented these criticisms there are positive things to say. For researchers the pages on evaluating the Delhi project are interesting and helpful. This is an extraordinarily difficult subject to evaluate and the author slips a little bit in concluding this chapter with the statement: "Perhaps the most practical evidence of the success (of the project) was the adoption in India of a national program of urban community development . . . after a careful study of these two pilot projects." I'm afraid that cannot be called "evidence." The decision may well have been based on considerations of political popularity.

Clinard makes some very relevant observations on the role of non-professionals in community work. Relatively untrained and uneducated people can do much, often even better than the "professional." This is an important matter for attention in the United States.

He also emphasizes the importance of linking community development activities with the normal political processes. They cannot take place in a vacuum. Politicians can help or hinder and it is important to deal with this fact. Too often this is not done.

Another vital point well made is that "a change in identity or self-image is basic to successful community development. The continued reiteration of belief in (the local residents) by the community organizers and by others demonstrated W. I. Thomas' view that people come to act according to the expectations held of them." That motto should be on the wall of everyone who proposes to help people help themselves.

Clinard recognizes and deals well with the question of power. Lack of power and the feeling of powerlessness are potent contributors to the universally bemoaned "apathy" of slum residents. Successful community development must take the extension of power to the powerless as a prime objective.

One final word of complaint to the publisher, the Free Press. A book like this has many footnotes. They are all in the back of the book, arranged by chapters. In the text the individual pages do not indicate what chapter you are in. To refer to a footnote you have to turn back to find out what chapter you are reading, then shuffle to the back of the book to locate the footnote—a very time consuming business. Why not put "footnotes" right at the foot of the page to which they refer?—DAVID R. HUNTER, *Stern Family Fund.*

The Formative Years of Social Security. By ARTHUR J. ALTMEYER. (Madison: U. of Wisconsin Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 314. $6.50.)

One of the more distinguished public administrators of our time, Arthur J. Altmeyer, has given us a useful account of the origin of the Social Security Act and its development from 1934 to 1954. As a member and chairman of the Social Security Board from 1934–46, and as Commissioner for Social Security from 1946–53, Mr. Altmeyer occupied a position which gave him a matchless opportunity to shape and observe the shaping of the social security system which means so much to so many Americans. His book is of special value to students of public administration but it can also serve political scientists concerned with the substance of public policy (there still are a few, aren't there?).

Mr. Altmeyer narrates and interprets the long succession of controversies which have embroiled

the Social Security Act during its "formative years." He discusses and evaluates the pressures of the Townsend movement for uniform old age pensions for all elderly citizens; later modifications (though unacknowledged) of the Townsend plan put forward by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and certain prominent Republicans; the resistances to establishing state merit systems for administering the act; the perversion of old age assistance for partisan purposes by political spoilsmen in Ohio in 1936–38 and the hotly disputed decision to terminate federal aid until the evil was corrected; the attempt to establish adequate minimum unemployment compensation benefits in all states; the debate over pay-as-you-go financing versus "the full reserve system"; the dubious decision to limit social security taxes to a low level of earnings; the wrangling over the relationship between individual contributions and total potential benefits; the denial or reduction of old age benefits to those over 65 who continue to work; the financing of old age assistance on a 50-50 matching basis versus federal grants proportioned to per capita state income; the substitution of a strictly national unemployment insurance system for the federal-state system; the Flanders-Ives-Nixon bill to subsidize the purchase of private health insurance policies; the wisdom or folly of joint administration of employment service and unemployment benefits programs; the issue of social security benefits for the partially and the totally disabled; permitting the states to disclose the names of persons on public assistance rolls which are partially financed by federal revenues; the argument about whether social security beneficiaries have a contractual right to certain benefits or "only" a statutory right. With Medicare freshly on the statute books and future extensions of health insurance probable, Mr. Altmeyer has taken special care to insure that the background of Medicare was adequately chronicled.

Although *The Formative Years of Social Security* is invaluable from the standpoint of historical narrative, it is somewhat disappointing in its scanty treatment of the interplay of political forces which have caused social security to evolve into its present form. The opinions of Congressmen are cited from time to time, the reports of Congressional committees and study commissions and advisory groups are recorded, but Mr. Altmeyer was either not particularly interested in the rich mosaic of political pressures, strategies and counter-strategies which have brought about the Topsy-like growth of social security, or he decided largely to ignore them when writing this volume.

But if a systematic and searching probe into the political environment shaping social security is lacking, this is partially compensated for by the occasional introduction of illuminating vignettes. Mr. Altmeyer reveals that President Franklin D. Roosevelt spoke to him in 1938 about using a National Health Program which had been endorsed by a National Health Conference as a campaign issue in 1940. Altmeyer suspects, therefore, that a third term was on Mr. Roosevelt's mind at least as early as 1938.

When a Huey Long filibuster brought Congress to adjournment in 1935 before action had been taken on an appropriation bill to finance the establishment of the social security apparatus, Comptroller General John R. McCarl saved the day by pointing out that "the work of the President's Committee on Economic Security had been financed as a research project by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration." McCarl said he saw no reason, therefore, why it would not be "entirely logical and proper to set up another research project to develop ways and means of putting the Social Security Act into operation."

Again, when Altmeyer urged the chairman of the Ways and Means committee to include farm workers under social security, the chairman replied, "Doctor, when the first farmer with manure on his shoes comes to me and asks to be covered, I will be willing to consider it." He also relates how Lord Beveridge (whose famous report was largely ignored by President Roosevelt) was made a deputy Sergeant-at-Arms by Sam Rayburn so that he could hear Winston Churchill address a joint session of Congress when every seat had already been taken.

In addition to such tidbits, Altmeyer offers various comments and suggestions containing a good bit of wisdom. He has a particularly instructive section on the quandaries and difficulties involved when federal grants to the states are suspended because the latter have flouted some provision of a law directing the administration of these grants. The cry is raised, "Why punish innocent people who need the money?" while the anguished administrator reminds his critics that unless the law is enforced, the states can disregard any federal requirement they find distasteful. In the Ohio affair, Altmeyer suggests that a useful compromise might have consisted of refusing to permit federal funds to be used to pay the salaries of persons hired outside the merit system in violation of federal law.

Commenting on the persistent efforts of Congressmen to influence the character of administrative decisions, he cites approvingly a political scientist who "after making an extensive study of the parliamentary form of government in a number of European countries, concluded that they had actual although not nominal separation of powers while we had nominal but not actual separation."

In the preface, Altmeyer confesses he has made no attempt "to analyze the long range economic, social and political forces at work." He sought, rather to discuss those immediate problems and policies which necessarily preoccupy the administrator. Similarly, the concluding chapter ("The Years Ahead") primarily deals with the work of tidying up the Social Security Act to make it a more effective instrument for achieving its original purposes. Unfortunately, the author does not seek to place today's law in the context of the historic transformations which prompted the Ad Hoc Committee on the Triple Revolution to make such drastic recommendations. If Altmeyer had chosen to back away from the Act he administered so long and so well, and evaluated the relevance and adequacy of social security's basic premises in the world of tomorrow, his conclusions and logic would have commanded unusual interest. Or does total immersion in a program over a long period of time create a perspective and a defensiveness which ineluctably disqualify one for such a task?—Reo M. Christenson, *Miami University (Ohio)*.

Financing the 1964 Election. By Herbert E. Alexander. (Princeton, N.J.: Citizens' Research Foundation, 1966. Pp. 137. $1.00.)

The field of party and campaign finance currently attracts the research energies of only a handful of American political scientists. Rarely is the topic on the programs of the various American political science meetings (although it remains a subject of concern at the congresses of the International Political Science Association). Published systematic treatment of political finance is to be found for fewer than ten states. The inadequacy of records and public reports and the need for substantial funds to conduct research into the subject undoubtedly keep the number of researchers small. Those conducting interviews with donors and recipients of campaign money can attest to the difficulties of obtaining a full, candid report of amounts and sources involved and the difficulties of ascertaining motivations. Further, many do not see the field as a challenging one in which to apply sophisticated methodologies or theories.

In the face of this rather bleak picture, the profession owes a debt of gratitude to the Citizens' Research Foundation (which in turn receives support from the Ford Foundation) and in particular to Herbert E. Alexander who has written or edited more than half of its eleven reports. The 1964 study uses the same categories of analysis as his *Financing the 1960 Election*. These include preconvention campaigns, convention costs, contributions and expenditures, labor and business in politics, the "aftermath," and issues of public policy.

Although a study of finance inevitably contains a large amount of descriptive material, Alexander does not hesitate to deal with broader issues and policies. To the student of comparisons and continuities in politics one of the best sections is that dealing with changes from 1952 to 1964. The latter pre-convention and general election campaigns are seen as the most expensive in history. The Goldwater campaign was a contradiction to the "widely held notions" that: large amounts in small sums could not be raised by direct mail or television appeals for funds; the out party is disadvantaged in fund-raising; and money is difficult to raise for a candidate with unfavorable poll results. Further, the drain of funds into expensive pre-nomination contests did not seem to cut into fund-raising ability in the general election campaign and, in a dramatic switch, Republicans attracted fewer large contributors and more small contributors than the Democrats.

In view of the importance of pecuniary factors for the political system, revitalization of the field as an object of research is much needed. Bolstered by adequate resources, political finance research, moreover, lends itself to a diversity of approaches. Alexander and others, for example, might be encouraged to plan now for a 1968 election study which would not only continue descriptive analysis but set up a series of propositions and hypotheses to be tested in light of available data since World War II. This period is exciting since it contains maintaining, deviating, reinstating, and critical elections. Theoretical leads put forth by Alexander Heard would be augmented by additional models and by widespread interviews. (Here the Michigan Survey Center's experience might be used.) The 1964 election, for example, suggests a hypothesis worthy of testing that the more ideological a candidate is perceived to be the more likely a large number of ideologically oriented voters will make donations.

Other fertile fields include the funding of congressional mid-term elections and a comparison of donors and of expenditures for legislative candidates in presidential and off-year elections. Despite inadequacy of records, comparative research on state political finance deserves a place with comparative research on state legislative behavior and party systems. Analysis of the relationship, if any, of finance to degrees of party competition is almost completely lacking, yet might reveal much about the political system. With most county governments remaining as bastions of considerable patronage, the campaign finances of county executives and legislators is also an obvious field for study.—Hugh A. Bone, *University of Washington*.

Money as a Campaign Resource: Tennessee Democratic Senatorial Primaries, 1948–1964. By William Buchanan and Agnes Bird. (Princeton, N.J.: Citizens Research Foundation, 1966. Pp. 97. $.50.)

Money and Politics in California: Democratic Senatorial Primary, 1964. By John R. Owens. (Princeton, N.J.: Citizens Research Foundation, 1966. Pp. 62. $.50.)

A recent Ford grant to the Citizens' Research Foundation has made possible still further monographs on the impact of money on politics. These two studies are the first analyses of primary elections. They are lively, well written accounts and all of the authors deserve thanks for their efforts to present thoughtful assessments of data which to say the least are elusive.

Strangely enough, both studies are instructive to those who may still overrate the role of money in campaigns. Owens shows that in California money was not the decisive factor in either the pre-primary screening of candidates, the primary or general election. Furthermore, the biggest spender lost the primary and then the biggest spender lost the general election. The study of six senatorial primaries in Tennessee concludes that, "There is *no* correlation between amount spent and votes received, and there is a negative correlation between number of votes and cost per vote." Lest any prospective campaign managers feel they have a new victory formula here, both studies overwhelm the reader with the increasing amounts being spent in primaries. There is evidence that almost twice as much was spent in the California primary as was "reported spent in the general election." Cranston and Salinger each spent about $500,000 and their combined unpaid bills at the end of the campaign was nearly $500,000. The money problem became so oppressive that a share-the-deficit agreement was drawn up, committing the winner to help raise up to $150,000 of the loser's debt. In much less affluent Tennessee, no serious contender spent less than $75,000 and the average senatorial primary studied cost $200,000. Money alone, then, may not win elections but it certainly requires more and more to run a losing campaign nowadays.

These studies could not deal with one of the more difficult issues emerging from any analysis of primary politics—i.e., the ability of political parties to meet their essential obligation of nominating candidates. No Republican has been elected to the United States Senate from Tennessee for fifty years and the Democratic party is a potpourri of factions. The attitude of Californians toward party organization is equally bizarre but for different reasons. In Pennsylvania, however, in 1966 Democrat Milton Shapp trounced a perfectly respectable, if relatively unknown, organization candidate, state senator Robert Casey, by spending one million dollars in the last ten days of the primary campaign on the mass media. Indeed, four weeks before election day, a poll commissioned by Mr. Shapp showed that he had only six percent of the vote. If the major charge which can be levied against a candidate is that he bears the endorsement of his party's policy committee or, as in the case of Rolvaag versus Keith in Minnesota, of his party's state convention, then politicians and political scientists who feel strongly about the responsibilities of parties still have a long way to go. So many citizens (college professors included) are so hostile to the very concept of political parties that a contender who can label his opponent the "machine candidate" and do so with enough money, ends up with an immense advantage. Perhaps future monographs can be devoted to this new old problem.

Neither study is naive enough to see better disclosure laws as the answer; indeed Buchanan and Bird point out that candidates could not be truthful "without forfeiting the election." The problems are just too manifold. One only hopes that the Long rider to the foreign investors bill of 1966, which allows taxpayers to designate one dollar of their income taxes to a Presidential Election Campaign Fund, does not add further complexities by inducing citizens to believe that a dollar solves the problem at all levels. The Long rider was inadequate recognition of the problem of money and politics. A more helpful law will emerge only after careful study of monographs such as these. Again, students of the problem are indebted to the continuing leadership of Mr. Herbert Alexander, director of the Citizens' Research Foundation, and the Ralph Nader of money and politics.—Sidney Wise, *Franklin and Marshall College.*

Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar. By Jerome E. Carlin, with a Foreword by Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1966. Pp. xxix, 267. $6.75.)

Despite the adage that no man can be a just judge in his own cause, professional associations have often sought self-government, asserting that only they can be adequate judges of their members' ethical behavior. As far as lawyers are concerned, it would appear from this study that the group is as ineffective a judge of the ethical actions of its members as the individual is of his own.

Using an index of ethical behavior constructed from the responses to thirteen hypothetical cases from conflict of interest to Christmas cards for clients, the author estimates the annual "number of serious violators" among lawyers in Manhattan

and the Bronx to be about 4,500 (among 20,500 in active practice), but "in any given year fewer than 2 per cent of lawyers who violate the generally accepted norms of the bar are formally handled by the official disciplinary machinery; only about 0.02 per cent are publicly sanctioned by being disbarred, suspended, or censured." The notoriety of an offense "increases the likelihood of disbarment," so that the bar associations appear "to be less concerned with scrutinizing the moral integrity of the profession than with forestalling public criticism and control."

This report is based upon interviews with approximately 800 lawyers in active private practice in Manhattan and the Bronx. The sample was carefully constructed to be representative of such characteristics of the members of the New York bar as law school attended, ethnic background, religion, size of firm, and type of clientele. "The metropolitan bar is, upon the evidence of our sample, a highly stratified professional community. Substantial differences in clientele, type of practice, and income mark the divisions among the principal strata. The striking differences in background between lawyers of the upper and lower strata indicate a highly systematic process of selection, recruitment, and retention. . . ." Most (77 per cent) of the large-firm lawyers are graduates of the Ivy League law schools—Columbia, Harvard, and Yale—and these men are not acquainted with many of the small-firm and individual attorneys, so that unified group leadership appears difficult, nearly impossible. Large-firm lawyers tended to score much higher on the index of ethical behavior than lawyers in small firms and in individual practice.

Law schools teach courses in legal ethics; bar associations investigate the character of applicants for bar examinations or of applicants who have passed; associations have codes of ethics and committees to consider new canons for them; association and court machinery exists to discipline the lawyer who engages in some unethical conduct. But none of these matters affects behavior as much as the conditions of practice ("The lower the status of the clientele, the higher the rate of violation. . . ."), the type of practice ("Those handling personal injury, criminal, and divorce matters . . . generally have the highest rates of violation . . . regardless of the status of their clientele,") and the type of court before which the lawyer regularly appears. ("The lower the level of the courts and agencies with which he comes into contact, the more the lawyer is likely to violate generally accepted ethical norms.") The ethical climate of his firm will either support or discourage violations. The lawyer's "inner disposition," as shown by his choice of partners or office-mate, is about equal in importance to his responsiveness to clients who may urge him to cut legal corners for them. In the evidence here presented no short and simple way appears promising to improve the ethical conduct of the bar.

The study seems most carefully done, and we may hope that it will be repeated for other cities. Students of government would welcome in future studies, however, questions or hypothetical cases on the ethical behavior of the lawyer-legislator, lawyer-lobbyist, lawyer-bill drafter, and lawyer-administrator.

There are 78 pages of appendices which show the sample, the responses, how the indices were constructed, and the interview schedule.—DAYTON D. MCKEAN, *University of Colorado.*

The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation. By BRUCE L. R. SMITH. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 332. $7.95.)

The prince has always had his counselors, but it is a distinctive mark of our age that advice-giving to political rulers and administrators has become institutionalized. Within the relatively short period since the end of the Second World War, the advisory function in the United States has undergone a startling evolution. From the long tradition of personal advisor and *ad hoc* study committee, we have moved to the permanent advisory committee usually composed of natural scientists and other experts whose responsibility is to advise the President and other high officials on complex scientific-technical questions. While these two forms of advisors have persisted, they are today overshadowed by a third type whose importance for the American political system has yet to be appreciated fully: the advisory corporation.

To its detractors and to its upholders alike, the RAND Corporation of Santa Monica, California is the symbol of this new political institution. For the former, it is a diabolical place where brilliant though twisted minds write scenarios on mega-death and other "unthinkables." For its defenders, RAND is an ingenious response to the growing need for objective and helpful studies in complex areas of public policy. Physically located 3,000 miles from Washington, D.C., and occupying the status of a private, non-profit corporation under government contract, RAND keeps in balance (its defenders argue) the two essential, and frequently contradictory, traits of a good advisor: it is sufficiently close to government to be knowledgeable and responsible, yet, sufficiently detached to be objective and disinterested.

In this well written and thoughtful study Bruce Smith places himself in the latter category. Though his book may not still the critics of RAND, Smith has given us our first and, on almost all points, a satisfactory treatment of an

institution and aspect of American politics today of which we political scientists are much too ignorant. But Smith gives us more than a history of the RAND Corporation. In addition, he discusses with skill and dispassion the many administrative and political issues raised by the devolution of essentially public responsibilities upon a private organization: in-house versus contract policy studies; the conflict of interest problem; independence versus responsibility; and the communication of results. His discussion of the development at RAND of systems analysis and program budgeting, which were subsequently introduced by Charles Hitch into the upper echelons of the Pentagon, and now, by Executive Order, are transforming all agencies of government, give the book added benefit to students of American politics.

For this reviewer, the most interesting and rewarding chapter of the book is a case study of the so-called overseas base study. Initiated in 1951 by the Air Force as a narrow technical study dealing with the cost of various locations for basing the Strategic Air Command in foreign countries, the base study was transformed by Albert Wohlstetter and his collaborators into a pioneering and broad analysis of American military strategy. While the details of the study can not be discussed here, its contributions to American politics were three-fold. In the first place, the origins of systems analysis—the systematic evaluation of policy alternatives by a multidisciplinary team—can be traced to the base study. Secondly, the analysis brought out the simple fact (unrecognized at the time by the Air Force) that it makes a considerable difference in nuclear war whether one strikes first or second; this discovery led to the concept of the invulnerable deterrent and eventually to arms control measures by which to stabilize the present system of mutual deterrence. Thirdly, the base study contributed to the emergence in the area of military strategy of "generalist experts" who are situated half-way between the "hard" scientist or engineer and the policy-maker.

The success of RAND leads Smith to inquire in the concluding section of his book whether it might not be a good idea to have "civilian" RAND-type organizations carrying out policy studies on policy issues such as water pollution, education, and poverty. In Smith's view this type of half-way house between the academic world of basic knowledge and the political world of action is essential if the United States is to bring natural and social scientific knowledge to bear upon the complex public policy questions of our society. One might add, too, the note that RAND itself will surely be moving in this direction under its new president Henry Rowen who worked with Wohlstetter on the base study, and, until recently, was responsible for the execution of the President's order making program budgeting (the Planning-Programming-Budgeting System) mandatory throughout most of the national government.

Before concluding, one sticky problem must be dealt with. This is the insinuation of certain reviewers that this is an "inside" book because its author was given access to confidential files, was a consultant to RAND for a brief period during the summer of 1962, and went to work for RAND following the completion of his Ph.D. at Harvard (the book is a revision of his dissertation). Smith freely acknowledges these connections without which this informed study could not have been written. In general, he rises above the limitation such close association can place upon one's objectivity. In the present reviewer's opinion, this book is no apologia for RAND. Though Smith is committed to the RAND concept, he is remarkably candid about the many sensitive issues with which he deals. There may be other equally sensitive questions which he might have discussed such as the alleged dispute between the "philosophers" and the "strategists" over the French deterrent and NATO or the allegation that RAND's advice tends to be too technical and negligent with respect to important political considerations. But whatever shortcomings the book may have with respect to this type of question, on balance Smith has written a forthright and scholarly study which enhances our knowledge considerably about a new feature of our political system.—ROBERT GILPIN, *Princeton University.*

Stockpiling Strategic Materials: Politics and National Defense. By GLENN H. SNYDER. (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1966. Pp. xii, 314. $6.00, cloth; $3.00, paper.)

Professor Glenn Snyder did not discover the bureaucratic law that any national policy dollar can be spent as ten different constituency dimes. But his case study of defense stockpiling since 1945 shows how divisive things can get under even the broad dollar-value umbrella of national security.

The United States squirrels dozens of raw and processed materials—from minerals to foods to footplasters—in several statutory stockpiles as insurance against war's shortages and ravages. Its logic seems just as compelling as the instincts that have prompted every postwar administration to let stockpiling go fitfully forward. And one doubts that most people separate—as Professor Snyder carefully does—stocks of "strategic and critical" aluminum and tin from silos of price-supported wheat from gleeful disclosures that the Army has somehow bought twenty years' supply

of ground beef, or that the Navy has 110,000 surplus oyster forks.

It could be a muckraker's windfall, even a scholarly one. But with rare clean writing and enviable restraint, Professor Snyder tells the story of how more or less single-value defense stockpile planning after World War II fed on events, jurisdictional disputes, special interests, and conflicting "logic" and compromise to multiply into nine potential stockpiles, most of them several values removed from war insurance and national defense.

Multi-value policy comes from multiple pressures. Interior, Commerce, and Agriculture know nothing else. The military has peculiar problems with its constituencies, and the State Department's main constituency is the world. Mix them all with congressmen who read "conservation and development" of dwindling resources as "production and use," and this familiar situation leaves the door open for sincere poor judgment at best, and unlawful mismanagement at worst. Students of Kenneth Royall, Louis Johnson, Arthur Flemming and George Humphrey will find valuable evidence and suggestions. However, the book does not deeply explore intra-military politics behind stereotypical military behavior of the period, and therefore may be less helpful to advanced students of civilian-military relations than to other administrative policy students.

Professor Snyder's analysis is generally chronological. He uncovers periods of State-Interior-military *et al.* maneuvering for control before the Stock Piling Act of 1946 (P.L. 79–520, which amended 1939 legislation); the period of essentially military stockpiling criteria during the Cold War pubescence of 1947–1950; the period of mixed civilian-military control during Korea's quasi-mobilization; and the period of civilian say-so during post-Korean asymmetry of strategic doctrine, nuclear technology, and market instability. It has only been since 1960 and the Kennedy-inspired Symington hearings of 1962–1963 that doctrinal shifts and Robert McNamara's trusteeship "have removed most of the blatant contradiction between stockpiling and strategy which characterized the previous administration—when the United States was unprepared to fight, and had no intention of fighting, the only kind of war for which a stockpile of strategic raw materials made any sense at all." Indeed, now the job is getting rid of what became surplus when stockpile assumptions caught up with modern strategy and technology.

Professor Snyder does not use "any complex theoretical model of decision making," although he hopes that "devotees of more sophisticated decision-making models will have found empirical data . . . which do fit into their particular approach."[1] They certainly can. And the author need not have embraced stillborn models. However, it might be that more attention to some of the ideally exclusive categories of domestic-international decision making models could explain more about Professor Snyder's crucial variables of actors' "interests" and "bargaining power."

Nothing haunts social scientists more than precisely establishing relationships called "power." It doesn't help when power is both independent and dependent variable. Policy and policy outcomes can be described in terms of interests and power. But unless there is definitive agreement on what power is related to in Interior, State, the Pentagon or elsewhere, can policy and policy outcomes be explained in these terms? What many of the stockpiling actors were talking about, after all, was a Runyonesque "piece of the action." That may not be scientific, but it implies simpler pursuits and less insatiable appetites than "power."

Professor Snyder does not fling his own "national security" definitions at the reader. Like national interest, national security can be defined just so far before definitions crumble under layerings of ever more tenuous stipulations. Professor Snyder knows this well, and it is to his high credit that he induces a fascinating story largely from the actors' own assumptions, perceptions, and exploitations of a constantly debatable area of national security policy.—ALDEN WILLIAMS, *University of Denver.*

Defense Purchases and Regional Growth. By ROGER E. BOLTON. (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1967. Pp. xiii, 189. $2.50, paper.)

Professor Bolton classifies each state and Census region according to its dependence on defense income in 1962 and the relative stimulus given to growth by defense income in the 1952–62 period. A wide spectrum of cases are reported. Among them, the author finds heavy reliance on defense expenditures and relatively strong growth effects in some cases, slight dependence and, indeed, growth depressed by adverse defense expenditure trends in others. Not all rapidly growing states owe their growth to defense activity. In some cases, the analysis indicates growth stimulus primarily from the civilian sector and rapid growth despite a slow rate of increase in defense income.

The study is primarily descriptive, as opposed to normative. Alternative criteria for an evalua-

[1] The author's original 1956 dissertation—here refined and updated—was being written at Columbia about the same time that the monograph by Professors Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (*Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics.* Foreign Policy Analysis Series, No. 3. Princeton, 1954.) was first being received.

tion of policy are discussed, though there is not the opportunity to apply them with the main focus of the work on the description of impact. One is immediately impressed by the clarity and directness of the exposition. In a subject matter area that is fraught with approximations of both concept and datum, Professor Bolton has made important contributions to precision.

The central model is a simple regional multiplier in which defense income enters as a part of exogenous income. This in itself is several conceptual notches above the more frequent practice of comparing defense payrolls directly with regional nondefense payrolls. The limitations of an aggregate multiplier approach lead the author to supplement it with a "ratchet effect" (Duesenberry type) predictor of the ratio of locally generated to total personal income in a few states. The model stands up to his statistical tests better than one might expect in view of its assumptions. Input-output data made available since Bolton's work was completed would today, nevertheless, invite a more disaggregated approach.

Some of the difficulties arising from unwanted aggregation are handled by sensitivity analysis. The two parameterizations express: (1) the relation between prime and subcontractor volume within a given geographic area; and (2) differences in breadth of definition of "defense-related" industries. The important conclusions of the study withstand these sensitivity tests though remain conditioned by other approximations (such as the use of a national average to convert procurement dollars to personal income state-by-state). In the same class, one might also refer to the problem of dealing with a time lag between contract award and time of production, though Professor Bolton's treatment of this problem is more sophisticated than most.

The work as a whole is the most definitive study of the subject known to this reviewer, though it is well to heed the author's caution:

"Some readers may feel that (the shortcomings of data and method) are so serious as to render the estimates of little value. I would prefer to have more readers of this kind than of those who would rely upon the figures down to the last decimal place. . . . I hope the study is useful in pointing out some of the difficulties of research in this field, and that the initial efforts to deal with them will suggest methods of greater refinement." (P. 7.)

—RICHARD A. TYBOUT, *Ohio State University.*

The New York Times Annual Indexes, 1863–74. (New York: R. R. Bowker Company, 1966. $44.50.)

The first publication in book form of the *Times* index for these years. The Bowker Company is printing or reprinting all of the annual indexes from 1851 to the present.—C.B.

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan. A Critique of Sources, Conditions, and Issues, with Appended Documents. BY RALPH BRAIBANTI. Published for the Program in Comparative Studies on Southern Asia of the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1966. Pp. xxvii, 569. $12.50.)

This book with the long name is in reality a combination of three modes: reader, annotated bibliography, and analysis. The author, Professor Ralph Braibanti, aims at "integrating the written record" of Pakistan's bureaucracy. He uses the latter term in a broad fashion to include local government and many judicial issues, as well as public administration. The reviewer agrees readily with Braibanti that this work is a "useful first step in evaluating the bureaucratic system of Pakistan" (p. viii). If writing on a single country's government or administration is not a stylish exercise in American political science today, it is nevertheless a crucial one for persons studying administration generally in the developing countries. Public administration in Pakistan is a tempting subject. There has been rapid economic development there during the Second Five-Year Plan, 1960–1965, and many observers see political development in the changes in recent years. Administrators have been at the center of all of this.

There is far more documentary evidence about administration in Pakistan than in most of the new states outside the influence of the Indian Civil Service. Some materials go back a century or even more, and they can provide the researcher with many worthwhile perspectives on present-day issues. Professor Braibanti acknowledges that the written record in Pakistan, as in other new countries, is "a source of ideological aspiration rather than necessarily a record of accomplishment." "Recorded aspiration is a crucial source of ideology" (p. viii), but it also has a dogged tendency to become accepted as factual analysis. A basic difficulty for the analyst is that organizational and program data (much less behavioral information) are simply not being generated by Pakistan's administration today in any useable volume. That is what is most needed. This problem, however, like most of those I find in the book, is beyond the control of the author-compiler.

Braibanti's métier is the study of administrative and constitutional law. There is fresh proof of that proposition herein. He gives a clear and provocative discussion of the administration of justice in tribal areas, with special reference to the Frontier Crimes Regulations of 1901. The high point of the book is a long chapter on legal research. Braibanti clarified for me the ways in which contempt proceedings threaten researchers on judicial and legal topics. He goes further to analyze a number of legal issues relevant to bureaucracy: the relationships between the 1956 Constitution and the martial law beginning in 1958; the second, 1962 Constitution as it departs from pre-1958 ideas and precedents; corruption in administration; and his favorite problem, the use of traditional writs. He feels that the use of such writs—mandamus, quo warranto, prohibition, certiorari, and habeas corpus—is "by far the most compelling intellectual problem in the law of Pakistan" (p. 299).

An annotated bibliography of several broad subject-matter areas occupies most of the book. The second best feature of the volume is the author's commentary on some of the landmark documents in Indian administrative history. There is valuable guidance to the materials on local government. On the relatively few occasions when he expresses opinions, one tends to agree with them.

I am not sure how another scholar can use the section concerning commissions and their work. There are long listings and brief descriptions of the reports of 38 commissions on organizational and procedural reforms and those of 33 commissions of inquiry during the period, 1958 to 1962. The author points out that this is a sketchy treatment, but also that a few of the documents are inaccessible or unavailable at all in Pakistan. An important minority has not been released or released *in toto* by the Government.

Fifteen appendixes (about 178 pages of text) present the same difficulty. Two appendixes are brief excerpts from commission reports which recommend administrative reforms. Three are press releases which served in lieu of full commission reports on administrative questions. Each contains assertions about what "should" happen, so they may be employed as research materials on other speculations about how reform might proceed. Ten of the appendixes are speeches by the President and the Chief Justice.

Professor Braibanti warns the reader he can scarcely generalize about the current state of Pakistan's administration by looking at these documents. They contain only a small amount of straight reporting and no real sense of the economic, political, or administrative changes that have been taking place. Programs and projects in the forefront of Pakistani attention today are not emphasized: the Rural Works Programme, Basic Democracies, Plan implementation, industrial expansion, and water resources administration in such forms as the Indus Basin Plan and the Salinity Control and Reclamation Projects. Some of the greatest movement forward is occurring in these programs, but literature about them is exceedingly scarce.

Such development-oriented literature is becoming more accessible in the United States as we cope with the mass of materials in 19 libraries that receive Pakistani publications through the P.L. 480 program. Professor Braibanti has been able to include a few of these in his bibliography, but he intends the book as a foundation for subsequent use of the new items. There may soon be more access to these current writings in the United States than in Pakistan. The Civil Service of Pakistan and other services have traditionally studied and criticized administration. Today however there is a counter-trend toward secrecy and classification of information. Foreigners find it difficult to gain access to study problems of any currency. Pakistani social science researchers remain few and far between. Braibanti sees a tiny glimmer of hope for growing strength in research in Pakistan "and a spreading appreciation for the autonomy, dignity, and utility of professional scholarship" (p. 96).

I do wish this capable scholar had given us more of his own opinions of the literature he reviews. He considers that "the quality of government documents in Pakistan is generally of a high order" (p. 62), a dictum on which there will be disagreement. Students of Pakistan will agree when he praises many specific books, reports, and articles. By and large, however, the reader must fend for himself in evaluating the sources. Perhaps Professor Braibanti means to tell us a book is inadequate or poorly done when he makes no comment about it. As the best-known American scholar of Pakistan's bureaucracy, however, Braibanti owed his readers plainer talk in several instances—especially his Pakistani readers.—GUTHRIE S. BIRKHEAD, *Syracuse University*.

The Accountability and Audit of Governments: A Comparative Study. By E. L. NORMANTON. (Manchester: Manchester University Press and New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. xx, 452. $11.00.)

This volume is a major contribution to the study of financial administration. The author, who has held senior positions in the Exchequer and Audit Department and with NATO, has also had administrative experience and the opportunity for research in the United States and in Western European countries. The resulting analysis

traces major historical developments in each of the countries under review but is basically a comparative study. At the same time, Normanton arranges his topics so that the reader is led from the rudiments of state audit in an orderly sequence to the more complex aspects of accountability.

The countries under review are Great Britain, the United States, France and Federal Germany, with occasional reference to the history and organization of government audit in Italy, Austria, Belgium, Norway, Denmark and Israel. The evolutionary treatment begins with the lowest common denominator—regularity—and proceeds to the "advance beyond regularity," where the state auditor is ". . . an impartial and studious fact-finder about government" (p. 123). The next stage is the concern of the auditor with organization and management, and finally the concern with administrative efficiency in the broadest sense. Normanton has useful chapters on "Fraud, Waste, and Extravagance" and on "Unsound Projects and Complicated Policies," where he concludes, not surprisingly, that most of the serious problems arise from a failure to plan policies and transactions related thereto.

The most interesting chapter in the book is on the nationalized industries. The United States, operating under the Government Corporation Control Act, gets very high marks in terms of the scope, depth and flexibility of GAO audit procedures. Normanton finds it paradoxical that the country most firmly opposed to public enterprise appears to be one of the very few ". . . which has so successfully integrated nationally-owned corporations into its administration that their control has ceased to be a public issue" (p. 319). There is really no paradox here. The Corporation Control Act was sufficiently rigorous in its budget and audit requirements that it discouraged the organization of government activities in the corporate form. It was a conservative victory.

France also comes off well in Normanton's appraisal. The Commission de Vérification des Comptes des Enterprises Publiques, established in 1948, has operated most effectively and ingeniously both alongside but somehow below the Cour des Comptes. It utilizes key personnel from the Cour, draws many temporary rapporteurs from other ministries, and reports (confidentially) to the Parliament, the Prime Minister and to the Cour. The Commission audits both the accounts and the efficiency of the enterprise and occasionally produces public reports.

In Great Britain the basic problems of public accountability for the nationalized industries have not yet been resolved, and for this Normanton is most critical of the Labour Party, which has been unwilling to apply the techniques necessary to assure public responsibility. The Comptroller and Auditor General continues to be excluded from responsibility. Private auditors report to the corporations themselves, not to the Parliament, and ministerial responsibility is most tenuous. Now, one hundred years after the Gladstone reforms, Normanton feels that the time has come for a Royal Commission on Accountability.

Normanton is quite properly convinced that state audit must have broad scope and depth if it is to strengthen administrative responsiblity in a constitutional system. He is less concerned about the relationship of state audit to management's responsibility for budget and planning. There is an unfortunate tendency in every government for the results of state audit to come so belatedly that its potential contribution to an improvement in budget review for both the executive and the legislature is largely lost.

It is possible that current developments in the U. S. Government in the introduction of the Program-Performance Budget System will one day extend to a more sophisticated articulation of efficiency audits with budget preparation and review.—JESSE BURKHEAD, *Syracuse University.*

Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator. By ROBERT D. CRASSWELLER. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966. Pp. xii, 468. $8.95.)

This book deserves to be welcomed as perhaps the most valuable addition to the general literature on Latin America in a long time. Significantly, the author is not an academician but a lawyer, formerly with the Department of State and now a member of the legal staff of a U. S. airline. A major contribution to our understanding of the politics of Latin America in general and of the Caribbean area in particular has been made by a non-professional unconcerned with new scientific techniques and approaches, but who is a careful researcher, an accomplished writer, and who also has a first hand acquaintance with the area. It is definitely the best work on the Dominican Republic during the "Era of Trujillo" (1930–1961).

Written in a lucid and sprightly style which makes it as readable as good fiction, it is also obviously based on thorough basic research. The author has used vast documentary material from governmental sources, both Dominican and American. In addition, he has used an extensive body of information obtained over a period of several years from personal interviews with many individuals who were principal actors in Dominican affairs during Trujillo's long rule. Occasionally he includes verbatim quotations of conversations with Trujillo but he assures the reader that they were supplied by participants or

witnesses. He remarks on the particular accuracy of the informants' memory and speculates that this ability derives from the crucial role of oral communication in a society which forbids or controls the various forms of written expression. In spite of the eerie and bizarre nature of some of the stories Mr. Crassweller's honest efforts to convey the truth are always convincing, and leave no doubt of his discretion and objectivity.

The book is essentially a fascinating case history of the unrestrained use of power. Trujillo, a product of the United States occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1916–1924, began as a typical Latin American *caudillo* in the historic pattern but ended as a modern dictator, without ideology, to be sure, but otherwise as an authoritarian leader who, seeking a totality of power, knew instinctively how to utilize this century's techniques of science and propaganda to this end. The demonic and monstrous traits of his personality are vividly portrayed. Every trait "was in some manner or degree a buttress for the central arch of his being, the power instinct." His desire for and faith in money, his phenomenal sense of ego mounting into megalomania, his remarkable physical energy and capacity for work, his passion for system, precision, and diligence, his nervous but rigidly disciplined temperament, his personal magnetism, his deep distrust of everyone, and his complete absence of scruples, were all related to his unrelenting drive for power. Also important in his power pattern, as it has often been the case with the great tyrants of history, was his instinct for secrecy and for unpredictability.

Trujillo developed a "system in which secrecy, uncertainty, helplessness and the denial of all the criteria of logic fortified the power of one man by devaluing the dignity and worth of all others." The uses of vanity and pomp, derived from his love of finery and his extraordinary dramatic sense, were among the many intuitions by which the dictator glimpsed the Dominican national character. He even knew how to use sex as a lever, as another source of power. Feeding his passion to dominate was also a feeling of social rejection by the upper class in the rigidly stratified Dominican society, which caused him to seek every opportunity to humiliate and degrade the high-born and the well-regarded. He was convinced that "humiliation and mistreatment and bullying were among the necessary ingredients of prestige and authority."

With keen insight, Mr. Crassweller notes that Trujillo, more than any other Latin American despot, saw in the entire economic process a source of political control as effective as the army. Recalling that the power structure developed by the typical *caudillos* resembled the Gothic construction—the great traditional vested interests, the Army, the Church and the landowning class serving as the high, vaulting ribs sustaining the arched edifice—,he sees Trujillo's structure as one based on the principle of the honeycomb. The traditional centers of power, to be sure, each had their cell in the walls of the comb, but also represented were every business interest, every financial interest, every tax, every exemption, every permit and license and trade regulation, and every law, all joined together and supporting each other, producing the balance and strength of the whole. Thus, every economic facet of national life, even the seemingly most remote, was subverted to political ends in some manner. The most pertinent parallel to Trujillo's case in the paranoia of power, notes the author, can only be found among the classical despotisms of Asia.

Mr. Crassweller's book can be read with pleasure and profit by any reader, but it is simply a must for students of Latin America seeking an understanding of the peculiar complexity of Caribbean politics.—Federico G. Gil, *University of North Carolina.*

An Explanation of De Gaulle. By Robert Aron. Translated from the French by Marianne Sinclair. (New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Pp xiv, 210. $4.95.)

De Gaulle: Implacable Ally. Edited by Roy C. Macridis. With a special introduction by Maurice Duverger. (New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Pp. xxxv, 248. $6.00.)

A curious train of thought was set in motion by the dust jacket identification of the author of one of the two books under review. M. Robert Aron won the Prix Fémina in 1961 for his book *Jesus of Nazareth: The Hidden Years* and is reported to be engaged in a "vast project called *The History of God.*" Though it might well skirt blasphemy, it should be said immediately that these two books are in no way engaged in the search for the "historical de Gaulle." That is surely too bad, for the one thing we do not need at this time is further myth-making about de Gaulle, and this is what both books do unashamedly: M. Aron by using his own words, Professor Macridis by letting de Gaulle speak for himself.

Pursuing the parallel with the "historical Jesus" further—with a repeated disclaimer about blasphemy—we are set to wonder how much better contemporary political science could have done than Albert Schweitzer and others, particularly if it had been able to operate circa 50 A.D. with the tools it has today. Glendon Schubert would have explained it all by analyzing voting blocs in the Sanhedrin; Arnold Rogow would have done a psychiatric study of Pilate; Ed Bock would have commissioned a case study; Robert Lane would have conducted depth interview with

twelve average residents of Jerusalem; Robert Dahl would have shown that as a result of the multi-peaked power structure of the Roman Empire nobody really made the crucial decision, only to be attacked by Hunter, Bachrach, Baratz, and company for his obtuseness and his obvious commitment to the Roman status quo. Undoubtedly Agger, Goldrich, and Swanson would have compared three cities in Galilee with three cities in Cappodocia, and, last but not least, Deutsch, Russett and associates would have compiled gross national indicators measuring intra-empire communication flows and occupational mobility in Caesarea and Jerusalem as compared with other cities of the Empire such as Londinium, Lutetia, and Vindobona.

Would they have done better? An appropriate space will be left here for each reader to supply his own answer; the reviewer will carefully sidestep this task. But the spoofing does have a rather serious side as it relates to both contemporary political science and the subject of these two books. For I would contend that up to now, at least, modern political science has not dealt effectively with the Gaullist phenomenon—it treats it *hors classe*—while the more conventional modes, as represented by these two books, certainly seem to be unable to do any better.

A very high priority among the sort of questions both modern and traditional political science consider important must surely be assigned to the question or questions about the nature and function of political leadership. Exactly what do the modern techniques alluded to above contribute to an explanation of that extraordinary phenomenon called leadership? For that matter, to what extent is not modern social science deficient precisely because it cannot cope with the extraordinary: with revolution, with rapid change, with charismatic leadership? And if the conventional modes, as represented by these two books, deal with leadership by embroidering existing myths, where does that leave us?

It is difficult to credit M. Aron with this current volume. How the author of *The Vichy Regime*—a systematic, exhaustive, and supremely competent analysis of the Petain regime—could have perpetrated this adulatory (though not totally uncritical), diffuse, and poorly organized tract staggers the imagination. From the almost genuflecting introduction to the end he presents us with a set of reflections, which seem to have no clearly recognizable structure, on the paradoxical character of de Gaulle. Part I, in which over fifty out of approximately eighty pages are devoted to events of 1940, supposedly treats the subject chronologically, while Part II is labelled "De Gaulle and French Politics—Circumstances and Strategies." There is no clear distinction between these two parts and several topics are covered in both; in some instances the same quotations are used twice. In the concluding chapter, "Gaullism as a Doctrine," M. Aron suggests that Gaullism might possibly be the alternative to the two decadent "isms" of the world today: liberalism as represented by the U.S. and Marxism. In between the opening and closing genuflections we are treated to such aperçus as the following: "De Gaulle, a poet of action who makes his own legends come true, wrote the legend of his life in his *Memoirs*. . . . It is as if the *Song of Roland* were written in Roland's own words." (P. 68.) And also: "Without admitting it France was waiting, from 1946 to 1958, for the return of the man of June 18, 1940" (p. 92). And again: "He is the first man from the biblical tradition who has taken the initiative back from atheistic materialism" (p. 111). These quotations, though obviously isolated from their context, nevertheless accurately reflect the general tone and style of the work. The question, indeed, is: what has been added to our understanding of the phenomenon of political leadership?

A. J. P. Taylor in his usual acerbic way has already disposed of Professor Macridis' editorial effort by suggesting that de Gaulle's speeches and proclamations, being nothing more than the incantations of a self-intoxicated witch doctor, are simply irrelevant to an understanding of de Gaulle's actions. To follow Professor Taylor would be an easy way out but it would be unfair to the value of this particular collection. We can by-pass both Professor Duverger's "Special Introduction" as well as Professor Macridis' own "General Introduction." They are of high analytic quality but are more concerned with criticizing de Gaulle than with understanding the man and the phenomenon of leadership. De Gaulle's statements, coming chiefly from his own books and memoirs and from the collection of speeches published by official sources, are grouped in three parts: "The Conditions of Independence," "The Margins of Independence," and "French Independence." In each part the readings are divided into several chapters; in addition to the editor's already mentioned general introduction, there is an introduction for each part and also to each chapter; there is also a brief note preceding each selection.

The General's own words are quite obviously hard to take, even in small quantities. But a total immersion in them had one unexpected result: it became evident quickly that the more general and "global" the topic, the more unpalatable and incomprehensible de Gaulle becomes; the more precise and technical the subject the more lucid his words come through to the reader. In Part I the chapter on the economy—perhaps the most

surprising topic of all—, in Part II the chapter dealing with the army and nuclear weapons, and in Part III the selections dealing, in two separate chapters, with Franco-American and with Franco-German relations were to me the most exciting. Perhaps the General is not a generalist after all (pun intended!) but feels most at ease when he deals with specific policy issues. Might it not be that he has discovered that leadership is not a vague "Ding an sich" but is exercised successfully only in the context of specific situations and by dealing with specific policies? The charisma is there, and surely needs to be there—see the contrast between John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson—but unless things get done in specific policy areas there can be no successful leadership. Professor Macridis nowhere suggests that such a conclusion can be drawn from the selections he has assembled and I would thus hesitate to advance it as anything but a tentative suggestion, worth some future consideration.

One might think that one "tentative suggestion" would be a poor harvest for a few days of concentrated reading—not at all. The number of verified hypotheses in political science is all too small; that of verifiable hypotheses not much larger. If this review has possibly suggested the construction of *one* other verifiable hypothesis, it will represent time well spent in the interest of ordering the knowledge over which this discipline disposes.—ALFRED DIAMANT, *Haverford College and Ruhr-Universität Bochum.*

Khrushchev: A Career. By EDWARD CRANKSHAW. (New York: Viking Press, Inc., 1966. Pp. 311. $7.50.)

The man who emerged from obscurity to rule the Soviet Union and become the chief actor on the world's stage for a time, only to fall back again into obscurity, is the subject of a new biography. The author, a distinguished political journalist and Soviet specialist, Edward Crankshaw, has subtitled it "A Career," presumably because most of it deals with the years before 1957, when Khrushchev finally succeeded in purging the party Presidium of holdovers from Stalin's day and packed it with his own followers.

Crankshaw traces Khrushchev's life from its beginnings in the borderland of Russia and the Ukraine. His career was slow to begin. He was almost 23 years of age when the tsarist regime was brought down, yet he played no noteworthy part in the momentous events that followed, and he did not join the Communist Party until 1918. A decade later he was still only a provincial official in the Ukraine. In 1929, however, he was transferred to Moscow and, borne up by the party's social and industrial revolution, he rose in a half-dozen years to be the party boss of Moscow. A second wave, the Great Purge, carried him still higher. By 1939 he was Stalin's lieutenant in the Ukraine and a member of the Politburo. In early 1947 he met a sharp setback, presumably because of the famine in the Ukraine the previous year. He recovered, however, and returned to Moscow at the end of 1949 as the third ranking member in the party apparatus, after Stalin and Malenkov. There is suggestive, though not conclusive evidence of Khrushchev's collusion with Stalin in fabricating the so-called "doctors affair," an alleged Zionist plot to murder Soviet army leaders. Crankshaw, however, does not allude to this evidence and he devotes few pages to the key but obscure developments in the last months of Stalin's life.

The bare facts of Khrushchev's career in the Stalin period are accessible. To get beyond them requires extensive research. Fortunately for Crankshaw, the work had been done previously, and done well, by Lazar Pistrak in *The Grand Tactician* (1961). Crankshaw's evocation of Russia's past is livelier (and somewhat wordier), but interested political scientists should return to Pistrak's scholarly account of this period in Khrushchev's life.

The last third of the book deals with Khrushchev's career after Stalin's death. Crankshaw has already written much about these events, and his interest seems to lag as he draws closer to the present. Nevertheless, the general reader will find here a thoughtful appraisal of Khrushchev's period of rule.

Crankshaw is a knowledgeable, and frequently reliable interpreter of the events he deals with. Too often, however, we encounter odd judgments.

> When we ask ourselves how the Khrushchev who had clawed and maneuvered his way upwards . . . managed to retain more than a spark of common humanity, the answer must be, can only be, that he was married to Nina Petrovna. The life story of this remarkable woman, if it could be told, would help us to understand Russian reality better than any account of the activities of her husband (p. 116).

To the many theories about the Soviet regime has there now been added a "petticoat theory" of Soviet politics? Again, Crankshaw believes that in February 1956 "Khrushchev achieved the summit of his career. The Soviet Union lay at his feet: there was nothing he might not do, and this was never again to be true" (p. 233). Few Soviet specialists would agree. Khrushchev still had powerful rivals in the leadership at that time, and it was many months before he could be rid of them and carry out some of the limited reforms at which he aimed.

Crankshaw is not always careful with historical details. For example, he says Lenin was "scarcely aware" of the existence of the party apparatus (p. 36); actually, to his credit, Lenin warned in his

"Testament" against the dangerous power Stalin had acquired as "general secretary," that is, head of the party apparatus. Again, Crankshaw writes that after the second World War Stalin at first neglected nuclear weapons (p. 149); actually, from 1943 on Stalin gave them high priority, so that at his death the Soviet Union was much farther along in the development of modern strategic weapons systems than the West had supposed.

Crankshaw's book is highly readable and will satisfy many of his readers. A serious political biography of the retired dictator, however, lies in the future.—MYRON RUSH, *Cornell University.*

Power in the Liberal Party: A Study in Australian Politics. By KATHARINE WEST. (Melbourne: F. W. Chesire, 1965. Pp. viii, 289. $5.20.) *Political Parties in New Zealand.* By R. S. MILNE. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 313. $8.00.)

For some reason—perhaps the shortage of political scientists in both countries—Australia and New Zealand have long been marked by the lack of scholarly attention paid to politics and government there. Before World War II, there was virtually nothing published of much substance about either country's political system. Slowly since then, part of the deficiency has been made up, at least as far as attention to the form and structure of government is concerned, until today a quite respectable bibliography of titles in the area with regard to both countries can be compiled. Now with the publication of these two books, much of the deficiency with regard to politics "Down Under" has also been made up—and made up very well, it might be added, for both books are thoroughly researched, well written, and vastly informative.

Mrs. West's book (Mrs. West is a lecturer in political science at the Australian National University in Canberra) is confined quite narrowly to the Liberal Party in Australia (and to the Country Party insofar as it operates in partnership with the Liberal Party), while Professor Milne's book (he is chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of British Columbia) covers both the dominant parties in New Zealand as well as the several smaller parties and anti-party groups which are characteristic of New Zealand politics. Mrs. West is concerned primarily with the power relations *within* the Liberal Party while Professor Milne provides us with a broad study of each of the important aspects of political party history, composition, organization, and operation in New Zealand. And Mrs. West by and large confines her remarks to Australia alone, while Professor Milne introduces a good deal of comparative data, particularly from Britain, Australia, and Canada. Put together, the two books give one the feeling that they cover the antipodean party system very well and that for the first time one can speak with some authority on that subject.

Power in the Liberal Party is based on an examination of official party records and on interviews with major and minor party officials all across Australia. Its objective is to identify the leadership in each of the state units of the Liberal Party and to explore the relations between them. Unfortunately for the reader unfamiliar with the context within which Australian parties operate, no introduction or general setting is provided before he is plunged directly into a detailed analysis of the leadership in each of the six state divisions of the party, beginning with the states in which it has traditionally been in power (Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, and Queensland) and concluding with the states in which the party has generally been in opposition (New South Wales and Tasmania). Mrs. West makes it abundantly clear that the leadership of a party unit operates differently in the two situations. The study is brought to an end with a discussion of the national party as it functions in Parliament and with an excellent chapter of conclusions. Mrs. West finds that "there is no such thing as The Liberal Party of Australia" (p. 261); instead, it is a composite of several distinctive parties, each set apart from the others not only by differences between the dominant personalities in each but by the different environments in which each operates. Because of these differences the possibility of intra-party conflict is always present and often realized. Turning to power within the party, Mrs. West finds that "the securely-ensconced Liberal Leader has been one who has been able to guard against being too closely identified in the electorate's mind with specific business interests" (p. 263). In parties out of office, leadership changes have been more frequent than in parties ordinarily in office. Finally, she finds that intra-party democracy is less real than apparent; instead, "power is both formally and informally concentrated in the upper reaches" of the party units, at whatever level they exist (p. 265) and this with at least the tacit approval of the ordinary party member.

Professor Milne approaches his subject with far less assurance that the reader knows something about New Zealand and New Zealand politics than Mrs. West approaches hers. Thus he begins with a discussion of the social and political setting for party politics in New Zealand (her equalitarianism, her basic conservatism, and the slowness with which New Zealanders become excited about political issues—indeed, the paucity of issues—seem to be the basic factors affecting party poli-

tics) and of the history of politics and of the National and Labour Parties there since 1890. His perception and understanding of New Zealand and of the quality of New Zealand life is evident throughout the discussion. He then turns to a consideration of voting behavior in New Zealand, of the relation between parties and interest groups, of the organization and membership of the two major parties in and outside of Parliament, of party conferences, and of problems in candidate selection. Like Mrs. West, Professor Milne sums up his findings in a concluding chapter. He reminds the reader of New Zealand's size and of the limitation that size places on possible differentiation between the parties. He points out the average New Zealander's insistence on involvement and the consequent greater emphasis on democracy and equality in internal party operations than is found, for example, in either British or Australian parties. And he comments on the contradictory growth of political apathy and of the possibility of its coming to undermine both the party system and democracy in New Zealand.

Although Mrs. West's book is more limited in scope, one comes away from reading the two books convinced that party politics are lively and meaningful in both countries and that the major parties are responsive to the peculiar needs of the people there. But their value is greater than that. Australia will be increasingly important to the United States in the years ahead, at least because of the extensive mutual defense agreements between the two countries, growing economic ties between them, and the development of a common cultural pattern in the two countries. New Zealand may well move into Australia's orbit—there is continued talk about statehood status for New Zealand—and even if not, she has an importance of her own to the United States. Thus it is good to have knowledge of the status of the political systems of both countries, and particularly of the Liberal and National Parties, both of which seem likely at this writing to emerge victorious once again in the November, 1966 elections, on which to base projected future action.

Mrs. West's book has already been recognized as a *tour de force* in Australia and is being widely acclaimed both at home and abroad; and Professor Milne's book can hardly help but acquire a similar high reputation as it becomes known. Both books will serve for a long time as models of their type, and the literature of political behavior is the richer because of them.—RICHARD H. LEACH, *Duke University.*

The French Army in Politics, 1945–1962. By JOHN STEWARD AMBLER. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 427. $6.50.)

In the post-World War II years, the French Army has twice refused to obey the commands of the civilian government it legally serves. Certain elements within the military establishment, in May, 1958 and again in January, 1961, chose to distinguish between the political regime, which they despised, and the nation, which they honored and served. In both instances, the immediate causes of the insurrections were related to the Algerian question, a dominant issue in French politics from 1944 to Algeria's independence in 1962.

The result of the first insurrection was the demise of the Fourth French Republic, the return of Charles de Gaulle, and increased political involvement and influence for the Army. After the 1961 rebellion, however, the presidential system was on stronger political ground and civilian control over the military was restored, albeit tenuously. *The French Army in Politics, 1945–1962,* is essentially an effort to explain these political intrusions by an extensive analysis of the military establishment itself and its complex, unrewarding role in postwar colonial policy.

Professor Ambler begins with an examination of the historical-traditional relationship between the French Army and the French Nation from 1815–1945. Although he notes some explicit exceptions, Ambler characterizes the military as impressively non-political during this period. Underlying the civilian control of the period were several factors. Diversities of social origins and political attitudes among the officer corps inhibited unified political action from this element. Other factors included the Army's well-nurtured sense of professional obedience to the government of the day, and the "safety valve" of colonial service, an outlet providing French officers with opportunities for power, action, and status unavailable in the *metropole.* Having established the elements that supported civilian supremacy, Ambler turns his attention to the factors that led to the demise of this "Great Mute" and the increasing politicization of the Army in the postwar period.

Underlying the Army's violent intrusion into politics was, first, the deepening and continuous isolation of the military from the civilian community in France. The military disgrace and subsequent disunity of World War II, unsuccessful and internally frustrating involvement in two sustained and unsupported guerrilla wars, Indochina and Algeria, and later reliance upon a reluctant Army for the performance of technological and civil functions all contributed to this isolation. In brief, the result was a crisis of self-esteem, status and honor, which led those elements most deeply involved to resort to political intrigue, violence, and finally mutiny.

Professor Ambler condenses a sizable accumulation of data including military diaries, newspapers and courtroom testimonies, elaborate secondary sources of an academic nature, and some interviews. The data are not always well integrated, but documentation is extensive. The author is at his best in his treatment of France's post-war involvement in the guerrilla conflicts of Algeria and Indochina, the politico-military organizations and tactics of the Vietminh and the *Front de la Libération Nationale*, and the responses of the French military in each instance. His treatment of military politics and counter-insurgency, the evolution of the French military's doctrine of *La Guerre Révolutionnaire*, and the cleaveages within the military establishment are excellent. However, the author has a tendency to dilute his effort by summary judgments and qualifications that suggest uncertainty more than temperance and undercut his strongest, most thoroughly amplified points.

The French Army in Politics is uneven and, at its best, explanatory. From time to time, Professor Ambler fails to touch upon major aspects of the political involvement of the French military establishment. The reader is informed at the outset that he must look beyond traditional theories of civil-military relations to explain the crumbling foundations of civilian control in France. Weak constitutional consensus, therefore, is treated as merely one contributory factor in the French case. Well enough, but the author's examination of this aspect of the problem is both unsystematic and inadequate. Herein lies the major weakness of Ambler's effort. It is never easy to establish the parameters of a case-study, and this reviewer has full sympathy for the difficulties involved. However, once the boundaries are defined, the author assumes responsibility for full treatment of all aspects of the problem. "All patterns of civil-military relations can be understood only in the context of the entire political system within which they exist," we are told (p. viii). This book contains no adequate treatment of the political side of the coin during the years 1945–1962. The Fourth Republic is depicted as an unstable arrangement that suffered a constantly diminishing base of popular support. No adequate treatment is provided, however, of the political parties, coalitional arrangements, leadership, or governmental ups and downs—those aspects of the weakened political system that presumably impinged directly upon the military and beckoned them to redress. A serious omission is a well-ordered discussion of the Fifth Republic and the political impact of Charles de Gaulle. The reader gleans the barest hint of the legal, constitutional base of the Fifth Republic and of important realignments in the party system. There is simply no treatment of the several referenda that altered the governmental structure and granted independence to Algeria; and finally, only passing reference is made to the extraordinary powers granted to de Gaulle to meet the various Algerian crises.

Much, of a specifically political nature, would seem to fall within the scope of this book that was touched upon only superficially. Nevertheless, for the scholar interested in the politics of the French military establishment in the post-war period, it is a contribution of substance and depth.—KEN A. BODE, *Michigan State University.*

Studies in British Politics: A Reader in Political Sociology. ED. BY RICHARD ROSE. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966. Pp. xii, 340. $5.95.)

Readers in political behavior are now coin of the realm in the United States, but the appearance of one from beyond the Atlantic must still be treated as a distinct event (or perhaps as a harbinger of an impending New Wave). First is not always best, but this happens to be a very good and useful collection, and one that fills a pedagogical gap not yet discovered by the industrious Bobbs-Merrill editors.

Several years ago Rose wrote a particularly insightful text on British politics which presented an interpretation of the subject from the standpoint of modern social science. Now he has attempted to make available representative slices of the periodical literature that influenced his thinking in the earlier volume. (All but three of the 26 selections are articles or reports, happily presented *in toto* or nearly so.) Again the framework is modified Almond, and again the emphasis displays the strengths and weaknesses of this approach. Predictably it is heavy on political culture, socialization, communications, and the articulation of group demands, and it reflects the editor's belief in party as the key instrument of British political life. While a companion volume on "political behavior within the policy-making process of government" is promised, it is noteworthy that political sociology as Rose employs it in the present book touches only in the lightest way upon formal institutions of official policy-making and only briefly on the extent to which policy output, or the general situation of the country, may affect the choices of political actors. This of course may simply mirror the difficulty experienced by scholars of this persuasion in analyzing the linkages between the main concerns of the sociologist and the political scientist; but the disjuncture still remains, and this collection is evidence of it.

What we are given, then, is an admittedly eclectic array of approaches to British politics—ranging from a discursive BBC interview with Harold Wilson on his family background and

youthful experiences to a preview of McKenzie and Silver's historical-behavioral study of the working class Tory to an audience research report on television and the 1964 General Election. The scope of the selections should be of undoubted value to the student contemplating methodological strategies, not only because it permits him to sample and assess a number of research techniques, but also because it underlines the editor's sensible advice that "Quantitative or descriptive techniques are not good or bad in themselves; rather, they are more or less relevant to particular problems in the study of politics" (p. x).

The same diversity and breadth of outlook, at least within his loose organizational framework, has also influenced Rose's choice of sources. He has included a number of pieces from such relatively uncommon sources as *The Listener*, *Time and Tide*, *The Twentieth Century*, and *Crossbow*, and from hitherto unpublished conference papers and polling files. The need to look outside the house organs of the academy seems to have been particularly great in the area of political communications, where the quality, scope and rigor of the pieces clearly indicate how underdeveloped this aspect of British political sociology is at present. Which is another way of saying that in Britain as elsewhere, the movement toward behaviorism has advanced more quickly and more easily in certain fields than in others—for example, fairly strongly in the analysis of demographic variables (notably social class), in voting studies, and in party behavior, and less so in the study of political (as contrasted with political-cultural) attitudes, of communications, and of the instrumental links between social and political processes. The editor's introductory and bibliographical comments serve nicely to relate the individual studies to the larger framework of social science concerns, although it would be equally useful had he pointed out to fellow students of British politics where the numerous lacunae still lie.

It is nevertheless heartening to recall that a collection such as this could not have been pulled together ten years ago. And it is equally encouraging to contemplate that when, three or four years from now, Rose brings out a second edition of the *Studies*, he is bound to be at least slightly embarrassed by the riches presently being extracted by his colleagues, and by himself. I understand that there are more books of this kind in the making. This is a good one, which ought to set a challenge and a high standard for the others. Teachers of British politics, and of comparative politics generally, will find it useful for supplementing (though hardly supplanting) the book-length arguments of Alford, Almond-Verba, Beer and McKenzie, and for documenting the present diversity of outlook and method in what the British persist in calling "political studies."—JAMES B. CHRISTOPH, *Ohio State University*.

The Defendant's Rights Under English Law. By DAVID FELLMAN, (Madison, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1966. Pp. x, 137. $4.00.)

David Fellman, Vilas Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, offers us a concise and scholarly statement of the rights of criminal law defendants in England. Students will find it a useful companion piece for the author's earlier (1958) study of *The Defendant's Rights* in the United States. The reader will be disappointed, however, if he expects a study in comparative law. The author concedes at the outset that he has "made no systematic effort to compare American with English law and practice in describing the rights of those who in England are accused of crime." He but mentions in passing "some similarities and differences in the two legal systems." The exposition is impressively documented with references to classic treatises as well as to current literature in English criminal law. It is copiously footnoted with citations to cases in the English courts from time immemorial to the present decade, and also includes many recent and controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court which point up the "similarities and differences" in the two legal systems.

The critic is initially disarmed by Professor Fellman's Preface. As he explains, his purpose in writing the book was "a very modest one: to describe those rules of law which we in the United States have come to regard as the constitutional rights of persons accused of crime." The book is not concerned with the sociology of crime, or with the politics of criminal law enforcement, or with problems of penology. As the author points out, these are interesting and important subjects but it was not his intention to write about them. Nor has he followed the academic fashion in public law to interpret judicial behavior in terms of the judges' political attitudes and personal predilections. The critic might wish that Professor Fellman had pursued such relevant lines of inquiry; the study might have been enhanced by enlarging its scope; but the author preferred to "cast a small net."

Only in the last chapter—and that less than a score of pages—does Professor Fellman attempt "an evaluation." He recognizes the general smugness, the almost universal admiration, with which most English people, and especially English judges, view their courts of law. He does, however, cull a few trenchant criticisms from such diverse authorities as Barbara Wooton, J. B. Priestley, a Royal Commission, a Home Office

Study, and the interdepartmental Streatfield Committee. Thus he concludes, "While it cannot be said that the English system of justice is perfect (as indeed no system is) and while further reform is necessary and is being urged in responsible circles of British life, there is world-wide admiration for a system which displays such solicitude for the plight of one who is accused of crime."

The Defendant's Rights Under English Law is certainly more than an academic pot-boiler, but it is not a great, or even ambitious, piece of work. Perhaps some day—and would that it be soon—David Fellman can be induced to write more than "a small book." It would be more than interesting to his professional colleagues; it could be provocative and influential in the public forum, if this outstanding authority in constitutional law would project more of his own views and values into his final statement of the defendant's rights, both in the American and in the English courts. A distinguished professor—and David Fellman is that by all accounts—has an obligation not merely to share his knowledge but also to impart some of his wisdom.—MARIAN D. IRISH, *The American University.*

Ireland Since the Rising. By TIMOTHY PATRICK COOGAN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 355. $6.95.)

Students of Irish Politics have long felt the need for a book like *Ireland Since the Rising.* It is the first serious attempt to provide a coordinated picture of the political, social and economic changes that have taken place in Ireland during the past fifty years.

Fifty years ago, on April 24th, 1916, a handful of men, members of the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army, rose in armed revolt against English occupation. The "Rising," as it is called in Ireland, lasted only about a week and the general reaction of Irishmen was cool, if not cold. Within months, however, feelings had drastically changed, and the nation united in a struggle that ranged from passive resistance to guerilla warfare, directed most bitterly at the "Black and Tans" who had been sent from England with instructions to "make Ireland hell for the devils." Unfortunately the Treaty which ended this conflict split the country between those who were prepared to accept partition, with Dominion status, and those (led by Eamon de Valera) who wanted to hold out for an independent, united Ireland. The men who had fought against England now fought among themselves in a civil war that lasted almost a year and led inevitably to the defeat of those opposed to the Treaty. It is interesting, however, that the "Anti-Treatyites" ended their boycott of the Dublin Dáil (Parliament) five years later; and five years later again, at the General Election held on February 16th, 1932, they were returned (still under the leadership of de Valera) as the largest single party. With the exception of two short periods, de Valera's party, Fianna Fáil, has been in power ever since.

Political scientists will find this period from 1916 to 1966 full of fascinating questions that have yet to be fully answered. It is very unusual, for example, to see the losers of a civil war peacefully take over political power a decade later. How was this possible in Ireland? One would like to see a study also of the difference between the three main political parties, and the reason why the Labour Party has never developed as it has done, for example, in England. Indeed, there is material for research in practically every aspect of Irish political life, both north and south of the "Border."

Coogan's book, however, is not simply the story of political development in Ireland. He has much to say also of the present structure of the State (local government, the legal system, etc.), Ireland's Economy (right up to the signing of a Free Trade Agreement with England in December, 1965), modern Irish culture, the Gaelic Movement, and Religion, with special sections also on the I.R.A. and Northern Ireland. In some places, Mr. Coogan's summary is, to quote his own words in the section on Religion, "impressionistic and sketchy." But this is inevitable in a field in which so little solid research has been carried out. Indeed, it is a tremendous credit to him that he has succeeded in presenting an intelligible and convincing picture of one of the most revolutionary periods in Irish history, a period so close to us that readers will inevitably disagree with him in his interpretation of some events and in his judgement of some people. Perhaps it is a sign of his objectivity that those on opposing sides will be ready to scalp him for many of his comments.

For political scientists and sociologists, this book is an excellent introduction—indeed the only one—to a study of the political and social changes that have taken place in modern Ireland. I shall be surprised if some American political scientists and sociologists, on reading this book; are not tempted to bring their research to Ireland. Scholars thus tempted will be welcome by Irish universities.—EUSTACE M. HAYDEN, Social Sciences Research Center, *University College, Galway, Ireland.*

The Politics of Wage-Price Decisions: A Four-Country Analysis. By MURRAY EDELMAN AND R. W. FLEMING. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1965. Pp. 331. $6.75.)

The authors of *The Politics of Wage-Price Decisions* "tried to learn what has made workers, union officials, managements, and governmental agencies in four Western European countries act

and react as they did regarding wage decisions and price decisions related to wage decisions." Their task was formidable, and they have succeeded in piecing together a summary of the background, development, and implementation of public and private wage and price policies in Italy, Germany, Great Britain and The Netherlands, in the post-war years up to 1963. Their focus is on institutional behavior, and the study is most successful when it traces the patterns of public and private wage and price decisions in the light of the organizational, social, political, and economic environments. The chapters on Great Britain and The Netherlands in particular provide a valuable guide through their experiments with innovative wage-price policies.

The study is a valuable source book for those who are concerned with the possibility of preventing inflation while demand pressures build up on product and labor markets. The authors are not very optimistic about the effectiveness of voluntary controls, and conclude that exhortation "is not regarded as a serious control device." But it may be that their conclusion is based on too restrictive a definition of success. They admit that exhortation "may have some effect in keeping things from getting worse, and it may help in creating a climate of opinion which will exercise a braking influence." If, on the average it is possible to maintain (or create) low unemployment rates at a reduced rate of price increase as a result of public exhortation, such appeals cannot be dismissed as a "political rather than an economic exercise." The authors overly discount the economic importance of causing "economic changes to be less than they would otherwise be," and they overlook such evidence of the serious economic role of exhortation as the German government's early reduction of automobile tariffs when Volkswagen flouted its campaign for a price-wage moderation.

One theme that runs through the book is that a policy of voluntary restraint depends for its effectiveness on acceptance by the institutions and individuals in the economy. Why should unions forego wage increases? Why should managers forego profits? In extreme circumstances, such as a critical balance of payments problems, the objective situation may make it clear that restraint is essential to avoid disaster. But, as the British Labor government is learning currently, the painful alternatives to restraint may not be perceived as inevitable, and powerful groups may continue to press for their own gains in spite of the clear and present risk of serious aggregate consequences. A report by the British National Economic Development Council, quoted in the chapter on Great Britain, states,

"A policy for prices and money incomes can succeed only if those concerned are convinced that it is a necessary part of the wide programme for growth of real income, and that restraint by one section of the community will not merely result in a gain by other sections."

And acceptance must go beyond formal pronouncements by major labor and management organizations. Individual companies, unions, and even union members must have adequate reasons for withholding their economic power. "Ultimately, . . . the viability of a wage policy, so far as the unions are concerned, will depend upon convincing individual workers that they are likely to gain from such a policy, in short, by offering a quid pro quo for restraint on their part." The identical principle applies to management on the price side. The public interest must be translated into private interest to be effective.

In every country studied, participation by private groups in the planning and implementation of economic policy was considered a necessary condition for cooperation in a program of voluntary restraint. Even full participation by unions and management in the decision process does not insure success. As the study points out:

"Private organizations of the kind which represent labor and management spring into being in response to a felt need for power mobilized in the common interest of the members. When such organizations are asked to participate in planning, which includes other interest groups, it is self-evident that each will be required to sacrifice something of its own interests in favor of the whole. If the sacrifice can be said to result in offsetting benefits of sufficient value there may be no problem, but this will rarely be so clear as to permit no doubt."

As inflation threatens in the United States and as public exhortation for price and wage moderation in accordance with the "Guideposts" becomes less and less effective, we are approaching a situation similar to that faced by the countries of Western Europe. We, too, must face the problem of whether we will be able to continue our prosperity without disruptive inflation or formal controls. The European experience suggests that management and labor may be increasingly acquiescent to some form of voluntary planning in their own interests. "It is significant that the most serious interest in planning has come in all these countries in periods of prosperity, with unemployment virtually nonexistent or at low levels."

In a final chapter the authors discuss the use of wage-price decisions as symbols, and suggest that "private and public wage-price pronouncements, acts, gestures, and programs not only have economic consequences, but also wide and deep implications for social stability." They have observed that in all of the countries studied behavior related to wage-price policies was used to increase political power and to further individual and organizational objectives in government, labor, and union organizations. This is indeed an important point, but it should not be permitted to obscure the strength of the economic forces within

which wage-price decisions are made. The authors appear to have a misleadingly narrow concept of economics when they assert that "powerful managements, . . . often made concessions that are hard to explain in economic terms but that make a good deal of sense in the light of their organizational and political consequences." A wage increase to support the more desirable union or to attract needed labor makes perfectly good economic sense. Management may not always act in terms of a narrowly defined profit motive, but the evidence reported in this study does not provide a basis for discounting the importance of economic motivation.

A major flaw in the study is its failure to give adequate consideration to or to assess the relative importance of the economic forces relative to the social, psychological, and institutional variables. Market forces make themselves felt through the behavior of individuals and organizations, but careful observation of the actors may not provide a valid basis for explaining the resultant patterns of wage-price decisions. This is particularly true when the analyses are based on ex-post rationalizations of economic behavior. At several points the authors discuss the impact of economic forces, but the treatment of economic variables in the study is uneven and frequently misleading. In discussing wage increases in low and high productivity industries, the authors tend to ignore the critical role of labor market conditions. They report that the Italian cost-of-living index increased between 1948 and 1959 "by an annual average of only 1.69%." But the index has 1938 as a base year, and stood at 48.44 in 1948. The annual average increase in the cost of living was therefore closer to 3.1%. At another point the study asserts that "only a relatively small proportion of the population could afford to pay the rents that would be charged in the absence of controls." Who, then, would live in the available housing? Unless a large proportion of the population was without any housing at the outset, a completely free market would push prices up to the point where the population could (but would prefer not to) pay the rents. The careless treatment of economic analysis is coupled with an overemphasis on psychological and cultural explanations for which no evidence is provided. It is hard to reconcile the labor black market in The Netherlands with their alleged "disposition toward conformity" and their "sense of discipline."

The historical description is on firmer grounds than the analysis, and this study of the politics of wage-price decisions fills an important gap by compensating for the economists' tendency to overlook important social and institutional variables. The authors' perceptive institutional analysis and their many insights into the complexities of organizational behavior and the problems of social control based on voluntary cooperation, make this study required reading for anyone who is concerned with the ability of a democracy to maintain satisfactory levels of economic growth in the face of inevitable inflationary pressures.—MYRON L. JOSEPH, *Carnegie Institute of Technology.*

Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations. By EMILY CLARK BROWN. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 394. $6.95.)

Professor Brown's intention in this book is to describe and appraise Soviet unions and industrial relations since Stalin's death. Ostensibly, her "analysis is not concerned with the desirability of one or another social system, or with what 'real trade unions' are or ought to be." She has not assumed that "human dignity, individual freedom, and equality of opportunity are, inevitably, the monopoly of any one system." And one principal conclusion is that: "in brief, the industrial relations system in the Soviet Union, however imperfect in application, tends toward a constitutional system with large elements of worker participation." The book might have been more properly entitled "gullible's travels through the world of Soviet trade unions."

There is much of value in this book. Professor Brown is technically expert, and there is very good factual and descriptive material in her book. She is to be commended for trying to be very cautious, and for trying to give a very balanced account of the shortcomings as well as the intentions of the Soviet labor system. The few factual errors relate primarily to the early period, e.g., collective agreements "played an important role in regulating wages and other labor conditions in the first years. . . ." They did exist, but were quite ineffective. This is a typical error.

The main problems, however, are those of perspective, of excessive formalism, of a technocratic bias, and of contradiction. Professor Brown explains Soviet industrial relations primarily by its formal institutional structure. This has about the same result as an attempt to explain Soviet politics in terms of its constitution would have. Complicating matters is the fact that she appears to operate from a set of assumptions about technology, social development, and democracy. She believes that in "all industrial society there is a need for institutions to speak effectively for the working people." Democracy appears to be the inevitable result of technological maturity. This ontological judgment leads to a contradiction. Originally stating she was not concerned with what trade unions ought to be, she concludes with an affirmation of independent unions. She believes unions, "if they are to fill the role ex-

pected of them, must, in part at least, be agencies speaking for their members and responsive to opinion from below."

If Professor Brown believes she is neutral, if she thinks she is taking an objective stand on the Soviet Union, she is mistaken. She has a very distorted view of the realities of the Soviet system. There is indeed wisdom in the position "people will be people," but this does not tell us very much about the system, or what it does to people. Incredibly, she appears to believe democracy exists on the plant level in Soviet trade unions (p. 145 ff.). As we follow her journeys through the world of Soviet industrial relations, Professor Brown proves to be naive indeed.

The major issue since the death of Stalin has been destalinization. The Russians appear to be terribly confused and unable to resolve the political and economic problems they inherited from Stalin. They do not appear to know where or how to go, and they are deeply divided, politically and ideologically. Confusion and vacillation over increased liberalization of the regime—this has been the main lesson of the past thirteen years. Yet, when one is finished with her book, nowhere has one found an examination of destalinization, its problems and consequences. Professor Brown takes destalinization for granted, and is optimistic about the unions growing stronger and more responsive to their members' needs and wishes. She deals with Khrushchev's effort to create stronger unions, but she does not examine it as part of a political effort to curb the powers of the managers. She does not explore the possibility that labor's increased power reflects the larger political conflict between the party and the economic administrators. Nor does she trace policy disagreement and confusion over labor turnover, discipline, labor productivity, the work book, the cut work week, or unemployment—all of which have been very sensitive questions; all of which have been subject to a great deal of discussion by people who favor and oppose increased labor reforms.

In short, Professor Brown has flown right by the larger issue of destalinization, the one which sets the very context for her study and for her main conclusions. It is this kind of oversight that leads one to wonder again about her realism. Though there is much valuable information in this book, I am afraid the book we need on Soviet trade unions is still to be written.—JAY B. SORENSON, *Smith College.*

Agriculture Under Communism. By LORD WALSTON. (Chester Springs, Pennsylvania: Dufour Editions, 1962. Pp. 108. $2.95.)

If political science should be a study (descriptive or scientific) of the relationships among people in politics, government and administration, political science is sadly failing its responsibilities, and Lord Walston's little book for the "general reader" carries an important message also for the student of politics. The wants and needs of the various groupings of people are surely at the heart of social sciences. Yet any quick survey of the literature of political science will reveal that the vast majority of political studies are urban oriented when, in fact, the majority of mankind (52% according to a United Nations' survey) still resides in agricultural areas. More than this, outside of industrialized United States and Western Europe, some two thirds of the population is engaged in agricultural pursuits, and agriculture comprises the most important domestic problem of the nations involved. This political reality emphatically applies to the communist states where, ironically, communist governments came to power by turning Marxism on its head. Communist revolutions have not succeeded in industrialized proletarian nations, but in predominantly agricultural peasant nations where rural unrest was exploited for communist ends.

Not only are most contemporary political studies written in seeming ignorance of the enormous impact of rural wants and needs upon national politics, but so also are economic studies often relatively blind to the urban dependence on the countryside's food and fibers. As the author underlines, "even the greatest tycoon, . . . insulated by his millions from the ordinary world, cannot survive for twenty-four hours without the help of farmers or the peasants" (p. 7). Written in the deceptively easy style of the British essayist there is much that is profound in this book. Unfortunately, there is an almost total lack of documentation or statistics and some of what is cited is in error. For example, Lord Walston is incorrect in asserting that between 1926 and 1938 twenty-four million Russian peasants found work in the towns, and he also errs in asserting that in 1928 individual peasants were producing over 40 percent (p. 34) of the "food production" in the U.S.S.R.

Most of all, Lord Walston surely is wrong in concluding that "force and compulsion may even be justified" (p. 100) as a means of achieving much needed rural change in developing nations. Beyond democratic objections to such means, force inevitably destroys peasant incentives to produce most efficiently. Would agriculture be the major domestic problem in communist states today (especially in the Soviet Union) if force had not been the major means of instigating rural policies? Ironically, the major thrust of the argument in this book goes quite the other way. Communist nations, plus the whole range of the other developing nations, will progress significantly only if and when the full import of peasant political

and economic forces is realized, and thus policies are designed that exploit the "full co-operation and good will of the cultivator himself" (p. 106).

In the main this book is a sound although incomplete introduction to the problem of "agriculture and communism," because its author has a long background as an agricultural administrator and practical farmer and some first hand knowledge of some of the states discussed. Unfortunately, most American political scientists (and economists) won't read its lessons, because most Western social scientists are urban bred and oriented and over impressed by the impact of the industrial revolution on society, and thus they assume falsely that the socio-political change in the cities has been (or shortly will be) paralleled by similar change in the countryside. Thomas Jefferson's agrarian idea was not entirely a false prophecy. American political scientists, especially those in the international and comparative fields, could well devote much more attention to rural politics. Authors such as Lord Walston document this need.—ROY D. LAIRD, *University of Kansas.*

Aspects of Political Development. By LUCIAN W. PYE. The Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics. (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1966. Pp. ix, 205. $1.95.)

Caste, Class, and Power: Changing Patterns of Stratification in a Tanjore Village. By ANDRÉ BÉTEILLE. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1965. Pp. 238. $5.00.)

It might be revealing if one were to measure the volume of works published since 1946 that deal directly with the traditional and transitional polities. If volume is any indication of seriousness, then it can only be inferred that contemporary social science is in dead earnest as it focuses upon society and polity in Africa and Asia. These two small books reflect the continuing seriousness and skill with which careful social science scholars put non-Westerners on the couch for a close look at their changing values, their shifting cognitions and psychic processes, and at the old and new institutions and agencies that appear to be articulating these phenomena along discernible lines. The study of comparative politics in the developing lands has in a short time come by its own approaches, its own theoretical guidelines, and its own attendant vocabulary. Both of these books are a continuation of this trend, one through the medium of descriptive theory, the other by painstaking analysis of a single development case.

The material presented by Lucian Pye is not especially new. In fact only two of ten chapters can fairly be described as new material, the bulk of the work being slight modifications of earlier writings and reproductions-by-permission under the same cover. But the book is none the worse off for that. It has, to begin with, a modest aim: "to introduce students to an exciting and growing field of study." As an introduction to the study of political development, Pye's *Aspects* will have to be almost necessary reading and it has the advantage from the beginner's viewpoint of summarizing at appropriate places the findings and conclusions of others in the political development field. The net effect, as an introductory book, is to acquaint the reader with most of the literature and ideas concerning political development.

Perhaps a stronger case can be made for the usefulness of *Aspects of Political Development* in that it meets in part the larger design of the Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics, i.e., to help in re-establishing the long-lost relationship between comparative politics and political theory. It is a constructively theoretical book, dealing in turn with the normative bias of most of the literature of non-Western comparative politics, with the conceptual ambiguities of "political development," and with the institutions and socio-psychological patterns that accompany political change. The major explorations in the theory of political development come in Chapter III, where Pye assays the contributions of social theorists and examines the problem caused by a "lack of doctrine." This is a particularly interesting chapter, and its most interesting pages are contained in a short section entitled "Crises in Political Development." Pye and his fellow gatekeepers of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council have isolated six more or less distinct crises with which a society must successfully deal before it can become a modern nation-state. These are the Identity Crisis, the Legitimacy Crisis, the Penetration Crisis, the Participation Crisis, and the Integration Crisis. It is the contention of the author that the basic pattern of a society's development will depend on the sequence of occurrence of these crises and the ways in which they are resolved. These critical stages are no more than outlined, however, and the balance of the book departs in various directions according to what have been the particular issues of political modernization and development: the appropriateness of democracy, personality and changing values, law, insurgency, communications and the military.

This summary book by an established scholar in the political development field should be a handy teaching guide for political science courses that encounter non-Western countries or systems in rapid transition. The reviewer believes it has additional merit in providing a succinct statement of most of the relevant descriptive theory pertinent to political development, thereby helping

the apprentice scholar to detect the ties and linkages between a set of functions in one developing culture and those in another.

Caste, Class, and Power is a thorough and detailed case study of a single Indian village with specific regard to the changing patterns of interaction among the villagers as they are deployed in castes, classes, and power groupings. André Béteille has conjured up a picture of significant change in the village of Sripuram, in Tanjore District of Tamil-speaking South India. The changes in this thousand-year-old village in fact appear to have moved in a cumulative way from caste to class to power, yielding a power foundation for contemporary elites that the author has trouble describing. Although only approximately one-third of this book deals explicitly with the political dimension of Sripuram, most of the information presented has an ultimate political payoff. This is nowhere more evident than in the case of the Sripuram Brahmins, who show no signs of yielding their ritually superior ascriptive status, but from under whose feet the power base has clearly and dramatically shifted. It is a frequent observation of the author that local influence has moved away from the Brahmins—even when they are substantial landholders—and toward the "new popular leaders," who are almost certain to be non-Brahmins. To some extent, these changes are a reflection of regional and national trends.

A noteworthy feature of this fine piece of research is the finding that, despite the general tone of change and movement, the modern political agencies of India—political parties and interest associations—have not been the key agencies in articulating political claims or in resolution of conflict. Nor for that matter have the State Legislative Assemblies or even the local *Panchayats*. Rather the most salient conflicts and their final resolution have tended to assume the lines of caste. Béteille's finding in this case only lends greater weight to the idea that the national intermediaries and elites must in various ways accept the fact of caste as a principle of political deployment, whereby the locally dominant caste secures its position through the system of representation. —Edward L. Pinney. *Washington and Lee University.*

Dilemmas of Democratic Politics in India. Edited by G. S. Halappa. (Bombay: Manaktalas, 1966. Pp. xiv, 292. Rs. 26.)

This is a collection of 21 papers presented at a seminar in India in 1965. Nearly all the participants were Indian academicians, most of them political scientists with, however, a sprinkling of participants from law, economics, and government institutions. All the participants appear to have been deeply committed to the development of democracy in India and made a serious attempt to find out where India has succeeded and where she has failed in her effort to develop a democratic political system. While all aspects of the political system could not be examined, the seminar managed to look at a remarkably large number of them. They looked, for example, at civil liberties, voting behavior, the federal system, checks and balances, the bureaucracy, and the influence of caste. They examined also the various legislatures and their relationships to the parties, the courts, and the executives. Grass roots democracy in the villages was peered at, and in addition, the seminar looked at such larger matters as the role of economic development and planning in the development of democracy and at the role of a changing political system in producing change in the social system.

Needless to say, the authors of these papers had little difficulty finding non-democratic elements in the Indian political system. They seemed to find more to deplore than to praise; and their general conclusion seemed to be that although there is much that is democratic in India, and although much progress toward a predominantly democratic system has been made, democracy in India cannot yet be taken for granted. It is still in what Selig Harrison has referred to as the "dangerous decades" and much still needs to be done even to build the infra-structure upon which democracy can grow. The illiteracy, poverty, hierarchical-authoritarian tradition, and language loyalties that pervade India provide a weak base for the development of democracy. Disappointment after disappointment has followed the effort to develop democratic attitudes, processes, and institutions in the multitude of Indian villages in which the bulk of the people live. Yet no one in the seminar visualized any acceptable alternative to democracy for India or suggested that the experiment be abandoned.

Most hopeful for the future of political science in India were those papers that called attention to the dearth of empirical data on the Indian political system and suggested a host of questions feasible for empirical research.

As is normal with such symposia, the contributions are uneven, some being of first rate quality while others add so little to our political knowledge that they might better have been left out. A tighter editorial job on both content and English expression would have improved the volume.

The book renders a service, however, by giving us in one volume the thinking of what appears to be a fairly good sample of India's academia regarding Indian democracy; and it summarizes in one volume most of the weaknesses of, obstacles to, and problems of democracy-building in a country whose experiment with democracy is looked upon

as a major test case for our time.—WILLARD RANGE, *University of Georgia.*

Africa's Golden Road. By KWESI ARMAH. (New York: Humanities Press, 1965. Foreword by Mzee Jomo Kenyatta. Pp. xii, 292. $6.00.)

Africa's Search for Identity. By VICTOR C. FERKISS. (New York: George Braziller, 1966. Pp. 346. $6.50.)

Who speaks for the Africans? Do those who pretend to be able to articulate the felt but often unexpressed needs of most Africans write merely with the national interest of a particular country in mind, or about the views of a particular stratum of the African population with which they—African or non-African authors—identify or communicate most easily?

The survey book on Africa has the potential to generalize about the complexities of development and change and to attempt an assessment of the desires of Africans. Not limited by the bounds of a scholarly monograph, the author of the survey is able to make some contribution to the understanding a general reader or student might have of the real problems, hopes, and needs among different strata, in different African countries.

A problem with the survey is that, so often, one book has about the same information between its covers as another. For the same information an author attempts a slightly different interpretation, or he attempts to reach a new audience. Sometimes, it is unclear who the author is trying to reach and what new point he is making. Kwesi Armah's *Africa's Golden Road* and Victor Ferkiss' *Africa's Search for Identity* have little focus, make no attempt to distinguish between what different strata and countries may want. And, these two books are essentially attempts to consider Africa's place in the contemporary world by summarizing, once again, recent events in world history, with a new twist to give the illusion of originality: a golden road here, a search for identity there.

Ghana's former High Commissioner in London asserts the need for African unity. He discusses the one-party state at length and justifies what he calls democratic centralism; the regime of Dr. Nkrumah for which he worked; and the meaning, for him, of non-alignment. He says nothing about the military. Even in the area of greatest interest —African unity—Mr. Armah says little about the history of Pan-Africanism; there is also no serious discussion of regional planning, the possible disadvantages of certain forms of unity, the implications of links with the Common Market, and other economic and political complexities. In his discussion of Ghana, Mr. Armah might have added to the interest of the book by a longer personal statement of his own career.

Kwesi Armah was the chairman of the Committee of African Organizations in London from 1959 to 1961, and he does have some interesting things to say about this group which attempted to provide links among African student organizations. Many important intellectuals and politicians were members of this committee, and leaders were provided with a forum. Meetings the committee sponsored are discussed, and the author includes in three appendices communiques and constitutions of the All-African Students' Union in Europe set up by the Committee.

Mr. Armah tells us the future looks bright. All is well in Africa because African leaders are "devoted" and "truth-speaking," the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is stronger every day, and, happily for all, African states "refuse to engage in war-mongering and war-making" (p. 148). For this author, the continent of Africa is rapidly becoming a paradise destined to play an important role in the world by showing the rest of us the road to sanity and peace. This golden road of history is leading to the golden age. March on!

Dr. Victor Ferkiss, Professor at Georgetown University, writes as an American political scientist out to discover the "basic dynamic of African politics" (p. 5). He claims to know *The Problem* Africans face, and he defines it as one of "identity," or role in the contemporary world. The author insists that every African whether in the high administration or on the farm, from the city of Kinshasa to the village of Boundji is concerned with identity. Once the American author defines the single problem, he offers advice about the solution of it but warns Africans not to take the paths suggested by some leaders.

In his first warning he advises against African unity and assertions of Africanness or blackness; African unity, he says, might mean the construction of a racially chauvinistic society, opposed to the West, and assertions of blackness often mean, he continues, "the antithesis of everything white."

In a discussion of southern Africa he warns the Blacks to strive to build a multi-racial society lest Africa become "an isolated empire of bitterness or an adherent of a new international based on racism and economic backwardness" (p. 340). Concerning Angola, the author is already outraged by what he asserts has been African brutality toward Whites; Angolan nationalists' political ideas include, Ferkiss says, "possession of white man's goods, homes and women, a kind of perversion of the cargo-cult pattern familiar to anthropologists, the reaction of a dispossessed and despairing primitive group" (pp. 196–197). One wonders why Dr. Ferkiss did not tell us more of the civilized and unperverted torture in South African prisons or the cultivated brutality of the Portuguese in Angola. To be fair, the Whites of southern Africa do not escape a little criticism,

but the author blandly assumes that a "peaceful transfer of power" with "patience" and "good luck" is possible and even imminent.

The essential idea in his incredible discussion of southern Africa is that although Whites oppress and dehumanize Africans, the African must wait for the White to cease the oppression, or the African must gently and courteously promote changes which will peacefully promote the multiracial societies Whites are unwilling to accept. If, on the other hand, Africans engage in violence, the author of this book stands ready to condemn them in the strongest terms: "brutal," "perversion," "primitive," words long used to justify colonialism.

Around this Ferkiss sketches pre-colonial days, colonialism in Africa, the growth of nationalism (African "states are the creation of many different nationalist movements." p. 81), the meaning of freedom, and the problems of nation-building ("African society is politicized from the seats of government to the most remote villages." p. 117), Africa in international relations. Thus, with the destruction of some incorrect images the author succeeds in establishing new ones. His discussion of southern Africa, his presumptuous manner, and the odd collection of half-truths, errors, and ambiguous, often gratuitous, statements make the book very tedious to read.

With full assurance Ferkiss tells the world that Bantu are lighter in skin color than many other Africans because they are half Bushman; he refers to Lord Hailey as the "late Lord Hailey" (p. 282) although the gentleman is alive. French phrases are incorrectly transcribed, and Ferkiss claims that in almost all of Africa "kinship ties are the only ties with real meaning" (p. 32) although age groups, secret societies, and other groupings are very important too. His lack of understanding of what Africans want is reflected in his comment about one of the most controversial men in Africa: "Tshombe's major fault is his difference in temperament from the dominant type of African nationalist leader, his phlegmatic and pragmatic manner, his disdain for ideology and public relations" (p. 189). This might have been written by any one of Tshombe's European public relations firms.

Of these two books, Kwesi Armah's is clearer and better written. It is clear he speaks only for himself and the Nkrumah regime. He is also careful to indicate sources of his information whereas Ferkiss is not. The latter claims to write as a disinterested observer, but it seems evident he speaks for those who claim, in Africa and elsewhere, to know the needs of black men and the solution to problems of development better than black men. He speaks for those who fear that Africans and others will take the initiative in ridding themselves of visible and hidden oppressors.—BRIAN WEINSTEIN, *Howard University.*

Nigerian Government and Politics. By JOHN P. MACKINTOSH, et al. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966. Pp. 651. $12.95.)

This book is a notable contribution to the study of Nigerian politics. Most of it has been written by Professor Mackintosh on the basis of his extensive research. In addition, five able co-authors have contributed chapters on special topics. Readers may disagree with the authors of this book on matters of interpretation, but they are bound to value the wealth of information it provides.

Recent studies of African politics are distinguished by imaginative attempts to develop social theory as suggested by the concept of "political culture," numerous concepts associated with "political development," and other concepts that probe the nature of social change. This study, however, can lay claim to no such distinction. In that respect, the author's introductory statement, "This book does not attempt to prove anything," is accurate. His chapter on local politics includes three interesting surveys of voter opinion, but it reveals little of the relation between personal conflicts and the underlying movement of social forces. The result is sheer empiricism. Similarly, a lack of appreciation for the underlying ideological nature of the Western Regional crisis of 1962 is, in this reviewer's judgment, a shortcoming in his otherwise excellent account of the matter. These criticisms may simply cavil. Mackintosh does demonstrate conclusively the tendency to a one party system in the several regions. But his approach to the nature of Nigerian politics is essentially Shakesperian: a struggle for personal gain and power, suffused with tribal sentiments, but unencumbered by the forces of social change. Many readers will be satisfied, but this reviewer is not.

A highly informative account of the 1964–65 election crisis features the argument that ex-President Azikiwe attempted to take over the Nigerian Government in January 1965. Azikiwe does appear to have weighed advice to the effect that in the absence of a valid election he could exercise discretion in the appointment of a new prime minister. However, the facts revealed in this book also support an easier burden of interpretation: that Azikiwe merely wanted to avert a takeover of the government by the Nigerian National Alliance by means which, if not technically unconstitutional or wholly fradulent, were nonetheless contrary to constitutionalism in the accepted sense of that term. Analyzing Azikiwe's actions in the crisis, Mackintosh implies (in chapters I, XIII, and XIV) that the president

did not fully appreciate (or accept) his status as a figurehead under the Nigerian Constitution. Azikiwe's published statements could be cited in rebuttal. Mackintosh also asserts that the United Progressive Grand Alliance's decision to boycott the election of December, 1964 was born of a belated awareness that it could not win even a relatively fair election since its electoral position in the north had deteriorated irretrievably. Therefore, he concludes, "an element of irrationalism" entered the calculations of UPGA leaders. He may, however, overstate his case in asserting that free elections in the Northern Region would have made little difference in the result: "total rejection" of the regional opposition. It is also extreme to say that, apart from Tivland, the election of 1964 "clearly marks the end of opposition in the North."

Critical observations should not dim the appreciation of readers for this important and comprehensive work. However, a rival interpretation of the recent crises might serve to bring one of its central arguments into sharper focus. These crises might be seen as an outcome of the long and continuing struggle over regional power. Mackintosh's thesis on the one party tendency in the regions is sound. But the strength of antiregionalism in Nigeria should not be discounted, although it requires a different conceptual framework than this book provides to be understood. A decisive defeat of the antiregionalist democratic forces could still lead to dismemberment of the country. Mackintosh does not retrieve his position by stating at the end that the military *coup* of January, 1966 could strengthen a previously described trend toward unitary government. A stable unitary government, indeed a stable federation, would require new political formations that transcend tribalism, regionalism, and the analysis of this book. Their emergence might prompt the author to revise his sharp views on the cultural inaptitude of Nigerian society for libertarian democracy. His observations on the existence of a "double standard" or wide divergence between the precepts of democracy and the practices of the people do not apply in Africa more than elsewhere. One might believe in the universality of democracy in our time and still agree with Mackintosh that "Nigerian politics will develop on their own lines in response to and as a part of the changes in Nigerian society."—Richard L. Sklar, *The University of Zambia.*

Mauritius: Problems of a Plural Society. By Burton Benedict. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. vi, 72. $4.00.)

Sudan Republic. By K. D. D. Henderson. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. 256. $8.50.)

The Malagasy Republic: Madagascar Today. By Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965. Pp. xvi, 504. $12.50.)

Burton Benedict has written a worthwhile study of the tiny, multiracial island of Mauritius. His work, *Mauritius: Problems of a Plural Society,* will serve as a useful adjunct to the existing, largely romantic literature of the 19th century which attempted to deal with the procession of Portuguese, Dutch, French, Africans, English, Indians and Chinese who have formed the history of this Indian Ocean pinnacle.

Tiny, overpopulated, unindustrialized and overly dependent upon a single primary product (sugar provides 99 per cent of its export revenues), Mauritius is further handicapped by its heterogeneous population. For some reason, although they are residentially interspersed, the people of Mauritius have not fused their diverse backgrounds into a single culture as have their counterparts on the nearby island of Reunion. Instead they have gravitated, slowly, but seemingly resolutely toward a more fragmented society until, with the approach of independence, the Creole, Chinese, Moslem and Tamil minorities fear for their future at the hands of the more numerous Hindus who currently make up two-thirds of the population.

Dr. Benedict has a deep feeling for the variety of social, economic and racial cleavages which underscore the validity of his final prognosis: "The danger of communal conflict increases." At the same time, his flat, listless style detracts from the sense of urgency he wishes to impart. And while he gives the reader a superb picture of the confluence of political forces on the local level, his treatment of national politics (to which on this small island, local political socialization must inexorably flow) is less than adequate. He mentions no national figures, ignoring the leading statesman of the powerful Hindu Labor Party, Sewoosagur Ramgoolam, and the passionate Creole orator of the Parti Mauricien, Gaetan Duval. He also neglects the ideological overtones of the existing national parties and thus gives an overly parochial view of the political situation.

Contrary to the paucity of literature on Mauritius, much has been written about the Sudan, and K. D. D. Henderson himself has already composed two books about it, *Survey of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan* and *The Making of the Modern Sudan.* His *Sudan Republic* is essentially a popularized spinoff from these earlier works and hence is a bit repetitious. Some of his description also seems to be charmingly irrelevant. In describing part of the western frontier, for example, he declares that the boundary "bears a curious resemblance to the profile of the late Lord Oxford."

The Sudan, largest country in Africa and lying astride the umbilical cord of the Nile, has had a

long, fascinating and often tragic history which Henderson summarizes rather well. His only real contribution to the field, however, is his analysis of the Sudan's "southern problem" and he devotes half the pages of the book and most of its documentation to the task. The largely animistic Christian Negroid tribes of the southern Sudan have found it increasingly intolerable to live under the rule of the more populous, better educated, Arabic peoples of the north. Largely ignored, and intermittently persecuted, the southern peoples have taken to violence in recent years to dramatize their dissatisfaction. The simmering revolt in the south has plagued every Sudanese regime since 1954 and has, by virtue of its 100,000 refugees, spilled over into the neighboring countries of Ethiopia, Uganda, Chad, Central African Republic and the Congo (Kinshasa).

Yet even in his area of concentration, Henderson misjudges the political climate, disregarding for example the importance of the Congo issue in internal Sudanese politics. In an antic episode, leftist pressure in 1964 led the then Prime Minister Serr el Khatim Khalifa to support the Congolese rebels despite their racial affinities with the southern tribes. The Sudanese government allowed the Algerians, Egyptians and Russians to pour in far more weapons than the disorganized rebels could utilize. This miscalculation had serious repercussions. Many of the weapons destined for the Congolese fell into the hands of the southerners and when the Congolese rebellion failed, Khalifa became associated with its failure and the increasing strength of the southerners. He was then ousted by a resurgence of conservative Moslem elements under Prime Minister Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub. Henderson is, however, quite right in pointing out that the leaders of the Sudan, both north and south, must solve the "southern problem" not only for internal peace but in order to prevent the increasing polarization of Arab and Negro groups in many of the countries in the vast savanna regions of north central Africa.

Of the three books, *The Malagasy Republic: Madagascar Today* by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff is the most exciting combination of solid scholarship and readability. It represents a substantial contribution to the literature of Africa. Well documented and perspicacious, *The Malagasy Republic* is a welcome event and fills a serious void in the English language literature of this largely unknown and exotic island. Geographically close to Africa, culturally proximate to Asia and economically linked to the underdeveloped world, Madagascar stands largely alone, almost xenophobic in its fear of economic innovation, foreign ideology and social change.

Happily, the authors have avoided a common mistake of political scientists and sociologists who when dealing with African cultures have stressed either the European influence or the traditional societies themselves instead of viewing the development of political institutions as part of a space-time continuum affected by previous African forms, Asian and Near Eastern intrusions, European impositions and finally—through the education of African elites—global political theory. Thus Adloff and Thompson view the modest "human investment" programs of the present government of Philibert Tsiranana in light of previous national work projects, including the forced labor under the French and the semi-slavery of the earlier Merina monarchy.

The book is not flawless. The historical chapters are uncertain and both the analysis and mechanics of the crucial 1947 revolt are weak. The book could also use a final summarizing chapter to bring together the many strands of investigation which the authors have pursued. In addition, one may have a good deal of difficulty with their interpretation of the so called "cult of the dead" which they find "stultifying" and which they see as an explanation for the placidity of the Malagasy people. Anthropology aside, it may simply be that the people of Madagascar prefer peace and serenity to social and political turmoil and have thus far been fortunate enough to realize this preference. Still, Adloff and Thompson have attempted a great deal and most of it has come off very well. Serious students of Africana will find *The Malagasy Republic* rich in detail, admirable in scope and substantial in interpretation.—CHRISTIAN P. POTHOLM, *Dartmouth College.*

Area Studies and the Library. ED. BY TSUEN-HSUIN TSIEN AND HOWARD W. WINGER. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. Pp. vi, 184. $4.50.)

Contains papers and discussion on the problems of supporting area studies with library resources, submitted to the Thirtieth Annual Conference of the Graduate Library School, University of Chicago.—C.B.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

Deterrence and Strategy. BY ANDRE BEAUFRE. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 174. $6.95. Translated by Major General R. H. Barry.)

Air Transport Policy and National Security: A Political, Economic, and Military Analysis. BY FREDERICK C. THAYER, JR. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1965. Pp. xxiii, 352. $8.00.)

These two books have only a few things in com-

mon. They were both written by professional soldiers—a French Army general and a U. S. Air Force colonel. Both are concerned, more or less, with military subjects, and both deal with certain other aspects of security policy. Here the similarity ends, however, for the Beaufre volume is what is commonly referred to as a "think piece," which focuses on international nuclear deterrence, and the Thayer volume is a detailed, interdisciplinary case study of U. S. air transport policy. The Beaufre volume is written with flair and imagination; the Thayer volume is written skillfully but more pedantically.

With typical Gallic intellectual force, General Beaufre defends the French *force de frappe* and at the same time presents a concise summary of some of the controversial issues involved in nuclear deterrence and strategy. Decision makers, teachers, and laymen interested in national security policy will find this relatively small volume extremely useful. It is also an important sequel to the author's *An Introduction to Strategy* published in the U. S. last year.

General Beaufre's new book is divided into two parts. Part I, the larger portion, is a discussion of the concept of deterrence, including an analysis of bilateral and multilateral deterrence at three levels—nuclear, conventional, and cold war—and the way each level affects the others. Part II reviews the effects of some of the principles of nuclear deterrence upon strategy and military structure. Here Beaufre emphasizes the need for maintaining a flexible and adaptable military system.

The author argues that the nuclear bomb has become "the most powerful stabilizer man has ever known" (p. 19). While he admits that possession of nuclear weapons by all nations would make for an unstable world, he is nevertheless convinced that independent ownership by a few "reasonable" powers would make for a stable world. His treatment of multilateral deterrence among three or more nuclear powers is the most fascinating part of the book. He believes, for example, that since a weaker third party would be allied with one of the superpowers, calculations of risks and costs in war would be more difficult and uncertain. "The effects of the existence of the third party," therefore, "is to restrict to some extent the freedom of action of the two principals" (p. 85). Lower levels of conflict—conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare, etc.—would become less likely to occur. In contrast, in the existing bilateral nuclear deterrent "stalemate," conflict is more likely to occur at lower levels and possibly to escalate out of control. Although Beaufre admits that an independent nuclear force can be dangerous unless it is "truly allied," he neglects to give the blueprint for assuring a truly allied relationship.

Beaufre, of course, has the same problem that everyone has in writing on the subject of nuclear deterrence. That is, advocates of nuclear proliferation cannot, in the absence of war, prove their case with finality; neither can their opponents. Nonetheless, Beaufre's arguments are crisp, precise, and compelling. Moreover, his case for the independent French nuclear force is the most convincing to date. Yet he neglects some critical considerations: whether the French *force de frappe* perpetuates a divisive force in the political and economic integration of Western Europe; whether other jealous nations will also want "the bomb"; and the fact that development of nuclear weapons is an enormous drain on any state's resources. The fact remains, above all, that relative military stability exists in the bipolar situation whereas the multilateral situation is an unknown.

Proliferation of nuclear weapons, particularly with reference to France, continues to be one of the most important and controversial developments in international politics. The appearance of General Beaufre's sophisticated volume is a welcome addition to the dialogue on this subject.

Colonel Thayer's history and analysis of United States air transport policy is the type of study often sought by political scientists who are interested mainly in national security policy and civil-military affairs. Teachers of public administration will also find this volume useful. The book is written much in the style of the two books of case studies edited by Harold Stein, for the Thayer volume is a detailed account of one of the more confusing, esoteric areas of public policy. However, it is more than a history. The author also analyzes many of the problems associated with his subject and, in addition, has the courage to suggest rather specific solutions to those problems.

A major thesis of the author is that with regard to American air transport policy, "the U. S. has too quickly rejected reasonable and pragmatic solutions in favor of less satisfactory policies" (p. vii). Moreover, he argues, "no administration since Hoover's has explicitly accepted responsibility for a national airlift policy" (p. 4). Instead, the history of government action appears to reveal a long series of ad hoc responses to immediate problems. There is a noticeable absence of long-range programming which would demonstrate appreciation for the delicate interrelationships of foreign relations, military strategy, and international economics involved in the making of U. S. air transport policy. Thayer admits that "strategic military airlift and international air transportation on a truly massive scale are relatively new phenomena" (p. viii), but would insist that they will both become increasingly critical concerns of national security.

This heavily documented book is organized into four parts. The first three parts are mainly descriptive-historical. Part I contains two relatively short chapters on "International Airline Policy Before World War II." The four chapters in Part II are concerned with "World War II and Its Aftermath." And Part III, with three chapters, is entitled "Congressional Policy-Making and the Strange Military Alliance." However, the bulk of the author's analytical work is found in Part IV, where the two concluding chapters are devoted to "Military and Commercial Policies, Today and Tomorrow." There is also an extremely helpful 10-page bibliography.

The unique methodological feature of the study is that Colonel Thayer, within an historical framework, rather skillfully employs an interdisciplinary approach, stressing the interaction of politics, economics, and military strategy. (The author has particular personal expertise in the latter, having spent half of his approximately 20 years in the USAF in assignments involving military airlift or military air transport.)

The book is obviously a doctoral dissertation, albeit a very good one. It is too bad, for example, that it was not descholasticized to the extent that would have permitted incorporating into the text much of the interesting and sometimes vital information now contained in the innumerable footnotes. Nevertheless, the author's diligence in distilling pertinent information from dozens of government documents (a hazardous, time-consuming, laborious task, well known to all who write on military subjects), from other related studies by many other writers, and from his own experience and insights, and finally piecing all these data together in order to tell an incredibly complex story is certainly admirable. In short, quite aside from its own merits, it is a valuable source book for those persons interested in this aspect of public policy.—CLAUDE J. JOHNS, JR., *United States Air Force Academy.*

The Greek Civil War, 1944–1949. By EDGAR O'BALLANCE. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 237. $7.50.)

Major O'Ballance's scholarly study effectively complements Professor D. G. Kousoulas' earlier and classic *Revolution and Defeat, The Story of the Greek Communist Party.* While Kousoulas' book provided the political profile of recent Greek Communism, O'Ballance offers its military counterpart with a detailed examination of the strategy and tactics of the Greek guerrilla war of 1944–1949. This painstakingly researched work was not written for the uninitiated or the general public, but it is nevertheless of the greatest professional interest to the advanced student of international Communism, national guerrilla movements or the peculiarities of Southeastern European politics.

The overall significance of the military aspects of the Greek civil war is further enhanced today by the involvement of the United States in Vietnam. The five long and savage years of in-fighting in Greece should provide numerous valuable lessons and serious reminders to Western observers. Mostly, we must remember that the Greek and other Balkan Communists fought a tough and carefully planned war to seize power in Greece, and yet it is still the only country where they were decisively defeated.

The true pattern of the protracted Greek civil conflict is almost beyond unraveling. The author should be heartily congratulated for systematizing the unsystematic and attempting to rationalize the fundamentally irrational. Thus the civil war is divided into three military rounds, the first two of which ended in political stalemates with the Greek Communist elite occupying advantageous and fairly significant positions. The third round, of most particular interest to the American reader since it heralded the introduction into the Greek political scene of massive United States military aid, is astutely covered under two chronologically related headings: first a year (1948) of essentially "watchful waiting" on both sides, military build-up and minor guerrilla skirmishing, then the crucial year (1949) of Communist defeat and the collapse of the Greek Communist movement both at home and externally, among the disenchanted and warring Balkan guerrilla groups from Albania, Yugoslavia, Rumania and Bulgaria. An excellent final chapter presents a brief analysis of the reasons for the decisive Communist defeat.

One of the author's principal conclusions is to dispel forcefully the myth that the Communist collapse in Greece must be "ascribed to Tito closing his frontier. . . . Many pundits," he observes, "are convinced, even to this day, that had this not been done, the insurgent war would still be in progress" (p. 18). This is not so, Major O'Ballance states; although closing the Yugoslav border deprived the Greek guerrillas of such essentials as a mainstay, refuge and principal supplier, they still had the support, space, bases and supplies from such adjoining countries as Albania and Bulgaria. The far more significant factors properly stressed by the author are:

1) the neglect by the Greek Communists of one of the primary principles of insurgent warfare, "winning the minds and hearts of the majority of the people" (p. 210),

2) the faulty judgment of KKE leadership which produced several major tactical errors. The author is convinced that at least two of these were in the "disaster" category: the misjudgment in 1945 of the British reaction to an attempt at the armed take-over of the country, and the backing of Stalin in 1948 instead of Tito, thus choosing the wrong side—from the Greek geopolitical perspec-

tive—in the bitter Cominform struggle, and

3) last but not least, the Greek Communist movement's sudden switch in 1948 from guerrilla to conventional warfare, a "colossal mistake" (p. 212 et seq.) which helped to maximize the battle-effectiveness of the Greek Royalist Army and of the ever-expanding American material aid. It is most heartening to read, in this context, a proper appreciation of the role played by American foreign policy—a factor often neglected or minimized in the recent literature dealing with the Greek civil war. This reviewer most emphatically agrees with Major O'Ballance's strategic estimate that had the Truman Doctrine not been formulated in early 1947, had U. S. aid not begun to arrive by late 1947, had it been delayed or more restricted in volume, the Greek National Army might well have been defeated. Thus massive American intervention "brought new hope and gave the essential material supremacy over the 'Democratic Army.'" (p. 214).—ANDREW GYORGY, *The George Washington University.*

Viet-Nam Witness: 1953–66. By BERNARD B. FALL. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. ix; 363. $6.95.)

The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia. By BERNARD K. GORDON. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall. Pp. xiv, 201. $4.95.)

Vietnam: Between Two Truces. By JEAN LACOUTURE. Introduction by Joseph Kraft, translated from the French by Konrad Kellen and Joel Carmichael. (New York: Random House, 1966. Pp. xv, 295. $5.95, cloth; $1.95, paper.)

Provocative analysis of the genesis and evolution of Indochina's seemingly perpetual nightmare is provided dramatically by Bernard B. Fall's collected essays in *Vietnam Witness* and by Jean Lacouture in *Vietnam: Between Two Truces.* Unquestionably, both treat their complicated, multifaceted subject matter with enviable accuracy, although the two authors display a disturbing propensity for certainty when dealing with extremely complex situations. Nor does either hestitate, when analyzing hypotheses of his own construction, to accept their validity as articles of faith even when lack of evidence prevents the complete disavowal of alternative hypotheses.

Independently, both internationally recognized authorities on Vietnam expand upon a common theme: Vietnam's dilemma is incomprehensible without understanding the interplay of truly indigenous forces, despite the considerable impact of external forces and of the vicissitudes of great power diplomacy. Both support their contention with significant evidence that the conflict of the 1960's is the product, first, of purely "local" (i.e., South Vietnamese) political processes and, second, of inadequacies manifested by the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem and his successors. The outline of anti-Diem criticisms has often been voiced, and both present it eloquently: land reform failure; excessive administrative centralization and general administrative irrationality; overzealous programs which backfired against "former resistance fighters"; elimination of village council elections (which really were a relatively new development and Diem's innovation in this regard was an attempt to displace the local power structure with his own more than an attempt to dislodge a nonexistent pure democracy system at the village and hamlet level); and alienation of nearly each important Vietnamese interest group, i.e., the sects, Chinese, intellectuals, tribesmen, Buddhists, and military.

Despite the persuasive articulation of Saigon regime failures, it is the local nature of insurgency which is stressed. Fall, in fact, is admittedly most proud of his early comprehension and warning of deterioration in the south several years prior to the formation of the National Liberation Front. This point is of especial significance as it defies the official analysis concerning the incidence and control of the Second Indochina War. Nonetheless Fall's hypothesis relating to the southern nature of the pre-1960 development of revolutionary structure has gained increased credence even in official United States publications and in Douglas Pike's comprehensive *Viet Cong.* But even Fall appears to have recognized the nature of the forces directing pre-1964 insurgence only much after the fact. Only one of Fall's introductions written in 1966, for example, voices an appreciation of the importance of the religious sects before the post-Diem advent of a strengthened Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In one of his most original and important essays published originally in 1955 he notes "the sects had to disappear," a projection which at the least must be considered premature.

On the basis of the thesis that southern particularism dominates the insurgency both Fall and Lacouture advance the further arguments that only a rapprochement within the south, including the National Liberation Front, can eliminate insurgency. Fall, in an extremely powerful 1966 statement, appears to abandon this premise by documenting in considerable detail the impact of both American firepower and Democratic Republic of Vietnam regular forces upon the tenor of the conflict. But he remains unprepared to accept the thesis of post-1964 Tonkinese suzerainty over the National Liberation Front.

Supplementing their assumption of southern, primarily Cochinchinese, control over the forces of revolutionary warfare in South Vietnam both Fall and Lacouture opt for Norodom Sihanouk's

alternative of an "Indochina solution." It is here that the two Vietnam authorities present a prognosis similar to that of Bernard K. Gordon in *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia.* A well documented analysis of southeast Asian boundary dispute problems, Gordon's book suggests that regional cooperation may be a technique for sidestepping the great issues of the cold war as well as the problems of lack of national identity and of particularistic antagonisms. In many ways Fall and Lacouture accept Gordon's formula for southeast Asia (which under present circumstances could hardly include Indochina for, as Gordon states, "war has effectively removed the two Vietnams from much of the region's international politics") as a formula for resolving political conflict in Indochina. Thus the Fall-Lacouture formula reads: first, recognition of southern pluralism and of the demands of numerous regional, particularistic non-communist and communist elites (most of whom distrust the Tonkinese, to be certain, but who are still deeply divided even in the south along regional, ethnic, religious, and ideological lines); second, acceptance of regional autonomy and probably "neutralism"; and third, economic and cultural Indochinese regionalism. None of the formula's ingredients is intrinsically in disagreement with the stated objectives of American foreign policy as promulgated before publication of these two works although that policy and the stages of decision making prior to its promulgation are the object of considered and occasionally devastating criticism by both authorities.

Undoubtedly regionalism is a concept which merits advocacy in the abstract by each of the three authors as well as by the White House. In time the product of regional cooperation, whether within all Southeast Asia or simply within Indochina, could conceivably be prosperity and even the development of a "third force." Yet where even intra-national cooperation has been markedly absent, as it has been in varying degrees throughout southeast Asia, the formula obviously must be approached cautiously. The cold war, ironically, has simultaneously made the region a foremost international issue while applying external pressures which have precluded small, inter-nation wars of nineteenth century vintage and probably precluded many civil wars as well. Thus the irony of contemporary Asian romanticism presents itself on a nineteenth century stage in a twentieth century world, a problem none of the authors despite their keen appreciation of political processes in southeast Asia treats with precision.

Debates over the inclusion or exclusion of materials by Fall (particularly when he does reproduce dubious statements such as his advocacy of Tonkinese Catholics owning and cultivating the fields of the southern highlands and a 1954 projection that Hanoi would starve or become a Chinese colony if Vietnam were divided), debates over Lacouture's accuracy in detail (relative to the 1964–5 Pnom Penh conference for an "Indochinese solution" and relative to the evolution of revitalized Vietnamese Buddhism), and debates over Gordon's fairly unquestioning acceptance of the potential role of the Association of Southeast Asia (and of a possibly less conservative successor organization) and over the fruitfulness of his interpretation of personality as a variable in regionalism—these are at most secondary matters in a critique of the three works. A more underlying criticism of these three important contributions is that they advance regional cooperation with certainty while paying inadequate attention to the very problems rendering such cooperation difficult if not impossible, namely, romantic particularism and administrative inefficiency. As Fall has noted, "victory goes to the side that outadministers the other." When the variable of administrative effectiveness is lacking and when separatist forces are positioned to exploit this lack, regional and even "national" solutions are more in the category of dreams than of alternatives.—CHARLES A. JOINER, *Temple University.*

South Asia and United States Policy. By NORMAN D. PALMER. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966. Pp. x, 332. $4.25.)

Professor Palmer writes that this study is a product of five years of field work, research and reflection; that it deals with the internal dynamics and external policies of South Asia, chiefly of India and Pakistan; and the implications for U. S. policy. "It is in effect, three interrelated studies in one." He has packed in relatively limited space a measured treatment of the political and economic development of the two main countries since independence, their relation to each other and to the chief centers of power external to them, the U. S., the U.S.S.R., the Peoples Republic of China. He has reviewed and incorporated when pertinent an ample, though not exhaustive, supply of South Asian and Western sources. He uses 1965 as a cut-off date and, though dealing with near-contemporary issues it is worth noting that his work is not "dated." Thus, *South Asia and United States Policy* offers a rapid two-decade survey of a "pivotal area in contemporary international relations . . . one of the world's greatest laboratories of political, economic and social change . . . [that] embodies all the hopes and most of the problems of mankind."

For specialists in the field there will be little novelty in all but one of Professor Palmer's twelve chapters. On the other hand, Chapter

Eight, "Problems of Security and Defense," some 28 pages, pulls together scattered and scarce Indian and Pakistan data on defense strategy, force levels and materiel. One wishes that Professor Palmer might have extended his treatment of the subject. The defense of the Indian Ocean area is a much neglected item, not only by Indians and Pakistanis but also by others. For this subject, Palmer cites in his bibliography (p. 322) the less than a dozen pertinent items, not all of equal merit. Among these is the article, "Pakistan Perspective," by President Ayub Khan, *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1960, who wrote:

> As a student of war and strategy, I can see quite clearly the inexorable push of the north in the direction of the warm waters of the Indian Ocean . . . this push is bound to increase if India and Pakistan go on squabbling with each other. . . . If, on the other hand we resolve our problems and disengage our armed forces from facing inwards as they do today, and face them outwards. I feel that we shall have a good chance of preventing a recurrence of the history of the past.

These words of 1960 are applicable today. India and Pakistan have not stopped their "squabbling." On the contrary, they recently engaged in a short border war. Kashmir is still the central issue between them as it has been since August 1947. The Tashkent detente has largely evaporated. Neither the Communist Chinese invasion of Indian territory nor Peking's fourth atmospheric demonstration of a growing nuclear capacity has brought President Ayub Khan's words any nearer to realization.

In a major way, Professor Palmer's other chapters are designed as an analysis of the "conditions and policies" in both India and Pakistan which will help the reader understand why the foregoing issue remains where it is. (Ceylon, Nepal and Bhutan are noticed very briefly in this study of South Asia. Afghanistan, if it "belongs" to South Asia, is not included.) And to this analysis he adds an "evaluation"—his word—of U. S. policies toward both countries. U. S. involvement in the area is revealed in a variety of ways but perhaps no single item reveals more than this one: By mid-1965 *economic* bilateral aid—exclusive of U. S. aid through the World Bank and the International Development Association—to India reached $6 billion, "the largest amount of economic assistance to any developing country"; and to Pakistan, $3 billion.

Professor Palmer set for himself the goal of being "fair" to both India and Pakistan in carrying out his design. I am not sure what "fair" means. I assume that Palmer strives, as do other scholars, for objectivity in research and for judgment, where involved, based on his findings. But I suspect he means more than that—that is, he wishes to avoid "taking sides" in the Pakistan-Indian debate even when the data might lead to a specific judgment. Some evidence for this interpretation arises especially from his treatment of Pakistan as "an aligned country" (e.g., CENTO and SEATO) and India as a non-aligned country, and U.S. response to each and to both. Repeatedly he tells that the U. S. should "not praise or criticize" India and Pakistan "in accordance with their willingness or unwillingness to take an aligned position." To do one or the other is a short-sighted view, and it could be a disastrous one" (pp. 181, 267–269, 300, 302, etc.). But he never tells us why he thinks that to criticize the policy of another state is either short-sighted or disastrous. Surely stated differences in inter-state policy on so key an issue as alignment and non-alignment cannot be swept under the rug—nor should they be. For only through critical debate can national interests be understood and where possible conciliated.

Professor Palmer concludes his useful study with a prescriptive policy chapter designed, as he sees it, to further good relations for "the growing United States-South Asian encounter" based on "broadening commitments," "sounder foundations of understanding" and "more extensive contacts on official and unofficial levels." Obviously these are impeccable desiderata.—FRANK N. TRAGER, *New York University*.

China and the World: An Analysis of Communist China's Foreign Policy. By VIDYA PRAKASH DUTT. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. x, 356. $7.50.)

Communist China and Arms Control. By MORTON H. HALPERIN AND DWIGHT H. PERKINS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. xi, 191. $7.50.)

The two volumes under review are worthy contributions to the study of Communist China's role in international affairs. Both books are readable, informative, and well documented. They also represent two different, and complementary, ways of approaching Chinese foreign policy. The first volume, by an Indian scholar, covers the broad aspects of Peking's foreign relations since 1958. The second volume, by two Harvard professors, is a more analytical treatment of a specific issue—the Chinese position regarding arms control.

China and the World is an enlarged version of *China's Foreign Policy, 1958–62*, published in 1964 and reviewed in the September 1965 issue of this REVIEW (pp. 758–759). An epilogue that summarizes the principal currents in China's foreign policy between 1963 and 1966 has been added to the present volume. The book maintains a commendable degree of objectivity with some understandable exceptions in its treatment of issues involving India and Pakistan.

Communist China and Arms Control was prepared by Professors Halperin and Perkins as a report to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Completed after China's second nuclear explosion, this book is a scholarly and dispassionate study of Chinese policies toward disarmament and their political and strategic implications. The discussion starts with an examination of the foreign policy objectives, economic capacity, and military strategy of Communist China. Then follows a consideration of Peking's attitudes toward various arms control measures, international agreements, and international organizations. The book concludes with an analysis of possible ways to make China arms-control-minded and of the impact of arms control discussions and agreements upon Chinese Communist policy.

Although the volume is too concise to cover all issues adequately, its basic themes are both sensible and perceptive. Contrary to Soviet charges, Halperin and Perkins argue that Peking is no more a nuclear warmonger than Moscow, and that the Sino-Soviet disagreement is largely over the possibility and desirability of avoiding local wars. The authors also suggest four Chinese motivations for acquiring a nuclear capability. The first two, security and prestige considerations, are undoubtedly the overriding factors. Less convincing, however, are the other two reasons given: to support wars of national liberation and to establish Chinese hegemony in Asia. It would appear that in either case the Chinese nuclear threat could be readily countered by a superior deterrent.

According to Halperin and Perkins, Communist China currently has little interest in arms control and disarmament. As an anti-*status quo* power, she is opposed to any agreement that might limit her freedom to acquire nuclear weapons and to modernize her conventional forces. Consequently, her proposals for certain forms of disarmament and arms control must be viewed as political-propaganda moves, designed to appeal to underdeveloped countries and to inhibit the United States from using nuclear weapons. Moreover, the authors find little encouragement in the treaty behavior of Communist China, which has no hesitation to break or ignore international agreements whenever its interest so dictates. Under these circumstances, to induce China to become seriously interested in arms control is indeed a difficult task. The only concrete suggestions advanced by the authors are for the United States to keep open all available channels of communication with Communist China, including the Warsaw talks and the deployment of American forces.

In short, Halperin and Perkins rightfully entertain few illusions about Chinese attitudes and have good reasons to be skeptical about the prospects of establishing a meaningful disarmament dialogue with Peking at this stage. Nevertheless, in view of the crucial importance of the arms control problem, it is doubtful that the Chinese positions on this matter should be dismissed as purely political without further exploration. Is it possible that Peking may actually frown upon nuclear diffusion to other states and advocate proliferation only to justify its nuclear development? Given the relative backwardness of Chinese economy, is it conceivable that the Chinese Communists may have a genuine interest in achieving some sort of military parity with the superpowers through staged disarmament rather than through a costly arms race? As for treaty violations, is Communist China's record any worse than that of the Soviet Union? Could concern for a "bad image," retaliations, or other adverse consequences deter China from breaching voluntary treaty obligations? These and other questions remain to be examined more fully, although pioneering work has already been done by Professors Halperin and Perkins.—SHAO-CHUAN LENG, *University of Virginia.*

The American People and China. By A. T. STEELE. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966. Pp. x, 325. $7.50.)

This is a major contribution to the understanding of the functioning of public opinion in a democracy for three reasons:

1) It is an effort to relate and locate the role of public opinion on the subject of China policy in terms of what policy is and what it might be.

2) The author is willing to draw meaningful and lucid conclusions from his data on hand.

3) The book is written in superb English—no small feat when dealing with survey research.

A qualifying note should be entered at the outset: the reviewer did not read it until November, 1966, while the book obviously was written around mid-1965. Much has changed in the political outlook of America, important shifts have occurred in public attitudes toward China, and rather shattering events appear to be happening to Communist China abroad and at home.

Yet, A. T. Steele's careful research stands up remarkably well—good enough so that another edition with up to date revisions would make it even more real.

The Steele thesis is that U. S. policy toward China has been in a deep freeze since the Korean War in the early 1950's. That war hardened American public opinion toward the Mao regime, and little that has taken place since has encouraged a dialogue within this country to reassess U. S. policy. The lobby for the status quo, the author believes, has successfully locked the

United States into an inflexible, unbending stance. Congress, reflecting the public hostility toward Red China, sees little mileage in initiating a more flexible policy. The executive branch, especially under Lyndon Johnson, shows little inclination toward establishing real contact with the government or people of China. The press and other media simply reflect the prevailing view of not rocking the boat on China.

At the time of the writing, these important events had not developed:

1) China had not lost decisively in its efforts to penetrate its brand of non-revisionist Communism in Indonesia, Ghana, Algeria, Cuba, and other key areas of the world.

2) The struggle for succession in China and the apparently even deeper ideological cleavage marked by the purges and rampant Red Guards, had not yet emerged.

3) The willingness of American public opinion to back admission of Red China to the UN on a two-China basis, as well as to exchange Ambassadors, had not yet become clear.

With some form of offer by the UN to seat the Mao government in the offing, with China seemingly beset at home by internal divisions, with Soviet pressures to isolate China in the world Communist movement mounting, and with Chinese prestige slipping precipitously abroad, obviously American policy must react—beyond merely intensifying the effort to repulse the Communists in Vietnam.

Therefore, whether ready or not, a front and center dialogue over China policy appears to be confronting the American people. In this context, the Steele work is a beginning, a point of departure. The Survey Research Center questions were limited and are much out of date on Vietnam. They have been updated by a fair amount of subsequent survey material. One would have wished for a more integrated analysis of opinion leader attitudes compared with those of the rank and file. Mr. Steele is clearly more at home in his own field of discussing the problems of proper news coverage and analysis of China than in dissecting and making hard numbers from survey data talk. He has problems in differentiating solid cross-sectional data from impressionistic, spotty evidence.

But these are minor and mostly technical reservations in what has been one of the few attempts to make public opinion research functional. The Council on Foreign Affairs and Mr. Steele are to be commended for undertaking the kind of interdisciplinary effort on a much neglected subject. As the author correctly pays tribute to the growing and painstaking efforts in universities and in government to document the shadowy world of China, so this book is a pioneering venture of first rank in its own right.—Louis Harris, *Louis Harris and Associates.*

Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents. Edited by A. M. Halpern. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. Pp. xiv, 523. $9.95, cloth; $3.95, paper.)

"We are at war with China!" This was the recent response of a Peace Corps trainee bound for West Africa to an African's criticism of a tendency of some recent American movies to depict "the villain" as Chinese. While it is doubtful that this would be the dominant view among Peace Corps personnel, it is nonetheless sobering to think that this recent graduate of an American University might be articulating a growing American conviction that we are in the beginning stages of a war against the People's Republic of China. Whether or not the Council on Foreign Relations had the specific dangers of self-fulfilling prophecies in mind when it embarked upon publishing a series on the United States and China in World Affairs, one would hope that this series might do something to bring reason, perspective and information to bear in the struggle to fashion a China policy which will not push us all toward destruction.

Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents, edited by A. M. Halpern (the first publication in the series), appears to be designed to inform the attentive publics about the range of non-Soviet Bloc strategy and tactics toward Communist China and the state of current thought about China in most of the major countries or areas of the world. Each of sixteen articles that comprise the major part of this book is written by a native or by an outside expert who specializes in the analysis of politics of the country or area in question. (Seven of the ten articles from the *non-western* world are written by *westerners.*)

Although the articles contain much information and some first rate descriptive analysis of value to the expert, they appear to be focused mainly at the non-expert attentive publics if one can judge from the basically non-theoretical orientation of the book. While editor Halpern himself has contributed an interesting summary chapter in which he develops a typology of China policies, it seems reasonably clear that there has been very little attempt to make explicit the theoretical underpinnings upon which policies have been based nor has there been a sustained effort to operationalize some of the concepts such as "balance of power" or "world power balance." (Concepts, of course, which have been under attack in the more sophisticated types of social science analysis.) Nonetheless the book has significant value for both public

and expert alike in terms of the insights it gives, the reflection it promotes, and the questions it stimulates. Since it would be impossible to discuss the articles in terms of specifics, the remainder of this review will focus upon the general impressions that one may get from these explicit reminders of policies toward China from around the world.

China as an Object of Foreign Policy. Richard Harris in the article on Britain and China mentions that historically China has been considered by the British to be an object of British power, not a prime mover in international affairs. Although this book gives ample testimony to the fact that China has rapidly become an active, and at times threatening, global participant in international relations, there seems to be a curious vestige of this object orientation in the policy deliberations of many countries. If these articles (particularly by Westerners) are a fair indication of the thinking about China in the foreign offices of the world, then it would appear that much more consideration need be given to the subject of Chinese goals, aspirations, and motives than we find in this book or in many other places for that matter. One is struck by the general absence of any sophisticated effort to plumb the sources of Chinese conduct (even in passing) in these articles. Instead of presenting some evidence of a searching analysis of Chinese behavior as a part of the interactive process of fashioning policies toward China, the analyses in this context rarely rise much above the rather naive German analysis that "the Communists are constantly pressing against South Vietnam and Laos and the P.R.C. is in *every* way the ultimate source of this pressure" (p. 100). Apparently, the perception of a Communist Monolith still persists and the Sino-Soviet split, Yugloslavia, polycentrism and national Communism have not been fully perceived or appreciated. Communist doctrine may indeed help structure the range of alternatives for decision-makers in Communist countries, but our understanding is not enhanced if no real effort is made to take into account other variables such as nationalism, the role of reference groups, the psychology of attaining and retaining decision-making power, etc. Yet, from most of the articles in the book (the article on Japanese policies is the main exception) one finds little explicit evidence that the foreign policy decision-makers have fully attempted to appreciate the psychological or motivational underpinning of Chinese policies. Hence, the non-expert reader is almost forced to look at only one side of the equation of interaction between China and other countries of the world. While a fair rejoinder might be that these were intended to be views toward China and not articles on Chinese foreign policies, and that this evidence is implicit in the discussion of the policies themselves, it seems fair to comment that an evaluation of these policies toward China would have been improved if the reader had been given more explicit cross-national insights into what makes the Chinese behave as they do. It is not just the policies toward China that are of interest, but also how successful these policies are likely to be. Other than Monday-morning quarterbacking, we are unlikely to be able to make sound judgments about the range of policies toward China without some reasonably sophisticated attempts at determining the world view and orientations of the Chinese communists. We hope, of course, that this is being done in the foreign offices of the world but actions of the U. S. government and others give us cause to wonder whether enough effort is being made to place assumptions about Chinese conduct in a sufficiently coherent and precise framework for test and argument. China is no longer an "object of policy." It is an abiding subject.

Fading Dominance of U. S. China Policy. Another impression that one may gain from this book is how dominant American policy toward China once was (in terms of non-Communist world) and how serious is the challenge to that dominance today. Although the U. S. attempt to isolate, contain and precipitate the downfall of the Chinese Communists, best symbolized by keeping China out of the United Nations, was never accepted by all of the major non-communist powers, the power and influence of the United States in the 1940's and 1950's was sufficiently great so that the U. S. was permitted to be the architect of the "free world's" China policy. This book should make it obvious, even to the casual reader, that many countries including Great Britain, Canada, France, Japan, and Brazil were less than enthusiastic about the rationale and direction of American policy, but partially followed it because other more immediate matters of mutual interest and concern dictated that the U. S. was to have its way if only on the prestigious matter of entry into the United Nations.

That the American China policy is only partially successful is demonstrated by a number of the articles. Even those countries like West Germany and Australia who rest philosophically close to the United States on the China question have embarked on significant trading and other intercourse with China. Japan, Canada, Pakistan, France, Brazil and Great Britain, to mention a few, also have found the isolation policy of the United States unacceptable and have shown willingness to trade with China and to have interchange of people at least on an unofficial level. Only the idea of containment seems to continue

to be a viable one, but there is considerable difference on how that might best be done. The essentially military emphasis of the United States is now supported mainly by Thailand, South Vietnam, Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines and Australia. India too could be put in the military containment category since her friendship policy failed to deter the Chinese from taking what they considered was their territory. Different strategies of containment are exemplified by the efforts of Pakistan, Burma, Cambodia and France to place their relationships upon a basis of friendship and mutual interest. It is probably significant that in this latter category are found two nations, France and Pakistan, who have been generally allied with the United States in the past, but are now pushing the ties of alliance aside in dealing with China. Their action may at once be a demonstration and a demand that American China policy be rethought if the U. S. is to aspire to widespread support in dealing with China. Perhaps the U. S. and others can learn something from the successful tactics of Burma and Cambodia which focus on giving full recognition to the Chinese aspirations for prestige, respect and consideration in world politics without sacrificing their own basic interest in security. It can be argued that U. S.-China policy at this stage serves mainly to antagonize the Chinese and at the same time lessen the confidence of much of the world in American judgment. If this is indeed the case, then the U. S. has truly maneuvered itself into a policy position that approaches the hopeless.

A final impression seems worth mentioning. In the chapters on African, Middle Eastern, and Yugoslavian policies one is forcefully reminded that all is not clear sailing for Chinese policy makers in the non-aligned world. While certain aspects of the Chinese way toward industrial and political stature in the international arena do attract followers in many places both at the official and revolutionary level, the articles highlight growing doubts in these areas concerning the desirability of becoming too closely involved with or dependent upon the Chinese. However, this may be only temporary comfort for the West if the situations in these areas deteriorate on the political and economic level. The articles make clear that Chinese have established the contacts and indicated the revolutionary desire to lead the non-white, poverty-punished areas of the world in the struggle against the white, increasingly affluent one-third of the rest of the world. Whether these desires will wax or wane may, in no small part, depend upon the policies from six continents toward China. In these terms the description, information and review of the past in this book should be a valuable addition to the necessary dialogue on China policy.—DeVere E. Pentony, *San Francisco State College.*

Neighbors Taken For Granted: Canada and the United States. Edited by Livingston T. Merchant. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. xv., 166. $4.95.)

Academicians concerned with United States' foreign policy have adopted the national habit of ignoring Canadian-American relations. This behavior is reflected in the paucity of our scholarly resources devoted to Canadian studies. Exceptions can be dispatched with alacrity: the University of Rochester, the Duke Commonwealth Center and perhaps three dozen or so Canadian oriented courses scattered across the country. Unfortunately, one book, or even a series (as the Carnegie Foundation volumes demonstrate), cannot fundamentally alter so ingrained a trait. Livingston T. Merchant, former Ambassador to Canada, however, has edited a collection of essays by newspapermen, government officials and a historian which attempts to start afresh at bridging the ignorance gap. Unlike many other such compilations, the bulk of these contributions are worthwhile especially those touching aspects of defense and economic relations.

The defense needs of the North American continent forged a partnership between Canada and the United States. Reduction of the tangible Soviet threat and changes in defense strategy have altered that association. General Charles Foulkes of Canada notes the strategic shift from manned bombers and the decreasing importance of radar networks in a missile age and wonders if Canada's voice will continue to be heard in mutual military affairs. Is Canada's ability to contribute obsolete? Can the Joint Command remain an effective body? Indeed, can Canada even defend herself without reliance upon the United States? Should the answers be in the negative, is there any significant role for Canada to play in continental defense?

Economic relations are undergoing a similar reappraisal for it is here that the American impact on Canada is felt most intensely. Since the mid-fifties, Canadians have been sorely troubled by the flow of American capital over the border. Michael Barkway, editor of Montreal's *Financial Times*, offers a strident, nationalistic argument contending that if this capital flow is not dammed in another decade there will be very little of Canada not owned by the United States. The statistics are always impressive. United States' firms control 70% of all Canadian oil and gas, mining and smelting plus 50% of all manufacturing. This economic penetration, benign in intention, is not without justification. Defending

American investment against criticism is Ivan White, former Minister to Canada, who cites the need for and advantages of this capital and also notes its slowing pace, both in absolute and relative terms. White even moves to the attack. Is the expense of maintaining a separate Canadian economy truly worth the cost? Is a $2,000 average annual wage differential between a citizen of Canada and his southern neighbor necessary? Must Canadian industry, lacking economies of scale and serving a small market, be protected while transportation costs mount as goods are shipped non-rationally parallel to the border rather than across it? These judgments are wisely left to the reader. However, the implicit suggestion of the value of a North American free trade zone should be made explicit. Canada and the United States are each other's best customer. A common market between them would give Canadian industry the benefit of a population ten times that of Canada while the United States, in return, could fairly expect to discuss the allocation of natural resources as a continental, rather than a national, problem. Although such discussion is anathema to Canadian nationalists who desire Canadian resources pledged to benefit Canada alone, it is not an unreasonable *quid pro quo*. Hydroelectric power, oil, natural gas and water already cross the border. Continentalization would only strengthen the partnership and the economies.

If the mutual and sorbering economic and defense problems of these giants are to be resolved with the least damage to the United States and to Canadian-American relations, the academic community of the United States must free itself of its traditional apathy with respect to Canada. Mutual policies of partnership must be analyzed, understood and furthered. At best, this book will spur academicians to counteract their habits. At worst, the essays will serve as useful bibliographic entries for the faithful few who already are aware of the significance of Canada for the United States.—J. RICHARD WAGNER, *University of Arizona.*

The Arab Cold War, 1958–1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics. BY MALCOLM KERR. (London, New York, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. viii, 139. 10s. 6d. net.)

Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World: (The Middle East and North Africa). BY HISHAM SHARABI. (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1966. Pp. iv, 176. $1.95, paper.)

Arab politics constitute the focus of both of these small, scholarly studies, but they differ in purpose and scope. Dr. Kerr's work does not represent exhaustive research, he states, but is an interpretive essay. He is primarily concerned with the idea of Arab unity in Arab politics from the formation of the United Arab Republic (1958) to the Arab Summit Conference (1964). Although this means that the scope of the study is limited in time and place, the broader implications of the formation and break-up of the United Arab Republic are also examined.

By contrast, Dr. Sharabi sets himself the admittedly ambitious goal of analyzing "the forces that have shaped contemporary Arab politics both in the Middle East and North Africa." Although one may wonder whether a scholarly but slender volume like this could really accomplish such a task, the author's high aim has not damaged the quality of his work. His intellectual boldness is matched by the excellence of his scholarship—he makes no claim to the completeness of his study.

The Arab Cold War, 1958–1964 starts with the Syrian-Egyptian union against the background of a brief but penetrating discussion of the relevant ideological-psychological as well as political forces, including the development of socialist and revolutionary ideas, anti-colonial sentiment, and the struggle of the Syrian Ba'th, the Communists and the army. The author challenges a common explanation that the Ba'th sought union with 'Abd al-Nāṣir to avert a Communist take-over, but his own explanation must be pieced together from scattered pages: Apparently the Syrians opted for union with Egypt in order to save themselves from "isolation" (p. 6), to prevent "anarchy" (p. 11), to rescue the government from its insecurity (p. 21), and to stimulate the overthrow of conservative regimes and bring such countries as Iraq into an Arab Union (p. 24). The reasons underlying the secession of Syria were also numerous and complex, including the dissatisfaction with Egypt of not only the very rich but also various other groups of people ranging from the businessman down to the ordinary shopkeeper. What was perhaps at the heart of the breakdown of the union was the failure of the Egyptians to provide for the Syrians "a field for effective political participation" (p. 33), although the Ba'th leaders also bungled the chances for unity.

In discussing political developments from the break-up of the union up to the beginning of the Cairo negotiations in March, 1963, Dr. Kerr outlines not only the Syrian and Egyptian reactions but also the basic tenets of 'Abd al-Nāṣir's "Arab Socialism" which manifested itself once the symbolic lure of "Arab Nationalism" had suffered from the first dismal experiment in Arab unity. The author perceptively observes that the ideological shift of emphasis from Arabism to Social-

ism was not merely a matter of doctrinal development but also a shrewd tactical move by the Egyptian leaders "to hold tenaciously to the initiative, [and] to counter-attack whenever in danger of being outmaneuvered and isolated within the Arab world" (p. 43). A similar realistic approach characterizes the treatment of the interesting Cairo negotiations for unity. The author probes beneath the facade of slogans and doctrinal pronuncements and reveals the real power, tactical and psychological considerations.

Dr. Kerr's realistic appraisal extends to the aftermath of the unity talks and the resulting Cairo agreement as well as the Cairo summit of January, 1964. Bickering and factional strifes characterized the relationship of Cairo with Damascus and Baghdad in the wake of the Cairo "agreement." And at the end of 1963 "more Arab states were at each other's throats at once than ever before" (p. 127). Of the thirteen members of the Arab League only three were on satisfactory terms and the most bitter quarrels were those between the revolutionary movements of Cairo and Damascus. The struggle between these two rivals finally plunged Syria into a new military dictatorship.

Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World ends on a somewhat similar note, although its conclusions transcend the fate of the Syrian regime. Dr. Sharabi seems to lament the failure of the Arab revolution to humanize politics and "to serve those it aimed to uplift." But his real concern is with the analysis of forces influencing Arab politics rather than with the evaluation of Arab regimes. Islam and "colonial domination" are two of the most important forces, although only the general features of Islam are outlined. European domination, particularly by the British and French, is treated in detail as it profoundly influenced "the Arab world's political character and institutions in modern times" (p. 23). With the end of this domination came the emergence of four "systems of power" (the preface mentions only three) in terms of the various kinds of colonial experience, and "sources and claims to legitimation." These are the *patriarchal system*, the *"palace" system*, the *multiparty system*, and the *single-party system*. The author also takes up coups d'etat and their far-reaching and adverse implications for parliamentary democracy. He concludes justifiably that the seizure of power by the military has not been followed by any real politicization of personalistic military rule which is devoid of any institutional base for "orderly transition of power" (p. 65). The Arab states are also classified into the *revolutionary* and *monarchical* groups, as well as an *intermediate* one. The 1949–1958 period was characterized by coups d'etat while the 1960's have been marked by doctrinal and practical manifestations of "socialism and revolution."

Socialism and revolution are brilliantly examined not only as ideologies but also as forces influencing Arab political behavior. The revolutionary states such as Egypt and Algeria still uphold Arab nationalism but emphasize radical social and economic change. Egypt, for example, has nationalized all banks, insurance companies, transportation lines, etc. The ideology of Arab socialism, however, seems "to owe more to Proudhon than to Marx, to British socialism than to Communism" (p. 68).

Both comparativists and area specialists should find these books useful not only for their scholarly contributions but also as welcome teaching aids. *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World* in particular fills a real gap in teaching materials on contemporary Arab politics; its chapter on "The Language of Politics" and especially its documentary material—most of which appears in English in this book for the first time—are very useful indeed.—ROUHOLLAH K. RAMAZANI, *University of Virginia.*

The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs: American Educational and Cultural Policy Abroad. By CHARLES FRANKEL. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution. 1965. Pp. xi, 156. $5.00.)

Professor Frankel examines the educational and cultural policy of the United States in a descriptive study which outlines institutional arrangements and appraises current practice. The author notes the quickening tempo of exchange activities due to improved communications which makes possible the existence of a real international intellectual forum. The increased demand for exchange is also found to be due in part to the technological and skilled manpower needs of developing areas.

The study declares that on the whole instrumentalities developed by the government to meet existent needs are "less of a forethought than a series of afterthoughts" (p. 5). The administrative structure is a complicated one in which policy implementation and decision making are shared by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development and a host of other federal agencies. The worst feature of this unwieldy structure is that U.S.I.A. has a mission to promote the foreign policy of the United States, but is not a part of the Department of State, whereas educational and cultural affairs which should transcend the day to day pressures brought to bear on foreign policy are located inside of the

Department of State (p. 29). The writer finds that educational and cultural programs have long range objectives which prevent their fitting into annual country plans. Such programs are also weakened by close identification with diplomacy and propaganda.

The monograph under review does have some methodological problems. The writer interviewed over three hundred individuals, but the twelve countries from which the respondents originate are hardly representative of either major geographic areas or cultures. Statistical descriptions of official American personnel engaged in educational and cultural affairs activities are based on files that "were made available," which tells the reader little of the representative quality of the data or the manner in which the files were selected. However, this is a most useful, informative and thoughtful study.

Professor Frankel is perhaps at his best in Chapter IV which contains an excellent account of communications between American and foreign intellectuals. He speaks particularly to social scientists in describing the impact of behavioral studies on the academic community abroad. This section is essential reading for anyone planning to teach or to conduct research outside of the United States.

In conclusion the author calls attention to the need for focusing and upgrading the proliferated educational and cultural affairs program. He prescribes the strengthening of the position of the cultural affairs officer. The role of academics and private agencies would also be increased by the creation of a semi-autonomous foundation for educational and cultural exchange composed of government agencies, universities, and learned societies. Professor Frankel maintains that responsibility for educational and cultural affairs should be placed under the Department of State rather than U.S.I.A. and that an office of Under-Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs should be created. Since the publication of this work the author has become Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. The reviewer wishes him luck in the operationalization of his study.—ROBERT E. CLUTE, *The University of Georgia.*

Outlook on Space. BY F. T. EVANS AND H. T. HOWARD. (New York: Hillary House Publishers Ltd., 1965. Pp. 175. $5.50.)

This little book is an excellent approach to the general problem of outer space. It falls into two parts. The first 115 pages deal with the astrophysical aspects of space, while the second part is concerned with the international scene—law in a new dimension, the national past, and the international future. The appendix includes, inter alia, a planetary table, the structure of the United Nations, various documents, as well as tables of space probes and satellites. The book is written in a popular style, and is clearly directed more towards the general reader than the scientist or space expert.

It is pointed out that the present aims and methods of space scientists and engineers are firmly based on the experience of the past, and that they have grown out of traditional astronomy and rocket technology. At the same time, and in response to the advancing technology, international organizations have been growing both in scale and effectiveness in spite of a chaotic world of sovereign national states.

In this age it is very clear that human activity in all its aspects cannot be contained within respective national frontiers, but tend to spill over into regional and universal space, as the nature of a given activity may require. Thus the genius of inventiveness and the power of scientific knowledge must in time cause the boundaries of nations to blur more and more as functional international organizations, both regional and universal, are made necessary.

In dealing with international law, in part two of the book, the authors contend that "so far no body of international Space Law exists" (p. 120). This may be true in a very narrow sense, but it would seem to the present reviewer that the statement is too categorical and in need of some modification. The Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which was accepted unanimously by that body on December 20, 1961, is cited by the authors on p. 121, but declared not to be law, "but merely an agreement, between those countries only which are members of the U. N. and which are accordingly bound by the U. N. Charter."

The present reviewer wishes respectively to point out that it is not necessary for an agreement to include all the states in the world to be binding international law. Furthermore, as the authors admit, the states party to the Resolution "are accordingly bound by the U. N. Charter." It might be pointed out also that on December 19, 1962, a second resolution (U. N. Doc. A/5341, Resolution 1802, XVII) on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space was adopted by the General Assembly, stressing further elaboration of legal principles governing activities of states in outer space. It is of course true that as to the legal value of General Assembly resolutions there is *divided opinion* among authorities, but it is precisely for this reason that categorical statements regarding this matter should be avoided. In a paper presented before

the Second World Conference on World Peace Through Law held in Washington in September of 1965, Professor Ivan A. Vlasic had this to say: "The requirements and speed in man's activities in space are such that the world community has in many instances no alternative to accepting the U. N. resolutions as the appropriate channel for setting standards of conduct in this new medium. Whether one characterizes these resolutions as merely providing evidence of customary law or as *law creating*, their effect in practice is the same."

Inasmuch as this rather small volume attempts "to sketch the development both of space travel and internationalism" it is not to be expected that the whole of the argument could have been presented. This book, not intended for specialists in science and law, is a charming introduction to the relationship between space research and international organization.—OSCAR SVARLIEN, *University of Florida.*

Politics, International Relations and Law: Scope, Methodology and Classification. BY GIRJA KUMAR. (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965. Distributed by Taplinger Publishing Company. Pp. xxiii, 209. $10.25.)

Chiefly a critique of existing schemes of library classification as they are applied to political science, with tentative elaboration of a new classification schedule based on the postulational approach of the Indian librarian, S. R. Ranganathan.—C.B.

NEWS AND NOTES

The sixty-third Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 5–9, 1967 at the Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago.

NATIONAL OFFICE'S CHANGE OF ADDRESS

The American Political Science Association's national office has moved to its new quarters in the Political Science Building. Henceforth all correspondence to the Executive Director, officers, and staff should be addressed to:

The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

New officers of the Southern Political Science Association are: Preston W. Edsall, North Carolina State University, president; Gladys M. Kammer, University of Florida, president-elect; and S. Sidney Ulmer, University of Kentucky, vice president and program chairman for the 1967 annual meeting. Other members of the program committee are Donald R. Matthews, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and John T. Dorsey, Jr., Vanderbilt University. The 1967 meeting will be held in New Orleans, November 2, 3 and 4.

At the first meeting of the Central States Conference on Public Administration, held October 21–22, 1966 in Kansas City, George J. Mauer, Oklahoma State University, was chosen president-elect. The Oklahoma chapter of the ASPA presented a program on "The Association of Central Oklahoma Governments: An Experiment in Intergovernmental Relations."

The American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy elected the following officers at its annual meeting in September: Jerome Hall, Indiana University, president; John Rawls, Harvard University, vice president; John Lewis, Oberlin, vice president; John Ladd, Brown University, secretary-treasurer.

The International Studies Association will hold its eighth annual national convention on April 14–15 on the Washington Square campus of the New York University in Manhattan. Those planning to attend should communicate with Vincent Davis, Executive Secretary, ISA National Office, University of Denver, Denver, Colorado 80210.

The Midwest Conference of Political Scientists will hold its 25th annual meeting on April 27–29 at the Memorial Union, Purdue University, Lafayette, Indiana.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The Public Affairs Conference Center was transferred from the University of Chicago to Kenyon College in September, 1966. ROBERT GOLDWIN, Kenyon College, has been appointed director.

Harvard University on October 17, 1966, changed the name of its Graduate School of Public Administration to the John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government. At the same time it created within the School an Institute of Politics to be supported by an endowment to be provided by the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, Inc. RICHARD E. NEUSTADT has been named director of the Institute.

The Australian National University invites applications for its scholarships in political science, including public administration. Applicants should be postgraduate students with a capacity for research. Scholars will normally enroll for a Ph.D. degree, the course for which extends over

three years. An award is initially made for two years, but will be normally extended for the whole period of the approved course. The basic scholarship allowance is $A2330 per annum. Marrried scholars with dependent children receive additional allowances. Fares to and from Canberra are paid.

Application forms and further particulars are available from the University. Applications should reach the University by April 30, 1967. Scholarships may be taken up at any time after the award, subject to agreement by the head of the department. Interested persons should write to D. K. R. Hodgkin, Registrar, Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University, Box 4, P.O. Canberra, A.C.T. Australia.

The editorial staff of the forthcoming new journal, *General Politics Quarterly* include the following: JOHN E. WESTBURG, St. Ambrose College, editor; JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER, University of Iowa, JOHN B. MCCONNAUGHY, University of South Carolina; URBAN G. WHITAKER, San Francisco State College; RITA KAPOOR BRICKSIN, St. Ambrose College, associate editors.

For the twentieth consecutive year, the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, will hold a summer institute in survey research techniques. The 1967 institute will be presented in two four-week sessions, the first from June 28 to July 21 and the second from July 24 to August 18. The sessions may be taken independently or successively. For further information write to the Survey Research Center, The University of Michigan, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

The first issue of *Metropolitan Viewpoints*, published by the Graduate School of Public Affairs, SUNY, appeared on August 1, 1966.

The Institute of Government and Public Affairs of the University of Illinois and the Department of Political Science at Chicago Circle, held an Assembly on the State and its Cities, December 8–10, 1966.

In cooperation with the American Political Science Association, the Illinois Legislative Council held a conference for newly elected members of the Illinois General Assembly at the University of Illinois conference center, November 30–December 1, 1966. SAMUEL K. GOVE, Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, served as consultant to the Association in preparing for the meeting.

ELTON ATWATER, Pennsylvania State University, was on research leave during the fall term. He is also administering a U.N. internship project at the university.

ROBERT BERDAHL, San Francsico State College, served as research consultant with the American Council on Education in Washington, D.C. during the fall term.

PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK, University of South Carolina, was the 1966 recipient of the Russell Creative Research award in the Humanities given annually by the University.

DONALD C. BLAISDELL, City College of CUNY, is a trustee of the Overseas Education Fund of the League of Women Voters.

BERNARD C. BORNING, University of Idaho, will conduct an NDEA Civics Institute for secondary school teachers on the Idaho campus this summer.

PAUL R. BRASS, University of Washington, is doing research in India during 1966–67, under a grant from the American Institute of Indian Studies and the American Council of Learned Societies.

DONALD CASTLEBERRY has resumed his duties at San Francisco State College after spending 1965–66 in Sweden where he was resident director of the California State Colleges International Program.

RICHARD C. COLLINS, Seattle University, has taken a year's leave of absence to serve as associate director of the U. S. Civil Service Commission's Executive Seminar Center in Berkeley.

GEORGE A. CONDON, Washington State University, spent the summer acting as legislative assistant to the governor of Washington.

EDMOND COSTANTINI, University of California at Davis, served during the autumn term as educational secretary to the governor of California.

FRANK C. DARLING, University of Colorado, has returned after a Fulbright lecture grant to the Philippines. He lectured on American foreign policy in Singapore, Malaysia, Great Britain and Western Germany.

HENRY DAVID, National Science Foundation, has been appointed Executive Secretary of the Division of Behavioral Sciences of the National Research Council.

JOHN A. DAVIS, City College, CUNY, is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations; is the editor of *African Forum*, a new magazine which began publication in 1965; and was co-chairman of the U. S. Committee of UNESCO for the first World Festival of Negro Arts, held in Dakar in April, 1966.

TED DIAMOND has been appointed counsel to a commissioner of the N. Y. City Department of Parks.

JACK D. POWELL, Washington State University, is spending a sabbatical leave at Stanford University.

ALEX N. DRAGNICH, Vanderbilt University, was elected president of the Southern Conference of Slavic Studies at the annual meeting in October. He spent the summer of 1966 in Yugoslavia doing research.

ELLIOTT P. FAGERBERG, Graduate Institute of International Studies of the University of Geneva and the European Division of the University of Maryland, is doing research at the Mershon Center for Education in National Security, the Ohio State University.

JOHN FERGUSON is on leave from the Pennsylvania State University during 1966–67. Part of his time is spent as senior political scientist for the Joint State Government Commission, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

MARGUERITE J. FISHER, Syracuse University, presented a paper at the U. N. Conference on National Development and the Status of Women in Asia in December. The conference was in the Philippines.

GERALD FRIEDBERY, University of California, was on autumn research leave.

FRED GANTT, JR., North Texas State University, will do research during the summer of 1967 under a university faculty grant.

EDWARD B. GLICK, Temple University, conducted research in Panama and El Salvador during the past summer under grants from the Office of Naval Research and Temple University.

RUDOLPH GOMEZ, Colorado College, will spend the summer and fall of 1967 as Fulbright lecturer at the Catholic and San Marcos Universities in Lima, Peru.

HARRY A. GREEN, formerly deputy director, Division of Economic Opportunity, Office of the Governor of Florida, has been named special assistant in the Department of Housing and Urban Welfare.

CLARKE HAGENSICK, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, served on the Wisconsin Governor's Committee on Improved Expenditure Management in the summer of 1966.

CHARLES M. HARDIN, University of California at Davis, was on autumn research leave.

CHARLES A. HOLLISTER, Bucknell University, was on leave during the fall term.

JOHN E. HORNER, U. S. Department of State, is "diplomat in residence" at Tulane University during 1966–67 and is attached to the political science department.

CLYDE JACOBS, University of California at Davis, was on leave during the fall and winter terms.

GEORGE MCT. KAHIN, Cornell University, is on sabbatical leave during 1966–67.

LADIS K. D. KRISTOF, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, presented a paper at the First International Congress of Balkan Studies in Sofia during the summer of 1966.

JOHN C. LANE, SUNY at Buffalo, spent a sabbatical leave in England and East Germany during the fall term.

GERARD J. MANGONE, Syracuse University, will be on leave in Washington, D. C. during the spring term.

DAVID S. MCLELLAN, University of California at Riverside, will be on leave through 1968 and will serve as director of the University of California Study Center at Bordeaux, France.

GLENN G. MORGAN, San Jose State College, spent a month in the Soviet Union. He is on leave during 1966–67 under a grant from the American Council of Learned Societies.

BENJAMIN NIMER, The George Washington University, was on leave during the autumn term. He also conducted research in Western Europe during the summer.

JOHN R. OWENS, University of California at Davis, was on research leave during the fall and winter terms.

JULIUS PAUL, research political scientist in the Division of Neuropsychiatry, Walter Reed Army Institute of Research, has been appointed by the mayor of Rockville, Md., to the city's Human Relations Commission.

THOMAS PAYNE, University of Montana, served as resource person for the American Broadcasting System in Helena on election night in November.

ROBERT PFALTZGRAFF, Seton Hall University, has been appointed to the Board of Editors, *Journal of European Affairs*.

DON C. PIPER, University of Maryland, received one of the University's ten "Excellence in Teaching" awards for 1966.

ELMER PLISCHKE, University of Maryland, was on sabbatical leave during the fall term.

BHAGWATI P. K. PODDAR, currently in India on a research grant from the Relm Foundation, is assisting in revising the political science program at the Indian Institute of Technology, New Delhi.

PAUL F. POWER, University of Cincinnati, did research in India while on leave of absence during the fall term.

RAYMOND L. RANDALL, Indiana University, has been appointed director of the Institutional and Social Service, Office of Technical Cooperation and Research, AID.

MELVIN RICHTER, Hunter College, has been awarded the Conference on British Studies prize for his book, *The Politics of Conscience: T. H. Green and His Age.*

ROBERT S. ROBINS, Tulane University, served as director of Duke University's Summer Institute on Southern Asia, 1966.

DONALD B. ROSENTHAL, SUNY at Buffalo, is on leave during 1966–67 and is studying at the University of Chicago under the auspices of the Ford Foundation.

DONALD S. ROTHCHILD, University of California, is on leave during the current academic year and is teaching at the University College, Nairobi, Kenya, as a field representative of the Rockefeller Foundation.

H. PIERRE SECHER, Western Reserve University, was on research leave during the fall term.

JEROME N. SLATER, SUNY at Buffalo, will be on leave spring and summer terms to conduct research in Washington, D. C. under an SSRC grant.

HERBERT J. SPIRO, University of Pennsylvania, attended a Round Table on "Government and Politics of Economic Organizations" of ISPA in Warsaw, Poland. He also attended a conference on "Theory and Practice of Political Development" at the Brookings Institution. He gave papers at both conferences.

HAROLD STANLEY THAMES, North Texas State University, conducted research at the United Nations during the summer of 1966 under a university grant.

ELLIS WALDRON, University of Montana, and BOYD A. MARTIN, University of Idaho, were director and associate director, respectively, of a joint Montana-Idaho Assembly on State Legislatures in December. Some sixty interested persons from the two states considered various recommendations aimed at improving the functioning of state legislatures in the light of reapportionment.

RICHARD L. WALKER has returned to his post at the University of South Carolina, after spending the year in Taiwan.

HERBERT WALTZER, Miami University (Ohio), was invited to return to CBS during the week of the November elections to continue a study of the impact of television on the election.

WILLIAM V. WEBER, Western Michigan University, has been elected to the Michigan State House of Representatives.

STAFF CHANGES

NEW APPOINTMENTS

ALVIN A. ABBOTT, assistant professor, Wisconsin State University at Stevens Point; formerly of Central Michigan University.

JAMES CARL AKINS, assistant professor, University of Houston.

JAMES E. ANDERSON, associate professor, University of Houston; formerly of Wake Forest College.

THOMAS J. ANTON, professor, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle.

DOUGLAS ASHFORD, associate professor, Cornell University.

DAVID BARNEY, lecturer, University of California at Davis.

ASKOE K. BASU, assistant professor, University of Southern California.

SYLAN M. BERMAN, associate professor, Institute of International Law and Relations, The Catholic University of America.

PAUL W. BOEYINK, lecturer, San Jose State College.

A. STEPHEN BOYAN, assistant professor, Pennsylvania State University; formerly of the University of Chicago.

STEPHEN N. BRYANT, instructor, North Texas State University, 1966–67.

DOUGLAS P. BWY, assistant professor, Western Reserve University.

WALLACE F. CALDWELL, associate professor, Washington State University; formerly of Kansas State University.

IRA CARMEN, associate professor, Coe College; formerly of Ball State University.

DAVID N. CHAMBERLIN, assistant professor, Kansas State University.

PETER CHENG, associate professor, University of Nebraska.

DAVID E. CLARKE, associate professor, Western Washington State College; formerly of the University of Alaska.

LOUELLYN COHAN, lecturer and post-graduate research political scientist, University of California at Davis.

GENEVIEVE COLLINS LINEBARGER, lecturer, University of Maryland, 1966–67.

JETT B. CONNER, instructor, North Texas State University, 1966–67.

DONALD DAHLIN, assistant professor, University of South Dakota.

THEODORE DENNO, lecturer, University of Southern California; formerly of San Diego State College.

ROBERT DELORME, assistant professor, California State College, Long Beach.

ERNEST R. DEPROSPO, JR., instructor, Pennsylvania State University.

KARL W. DEUTSCH, professor, Harvard University.

ELDON EISENACH, assistant professor, Pennsylvania State University; formerly of the University of California.

GORDON H. EVANS, assistant professor, SUNY, New Paltz.

EDWARD L. FARLEY, instructor, University of Houston.

YALE FERGUSON, instructor, Newark College of Arts and Sciences, Rutgers.

STEPHEN FRASER, assistant professor, San Francisco State College.

RICHARD W. GABLE, professor and research political scientist, Institute of Governmental Affairs, University of California at Davis.

WILLIAM R. GARNER, associate professor, Southern Illinois University; formerly of North Texas State University.

HARVEY R. GLASSEN, instructor, University of Massachusetts at Boston.

ROBERT GOLDWIN, associate professor, Kenyon College.

DONALD GREGORY, instructor, North Texas State University, 1966–67.

KENNETH W. GRUNDY, associate professor, Western Reserve University; formerly of San Fernando Valley State College.

ANDREW GYORGY, professor, Institute for Sino-Soviet Study, George Washington University; formerly of Boston University; Sept. 1966.

KENNETH I. HANF, acting assistant professor, University of California at Davis.

DAVID K. HART, assistant professor, San Francisco State College.

FREDERICK H. HARTMANN, special advisor to the president of the Naval War College and the first occupant of the newly created permanent Alfred Thayer Mahan Chair of Maritime Strategy.

MARGARET HAUPT, assistant professor, Coe College.

DONALD C. HELLMAN, associate professor, joint appointment in political science and the Far Eastern Institute, University of Washington, September, 1967.

CALVIN HIBNER, University of Utah.

RUBEN J. DEHOYOS, Wisconsin State University at Oshkosh.

E. TERRENCE JONES, assistant professor, Kansas State University; formerly of Georgetown University.

RONALD D. JONES, associate professor, School of Business and Public Administration, University of Missouri at Kansas City; formerly of the RAND Corporation.

RUTH JONES, instructor, Kansas State University.

ROBERT DALE JUDY, assistant professor, North Texas State University.

GEORGE KACEWICZ, assistant professor, California State College, Long Beach.

LINDSAY KEFFER, instructor, North Texas State University, 1966–67.

ELDON G. KENWORTHY, assistant professor, Cornell University; formerly of Yale University.

HONG NACK KIM, assistant professor, North Texas State University.

RICHARD J. LANDRY, instructor, Cornell University.

ROBERT LAPORTE, JR., assistant professor, Pennsylvania State University; formerly of Syracuse University.

MICHAEL LAWRENCE, assistant professor, De Pauw University; formerly of the University of Chicago.

ROBERT D. LEE, JR., assistant professor, Pennsylvania State University; formerly of Harvard University.

WILLIAM LEITER, assistant professor, California State College, Long Beach.

CHRISTOPHER LEU, lecturer, University of California at Davis.

ORMA LINFORD, assistant professor, Kansas State University; formerly of Wisconsin State University, Kenosha.

PETER C. LODER, instructor, Bucknell University.

DAVID W. LUBKERT, instructor, San Jose State College.

O. G. A. MASTROIANNI, instructor, Augusta College.

R. D. MCLAURIN, instructor, Merrimack College.

RUTH T. MCVEY, lecturer, Cornell University.

VERNON C. MECHTENSHEIMER, assistant professor, Madison College.

LAWRENCE C. MEYER, assistant professor, California State College, Fullerton; formerly of the University of Texas.

ROBERT MIEWALD, assistant professor, California State College, Long Beach.

GEORGE MODELSKI, professor, University of Washington, formerly of the Australian National University.

ROBERT MOLLAN, University of Utah.

JOHN D. MOLLOY, assistant professor, Michigan State University; formerly of the University of Cincinnati.

W. EDMUND MOOMAW, assistant professor, Eastern Kentucky University.

RICHARD W. MURRAY, instructor, University of Houston.

THOMAS P. MURPHY, professor and director of Public Administration, University of Missouri at Kansas City; formerly of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

DAVID A. NICHOLS, instructor, University of Massachusetts at Boston.

CATHERINE D. PAPASTATHOPOULOS, research associate, Institute of Public Administration, University of Michigan.

JACK W. PELTASON, Chancellor, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, July, 1967; formerly Vice-Chancellor for Academic Affairs, University of California, Irvine.

O. WILLIAM PERLMUTTER, professor, SUNY at Albany; formerly of Kent State University.

KEITH S. PETERSON, associate professor, North Carolina State College.

AMIR RAFAT, associate professor, DePauw University; formerly of Kent State University.

KNUD RASMUSSEN, associate professor, Clark University; formerly of Colgate University.

DAVID RICCI, assistant professor, Pennsylvania State University; formerly of Harvard University.

LINDA RICHTER, instructor, Kansas State University.

WILLIAM L. RICHTER, assistant professor, Kansas State University; formerly of the University of Hawaii.

WINSTON W. RIDDICK, assistant professor, Louisana State University.

O. ZELLER ROBERTSON, assistant professor, University of South Dakota.

EVAN D. ROGERS, instructor, Washington State University; formerly of the University of Minnesota.

ARNOLD A. ROGOW, professor, City College, CUNY.

RICHARD ROSE, professor, Strathclyde University, Glasgow, Scotland; formerly of Manchester University.

ARTHUR W. ROVINE, assistant professor, Cornell University.

LEONAS SABALIUNAS, assistant professor, Eastern Michigan University.

GUENTHER SCHAEFER, assistant professor, San Francisco State College.

WILLIAM A. SCHULTZE, assistant professor, Kansas State University; formerly of Valparaiso University.

PHILIP SIEGELMAN, associate professor, San Francisco State College.

JOHN W. SLOAN, instructor, North Texas State University.

JEFFREY A. SPENCER, instructor, Illinois Wesleyan University.

EMIL STARR, associate professor, University of Massachusetts at Boston; formerly Regional Director for the Foreign Policy Association.

DAVID STEINICHE, instructor, DePauw University.

PAUL R. Tennant, assistant professor, the University of British Columbia.

ANNE THOMPSON FERARU, assistant professor, California State College at Fullerton; formerly of the University of Hawaii.

THOMAS LANDON THORSON, associate professor, University of Toronto.

GLEN E. THUROW, instructor, Bucknell University.

IVAN VOLGYES, instructor, University of Nebraska.

JOAN WADLOW, assistant professor, University of Nebraska.

MARY JUNE WALL, assistant professor, Madison College.

JERRY WEAVER, assistant professor, California State College, Long Beach.

BERNARD WEINER, assistant professor, Western Washington State College; formerly of San Diego State College.

HERBERT G. WILCOX, assistant professor, California State College at Fullerton; formerly of St. Johns University.

FREEMAN J. WRIGHT, assistant professor, Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Quito, Ecuador; formerly of Fresno State College.

RICHARD F. WRIGHT, instructor, University of Montana, 1966–67.

JON A. YINGER, assistant professor, California State College at Fullerton; formerly of San Bernadino Valley College.

MATTHEW ZUCKERBRAUN, Lafayette College.

VISITING APPOINTMENTS (1966–67)

KENNETH G. ARMSTRONG, University of Melbourne: Carnegie Fellow, 1967, and research associate, fall term, 1967, Cornell University.

PAUL C. BARTHOLOMEW, University of Notre Dame: professor, National University of Ireland, University College, Dublin, January–June, 1967.

WILLIAM J. BLOCK, North Carolina State University: professor, Duke University, fall, 1966–67.

TAO CHENG, assistant professor, Pennsylvania State University.

JOHN H. FERGUSON, Pennsylvania State University: professor, University of Pennsylvania.

ANDREW GYORGY, professor, University of Arizona, spring, 1966.

KLAUS J. HERRMANN, Sir George Williams University: professor, Hochschule für Politische Wissenschaften, Munich; lecturer, Julius Maximilians University of Wuerzburg, summer, 1966.

ANTHONY KING, University of Essex: professor, University of Wisconsin, spring, 1967.

MORTON KROLL, University of Washington: professor, University of West Indies, Jamaica, 1966–67.

RICHARD H. LEACH, Duke University: professor, North Carolina State University, spring, 1966.

AVERY LEISERSON, Vanderbilt University: professor, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi, 1966–67.

LOUIS S. LOEB, American University: lecturer, University of California at Davis.

GRANT MCCONNELL, University of Chicago: professor, University of Washington, spring, 1967.

ANDREW MILNOR, Boston University: assistant professor, Cornell University.

CHESTER A. NEWLAND, North Texas State University: professor, University of Southern California.

ROBERT E. O'BRIEN, lecturer, Pennsylvania State University.

LINCOLN SMITH, New York University: professor, University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, N.B., summer, 1966.

HAROLD M. VINACKE, lecturer, Miami University (Ohio), spring, 1967.

D. J. WENDEN, Oxford University: professor, San Francisco State College.

OTHER APPOINTMENTS

BURTON R. BRAZIL, San Jose State College: acting dean, School of Humanities and Arts, fall term, 1966.

EDWARD H. BUEHRIG, Indiana University: acting chairman, 1966–67.

J. W. BRADURY, Southern Colorado State College: associate professor and assistant to the president of the university; formerly of the U. S. Air Forces Systems Command.

DONALD BRANDON, University of San Francisco: chairman.

BYRUM E. CARTER, Indiana University: dean, College of Arts and Sciences.

JAMES W. DAVIS, Central Michigan University: chairman; formerly of St. Cloud State College.

MARIO EINAUDI, Cornell University: director, Center for International Studies.

JOSEPH HAJDA, Kansas State University: director of International Activities.

HORACE V. HARRISON, University of Maryland: acting head, fall term, 1966–67.

FERREL HEADY, University of New Mexico: academic vice-president; formerly of the University of Michigan.

BERNARD HENNESSEY, Pennsylvania State University: professor and chairman.

MARY EVELYN HUEY, North Texas State University: director, Joint University Community Services Center, 1966–67.

H. W. KAMP, North Texas State University: chairman.

JAMES KESSLER, Indiana University: acting director, Institute of Public Administration, replacing York Willbern during 1966–67.

HAROLD M. KLEIN, Rutgers: extension associate, Bureau of Government Research.

LEE LAYPORT, Santa Ana College: chairman, Division of Social Sciences, January 1, 1967.

CHARLES G. MAYO, University of Southern California: assistant professor and associate dean of the Graduate School; formerly of San Francisco State College.

RAYMOND A. MOORE, University of Southern California: director of graduate studies, Department of International Studies.

WILLIAM L. MORROW, DePauw University: acting chairman.

STEVEN MULLER, Cornell University: vice-president for Public Affairs.

ELINOR OSTROM, Indiana University: graduate advisor, Department of Government.

ROLAND I. PERUSSE, Inter-American University, San Jose, P. R.: chairman and director of Inter-American Studies.

SAMUEL R. SOLOMON, Eastern Michigan University: chairman.

MATTHEW C. STEWART, associate director, Institute of International Studies, University of South Carolina.

JOSEPH L. SUTTON, Indiana University: dean of the Faculties.

CLARENCE E. THURBER, University of Oregon: professor and deputy director, Institute of International Studies and Overseas Administration; formerly of Pennsylvania State University.

DONALD E. WEATHERBEE, University of South Carolina: director of undergraduate studies, Department of International Studies.

JOSEPH WOODKA, Wisconsin State University at Stevens Point: professor and chairman; formerly of Central Michigan University.

MARVIN ZETTERBAUM, University of California at Davis: associate professor and chairman.

PROMOTIONS (with new rank)

DEAN ALFANGE, JR., Lafayette College, assistant professor.

RAMON ARANGO, Kenyon College, associate professor.

WILLIAM C. BAUM, Grand Valley State College: associate professor.

LAWTON E. BENNETT, North Carolina State University, assistant professor.

JOHN P. BRADLEY, North Texas State University: associate professor.

WARNER O. CHAPMAN, Indiana University: professor.

IRA S. COHEN, California State College, Long Beach: associate professor.

MORRIS H. COHEN, Clark University, professor.

RICHARD R. FAGEN, Stanford University, associate professor.

GLENN W. FISHER, University of Illinois, professor.

GARLAND FOTHERGILL, Wisconsin State University at Stevens Point, professor.

JACK B. GABBERT, Washington State University, associate professor.

FRED GANTT, North Texas State University, professor.

JOHN H. GILBERT, North Carolina State University, assistant professor.

BATES M. GILLIAM, Virginia Military Institute, professor and colonel.

EDWARD M. GOLDBERG, California State College at Los Angeles, associate professor.

E. RAY GRIFFIN, North Texas State University, associate professor.

MILTON HOBBS, Indiana University, associate professor.

MARY EVELYN HUEY, North Texas State University, professor.

LEE R KERSCHNER, California State College at Fullerton, associate professor.

YOUNGNOK KOO, Eastern Michigan University, assistant professor.

MARCELINO MIYARES, St. Procopius College, assistant professor.

BERNARD S. MORRIS, Indiana University, professor.

DONALD C. MUNDINGER, Valparaiso University, professor.

HANS RIDDER, California State College, Long Beach, assistant professor.

LEROY N. RIESELBACH, Indiana University, associate professor.

EDGAR L. SHOR, Colgate University, professor.

WILLIAM J. SIFFIN, Indiana University, professor.

CRODELL A. SMITH, North Texas State College, associate professor.

RICHARD C. SPENCER, Coe College, professor emeritus.

THOR SWANSON, Washington State University, professor.

WOODWORTH G. THROMBLEY, Indiana University, associate professor.

THOMAS P. TROMBETAS, California State College at Long Beach, associate professor.

WALTER F. WEIKER, Newark College of Arts and Sciences, Rutgers, associate professor.

RESIGNATIONS AND RETIREMENTS

HOUSTON I. FLOURNOY has resigned from Pomona College to assume the post of State Controller for the State of California.

GILBERT Y. STEINER, University of Illinois, has resigned to accept a position as Senior Associate at the Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.

HARRY W. VOLTMER has retired as professor and head of the department at De Pauw University. He will continue to teach on a part-time basis.

IN MEMORIAM

PETER H. ODEGARD, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, and a former President of the American Political Association, died suddenly in Berkeley on December 7, 1966.

He was a distinguished scholar and practitioner of politics, a gracious colleague, superb teacher, and inventive government official. In his lifetime he combined two attributes—political commitment and scholarly detachment—which, when thus fused, mark the rare civilized practitioner of our profession. His career as scholar and teacher spanned four decades; it spanned also a wide range of American colleges and universities. His colleagues and former students are ubiquitous and legion. He was concerned for the quality of American liberal education, and this was especially manifest in his intense conviction that the teaching of politics was necessarily both a scientific and a civic enterprise. From his father, a Norwegian immigrant and Socialist, he inherited a deep concern for social reform. In politics a liberal democrat, he held deep and sometimes passionate convictions—and these with human warmth rather than humorless dogmatism. His affection for people extended to those with whom he strongly disagreed, and among his close friends were many of these.

Born in Montana in 1901 of Norwegian immigrant parents, Odegard studied at the University of Washington where he was influenced by Vernon L. Parrington and J. Allen Smith. At Columbia University, where he received his doctorate and taught in the Department of Public Law and

Government, he studied under John Dewey, Thomas Reed Powell, Arthur MacMahon, and Lindsay Rogers. Afterwards he taught at Williams College (1928–1930), Ohio State University (1930–1938), Stanford University (1934), Amherst College (1938–1945), and the University of California (1948–1966). For three years (1945–1948) he served as President of Reed College. He held honorary degrees from Amherst College; Oriel College, Oxford University; Ohio State University; the University of Pittsburgh; and the University of Montana. His public service in national and state affairs included work with the U. S. Secretary of the Treasury; the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission; the President's Commission on Migratory Labor; and the National Commission for UNESCO. His candidacies for the Democratic nominations for the California Lieutenant-Governorship and the U. S. Senate were pressed unsuccessfully by California liberals in 1954 and 1958. To many million Americans in the early 1960's, Professor Odegard's popular, nationally televised "Continental Classroom" served as a first systematic introduction to American government and politics.

Professor Odegard's influence in American higher education was pervasive and intangible; the warm enthusiasm and vigor which he brought to all things touched colleagues and students alike. While chairman of the Berkeley Political Science Department between 1948 and 1956, he raised its quality in large measure by undogmatic respect for, and encouragement of, the quality of intellect, irrespective of methodological differences; if this Department continues today, as it does, to embrace a catholic and excellent representation of viewpoints of our discipline, this legacy is owed in the first instance to him.

PAUL SEABURY
University of California, Santa Cruz

STANLEY KUHL HORNBECK, widely respected for his contributions to the literature on the Far East and on international legal subjects, died in Washington, D. C., on December 10, 1966. His long public career brought him to prominence as a major policy counselor, particularly on Far Eastern diplomacy in the Department of State from 1928 to 1944, and culminated with his service for three years thereafter as ambassador to the Netherlands.

Born in Franklin, Massachusetts, on May 4, 1883, he earned B.A. degrees from the University of Denver and from Oxford (at the latter as Rhodes Scholar from 1904–07) and the Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin. He taught in colleges in China and at Wisconsin, Michigan, and Harvard. His varied career brought him many assignments abroad, including duties in the Far East staff at the Peace Conference in Paris; he became also a colonel in the Army Reserve.

Always a precise scholar, he wrote and spoke with brevity and lucidity in terms of broad application. He believed strongly, as he wrote in 1941, in "*the* foreign policy of the United States," not "separate and peculiar" for regions of the world, made by officers "sensitively receptive and responsive" to public opinion and "designed to safeguard and promote the legitimate national interests of the United States." Gravely courteous and of wry humor, he was perhaps most of all interested in people. His four books and numerous articles, as his friends and readers of four generations will recognize, are monuments to his personal wisdom and intellectual integrity.

FRANKLIN L. BURDETTE
University of Maryland

WILLIAM R. MARTIN, assistant professor of government at North Texas State University and the president of ISA Southwest, died in Paris, France, on July 2, 1966, following a cerebral hemorrhage six days earlier and emergency brain surgery. Professor Martin was in Paris engaged in research on the defense policy of the French government, and had planned to go to Sweden later in the summer for work on another research project. He was 33 years old at the time of his death.

Professor Martin was born and raised in Ardmore, Oklahoma, where he graduated from Ardmore High School in 1950. He received his B.A. degree from Princeton University in 1954, and his M.A. degree (1957) and Ph.D. degree (1964) from the University of Oklahoma. He also held a Certificate from the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland.

He had held faculty positions at Texas Technological College and at the University of Cincinnati prior to joining the faculty of the Department of Government at North Texas State University in Denton in the fall of 1964. He is survived by his widow, Patricia Anne, and by his parents in Ardmore, Mr. and Mrs. Rupert Martin.

Professor Martin's colleagues and students admired him for his professional competence, his congenial pleasant personality, and his quiet but effective enthusiasm and dedication. He will be greatly missed by members of the profession who knew him as an able scholar and an inspiring teacher.

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT
North Texas State University

GRANTS FOR ASIAN POLITICAL SCIENTISTS

The American Political Science Association again has received from The Asia Foundation a grant for encouraging closer relations between Asian and American political scientists. The funds will be used in three ways:

1) To enable Asian political scientists to become members of The American Political Science Association for a one-year period at greatly reduced rates. Membership includes subscription to *The American Political Science Review*. To be eligible, applicants must reside in one of the Asian countries listed below.

2) To enable libraries, university departments, and research institutes in Asia, who have heretofore been unable to do so, to subscribe to *The American Political Science Review* at greatly reduced rates.

3) To supplement travel expenses of Asian political scientists who are in the United States and who wish to attend meetings of The American Political Science Association. The next meeting will be held September 5-9, in the Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago.

(Applicants must be at least at the graduate student level and may come from any of the following Asian countries: Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Ruyukyus, the Republic of China (Taiwan), Thailand, and Vietnam. Applicants who have not previously received grants will be given first consideration. Application forms may be obtained from The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036.)

1961 BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY AVAILABLE AT REDUCED RATES

A limited supply of the fourth edition of the Biographical Directory, published in 1961, is available for $1.25 per copy for the paperbound copy and $2.25 per copy for the clothbound copy. Formerly, the price was $12.50 for the clothbound and $10.00 for the paperbound. Orders should be sent to:

The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

in the study of politics

New research areas open new approaches to government through exploration of new concepts and theories. For research-based books that are carefully integrated with existing literature: Rand McNally books in political science.

AMERICAN POLITICS RESEARCH SERIES

Edited by AARON WILDAVSKY
University of California, Berkeley

Each book in the series consists of an original research venture tied into existing information and theory in such a way as to make a new contribution to the field.

POWER IN COMMITTEES: An Experiment in the Governmental Process
JAMES DAVID BARBER • Yale University
1966 • 189 pages • $5.00

SOCIAL INSECURITY: The Politics of Welfare
GILBERT Y. STEINER • The Brookings Institution
1966 • 270 pages • $6.00

POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE PUBLIC: Policy Outcomes in the American States
THOMAS R. DYE • University of Georgia
1966 • 325 pages • $6.00

AMBITION AND POLITICS: Political Careers in the United States
JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER • Michigan State University
1966 • 226 pages • $6.00

STUDIES IN POLITICAL CHANGE

Edited by MYRON WEINER
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Aspects of political change in developing nations are illustrated through specific examples of change and combined with a theoretical understanding of the processes of such change.

CREATING POLITICAL ORDER: The Party-States of West Africa
ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG • University of Chicago
1966 • 168 pages • $2.50 paper

SONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT: Elite Youth in Panama and Costa Rica
DANIEL GOLDRICH • University of Oregon
1966 • 139 pages • $2.50 paper

PUBLIC LIBERTIES IN THE NEW STATES
DAVID H. BAYLEY • University of Denver
1964 • 162 pages • $2.50 paper



RAND McNALLY & COMPANY The College Department • Chicago, Illinois 60680

the study of international politics

A demanding, interdisciplinary study calls for currency, accuracy, and competent analysis. Whether you are concerned with the laws of nations, aspects of human behavior, or the prospects for peace, look to the books in political science from Rand McNally.

INTERNATIONAL REGIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: A Study in Political Ecology

BRUCE M. RUSSETT • Yale University
New 1967

Explores some of the relationships between political systems and their social/physical environments in order to group political units into larger clusters. Comparisons are made at two times: the early 1950's and the early 1960's. They are based on five criteria: socio-cultural similarity, similarity of political behavior in international politics, political interdependence, economic interdependence, and geographic proximity. No other book has as rigorous quantitative analysis and hard evidence applied to these theoretical interests at the global level.

THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: An Introduction to the Role of International Law in the Contemporary World

WILLIAM D. COPLIN • Wayne State University
1966 • 312 pages • $3.50 paper

Discusses contemporary operation of international law through an interdisciplinary approach and in terms of social science concepts. Outlines the means by which international law and organization contribute to the development of an international political culture. Appendices contain seven examples of treaties and other documents of international law.

HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: Contributions from the Social-Psychological Sciences

Edited by J. DAVID SINGER • University of Michigan
1965 • 466 pages • $9.00

Nearly fifty articles by prominent sociologists and psychologists are carefully edited and condensed to point up the connection between behavioral sciences and international relations. Organized in terms of one theoretical approach to comparative foreign policy.

TOWARD A STRATEGY OF PEACE

Edited by WALTER C. CLEMENS, JR.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1965 • 264 pages • $3.50 paper

The obstacles to peace—as well as the approaches to a strategy of peace—are examined by more than a dozen scholars and public officials. The selections show interrelationships of domestic and international affairs.



RAND McNALLY & COMPANY The College Department • Chicago, Illinois 60680

Oxford University Press

The Nature and Function of International Organization *Second Edition*

By STEPHEN S. GOODSPEED, *University of California, Santa Barbara*
In a completely revised and updated study, Professor Goodspeed draws an objective picture of international organization, past and present. New material in the Second Edition includes an analysis of the most recent developments affecting colonialism, full coverage of all cases and advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice, and a survey of the financial problems of the United Nations from 1960.
1967 736 pp. illus. $7.50

Freedom and the Court:

Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States

By HENRY J. ABRAHAM, *University of Pennsylvania*

The study examines the role of the judiciary in the United States from 1789 to the present in determining the evolution and implementation of certain fundamental civil rights. Its central purpose is to consider the lines a democratic society must draw between the rights of the individual and the rights of the community as a whole.
April 1967 352 pp. cloth $7.50 paper $2.75

The Politics of the Third World

By J. D. B. MILLER, *Australian National University*

The study examines those countries of the Afro-Asian bloc united by the common attributes of being non-European, non-Communist, and poor. Professor Miller is primarily concerned with international behavior of the Third World states and devotes particular attention to those aspects of their domestic affairs that contribute towards foreign policy. The general conclusion of the study is that Third World unity as a distinctive political force has not been achieved and that harmony of view within the Third World exists only on issues of symbolic importance such as colonialism and economic development.
1967 144 pp. cloth $3.75 paper $1.50

Modern Capitalism:

The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power

By ANDREW SHONFIELD, *Royal Institute of International Affairs*

"Perhaps the most important book of the last decade, Mr. Shonfield achieves the difficult task of making sense out of present day politics and economics of the Western World."—Henry W. Morton, Queens College, New York
1966 475 pp. cloth $10.50 paper $4.50


Contemporary French Political Thought

By ROY PIERCE, *University of Michigan*

"A pioneering work which opens a number of avenues for exploration by American political scientists. Basic to any course in comparative political theory dealing with contemporary problems."—H. Malcolm Macdonald, University of Texas
1966 288 pp. cloth $5.75 paper $2.50

Oxford University Press / 200 Madison Ave. / N.Y., N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*



The New States of Asia: *A Political Analysis*

***By* MICHAEL BRECHER,** *McGill University*

Recent events in Southern Asia and their relevance for all peoples are described in these six political essays. Following an introductory chapter, Professor Brecher discusses the colonial epoch, the quest for internal political stability, the role of Israel in the Afro-Asian community, and the often misunderstood non-alignment policy. At the heart of the study is an analysis of the theory of subordinate state systems.

1966 240 pp. paper $1.50

South-East Asia: *Race, Culture, and Nation*

***By* GUY HUNTER,** *Institute of Race Relations, London*

Professor Hunter investigates the experience of the nations of South-East Asia as they attempt to weld many diverse peoples and cultures into unified, modern nations. Following a historical and geographical survey of the area of his study, he turns to aspects affecting the social and economic life of the region. Within the context of the nationalism of developing countries, the study indicates the global relevance of the Asian nations' experience.

1966 208 pp. 16 tables cloth $4.50 paper $1.95

Three Worlds of Development:

The Theory and Practice of International Stratification

***By* IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ,** *Washington University*

One of the clearest and most carefully documented studies of the underlying crises of development I have seen."—D. E. Ashford, Cornell University

1966 528 pp. cloth $8.50 paper $2.95

The Springtime of Freedom:

Evolution of Developing Societies

***By* WILLIAM MCCORD,** *Rice University*

1965 342 pp. cloth $6.00 paper $2.25

Readings in American Democracy *Second Edition*

***Edited by* GERALD STOURZH *and* RALPH LERNER. *Revised by* H. C. HARLAN,** *Chicago City Junior College*

1966 486 pp. paper $2.25

Oxford University Press / 200 Madison Ave. / N.Y., N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Oxford University Press

The Democratic Civilization

By LESLIE LIPSON, *University of California at Berkeley*

1964 632 pp. $7.50

Elements of Democratic Government

Fourth Edition

By J. A. CORRY, *Queen's University, and* HENRY J. ABRAHAM, *University of Pennsylvania*

1964 842 pp. $7.75

Free Government in the Making:

Readings in American Political Thought
Third Edition

By ALPHEUS T. MASON, *Princeton University*

1965 952 pp. $8.00

Readings in Economics and Politics

Second Edition

Edited by H. C. HARLAN, *Chicago City Junior College*

1966 800 pp. paper $2.75

Equality in America: *Religion, Race, and the Urban Majority*

By ALAN P. GRIMES, *Michigan State University*

1964 144 pp. cloth $4.00 paper $1.50

The Judicial Process:

An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of the United States, England, and France

By HENRY J. ABRAHAM, *University of Pennsylvania*

1962 384 pp. paper $2.50

Men at the Top: *A Study in Community Power*

By ROBERT PRESTHUS, *University of Oregon*

1964 496 pp. cloth $8.50 paper $2.95

Oxford University Press / 200 Madison Ave. / N.Y., N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Oxford University Press

The Quest for Security in New Zealand 1840-1966

By **W. B. Sutch.** The first third of this book was originally published in 1942 and established itself as a pioneer and key work on New Zealand history. Now the original volume serves as an introduction to the social history of the last thirty years. The author was close to the policymakers throughout these years and gives a vivid account of the various measures and achievements of the first Labour government, the post-war conflicts, the Holmes case, legislation that diminished civil liberties, the influences of U.S. foreign policy, and the country's failure to build a balanced economy. *Cloth*, $10.40; *paper*, $4.40

Australia, Britain and E.E.C.

By **H. G. Gelber,** *Monash University, Melbourne.* Reactions to Britain's desire to apply for membership in the European Economic Community were many and varied, in Britain itself, in Europe, and throughout the Commonwealth. In this book the author has put into world perspective Australia's position and attitudes, from the time of the first tentative discussion to the final breakdown of the Brussels talks. It is against the background of the evolving situation in Europe and the political preoccupations of Mr. Macmillan that the factors affecting Australia are discussed in detail. $9.60

The NATO International Staff / Secretariat 1952-1957

A Study in International Administration

By **Robert S. Jordan,** *George Washington University.* This book examines three connected themes of international importance: the origin and powers of the office of Secretary-General of NATO from its foundation in 1952 to 1957; the establishment, growth, and function of the International Staff/Secretariat in the same period; and, as a major influence on the development of both, the professional background, personality, and ideas of Lord Ismay, the First Secretary-General. The information is closely documented, and much of it is published here for the first time. $9.60

The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System


From Private Enterprise to Socialism, 1952-1965

By **Patrick O'Brien,** *School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.* The transformation in Egypt's economic organization is traced, explained, and evaluated in its historical sequence. Various facets of the subject are studied, including investments and savings, industrialization, agriculture, consumption, and the role of ideology. Central to the analysis is the explanation for the profound and rapid changes in Egypt, which can add to our understanding of the widespread rejection of private enterprise by other nationalist régimes in Asia and Africa. *2 tables.* (*Royal Institute of International Affairs.*) $8.80

Oxford University Press / 200 Madison Ave. / N.Y., N.Y., 10016.

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

American Government and Politics
A Reader



1967 **400 pages** **$4.25**

William J. Moore, Walter C. Schuling, Aram M. Sogomonian, *and* George K. Zaharopoulos, *San Bernardino Valley College*

CHAPTER HEADINGS AND AUTHORS REPRESENTED

Government and Politics: A Prologue
Aristotle, Montesquieu, Robert MacIver, Benito Mussolini, Joseph Stalin, J. William Fulbright, Charles Frankel.

The American Constitutional System
James Madison, Clinton Rossiter, Martin Diamond, Russell Kirk, Sidney Hook, *States' Rights Party Platform of 1948*, Orville Freeman, Walter Millis.

The Courts
Tom C. Clark, William O. Douglas, *Marbury v. Madison*, Irving R. Kaufman, Thurgood Marshall.

Political Behavior and Party Politics
Clinton Rossiter, Campbell-Converse-Miller-Stokes, Henry A. Turner, Berelson-Lazarsfeld-McPhee, Roper-Gallup-McDonald, Adlai E. Stevenson.

The Congress
Lewis Anthony Dexter, Clem Miller, Hubert H. Humphrey, Tom Wicker, Douglas M. Davis.

The President
Sidney Hyman, Louis W. Koenig, John F. Kennedy, Theodore C. Sorensen, Arthur M. Schlesinger.

The Government and the People
Stuart Chase, Barry Goldwater, Frank Church, Paul H. Douglas, Harlan Cleveland, *Brown v. Board of Education*, Burke Marshall, Lyndon B. Johnson.

The United States and the World
George W. Ball, Hans J. Morgenthau, George F. Kennan, J. William Fulbright, Dean Rusk, Stuart Chase, C. P. Fitzgerald, George C. Lodge, Robert L. Heilbroner.


State and Local Government
LeRoy Collins, William B. Munro, *Constitution of the State of California, Reynolds v. Sims*, Andrew Hacker, *Newsweek, The American Assembly*, Donald J. Curran.

Contemporary Challenges
Richard F. Hamilton, Robert M. Hutchins, Robert L. Heilbroner.

College Division
American Book Company
55 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10003

"A monumental conception"[1]

"Raymond Aron's masterpiece"[2]



"Far more elaborate and convincing than any of the theoretical formulations worked out on this side of the Atlantic."—*Stanley Hoffman, Harvard University.*[1]

"A recapitulation of everything that politicians and historians have learned over the past thirty or forty years. A more impressive discussion of the nature of war has not been written since Clausewitz."—*Golo Mann.*[2]

One of the world's foremost political scientists considers the way in which nations have dealt with one another on the "diplomatic-strategic" level from the beginnings of history to the present, showing the social, cultural and philosophical as well as the political and economic factors that have always entered into such relations and underlining the moral perspectives confronting mankind today. Panoramic in scope, PEACE AND WAR expands the reader's horizons and gives new perspective to the day's news. Translated from the French by Richard Howard and Annette Baker Fox, PEACE AND WAR is now at all booksellers. 840 pages, $10.00

DOUBLEDAY

The BIG Issues in Politics from Spectrum Books . . .

POLITICS IN AFRICA—Five political scientists examine the growth of the "master science" in Africa today . . .

PATTERNS OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT: Five Comparisons

edited by Herbert J. Spiro, University of Pennsylvania

In this new book, Herbert J. Spiro, Carl J. Friedrich, Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Claude E. Welch, Jr., and Ali A. Mazrui compare Africa's development with that of other newly-emerging nations of the world, to determine if African nations are repeating traditional political methods or establishing new ones. *Feb., 1967 Cloth $4.95, paper $1.95*

THE COMMUNIST WORLD—45 documents illustrate Communism's domestic trials . . .

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AMONG COMMUNISTS

edited by Robert H. McNeal, University of Toronto

Using 45 of the Communist's own pronouncements, the editor shows the ideological, institutional, and historical characteristics of their "closed network" of alignments and antagonisms. *March 1967 Cloth $4.95, paper $2.45*

THE COMMON MARKET—An evolving European political union, argues this author . . .

THE POLITICS OF THE COMMON MARKET

by W. Hartley Clark, Carleton College

The paramount interest of the Common Market is not business and economics, states the author, but politics and the building of a "United States of Europe." Clark examines the policy-making processes of the European league, appraising recent issues and influences. *April, 1967 Cloth $4.95, paper $1.95*

ALSO OF INTEREST—A series of volumes on today's nation-states and the historical forces which helped mold them . . .

THE MODERN NATIONS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Volumes in the series: Argentina • Australia • The Balkans • Central America • Ceylon • China • Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic • Egypt & The Sudan • France • India • Indonesia • Italy • Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia • New Zealand • Nigeria & Ghana • The Philippines • Portuguese Africa • Russia • Scandinavia • Venezuela & Colombia • West Africa: The Former French States • The West Indies & The Guianas *each volume in the series: cloth $4.95, paper $1.95*


Available at your bookstore

(Teachers: examination copies available from Prentice-Hall fieldmen. Write for free brochure on Modern Nations series! Spectrum Advertising Dept., Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 07632)

SPECTRUM BOOKS Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, N. J.

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

)o They Know Something You Don't Know? . . .



Educators bought 50% more TIAA life insurance in 1965 than in 1964, the previous all-time high. And the *average* policy ($30,000) continues to be much higher than the average for companies insuring the general public.

It must be TIAA's new lower premium rates.



)r example,

$50,000 POLICY COSTS ONLY $98 at age 30. Here's how:

$50,000 20-Year Home Protection Policy

Age at Issue	25	30	35	40
Annual Premium *(Payable only 16 years)*	$134.00	$159.00	$206.50	$290.00
Cash Dividend End of First Year *(based on 1966 dividend scale; not guaranteed for the future)*	55.50	61.00	70.50	88.00
First Year Net Premium	$ 78.50	$ 98.00	$136.00	$202.00



This is a plan of level premium Term insurance which provides its largest amount of protection initially, reducing by schedule each year over a 20-year period to recognize decreasing insurance needs. There are several other insurance periods, and Home Protection policies are available at all ages under 56.

ARE YOU ELIGIBLE FOR TIAA? Yes, if you are employed by a college, university, private school, or other nonprofit educational or scientific institution that qualifies for TIAA eligibility.

tiaa

TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ASSOCIATION TO
730 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017

Please mail the new Life Insurance Guide and a personal illustration.

Name_____ Your Date of Birth_____

Address_____ ZIP_____

Dependents' Ages_____

Nonprofit Employer_____
college, university, or other educational or scientific institution

[ail the coupon for the
:w Life Insurance
uide and a personal
ustration of TIAA
)licies for your age.

ANNOUNCING

POLITICAL CONTINUITY AND CHANGE

Peter H. Merkl

This comprehensive introduction to political theory and comparative government explores the continuity of Western political tradition in terms of some of the seminal concepts of the great political philosophers, examines political institutions and processes of modern government through comparison with the systems of various Western and non-Western countries, and considers processes of revolutionary change as they have affected to the West, and more particularly, today's developing nations. Instructor's Manual. *Just published.*

and a reminder

These are the first three volumes in Harper's COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT SERIES, Michael Curtis, Advisory Editor

Latin-American Politics and Government
Robert J. Alexander

Western European Integration
Michael Curtis

Governments of the Commonwealth
Josephine F. Milburn

Harper & Row Publishers



49 East 33d Street
New York, 10016

Recently Published Volumes in Harper's COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT SERIES



Michael Curtis, Advisory Editor

Eastern European Government and Politics

Vaclav Benes, Andrew Gyorgy, and George Stambuk

This country-by-country study considers the development and structure of the Eastern European states, their individual Communist parties, the forces that shape their leadership, and their relations with the Soviet Union since World War II. The authors, each a native of the region and an expert in its affairs, strive to effect a balance between two diverging interpretations: that which recognizes very little change in the Eastern European scene and that which exaggerates any appearance of change. *247 pages; $3.50 paper*

The Government of the German Federal Republic

Robert G. Neumann

This analysis of the government and politics of the Federal Republic today includes a brief historical introduction, the controversial issue of German reunification and its political significance, Germany's place in the European and Atlantic worlds, reasons for her political stability and instability, and points of cooperation and friction between Germany and her neighbors. *192 pages; $2.75 paper*

Japanese Political Style

An Introduction to the Government and Politics of Modern Japan

Warren M. Tsuneishi

This book introduces the most important aspects of contemporary Japanese politics and government and discusses Japan's geographic and economic foundation, its national characteristics, and historical and constitutional background. *226 pages; $2.50 paper*

British Government and Politics

Douglas V. Verney

In describing contemporary British political life, the author assumes the basic premise that its significance lies in its adjustment—or inability to adjust—to the loss of an Empire and to the impoverishment caused by two world wars. *226 pages; $2.50 paper*

Harper & Row, Publishers

49 East 33d Street, New York 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

A Selection of New Political Science Texts



AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL THEORY
Twelve Lectures at Harvard
Carl J. Friedrich

AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES
A Systemic Perspective
Charles G. Mayo and Beryl L. Crowe

AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
The Creation of Public Order
Roland Young

AMERICAN LEGISLATURES
Structure and Process
George S. Blair

HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL POLITICS
Third Edition
Paul Van Riper, Jr.

CHALLENGE AND DECISION
Political Issues of Our Time, Second Edition
Reo M. Christenson

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
OF THE UNITED STATES
William C. Havard

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
Readings and Documents, Second Edition
Peter H. Odegard
Late of University of California, Berkeley

Harper & Row, Publishers
49 east 33d street, new york 10016

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC:
An Introduction to American National Government

MARTIN DIAMOND • **Claremont Men's College**
WINSTON MILLS FISK • **Claremont Men's College**
HERBERT GARFINKEL • **Michigan State University**

"This is a major new teaching resource . . . a text book with style . . . The writing is lean and exciting . . . The analysis of contemporary institutions and problems is crisp and informative . . ."

C. Herman Pritchett, University of Chicago

"A great deal of careful planning has gone into this work . . . it includes the historical, the constitutional, the descriptive, and the behavioral approach, but in an integrated fashion so that it can be seen how each contributes to a proper understanding of the American governmental system."

Jerome H. Kerwin, University of Santa Clara

"This perceptive and imaginative book will surely go to the top of the long list of texts for the introductory course in American national government. I am especially pleased by the 'decent respect' it pays to both history and theory . . ."

Clinton Rossiter, Cornell University

In 15 chapters, The Democratic Republic provides a comprehensive view of the American political order—a concise, factual account of the essential structure, functions, regulations, and powers of American government. The talents of a political theorist, a constitutional lawyer and a political parties specialist have produced a unified, well-organized book with strong continuity between chapters.

The Instructor's Manual was prepared by Morton Frisch, Professor of Political Science, Northern Illinois University.

Contents

Part I. Origin of the Republic
1. The Formative Years
2. Framing the More Perfect Union

Part II. Constituting Democracy
3. The Fundamental Political Principles
4. The American Constitutional System: Powers and Constraints

Part III. The Branches of Government
5. The Legislative Branch: Congress
6. The Executive Branch: The Presidency
7. The Judicial Branch: Courts for the American Constitutional System
8. The Administrative System

Part IV. Politics
9. Parties, Politics, and Groups
10. The Political Community: Suffrage, Immigration, and Citizenship
11. Machinery of Representation: Apportionment, Nominations, and Elections
12. Campaigns and Voting Behavior

Part V. Governing
13. Government and Personal Freedom
14. Governing the Economy
15. The Conduct of Foreign Affairs

1966 • 572 pages • $7.50

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY

The College Department • Box 7600 • Chicago, Illinois 60680

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Appleton-Century-Crofts

THE SUPREME COURT AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, Second Edition

GEORGE W. SPICER, *University of Virginia*

A remarkably incisive, brief critical analysis of the Supreme Court as guardian of American civil liberties. The long-awaited revision of this highly regarded study contains additional chapters on civil and criminal procedure and retains the useful summary analysis at the end of each chapter.

February 1967 280 pages paperback $2.45

A SECOND FEDERALIST: Congress Creates a Government

Edited by CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, *Indiana University* and GEORGE W. CAREY, *Georgetown University*

Superbly edited, this compilation of the Congressional debates from 1789 to 1824, is abridged and excerpted from the Annals of Congress, the most complete record of what was said and done by Congress in its first four decades.

January 1967 325 pages paperback $2.95

WORLD TENSIONS: Conflict and Accommodation

ELTON ATWATER, KENT FORSTER, and JAN S. PRYBYLA, all of *The Pennsylvania State University*

An interdisciplinary approach to world affairs, for students with no previous training in the social sciences. The authors, an historian, political scientist, and economist, examine both the sources and resolution of conflict between sovereign states, conveying a sense of immediacy through illustrations of actual practice of contemporary governments. Features include a series of western and non-western views, in each chapter, on the problems discussed, and guidance on how to prepare a "position paper" on an international issue.

April 1967 400 pages illustrated paperback

PRESIDENTIAL GREATNESS: The Image and the Man from George Washington to the Present

THOMAS A. BAILEY, *Stanford University*

Written with wit and incisiveness, this widely reviewed and acclaimed analysis of executive leadership takes a perceptive new look at old stereotypes and establishes criteria for Presidential excellence.

September 1966 386 pages paperback $3.95

SOURCES IN MODERN EAST ASIAN HISTORY AND POLITICS

Edited by THEODORE MCNELLY, *University of Maryland*

A collection of source materials on the recent history, politics, ideologies, and international relations of China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam correlated with standard textbooks on the Far East. Introductory notes and headnotes summarize recent Far Eastern history and provide a framework for understanding the significance of the selections.

April 1967 416 pages illustrated paperback



APPLETON-CENTURY-CROFTS

Division of Meredith Publishing Company

440 Park Avenue South, New York 10016

Appleton-Century-Crofts

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, Second Edition

VERNON VAN DYKE, *The University of Iowa*

Topical rather than historical, this reasoned analysis of the behavior of states in their relations with one another draws not only on diplomatic history, but on psychology, economics, and political theory as well.

April 1966 527 pages $6.50

OGG AND RAY'S . . .

INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, Thirteenth Edition

May 1966 979 pages illustrated $8.75

INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, Thirteenth Edition

May 1966 755 pages illustrated $7.95

ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, Ninth Edition

1965 printing 718 pages illustrated paperback $4.95

ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, Ninth Edition

1965 printing 550 pages illustrated paperback $3.95

all by WILLIAM H. YOUNG, *The University of Wisconsin*

Instructor's manual available for all Ogg and Ray books.

BASIC ISSUES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, Fifth Edition

Edited by HILLMAN M. BISHOP and SAMUEL HENDEL, both of *The City College of New York*

Dealing with the fundamental values and persistent issues of our democracy, this best-selling collection of authoritative readings presents a broad spectrum of divergent viewpoints on the vital questions confronting the American political system.

1965 603 pages paperback $3.65

LEADING CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONS, Thirteenth Edition

ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, *National Historical Publications Commission, in* collaboration with ROBERT F. CUSHMAN, *New York University*

With decisions as recent as the 1966 Voting Rights case, the thirteenth edition of this highly successful and widely adopted text is the most complete and up to date of the smaller casebooks.

August 1966 585 pages paperback $3.95

CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1964-1966

ROBERT F. CUSHMAN

The first of a series of inexpensive supplements, designed to bring Cushman and Cushman: *Cases in Constitutional Law* and all other casebooks fully up to the minute.

December 1966 73 pages paperback $ .95

APPLETON-CENTURY-CROFTS

Division of Meredith Publishing Company

440 Park Avenue South, New York 10016

ACC.

CHINA AFTER MAO

With Selected Documents

By A. Doak Barnett

One of America's leading authorities on China outlines and assesses the implications of the inevitable passing of Mao Tse-tung and the older generation of revolutionary leaders from their position of command in China. Describing the mid-1960's as "a transitional period of great historic significance," the author outlines the basic unsolved problems and unresolved issues that face Peking's leaders, speculates on future changes in Chinese Communist leadership and policies. Part II of the book presents documents pertinent to the developing crisis in China, including "Khrushchev's Phoney Communism," Lin Piao's "Long Live the Victory of the People's War," and "Great Cultural Revolution." *China After Mao* is based on the Walter E. Edge lectures given at Princeton University in October 1966. *312 pages. cloth, $6.00*

paperback, $1.95

COMMUNISM IN FINLAND

A History and Interpretation

By John H. Hodgson

Why is it that Finland, a country which fought the Soviet Union twice during World War II, is one of the few democratic nations with a strong Communist party? Professor Hodgson answers this question by tracing the history of Finnish Communism from the emergence of a left wing within the Finnish Social Democratic Party to the present day. *240 pages. $6.00*

THE ALBANIAN NATIONAL AWAKENING, 1878-1912

By Stavro Skendi

In its long struggle for national unity, Albania faced complex problems, both internal and external. The progress and setbacks of that struggle are traced step by step in this study of the least-well-known period in the intricate history of this small but strategic country and its old and interesting people.

544 pages. $12.50

Princeton University Press

The Fabric of Democracy:

Readings in American Government

329 PAGES ✶ 1966 ✶ PAPER COVER ✶ $3.50

Charles P. Blackmore and Abraham Yeselson,
Rutgers University

Articles and cases illuminating the development, processes, and operation of the American federal system from its beginnings through Lyndon B. Johnson. Men in government and political analysts and critics examine the pressures, stresses, and strengths inherent in the overlapping prerogatives of a federal system. The authors provide an accurate, concise, lucid introduction to each of the thirteen chapters.

There are portions of Congressional debates on some currently controversial issues.

CHAPTER HEADINGS AND AUTHORS REPRESENTED:

Roots of American Democracy and Constitutional Development
The Declaration of Independence, Thomas Paine, James Madison, Hugo L. Black.

The Nature of Federalism: Conflict and Cooperation
Southern Declaration on Integration, McCulloch v. Maryland, General Analysis of Grants-in-Aid, Arthur S. Miller, Lyndon B. Johnson.

The Rights of Free Men
Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty, Abington School District v. Schempp, Gitlow v. New York, Chambers v. Florida, Mapp v. Ohio, Brown v. Board of Education, Senators Stennis and Javitz, Senator Goldwater.

The Political Process
Stephen K. Bailey, Malcolm Moos, Henry Steele Commager, Lyndon B. Johnson, Jack Edwards, How an Election was Bought and Sold (Anon.), Interview with Elmo Roper, John F. Kennedy.

The Legislative Process
Hubert H. Humphrey, The Congress and America's Future, The House Reduces the Powers of Its Committee on Rules, Wesberry v. Sanders.

The Judicial Process
Julius J. Marke, Anthony Lewis, Representative Jamie L. Whitten, Representative Emanuel Celler.

The Presidency and the National Administration
John F. Kennedy, *U. S. News & World Report*, Birch Bayh, Jr., Frank C. Porter, Clarence B. Randall.

Financing Government
Leon H. Keyserling, Lyndon B. Johnson, Senator Harry Byrd.

Government and the National Economy
Ira Wolfert, The Government's Role in Consumer Protection, Neil McElroy.

Government and The Working Man
Max Lerner, E. J. Hanley, Emanuel Celler.

Government, The Farmer, and Natural Resources
John F. Kennedy, G. D. Arndt, Charles B. Schuman, Thomas W. Glaze, Joseph P. Lyford, Charles A. Reich, Stewart L. Udall, Wayne N. Aspinall.

The National Government and The People's Welfare
Senator Pat McNamara, Senator Tower, Senator Aiken, Lyndon B. Johnson, Edward J. Gurney, Joseph S. Clark.

Foreign Policy and National Defense
Holmes Welch, J. William Fulbright, Lyndon B. Johnson, Walter Millis, Abraham Yeselson.

College Division

American Book Company

55 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10003



New from the University of Chicago Press

The Court and the Constitution

A series edited by Philip B. Kurland

This new paperback series brings back into print in modestly priced editions a number of important books on past Supreme Court Justices and on the role of the Court in American life. As well as filling a need for students of law, political science, government, and history, these volumes will provide, collectively, a history of the Supreme Court.

Melville Weston Fuller

Chief Justice of the United States, 1888-1910

Willard L. King

With an Introduction by Phil C. Neal

Melville Weston Fuller presided over the Supreme Court for twenty-two terms—a period in which the Court handed down such important decisions as those on the Income Tax Cases of 1895, the "original-package doctrine," the Insular Cases, and the now discredited "separate but equal" doctrine of *Plessy* v. *Ferguson*. In his new Introduction to this biography Phil C. Neal writes, "Fuller emerges in these pages as, among other things, an attractive human being. . . . Our understanding of a major era of the Supreme Court is the richer for this work."

1967 416 pages Paper $2.95

The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis

The Supreme Court at Work

Alexander M. Bickel

With an Introduction by Paul A. Freund

From 1916 to 1939 Louis Dembitz Brandeis opposed the tendency of a majority on the Supreme Court to cling to a "laissez-faire" conservatism. Both without and within the Court, he exerted enormous influence in shaping the social and economic thought of the nation. This book gives the reader a rare opportunity to explore the mind of one of America's greatest jurists. Dean Acheson, in commending Professor Bickel's "excellent book," notes: "For the lawyer who wants a full-length view of Justice Brandeis' judicial methodology it is indispensable."

1967 320 pages Paper $2.45

John Marshall

James Bradley Thayer

With a Foreword by Mark De Wolfe Howe

First published in 1901, this concise biography remains an eminently readable introduction to the great Chief Justice. Thayer demonstrates that Marshall's most enduring contribution to the nation's welfare lay in his "strong constitutional doctrine, explained in detail, elaborated, powerfully argued, over and over again, with unsurpassable earnestness and force, placed permanently in our judicial records, holding its own during the long emergence of a feebler political theory, and showing itself in all its majesty when war and civil dissension came."

1967 196 pages Paper $1.95

The Growth of American Constitutional Law

Benjamin F. Wright

With an Introduction by Robert G. McCloskey

This brilliant survey evaluates the work of the Supreme Court up to the early 1940's, when the two great issues of modern constitutional history—the decline of laissez-faire and the rise of civil rights—were just taking shape. In his new introduction Robert G. McCloskey describes Wright as embodying "a deep knowledge of the institutional and intellectual history of America; a political scientist's concern to understand the Court as an operative instrument of government; and a respect for the judicial ideal of rationality and a sharply critical eye for the Court's shortcomings in its pursuit of that ideal."

1967 296 pages Paper $2.45

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

The Russian Revolution of 1905

The Workers' Movement and the Formation of Bolshevism and Menshevism

Solomon M. Schwarz

Translated by Gertrude Vakar

Hoover Institution Publications

This book covers the critical period during 1905 when Social-Democracy emerged as a factor of consequence on the political scene, only to divide into the two parts that became Social-Democracy, on the one hand, and, on the other, the authoritarian labor movement that assumed the name of Communism. Solomon M. Schwarz was a Menshevik spokesman on labor affairs and a member of the Kerensky government. His new book, *The Russian Revolution of 1905*, is the first volume in a comprehensive series, "The History of Menshevism," that will alter the understanding of the Russian revolution. Under Leopold H. Haimson, surviving Menshevik leaders have co-operated to prepare memoirs, monographs, and other scholarly materials. English-language volumes in this series will include "The Making of a Workers' Revolution: Russian Social-Democracy, 1891-1903," by Allan Wildman, and "Menshevism under Soviet Rule," edited by Haimson.

1967 LC:66-20582 384 pages, $8.95

The Death of Slavery

The United States, 1837-65

Elbert B. Smith

This fast-paced account of the crucial pre-Civil War period completes the chronological series of the "Chicago History of American Civilization." Smith's first-hand knowledge of politics gives the work an unusual emphasis which is especially appropriate for the politics of the times.

1967 LC:67-16779 232 pages, $5.00

The American Revisionists

The Lessons of Intervention in World War I

Warren I. Cohen

In this original analysis of Revisionism Cohen examines the thinking of those American historians and social scientists who took it upon themselves to persuade their countrymen that they should not have gone to war in 1917. *The American Revisionists* is an important study of a tradition in American thought which remains alive today among supporters of the Great Society who oppose United States involvement in Southeast Asia.

1967 LC:66-20594 252 pages, $7.95

Theory and Practice in American Politics

Edited by William H. Nelson and Francis L. Loewenheim

Contributors: Lawrence H. Chamberlain, Carl N. Degler, Felix Gilbert, Dumas Malone, Alpheus Thomas Mason, Ernest R. May, Hans J. Morgenthau, Louis Morton, and Benjamin F. Wright. ". . . a distinguished and timely contribution . . . the finest brief analyses of problems in American political thought to appear in the last decade."—Edward N. MacConomy, *American Historical Review.* *1967 165 pages Paper $1.95*

Benchmarks

Henry J. Friendly

These articles and lectures by one of America's leading jurists include reflections on the nature of judging, on the federal administrative agencies, and on other problems of deep interest to lawyers and students of government. Four chapters are appreciations of four great judges: Holmes; Brandeis, for whom Judge Friendly was law clerk; Learned Hand, a colleague in the last two years of Judge Hand's long life; and Frankfurter, his teacher and long-time friend.

1967 LC:67-12149 328 pages, $7.95

University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637

New and recent books
from the Little, Brown College Department

The Power of the Purse

Appropriations Politics in Congress

RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., *University of Rochester*

The author describes a political process vital to congressional power—the wielding of the power of the purse. He sees the House and Senate as political systems engaged in *internal* and *external* activities. The external relationships are those between the committees and House or Senate, between committees and Executive branch, or between two appropriations committees. The internal are those involving methods of organization, committee members' desires and perceptions, etc. This is the most comprehensive treatment ever given to this subject. *clothbound 704 pages $8.75*

The United Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy

Revised Edition

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

Since publication in late 1960, this book has been accepted as the definitive analysis of the U.N. from the viewpoint of United States' national interest. This major revision reflects the realities in the late 1960's and the problems and prospects for the early 1970's. All sections are thoroughly upated and include new material on international peace keeping, outer space, arms control, and the problem of Communist China. *paperbound 288 pages $2.95*

Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics

The American and British Experience

KENNETH N. WALTZ, *Brandeis University*

No other book has so systematically compared the British and American political systems in order to discover their foreign-policy capabilities. Professor Waltz critically explores the relationship between internal politics and external policy, and explains policy and process in terms of political structure. He applies an original analysis of political systems to the processes of making and conducting foreign policy, and uses specific cases and problems to illustrate these theories and analyses. *paperbound 352 pages $3.95*

New and recent additions
to the Little, Brown Series in Comparative Politics

Comparative Politics

A Developmental Approach

GABRIEL A. ALMOND and G. BINGHAM POWELL, JR.
Stanford University

This is a general introduction to the study of comparative political systems. The authors adapt structural-functional and systems theory to politics and treat political systems at three levels. As they review individual functions and classify political systems, the authors develop the themes of structural differentiation and the secularization of political culture. Political development is viewed historically. They examine experiences of individual countries with system development problems of state and nation building, participation, and welfare. Investment strategies in the new and modernizing nations are also considered. *paper 348 pages $2.75*

Politics in Israel

LEONARD J. FEIN, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

Based on very recent data, this study offers new insights into the present relationship of two of Israel's major problems: the integration of immigrants, and security. Professor Fein examines the country's dwindling pioneering ideology and explores the nation's quest for a meaningful identity in the 1960's. *paperbound 256 pages $2.75*

Politics in Japan

FRANK C. LANGDON, *University of British Columbia*

Professor Langdon describes the way in which political groups and organizations in Japan combine and interact to effect government policy. He shows how political attitudes are acquired and how political leaders are recruited and trained. This excellent study treats an important "border" country which is significant to the critical relationship of Western to non-Western societies. *paperbound 304 pages $2.95*

Little, Brown College Department
34 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02106

The expanding Basic Studies in Politics Series

Edited by Sheldon S. Wolin, *University of California, Berkeley*

Two new additions . .

The Theory of Democratic Elitism

A Critical Analysis

PETER BACHRACH, *Bryn Mawr College*

This incisive discussion of the theory of democratic elitism attempts to reconcile democratic theory and elitist theory. Professor Bachrach views democratic elitism as a basic cause of much recent political theorizing. He attacks democratic elitism as factually unsound empirical theory and as a theory unable to meet normatively the initial political needs of contemporary man. He presents a new theory, founded on the classic principle of self-development, as a meaningful alternative. *paperbound 128 pages 5⅜ × 8¼ $1.95*

Revolutionary Change

CHALMERS JOHNSON, *University of California, Berkeley*

Professor Johnson offers an introductory analysis of revolutionary resorts to violence in society. He utilizes a model of the social system to analyze the causes of revolution and draws upon political theory, anthropology, and social psychology to describe how public actions promote or retard revolutionary conditions. All social science concepts employed in the book are introduced and explained for the student new to social theory. *paperbound 208 pages 5⅜ × 8¼ $2.50*

Federalism

Origin • Operation • Significance

WILLIAM H. RIKER, *University of Rochester*

An outstanding volume in the series, this is a concise analysis of the concept of federalism and systems of federalism with the emphasis on the United States. What occasions the adoption of a federal government, what induces societies to keep federal governments they already have? Professor Riker answers these questions by examining past and present federal systems and their workings. *paperbound 5⅜ × 8¼ 169 pages $1.95*

Political Parties in the American System

FRANK J. SORAUF, *University of Minnesota*

This is an interpretation and analysis of American political parties. Professor Sorauf focuses on the broad outline of the nature and function of the parties, drawing on comparisons with parties of other democracies to add depth to his analysis. He suggests a theory of political parties and, in the last chapter, even suggests in a schematic way the main relationships between party functions and organization on the one hand and the general political and social system on the other. *paperbound 5⅜ × 8¼ 194 pages $1.95*

A New Text on . . .

American Political Patterns

Conflict and Consensus

DAN D. NIMMO, *University of Houston*

THOMAS D. UNGS, *Wichita State University*

Nimmo and Ungs describe the principal patterns of American political behavior within the consistent theoretical framework of conflict representation.

In American communities social conflict is regulated by certain patterns of behavior. Examination of these patterns reveals an underlying consensus necessary to the preservation of the community.

Representation in American government is a process of communication that brings the conflict to light through patterns of participation, opinion, leadership, choice, partisanship, and pressure.

Resolution is a process of accommodation that keeps conflict within manageable limits through policy-making. Officials make binding public policy with acts of formulation, leadership, adoption, application, and adjudication.

The style of *American Political Patterns* is particularly clear. Nimmo and Ungs include only truly relevant examples to illustrate basic principles of American democratic government.

clothbound | *6 × 9* | *480 pages* | *$5.95*

Little, Brown College Department

34 Beacon Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02106

Exceptional publications treating the basic issues in American Government:

GOVERNING THE AMERICAN NATION

By Richard H. Leach, Duke University. Just Published, 1967. "It is a solid, professional piece of work . . . of high quality, excellent teachability." Peter Woll, Brandeis University, from a pre-publication review. College list $8.95.

INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

By William C. Havard and David R. Mayhew, both of the University of Massachusetts. Scheduled April 1967 publication. "I find this a highly promising collection of readings. It has several advantages over many of the other reading books in the field. More notably, the editors have avoided the kind of proliferation which marks so many efforts and which bewilders students through such a variety of riches." Gordon Baker, University of California, Santa Barbara, from a pre-publication review. College list $5.50 tent.

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT Behavior and Controversy

By Lewis Lipsitz, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Scheduled March, 1967 publication. "I have reviewed [the text]. It has excellent materials, a widely read and intellectually sensitive editor, and a definite role within the college community. . . ." Edgar Litt, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, from a pre-publication review. Paperbound. College list $5.25 tent.

ALLYN AND BACON, INC.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

By William J. Crotty, Northwestern University; Donald M. Freeman, University of Arizona; and Douglas S. Gatlin, Florida Atlantic University. Just Published, 1966. "It is a superior work, one which I would very probably use in a course on parties and one which I would seriously consider for an introductory course in American Government. . . ." Joseph Cooper, Harvard University. College list $6.25.

THE JUDICIARY: The Supreme Court in the Governmental Process

By Henry J. Abraham, University of Pennsylvania. Recently Published, 1965. Part of the Allyn and Bacon Series in American Government, Consulting Editor: William Beaney. Paperbound. College list $1.95.

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA

By Daniel R. Grant, Vanderbilt University; and H. C. Nixon, Professor Emeritus, Vanderbilt University. College list $8.50.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE: FROM BURGESS TO BEHAVIORALISM

By Albert Somit, State University of New York at Buffalo; and Joseph Tanenhaus, State University of Iowa. Scheduled April, 1967 publication. The underlying theme of this text is that an understanding of the issues, problems, and controversies facing American political science today requires familiarity with certain aspects of the development of the discipline during the past three quarters of a century. The book traces the rise of political science as a profession, examines the manner in which its practitioners have defined their professional responsibilities and goals, describes how political scientists have viewed their field since its emergence as an independent and scholarly inquiry, and analyzes the recurrent efforts to develop a "science of politics." College list $5.25 tent.

RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES

By Norman J. Powell, the City College of the City University of New York. Scheduled 1967 publication. Examines the meaning of bureaucracy and the mechanisms which enforce responsibility, then evaluates the American system. Paperbound.

OTHER OUTSTANDING PUBLICATIONS:

BASIC ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Peter Toma, University of Arizona; and Andrew Gyorgy, George Washington University. Scheduled April, 1967 publication. Emphasis is on studying the scope and method of International Relations, international politics, organization, and law, through concepts and clash of issues. Paperbound. College list $5.00 tent.

READINGS IN COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

By Nimrod Raphaeli, Hebrew University. Just Published, 1967. Presents materials that probe beneath the formal administrative organizations and into the broader context of the social sciences. Paperbound. College list $6.50 tent.

WORLD POLITICS: The Writings of Practitioners, Classical and Modern

By Arend Lijphart, University of California, Berkeley. Just Published, 1966. Presents material on the basic concepts and persistent issues of world politics. Selections are from outstanding classic and contemporary political theorists in the field of international relations and by political practitioners who can speak authoritatively on world affairs. Paperbound. College list $4.95.

ALLYN & BACON, INC.

DEPT. K-1
150 Tremont Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02111

Important New Texts From

THE RELATIONS OF NATIONS,

Third Edition

By Frederick H. Hartmann, Naval War College

Thoroughly revised and updated, the Third Edition of this text continues to provide a systematic analysis of international politics in a careful combination of theory and historical data. The book progresses from general background material to specific relations between countries, and case studies are used throughout. Numerous charts, tables, and maps illustrate the text.

1967, approx. 752 pages, prob. $8.95

WORLD IN CRISIS

Readings in International Relations

Third Edition

Edited by Frederick H. Hartmann

Here is a collection of essays which provides the student with the stimulating thinking of scholars and statesmen on all major aspects of international relations. More than one half of the selections in this edition are new. Each of the selections is given at sufficient length to develop fully the contributor's position and contrasting views are frequently represented. New to the book is a complete case study of the Cuban Crisis and a chapter on Vietnam.

1967, approx. 448 pages, prob. $3.95

Write to the faculty service desk for examination copies.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Macmillan In Political Science

THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED, *Second Edition*

By John C. Livingston and Robert G. Thompson, both of Sacramento State College

The Second Edition of this successful text has been sharpened and clarified by establishing, in the first four chapters, the democratic frame of reference needed before proceeding to an examination of American practices and institutions. The authors then pose questions about the nature of democracy and present their answers as well as those propounded by liberal, conservative, and "brokerage" theory. There is a detailed outline at the beginning of each chapter and a list of suggested readings are provided at the end of the book.

1966, 608 pages, $6.95

***To Accompany the Text . . . Examine these selections from the* GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN WORLD SERIES**

The Democratic Party in American Politics

By Ralph M. Goldman, San Francisco State College

1966, 160 pages, paper, $1.50

Presidential Leadership: Personality and Political Style

By Erwin C. Hargrove, Brown University

1966, 153 pages, paper, $1.50

Interest Groups and Lobbying

By Abraham Holtzman, North Carolina State University

1966, 154 pages, paper, $1.50

The Republican Party in American Politics

By Charles O. Jones, University of Arizona

1965, 160 pages, paper, $1.50

The Supreme Court in the Political Process

By Samuel Krislov, University of Minnesota

1965, 155 pages, paper, $1.50

The Role of Government in the American Economy

By Emmette S. Redford, The University of Texas

1966, 160 pages, paper, $1.50

866 Third Avenue / New York, N.Y. 10022

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

NEW FROM BLAISDELL

IDEOLOGIES IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Andrew Gyorgy, *George Washington University*
George Blackwood, *Boston University*

Ideologies or "ism's" may be defined as concise sets of economic, political, and social beliefs governing the lives of societies. In an increasingly *political* world, ideologies play a crucial role. This introductory text examines such questions as the role of ideas in world affairs; the nature and characteristics of an "ideology"; and the distinction between political parties and political movements. In answering the key question, *What is an ideology?*, the authors classify today's major "ism's" into such free world ideologies as capitalism, democracy, and socialism, and into such ideologies of dictatorship as the various forms of fascism, national socialism, and communism.

1967. 272 pages. Paperbound. $3.50

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA
Origin and Evolution of its Fundamental Ideas

Arthur E. Sutherland, *Harvard University Law School*

This book is a history of five constitutional ideas: rule by majority will, justice despite majorities, equality of man, diffusion of governmental power, and the ideal of a fundamental written law. The author traces their origin and growth from Magna Carta through five centuries in England; through a century and a half in Colonial America; and through the experience of the United States from independence to present day.

1965. 618 pages. $9.50

CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRACY, Revised Edition

Carl J. Friedrich, *Harvard University*

This well-known text studies the nature and development of modern government, the pattern of constitutional government, the functioning processes of constitutional government, and governmental tension, breakdowns, and adjustments.


1950. 688 pages. $9.50

MATHEMATICAL MODELS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

John J. Kemeny, *Dartmouth College*
J. Laurie Snell, *Dartmouth College*


This text is appropriate for use in a one-semester course at the junior level which requires as prerequisites a year of calculus and a course in finite mathematics. As such it is important in the mathematics curriculum, but it can be used and understood by social scientists. After the general introduction the authors present a series of cases which can be chosen by the instructor and presented in an order which is flexible.

1962. 145 pages. $8.50



BLAISDELL PUBLISHING COMPANY

A Division of Ginn and Company
275 Wyman Street, Waltham, Massachusetts 02154



FEDERALISM AND SUPRANATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Patterns for New Legal Structures

by Peter Hay

Increasing economic interdependence and the need for transnational cooperation have given rise to new types of international organizations, particularly since World War II. Using the three European Communities as models, these timely essays explore the nature of supranational organizations, the techniques they utilize, and their contribution to the formulation of international law. The author offers a provocative discussion of the constitutional problems that would evolve from United States participation in such Communities and examines similar adjustments being effected in Germany under the Bonn Constitution. 335 pp. $7.50.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE, INVESTMENT, AND ORGANIZATION

edited by Wayne R. LaFave and Peter Hay

In this comprehensive introduction to the rapidly expanding area of international trade and investment, nineteen authorities in the field examine current practical problems of international trade, its regulation by regional international organizations, and the impact of these organizations on the development of uniform standards and legal norms. The wide range of topics discussed include basic trends in East-West trade, the move to reduce tariff restrictions, incorporation of American business abroad, regional trade associations, and the implications of economic association among underdeveloped countries. 499 pp. $7.50.

THE POLITICS OF WAGE-PRICE DECISIONS

A Four-Country Analysis

by Murray Edelman and R. W. Fleming

Here is a multifaceted evaluation of the ways in which Italy, Germany, Great Britain, and The Netherlands have attempted to exert a restraining influence on price and wage levels since World War II. It includes a comparison with the United States that throws light upon current American wage-price decisions and policies. ". . . a first-rate piece of work, subtle and well informed."—*The Journal of Politics.* 331 pp. $6.75.


WHITE-COLLAR TRADE UNIONS

Contemporary Developments in Industrialized Societies

edited by Adolf Sturmthal

The past, present, and future of white-collar trade unionism and its implications for traditional blue-collar unions in Australia, Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Sweden, and the United States are traced and analyzed by authorities in each of these countries in this timely and important book. 412 pp. $7.95.

THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS, URBANA, ILLINOIS



Introduction to Political Science

Recently published . . .

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

An Introduction to Political Science

Edited by JOHN C. WAHLKE, *University of Iowa and*
ALEX N. DRAGNICH, *Vanderbilt University*
Random House, 1966; 624 pages; $7.95

A collaborative effort by eight specialists, this new text combines description of political systems with analysis of the nature of political science itself. The resulting perspective affords a broad, systematic, and unified introduction to the whole field of political science.

In preparation . . . the Third Edition of

COMMUNISM

by ALFRED G. MEYER, *The University of Michigan*
PS34; about 220 pages; about $1.95 paperbound

A brilliant, short introduction to the study of communism as a system of ideas, a political movement, and a form of government.

INTRODUCTION TO GOVERNMENT

Third Edition, Revised

by ROBERT REINOW, *State University of New York, Albany*
Knopf, 568 pages; $7.95

A study of the principles of government based on comparative methods, with particular emphasis on government in the United States, this introductory text offers a detailed examination of the forces at work in political decision-making. The present edition, carefully revised and brought up to date, is written in the same straightforward and engaging style that won immediate favor for the earlier editions, and takes full account of the most recent findings of behavioral research on voting, elections, legislatures, and legislative behavior.

Legislative Process

THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES

by MALCOLM E. JEWELL, *University of Kentucky and*
SAMUEL C. PATTERSON, *University of Iowa*
Random House, 1966; 589 pages; $7.95

A wide-ranging survey of the legislative process in this country as it can be studied in Congress and the fifty state legislatures. The authors discuss in detail the multitudinous aspects of American legislatures: the role of executives in the legislative process; legislators and their backgrounds; and legislative voting behavior.

CONGRESS MAKES A LAW

by STEPHEN KEMP BAILEY
V511; 304 pages; $2.45 paperbound

CONGRESS Politics and Practice

by NORMAN C. THOMAS
The University of Michigan
and KARL A. LAMB
University of California, Santa Cruz
PS45; 155 pages; $1.95 paperbound

For further information, write to

RANDOM HOUSE & ALFRED A. KNOPF, Inc.

State and Local Government



Just published . . .

THE FIFTY STATES and Their Local Governments

JAMES W. FESLER, *Editor, Yale University,* KARL A. BOSWORTH, *University of Connecticut,* DAYTON D. McKEAN, *University of Colorado,* HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Columbia University,* ROBERT L. MORLAN, *University of Redlands,* ALLAN R. RICHARDS, *Louisiana State University,* VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, *Northwestern University,* YORK WILLBERN, *Indiana University.*
Knopf, February 1967; 640 pages; $8.50

A revision and substantial expansion of THE 48 STATES, on which six of the present authors collaborated. Its focal concern is the capacity of state and local governments to exercise power responsibility, democratically, intelligently, and efficiently.

THE STATE LEGISLATURE
Politics and Practice

by MALCOLM E. JEWELL, *University of Kentucky*

A short, but comprehensive study of the realities of party politics and legislative behavior at the state level. PS37; 152 pages $1.45 paperbound

THE STUDY OF LOCAL POLITICS

by WILLIAM H. RIKER, *Lawrence University*

An introduction to the subject of field research in politics, prepared especially for the undergraduate student. PS29; 126 pages; $.95 paperbound

THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION

Representation, Political Power, and The Supreme Court
by GORDON E. BAKER, *University of California, Santa Barbara*
PS20; 192 pages $1.95; paperbound

A survey of the background and issues involved in one of the most important problems facing American government today. An appendix gives excerpts from the most significant recent Supreme Court cases on reapportionment.

RULE 9: POLITICS, ADMINISTRATION, AND CIVIL RIGHTS

by NORMAN C. THOMAS, *The University of Michigan*
PS57; 144 pages; $1.95 paperbound

A case study of policy making by an administrative rather than a legislative branch of state government.

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

by ANWAR SYED, *University of Massachusetts* PS54; 224 pages; $2.25 paperbound

A synthesis of what American political philosophers, from Jefferson to the present, have thought about local government and its place in the American system.

Civil Rights

Available in a Second Edition

COURTS AND RIGHTS The American Judiciary in Action

by JOHN ROCHE, *Brandeis University* PS36; 160 pages; $1.95 paperbound


Examines the role of America's judicial institutions in the struggle for civil rights.

THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS

by CHARLES V. HAMILTON, *Lincoln University*

This incisive study of Negro civil rights in America stresses the inadequacy of "traditional" political processes and the need for innovation in dealing with civil rights issues.
Fall 1967; PS56; 192 pages; $1.95 paperbound

The College Department **501 Madison Avenue** **New York 10022**



Comparative Government

PATTERNS OF GOVERNMENT

The Major Political Systems of Europe
Second Edition, Revised and Enlarged
by SAMUEL H. BEER *and* ADAM B. ULAM, *Harvard University,*
HARRY ECKSTEIN *and* NICHOLAS WAHL, *Princeton University, and*
HERBERT J. SPIRO, *University of Pennsylvania*
Random House, 832 pages; 18 tables and figures; $7.95

Substantially expanded and updated, this is the revised edition of a book which has established itself as one of the foremost texts in comparative government on the introductory level.

Recently published . . .

DOCUMENTS OF MAJOR EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS

by RANDOLPH L. BRAHAM, *The City College of The City University of New York*
Knopf, 1966; 224 pages; $2.45 paperbound

Brings together (either complete or in carefully-edited excerpts) the constitutions, electoral laws, most recent party programs, and post-World War II election results of Great Britain, France, Germany, and the USSR. Compact, yet comprehensive, the collection can be used with any standard comparative government text.

Winner of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation Award for 1965

BRITISH POLITICS IN THE COLLECTIVIST AGE

by SAMUEL H. BEER, *Harvard University*
Knopf, 1965; 384 pages; $5.95

An assessment-in-depth of contemporary British political life, this new book focuses on the role of parties and interest groups in the formation of public policy. Professor Beer discusses present-day British politics—Labour and Conservative—in terms of the historical evolution of political behavior in Britain since the sixteenth century.

In preparation . . .

USSR 50 YEARS LATER

The Promise and the Reality
Edited by SAMUEL HENDEL *and* RANDOLPH L. BRAHAM,
The City College of The City University of New York
Knopf, Summer 1967; about 400 pages; about $3.95 paperbound

Nine specialists assess the record of the Soviet Union: the political system in general, the economy, social and cultural developments, relations with other Communist states, the USSR in world affairs, and the future of the Soviet Union.
Revised Edition

Recently published . . .

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE SOVIET UNION Revised Edition

Edited by ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, *University of Pennsylvania*
Random House, 1966; 458 pages; $4.95 paperbound

A new edition in paperback of a comprehensive collection of readings on Soviet foreign policy since 1917. The present revision includes selections on the USSR-Cuba dispute, the nuclear test-ban treaty, and the changing Soviet attitude toward India.


Newly revised

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE SOVIET UNION
by LEONARD SCHAPIRO V176; 194 pages; $1.95 paperbound

For further information, write to

RANDOM HOUSE & ALFRED A. KNOPF, Inc.

International Relations



Just published . . . the Fourth Edition of

POLITICS AMONG NATIONS

The Struggle for Power and Peace

by HANS J. MORGENTHAU, *University of Chicago*

Knopf, January 1967; 672 pages; $7.95

Professor Morgenthau appraises the fateful struggle of sovereign states for power and peace in our time in what is still the most comprehensive and useful survey in the field of contemporary international politics.

THE MIGHT OF NATIONS

Revised Edition

World Politics in Our Time

by JOHN G. STOESSINGER, *Hunter College of The City University of New York*

Foreword by Arthur N. Holcombe

Random House, 1965; 460 pages; $6.75

The revised and updated edition of the text won the Bancroft Prize in International Relations. The major problems of international politics, organization, and law are covered, including such recent developments as the liquidation of the African colonies, disarmament negotiations, and the U.N. financial crisis.

CRISIS AND CONTINUITY IN WORLD POLITICS

Readings in International Relations

Edited by GEORGE A. LANYI *and* WILSON C. McWILLIAMS, *both of Oberlin College*

Random House, 1966; 768 pages; $4.95 paperbound

An important new anthology of extraordinary range and scope, offering significant readings on the abiding issues of international relations by writers from Machiavelli to the leading contemporary scholars and commentators.

Theory and Methods of Political Science

In preparation . . .

CONTEMPORARY RADICAL IDEOLOGIES

by A. JAMES GREGOR, *University of Texas*

Random House, Fall 1967; about 450 pages; about $4.95

A description and original analysis of the major radical ideologies of our time: Leninism, Fascism, National Socialism, Apartheid and African Socialism. Drawing extensively on primary source material, the accounts of each system are compact but thorough and balanced in coverage. Especially notable are the chapters on Fascism and Apartheid, since there are few comprehensive accounts in English of these systems *as ideologies.*

Recently published . . .

POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN AMERICA

New Directions

Edited by HEINZ EULAU, *Stanford University*

Random House, 1966; 455 pages; $6.95 hardcover, $4.95 paperbound

A major collection of significant readings on political behavior in the United States, illustrating important trends in research and in the development of theory and methodology. This is a companion volume to Professor Eulau's THE BEHAVIORAL PERSUASION IN POLITICS (A Random House Study in Political Science).

The College Department **501 Madison Avenue** **New York 10022**

DORSEY PRESS

1967 Books in

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM:

Notes and Readings

Edited by BERNARD E. BROWN, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York, and JOHN C. WAHLKE, The University of Iowa

Systematic, analytic, and dynamic, this new text encourages students to view the United States as one political system among many. To this end, the editors have organized the material around the theme "systems analysis." After exploring some problems of methodology, the student has his attention directed to the following topics: (1) legitimacy and consensus, (2) political dynamics, (3) decision-making and policy formulation, and (4) political change. Each of these topics is spelled out as an analytic category in terms of which the American or any other political system may be examined. In viewing and analyzing the American political system in terms of these four categories, the student will be able more easily to compare the United States with other nations, to identify the similarities and differences, and to recognize the unique and the universal. This book is valuable as a supplementary text for introductory courses in American government or political science.

682 pages *Paperbound* *Text price: $4.75*

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING:

A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative, *Revised Edition*

By JAMES A. ROBINSON, The Ohio State University

With more than one third of its material completely rewritten, this text continues to give students excellent and up-to-date insight into the influence of Congress on U. S. foreign policy. New material has been incorporated on legislative-executive relations regarding foreign policy, and on the frequency of communications with members of Congress. This Revised Edition also includes a newer and more extensive analysis of how variations in communications processes among Congressmen affect their voting on foreign policy legislation. The book concludes with a reappraisal of Congress' role in foreign policy.

About 300 pages *Paperbound* *Tentative text price: $3.50*

Write Today to Reserve Your Examination Copies

DORSEY PRESS

Published in The Dorsey Series in Political Science

THE DORSEY PRESS

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

The Dorsey Series in Political Science

THE LANGUAGE OF MODERN POLITICS

An Introduction to the Study of Government

By H. MARK ROELOFS, New York University

This book presents to the beginning student an important point of view: that politics should be studied for what it is—a distinctly human activity in which men attempt to converse about and communicate their problems. The student is also given a conceptual framework with which to discover and interpret information for himself. Roelofs' text is purposely brief, each chapter written with an eye toward the special appendix listing paperbacks which might be assigned as collateral reading. *About 550 pages; Tentative text price: $8.25*

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY

By EUGENE J. MEEHAN, Brandeis University

A critical, analytic study, this book analyzes discussions now taking place in the field about methodological, conceptual, and evaluative problems in the study of politics. It provides a framework useful for examining major works produced recently, and a framework in which the study of political thought can be made relevant to the study of politics generally. *About 600 pages; Tentative text price: $8.50*

THE ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Revised Edition

By GERARD J. MANGONE, Syracuse University

Greatly expanded and completely updated, this new Revised Edition presents additional introductory text material for each section of cases and documents. Current materials have been added to almost every subject, especially in problems of jurisdiction and the legal regulation of international force. The opinions from national and international courts have been combined with cogent essays by the author. *About 550 pages; Tentative text price: $8.25*

PATTERNS OF SOVIET POLITICS, Revised Edition

By RICHARD C. GRIPP, San Diego State College

Expanded and reorganized, this new edition provides recent information on such developments as Khrushchev's downfall, the new five-year plan, the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, and related governmental and political changes since 1936. Discussed are such concepts as political socialization and recruitment and legitimacy regarding the Soviet political system. An expanded final chapter elaborates summary concepts on the patterns of Soviet politics. *About 400 pages; Tentative text price: $7.75*

THE NATURE OF POLITICAL INQUIRY

By FRED M. FROHOCK, Syracuse University

Bringing together both classical and modern political theory at a methodological level, this book defines political inquiry through a discussion of the necessary role of theory in investigation. The wide range of problems scrutinized makes this text an appropriate volume for both undergraduate and graduate courses and seminars. *About 250 pages; Tentative text price: $5.00*

Consulting Editor: Norton E. Long, Brandeis University

HOMEWOOD, ILLINOIS

DORSEY PRESS

FP

Domestic Sources Of Foreign Policy

Edited by James N. Rosenau, *Rutgers University*

The first multidisciplinary approach to the study of the influence of domestic factors in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. Excerpts from several disciplines—political science, sociology, and psychology—discuss such topics as voting and foreign policy, mass communications and foreign policy, and the significance of various interest groups. Among the contributors are Bernard C. Cohen, Scott Greer, Theodore J. Lowi, Herbert McClosky, Lester W. Milbrath, and Warren E. Miller.

Just Published 352 pages (approx.) $7.50 tent.

International Politics And Foreign Policy

A Reader in Research and Theory

Edited by James N. Rosenau, *Rutgers University*

Fifty-five selections from the work of Gabriel Almond, Karl W. Deutsch, Morton Kaplan, Arnold Wolfers and others present a remarkably broad range of contemporary theory and theoretical approach. ". . . brings together a comprehensive selection of articles covering most aspects of the advancing field. . . . I find Rosenau's selection very satisfying, in the sense that I cannot think of anything else I want to put in . . . here is an excellent broad sample of recent writing."

—Kenneth E. Boulding, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*

1961 511 pages $8.95

Contemporary Political Analysis

Edited by James C. Charlesworth, *University of Pennsylvania*

Twenty distinguished contributors including Heinz Eulau, James N. Rosenau, Karl W. Deutsch, David Easton, and Andrew Hacker discuss and evaluate the major contemporary methodologies in political science research. Each of eight research approaches—behavioralism; functional analysis; the quantitative approach; systems theory; decision-making theory; game theory; communications theory; and political development theory—is described, analyzed, and evaluated.

July, 1967 480 pages (approx.) $7.95 tent.

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Quantitative International Politics

Insights and Evidence

Edited by J. David Singer, *University of Michigan*
Volume Six in the Series *International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research,* Heinz Eulau, General Editor

The work of fourteen political scientists and historians has been gathered in the first book-length presentation of data-based studies to touch all areas of international politics. The contributors demonstrate how the rigorous methodology of the behavioral disciplines can be brought to bear on the raw information of world politics to sort out useful data, test hypotheses, and support meaningful generalizations.

May, 1967 352 pages (approx.) $8.50 tent.

Knowledge And Power

Essays on Science and Government

Edited by Sanford A. Lakoff, *State University of New York at Stony Brook*

Fifteen authoritative readings, none of which has ever before appeared in book form, consider the controversies and modern relationships between science and government. Included are an examination of the President's Science Advisory Committee, the Oppenheimer case, Project Mohole, NASA, the nuclear test-ban controversy, and the Congressional inquiry into smoking and health. Daniel S. Greenberg, McGeorge Bundy, Stanley J. Reiser, Carl W. Fischer, Harvey Brooks, and Alan T. Waterman are among the distinguished contributors.

1966 550 pages $9.95

Congressmen And The Electorate

Elections for the U.S. House and the President, 1920-1964

By Milton C. Cummings, Jr., *Johns Hopkins University*

The first thorough analysis of the way Americans have voted for the President and for congressmen from 1920 to 1964. Over-all conclusions about American voting habits are drawn from considerations which include split-ticket voting, incumbent congressmen and the electoral verdict, policy and personality differences between presidential and congressional tickets of the same party, and minor parties.

1966 304 pages $5.95

more from THE FREE PRESS ▶

Three Distinguished Free Press Paperbacks—

FP

Political Ideology

Why the American Common Man Believes What He Does

By Robert E. Lane

"With this volume Lane consolidates his position as a leader of his generation in the development of a social psychology of political life. . . . He has produced our first sustained empirical exploration of the content, sources, and consequences of common political ideologies in psycho-social categories of analysis."—Daniel Lerner, *American Sociological Review*. ". . . a fascinating document that should be read by all of us."—Andrew Hacker, *The American Political Science Review*. "The author has employed a technique that is first-rate in political science. . . . Seldom can the political beliefs of a number of people have been probed in either such breadth or depth . . . may well become a classic of its kind."

—H. B. Mayo, *The Journal of Politics*

320 pages (paper) $2.95

Political Life

Why and How People Get Involved in Politics

By Robert E. Lane

Political Life is the first comprehensive view of popular participation in American democracy. It summarizes, interprets, and organizes hundreds of research studies on the political process as well as the theoretical literature in the field. ". . . careful and thoughtful . . . Lane has produced a study that deserves to be widely used by all students of politics."—*Political Science Quarterly*

374 pages (paper) $2.45

The Nerves Of Government

Models of Political Communication and Control

By Karl W. Deutsch

The Nerves of Government examines the theory that government is more a problem of steering than of power. "Professor Deutsch is one of the important figures in modern political science and this is his most significant book. . . . it needs to be read and reread."—Richard A. Brody, *The American Political Science Review*

334 pages (paper) $2.95

Available at your bookstore or directly from . . .

THE FREE PRESS A Division of The Macmillan Company
866 Third Avenue, New York 10022

Please mention The American Political Science Review *when writing to advertisers*

New—for college courses

GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

Webb S. Fiser, State University of New York at Albany;
Stuart Gerry Brown, University of Hawaii; and
John S. Gibson, Tufts University

Coming in April! This textbook surveys concisely but comprehensively the framework of the American governmental system. Intergovernmental relations are developed as cooperative action between levels of government rather than as compartmentalized treatments of federal, state and local systems. Going beyond discussion of politics, parties, and pressure groups, this book shows how the political process unfolds around concrete policy issues in the context of changing historical developments. Particular attention is given to such currently important problems as urban renewal, metropolitan areas, poverty, race relations, law enforcement, agriculture, and education. The chapter on science and government and those on the international scene create a sense of student involvement in America's place in the world order.

1967. 803 pages. $8.50

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

John M. Pfiffner, University of Southern California; and
Robert Presthus, University of Oregon

Coming in April! A standard for over three decades, this textbook examines administration at all levels of government. The book integrates traditional descriptive-institutional materials of administrative science with behavioral analyses of administration in action. It analyzes such aspects of administration as its historical and institutional framework, the separation of powers, the role of executives (particularly that of the specialist in modern administration), and the problem of obtaining superior talent in government.
Fifth Edition covers decision-making and the data-processing revolution, and discusses the new human-relations approach—incorporating recent research into group behavior, individual motivation, and leadership dynamics.

5th Ed., 1967. 530 pages. $8.00

The Ronald Press Company

.....15 East 26th Street / New York, N.Y. 10010

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

by EMMETTE S. REDFORD, DAVID B. TRUMAN, ANDREW HACKER ALAN F. WESTIN, and ROBERT C. WOOD

Now in use at over 180 colleges and universities, *Politics and Government in the United States* presents a full-scale study of the structure and process of American democracy. The book reflects a breadth of knowledge and experience seldom found in a beginning textbook; at the same time, its skillful balance of fact and interpretation, hard analysis, and vigorous style make it an absorbing introduction to American government. *"An excellent work from almost every conceivable point of view."*—Henry J. Abraham, University of Pennsylvania. With Instructor's Manual.
National Edition: 874 pages, $8.50
National, State & Local Edition: 1,004 pages, $8.95
Student Guide by Robert J. Quinlan: Paperbound, 205 pages, $2.95

THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

by LOUIS KOENIG

"Mr. Koenig's knowledge of the Presidency and its history, a knowledge that includes both the Constitutional Convention and the first months of the Johnson Administration, is not much short of encyclopedic. In fact, I cannot recall a book on the same subject, nor even those . . . that are required reading in the colleges, that brings together so much information and insight in an organized fashion."—Arnold A. Rogow in *Book Week*. Text Edition: 435 pages, $7.50

VIEWS OF AMERICA

Edited by ALAN F. WESTIN, JULIAN H. FRANKLIN PAUL E. SIGMUND, and HOWARD R. SWEARER

Fifty-nine contemporary articles that express the dominant, characteristic opinions of America held in Western Europe, the Communist bloc, and the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. A final section explores American reactions to foreign observers and includes recent analyses of the sources and import of foreign commentary. "This is an unusual, I am almost tempted to say unique, book, in that it gathers together what is for the most part difficult to obtain information and opinion on a most important topic, and makes it useful for and relevant to a number of class users."—Russel B. Nye, Michigan State University. Text Edition: Paperbound, 375 pages, $3.95



Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.

New York / Chicago / San Francisco / Atlanta

MAJOR FOREIGN POWERS
Fifth Edition

by GWENDOLEN M. CARTER and JOHN H. HERZ

Coming in the spring—a thorough revision and updating of the widely respected text for the basic comparative government course. *Major Foreign Powers,* Fifth Edition, describes and compares in detail the governments and politics of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Germany, and France—making frequent reference throughout to relevant aspects of government in the United States and other countries. 720 pages, $9.50 (probable). Publication: April, 1967

POLITICAL PATTERNS IN TODAY'S WORLD

by D. W. BROGAN and DOUGLAS V. VERNEY

Two noted political scientists appraise the operations of democracy and totalitarianism in selected countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, and the U.S.S.R. "I consider *Political Patterns in Today's World* the best supplementary reading to a textbook on comparative government."—Nimrod Raphaeli, University of Michigan. Paperbound, 274 pages, $2.95

POLITICS IN AFRICA: 7 Cases

Edited by GWENDOLEN M. CARTER

"Professor Carter's book offers a lively, highly readable discussion of some of the major current issues in African politics. The case approach is particularly useful for an introductory course, combining as it does a sense for general issues with an appreciation of the circumstances within which each African country, and set of leaders, must operate."—David B. Abernethy, Stanford University. Paperbound, 283 pages, $3.25

POLITICS IN THE SOVIET UNION: 7 Cases

Edited by ALEXANDER DALLIN and ALAN F. WESTIN

"This collection of essays is remarkable not only for the coverage—everything from literature and art to the military—but for the citations from Soviet writings and the reproductions of Soviet cartoons. The extensive and up-to-date bibliographies are also very valuable. I intend to use this not only for comparative government courses, but also for Russian History."—Mother Jane Miller, San Francisco College for Women. Paperbound, 282 pages, $3.25



Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.

New York / Chicago / San Francisco / Atlanta

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE

W. W. KULSKI, Duke University

A highly successful text which analyzes the ideological conflicts, discordant national interests and the social and economic factors that underlie today's revolutionary transformations. Close attention is given to the problems of the underdeveloped nations—the "Third World"—and their role in today's power struggle. *"Of the perhaps dozen books on the subject that this reviewer has read in the past year, this is by far the most knowledgeable and useful. It can be recommended for student, intellectual and technician alike."*—America

650 Pages $7.25

THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY: EAST AND WEST

KURT LONDON, George Washington University

The author scans the policy machinery of the main protagonists of the East-West conflict—United States, Russia, China, Great Britain and France. Special emphasis is given to the vital roles of intelligence and propaganda in the making and implementation of policy, and the agencies and media are carefully defined.

368 Pages Paperbound $1.95

THE SOVIET ECONOMY SINCE STALIN

HARRY SCHWARTZ

Russia's current economic difficulties and the reasons for them are analyzed by the *New York Times'* specialist on Russian affairs. The continuing problem of Soviet agriculture and the ouster of Khrushchev are given close attention.

256 Pages Paperbound $1.95

LA GUARDIA COMES TO POWER: 1933

ARTHUR MANN, University of Chicago

A distinguished historian examines the significant elements of the election that was a turning point in the history of American urban politics. *". . . contains the best account of an urban election we have ever had."*—Atlantic Monthly

192 Pages Paperbound $1.95

THE INTEGRATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITIES

KARL W. DEUTSCH, Yale University; PHILIP E. JACOB, HENRY TEUNE, JAMES V. TOSCANO, WILLIAM L. C. WHEATON, University of Pennsylvania

Integrated political behavior at the metropolitan and international levels is explored in ten essays based on empirical studies in a wide range of fields, including communications, international tensions, planning and regional science, local government, social structure, social psychology and cultural anthropology.

314 Pages Paperbound $1.95

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY College Department, East Washington Square, Philadelphia, Pa. 19105



The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.
and
The Inter-University Case Program, Inc.
announce

Governmental Reorganizations: A Casebook

Edited and with Analytical Commentary / **by FREDERICK C. MOSHER,** *University of California at Berkeley*

The product of a five-year experimental effort sponsored jointly by the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California at Berkeley and the Inter-University Case Program, Inc., this book uses the case study method for systematic research and analysis about the process of administrative reorganization.

A methodological and substantive introduction is followed by 13 case studies, including six not previously published in the ICP series. Part Two of the book is a substantial analysis and commentary on organizations in public administration, the dynamics of organizational change, the participation hypothesis in reorganization, and related factors.

The cases describe a spread of reorganizations—from successful to unsuccessful—in federal, state, and local agencies.

Spring 1967 — *750 pages* — *$12.00 clothbound*
An "on approval" title

Some Recent Case Studies in the ICP Series:

ICP No.	*TITLE*	*AUTHOR*	*PP.*	*PRICE*
89	Reorganization of the U.S. Public Health Service	Edith T. Carper	75	$1.45
91	Defeating the Leadership's Nominee in the House Democratic Caucus	Rep. Richard W. Bolling	15	.50
95	Detroit Experiment: Citizens Plan for a New High School	Roberta S. Sigel	70	2.25
98	The Federal-State Struggle for Offshore Oil	Hubert Marshall and Betty Zisk	53	1.50
99	Labor Lobbying and Labor Reform: The Passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act	Samuel C. Patterson	40	1.00
100	The Office of Education and the Education Act of 1955	Stephen K. Bailey	20	.50
101	Bases in Spain	Theodore J. Lowi	40	.75

For these cases, and new catalog, *Index and Summary of Case Studies, The Inter-University Case Program, Inc.*, listing and describing cases published by ICP from 1948 to the present, write today to:

COLLEGE DIVISION
THE **BOBBS-MERRILL** COMPANY, INC.
SUBSIDIARY OF HOWARD W. SAMS & CO., INC.
4300 WEST 62nd ST. • INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA 46206

THE STATE OF THE UNION:

Commentaries on American Democracy

Edited by Robert B. Dishman, University of New Hampshire. This collection of sixty-four readings on major issues in American life by prominent people in political science, history, economics, politics, education, sociology, and the arts has been organized around key phrases of the Preamble to the Constitution. The editor's essays introduce each subject and discuss the problems and issues involved. There is an additional *Topical Table of Contents* in the back of the book. *1965. x, 546 pages. Paper. $4.85*

PRESSURE GROUPS IN AMERICAN POLITICS

Edited by H. R. Mahood, Memphis State University. This collection of essays by distinguished writers introduces the student to the important role played by pressure groups in public policy-making and brings to his attention the existence of a group theory of politics. It presents both a theoretical and factual framework for a "group" basis of politics—viewing politics as the activity of different groups in conflict. *1967. x, 304 pages. Paper. $2.75*

DEMOCRACY AND ELITISM: Two Essays with Selected Readings

By Harry Girvetz, University of California, Santa Barbara. For courses on the "isms" and political philosophy, this book presents an informative symposium on democracy and elitism. Two long essays by the author present clear and reasoned definitions of democracy and elitism. The readings which follow document and expand points made in the first two essays. In summation an Epilogue asks: Do elitist or democratic tendencies now dominate in the United States? *1967. xi, 349 pages. Paper. $3.50*

NEUTRALISM AND DISENGAGEMENT

Edited by Paul F. Power, University of Cincinnati. This anthology examines the various forms of neutralism and disengagement as they are avowed and practiced by many nations today. The editor has drawn upon government documents, speeches, articles, reports, and excerpts from treatises to represent the different approaches taken to these policies throughout the world. With suggested topics for controlled and library research. *1964. xii, 192 pages. Paper. $2.50*

FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE:

A Study of Elite Attitudes on European Integration and World Politics

By Karl W. Deutsch, Yale University, Lewis J. Edinger, Washington University St. Louis, Roy C. Macridis, Brandeis University, and Richard L. Merritt, Yale University. This study, for courses in international politics or foreign relations, summarizes and discusses elite opinions on such questions as the future of NATO and the Western Alliance, arms control and disarmament, the reunification of Germany, and France after De Gaulle. *1967. xii, 324 pages. Paper. $2.95*

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

COLLEGE DEPARTMENT · 597 FIFTH AVENUE · NEW YORK

From ST. MARTIN'S

St. Martin's Series in American Politics:

The Modern Presidency

Grant McConnell, *The University of Chicago*

A coherent exposition of the modern presidency as it has emerged through the long term of American history, and especially as it has been transformed in the years since the Depression.
1967. 128 pages. Paper: $1.50

Other books in the Series:

The New Congress

Stephen K. Bailey, *Syracuse University*

"This insightful and compact treatment by a sophisticated scholar and practitioner of politics should be a particularly convenient introduction to the subject for both laymen and undergraduates. It contains some points which may be instructive to the more advanced and experienced reader as well. Well written throughout."
—**Herman Somers,** *Princeton University*
1966. 128 pages. Paper: $1.50

Political Parties in the United States

Allen P. Sindler, *Cornell University*

"This is a delightful book to be read both by the specialist and by the non-specialist in the field of politics. Chapter IV on the general characteristics of American National Parties is especially penetrating and thought-provoking.
—**James A. Gathings,** *Bucknell University*
1966. 128 pages. Paper: $1.50

The Convention and the Constitution

The Political Ideas of the Founding Fathers

David G. Smith, *Swarthmore College*

"Places the great issues of the 1787 Constitutional Convention in the perspective of the political theories of the drafters—an illuminating volume."
—**C. Edwin Gilmour,** *Grinnell College*
1965. 128 pages. Paper: $1.75

To be published:

Political Theory *George Kateb, Amherst College Spring 1968. Paper: $1.50 tent.*



College Department
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010

INCENTIVES to thoughtful and spirited discussions

STUDIES IN HISTORY AND POLITICS

Each volume in this distinctive series combines thematic organization, primary sources, scholarly interpretive essays along with editorial introductions and comments in order to provide valuable historical-political perspectives on topics in

- American History
- European History
- American Politics
- Comparative Politics

Latest Titles

BRITISH POLITICS—
People, Parties and Parliament
ANTHONY KING, University of Essex

SOLDIERS AND STATES—
Civil-Military Relations in Modern Europe
DAVID B. RALSTON, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Already Available

CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY
JOHN F. WILSON, Princeton University

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNIST BLOC
ROGER W. PETHYBRIDGE, University College, Swansea

RUSSIA AND THE WEST—
from Peter to Khrushchev
L. JAY OLIVA, New York University

PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION

- **THE DEBATE OVER THERMONUCLEAR STRATEGY**
- **THE MEANING OF McCARTHYISM**
- **INTERVENTION, 1917:** Why America Fought
- **THE WAR OF 1812:** Past Justifications and Present Interpretations
- **PEARL HARBOR:** Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, Revised Edition

All volumes paperbound

D. C. HEATH AND COMPANY
college department

Home Office: Boston, Mass. 02116 Sales Offices: Englewood, N.J. 07631
Indianapolis, Ind. 46219 San Francisco, Calif. 94105 Atlanta, Ga. 30324
Dallas, Tex. 75247 London W.C. 1 Toronto 2-B

The New Inter-Nation Simulation Kit

for teaching and research has been developed

by Harold Guetzkow, Northwestern University
Cleo H. Cherryholmes, Michigan State University

SRA, long a leader in innovation for education, has published INSKit™ to bring a new dimension to teaching and research in the social sciences. The model used is the result of years of continuing research and refinement at Northwestern University.

INSKit provides, besides the basic model, details for conduct and variations of the simulation and step-by-step directions for the several forms used to record, report, and calculate the consequences of the economic, military, and political decisions.


With INSKit, you need only students, time, and space to open the full potentialities of inter-nation simulation . . . at far less cost than you would have to prepare your own model and materials.

Write for prices or for a visit from an SRA College Associate.

SRA

Science Research Associates, Inc.
259 E. Erie St., Chicago, Ill. 60611

A subsidiary of IBM



Now is the time
for all good political scientists—

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS SINCE WORLD WAR II: A Short History

By CHARLES L. ROBERTSON, *Smith College.* INTERNATIONAL POLITICS SINCE WORLD WAR II combines a fairly detailed summary of international events and crises since the war with an overview of broad changes in the political pattern of the world. It takes as a starting point the world of sovereign nation-states that developed in previous centuries. It then shows how recent events result from the combination of older patterns of politics with new developments in mass communications and mass ideologies, increases in population, the rise to power of new major states and the transformation of old empires into a large number of new successor states, and finally, the development of new weapons. *1966. 385 pages. Cloth: $6.95. Paper: $3.95.*

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Edited by JASON L. FINKLE, *The University of Michigan; and* RICHARD W. GABLE, *University of California, Davis.* This reader in political sociology provides a systems approach and a conceptual framework for analyzing the contemporary process of political development and its relationship to other societal transformations. *1966. 599 pages. $8.95.*

METROPOLIS ON THE MOVE: Geographers Look at Urban Sprawl

Edited by JEAN GOTTMANN, *Ecole des Hautes Etudes (Sorbonne); and* ROBERT A. HARPER, *Southern Illinois University.* Considers the form, forces, and pressures created by urban sprawl, examines its impact upon the functioning of the city, and offers an alternative for the future. *1967. 203 pages. Cloth: $6.50. Paper: $3.45.*

CHINESE SOCIETY UNDER COMMUNISM: A Reader

Edited by WILLIAM T. LIU, *University of Notre Dame.* Emphasizes the control apparatus of Chinese society and the various institutional consequences of control from the dynastic periods, through the transitional interlude, to the contemporary Communist regime. *1967. 496 pages. Cloth: $8.50. Paper: $5.50.*

FROM COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY
Readings in International Organization and the Maintenance of Peace

Edited by JOEL LARUS, *Brandeis University.* "This collection of writings and documents constitutes a useful and original approach to the study of contemporary international organization. It is particularly helpful to have in a handy form some of the actual documents."—Lincoln P. Bloomfield, *Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 1965. 556 pages. Cloth: $6.95. Paper: $4.95.*

SOCIAL CHANGE: The Colonial Situation

Edited by IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, *Columbia University.* A comparative and inter-disciplinary approach to the process of change in colonial societies within a world context of modernization. "This is a valuable reference work for anyone seriously interested in developing nations."—*Current History. 1966. 674 pages. $9.50.*

JOHN WILEY & SONS, Inc.

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers.*

—to make sure they haven't missed these important Wiley publications

ARMS CONTROL AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

By KARL W. DEUTSCH, *Yale University*. Based on the results of a major research effort on the acceptability of disarmament and arms control measures in the European political environment, this is the first book to test the judgments of scholars and political analysts against verifiable data. Focusing on France and Germany as the key countries of Europe, it combines five streams of evidence: intensive elite opinion surveys; mass opinion data; content analysis of major newspapers; quantitative data about the actual social and economic behavior of countries and peoples; and the historic and diplomatic record. *1967. Approx. 184 pages. Prob. $5.95.*

ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER

By ANGUS CAMPBELL, PHILIP E. CONVERSE, WARREN E. MILLER, *and* DONALD E. STOKES, *all at the Survey Research Center, The University of Michigan.* In many ways a successor to THE AMERICAN VOTER by the same authors, ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICAL ORDER expresses better than any book yet written the profound shift of electoral research from problems of individual behavior to the problems of a wider political order. *1966. 385 pages. $8.75.*

SIMULATION AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

By ANDREW M. SCOTT, *University of North Carolina; with* WILLIAM A. LUCAS *and* TRUDI M. LUCAS. This book examines the research potential of one kind of simulation for the investigation of social change in modernizing societies. It demonstrates ways that the central features of entire social, political, and economic systems can be simulated. By simplifying the complex processes of development, by compressing the time required for their evolution, and by building a working model of them, the observer can learn about the larger processes by studying the miniature. *1966. 177 pages. $5.95.*

JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL

Law Enforcement in Democratic Society

By JEROME H. SKOLNICK, *University of California, Berkeley.* "To my mind it is by far the best thing that has been done on the police and is a must for anyone who attempts to understand the current controversy over the relation between individual rights and the protection of society. Mr. Skolnick has not only done an able job of research, but has presented his material in a well-written and fascinating form. This study should be a model for those it will inspire over the next generation."—John Kaplan, *Stanford University School of Law. 1966. 279 pages. $7.95.*

now available in paperback . . .

HUMAN NATURE IN POLITICS

By JAMES C. DAVIES, *University of Oregon. 1963. 403 pages. Paper: $4.95. (Cloth: $7.95.)*

THE DYNAMICS OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY

Compiled and edited by DONALD BRUCE JOHNSON, *University of Iowa; and* JACK L. WALKER, *The University of Michigan. 1964. 355 pages. Paper: $4.95. (Cloth: $7.95.*

605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*



Photo by Fred Stein

Hannah Arendt

"An achievement in historiography ...also in political science."

—DAVID RIESMAN, *Commentary*

"A classic" —*Times Literary Supplement*

A new introduction, written from the perspective of the nineteen sixties, and an enlarged bibliography bring up-to-date this classic study of twentieth century politics. The extended essay which introduces this new edition takes into account Stalin's plans during the last years of his life as well as a consideration of the significance of the Chinese revolution and the present crisis which had just started when this edition went to press.

THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM

$8.75 HARCOURT, BRACE & WORLD

CQ BACKGROUND PAPERBACKS FOR FALL 1967

CQ GUIDE TO CURRENT AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
. . . recent significant developments in American Government
120 pages, 8½"x11" $2.00
Fall edition in print late August 1967
(Spring 1967 edition available now)

REPRESENTATION AND APPORTIONMENT
. . . response of the nation to Supreme Court's decisions
August 1966, 96 pages, 8½"x11" $2.50

HOUSING A NATION
. . . federal policy from 1945 through 1965 creation of Department of Housing and Urban Development
March 1966, 96 pages, 8½"x11" $2.50

POLITICS IN AMERICA 1945-1966
. . . elections since 1945 reviewed and related to national and international events; data on results; election law developments
About May 1967, 124 pages, 8½"x11" $2.50
(1945-1964 edition available now)

REVOLUTION IN CIVIL RIGHTS
. . . developments since 1945 through 1965 Voting Rights Act
September 1965, 96 pages, 8½"x11". $2.50
(To be updated through 1966 about June 1967)

LEGISLATORS AND THE LOBBYISTS
. . . how Congress is pressured and by whom; the military-industrial lobby; case studies of legislation
August 1965, 80 pages, 8½"x11" $2.50

Examination copies available to faculty members upon request

EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE
1735 K Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20006

DOUBLEDAY ANCHOR BOOKS

THE FIRST NAME IN QUALITY PAPERBACK PUBLISHING

FROM RACE RIOT TO SIT-IN: 1919 and the 1960s

A Study in the Connections Between Conflict and Violence

Arthur I. Waskow

An analysis of the race riots of 1919 and the recent movement of "creative disorder," offering entirely new evidence and new "inventions" by which racial justice can be achieved without national catastrophe. "Brilliant and creative."—*Washington Star* $1.45

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF INDIA

W. H. Morris-Jones

This study of the operation of political institutions in independent India concentrates on how local loyalties, the caste system, overpopulation, language barriers, and other factors influence the formal framework of government. $1.25

URBAN RENEWAL: PEOPLE, POLITICS AND PLANNING

Edited by Jewel Bellush and Murray Hausknecht

This reader on the political controversies and sociological realities of revitalizing the American city deals with such topics as constitutional questions, slum clearance, leadership problems, citizen participation, and the effects of public housing. *An Anchor Original.* $1.95

THE RADICAL PAPERS

Edited with an Introduction by Irving Howe

Michael Harrington, Bayard Rustin, Harvey Swados, Paul Goodman, Christopher Jencks, Daniel Bell, George Lichtheim, and fifteen other Americans call for radical social reforms as they write on education, urban renewal, civil rights, and poverty. $1.45

DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC.

Garden City, New York

Our Laidlaw division, River Forest, Illinois, serves the textbook needs of today's schools.



THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT

By ARTHUR F. BENTLEY

Edited by PETER H ODEGARD

The Process of Government, an extraordinarily original introduction to interest group analysis in political science, was written in 1908 by Arthur F. Bentley, a pioneer in contemporary behavioral science. Largely ignored for two decades, the book is now generally regarded as a seminal contribution to modern political analysis. *A John Harvard Library Book.* $6.95

FARM POLICIES AND POLITICS IN THE TRUMAN YEARS

By ALLEN J. MATUSOW

In the years immediately following World War II, Mr. Matusow relates the process by which the government overcame internal political disharmony and the alienation of the farmers to save Europe from famine. Included is an assessment of the role of the farm issues in the 1948 election and the origin and ultimate defeat of the controversial Brannan Plan. *Harvard Historical Studies, 80.* $7.50

THE SOVIET BLOC

Unity and Conflict

Revised and Enlarged Edition

By ZBIGNIEW K. BRZEZINSKI

Mr. Brzezinski, who is currently serving on the State Department's Policy Planning Council, has revised and updated his important study wherever necessary and added three extensive new chapters on recent developments. He gives particular attention to the Sino-Soviet dispute. *Russian Research Center Studies, 37. Center for International Affairs.* $9.95

THE UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN

Revised Edition

By DEXTER PERKINS

This revision of an important study shows how the immense economic disparities between this country and its southern neighbors, the threat of Communism, and our ever-increasing involvement in Europe and Asia have given a new color to our relations with the peoples of the Caribbean. *American Foreign Policy Library.* $4.75

HARVARD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

LOOKING FOR A BOOK PUBLISHER?

It is no secret that publication is regarded as the foundation stone of a scholar's career. In order to gain recognition, prestige, and advancement, the scholar must seek publication.

Here at Exposition Press, we offer scholars a complete publishing service, under our special academic imprint, "Exposition-University Books." Though the proportion of scholarly publications in the lists of the trade houses is shrinking, due to economic pressures, many of our recent titles in the academic fields have gained popular reviews, professional recognition and steady sales. These books are the result of a publishing plan that is bringing a steady flow of scholarly writers to Exposition Press. They reflect the high editorial standards and quality of design and production which have won the respect of libraries, schools, booksellers and critics. Ask for free catalogs.

FREE! The behind-the-scenes story of book publishing revealed in two fact-filled, illustrated brochures, containing a detailed description for our subsidy plan including a breakdown of contract terms and typical costs (in print for the first time). Copies are available on request. Your inquiries and manuscripts are invited. An editorial appraisal will be furnished promptly without obligation. References upon request.

Please write to Dept. 93C

EXPOSITION PRESS, *Main Office, 386 Park Ave. So., New York 16, N.Y.*
California office: 9172 Sunset Blvd., Los Angeles 69, Calif.

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal on International Relations
Under the Editorial Sponsorship of the
CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Vol. XIX **April 1967** **No. 3**

CONTENTS

Containment in Asia Reconsidered ..... DAVID P. MOZINGO
On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia ..... JOHAN GALTUNG
French Strategy Emergent: General André Beaufre—A Critique ..... EDWARD Y. KOLODZIEJ
The Political Order and the Burden of External Relations ..... PAUL Y. HAMMOND
Social Science Research Abroad: Problems and Remedies ..... KLAUS KNORR

Research Note

Political Integration and Political Stability: A Hypothesis ..... CLAUDE AKE

Review Articles

The Communist Phoenix and the Indonesian Garuda ..... ANN RUTH WILLNER
The Tragedy of Syria ..... LEONARD BINDER

Subscriptions, $7.50 a year (two years, $12.50), single copies $2.50

WORLD POLITICS
Corwin Hall, Princeton, New Jersey 08540

SPRING, 1967, TEXTS FROM DODD MEAD

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

by DELL G. HITCHNER *and* CAROL LEVINE

The extraordinary success of *Modern Government: A Survey of Political Science*, Second Edition, 1965, by Dell G. Hitchner and William H. Harbold, The University of Washington, has led Professor Hitchner and Carol Levine to prepare a derivative paperback designed for the comparative government course. It may be used with the various short books devoted to the government of a single country that are commonly used in that course. The perspective is entirely comparative and analytical. The authors refer to a wide range of governments, especially the developing countries. Included is a treatment of communist governments and politics.

April *approx. 250 pages* *paperback* *tentative price $2.95*

THE SELECTIVE SERVICE ACT

A CASE STUDY OF THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS

by CLYDE E. JACOBS *and* JOHN F. GALLAGHER

The authors offer a case study of the legislative enactment of the Selective Service Act of 1948 and of executive implementation and judicial interpretation of this legislation. The study is designed to show the student how each of the three branches of government participates in the policy-making process. It is designed for use in introductory courses in American government and in advanced courses in American government and in public policy formulation. Clyde E. Jacobs is at the University of California, Davis, and John F. Gallagher is a member of the commission on the New York State Constitutional Convention.

April *approx. 200 pages* *paperback* *tentative price $2.50*

DODD, MEAD & COMPANY, INC.

79 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

IN CANADA: 25 Hollinger Road, Toronto 16, Ontario

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

CROWELL STUDIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

The titles in this new series focus upon topics that are crucial to the understanding of political processes. The volumes, which are primarily analytical, have been designed for use by undergraduates; they are clearly and succinctly written, and they make use of the most recent research and data. Teachers of Political Science should find the books in this series valuable for supplementary assignments in survey courses as well as courses on the advanced level.

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM IN TRANSITION

Harry Lazer, City College of New York

How adaptable has the American political system, conceived in the eighteenth century, been to the dramatic changes of the last two hundred years? How well has our method of government adjusted to the shift from a rural agricultural society to an urban industrial one? This volume attempts to find the answers to these questions by analyzing the impact of social and economic change upon the institutions of our government. Mr. Lazer first traces the historical development of these changes, noting the effects they have had on the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. He then asks this important question: In what ways have the branches of government succeeded in rising to the challenges of the twentieth century and in what ways have they failed?

April, 1967 *256 pages* *about $2.50*

PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES

Road to the White House

James W. Davis, Central Michigan University

In the twentieth century the Presidency has emerged as the keystone of the American system of government. This raises a crucial question for students of politics: By what process does the victorious candidate reach the White House? This book analyzes the first essential step in this process—the winning of the presidential nomination. Mr. Davis contends that in the past three decades the successful candidates have laid the groundwork for victory in the presidential primaries. By using the primaries to bypass state leaders and party professionals supporting other candidates, the eventual nominees have placed the choice of the presidential nomination in the hands of the voters in the primary states, even though less than a third of the states use the primary system. Thus, the national conventions have tended to become ratifying bodies rather than deliberative assemblies convened to choose the "best qualified" candidates. To support this thesis, the author has, in this volume, undertaken the first comprehensive study of the primary system since 1926.

April, 1967 *304 pages* *about $2.50*

AMERICAN FEDERALISM

A View from the States

Daniel J. Elazar, Temple University

Though federalism is a concept integral to the American system of Government, it is, nonetheless, not often fully understood. At a time when national programs in such important areas as education, civil rights, welfare, and public improvements carry strong implications for the federal system, it is essential that students of government know what federalism is, and how it relates to today's politics. This penetrating analysis views the federal system from the vantage point of the states, the basic components of the federal union.

1966 *288 pages* *$2.50*

THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY

201 Park Avenue South New York 10003

Political Opinion and Electoral Behavior: Essays and Studies

NEW: Edited by Edward Dreyer, San Diego State College, and Walter Rosenbaum, University of Florida. 1966. 506 pages. 6 x 9. Paperbound.
"A collection of almost uniformly important articles. Tied together with interpretative comments of conceptual clarity and unity—a very rare accomplishment for a book of readings."—Bernard C. Hennessy, Pennsylvania State University

Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform

NEW: By Roger Davidson and David Kovenock, Dartmouth College, and Michael O'Leary, Syracuse University. 1966. 224 pages. 5⅝ x 8⅜. Paperbound.
"... this manuscript is the most sensible discussion of Congressional reform I have read. At last someone has sought to make the value judgments underlying various reform proposals explicit, and to clarify systematically the alternative roles Congress might play in the American political system."
—Donald R. Matthews, University of North Carolina

Just published: **Political Television**

By Bernard Rubin, Boston University. 1967. 208 pages. 6 x 9. Paperbound.

Political Modernization

Readings in Comparative Political Change edited by Claude Welch, SUNY at Buffalo. 1967. 384 pages. 6 x 9. Paperbound.

Also of interest: **Public Opinion**

By Bernard Hennessy, Pennsylvania State University. 1965. 384 pages. 6 x 9. Clothbound.

Comparative World Politics

Readings in Western and Premodern Nonwestern International Relations edited by Joel Larus, New York University. 1964. 6 x 9. 286 pages. Paperbound.

For review copies write to box APSR-1
Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc.
Belmont, California 94002

PRAEGER

Two outstanding books on Italian politics by NORMAN KOGAN

A POLITICAL HISTORY OF POSTWAR ITALY

The author, Professor of Political Science at the University of Connecticut, analyzes the major political and economic events of the past two decades, including the establishment of Italy's first Center-Left government and the "economic miracle" that has transformed northern and central Italy. He also explores why—despite improved economic conditions—the political stability of the country remains precarious. 252 pp. $6.00 clothbound

THE POLITICS OF ITALIAN FOREIGN POLICY

This penetrating book undertakes to show that the key objective of Italian foreign policy is to protect the domestic social structure. "A useful, worth-while study."—*Library Journal.* 190 pp. tables, index. $5.00 clothbound

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, Publishers
111 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003

ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FEDERALISTS
Selected Documents
Edited by John D. Lewis, *Oberlin College*

Documents concerning the famous debate over the adoption of the Constitution in 1787-1788. The arguments of the defenders of the Constitution are drawn chiefly, but not exclusively, from *The Federalist,* by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay. The anti-Federalist arguments are from various sources.
Approx. 320 pp. *paper approx.* **$3.50**

GARRISONS AND GOVERNMENT: Politics and the Military in New States
Edited by WILSON C. MCWILLIAMS, *Oberlin College*

A survey of the political role of military organizations in developing countries, set in a broad comparative and historical framework, designed to help the reader understand the influence of the military on politics in new and old nations.
Approx. 330 pp. *paper approx.* **$2.50**

THE LAW OF THE POOR
Edited by Jacobus tenBroek, *University of California,* Berkeley and the Editors of *California Law Review*

The purpose of this symposium was to provide a critical review of the rules and procedures, doctrines and presuppositions of the law of the poor. Sponsored by the Center for the Study of Law and Society, it included scholars from the fields of law, social science, and social work.
704 pp. *paper* **$4.95,** *cloth* **$10.00**



CHANDLER PUBLISHING COMPANY
124 Spear Street, San Francisco, California 94105

MARX'S ECONOMIC PREDICTIONS

by Fred M. Gottheil

During the course of his creative years (1843–83), Marx produced a large quantity of economic, political, and historical books, essays, pamphlets, addresses, and correspondence. Dispersed among these writings were many prophecies, both abstract and specific. *Marx's Economic Predictions* evaluates over 150 of his predictions as logical derivatives of his theoretical system.

xv + 216 pages $7.50

THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY

Criminal Procedure and Converging Constitutional Doctrines

by Walter V. Schaefer

In *The Suspect and Society,* the author deals with the legal problems that cluster about police interrogation of persons suspected of having committed crimes; he considers the constitutional doctrines that bear upon this practice as it has been conducted in the past; and he discusses the model code of procedure advanced by the American Law Institute. The proposals offered in this book should be of interest to everyone concerned with the application of our constitutional ideals to our legal institutions.

100 pages $3.50

PERSPECTIVES ON THE COURT

by Max Freedman, William M. Beaney, and Eugene V. Rostow

During the past twenty years the Supreme Court has been involved in reformulating our fundamental law as it relates to civil rights, separation of church and state, reapportionment, and criminal procedures. Here, the Court's performance is viewed by three eminent men from the vantage points of journalism, political science, and law.

120 pages $3.50

APPROACHES TO COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

R. Barry Farrell, editor

In this volume, twelve internationally respected political scientists analyze the relationship between national and international politics. These scholars are Karl W. Deutsch, James N. Rosenau, Carl J. Friedrich, George I. Blanksten, Pablo González Casanova, Norton E. Long, R. Barry Farrell, Vernon V. Aspaturian, Roland Young, Chadwick F. Alger, Raoul Naroll, and Oliver Benson.

368 pages cloth, $9.95 paper, $3.95

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS

Evanston, Illinois

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN PAPERBACKS IN CONTEMPORARY GOVERNMENT . . .

THE GOVERNMENT OF REPUBLICAN ITALY, Second Edition. John Clarke Adams and Paolo Barile. 251 pages, 1966, $2.50.

BRITISH PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY, Second Edition. Sydney D. Bailey. 281 pages, 1966 Impression, $2.50.

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF SWITZERLAND. George Arthur Codding, Jr. 174 pages, 1965 Impression, $2.50.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF CHILE. Frederico G. Gil. 323 pages, 1966, $2.95.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN ISRAEL. Oscar Kraines. 246 pages, 1961, $2.50.

CONTEMPORARY GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN. Theodore McNelly. 228 pages, 1963, $2.50.

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN MALAYSIA. R. S. Milne. 259 pages, 1967, $2.75.

THE MEXICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM. L. Vincent Padgett. 244 pages, 1966, $2.75.

THE INDIAN POLITICAL SYSTEM. Norman D. Palmer. 277 pages, 1961, $2.50.

CONTEMPORARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY. Elmer Plischke. 248 pages, 1964 Impression, $2.25.

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF PAKISTAN. Khalid B. Sayeed. About 300 pages, Spring 1967.

SOUTH VIETNAM: Nation Under Stress. Robert Scigliano. 227 pages, 1963, $2.50.

NORWEGIAN DEMOCRACY. James A. Storing. 246 pages, 1963, $2.50.

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN

Boston Atlanta Dallas Geneva, Ill. New York Palo Alto

New

THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, 1920-1966

Robert A. Scalapino

In this authoritative account of the evolution of the Japanese Communist Party from its beginnings nearly half a century ago to its present situation, an acute student of Asian society provides an arresting portrait of a political party that, by orthodox Marxist criteria, should have risen to first importance but never did. While according most attention to domestic developments both within and outside the party, Mr. Scalapino also relates them meaningfully to their international context. His account of the inability of the party to draw lasting political advantage from the opportunities that have presented themselves over the years is notable for its grasp of Japanese political realities. Drawing on a wide range of primary sources, written with a sense of the dramatic qualities of the story, and demonstrating a mastery of its subject, this book represents a milestone in the study of Asian politics.

A publication of the Center for Japanese and Korean Studies **$6.50**

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA

James R. Townsend

The first systematic study of mass political participation in Communist China, a crucial aspect of its political development. Mr. Townsend discusses the Chinese Communist style of participation, relating it to historical precedents in the pre-Communist setting, Soviet Marxism, and the experience of the Chinese Communist Party. He then considers how the Chinese Communist concept of participation has been implemented since the establishment of the present government.

A publication of the Center for Chinese Studies. **$5.50**

CALIFORNIA SLAVIC STUDIES: Volume IV

N. V. Riasanovsky and **Gleb Struve,** Editors

This series presents articles broadly representative of the field of Slavic and East European affairs. Vol. IV contains articles by Kathryn B. Feuer, Waclaw Lednicki, Edward Chmielewski, Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Xenia Gasiorowska, George Gomori, and Henrik Birnbaum. **$5.00**



from California

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS
Berkeley 94720



POLITICAL SCIENCE TEXTS FROM PRENTICE-HALL

AMERICA'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Edited by Dankwart A. Rustow

This new series is the work of eleven distinguished authors whose specialized knowledge and practical experience are applied to a broad and diversified coverage of the fields of American foreign policy and international relations.

FOR 1967 PUBLICATION:

AFRICA AND UNITED STATES POLICY, Rupert Emerson, Harvard University. Emerson maintains that Africa remains the continent of least concern to the United States, but the Congo and southern Africa hold the threat of becoming major global trouble centers. April

FOREIGN AID IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, John D. Montgomery, Harvard University. Montgomery explains political and economic tactics used to promote stability and encourage development, viewing many phases of foreign aid. But the nature of our commitments is the main concern of the book. January

FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION:

THE BURDEN OF DECISION: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1945, by Charles Burton Marshall, Johns Hopkins University

LATIN AMERICA AND UNITED STATES POLICY, by Kalman H. Silvert, Dartmouth University

THE MAKING OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, by William C. Olson, Columbia University

THE WEB OF INTERDEPENDENCE: THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, by Ernst B. Haas, University of California, Berkeley

ASIA AND UNITED STATES POLICY, by Wayne A. Wilcox, Columbia University

COLD WAR AND COEXISTENCE: RUSSIA, CHINA, AND THE UNITED STATES, by William E. Griffith, Massachusetts Institutes of Technology

EUROPE AND UNITED STATES POLICY, by Stanley Hoffman, Harvard University

MILITARY STRATEGY IN WORLD POLITICS, by Walter Goldstein, Brooklyn College

THE NEW SETTING OF WORLD POLITICS, by Dankwart A. Rustow, Columbia University

Books in the series are in an attractive, uniform format of 6" x 9", approximately 128 pages each, paperbound $1.95, cloth $4.50

THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL SCIENCE SERIES

Edited by Robert A. Dahl

The aim of this series is to provide a collection of texts that will integrate the major aspects of modern political science, making available to the beginning student the fruits of the most recent empirical and theoretical studies in political science.

FOR 1967 PUBLICATION:

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT, Dankwart Rustow, Columbia University. This book offers a comparison of political dynamics of democracies, totalitarian dictatorships, and the developing countries. The author emphasizes such universal themes as modernization, the formation of nation states, and the recruitment of leadership.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, Karl W. Deutsch, Yale University. Dr. Deutsch briefly and systematically introduces the major analytic concepts and basic data of world politics, with the aim of helping the student test his opinion against evidence.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, James Fesler, Yale University. This volume combines three objectives: administration's relation to society and the political system; the institutional arrangements for large-scale administrations; and the motivation and behavior of individuals who participate in the administrative process.

INTEREST GROUPS, by Graham Wootton, Oxford University

SYSTEMS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, by Oran Young, Princeton University

To supplement the series:

READINGS IN MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS, Edited by Robert A. Dahl, Yale University, and Deane E. Neubauer, University of California, Irvine

PUBLISHED TITLES IN THE SERIES

THE AGE OF IDEOLOGY, by Frederick M. Watkins, Yale University

THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, by Fred I. Greenstein, Wesleyan University

CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY, by Nelson W. Polsby, Wesleyan University

MODERN POLITICAL ANALYSIS, by Robert A. Dahl, Yale University

PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, by Charles L. Black, Jr., Yale University

POLITICS AND POLICIES IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, by Herbert Kaufman, Yale University

PUBLIC OPINION, by Robert E. Lane, Yale University and David O. Sears, University of California, Los Angeles

To supplement the series:

READINGS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR, Edited by Raymond E. Wolfinger, Stanford University

Each of the volumes in the series is designed in a uniform 6" x 9" format, approx. 128 pp., paperbound $1.75, cloth $4.50

COMPARATIVE ASIAN GOVERNMENT SERIES

Edited by Robert E. Ward and Roy C. Macridis

This series provides a comparative and functionally oriented analysis of twenty-one contemporary Asian political systems including Japan, India, the Chinese People's Republic, eight Southeast Asian and ten Southwest Asian countries.

FOR 1967 PUBLICATION:

INDIA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM, Richard L. Park, University of Michigan. This book provides an introduction to the modern political system of India with stress given to the historical, social, and economic background, plus an emphasis in analysis given to political behavior. Fall 1967

JAPAN'S POLITICAL SYSTEM, Robert E. Ward, University of Michigan. Ward views the Japanese political system as a distinguishable but interrelated segment of the total Japanese social system and goes to unusual pains to clarify the ways in which Japanese politics are shaped and affected by such factors as social structure, values, history, and economics. May 1967

SOUTHEAST ASIA'S POLITICAL SYSTEMS, Lucian W. Pye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The principal focus of this study is on comparative patterns of modernization in Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia in this sense is seen as providing a laboratory for distinguishing different patterns of modernization. June 1967

SOUTHWEST ASIA'S POLITICAL SYSTEMS, Dankwart A. Rustow, Columbia University. This book aims to provide an accurate, objective, and up-to-date description and comparative analysis of the Southwest Asian political systems in accordance with an organizational framework that will make these data meaningful for comparing the Southwest Asian political systems to other political systems, including our own. Forthcoming

CHINA'S POLITICAL SYSTEMS, by Allen S. Whiting, Former Director of the Office of Research and Analysis for the Far East, Department of State, 1962-66. The author examines the struggle of China to achieve political and economic modernization. Forthcoming

All volumes in this series approx. 128 pages, paperbound $1.95, cloth $4.95.

FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Edited by Wallace S. Sayre

The Foundations of Public Administration Series explores recent developments in the field including the lineage between public administration and the political system, the sociological and social-psychological aspects of public administration, and the attempts to develop cross-cultural concepts of administration.

FOR 1967 PUBLICATION:

THE POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATION, by Wallace S. Sayre, Columbia University

THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY, by Francis E. Rourke, The Johns Hopkins University

PUBLISHED TITLE

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, by Ferrel Heady, University of New Mexico. 1966

FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION

THE ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY, by Harvey Mansfield, Columbia University

NATIONAL SECURITY: POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION (author to be announced)

The volumes in the series are in a paperbound format of 6" x 9", approx. 128 pp., each volume $1.95

THE CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY SERIES

Edited by David Easton

This new series in political science is devoted to empirically oriented theory. The primary objective is to serve as in impulse in the direction of further elaboration and enrichment of theoretical thinking.

FOR 1967 PUBLICATION:

SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND POLITICS: THE THEORIES OF TALCOTT PARSONS, William C. Mitchell, University of Oregon. Although Parsons has become one of the most controversial sociologists of his time, the author claims his importance is not limited to sociologists alone. Mitchell provides a detailed study of Parsons' writings synthesizing them from a political perspective. January 1967, 240 pp., cloth $5.95

PUBLISHED TITLES IN THE SERIES:

A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS, edited by David Easton, University of Chicago. 1966, 143 pp., cloth $5.95

VARIETIES OF POLITICAL THEORY, edited by David Easton, University of Chicago. 1966, 192 pp., cloth $5.25

FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION

INTERNATIONAL THEORY, by Arthur L. Burns, Australian National University

MODERN THEORY OF EQUALITY, by Wendell Bell, Yale University

MODERN THEORY OF REPRESENTATION, by John C. Wahlke, University of Iowa

TOWARD A THEORY OF POLITICAL COMPETITION, by Heinz Eulau, Stanford University

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY, by J. David Singer, University of Michigan

OUTSTANDING BOOKS TO BE PUBLISHED IN 1967

TODAY'S ISMS; COMMUNISM, FASCISM, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, 5th Edition, 1967 by William Ebenstein, University of California, Santa Barbara

The new 5th Edition of this classic study offers an up-to-date overview of the world's major political systems: Communism, Fascism, Capitalism, and Socialism. The basic approach treats these four important *Isms* as ways of life rather than as specific governmental, economic or social institutions.

March 1967, Approx. 272 pp., paperbound $3.75

CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 4th Edition, 1967 by Winston W. Crouch, University of California, Los Angeles; Dean E. McHenry, University of California, Santa Cruz; John C. Bollens, University of California, Los Angeles; Stanley Scott, University of California, Berkeley

Four noted authorities whose combined experience includes teaching, research, and public service over many years provide an inside view of the politics and problems of the most populous state in the nation. The emphasis is on current issues and political techniques with proper attention to the day-by-day operations of state and local governments. March 1967, approx. 336 pp., paperbound $3.75

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL ANALYSIS, 4th Edition, 1967 by Robert E. Lane, Yale University; James D. Barber, Yale University; Fred I. Greenstein, Wesleyan University.

This revised edition presents concrete case studies of government in action, which focus attention on significant political concepts and issues. The volume stresses the student's own role in developing and testing generalizations about political behavior and appraising political processes and policies. March 1967, approx. 385 pp., paperbound $5.50

FOREIGN POLICY IN WORLD POLITICS, 3rd Edition, 1967 Edited by Roy C. Macridis, Brandeis University

Introducing the student to the problems of foreign policy in the context of existing world relations, the Third Edition focuses upon ten contemporary national states and probes the factors that determine their foreign policy. The attitudes, purposes, and motivations which are peculiar to each of these nations, as well as the national characteristics which they have in common with other nations, are examined in relation to the mutual political and economic interests common to all nations. Each chapter is written by a specialist on the background, temperament, and foreign policy of the nation discussed. April 1967, approx. 416 pp., paperbound $4.95

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, by Ernest B. Fincher, Montclair State College

By using a quantity of factual information and anecdotal material the author underscores the dynamic character of American government and its relationship to the lives of ordinary citizens. The text covers in depth major aspects of national government such as political parties; interest groups, federal courts, and the presidency. January 1967, 320 pp., paperbound $3.95

FOREIGN POLICY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, 3rd Edition, 1967 by Charles O. Lerche, Jr.

The completely revised Third Edition bases its analysis upon the role of the "American people" in foreign affairs and examines the responses of the United States to the challenges of an unstable world. Emphasis is on the broader scope of considerations in national foreign policy and Soviet-American confrontations. January 1967, 387 pp., $8.25

PARTIES AND THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM: A BOOK OF READINGS, by Garold W. Thumm, Bates College, and Edward Janosik, University of Pennsylvania

Composed of articles from scholarly journals and excerpts from important political science books, PARTIES AND THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM is a new and refreshing anthology that brings together selected materials dealing with the theory and practice of political parties—their nature and functions, their organization, their operations, and their ecology. May 1967, approx. 320 pp., paperbound $3.95

FUNCTION AND POLICIES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 3rd Edition, 1967 by J. W. Peltason, University of California, Irvine, and James M. Burns. Williams College

FUNCTIONS AND POLICIES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT describes comprehensively what American government does and what its specific policies are. It discusses governmental policies, functions, and programs against a background of history and politics, which encompass events as recent as those in the Johnson administration. May 1967, approx. 464 pp., $6.95

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, by K. J. Holsti, University of British Columbia

Offers an integrated framework for analyzing the behavior of states, with emphasis on the systemic and domestic sources of external political goals, the bargaining methods used to achieve or defend objectives and interests, restraints on policies, and behavior and procedures conducive to the resolution of international conflicts. May 1967, approx. 512 pp., $8.95

ISSUES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, by Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. von der Mehden, Crawford Young, all of the University of Wisconsin

Here is one of the first genuinely comparative studies of the politics of developing nations. The common and distinctive experiences of the emerging nations of Africa, Asia, and Latin America are examined to show both common features and subtle shades of differences in the way these nations confront critical problems of political development. The authors explore such crucial themes as national integration, political order, and the problems of finding a workable idealogy of development. May 1967, approx. 280 pp., paperbound $3.95

For approval copies, write:

Box 903
Prentice-Hall
Englewood Cliffs
New Jersey 07632



Proceedings of the Virginia State Convention of 1861 February 13 to May 1

Edited by George H. Reese

Head, Historical Publications Division, Virginia State Library

liv, 3155 pp. 6⅛ × 9¼, 4 vols., Boxed. $60.00 the set

Proceedings of the Virginia State Convention of 1861: February 13 to May 1 brings together for the first time the complete texts of Virginia's historic "secession debates."

An authoritative introduction is included along with a synoptical guide of each day's proceedings—a valuable aid in following the progress of the sessions.

To all intents and purposes, Virginia's official withdrawal from the Federal Union on May 23, 1861, was a mere formality. The actual drama took place at the Convention, and all the turmoil and excitement of that crucial decision has been recaptured in these speeches. These four volumes provide the standard text for one of the most important legislative sessions ever held in this country.

Published by the Virginia State Library

Distributed by the University Press of Virginia

Annexation in Virginia

The Use of the Judicial Process for Readjusting City-County Boundaries

Chester W. Bain

Olin D. Johnston, Professor of Political Science, University of South Carolina

xiv, 258 pp., 6 × 9¼, index, L.C. 66-12468, $6.00

Unique to the state of Virginia is complete reliance on judicial procedure for readjusting municipal boundaries. Chester W. Bain, in *Annexation in Virginia,* gives a critical analysis of this procedure and its applicability to other states.

The General Assembly of Virginia adopted a statute in 1904 transferring the responsibility for annexation from the political realm to the judicial and established a special court of law presided over by judges selected from the state's judicial system to handle the cases. Mr. Bain closely examines legislative history from 1904 to June 30, 1965, with attention to the forces that have influenced the adoption and amendment of the statute. The issues and questions that have arisen under the statute are presented, and the way in which the courts have decided the issues is evaluated. *Annexation in Virginia* was published for the Institute of Government of the University of Virginia.

University Press of Virginia Charlottesville

OUTSTANDING McGRAW-HILL TEXTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Second Edition

By **Charles R. Adrian,** *University of California, Riverside.* Available Winter.

McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE, Second Edition

By **Carlton Clymer Rodee, Totton James Anderson,** *and* **Carl Quimby Christol,** *all of University of Southern California.* Available Spring.

McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.

VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: Second Edition

Edited by **Reo M. Christenson,** *Miami University* **Robert O. McWilliams,** *Eastern Michigan University.* Available Spring.

McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.

Elements of American Government, Seventh Edition. 512 pages. *$7.95*

The American Federal Government, Ninth Edition. Coming this spring.

The American System of Government, Ninth Edition. Coming this spring.

All three by **John H. Ferguson,** *The Pennsylvania State University;* and **Dean E. McHenry, University of California at Santa Cruz.**

THE DYNAMICS OF MODERN GOVERNMENT

By **Eugene J. Meehan,** *Brandeis University;* **John P. Roche,** *Brandeis University;* and **Murray S. Stedman, Jr.,** *Trinity College.* 450 pages, $7.50

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS

By **Charles R. Adrian,** *University of California, Riverside;* and **Charles Press,** *Michigan State University.* 756 pages. *$7.95*

FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Joseph P. Harris, *Consulting Editor*

Revisions and additions have been made to keep this series up to date and to enlarge its scope, but its purpose remains the same as it was on first publication: To provide a group of relatively short treatises dealing with major aspects of government in modern society.

Andrew Hacker: *The Study of Politics: The Western Tradition and American Origins*

C. Herman Pritchett: *The American Constitutional System,* Second Edition

Hugh A. Bone and Austin Ranney: *Politics and Voters,* Second Edition

Rowland Egger: *The President of the United States*

Joseph P. Harris: *Congress and the Legislative Process*

John J. Corson and Joseph P. Harris: *Public Administration in Modern Society*

Charles O. Lerche, Jr.: *America in World Affairs,* Second Edition

Charles R. Adrian: *Governing Our Fifty States and Their Communities,* Second Edition

H. Frank Way, Jr.: *Liberty in the Balance: Current Issues in Civil Liberties,* Second Edition

AMERICAN POLITICS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM, Third Edition

By **Hugh A. Bone,** *University of Washington.* McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science. 700 pages, $8.95

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF CALIFORNIA, Third Edition

By **Henry A. Turner,** *University of California, Santa Barbara;* and **John A. Vieg,** *Pomona College and Claremont Graduate School, Calif.*

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: Perspectives and Analysis

By **William P. Gerberding,** *University of California, Los Angeles.*

McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science. 400 pages. *$7.95*



McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY

330 West 42nd Street, New York, N. Y. 10036

PRAEGER

New Paperbacks in International Relations

IN PURSUIT OF WORLD ORDER

U.S. Foreign Policy and International Organizations
Revised Edition

By RICHARD N. GARDNER. Introduction by Harlan Cleveland. Now thoroughly updated: "An admirable guide to the intentions and hopes of the United States in the United Nations. . . . Lucid, readable, and authoritative." ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, in *The New Republic*. 281 pp. U-616 $2.25

THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Edited by EVAN LUARD. Ten distinguished authorities—among them, Sydney D. Bailey, Geoffrey Goodwin, Inis L. Claude, Jr., and Andrew Shonfield—trace the history, structure, and functions of the most important international bodies, including the U.N. and the World Bank. "The approach is fresh and unique."—*Library Journal* 342 pp. notes, bibliog., index. U-620/ $2.95

THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE

By LEONARD BEATON. The Well Known Consultant at The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, explores what the world's leaders have learned, or failed to learn, from the Cuban missile crisis, from Vietnam, and from each of the other crises of recent years. 118 pp. P-220/$1.45

WORLD POLITICS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTION

By JOHN W. SPANIER. "A text that is outstanding for its clarity, its style, and its comprehensiveness in dealing with the revolutionary events of our time. The author confronts major problems directly; in doing so, he provides the student with information he can bring to bear upon the issues of politics and the problems of theory that the author so sharply identifies."—KENNETH N. WALTZ, Professor of Politics, Brandeis University. A Praeger Paperbound Text. 488 pp. bibliog., index. $3.95

THE COMMUNIST STATES AND THE WEST

Edited by ADAM BROMKE and PHILIP E. UREN. "This collection of twelve essays . . . describes and evaluates change in the Communist world in terms of East-West relations. . . . It will succeed admirably in revealing 'something of the new international reality' to the interested layman and the beginning student of foreign affairs."—*Library Journal*. 253 pp. U-619/$2.25

THE HARD AND BITTER PEACE
World Politics Since 1945

By G. F. HUDSON. An illuminating study of the international scene from the end of World War II to the present, by the author of *The Far East in World Politics* and *Europe and China*. With a chronology of significant events in great power relations, 1945-65. 319 pp. bibliog., index. U-594/$2.50

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, Publishers

111 Fourth Avenue,
New York, N.Y. 10003

—— Presenting ——

Van Nostrand Political Science Series. General Editor: Franklin L. Burdette.

CONDUCT OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
Third Edition

By Elmer Plischke, University of Maryland. **Just Published.**

The Third Edition of this widely acclaimed reference and text for Foreign Service candidates and students of American diplomacy has been completely revised and updated.

THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE, The Soviet System in Theory and Practice, Third Edition

Edited with introductory notes by Samuel Hendel, The City College of the City University of New York. **Available Summer, 1967.** Approximately 600 pages; about $4.95 (paper).

Soviet society—its premises, achievements, failures, and prospects—is examined in this rich and skillfully balanced collection of writings.

DIMENSIONS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Readings and Documents

Edited with chapter introductions by Martin C. Needler, University of New Mexico. 1966; 384 pages; $4.75 (paper).

United States foreign policy of the present, the recent past, and the future, is the theme of this timely collection of readings.

LIBERALISM VERSUS CONSERVATISM: The Continuing Debate in American Government: Key Readings

By Willmoore Kendall, University of Dallas; and George W. Carey, Georgetown University. 1966; 464 pages; $4.50 (paper).

This collection of dynamic readings by key thinkers offers a balanced presentation of conservative and liberal thinking on the American political system for today's student of American government.

EUROPEAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS
Second Edition

By William G. Andrews, Tufts University. 1966; 608 pages; $4.95 (paper).

"This is an excellent and well selected collection of articles, speeches, and documents. It makes a most useful supplement to the usual textbook of comparative European government. I intend to prescribe the new edition as I did the old."—E. Felt, University of Massachusetts.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE IN LATIN AMERICA: The Governing of Restless Nations

By Charles W. Anderson, University of Wisconsin. **Just Published in paperback.**

Here is a dynamic approach to the study of Latin American politics, focusing on the most important problem of that continent—the struggle for economic and social change.

ADMINISTRATIVE QUESTIONS AND POLITICAL ANSWERS

Edited by Claude E. Hawley, The City University of New York, and Ruth E. Weintraub, The City University of New York (Hunter College). 1966; 616 pages; $5.95 (paper).

The text is comprised of outstanding articles that focus on the major trends and ideas in the field over the past twenty-five years and indicates how administrative agencies have adapted to their political environment.

New Perspectives in Political Science
General Editor: William G. Andrews

MARXISM: A Re-Examination 13

By Irving M. Zeitlin, Indiana University. Available May, 1967. Approximately 200 pages, about $1.95. In this four-part study of the social and political theory of Karl Marx, the author explains the nondogmatic character of Marx's work, what constitutes nondogmatic marxism, and how the theory is affecting and will affect social science research.

THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT 14
American Political Theory, Volume I

By Neal Riemer, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. Available May, 1967. Approximately 256 pages, about $2.45.

The creative spirit of our forefathers coupled with their rare ability to function as philosopher-statesmen helped to guide the creative democratic experiment in reconciling liberty and authority in a large state is the main theme of this study.

CIVIL LIBERTIES IN EUROPE 15
Four Case Studies

Edited by **Ronald Bunn**, Louisiana State University; and **William G. Andrews**, Tufts University. Contributors: **Michael Gehlen, Jerome King, Geoffrey Marshall, Ronald Bunn.** Available May, 1967. Approximately 256 pages, about $2.45.

Civil liberties problems in Great Britain, France, West Germany, and the Soviet Union are described and analyzed in this casebook by four key specialists.

Send for your on-approval copies. Write to the College Department,

Van Nostrand

120 Alexander Street
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

Scott Foresman College Division

New Spring Titles

THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Readings in Constitutional Law

MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, University of California, Irvine

This substantive collection of readings, designed to survey the most important current cases, doctrines, and issues in the area of constitutional law, focuses on what the Supreme Court has done and ought to do about current issues. Topics examined in depth include freedom of speech, freedom of religion, reapportionment, Negro civil rights, expatriation, and the rights of accused persons. While a certain amount of necessary technical discourse is included, most of the materials deal with important general questions of public policy. The editor has written chapter introductions and selection headnotes and has added a brief section on research methods and problems at the end. *Ready in late Spring, approx. 256 pages, softbound, prob. $3.75*

CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION

Issue 4

JAMES FINDLAY, DePauw University

A collection of essays on the world in the mid-sixties, this book can be used as a basic text in a current affairs course, as one element in a social science survey, or as supplementary material in a political science course such as American Institutions or International Relations. While the selections are completely different from those appearing in the previous editions of the book, they represent a wide range of institutions and areas of special interest. Instead of separate chapters on the Soviet Union and Communist China, a single essay on the Communist world as a whole is included. The new essay on Africa considers the Middle East, and a new chapter on religion increases the coverage given to contemporary socio-cultural areas. Two of the authors, Vera Dean and Holland Hunter, appeared in *Contemporary Civilization: Issue 3;* the remaining eleven contributors are new and include Soviet expert Donald Zagoria, sociologist Robert Nesbit, and critic Robert Ellman. The essays are generally political in emphasis but include consideration of social problems, science, religion, and the arts. A preface by Henry Steele Commager and a separate section of readings from current journals and magazines provide additional perspective. Issue 4 contains four maps, 50 photographs, and a chronological chart of significant events since 1945 which has been updated and keyed more directly to the essays. *Ready in April, approx. 320 pages, softbound, prob. $3.50*

SCOTT, FORESMAN AND COMPANY College Division

Glenview, Illinois Atlanta Dallas Palo Alto Oakland, N.J.

The POLITICS of ESCALATION in VIETNAM

By FRANZ SCHURMANN, PETER DALE SCOTT, REGINALD ZELNIK

"A most important and revealing history, and a clear demonstration of what is wrong with the strategy of escalation."—*John Kenneth Galbraith.* "THE POLITICS OF ESCALATION IN VIETNAM is probably the best single investment anyone can make in the literature on Vietnam. . . . It is a work which I would like to see seriously and thoughtfully debated by Administration advocates."—*Bernard B. Fall, New York Review of Books.*

A Fawcett Premier paperback book, 160 pp., 60¢

VIETNAM: History, Documents and Opinions on a Major World Crisis

Edited, with an Introduction by MARVIN E. GETTLEMAN

Here are materials on which statesmen and policymakers rely and which will enable the reader to understand our involvements. Selected writings of historians, statesmen, and journalists which illustrate the key events and major epochs in the evolution of Indochina. A rich collection of basic documents—some available nowhere else in this country—including statements of governments, international agreements, and monitored radio broadcasts.

A Fawcett Crest paperback book, 448 pp., 95¢

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM IN THE ERA OF LENIN, A Documentary History

By HELMUT GRUBER

This volume provides a concise and stimulating narrative framework into which the texts of the most significant doctrinal statements, manifestoes, analyses, tactical decisions, and polemics of the movement have been interwoven. The contents highlight the outstanding events in communism's heroic period and illuminate the growth of the national communist parties against the background of the developing Communist International.

A Fawcett Premier paperback book, about 512 pages, May 95¢

Education Dept., Desk FD

FAWCETT PUBLICATIONS, INC.

67 West 44 St., New York, N.Y. 10036

Peaceful Coexistence

International Law in the Building of Communism

By Lt. Col. Bernard A. Ramundo

This study explores the Soviet position on basic questions of international law and contemporary international legal problems. The purpose throughout is twofold: to determine the manner in which the Soviets utilize international law to support policy objectives, and to decide whether, and to what degree, the Soviet approach to international law differs from that of other countries. The Soviet Union, Dr. Ramundo contends, has outgrown its earlier role as an "outlaw State," and now manifests an acute sensitivity to the need to demonstrate legal propriety in international relations. The law of peaceful coexistence has been devised to fill this need in the interest of the realization of Soviet foreign policy objectives. $6.95

Northern California's Water Industry

The Comparative Efficiency of Public Enterprise in Developing a Scarce Natural Resource

By Joe S. Bain, Richard E. Caves, and Julius Margolis

The provision of fresh water is a highly complex undertaking, involving independent local public agencies, regular departments or bureaus of government, private companies, and individuals who have their own wells. Most previous studies have emphasized the activities of state or federal water agencies; this book analyzes in great detail the whole operation of water supply in a large area—the "water industry" of Northern California. Although this study deals specifically with Northern California, its "industry study" approach might well serve as a pattern for other areas.

Published for Resources for the Future, Inc. $15.00

NAACP

A History of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Vol. I, 1909-1920

By Charles Flint Kellogg

This is Volume I of a projected two volume series which is likely to become the definitive history of the NAACP. Professor Kellogg, who has drawn heavily on the previously unavailable Spingarn and Du Bois papers, traces the development of the NAACP from its founding in 1909 by Oswald Garrison Villard, W. E. Du Bois, and the Committee of Forty to its acceptance by Negroes as the most effective organization in the United States working for political and social equality. $8.75

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS
Baltimore, Maryland 21218

Available This Spring

ON CAPITOL HILL: Studies in the Legislative Process

JOHN BIBBY, *University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee*
ROGER DAVIDSON, *Dartmouth College*

Based entirely on the original research of the authors, here is a series of descriptive and analytical studies designed specifically to illustrate and illuminate certain aspects of Congressional operations and the environment in which the legislator works. Each of the studies is complete within itself, and can be adapted to a variety of teaching techniques or approaches.

January 1967 **288 pp.** **$3.25**

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL DICTIONARY, Second Edition

JACK C. PLANO *and* MILTON GREENBERG,
both of Western Michigan University

Over 1100 terms are carefully defined in a paragraph setting forth both the historical and current significance of each. Every entry has been revised to some degree in this new edition, and seventy-five new lexical terms have been added. With few exceptions, each chapter has four sections, the first and longest section in each case being an alphabetical listing of terms. Cross references are given for similar or closely related entries.

March 1967 **416 pp.** **$4.50 paper (tent.)**

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN LATIN AMERICA: A Reader

PETER G. SNOW, *State University of Iowa*

This distinctive collection of readings—taken from the writings of political scientists, as well as historians, journalists, sociologists, anthropologists, and economists—provides a review of the cultural background, governmental and political systems, and major political issues of present-day Latin America.

March 1967 **560 pp.** **$8.50 (tent.)**

UNDERSTANDING THE CONSTITUTION, Fourth Edition

By the late EDWIN S. CORWIN, *and*
JACK W. PELTASON, *University of California, Irvine*

This book provides a clause-by-clause explanation of the articles and amendments of the Constitution and a discussion of the practical significance of its most important provisions as they are interpreted and applied today.

March 1967 **192 pp.** **$2.95 paper (tent.)**



Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
383 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10017

An Atlas of Russian History

Eleven Centuries of Changing Borders

by Allen F. Chew

This atlas, which combines thorough scholarship with the most practical features for use, will become an indispensable supplement to texts on Russian affairs. Large in format (8¼ x 10¾ inches), with a spiral binding which allows the maps to lie flat, the book contains thirty-four maps which show how Russia's boundaries have changed from the formation of Kievan Rus in the ninth century to the most recent revisions resulting from World War II. Each map is accompanied by concise, descriptive text.
$3.95

Poverty amid Affluence

edited by Leo Fishman

Written by eminent social scientists and public leaders, the eleven papers presented here were originally delivered in May 1965 at the West Virginia University Conference on Poverty amid Affluence. "Must reading."—*Publishers' Weekly.*
cloth $6.00; paper $1.95

Greek Political Reaction to American and Nato Influences

by Theodore A. Couloumbis

Traces recent controversies that have entwined internal and international politics in Greece, and finds evidence to support the hypothesis that U.S. aid and influence facilitated the Conservative hegemony from 1952 to 1963.
$7.50

The Trauma of Decolinization

The Dutch and West New Guinea

by Arend Lijphart

In demonstrating that the motives behind Dutch reluctance to let go of West New Guinea were subjective and psychological, the author challenges economic explanations of colonialism. Yale Studies in Political Science, 17.
$7.50

New Yale Paperbounds

Arms and Influence

by Thomas C. Schelling

"This is a brilliant and hardheaded book. It will frighten those who prefer not to dwell on the unthinkable and infuriate those who have taken refuge in stereotypes and moral attitudinizing."—Gordon A. Craig, *New York Times Book Review.*
$1.95 (cloth $7.50)

The Lawmakers

Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life

by James David Barber

"Clearly one of the most significant studies of American politics written since the advent of behavioral studies in political science."—*Western Political Quarterly.*
$1.95 (cloth $7.50)

Children and Politics

by Fred I. Greenstein

"The first book-length empirical treatment of the political socialization of American elementary school children."—*American Political Science Review.*
late spring **$1.75 (cloth $5.00)**

available through your bookstore

Yale University Press YA
New Haven and London LE

in Canada: McGill University Press

INDEX TO ADVERTISERS

Allyn & Bacon, Inc. 262, 263
American Book Company 244, 255
Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc. 252, 253
Audio-Visual Research 4
Blaisdell Publishing Co. 266
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 281
University of California Press 298
Chandler Publishing Company 295
University of Chicago Press 256, 257
Congressional Quarterly 288
Thomas Y. Crowell Company 293
Dodd, Mead & Company 292
Dorsey Press 272, 273
Doubleday & Company, Inc. 245, 289
Exposition Press 291
Fawcett Publications, Inc. 308
Free Press 274, 275, 276
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 278, 279, 288
Harper & Row 1, 248, 249, 250
Harvard University Press 290
D. C. Heath & Company 284
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc. 310
Houghton Mifflin Company 297
University of Illinois Press 267
Johns Hopkins Press 309
J. B. Lippincott Company 280
Little, Brown & Company 258, 259, 260, 261
McGraw-Hill Book Company 304
Macmillan Company 264, 265
Northwestern University Press 296
Oxford University Press 240, 241, 242, 243
Frederick A. Praeger 295, 305
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 246, 299, 300, 301, 302
Princeton University Press ..... 254, Cover II
Rand McNally & Company ..... 238, 239, 251, Cover IV
Random House 268, 269, 270, 271
Ronald Press 277
St. Martin's Press, Inc. 283
Science Research Associates 285
Scott, Foresman & Company 307
Charles Scribner's Sons 282
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association 247
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 306
University Press of Virginia 303
Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc. 294
John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 286, 287
World Politics 291
Yale University Press 311

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam
Sidney Verba, Richard A. Brody, Edwin B. Parker, Norman H. Nie, Nelson W. Polsby, Paul Ekman and Gordon S. Black 317

The Political Relevance of Behavioral and Existential Psychology
Henry S. Kariel 334

The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements
Robert C. Tucker 343

Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First
Stanley Kelley, Jr., Richard E. Ayres, and William G. Bowen 359

Party, Region and the Dimensions of Conflict in the House of Representatives, 1949-1954
Gerald Marwell 380

An Attempt to Simulate the Outbreak of World War I
Charles F. Hermann and Margaret G. Hermann 400

Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis
J. S. Nye 417

Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry
Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D. Searing 428

Protest Participation among Southern Negro College Students
John M. Orbell 446

Research Notes

The Measurement of Inter-Party Competition and Systemic Stability
David G. Pfeiffer 457

A Note on Legislative Research: Labor Representation in Rhode Island
Jay S. Goodman 468

Representational Role Types: A Research Note
Norman Meller 474

Communications to the Editor 478

Book Reviews and Notes
Donald R. Matthews (acting ed.) 481

Report of the Executive Committee 565

News and Notes
Leo B. Lott (ed.) 569

VOL. LXI **JUNE, 1967** **NO. 2**

Published Quarterly by

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS AND THE CUBAN WORKING CLASS

By Maurice Zeitlin

Mr. Zeitlin was in Cuba during the summer of 1962 and conducted a series of in-depth interviews with Cuban workers. His book speaks to such questions as: How did workers react to the revolution? What influence did variations in age, skill, race, mobility, economic security, and size of plant have on the attitudes and behavior of workers? What kinds of political behavior can be anticipated in the future among workers in times of revolutionary social change? *August. 352 pages. 73 tables. $8.00*

POLITICAL PROTEST IN THE CONGO

The Parti Solidaire Africain During the Struggle for Independence

By Herbert Weiss

Drawing upon personal observations as well as official documents, Mr. Weiss describes the growth of political parties in the Congo, presents the first detailed history of the PSA, discusses the evolution of anti-colonial protest in the Kwango-Kwilu area of the Congo, and concludes with the relation of the PSA to anti-colonial protest in other parts of Africa.

August. 325 pages. Maps. $8.50

AFFLUENCE AND THE FRENCH WORKER IN THE FOURTH REPUBLIC

By Richard F. Hamilton

The basic concern of the author is to find the reason for the persistent leftist character of French working-class politics in a period of rapid industrialization and improving living standards. Reanalyzing material from surveys made by two French organizations, he finds that increased affluence is correlated with changes in social structure that increase radicalism. *Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.*

August. 324 pages. Maps. Tables. $8.50

Scholars are invited to write The Editor for a complimentary copy of our style booklet.

Princeton University Press

New Titles from Harper & Row

AMERICAN LEGISLATURES
Structure and Process

George S. Blair, Claremont Graduate School

This comprehensive new text examines the American legislative assemblies, their structure, processes, and membership, at all three levels of government. The author discusses the legislature's interrelationship with the executive and judicial branches of government as well as with political parties and interest groups.

Second Edition

CHALLENGE AND DECISION
Political Issues of our Time

Reo M. Christenson, Miami University, Ohio

Up to date and forward looking, this presentation of the major domestic political issues facing this generation provides a detailed study of their genesis and legislative experience through the Eighty-ninth Congress.

On the first edition: "An outstanding summary of salient political issues facing the American public. . . . An excellent primer for undergraduates and graduates who are searching for solutions to the problems confronting our society." *Choice*

AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES
A Systemic Perspective

Charles G. Mayo, University of Southern California

Beryl L. Crowe, Oregon State University

This new text-reader provides a theoretical framework for integrating twenty empirical studies of the American party system. Articles and introductory statements explore the relationships critical to an understanding of the structure and function of political parties. As integrated in the book, the articles are compatible with basic texts —both traditional and behavioral—on political parties.

AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
The Creation of Public Order

Roland Young, Northwestern University

New and highly original, this concise book provides a framework of ideas for understanding how the American system of law and politics has developed, how it works, and how it may be compared with other systems.

150th ANNIVERSARY

HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS 49 East 33d Street, New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

President
ROBERT A. DAHL
Yale University

President-Elect
MERLE FAINSOD
Harvard University

Vice Presidents

ROBERT LANE
Yale University

AVERY LEISERSON
Vanderbilt University

RICHARD SNYDER
University of California

Secretary
KENNETH WALTZ
Brandeis University

Treasurer
MAX M. KAMPELMAN
Washington, D.C.

Executive Director
EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK
1527 New Hampshire Avenue
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

Associate Director
DONALD G. TACHERON

Managing Editor, APSR
AUSTIN RANNEY
University of Wisconsin

COUNCIL

Above-named Officers *ex officiis*

JAMES C. DAVIES
University of Oregon
ALEX M. DRAGNICH
Vanderbilt University
HEINZ EULAU
Stanford University
SAMUEL HENDEL
City College of the City University of New York
WALLACE MENDELSON
University of Texas
LAURENCE I. RADWAY
Dartmouth College
WILLIAM H. RIKER
University of Rochester
VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM
Northwestern University

M. MARGARET BALL
Duke University
WILLIAM BUCHANAN
Washington and Lee University
H. PAUL CASTLEBERRY
Washington State University
HERBERT KAUFMAN
Yale University
CHARLES A. MCCLELLAND
University of Southern California
ALFRED G. MEYER
University of Michigan
CLARA PENNIMAN
University of Wisconsin
CLINTON ROSSITER
Cornell University

FORMER PRESIDENTS

FRANK J. GOODNOW
ALBERT SHAW
FREDERIC N. JUDSON
JAMES BRYCE
A. LAWRENCE LOWELL
WOODROW WILSON
SIMEON E. BALDWIN
ALBERT BUSHNELL HART
W. W. WILLOUGHBY
JOHN BASSETT MOORE
ERNST FREUND
JESSE MACY
MUNROE SMITH
HENRY JONES FORD
PAUL S. REINSCH
LEO S. ROWE
WILLIAM A. DUNNING
HARRY A. GARFIELD
JAMES W. GARNER
CHARLES E. MERRIAM

CHARLES A. BEARD
WILLIAM B. MUNRO
JESSE S. REEVES
JOHN A. FAIRLIE
BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH
EDWARD S. CORWIN
WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY
ISIDOR LOEB
WALTER J. SHEPARD
FRANCIS W. COKER
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE
THOMAS REED POWELL
CLARENCE A. DYKSTRA
CHARLES GROVE HAINES
ROBERT C. BROOKS
FREDERIC A. OGG
WILLIAM ANDERSON
ROBERT E. CUSHMAN
LEONARD D. WHITE
JOHN M. GAUS
WALTER F. DODD

ARTHUR W. MACMAHON
HENRY R. SPENCER
QUINCY WRIGHT
JAMES K. POLLOCK
PETER H. ODEGARD
LUTHER H. GULICK
PENDLETON HERRING
RALPH J. BUNCHE
CHARLES MCKINLEY
HAROLD D. LASSWELL
E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER
V. O. KEY, JR.
R. TAYLOR COLE
CARL B. SWISHER
EMMETTE S. REDFORD
CHARLES S. HYNEMAN
CARL J. FRIEDRICH
C. HERMAN PRITCHETT
DAVID B. TRUMAN
GABRIEL A. ALMOND

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Published quarterly by The American Political Science Association

EDITORIAL BOARD

AUSTIN RANNEY, *Managing Editor, University of Wisconsin*

ROBERT E. LANE, *Yale University*
HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Columbia University*
WARREN E. MILLER, *University of Michigan*
WALTER F. MURPHY, *Princeton University*
J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College*
JOHN E. TURNER, *University of Minnesota*
VERNON VAN DYKE, *University of Iowa*
MYRON WEINER, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

EDITORIAL ASSOCIATES

DONALD R. MATTHEWS, *Acting Book Review Editor, University of North Carolina*
LEO B. LOTT, *News and Notes Editor, University of Montana*
MARY H. GROSSMAN, *Madison*

EDITORIAL OFFICE

Managing Editor, APSR
North Hall, University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Executive Director, APSA
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Individual and institutional memberships are $15.00 a year ($6.00 for graduate and undergraduate students). Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $3.75 per copy; for *back issues* address Johnson Reprint Corp., 111 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003.

Applications for membership, orders for the REVIEW, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of change of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the month before publication.

Address correspondence about contributions to the REVIEW to Austin Ranney, North Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 53706. All manuscripts should be submitted IN DUPLICATE. They should be double-spaced and may be in typed, mimeographed, hectographed, or other legible form. Footnotes should appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the pages.

Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name and affiliations should appear only on a separate covering page. All footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate page.

Address books intended for review to Donald R. Matthews, Caldwell Hall, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C. 27514; *News and Notes items* to Leo B. Lott, Department of Political Science, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana 59801; *advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence* to the Executive Director at the Washington office.

Articles and notes appearing in the REVIEW before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature. The International Political Science Abstracts* and the *International Index to Periodicals* index current issues. Microfilm of the REVIEW, beginning with Volume 46, may be obtained from University Microfilms. 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. A *Cumulative Index* of the REVIEW, Volumes 1-57: 1906-1963, may be obtained from Northwestern University Press, 1735 Benson, Evanston, Illinois.

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.

Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.

Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.

Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

Copyright, 1967, by The American Political Science Association

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS

BRUSSELS, 18-23 SEPTEMBER 1967

Information on the Program, Registration

The International Political Science Association, composed of the political science associations of twenty-nine countries, approximately 150 teaching and research institutions and 500 individual members, will hold in Brussels, from 18 to 23 September 1967, its seventh triennial Congress. Like the Congresses held previously in Zurich (1950), The Hague (1952), Stockholm (1955), Rome (1958), Paris (1961) and Geneva (1964), the Brussels Congress will be open to all persons interested in the study of politics.

AGENDA

I. **The idea of popular participation in the 19th and 20th centuries (the heritage of Rousseau and Mill).**
General rapporteur: Prof. I. FETSCHER, Johann Wolfgang Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main.

II. **Recent research on typologies of political regimes and political development.**
General rapporteur: Prof. H. DAALDER, University of Leyden, and Prof. N. PASIC, Director, Higher School of Political Sciences, Belgrade.

III. **Consensus and dissent, with special reference to the developing countries.**
General rapporteurs: Prof. G. SARTORI, University of Florence, and Prof. E. SHILS, University of Chicago.

IV. **Theory and practice of representation.**
General rapporteurs: Prof. A.H. BIRCH, University of Hull, and Mr. M.A. KRUTOGOLOV, Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Moscow.

V. **Administrative law and public administration.**
General rapporteur: Prof. A. MOLITOR, Catholic University of Louvain.

VI. **The government and politics of economic organizations.**
General rapporteurs: Prof. C.E. LINDBLOM, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, and Prof. Z. RYBICKI, Pro-Rector, University of Warsaw.

VII. **The political role of international economic organizations.**
General rapporteurs: Mr. R.W. COX, Director, International Institute of Labour Studies, Geneva, and Prof. A.B. OVERSTREET, Smith College, Northampton, Massachusetts, and Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.

VIII. **Neutrality, neutralism, non-alignment.**
General rapporteur: Prof. J. LALOY, Institute of Political Studies, University of Paris.

IX. **The political scientist's problems of scientific information.**
General rapporteur: Prof. J. MEYRIAT, Institute of Political Studies, University of Paris, Secretary General, International Committee for Social Sciences Documentation.

Discussions will be held in English and French, with simultaneous interpretation.

In addition to the working sessions open to all participants, eleven specialist meetings organized privately will be held under IPSA's auspices to discuss problems of research.

Individual members of IPSA and official delegates of associate members (institutions) will be granted a reduction on registration fees. IPSA extends a warm invitation to both political scientists and institutions to apply for membership.

Registration cards, hotel reservation forms and further information may be obtained from APSA, or directly from the

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
27, rue Saint-Guillaume, Paris 7e (France)

CALCUTTA

The American Political Science Review

VOL. LXI JUNE, 1967 NO. 2

PUBLIC OPINION AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM*

SIDNEY VERBA[a], RICHARD A. BRODY[a], EDWIN B. PARKER[a], NORMAN H. NIE[a], NELSON W. POLSBY[b], PAUL EKMAN[c], AND GORDON S. BLACK[d]

I. PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy seems to command more public attention than domestic policy and yet—insofar as it has been researched—public opinion on foreign policy seems to have less impact on governmental decisions than does opinion in most other issue areas.[1] There are at least two reasons, one normative and one empirical, why public opinion can be regarded as pertinent to some foreign policy questions—especially those associated with "life and death." Normatively, it is desirable for political leaders in a democracy to commit national resources in ways generally approved by the populace. Large scale military commitments should, if at all possible, meet with the approval of public opinion. Empirically, if they do not, experience has shown there are circumstances in which public disapproval of the course of foreign policy may be registered in national elections. Specifically, our one recent experience with a situation of partial mobilization and a limited but large-scale and indefinite commitment to military action in Korea did in time produce a distribution of opinion that suggested the war was very unpopular. And though its precise impact on the 1952 presidential election is difficult to assess there is little doubt that the Korean issue contributed significantly to the Eisenhower landslide.[2]

Among the questions raised by the Korean experience is whether the American public will easily tolerate the prosecution of long drawn-out wars of partial mobilization. Therefore, it is not surprising that another such war, in Vietnam, has stimulated a concern with public opinion.

This paper reports the results of a survey study of American attitudes towards the war in Vietnam which attempted to probe somewhat more deeply into public attitudes on the war than have newspaper surveys and commercial polls.[3] The data help us clarify the role

* The data reported in this article were collected by the National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago. We are indebted to the Center and to Peter H. Rossi, its Director, for collaboration in designing and conducting the study as well as for financial support. We are also grateful to G. Ray Funkhouser, Barry Greenberg, Douglas Johnson and Peter Lyman for assistance in data gathering and processing. The survey was also supported by contributions from 250 individuals—mostly faculty members at Stanford University and other universities in the San Francisco area.

[a] *Stanford University*
[b] *Wesleyan University*
[c] *University of California Medical Center*
[d] *University of Rochester*

[1] See, for example, Warren E. Miller and Donald Stokes, "Constituency Influence in Congress" this REVIEW, 57 (March, 1963) 45–56; and Miller, "Voting and Foreign Policy" in James Rosenau (ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (forthcoming).

[2] See Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter*, (New York: Wiley, 1960), p. 527. For summaries of poll data on public support of World War II and the Korean War, see: J. T. Campbell and L. S. Cain, "Public Opinion and the Outbreak of War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 9 (1965), 318–328.

[3] This survey was conducted in late February and early March, 1966, by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) with a questionnaire

played by public opinion in such limited wars, and will also, hopefully, shed some light on a question of growing importance: the nature of the emerging relationship of public opinion polling itself to foreign policy making.

At the time the present study was planned, the press was full of reports as to the importance to the President of public support. We were told that the President avidly followed the polls on the war. Furthermore, it was generally argued that the polls showed the American public firmly behind the President's policy. If he was under any pressure, it was from a growing group of opponents of his policy who wanted him to escalate the war.[4]

As students of public opinion familiar with the limitations of polling data, we were unsatisfied with these reports. Most recent academic studies of public attitudes have demonstrated that the public has little information on most issues and that most people do not have thought-out, consistent, and firmly-held positions on most matters of public policy; and this is especially the case the more "distant" the issue from the individual: e.g., attitudes on civil rights have more structure and consistency than those on foreign policy. In addition, these studies indicate differences between the political attitudes of elite groups and attitudes reflected in mass samples.[5] All this suggests that the marginal distributions of answers to simple issue-oriented questions asked of a cross-section sample of the population tell us relatively little.

Yet this is the "public opinion" that enters the public debate through the press and the commercial polls. The data on public opinion and the war in Vietnam were of this sort. A good example of this problem are the commercial poll reports of the support for the administration's policy in Vietnam which were based on questions as to whether one "approved or disapproved of the way in which the President was handling the situation in Vietnam." Such a question, we felt, was inadequate. Rather than being a question on support for the Vietnamese position of the administration, it seemed likely it was tapping generalized support for the Presidency, partisan affiliation, and/or attachment to the incumbent President for whom the bulk of the population had voted. We felt that a simple "approve" or "disapprove" answer told us very little and that there might be a more complex phenomenon behind that simple finding. In addition, evidence for the nature of the opposition to the President was both fragmentary and ambiguous,[6] so we felt that fuller information was needed.

designed and pre-tested at Stanford. The respondents were 1495 adults. To obtain the sample NORC drew probability samples of blocks within each of its seventy-five sampling points throughout the country and sent its interviewers to select men and women within those blocks (or comparable areal units) to correspond to the nation in age, sex, and employment status.

[4] *New York Times*, March 10, 1966, p. 10; see also C. L. Sulzberger, *New York Times*, March 7, 1966, Section IV; and *Newsweek*, March 7, 1966. These reports have references both to the "Harris Survey" (*Washington Post*, Feb. 28, 1966) and "private" polls.

[5] See, among others, Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in David E. Apter (ed.), *Ideologies and Discontent* (New York: The Free Press, 1964); Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffmann, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," this REVIEW, 44 (June, 1960), 406–427; V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, (New York; Knopf, 1961); S. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity and Civil Liberties*, (Garden City: Doubleday, 1954); and Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950).

[6] For example, the thrust of the February Harris Survey (*op.cit.*) was that the increasing disaffection with the "job President Johnson is doing in handling the war in Vietnam," was from those who favored increasing our military effort. This was interpreted in the White House (*New York Times*, March 10, 1966) as indicating that a majority of those opposing the President were "Hawks." But an analysis of the Harris report does not support this interpretation. If we examine the Harris data to ascertain whether those who had an opinion on escalation (8% were "not sure") approve or disapprove of the President's handling of the war we find the following:

	Jan. 1966 Attitude toward President's handling of the war		Feb. 1966 Attitude toward President's handling of the war	
	"good-excellent"	"fair-poor"	"good-excellent"	"fair-poor"
pro-escalation	50%	37%	63%	49%
anti-escalation	50%	63%	37%	51%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

Compared with the January data, the February poll results show a trend in the direction of the interpretation but not majority support. The

II. THE PRESENT STUDY

Our approach was to ask some of the standard questions about the support of the President, but to go further by asking opinions on a wide range of policy alternatives as well as about the possible costs of such alternatives. In addition, we asked some questions about the extent of our respondents' information, their general concern about the war, their political activity, and the usual background demographic variables. Thus, we could look across a large number of policy alternatives and see how opinions on them were distributed, and relate these opinions to a variety of social, political and personal background factors. Our resources did not allow us to ask as many questions as we would have liked, but enabled us to go well beyond the usual commercial poll.

Thus, the study was "academic" in form because of our concern for a range of issue questions and the patterns among them as well as in our concern for background explanatory variables. But it was non-academic in that the purpose was to contribute to public understanding at a time of heated political debate. The results received national publicity and extensive editorial comment. In addition, our report was inserted in the *Congressional Record*—as was a blistering attack on it.[7]

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE WHO APPROVE JOHNSON VIETNAM POLICY* BY PARTY AFFILIATION AND VOTE IN 1964

		Political Affiliation	
		Republican	Democratic
Vote Last Election	Johnson	67% (N = 80)	71% (N = 608)
	Goldwater	45% (N = 225)	39% (N = 56)

* The exact question wording was, "In general, do you approve or disapprove the way the Johnson administration is handling the situation in Vietnam?"

The percentages in the above table are the percentages of the respondents who said they approved.

Our original report made, we believe, an important contribution to the public debate on the nature of foreign policy attitudes by indicating that they were not as had been assumed; and that the phenomenon under study was not as simple as previous reports had suggested. This article reports further analysis of the nature of American foreign policy attitudes.

Overview of Results: Our general substantive findings can be briefly summarized.[8] We found that the war in Vietnam was a salient problem. More respondents (61%) reported "worrying" about it than about four other public issues—crime and juvenile delinquency (51%), Negro-White relations (32%), inflation and the cost of living (46%), and air and water pollution (27%). And we found relatively high levels of information on the issue.[9] Our study confirmed

trend, moreover, was apparently temporary; by late April, according to Harris (*Washington Post*, May 9, 1966), support for the President had dropped to 47% "good-excellent," 53% "fair-poor" and anti-escalation sentiment had increased:

	April	Feb.	Jan.
pro-escalation	43%	49%	45%
anti-escalation	48%	43%	48%
not sure	9%	8%	7%
	100%	100%	100%

Since the May press release does not report the cross-tabulation of support and escalation sentiment, it is not certain that Johnson opposers were anti-escalation but it is a reasonable surmise.

[7] *Congressional Record*, March 17, 1966, p. 5863 and April 28, 1966, p. A2320. For editorial comment on the poll, see, for instance, *New York Times*, March 17, 1966; *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, March 16, 1966; and *San Francisco Chronicle*, March 16, 1966. See *The Washington Post*, April 7, 1966, p. A25 for the original attack on our survey and *ibid.* April 16, 1966, Letters to the Editor Column, for our reply. For an account of press reaction to our initial report, see: Nelson W. Polsby, "Doves, Hawks, and the Press," *Transaction* (April, 1967).

[8] For a full report on all questions and all marginal results, consult *Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam* (March 15, 1966, Institute of Political Studies, Stanford University, Stanford, California).

This report has been published, in Spanish: "La opinión publica en Estados Unidos de América sobre la guerra de Vietnam," *Revista Mexicana de Sociologia*, 28 (Abril–Junio, 1966) 357–76.

[9] For instance, 86% of our respondents knew that Congress had not declared war, 68% knew we were bombing targets in the North at the time of the survey, 47% could name the capital of South Vietnam and 41% could name the cap-

the findings of others that the President had strong support at that time: 61% approved of his handling of the situation in Vietnam, while 29% disapproved.[10] But the data also supported our suspicion that the standard question used to tap support for the President's "handling of the situation" in Vietnam reflected in good part general support for the President rather than support for his particular policies. As Table 1 indicates, those who voted for Johnson in 1964 are much more likely to support his policy in Vietnam than are those who voted against him. And the fact (to be discussed below) that there is little relationship between party affiliation or previous party vote and specific policy preferences on Vietnam supports this interpretation. (See below, Table 6.)

We also found a greater openness to various moves to negotiate a settlement of the war than had been previously suggested. Majorities were willing to negotiate with the Vietcong (88%), to hold free elections even if the Vietcong might win (54%), and to allow a coalition government including the Vietcong (52%).[11]

At the same time however, majorities rejected alternatives that implied a sudden withdrawal from Vietnam or a complete abandonment of our commitments there. Thus, 55% rejected the alternative of "withdrawing our troops and letting the Vietnamese work out their own problems," and 81% said they would disapprove "if President Johnson were to announce tomorrow that we were going to withdraw from Vietnam and let the Communists take over." In addition to the above, we found a considerable reluctance to pay the domestic costs of the war, (among both doves and hawks) and a growing opposition as the escalation steps presented to the respondents became more severe.

Furthermore, contrary to previous press reports, we found strong evidence that those opposed to the President were more likely to be "doves" than "hawks."[12] On all policy issues those who reported being opposed to the President were more likely to take the "dove" response than were those who favored him. This point is made clearer when we compare those who "approve" of the President's handling of the situation with those who "disapprove" in terms of their scores on "escalation" and "de-escalation" scales.[13]

ital of North Vietnam. It is hard to be certain whether to consider these figures "high" or "low." It is our impression that they represent fairly high levels of information on an issue of foreign policy.

[10] The Gallup Polls, covering the period in which we were in the field, show results on the same question somewhat at variance with our results. AIPO reported lower levels of "approval" than we found although the level of "disapproval" was about the same:

> "In general, do you approve or disapprove of the way President Johnson is handling the situation in Vietnam?"

	Approve	Disapprove	DK (no opinion)
12/65 AIPO[a]	56%	26%	18%
1/66 AIPO	57%	27%	15%
2/66 AIPO	50%	33%	17%
Stanford/NORC Poll	61%	29%	10%
3/66 AIPO	56%	26%	18%

a. AIPO data are from press releases carried in the San Francisco *Chronicle*, March 9, and April 6, 1966.

[11] Since these results might be affected by who it was that the respondent perceived the Vietcong to be—their identification as North Vietnamese-dominated or indigenous South Vietnamese rebels being a matter of debate—we cross-tabulated these results against identification of the Vietcong. Attitudes toward negotiations with them is not dependent upon the way in which they are indentified or mis-identified.

[12] See footnote 4 above.

[13] Guttman scaling procedures were used to test whether sets of items which seemed intuitively to measure the same underlying attitude were in fact related in a unidimensional pattern. An eight-item 'escalation' scale and an eight-item 'de-escalation' or peace-initiative scale met the criteria for satisfactory Guttman scales in two separate random subsamples of the total. Coefficients of reproducibility were in excess of .90. Coefficients of scalability were in excess of .60 (see Herbert Menzel, "A new coefficient for scalogram analysis," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 17, 1953, 268–280). The distribution of scale scores was significantly different from chance by chi square test at the $p < .001$ levels.

The escalation scale included questions asking approval or disapproval of the level of military involvement at the time of the survey. The respondents were asked whether they would be willing to continue the fight in Vietnam if it meant: bombing of military targets in North Vietnam (77% approved), 200,000 troops in Vietnam (61% approved); questions asking about increases in manpower involvement; 500,000

Table 2 shows the distribution of supporters and opponents of the President's policy on the escalation and de-escalation scales. Johnson's supporters are much more likely to be found in the upper-right corner of the table indicating support for escalation and opposition to de-escalation, while Johnson's opponents are more likely to be in the lower left corner of the table indicating support for de-escalation and opposition to escalation. If we consider, for instance, cells b, c, and f which represent moderate or extreme "hawklike" positions, we find 43% of Johnson's supporters in these boxes and only 24% of his opponents. And in cells d, g, and h representing moderate or extreme "dovelike" positions we find 23% of Johnson's supporters, but 51% of his opponents. In sum, those who approved of the President's position scored higher on the escalation scale ($\bar{x}=4.4$) than those who disapproved ($\bar{x}=2.8$) ($t=8.7$, $p<.001$). And Johnson supporters scored lower on the de-escalation scale ($\bar{x}=4.0$), than his opponents ($\bar{x}=4.8$) ($t=5.8$, $p<.001$).

In general our study found that few respondents took consistent "dove" or "hawk" positions. The opinions of most tended to be moderate.[14] Our findings showed a relatively permissive majority behind the President, suggesting that the public would support him in some escalation of the war, but would oppose extreme escalation. There seemed to be more willingness to see a reduction of the war but, symmetrical with the opposition to major escalation, was an opposition to precipitous withdrawal. We did not find, as much writing suggests we should have found, a populace that wanted some quick and precipitate resolution of the situation. We concluded our original report as follows:

> "The American public is clearly concerned about Vietnam. . . . But their opinions appear to be moderate and responsible. They do not want to pay the domestic costs of commitment in Vietnam, but this is consistent with their desire for a negotiated settlement. And though the settlement they prefer involves a willingness to deal with the Vietcong that goes beyond present administration policy, they reject those solutions that require irresponsible abandonment of our commitments."

An editorial in the New York *Times* on March 17 interpreted these results as follows:

> "There is little support in the country—as a recent Stanford University poll showed—for the extreme alternatives of withdrawal or all-out war. But there is substantial support for a


troops (45%), all-out mobilization (40%); and escalation questions involving China and Russia: fighting the Chinese in Vietnam (56%), fighting the Chinese in China (32%), fighting an atomic war with China (29%), and fighting an atomic war with Russia (22%).

The de-escalation scale included items ranging from approval of withdrawal from Vietnam even if it meant a Communist takeover in Laos and Thailand as well as Vietnam (13% approve) to approval of negotiations with the Vietcong (88% approve). Items in between included: immediate withdrawal (15%), letting Vietcong eventually gain control (28%), gradual withdrawal while letting Vietnamese work out their own problems (39%), letting the Vietcong participate in a coalition government (52%), permitting free elections (54%), and agreeing to a UN-supervised truce (69%). That both sets of items—those on escalation and those on de-escalation—can be ordered on Guttman scales and that these orderings parallel the ordering of items that a politically sophisticated observer would arrive at as being more or less extreme escalation or de-escalation measures (atomic war with Russia being a more extreme move than atomic war with China, for instance) lends support to the argument that attitudes on the war form a meaningful pattern.

We asked respondents several questions concerning their willingness to pay possible domestic economic and welfare costs "if we are to continue the fighting." Approval for "increasing taxes at home" was 31% and disapproval 66%. "Putting ting government controls over wages and prices" got 41% approval and 53% disapproval. "Reducing aid to education" got 19% approval and 79% disapproval. "Spending less money for the War on Poverty" recived approval from 46% and disapproval from 51%. "Reducing the Medicare program" received 28% approval and 65% disapproval. For correlational analysis we combined the three welfare costs items into a single index and the two economic items into another index. (Guttman scaling analysis indicated that the two kinds of items were not sufficiently correlated to justify a combined scale).

[14] See our original report (cited in footnote 8) for a full report of these data. Consistent "hawks" took the following positions on four items: they favored increasing our commitment to 500,000 men and favored bombing North Vietnam cities; they opposed a coalition government that included the Vietcong and opposed elections if there were a chance the Vietcong might win. Consistent "doves" took the opposite four positions. We found 6% of our sample to be consistent "hawks" and 14% to be consistent "doves."

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE OF JOHNSON APPROVERS AND DISAPPROVERS IN VARIOUS SCALE CATEGORIES ON THE ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION SCALES



upper diagonal = Johnson Approvers, N = 855
lower diagonal = Johnson Disapprovers, N = 436

policy of holding military operations at their present level while taking new initiatives to seek peace. The Stanford poll demonstrated that the country is far ahead of the Administration in its willingness to take such initiatives, even if they should entail serious risks."

A Closer Look at These Attitudes: The data reported above told us more, we believe, about the nature of opinion on the war in Vietnam than earlier polls had told us. But there are still many unanswered questions as to the internal structure and sources of these attitudes. We will here explore these questions more fully than was possible in our original report.

The findings we report below are somewhat paradoxical. Our original findings were that there was more pattern and consistency in public attitudes on the war in Vietnam than we had originally expected. The war is an issue in foreign policy; foreign policy issues do not tend to generate coherent structures because individuals have little in the way of a concrete frame of reference such as that which often underpins attitudes on domestic policies. But, though we found many inconsistencies and much confusion, we also found more information about the war than one might have expected and in general the responses formed meaningful patterns. This is not to argue that we found sophistication among the public or attitudes that would provide a guide for the decision maker. Far from it. The differences in responses to similar questions worded differently indicates a lack of clear crystallization of opinion among many,[15] and there was much

[15] See S. M. Lipset, "The President, the Polls, and Vietnam," *Trans-action* (Sept.-Oct. 1966), p. 20.

TABLE 3. PRODUCT-MOMENT CORRELATIONS* (UPPER HALF OF MATRIX) AND ETA** COEFFICIENTS (LOWER HALF OF MATRIX) FOR 8 DEMOGRAPHIC AND ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES

	Education	Income	Information	Escalation	De-escalation	Costs	Welfare Costs	Race
Education		.42	.37	−.05	−.06	−.01	.06	.15
Income	.43		.29	.00	−.03	.04	.05	.24
Information	.37	.30		.12	−.19	.12	.10	.22
Escalation	−.07	.08	.14		−.37	.37	.30	.13
De-escalation	−.10	−.07	−.19	−.40		−.10	−.18	−.15
Econ. Costs	−.03	.11	.14	.37	−.12		.20	.02
Welfare Costs	.11	.07	.11	.32	−.20	.23†		.14
Race	.17	.26	.24	.16	−.19	.08	.17	

* N = 1209, $p < .05$ when $r > .06$, $p < .01$ when $r > .08$, $p < .001$ when $r > .11$ (N is less than 1495 because cases with missing data were excluded from this analysis.)

** Curvilinear correlation coefficient calculated for each pair with the variable higher (or further left) in the matrix as the independent variable. Sign of the eta coefficient is the same as the corresponding Pearson product-moment correlation.

† Curvilinear correlation is significantly different from the linear relationship, $< .001$.

inconsistency and much confusion. But the pattern of responses suggested to us that we were not dealing with a mere random phenomenon.

The results reported above thus have somewhat more of an internal structure than we might have expected. But paradoxically, as we shall report below, the preferences have little of the kind of external order we might have expected. Unlike candidate preference in an election, or opinions on domestic policies, attitudes on the war in Vietnam do not pattern along the standard dimensions of social structure. The respondent's social characteristics—class, party, place of residence—have little relationship to preference (with the partial and important exception of race, to be discussed below). Thus we seem to have a major political issue about which large numbers of ordinary citizens express opinions, claim to be concerned, and on which they seem relatively well informed. Yet their opinions on this issue are almost totally uncorrelated with the major dimensions of social structure that usually pattern political attitudes.

Patterns of Consistency. Correlation among various scales of attitudes toward the war suggest that there is consistency in public attitudes. As the data in Table 3 indicate, those who favor increasing the war are more likely to

TABLE 4. MEAN SCORES ON ATTITUDE SCALES AND INDEX OF INFORMATION BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION

Attitude	Level of Education					
	No High School	Some High School	Completed High School	Some College	Completed College	Total
Escalation	4.1	4.0	3.8	4.0	3.6	3.9
De-escalation*	4.0	3.9	3.6	3.6	3.8	3.8
Information**	3.6	4.1	4.7	5.3	5.8	4.5
Sample size	267	264	367	166	145	1209

* $p < .05$
** $p < .001$

be willing to pay the costs of that increase. The correlations between the escalation scale and the economic costs and welfare costs indices were .37 and .30, respectively.[16] Conversely, there is a tendency (though less marked) for those who favor de-escalation to oppose the payment of these costs. The correlation between the de-escalation scale and willingness to pay economic and welfare costs was −.10 and −.18, respectively. In addition, the escalation and de-escalation scales were negatively correlated −.37. In general, the attitudes form a meaningful pattern with all coefficients significant beyond the .001 level in the expected direction.[17]

[16] See footnote 13 for a description of these scales.

[17] The pattern of consistency can also be observed if we look at the mean escalation scores in relation to willingness to see taxes raised and aid to education cut "if needed to continue the war." Those who approve of reducing aid to education and raising taxes have the highest mean escalation score, while those who oppose raising taxes and reducing education aid have the lowest.

MEAN ESCALATION SCORES BY OPINIONS ON TAX INCREASE AND REDUCED AID TO EDUCATION

Increase Taxes (if needed to continue war)	*Reduce Aid to Education* (if needed to continue war)	
	Approve	Disapprove
Approve	Mean: 5.89 (N = 129)	Mean: 4.92 (N = 313)
Disapprove	Mean: 3.94 (N = 138)	Mean: 3.04 (N = 771)

(Variable N due to missing data cases; DK, etc., omitted.)

Social group and policy preferences: Are there different patterns of policy preference among different strata of the society? Our evidence suggests not. There is little relationship between such standard status variables as income or occupation and policy preferences on the war in Vietnam (Table 3). Similarly, we find little differences among sub-groups with different levels of education. The highly educated are little different from the less highly educated in their policy preferences (Tables 3 and 4). And neither religion nor strength of religious belief was correlated with preferences on the war. An analysis of attitude scales by region indicates that the Southwest and Western states were more in favor of escalation while the South was most in favor of de-escalation (Table 5).

The lack of clear relationship between social status and preferences on the war in Vietnam is not unexpected. The conflict, after all, does not involve domestic status politics. In the same way, one would not expect partisan affiliation to structure preferences very much—particularly in a country with a long tradition of a bipartisan foreign policy. Other literature also suggests that party affiliation is not closely related to preferences on foreign policy[18] and the crossing of positions by the President—who in 1964 attacked Goldwater for various schemes to increase the war that the President himself later introduced—ought to have dulled the edge of any division based on vote in 1964. This is confirmed in Table 6.

There is some tendency for Democrats to have higher mean escalation scores than Republicans; and for those who voted for Goldwater in 1964 to have higher escalation scores than those who voted for Johnson. But neither of these differences achieve statistical significance (by analysis of variance). When we com-

[18] See Warren Miller, "Voting and Foreign Policy," in Rosenau, *op. cit.*

TABLE 5. MEAN SCORES ON ATTITUDE SCALES AND INDEX OF INFORMATION BY REGION

Attitude	Region					
	East	North Central	South	Southwest	West	Total
Escalation**	3.8	3.9	3.5	4.3	4.2	3.9
De-escalation*	3.9	3.6	4.1	3.8	3.7	3.8
Information*	4.8	4.7	4.3	4.3	4.5	4.5
Sample Size	305	322	216	156	210	1209

* $p < .05$
** $p < .01$

bine party affiliation and party vote we find that those who crossed party lines to vote for the candidate of the opposite party have the more extreme positions on the escalation scale. The lowest escalation score is found among the Republicans who voted for Johnson. Those who voted consistently with their party affiliation—Johnson Democrats or Goldwater Republicans—have similar scores on the escalation scale.

It is tempting to interpret these data to suggest that party affiliation is not related to preferences in relation to the war in Vietnam, but that those who left their partisan affiliation to vote for the candidate of the opposite party did so (in part) because of the perceived foreign policy positions of the candidates—Goldwater having been perceived as more in favor of escalation. However, the variations within each of the groups is such that the overall differences are quite likely to be the result of chance variation in the sample: none achieve statistical significance. And similar non-significant results are found using the de-escalation scale. Perhaps the safest interpretation is that there is no relationship between party affiliation and vote, and preferences on this policy issue.

In contrast with the above findings, two demographic characteristics are related to preference on Vietnam. As Table 7 indicates, men are more likely than women to support escalation policies and women are more likely than men to support de-escalation policies. The mean escalation score for men is 4.4 compared with 3.7 for women. The mean de-escalation score is 4.1 for men and 4.5 for women. (In addition, men are more likely to be better informed, as measured by our information test. The average number correct among men was 5.0 and among women was 3.7.)

A stronger predictor of attitudes toward Vietnam policy was race (Table 8). Negroes were significantly more opposed to escalation than whites (they have a mean escalation score of 3.4 in contrast to 4.1 among white), and they are more willing to support de-escalation policies (Negroes have a 5.5 de-escalation versus a 4.1 score for whites). Since Negroes are significantly less well-informed than whites, we tested to see whether the difference is due to information level. But the relationship is even stronger when the level of information is controlled. The partial correlation between race and escalation with information level controlled is .16, and between race and de-escalation with information level controlled is −.20.

To sum up our findings thus far: There is little group difference in position on the war in Vietnam. Social status shows little relation to policy position and neither does party affilia-

TABLE 6. MEAN ESCALATION SCORES BY PARTY PREFERENCE AND VOTE IN LAST ELECTION

Party Preference	Vote in Last Election		
	Johnson ↓	Goldwater ↓	Didn't Vote ↓
Republican	3.3 (71)*	4.0 (194)	3.9 (64)
Democrat	3.9 (440)	4.1 (44)	3.8 (147)
Independent	4.2 (75)	4.0 (29)	3.9 (95)

* Sample sizes in parentheses. Neither the effect of party preference or vote, nor the interaction between the two reached statistical significance (by analysis of variance). (F values for rows, columns, and interaction are 0.7, 0.5 and 1.6, respectively.)

TABLE 7. MEANS AND VARIANCES ON ATTITUDE SCALES AND INDEX OF INFORMATION BY SEX

Attitude	*Male* (N = 486)		*Female* (N = 554)	
	Mean	Variance	Mean	Variance
Escalation***	4.4	6.46	3.7	8.45
De-escalation**	4.1	4.56	4.5	4.86
Information***	5.0	4.27	3.7	3.83

** $p < .01$
*** $p < .001$

TABLE 8. MEANS AND VARIANCES ON ATTITUDE SCALES AND INDEX OF INFORMATION BY RACE

Attitude	*Whites* (N=856)		*Non-Whites* (N=162)	
	Mean	Variance	Mean	Variance
Escalation**	4.1	7.31	3.4	9.04
De-escalation***	4.1	4.41	5.5	5.08
Information***	4.5	4.29	3.1	3.56

** $p < .01$
*** $p < .001$

tion and vote. On the other hand, women are more likely to oppose escalation and favor de-escalation and—more strongly—Negroes oppose escalation and favor de-escalation.

Non-Demographic Correlates of Policy Preference. The social characteristics of our respondents (with the important exceptions of sex and race) did not relate to policy preferences. What about measures deriving from the individual's cognitive and affective position vis-à-vis the war in Vietnam? One such measure is the extent to which respondents were worried about the war in Vietnam. There is a slight tendency for those who were worried about the war to favor de-escalation. When we compare those who report that they are worried about the war in Vietnam (n=829) with those who report they are not worried (n=526), we find a mean escalation score of 3.8 among the worriers and a mean score of 4.1 among the non-worriers. And the worriers have a mean de-escalation score of 3.9 in contrast with a score of 3.7 among the non-worriers. (Both differences are significant at the .01 level.)

The Informed Public. Of more interest from a theoretical as well as a policy point of view are differences in policy preference based on level of information.[19] Many have argued that the informed public should be attended to when it comes to policy guidance. How do the informed differ from the less-well-informed on their attitudes toward the Vietnam war? Those who expect the informed citizen to be more in favor of negotiations and de-escalation will find little comfort in our data, while those who expect the informed to favor a more militant policy will receive some—but not much—support for their position.[20] Respondents with high information scores were more likely to favor escalation and less likely to favor de-escalation. The correlations are small—a correlation of .12 between information and escalation and −.19 between information and de-escalation. Although significance tests show that both are reliable relationships that could happen as a result of sampling variation less than once in a thousand samples (see Table 3), it should be noted that the amounts of shared variance between information and policy preferences are about one and four percent respectively. Mean escalation and de-escalation scores in each of the levels on the information test are presented in Table 9.

The relationship between sex and race and policy preferences and between information and policy preferences led us to look further into the relation among all these variables. Men and whites have significantly more information than women or Negroes, and perhaps the explanation of these information differences lies in the interrelationship among sex,

[19] The eight information items in the questionnaire failed to fit the Guttman scale pattern, and were combined into an arbitrary index ranging from 0 to 8, with the higher score indicating more correct answers. Questions included identification of the capitals of North and South Vietnam, knowledge of number of U.S. troops in Vietnam and number of U.S. casualties at the time of the survey, whether Congress had declared war, whether North Vietnam was then being bombed, and identification of the Vietcong. For the last item, both North Vietnamese or South Vietnamese communists were accepted as "correct" answers.

[20] For an exploration of three models of the relation of information and opinion, see: W. A. Gamson and A. Modigliani, "Knowledge and Foreign Policy Opinions: Some Models for Consideration," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 30 (1966), 187–199.

TABLE 9. MEAN SCORES ON ATTITUDE SCALES BY LEVEL OF INFORMATION

Attitude	0–1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	Total
Escalation*	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.9	4.0	4.4	4.3	4.0	3.9
De-escalation*	4.4	4.3	4.0	4.0	3.6	3.6	3.2	3.4	3.8
Sample Size	74	122	186	232	184	180	152	79	1209

* $p < .001$

race and information, and policy position. If the differences between men and women in policy opinions are merely the result of men being, on the average, better informed than women, then better informed persons in both sexes should be more likely to support escalation policies than less well-informed people in the same sex. On the other hand, if sex is a primary causal factor, then the correlation between information and policy opinion should decrease or disappear when the analysis is run separately for men and for women. The same argument applies to the relationship between race and information.

The results of this analysis are presented in Table 10. The positive correlation between information and willingness to escalate disappears when controlled by race and sex. The .20 correlation in the Negro female group approaches the .05 level of significance, but in none of the four groups can the results be accepted as reliably different from a zero correlation. The correlations between information and support for de-escalation policies are not so dramatically reduced. In fact, the negative correlation between information and de-escalation policies becomes slightly stronger (to −.22) among white males. But, in general, this analysis suggests that there is little explanatory value in the information variable as far as policy preferences are concerned.[21]

We might, however, expect the informed to differ from the ill-informed in the structure of their preferences if not in the direction. For one thing, we would expect them to be more consistent in their policy positions. Much evidence from surveys suggests that uninformed respondents will have incompatible preferences—they will express approval for contrary policies, or prefer policies but be unwilling to pay the costs of these policies. Table 11 compares the "informed" and the "less well-informed" in terms of the consistency of their policy positions. (The informed are here defined as those who score in the upper half of our information scale, the less well-informed as those who score in the lower half.) As the table shows, the informed are more consistent in policy preference than the less well-informed. The negative correlation between scores on the escalation scale and scores on the de-escalation scale was −.47 for the informed and −.25 for the less well-informed. Thus the informed respondent who favors escalation is less likely to favor de-escalation at the same time. On the other hand, the informed differ little from the less well-informed in terms of their willingness to pay the costs of their policy preferences. Thus, among the informed, there is a correlation of .38 between scores on the escalation scale and scores on the scale of willingness to bear economic costs of the involvement in the war and a correlation of .26 between escalation scores and willingness to pay welfare costs. This is not significantly different from the correlations of .35 and .22, respectively, for the less well-informed group. Thus our hypothesis of greater

[21] To keep these conclusions in perspective it might be useful to point out that, even though the correlations are significantly different from zero, the approximately −.20 correlation between information and support for de-escalation policies means that less than 5 percent of the variation in policy scores can be accounted for by differences in information level.

TABLE 11. CORRELATION MATRIX: ESCALATION, DE-ESCALATION, ECONOMIC COSTS, WELFARE COSTS

(High information groups: upper triangle. Low information groups: lower triangle)

	Escalation	De-esc.	Econ. Costs	Welfare Costs
Escalation		−.47	.38	.26
De-escalation	−.25		−.13	−.19
Economic Cost	.35	−.03		.24
Welfare	.22	−.03	.15	

N = 599 for high information group
N = 625 for low information group

TABLE 10. CORRELATIONS OF INFORMATION SCORES WITH ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION SCALES, CONTROLLING FOR RACE AND SEX

Race and Sex	Escalation	De-escalation	(N)
White Males	.00	−.22*	(588)
White Females	.03	−.07	(583)
Negro Males	.05	−.11	(94)
Negro Females	.20	−.17	(90)

* $p < .001$

consistency among the informed receives only partial confirmation.

There is a further way in which the structure of the opinions of the informed might be expected to differ from that of the less well-informed. Though they might on the average have the same policy preferences—i.e., not be more "hawk" or "dove"—one might expect them to differ in the degree of polarization of their attitudes. But on the latter point, it is hard to say in which way they might differ. One might argue that the more one knows about the war in Vietnam, the more one is likely to want *some* solution—either by increasing the war or decreasing it. On this assumption, we should expect to find that the informed would take more extreme positions, while the less well-informed would take more moderate ones. On the other hand, one could argue that the war is so confusing, that the more one knows, the more ambivalent his position. The less well-informed, on this argument, would be more likely to take extreme positions.

Our data support neither position. The standard deviation of the scores on the escalation scale was 2.52 for the less well-informed and 2.39 for the informed—a slight tendency (if any) for the less well-informed to have more polarized opinions ($f = 1.1$ and is not significant). On the de-escalation scale the standard deviations for the less well-informed and the informed are 1.82 and 1.80, respectively, indicating that the groups do not differ in their likelihood to take extreme positions. This is further reflected in Table 12 where we compare the informed and the less well-informed in their response to a question that offered three unpleasant alternatives. The question read, "Suppose you had to choose among continuing the present situation indefinitely, fighting a major war with hundreds of thousands of casualties, or a withdrawal of American troops leading to an eventual Communist takeover. Which would you choose?" If we compare the two groups we find little difference between them. (Compare especially the two groups with those who answered "don't know" removed. This controls for the greater tendency of those who are less well-informed to give a "don't know" answer.) The informed are slightly more likely to prefer the present situation and slightly less likely to prefer withdrawal. But the shape of the opinion of the two groups is remarkably similar.

The informed, in summary, cannot be said to form a particularly distinct policy public. Their preferences differ, but not substantially, from those of the less well-informed; they are a bit more consistent, but the evidence is mixed on this; and in terms of their degree of polarization they are little different from the rest of the populace.

The Articulate Public. There is one further special public that deserves attention: the group that volunteers its position on public matters, in this case by writing letters to public officials or newspapers. The survey research respondent has to be sought out by the interviewer. The letter writer puts forth his views without the stimulus of the interview and, in this way, demonstrates his involvement. It has been argued that the letter writer differs from those who do not write letters substantially in his preferences, and this in part explains the mistakes politicians make in attempting to predict elections on the basis of opinion as they perceive it—i.e., form the mail they receive, the letters they see in newspapers and so forth.[22]

Converse, Clausen and Miller found that

[22] See Philip E. Converse, Aage R. Clausen and Warren E. Miller, "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election," this REVIEW, 59 (June, 1965), 321–323.

TABLE 12. CHOICE AMONG CONTINUANCE OF PRESENT SITUATION, MAJOR WAR, OR WITHDRAWAL

Preference	High Information	Low Information	Total	High Information	Low Information	Total
				(Don't know's removed)		
Present situation	53%	46%	43%	56%	52%	54%
Major War	24	22	23	26	25	26
Withdrawal	17	20	19	18	22	20
Don't Know	5	12	9	—	—	—
	100%	100%	100%	99%	99%	99%
Number of Cases	678	817	1495	643	717	1360

TABLE 13. ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION SCALE SCORES BY LETTER WRITING

	Escalation Scale Score ← Low → High										
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Letter Written	13%	9%	10%	12%	14%	12%	11%	4%	12%	3%	..... 100% (n = 239)
Not Written	9%	12%	11%	12%	12%	11%	11%	6%	10%	6%	..... 100% (n = 1251)

Mean: Letter written 3.9; not written 3.9.
Standard deviation: Letter written 2.52; not written 2.46.

	De-escalation Scale Score ← Low → High										
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	
Letter Written	3%	6%	16%	21%	21%	13%	7%	3%	6%	3%	..... 100% (n = 239)
Not Written	2%	6%	14%	20%	22%	13%	9%	3%	5%	6%	..... 100% (n = 1251)

Mean: Letter written 3.8; not written 3.8.
Standard deviation: Letter written 1.93; not written 1.83.

letter writers were much more likely to take positions on the extreme right than non-writers (and a bit more likely to take them on the left as well). Is the articulate public that writes letters a "hawk" public? In Table 13 we compare the letter writers with those who have never sent a letter on a public issue to a government official or to the newspapers.[23] We find no difference in direction of preference. The scores on the escalation scale and de-escalation scale are the same for the two groups: the letter writers have a mean score of 3.9 on the escalation scale as do the non-writers; and they both have the same mean score of 3.8 on the de-escalation scale.

It is more interesting to compare the letter writers and the non-writers in terms of the polarization of their opinions. Converse, Clausen and Miller[24] found sharp differences between the public that had never written letters to public officials and the public that had written letters. The articulate public, they found, is more ideologically oriented and more likely to take a position on either end of a policy continuum. And this is quite understandable, given the fact that they have volunteered their opinions—their greater motivation to express themselves would, we would expect, come from stronger policy preferences. This would lead us to expect that letter writers are more likely to be either "hawk" or "dove" with the non-writers taking the more mild middle positions. The data in Table 13 indicate this is not the case; letter writers are *not* more likely to take extreme positions. The standard deviation of their scores on the escalation scale is 2.52 compared with one of 2.46 for the non-writers; and for the de-escalation scale, the scores are 1.93 and 1.83, respectively. Neither difference is significant by the F-test.

Table 14 shows that responses to the "three-alternative" question—present situation, major war, or withdrawal—which also yields little difference in the response patterns of writers

[23] It must be pointed out that we are not talking of letter writers specifically on the Vietnamese war. We found only 17% of our respondents had ever written a letter on any subject, and any attempt to isolate a specific group that had written on the Vietnamese war would have given us too few cases to analyze. This limits the meaning of the following analysis, but not completely. The Converse, Clausen and Miller article uses a similar general measure of letter writing. But this illustrates the limitation of the cross-section survey in obtaining enough cases of significant policy groups.

[24] *Op. cit.*, pp. 332–336.

TABLE 14. CHOICE OF PRESENT SITUATION OR WITHDRAWAL BY LETTER WRITING

Preference	Letter Written	Not written	Total
Present situation	52%	49%	49%
Major War	23	23	23
Withdrawal	20	18	19
Don't Know	5	10	9
	100%	100%	100%
Number of cases	239	1251	1495

and non-writers. Writers are a shade more likely to prefer the present situation and slightly more likely to prefer withdrawal; while the non-writers are somewhat more likely to have no opinion. But the differences are not significant (basically, letter writers are not different from non-writers.)[25]

These results must stand as significant negative findings. Our expectations—reinforced by the Converse, Clausen and Miller findings—had been that the letter writers would tend to take more extreme positions. Indeed, the fact that they are so similar to the inarticulate population leaves us puzzled.[26] It might be that the key lies in the fact that the measure of letter writing is not specific to the Vietnam situation. If we had a sample of letter writers on Vietnam we would be more likely to find the expected polarization. On the other hand, the results parallel those for the information items—and those were information items specific to Vietnam. We shall return to this point.

When we compare the articulate and informed publics with the less articulate and less well-informed publics we find differences, but not as substantial as we might have expected. Their policy preferences differ little. They are no more likely to take extreme positions than the rest of the public—a finding more striking for the articulate public than for the informed public. And though they are somewhat more consistent in their preferences, even this pattern is less than clear.

III. CONCLUSIONS

The data reported in this article bring us a little closer to an understanding of the nature of public attitudes on the war in Vietnam—though they leave many questions unanswered. It becomes clear why public opinion—though it is often invoked—is not an effective guide to policy and does not represent a major constraint on the administration.

1. Our first finding is that public opinion is relatively orderly. The public expressed concern about the war and was relatively informed about it. The correlational analysis among scales shows patterns of consistency among the population; and many of the inconsistencies can be interpreted as more apparent than real. An overwhelming majority (88%) expressed willingness to negotiate with the Vietcong and a similar majority (81%) would oppose withdrawal of our troops "tomorrow." One can argue that many respondents are taking positions at the opposite ends of the spectrum at the same time; but this is not necessarily the case since the two policies are not in conflict. Negotiations do not necessarily imply precipitous withdrawal.

But though the preferences we found among the population were patterned, they were patterned in a more complex way than would be suggested by the summaries of public attitudes found in the standard surveys based upon one, two or three questions. Despite the consistency found, few respondents could be called "hawks" or "doves"; rather, they took more

[25] They differ, however, from the non-writers in terms of consistency roughly as do the informed from the less-well-informed. They are somewhat more likely to be consistent in that the negative correlations between escalation and de-escalation scales are larger, (−.52 for the letter writers and −.34 for the non-writers), the correlation between escalation scores and willingness to pay welfare costs is higher, (.39 for the letter writers and .21 for the non-writers.) But, as with the information items, the distinction is not clear. They are no more likely than the non-writers to be willing to pay the economic costs of escalation. The correlation between escalation scores and willingness to pay economic costs is .37 for both writers and non-writers.

[26] Actually, a closer look at the findings in the Converse, Clausen and Miller article suggests that their findings are similar to ours in one important respect. Though they find a sharp difference between the mass public and the letter writers on most issues, they find much greater similarity on the one foreign policy issue that is reported, "negotiation with the communists." The discrepancies on this issue are so slight in comparison with the discrepancies discovered on the domestic issue (*op. cit.*, figures 2a–e, p. 334), that the analysis of opinion on this issue via letters could have served as a reasonable estimate of the shape of the distribution of public opinion. On the four domestic issues, in contrast, expression through letters was a highly inaccurate guide to public opinion. See below for a further discussion.

moderate positions somewhere nearer the center of the spectrum.

2. A major finding is that though the preferences of respondents have internal structure, they are not related to the broad social groupings around which political and social attitudes often cluster. Variables of social status—occupation, income, or education—do not relate to policy preferences on the Vietnamese war; nor do such variables as religion or region. (The latter makes some difference though not much.) In addition, party affiliation does not relate to policy preferences; a fact that illustrates why it is difficult to make foreign policy the subject of political campaigns.[27]

When it comes to policy preference on the Vietnamese war, the average citizen can receive relatively little guidance from the ordinary reference groups that help him pattern his attitudes. And perhaps the most significant lack is in the relation to party affiliation—the citizen looking for guidance among his fellow partisans will find little. In turn, of course, this means that the pattern of preferences is such that political leaders have a harder time taking them into account. Aside from the gross marginal distributions—"is the President more popular today than yesterday?"—the political leader may have trouble calculating the consequences of patterns of attitudes of the war since they cannot be assigned to the ordinary group categories of political structure.

3. Two differences among social groups do stand out, however. One is the difference between men and women, with women more in favor of de-escalation; and the other between whites and Negroes with the Negroes more in favor of de-escalation. Both findings need further study for adequate explanation, though it is easy enough to suggest some reasons. The male-female difference is consistent with other findings that women differ from men in their political behavior in being somewhat more opposed to policies that could be considered "aggressive"—whether these be capital punishment or universal military service.[28]

The racial patterns are particularly interesting. This does not appear to be a social class phenomenon in disguise, but a difference patterned by the racial distinction. The *ad hoc* explanation is obvious; at the present moment the American Negro is alienated from American society and unimpressed by arguments that our commitment is necessary to preserve freedom and justice for ourselves and others in Southeast Asia.[29] In addition, he may be aware of criticisms of the draft that suggest a disproportionate Negro contribution to the war effort. All this is speculation. But if true, it suggests a relatively high level of self-consciousness among the Negro population that allows the connections to be made between their social position and the war; and it also means that we have found an instance in which the preferences on the war are closely related to one of the major dimensions of social grouping that often pattern political attitudes.

4. If social position (with the exception of sex and race) fails to organize policy preference on this issue, what succeeds? One possible answer is that they are patterned by the respondent's cognitive and affective relationship to the war itself—i.e., that it is not a group-related set of attitudes but a set of attitudes related to the object of the attitude. Some evidence for this is found in the differences in policy preferences between the "worriers" and the "non-worriers" and weaker evidence is found in the differences between the "informed" and the "less well-informed." One would need more data on perceptions of the war, estimates of likely outcomes, and the like, to see whether this type of patterning is significant.[30] The point is that in the absence of the ordinary guidelines of group position that would allow the citizen to adopt the position of those like him or the guideline of group-relatedness that would allow the citizen to adopt a position he perceives as relevant for the groups with which he identifies, cognitive and affective relationship to the events themselves may structure attitudes.

5. One striking finding is the similarity between the informed and articulate population on the one hand, and the rest of the population on the other. All writing on foreign policy attitudes makes a sharp distinction between

[27] See Miller, *op. cit.*, and John Corry's news story on Vietnam as an issue in the 1966 Congressional election (*New York Times*, Oct. 20, 1966, p. 1).

[28] See Fred Greenstein, "Sex-Related Political Differences in Childhood," *Journal of Politics*, 23 (May, 1961), 353–371; Robert E. Lane, *Political Life*, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), 209–216; and Maurice Duverger, *The Political Role of Women* (Paris, 1955).

[29] Gamson and Modigliani (*op. cit.*, p. 189) hypothesize and demonstrate that "the greater the attachment to the mainstream, the greater the degree of conformity of one's foreign policy opinions to official policy."

[30] cf. P. Ekman, E. Tufte, K. Archibald and R. Brody, "Coping with Cuba; Divergent Policy Preferences of State Political Leaders," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (1966), 180–197.

"elite opinion" and the rest. The distinction is still important; but our findings indicate that on this particular issue the shape of opinion differs little between these levels of society. The informed and articulate differ little from others in the direction of their preferences. They are somewhat more likely to have consistent positions (but less so than we would expect). But their positions are not consistently more extreme or consistently more moderate and middle-of-the-road. Commentators have often suggested that if the public "only understood the situation better" they would take positions quite different from the uninformed masses. Or they have believed that visible public opinion (as revealed in letters-to-the-editor columns, for instance) gives an inaccurate picture of the opinion among the populace. It is perhaps a token of the complexity and ambiguity of the war in Vietnam that the informed and articulate (on our simple measures) do not differ from the rest of the population in their preferences or in the likelihood that they take either extreme or moderate positions. As one gets closer to the situation (as one gets more information, for instance) the problem remains unclear. This phenomenon may be true of many political situations, but it appears at any rate truer about the war in Vietnam. Indeed, the similarity among the informed and articulate groups and the mass of the population in their distribution of policy preferences—similar proportions in both groups want escalation or de-escalation, while the bulk lie somewhere in between—continues up the ladder to political leaders and activists in and out of the government. There is no position found by us among the mass public that does not have its advocates in Washington.

In the light of this argument, it is intriguing to compare a poll of members of Congress conducted by the *Congressional Quarterly* with our survey. Congressmen were divided into those who indicated support for present policy, those who wanted to increase the war and those who wanted to see it diminished. The results (as indicated on Table 15) are remarkably close to the results we obtained from a similar choice presented to our national sample. The very close parallel in results must be considered fortuitous since the question asked of the Congressmen, though it offered a similar set of alternatives to the question we asked of our respondents, was phrased quite differently and

TABLE 15. CONGRESSIONAL AND MASS OPINION COMPARED

*Congressional Opinion, October, 1966** Policy Choice		Stanford Survey, February 1966 Policy Choice	
"Basic course U.S. is following"	48.5%	Present Situation	49%
"More decisive military action by the United States to meet communist aggression and achieve victory in the war"	26.4%	Major War	23%
"More emphasis on peace talks, increased steps toward de-emphasis of the conflict and eventual accommodation with the Vietcong"	15.1%	Withdrawal	19%
Unascertained	10.0%	Don't Know	9%
	100%		100%
Number of cases	535		1495

* These data are based on a mail poll conducted by the *Congressional Quarterly* and reported in the *New York Times*, Oct. 29, 1966. The mail questionnaires were followed-up by telephone queries in cases of no response. Those who did not reply were assigned to a position based on previous public statements.

The *Congressional Quarterly* reported 58.5% as backing the basic position of the administration. But, according to the *New York Times* this figure was arrived at by placing most of the 10% who did not respond and who could not be placed on the basis of public statements in the category indicating basic approval of the administration. According to the *New York Times*, the theory used was that "silence indicated acquiescence." We have taken the more cautious position of leaving this 10% in an "unascertained" category.

The data are by no means directly comparable with our survey, since the question was different and the time nine months later. See Table 12 and the relevant text for our question wording.

the time of the Congressional survey was nine months later. But the Congressional poll confirms our point that the general shape and distribution of policy preference is parallel between the mass public and elite groups such as the informed and articulate.

The lack of difference between the "elite" and "mass" opinions may be related, furthermore, to the lack of "group structure" of the issues. On various domestic issues the more informed and the more involved can pick up cues as to the group or party relevance of the policy issue. Thus the more informed and involved are more likely to take positions on one side of the issue or the other. But in connection with the war in Vietnam, the informed and the involved receive few cues of this sort. Thus, they differ little from the rest of the population.

6. The public opinion we have been discussing does not seem to possess much potential for controlling or limiting the alternatives of the administration. If anything, it mirrors the complexities of the debate in Washington and probably reflects a permissiveness in either direction. Our data suggest a higher permissiveness for reduction of the war, but evidence from other polls since then suggests that the President's support increases no matter what he does—increase the war or talk of negotiations—as long as he does something. The increase in support, however, tends to be temporary. But above all, the lack of structure of preferences along party or class lines means that attitudes toward the war are not likely to affect electoral outcome and are less likely to be taken into account in making policy calculations.

Indeed, if we are right in suggesting that the range of preferences among the populace as a whole and among the articulate and informed subsections of the populace mirrors the range of preferences found in elite groups, we can see what kind of relation public opinion polling data have to policy making. The relation is probably circular. A leader—be it the President or someone opposed to his policies—adopts a position. He then finds support for that position among the public—support easier to find if one asks the type of survey question that highlights one part of the range of preferences and obscures the others. He then uses this finding to justify and legitimize his position. This may not be an inaccurate summary of the use of the polls by the President. But it suggests that the careful student of public opinion will want to look at a more complex and variegated picture of public attitudes before coming to conclusions as to what the public wants, or what it will or will not accept.

THE POLITICAL RELEVANCE OF BEHAVIORAL AND EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY

HENRY S. KARIEL
University of Hawaii

Over the last few decades political scientists have shown an understandable interest in material brought into relief by neighboring disciplines. A concern with enriching the field of political science by drawing on sociological, economic, and psychological data has led to efforts to accommodate findings derived from study in areas in which men are subjected to non-political pressures—the constraints of society, the economy, and ultimately their own physical and psychological nature. As the conventional academic boundaries are crossed, knowledge of distinctively political matters, it has been hoped, will become richer as well as more precise. This essay seeks to clarify the promise and limits of two non-political approaches to an understanding of politics, namely those which are represented by two types of psychology, and to take account of their bearings on normative political thought.

Traditionally, normative political thought has been concerned with the analysis and understanding of the ends of political action: it has been an attempt to present and elucidate them. Setting specific points of view in a larger context, it has tended to be discursive and utopian, speculatively enlarging the realm of public possibilities and common choices. More recently, it has been concerned with presenting models designed to assimilate empirically validated propositions about political behavior. To these concerns, various forms of non-political thought have always made their distinctive contributions.

As non-political approaches revealed their relevance, it has been repeatedly asserted that political philosophy was being quietly preempted by non-political thinkers.[1] To be sure, there have been a great many sources of preemption, and as many explanations for the readiness of contemporary political scientists to respond to the challenge of new methods and new kinds of data. But in any case, insofar as their own discipline has not adequately sustained them because of its imprecise methods or its unduly limited subject matter, political scientists have understandably turned elsewhere, whether to art, sociology, or psychology. They have felt justified in utilizing whatever approach might help them (1) specify the conditions for social survival and individual autonomy, (2) draft the blueprints for just action, and (3) articulate, in the words of Jacob Bronowski, "those deeper illuminations in whose light justice and injustice, good and evil, means and ends are seen in fearful sharpness of outline."[2]

If psychology in particular has tended to absorb political thought, this may be because of an acceptance of Herbert Marcuse's proposition that today psychological issues and categories have turned into political ones, that individual disease has become a function of the sickness of the body politic.[3] Moreover, psychological studies, especially those dealing with motivation, perception, and small-group behavior, have become attractive to students of politics because they may be studied with scientific rigor.

What, then, might be of relevance to political thought in the recent work of psychology? To what extent does current psychology enrich our appreciation of the complexities of human nature, and thus make us aware of possibilities which political theory must take into account? Does it alert us to a reality which a relevant political theory must recognize? Can it bring its generalizations to bear on actual or possible configurations of power in society? These questions may be addressed to two complementary persuasions in the field of psychology. Both are identifiable trends though neither presents anything like a unified doctrine. One, a behavioral persuasion, may usefully be regarded as positivist; the other, an existentialist persuasion, may usefully be regarded as negativist.

[1] That traditional political philosophy is in retreat is by now a tired proposition. It merely remains to relate the decline of the study of political philosophy and the rise of the study of political attitudes to the increasing visibility of inarticulate groups.

[2] *Science and Human Values* (New York: Harper, 1956), p. 94.

[3] *Eros and Civilization* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), p. xi. T. W. Adorno and his associates simply affirm that "ideology regarding each social area must be regarded as a facet of the total personality and an expression of more central ('subideological') psychological dispositions": *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 207.

I. BEHAVIORAL-POSITIVIST PSYCHOLOGY

When theory is defined as a logically ordered scheme of empirically validated and functionally related propositions, there would seem to be good reason for asking positivistic psychological studies what kind of contributions they may be making. Contemporary psychological research should certainly engage us insofar as it advances knowledge, as Murray Horwitz has written, "by experimental manipulation of environmental conditions in order to determine the types of psychological needs to be expected in particular situations."[4] We are entitled to returns from investigations in which man is postulated to be a determined creature, explicable in terms of his instincts, drives, needs, and motives. Psychological research, when undeviatingly empirical, is bound to reveal the extent to which an autonomous environment, partially built into man himself, acts on him. Measuring the force of the prevailing forms of conditioning, it should make us realize that some of our ideals are less indeterminate than we like to believe. As part of a descriptive theory of political behavior, it should inform us how to act economically under varying conditions. It should tell us how to reconcile ourselves to given causal sequences and how to adapt to given environmental systems. It should no less inform us what factors to vary so as to produce desired results.

To provide such knowledge, an experimental psychology postulates a society whose constituent elements are seen as functionally related. All particular cases and incidents, it is assumed for analytical purposes, are exemplifications of a natural order of social relations. When this methodological postulate is adopted by empirical psychologists, indeed by behavioral scientists generally, they help delineate non-political situations. That is, they identify situations within which men are not free to pursue alternative goals, within which they are driven by nature, by their needs, or by others with the power to command obedience. They thereby provide the kind of information that can keep normative political thought in touch with reality. They inform prospective political actors about the practicality of their ideals and the extent of their power. But because the conditions they define are necessarily non-political, to act exclusively on the basis of their findings, remaining "realistic" and practical, is to delimit politics: it is to adjust ideals to "reality," to the models of man and society authenticated by a natural science of psychology.

Although there is as yet no general theory of human behavior comprehensive enough to justify direct public implementation, the desire for such a policy science is surely evident.[5] Moreover, the charge that what we do know is trivial is refuted by the literature.[6] We know how politically engaged individuals perceive their environments and, in general terms, what sort of psychological patterns underlie their political participation.[7] We have confirmation of various kinds of propositions about the function of leaders and followers when groups reach a consensus. We know how to make alternative scales of values acceptable within stable societies. Those who wield power may now choose more effectively among various consensus-creating techniques, such as getting individuals to play specified roles so that they will ratify predetermined policies.[8]

[4] "Psychological Needs as a Function of Social Environments," in Leonard D. White (ed.), *The State of the Social Sciences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 161–183, 181.

[5] It was modestly expressed at the 1922 meeting of the American Political Science Association by Harold F. Gosnell; see his "Some Practical Applications of Psychology in Government," *American Journal of Sociology*, 28 (May, 1923), 735–743.

[6] See Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, *Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings* (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1964); and James C. Davies, *Human Nature in Politics: The Dynamics of Political Behavior* (New York: John Wiley, 1963).

[7] See Seymour M. Lipset *et al.*, "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), Vol. II, 1124–1175; and Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation: How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965). That this knowledge may mislead us when we rely on it exclusively to understand the politics of a relatively unregimented society has been noted by V. O. Key, Jr., "The Practically Relevant in Surveys," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (Spring, 1960), 54–61 (reviewing *The American Voter* by Angus Campbell *et al.*); and Leslie A. Fiedler, "Voting and Voting Studies," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (eds.), *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959), 184–196.

[8] See J. L. Moreno, *Psychodrama* (New York: Beacon House, 1946), and the work in the field of group dynamics. For a specific case in point, see Robert T. Golembiewski, "O & M and the Small Group," *Public Administration Review*, 20 (Autumn, 1960), 205–212.

However modest these findings, the ultimate expectation is to create a scientific foundation enabling human relations specialists to solve prevailing social problems.[9] Reasonably enough, the practitioners of a positivistic psychology will seek to put their hypotheses to the test, hoping to overcome social conflict and create a more orderly regime.

The ideal that controls their work, however much it may conflict with intervening preferences, constitutes one possible and wholly coherent conception of society. It thereby constitutes an unintended contribution to normative political thought; it provides a vision of possibilities, a model which should sensitize us to the consequences of still unidentified impulses and still incomplete policies.

Probably the most complete and least embarrassed expression of this ideal is to be found in B. F. Skinner's *Science and Human Behavior*. But it is his earlier utopian fiction, *Walden Two*, which reveals more directly how determinacy, initially a mere hypothetical postulate, becomes the very foundation of an operating social order. The psychologist-manager of Skinner's model community concedes that it might never be possible to *prove* that man is not free. "But," he says, "the increasing success of a science of behavior makes it more and more plausible."[10] The methodological convention of determinacy, consistently acted upon, is vindicated: the notion that man is not free, though he may well retain a subjective feeling of freedom, is progressively established as fact. Having the power to act on the basis of his belief in determinacy, the psychologist actually institutes it. In the process, he views himself not as arbitrary ruler but instead as a law-abiding governor obedient to nature's own pre-existing code, to man's true nature.

It should be apparent in what ways experimental psychology is here providing us with a theory for the distribution of power in society. We are led to recognize that we need no institutions to mediate between the findings of a positive science of psychology and the imperatives of the natural order of man, for both ultimately come to the same thing. We require no authority above social technicians: the success of their action will itself testify to its soundness. Because they are checked by the irresistible power of nature, the traditional devices for distributing, sharing, and legitimating power in society, though they may remain atmospherically useful for creating agreement, are irrelevant. We can dispense with the rhetoric and institutions of citizenship and representation. The good society will function without politics, without assuming either the autonomy of the rational individual or the consequent need for political power to restrain him.[11] Nor are individual interests sacrificed in the process. On the contrary, men are guided toward the fulfill-

[9] See James G. Miller, "Psychological Approaches to the Prevention of War," in Wayne Dennis *et al.*, *Current Trends in Social Psychology* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1948), 274–299; James G. Miller *et al.*, "Social Psychology and the Atomic Bomb: A Round-Table Discussion," in *Experiments in Social Process* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), 171–194; Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), especially pp. 202–203. I have discussed this scientific activism in "Society as Crucible," in Helmut Schoeck and James W. Wiggins (eds.), *Psychiatry and Responsibility* (Princeton, N. J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), 135–156.

[10] *Walden Two* (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 257. The empirical relevance of Skinner's novel has been pointed out by Andrew Hacker in "Dostoevsky's Disciples: Man and Sheep in Political Theory," *Journal of Politics*, 17 (November, 1955), 590–613. Hacker does not note how the benign conditioning apparatus of *Walden Two* was anticipated by Nicolai G. Chernyshevsky's *What Is to Be Done?* (1863). Chernyshevsky's rationalist utopia was parodied so thoroughly by Dostoevsky's *Notes from Underground* that Dostoevsky remains Skinner's most incisive critic. It may also be worth noting that the very weakness of Skinner's novel as a work of art (its lack of tension and movement, the flatness of its characters, its tendency to make assertions about experience rather than to display it dramatically) also makes his work unconvincing political theory. It fails to take account of possibilities which are radically different; it fails to comprehend how one man's health may be another's misery, or how one man's misery may be another's entertainment. Had Skinner's style enabled him to reveal the complexity and ambiguity of the arrangements he describes, the cause his work defends would have been implicitly challenged. But perhaps the artist simply cannot successfully depict a closed order; works of art, like the paradigms of science, necessarily expose alternatives, and thus unsettle whatever they presume to establish.

[11] Skinner's fictional psychologist, quite consistently, is hostile to politics on the ground that it impedes direct action: see *Walden Two*, 8 193–197.

ment of their authentic, natural needs. They are presumed to agree on the ends of life, ultimately sheer survival. There is no question, as Skinner has disarmingly intoned, that "health is better than illness, wisdom better than ignorance, love better than hate, and productive energy better than neurotic sloth."[13] A commitment to "healthy, happy, secure, productive, and creative people" makes it superfluous to sustain institutions balancing conflicting ends. Men may at last be made "happy, informed, skillful, well behaved and productive," first by acknowledging "that action is initiated by forces impinging upon the individual" and then by providing for the control of these forces through a behavioral technology.[13]

Thus Skinner's vision is frankly anti-political. If those who share it do not have the actual power to establish a unified society emancipated from philosophical speculation and ideological conflict, their theory is at least appropriate to such a society. Skinner makes clear that as experimental psychology becomes the exclusive basis for policy decisions, it must threaten a political order designed to keep conflicting interests alive. He fully faces the fact that a positive science of man is not a value-neutral means for serving *all* alternative ends, for one end it cannot serve is the preservation of politics. To be sure, if individuals should persist in their perverse affection for politics, science could arrange matters to suit them. It could lay out a social order so variegated as to require politicians to deal with the ensuing conflict. But this would negate the very assumption it operates on: the underlying existence of a functioning apolitical system that is progressively disclosed by experimental science.

Such a science will create healthy, productive, well-behaved individuals wherever it is free to extend its enterprises, wherever it is permitted to treat those whose cravings for community, status, fame, and power are such a problem in non-utopian regimes. It does not, therefore, seek to illuminate the character of the human condition—man's irreconcilable interests— but to attack it directly as a "problem" to be overcome. Eminently practical, it literally converts obviously dysfunctional factors into functional ones. It exposes the presumed wastefulness of political institutions which, because they preserve the interests of even outvoted groups, do not demand the conversion of their members. And its solutions, unlike political ones, are durable. If it is not widely argued that they be imposed on the body politic, this is only because most of the practitioners of experimental psychology are less thoroughgoing than Skinner. There is actually no reason, Skinner has pointed out, for restricting experimental science: "It is not a matter of bringing the world into the laboratory, but of extending the practices of an experimental science to the world at large. We can do this as soon as we wish to do it. At the moment psychologists are curiously diffident. . . ."[14]

As it displaces the traditional political order, experimental psychology displaces traditional political thought as well. One of the tasks of political thought—to challenge what is "given" and to reorder it creatively in the light of reason—becomes pointless. It becomes imperative to cease thinking, to commence acting. "We all know what's good," Skinner's benevolent psychologist affirms, adding without irony, "until we stop to think about it."[15] As the findings of experimental psychology become the rational ground for political action, alternative grounds must come to seem merely subjective and willful. If the truth to which a positivistic science of man guides us is deemed objective, if we clearly know what constitutes lawful behavior and have a full inventory of human needs, we must be irrational to question such knowledge and to sustain the institution of politics.

Combining a romantic reaction against the infinite complexities of life, a distrust of *political* power, and an elitist view of the masses as naturally desiring to escape responsibility for choice, Skinner bluntly spells out the abbreviations of the small-scale work of others. This itself may be redeeming in times when much is mumbled, repressed, or said in irony.

II. EXISTENTIALIST-NEGATIVIST PSYCHOLOGY

We are impelled toward a self-contained, self-replenishing regime insofar as we act exclusively on the postulate that human action, in Skinner's words, "is a lawful datum, that it

[13] B. F. Skinner, "Freedom and the Control of Men," *American Scholar*, 25 (Winter, 1955–56), 47–65, at p. 51; also see *Walden Two*, p. 159. Skinner's ultimate value is group survival; see his *Science and Human Behavior* (New York: Macmillan, 1953), 430–436, 443–446.

[13] "Freedom and the Control of Men," pp. 47, 53; *Cumulative Record* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1959), p. 34. Also see *Walden Two*, 175-197.

[14] *Cumulative Record*, p. 227.

[15] *Walden Two*, p. 159.

is undisturbed by the capricious acts of any free agent—in other words, that it is completely determined."[16] We are impelled toward a diametrically opposed regime insofar as we are persuaded to take an approach to human nature which seeks to save the specific pitch and texture of distinctively human experiences by aligning itself against all forms of determinism. What is the character of this alternative persuasion, and what kind of community does it imply?

In contrast to experimental psychology, this alternative persuasion assumes that human conduct is ineradicably colored by freedom. No explanations of human action, it holds, can be telling unless we understand it as the result of free choices. By nature, man is obstinately in rebellion against social constraints. He is therefore to be comprehended as an irreducible phenomenon, as existing ultimately independent of all circumscribing systems, classifications, or blueprints. He is a being in process, always unfinished, a being of only partially expressed potentialities. His mental health consequently is to be defined in the infinitely varied terms of the individual himself—that is, in reference to his own possibilities. His ego is to be understood as creatively integrating internal needs and external demands.[17] Man is to be recognized as an autonomous actor whose role is to limit his renunciations and conquer his environment.

To regard human freedom as the scientifically and therapeutically most effective postulate is to provide the conditions for the self-directed actualization of the individual. It is to act so as to enable men to do what their own nature dictates, not what some external code demands. Refraining from all manipulative practice, the psychologist will guide individuals to discover their identity, to experience it, and then to proceed in response to their discovery and experience. This calls not for the psychologist's objectivity and detachment but for his compassionate participation.[18] More precisely, it demands a posture of simultaneous involvement and detachment characteristic of the actor who plays his part without surrendering himself in the process.[19]

Recognizing all human relationships as encounters between unique persons, an existentialist psychology questions the norm (as well as the fiction) of the altogether aloof, disengaged analyst. Only a method enabling the observer, too, to play a part, it asserts, yields understanding and mastery of specifically human situations, situations in which men experience rage, horror, shame, joy, resentment, grief, love, and hate in all their specificity. As Leonard C. Feldstein has said,

> To be genuinely empirical, we must, when we inquire into the constitutive properties of an object, attend to every aspect and subtlety of that object. So a glance at a person, the "object" of

[16] *Cumulative Record*, p. 227, "A proper theory," Skinner adds, "must . . . abolish the conception of the individual as a doer, as an originator of action"; *ibid.*, p. 236.

[17] Thus Heinz Hartmann and Erik H. Erikson refuse to reduce ego functions to the id. See Hartmann, *Ego Psychology and the Problem of Adaptation* (New York: International Universities Press, 1958); "Comments on the Psychoanalytic Theory of the Ego," *Psychonanalytic Study of the Child*, 5 (1950), 74–96; Erikson, "The Problem of Ego Identity, *Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association*, 4 (October, 1956), 56–121; "Ego Development and Historical Change," *Psychoanalytic Study of the Child*, 2 (1946), 359–396.

[18] For a therapeutic approach expressing this view, see Carl R. Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy* (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1951). See also J. H. van den Berg, *The Phenomenological Approach to Psychiatry* (Springfield: Thomas, 1955), p. 102; Rollo May, Ernest Angel, Henri F. Ellenberger (eds.), *Existence: A New Dimension in Psychiatry and Psychology* (New York: Basic Books, 1958); and Rogers, "A Theory of Therapy, Personality, and Interpersonal Relationships," in Sigmund Koch (ed.), *Psychology; A Study of a Science* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1959), Vol. III, 184–256.

[19] Thus Carl R. Rogers asks the analyst to feel *as if* he were the other person—"without ever losing the 'as if' condition" (in Koch, *loc. cit.*). It may be pertinent to note the origins of existentialist psychology in the formulations of Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911): see H. A. Hodges, *The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey* (New York: Humanities Press, 1952), ch. 5. See also Eric Heller's analysis of Goethe's idea of scientific truth in *The Disinherited Mind* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Cuday, 1957), ch. 1; and Alan Gewirth, "Subjectivism and Objectivism in the Social Sciences," *Philosophy of Science*, 21 (April, 1954), 157–163. An entire sociological and anthropological school finds its vindication (and limits) in this approach. Consider the methodology not only of Max Weber and Karl Mannheim but no less that of Oscar Lewis's *Children of Sánchez: Autobiography of a Mexican Family* (1961) and Truman Capote's *In Cold Blood: A True Account of a Multiple Murder and Its Consequences* (1965)—all enlarging understanding while raising the problem of verifiability and veracity.

psychoanalytic inquiry, discloses not a mind and a body, mysteriously conjoined as independent structures, but a gesture, an expression, a gait, a sign of his intellectual acuity, his physique, his physiognomy. We experience that person as an integrated agency—a living, breathing, moving, joyous and sorrowing whole. Whether in dignity, defiance or wretchedness, he declares himself before us to be himself. When he acts and when he thinks, he expresses a single dynamic of existence.[20]

This formulation supports the familiar existentialist directive for both a proper science of man and a just human community: (1) to understand man he must be viewed sympathetically from within and (2) to establish the just state all men must be brought to realize that moral decisions, to be authentic, are theirs alone. In a world which puts men on trial whenever they seek to assert themselves, they are asked not to despair—and this despite the utter absence of some transcendent reason for bearing up. In the face of an oppressively organized environment which threatens man's very existence as self-directed actor, an existentialist psychology asks him to be himself. There is no further advice, no circumscription of possibilities, no definition of virtuous conduct.

The general prescriptions embodied in existentialist literature find their most concentrated expression in psychiatric practice. Ideally, the physician will follow the very procedures for therapy which accord with existentialist assumptions. It becomes his task to help the patient dominated by needless abstractions to identify them. He "treats" patients by encouraging them to articulate their needs, and thus to recognize the blocks to their self-development, the given formulas which tend to freeze their lives. Since he consistently reacts against all theories,[21] he will offer no new moral codes, no positive ways of structuring human life. He will merely legitimate opposition to myths, stereotypes, and ideologies—all in the name of an undefined freedom.

The term "freedom" cannot, of course, describe any specific situation in which man finds himself: every existing situation necessarily has coercive features. Thus the insistence on defining human reality in terms of freedom is in fact a form of exhortation, a plea to enlarge the sphere of freedom. To give point to this plea, the existentialist psychologist is impelled to make us aware of prevailing coercions and of the intricate ways we disguise them from ourselves. His moral posture is consistently liberal; he resists whatever threatens to make objects of us.

This determination to save man from humiliation inspires analyses which adumbrate the subtle degradations imposed by language and ritual. It gives thrust to the arresting elucidations of inauthentic behavior provided by Sartre, Beauvoir, and Camus.[22] It supports Fromm's account of loneliness, insecurity, and alienation under contemporary industrial conditions. It supports Erik Erikson's picture of how pathetically we cope with the anxieties generated by modern life;[23] Ernest Schachtel's study of the way our potential experiences are devitalized by the barren clichés we have for anticipating them; Harry Stack Sullivan's definition of the rigidities which characterize our social relations; Marcuse's stress on "the liberating function of negation in philosophical thought," on the need "to break the power of facts over the world and to speak a language which is not the language of those who establish, enforce, and benefit from the facts";[24] Norman O. Brown's stunningly perceptive diagnosis of the institution of money.[25] These

[20] Mimeographed manuscript, September 1960, p. 6.

[21] For an account of the recent shift away from "the psychological Age of Theory," see Sigmund Koch's epilogue to vol. 3 of Koch (ed.), *Psychology*; for a discussion of the present range of existentialist psychology, including an extensive bibliography, see Adrian van Kaam, *The Third Force in European Psychology* (Greenville, Del.: Psychosynthesis Research Foundation, 1960).

[22] See especially Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948), ch. 2.

[23] Erik Erikson, *Childhood and Society* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1950); see also Allan Wheelis, *The Quest for Identity* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1958). Erikson has been particularly concerned with showing that, as we mature in modern society, we are unprepared to meet successive crises. Our education fails to tell us to what to adjust and against what to rebel. We are made anxious by our inability to find out where we belong and who we are: child or parent, boy or girl, man or woman, entrepreneur or coordinator. And since we can gain self-knowledge only in specific encounters, our identity becomes diffuse, we lose it, and cannot get to know ourselves.

[24] Herbert Marcuse, "Actuality of Dialectic," *Diogenes*, No. 31 (Fall, 1960), 80–88, 83, 84.

[25] See Norman O. Brown, "Filthy Lucre," in *Life Against Death: The Psychoanalytical Meaning of History* (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1959), ch. 15.

accounts—and the harvest is rich—derive from an acute sensitivity to all types of coercion. They consequently lead to descriptions of coercive institutions and practices.[26]

Yet do they lead to scientific knowledge of human behavior? A humanistic existentialism clearly affirms that there is always more to man than a naturalistic, experimental psychology can comprehend. But how valid is its claim that it alone can provide psychological knowledge, that *its* empiricism is uniquely qualified to provide understanding of the individual?

It is Ludwig Binswanger who has most persistently maintained that the existentialist approach alone will provide adequate understanding of individual transactions. As early as 1926 he urged reliance on empathy as part of psychoanalysis. There are aspects of human existence, he claimed, which no positivistic science of psychoanalysis can uncover. What is required is the conception of man provided by an existentialist perspective, preeminently that of Heidegger. From Heidegger's point of view, Binswanger wrote, "man is no longer understood in terms of some theory—be it a mechanistic, a biologic, or a psychological one—but in terms of a purely phenomenologic elucidation of the total structure or total articulation of existence as 'being-in-the-world.' "[27]

It remains unclear, however, just how such understanding may be conveyed to others, and what others, when they have grasped it, should make of it. What begins as scientific claim moves easily toward obscurity. Where the idiom of experimental psychology is necessarily abstract, that of existentialist psychology tends to be subjective, precious, and esoteric. No doubt, we are presented with an uplifting reaffirmation of the inviolability of the individual, a respect for him as an infinitely creative force. But while this may invigorate the subject matter of the behavioral sciences, making their practitioners aware that they deal with human actors, politically it cannot buttress anything else. Lacking a theory of power, it raises the question of its practical relevance. The only political ethic of existentialist psychology is negative, a prohibition against treating men as objects. But a generalized reverence for human life, the directive not to interfere with its growth, simply cannot give practical guidance when men must act against some manifestations of life and in favor of others. It provides no theory for discriminating between competing forms of restraint, no scale for weighing the consequences of alternative decisions. The belief in the absolute incommensurability and discontinuity of data is bound to frustrate all theory building. The sympathetic immersion in pure human material, in sum, cannot provide anything positive, be it science or ethics.[28]

III. CONCLUSION

Yet despite the nihilistic purity of their aim, writers of an existentialist persuasion have recurrently searched for formulations which might help express their view and implement their commitment. Various artificial constructions have seemed expedient—the theoretical constructions of phenomenology (Binswanger), the idiom of theology (Tillich), the symbols of myth and conventions of drama (Sartre). What remains noteworthy is that the approach of a natural science of human behavior has not been regarded as effective and useful.[29] Exis-

[26] One need merely reflect on the fate of the "existentialist" component of political thinkers from Augustine to Marx to realize that in fact they may lead to a great deal more. Sartre's idealization of the Communist Party, Brown's of a state of "polymorphic perversity," Fromm's of a fraternal "communitarianism"—all these constitute a jumping to conclusions, an acceptance of finalities which links them with Skinner. Yet in their case, unlike Skinner's, such conclusiveness compromises their principles. In other words, existentialist psychologists may inconsistently defend the very regime which Skinner's behaviorism consistently seeks to establish.

[27] Ludwig Binswanger, "Erfahren, Verstehen, Deuten in der Psychoanalyse," *Imago*, 12 (May 6, 1926), 223–237; "Existential Analysis and Psychotherapy," in Frieda Fromm-Reichmann and J. L. Moreno (eds.), *Progress in Psychotherapy* (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1956), p. 144. See also Ulrich Sonnemann, *Existence and Therapy* (New York: Grune and Stratton, 1954); May *et al.* (eds.), *Existence*; and Avery D. Weisman, *The Existential Core of Psychoanalysis* (Boston: Little Brown, 1965).

[28] Thus Heinz Hartmann notes that the psychological analysis of morality will not direct human conduct and that, moreover, the psychologically healthy person is by no means necessarily "moral": *Psychoanalysis and Moral Values* (New York: International Universities Press 1960).

[29] An exception is Carl R. Rogers, perhaps because he has wanted to come to terms with Skinner (the text of their actual debate is in *Science*, November 20, 1956, 1057–1066): see Rogers, *On Becoming a Person* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), Part VII. However, Rogers' acceptance of behavioral methods is less than thoroughgoing: he still insists that the phenomenological approach

tentialist psychologists have consistently raised empirical questions about the practical conditions for personal autonomy; yet they have remained hostile to the behavioral, experimental methods required for trustworthy responses. Thus, while a behavioral science is indispensable for moving men most economically and painlessly toward personal autonomy, literally toward self-government, those sharing an existentialist approach have denied its relevance.

This is understandable enough. When the findings of behavioral science are regarded as the *sufficient* ground for public policy, as they are by Skinner and others who see determinism as "real" rather than as a methodological postulate, the range of human possibilities is restricted. Such scientism has naturally inspired concern, and has led existentialists and humanists of all persuasions to assail behavioral approaches indiscriminately.[30] Thereby, however, it has deprived itself of a foundation based on empirical theory. The rejection of a natural science of human behavior leaves only a do-it-yourself psychology as alternative. It may be that once the utopian society has been created, such a psychology would be sufficient: men might then be radically various, beyond all reduction, unknowable to one another, totally free to design their own projects. But until this post-historical era has been ushered in, the authors of accounts celebrating man's incredible promise should welcome methods of formal deduction and empirical fact-finding that seek to specify the practical prerequisites for personal autonomy. They should accept some policies as at least relatively final, recognizing that adjustment to them is not invariably undesirable. At times, as Allison Davis has noted, man's anxieties may be reduced by his "identification with his 'superiors,' and also by his acceptance of the controls, ego-ideals, and identity of his own status-group." Man may find it expedient to be simultaneously self-directed and compliant, acting on his own and yet accepting the limits imposed by "the objective social sanctions of age-status, sex-status, and the other basic types of social status."[31] To make this position square with the existentialist ideal of maximizing freedom, the strategy associated with constitutional proceduralism becomes appropriate.[32] If men are in fact limited by others, and these limitations cannot be overcome without self-destruction, it becomes necessary to uphold procedures designed to assure the possibility of the continued change of public policies. Furthermore, support for institutions that underwrite such change need not be derived from a timeless order of moral absolutes; it is sufficient to uphold a commitment to freedom as the highest public value.

This commitment, of course, is one to which those of an existentialist persuasion fully subscribe. But subscribing to nothing else, they evade the political problem of reconciling conflicting claims to power and the empirical problem of weighing the force of these claims. Failing in this, they become politically impotent and practically irrelevant.[33]

---

itself can use "objective measures, whose results are publicly replicable," that it can lead to the "development of clearly operational steps and operational tools for the measurement of the behaviors which represent . . . inner variables," and that it can (and should) lead to the discovery of "function-process relationships which hold for the inner world of personal meanings and to formulate these with sufficient precision that they may be put to empirical test"; "Toward a Science of the Person," in T. W. Wann (ed.), *Behaviorism and Phenomenology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 109–133, 120, 131.

[30] See Joseph Wood Krutch's obscurantist attack on Skinner in *The Measure of Man* (New York: Charter Books, 1962), sensibly put in its place by George Kateb, *Utopia and Its Enemies* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). See also Floyd W. Matson, *The Broken Image: Man, Science and Society* (New York: George Braziller, 1964); and Jacques Barzun, *Science: The Glorious Entertainment* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), both polemics lashing scientism as if it were science.

[31] Allison Davis, "The Ego and Status-Anxiety," in White (ed.), *The State of the Social Sciences*, pp. 212–228, 228.

[32] For an attempt to show how this proposition applies to Nietzsche's work, see my "Nietzsche's Preface to Constitutionalism," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (May, 1963), 211–225.

[33] This is implicitly recognized by Christian Bay's *The Structure of Freedom* (1958), a work which has made the most of empirical findings tending to support a view of man which relies on no transcending absolutes and postulates man's irreducible, "existential" nature. Similarly, it has been possible to use the normative constructs of existentialist psychology (especially those provided by Gordon W. Allport, Henry A. Murray, and Abraham H. Maslow) to give direction to empirical analysis: see Everett E. Hagen, *On the Theory of Social Change: How Economic Growth Begins* (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, 1962), 88–95; and Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Perso-*

Yet whatever the practical evasions of an existentialist psychology, it has recurrently succeeded in breaking the spell of convention. It arouses our sense of injustice, and thereby provides the ground for considering alternative possibilities. By making vivid the partisan nature of our intellectual preoccupations, it stimulates the political imagination. Moreover, it summons the policy scientist interested in social engineering to face up to the kind of tortured world existentialist accounts reveal as ours. And as he is responsible to his scientific vocation, he may well respond to their testimony—indeed, to the testimony of whoever expresses our dilemmas without resolving them, whoever reacts creatively against disorder, be they poets or sociologists. Reminded of the fallacy of closure, of regarding his findings as the whole of possible reality, he should feel encouraged to expand the dimensions of manifest experience, fastening less on the human condition than the human promise, defining not only what we are but also what with luck and action-oriented research we have it within ourselves to become.

nality, and Nation-Building: Burma's Search for Identity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). A useful synthesis of the literature dealing with basic needs is provided by Paul Kurtz, *Decision and the Condition of Man* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1965), ch. 9.

THE DERADICALIZATION OF MARXIST MOVEMENTS*

ROBERT C. TUCKER
Princeton University

I. INTERPRETATIONS OF POST-STALIN IDEOLOGICAL CHANGE

Marxism-Leninism, as the Soviet Marxist ideology is called, has never been wholly static; it has evolved over the years by a process of accretion, elimination and redefinition of dogma. But in the first post-Stalin decade, there were changes of unusual scope and significance in this sphere, accompanying and in some ways mirroring the general processes of systemic change which Stalin's death precipitated in Soviet society. This paper seeks to interpret the post-Stalin Soviet ideological changes, especially as they bear upon the politics of world revolution. In doing so, it attacks the broader theoretical problem of what goes on in radical political movements and their ideologies as these movements settle down and accommodate themselves to the existing world. For some such tendency appears to be involved in the Soviet case.

The year 1956 was the watershed of post-Stalin ideological change in the U.S.S.R. In the Central Committee's report to the Twentieth Party Congress—the first congress held after Stalin's death—Nikita Khrushchev announced a series of doctrinal innovations affecting particularly the line of Communist Marxism on international relations and the further development of the world Communist revolution. One was the revision of the Leninist thesis on the inevitability of periodic wars under imperialism. On the ground that the world-wide forces for peace were now unprecedentedly strong, it was proclaimed that wars, while still possible, were no longer fatally inevitable even though "imperialism" continued to exist in large areas. Not only could the antagonistic socio-economic systems peacefully coexist; they could and should actively cooperate in the maintenance of peaceful relations. At the same time, coexistence was a competitive process, economics being the principal arena of competition. In the long-range non-military contest for influence, the Communist countries would strive to show the superiority of their socialist mode of production over the capitalist mode and would thereby make the Communist socio-economic model compellingly attractive, particularly to the developing countries. Communism would spread, then, not by force but by force of example. And even as a strictly internal process in the countries concerned, the Communist revolution no longer need necessarily be accomplished through large-scale armed violence. New non-violent forms of "transition to socialism" (i.e., to Communism) might be found, especially in countries where capitalism was not yet very strong. Notwithstanding the Leninist tenet that ruling classes do not voluntarily surrender their power, it might now be possible for socialism to come to power in various places by a parliamentary path. The revolutionary forces would strive to "win a firm majority in parliament and to turn the parliament from an agency of bourgeois democracy into an instrument of genuinely popular will."[1]

Such was a large part of what came to be known in the Communist world as the "Twentieth Congress line." There were other elements as well. One was the proposal for *rapprochement* and cooperation between Communist parties and their historic Marxist enemies, the Social Democratic parties. Another was the formal recognition of Yugoslavia as a member of the family of Communist states, and therewith the recognition of diversity in Communist methods and institutions as legitimate within certain limits. The Twentieth Congress line was, moreover, accentuated and further elaborated in a series of important Soviet pronouncements in the ensuing years. In elaborating the new thesis on the non-inevitability of wars in the present era, Soviet leaders argued that the rulers of the non-Communist powers, or the more moderate and sober elements among them, could perceive the unprecedented dangers implicit in the rise of nuclear weapons and were inclined to take account of these dangers by pursuing a foreign policy designed to avoid another major war. Accentuating the optimistic idea that competitive coexistence could remain peaceful, the Twenty-First Soviet Party Congress in 1959 declared in its resolution that "even before the complete triumph of socialism on earth, while capitalism

* This is a revision of a paper delivered at the 1966 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. I am grateful to John Armstrong, Henry Bienen, Stephen Cohen, Alistaire McAuley and Daniel Tarschys for helpful comments on the original version.

[1] *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.

still exists on a part of the globe, a genuine possibility will arise of excluding world war from the life of human society."[2] To be sure, "national-liberation wars" were proclaimed to be legitimate and deserving of assistance from Communist states. But at the same time, Soviet leaders warned against the dangers of escalation inherent even in small local armed conflicts, and advocated that independence be granted to peoples still under alien rule so that armed struggle would not be needed to attain this goal. And the idea of the desirability of peace-keeping cooperation between competitors, particularly the Soviet Union and United States as the military superpowers of the two coalitions, was elaborated at length in Soviet writings.[3]

The Twentieth Congress line also gave strong endorsement to a new Soviet policy of *rapprochement* with non-Communist nationalist revolutionary regimes and movements in newly independent nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Governments of countries outside the Communist bloc were invited to join an expanding world-wide "peace zone" by adopting the policy of non-alignment with existing military blocs. Neutralism, the very possibility of which had been denied in Moscow in Stalin's final years, was thus given Soviet support; and what has come to be called the "third world" was recognized as such in a new tripartite world-view which contrasted sharply with the Stalinist bifurcation of the contemporary political universe into two warring camps. That the developing countries would eventually develop into Communist states was postulated, but it came to be recognized that nations choosing the "non-capitalist path" of development might inaugurate socialist economic practices in various different ways and not not necessarily under Communist Party auspices. Moreover, a political way-station on the long journey to Communism was envisaged in the concept of a "national democracy," which was defined as a non-Communist regime committed to internal developmental goals, tolerant of its own Communist movement, and friendly to the Soviet Union and associated states. Soviet writings meanwhile continued to emphasize the possibility of a peaceful parliamentary path of transition to Communism. And the association of Communism with the idea of dictatorship and violence was further softened with the introduction in 1961 of the notion that the contemporary Soviet state had ceased to be a "dictatorship of the proletariat" and become a "state of the whole people" in continual process of democratization.

All these doctrinal modifications were formally incorporated into the new C.P.S.U. Program adopted by the Twenty-Second Party Congress in 1961. Taken in their interrelated entirety, they marked the passage of Soviet Marxist ideology into a new stage of its history. In the decade since the Nineteenth Party Congress of 1952, which met in Stalin's presence and under his aegis, orthodox Leninism-Stalinism had been supplanted [illegible] a new Soviet ideological amalgam which might be called "neo-Communist Marxism." Needless to say, it showed continuity with the past, as in the reaffirmation of the ultimate goal of a world Communist society. On the other hand, there were definite breaks with the Communist ideological past. The doctrines of the non-inevitability of wars and the parliamentary path to Communism were deviations from Leninist-Stalinist orthodoxy as derived from from such fundamental works of Lenin as *Imperialism* and *The State and Revolution*. The idea of a non-class all-people's state deviated not only from Leninism-Stalinism but from its classical Marxist premises, one of which held that the state *qua* state is a class agency of repression. And old ideological concepts had in some cases been infused with new content. The most notable example is the altered conception of coexistence, which had once been pictured as a condition of unremitting political warfare and was now seen as a long-range peaceful competition of socio-economic systems for predominant world influence. True, the peacefully coexisting systems were envisaged as remaining adversaries between which no "ideological coexistence" would be possible.

The rise of neo-Communist Marxism in the Soviet Union has stimulated a world-wide debate over the meaning of the ideological changes. Three broad lines of interpretation have emerged. One is the official Soviet position, which holds that the ideological changes of the post-Stalin period are simply a new stage in a regular process of adaptation and development of Marxism-Leninism to keep it in tune with changing historical realities. Soviet ideology, according to this view, is a "creative Marxism-Leninism" that does not and cannot go unchanged in various particulars although it always remains true to its foundation principles. In particular, such profoundly important developments of the middle twentieth century

[2] Leo Gruliow (ed.), *Current Soviet Policies III* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 214.

[3] For details, see "Dialectics of Coexistence," in the writer's *The Soviet Political Mind* (New York: Praeger, 1963).

as the spread of the Communist system and the rise of nuclear weapons necessarily affect the validity of such an ideological thesis as that concerning the inevitability of wars under imperialism. In Khrushchev's words, "one cannot mechanically repeat now what Vladimir Ilyich Lenin said many decades ago regarding imperialism, or continue asserting that imperialist wars are inevitable until socialism triumphs throughout the world." And he went on: "We live in a time when we have neither Marx nor Engels nor Lenin with us. If we act like children who study the alphabet by compiling words from letters, we shall not go very far."[4]

The dominant Western interpretation of the post-Stalin ideological changes is not wholly dissimilar to the Soviet view. Impressed by the rigor of Soviet reaffirmations of commitment to the ultimate goals of world Communism, many Western students of Soviet affairs have tended to interpret the ideological innovations as essentially tactical. What has changed to some extent, according to this conception, is the Soviet doctrine on the ways and means of achieving the world Communist society that remains the cherished end of Soviet Communists. Moreover, the tactical changes represent to a very large extent a forced adjustment of doctrine (and practice) to the necessities of the nuclear age. Because of the enormity of the dangers posed by general war in the present era, the Soviet leadership has been compelled to reconsider its working assumptions concerning the feasible methods of spreading Communism. The modified Communist credo, with its emphasis upon peaceful competition of systems and its discovery of a peaceful path to Communist revolution, has resulted.

A third interpretation, which has been advanced by the Maoist leadership of Communist China in the course of the Sino-Soviet controversy of recent years, finds a much deeper significance in the Soviet ideological changes after Stalin. It holds that they are symptoms of a degenerative process, a decline of revolutionary commitment on the part of the post-Stalin Soviet leadership or the dominant element of it that found in Khrushchev a natural leader and spokesman. Between the Twentieth and Twenty-Second Party congresses, it maintains, these Soviet leaders developed a complete and rounded system of revisionist views: "They put forward a revisionist line which contravenes the proletarian revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, a line which consists of 'peaceful coexistence,' 'peaceful competition,' 'peaceful transition,' 'a state of the whole people' and 'a party of the entire people.'"[5] Hence the Soviet Union's "creative Marxism-Leninism" is in fact a species of revisionism—"Khrushchev revisionism." It expresses, and at the same time endeavors to conceal, the surreptitious departure of the Soviet ruling group from the spirit and practice of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism as taught primarily by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. And Chinese Communist writings have suggested that this phenomenon of Soviet deradicalization (to introduce a term of our own) goes along with, if indeed it does not grow out of, a process of *embourgeoisement* that is taking place in contemporary Soviet society, in which a new middle class has come into being with typical middle-class aspirations for material ease and stability.

"Revisionism" is a highly charged term, signifying in the Marxist context something similar to what various religions have meant by "heresy." For descriptive and analytical purposes, we may refer to the modified Soviet ideology simply as "neo-Communist Marxism." But with this reservation, and leaving aside for the moment the question of causation, I wish to suggest that the Maoist interpretation of the Soviet ideological changes may be close to the mark. The other two views unquestionably have some merit, for Soviet ideology *has* been creatively adapted to new historical circumstances and this adaptation *does* chiefly affect matters of strategy and tactics. Yet neither the Soviet official interpretation nor the dominant Western trend of thought does full justice to the phenomenon before us. The thesis of the present paper, at any rate, is that the changes in question reflect a deradicalization of Soviet Communism.

Here the methodological question arises of how such a judgment might be validated. How, in other words, would one *know* whether the Soviet Communist movement—or any other radical movement, Communist or non-Communist—was in the stage of deradicalization? To raise this question is to focus attention upon an apparent deficiency in our theoretical apparatus. We lack a general conception of deradicalization and, in particular, of the typical symptoms of the process, the characteristic behavior of radical socio-political movements, including those of the Marxist persua-

[4] Speech to the Third Congress of the Rumanian Workers' Party, June 22, 1960 (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1960), pp. 27, 28.

[5] "The Leaders of the C.P.S.U. Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times: Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (VII)," *People's Daily*, February 4, 1964.

sion, in the phase when their radicalism has subsided or is subsiding. In general, our scholarship has shown a greater interest in the rise of radical movements than in their decline. Well known titles like *The Origins of Totalitarianism* and *The Origin of Totalitarian Democracy* reflect this bias. There is no disputing the legitimacy and fruitfulness of studying radical movements in their origins and vigorous youth. On the other hand, reflection shows that deradicalization must be the eventual fate of all radical movements, whether or not they achieve political power, and that this process too is well worth systematic analysis. Indeed, it may be that the study of such movements in the phase of deradicalization may be one avenue of deeper insight into the psychology and politics of radicalism as such.

The present paper is as much or more concerned with this theoretical problem as with the particular case at hand. It seeks to conceptualize the process of deradicalization in terms of its symptoms, and thereby to suggest certain possible guidelines for analysis of recent phenomena in the development of Soviet Communism. These theoretical formulations will necessarily be quite tentative and provisional since they are derived from the study of a single historical instance of the phenomenon in question. The European Social Democracy around the turn of the century provides an example of a Marxist movement that was indubitably in the phase of deradicalization and therefore may be a profitable case to analyze from this point of view. First, however, a few general remarks on the nature of radical movements, and on deradicalization as a stage in their development.

II. RADICALISM: A GENERAL VIEW

There are various ways of viewing radical politics and political movements. Some, for example, may think of radical politics as extremist politics and radical movements as those which rely upon extreme or violent methods of action. The difficulty with definitions turning on the mode of action is that extremist means are no monopoly of radical politics but are used on occasion by groups that no one would call radical.

A more promising way of arriving at a working conception of radicalism is to consider the attributes of the type of mind or outlook in which radical politics generally has its source and inspiration. Let us postulate that (1) radical social doctrines arise from time to time as expressions of the radical mind in individuals of outstanding creative power, and (2) under propitious circumstances such doctrines attract followers in significant numbers and become the ideologies of organized socio-political movements which may be described as radical by virtue of their being dedicated to the realization of a radical social doctrine. What, then, are the attributes of the radical mind as reflected in the type of doctrines it creates?

There is, to begin with, an intense element of negation in it. The radical is first of all someone who says "No!" to the surrounding society. He mentally and emotionally rebels against the existing order, repudiates the world as it stands, or as he perceives it to stand. For example, Marx—a quintessential example of the modern radical mind—started with a total uncompromising denial and rejection of existing reality. Already in notes to his doctoral dissertation of 1841 he propounded this fundamental theme in the notion that "philosophy," in the persons of Hegel's disciples, was in revolt against the world. What was needed, he wrote somewhat later to his friend Arnold Ruge, was "*a merciless criticism of everything existing*, merciless in two senses: this criticism must not take fright at its own conclusions and must not shrink from a collision with the powers that be." And in his original formulation of Marxism in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, he foretold the revolutionary transformation of this "alienated world" in which man was everywhere estranged from his own nature and being. Subsequently, his terminology changed somewhat, but his *Weltanschauung* did not. World-denial is a theme running through the writings of his mature and later years as well as the early works. In a speech of 1856, for example, he pronounced sentence of capital punishment upon the bourgeois social order in the name of what he called the *Vehmgericht* or court of history, appointing the proletarian as "executioner." And for all its tortuous elaboration of abstract concepts, *Capital*, his supreme achievement, was in its way a nine-hundred-page cry of pain and outrage against bourgeois civilization as Marx perceived it.

But the radical is not adequately described as one who rejects existing reality. To understand the radical mind as found in modern Western history, we must penetrate the inner springs of its rebellion. The radical is not simply a rebel but a visionary. What inspires his rebellion against the world as it stands is his vision of an alternative universe, a perfect social order. His negation of what exists proceeds from an underlying affirmation, an idealized image of the world as it ought to be. Indeed, it is the very perfection of his alternative universe that explains the depth and

totality, i.e., the *radicalness*, of his act of world-repudiation. And here again, though somewhat less obviously, Marx provides an illustration. He initially rebelled against the world in the name of the "realization of philosophy," meaning the Hegelian philosophy of man's apotheosis in history. A vision of mankind in a state of perfection was thus his starting point. As his thought developed further, realization of philosophy was redefined to mean transcendence of human self-alienation or "humanism." And humanism in this special Marxian sense was conceived as the essence of future communism, which Marx thought would come about through the socialization of private property in a world-wide proletarian revolution.

This visionary aspect of Marx's radicalism was more clearly apparent in his early writings than later on. It was superficially obscured by the attack that he and Engels made on their socialist predecessors as "utopians." In the *Communist Manifesto* and elsewhere, they derided attempts to design ideal socialist communities (such as Fourier's phalansteries) and set socialist theoreticians the task of demonstrating the necessity of capitalist society's revolutionary self-destruction. But notwithstanding their own preoccupation with this task, the founders of Marxism never lost sight of their communist utopia. The vision of a perfect communist order of the future remained integral to the Marxist social doctrine. The present bourgeois epoch represented the closing chapter of man's "prehistory," declared Marx in millenarian tones in 1859. Beyond it lay the true life of the species, when man would become fully man—a freely productive being developing his talents in all directions—in communist society. That would be humanity's great leap from the realm of necessity to the realm of freedom, wrote Engels in *Anti-Dühring*. Society, they foresaw, would become classless and conflictless with the abolition of the division of labor in all its manifold enslaving forms, and the state would disappear for lack of repressive function. Man would finally realize his own nature in a society based upon distribution according to need. Such, in broad outline, was classical Marxism's image of the ideal communist order.

One other general attribute of the radical mind remains to be mentioned: its activism. The radical not only rejects existing reality; he wants and seeks to transform it. He not only has a vision of an ideal order but a belief in the possibility of realizing it, of moving from the world as it is to the world as it ought to be. "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in various ways," as Marx put it in the last of his eleven theses on Feuerbach. "*The point is, to change it.*" And the radical mind, at its most creative, has a prescription for action towards this goal, a conception of revolutionary politics. In classical Marxism the prescription for action was class struggle leading to a dictatorship of the proletariat. Marx had only scorn for a socialism that would renounce the "revolutionizing of the old world" and seek, like the early Christian communities, to "achieve its salvation behind society's back."[6] He informed the proletarians that they had "a world to win," and unfurled the banner of a "revolutionary socialism" that stood for "the class dictatorship of the revolution, the class dictatorship of the proletariat as the inevitable transit point to the abolition of class differences generally, to the abolition of all the productive relations that correspond to these relations, to the revolutionizing of all the ideas that result from these social connections."[7]

A full statement of the conditions under which radical movements arise in society is more than can be attempted here. But paraphrasing Lenin in *What Is To Be Done?*, we can say without much exaggeration that there can be no radical movement without a radical social doctrine to serve as its inspiration and ideology. The movement develops as an institutionalization of the radical doctrine, as the organized activity of a group (party, association, etc.) dedicated to the realization of the vision of a new society. By the nature of the self-selective process of initial recruitment, the movement's leadership, which may originally include the author or authors of the radical creed, will consist in large part of persons attracted to the doctrine by their own radical tendency of mind. On the other hand, some may be persons chiefly gifted in practical organizing ability. If conditions are propitious, as in a time of widespread misery and discontent, the movement may attract followers in large enough numbers to turn into a genuine mass movement. But many in the mass following may join the movement for motives other than zeal for the radical cause. Cases in point would be radical socialist movements with a mass membership arising out of their association with trade unions.

It appears to be the fate of radical movements that survive and flourish for long *with-*

[6] *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), p. 21.

[7] *The Class Struggles in France (1848–1850)* (New York: International Publishers, n.d.), p. 126.

out remaking the world that they undergo eventually a process of deradicalization. A loss of *élan* is not necessarily involved, for this process can go on in a movement at a time of significant growth and advance. Deradicalization signifies a subtle change in the movement's relation to the social milieu. Essentially, it settles down and adjusts itself to existence within the very order that it officially desires to overthrow and transform. This is not to say that the movement turns into a conservative social force opposed to social change. Rather, it becomes "reformist" in the sense that it accepts the established system and its institutionalized procedures as the framework for further efforts in the direction of social change. A resolution adopted by the Congress of Parties of the Second International at Amsterdam in August, 1904, conveys a vivid sense of this process in a passage warning against it:

> The Congress condemns in the most decisive fashion revisionist efforts to change the victorious tactics we have hitherto followed based on the class struggle, in such a way that instead of conquering political power by defeating our opponents, a policy of coming to terms with the existing order is followed. The result of such revisionist tactics would be that instead of being a party which works for the most rapid transformation possible of existing bourgeois society into the socialist social order, i.e., revolutionary in the best sense of the word, the party would become one which is content with reforming bourgeois society.

The phrase "coming to terms with the existing order" best indicates what deradicalization means. In the stage of deradicalization, the movement loses its revolutionary other-worldliness, the alienation from existing conditions arising out of its commitment to a future perfect order, and makes an accommodation to the world as it stands.

Among the numerous and complex causal factors in deradicalization, two are particularly noteworthy: leadership change and worldly success. So far as the first is concerned, it is clear that mere continued official adherence to a radical social doctrine cannot preserve radicalism in a movement if the leadership, through aging or change of leaders, ceases to be radical in its outlook. The radical tendency of mind, as suggested above, is likely to be dominant among the original generation of the movement's leaders. In the normal course of events, however, this situation will eventually change. Not only may some among the original generation of leaders mellow as they grow older. Younger persons who rise through the movement into leadership positions are less likely than the original leaders to be radical types. Ambition, organizing ability and concern for the interests of the organization and its social constituency are likely to be their predominant characteristics. Successive generations of leaders will show less and less of the alienation from the existing order that characterized the radical founders of the movement and their associates.

Turning to the second factor, there seems to be an inverse relation between a radical movement's organizational strength and the preservation of its radicalism. Radical movements that remain small sectarian groups on the fringe of society are relatively impervious to deradicalization; the history of twentieth-century Trotskyism furnishes numerous illustrations. But when a radical movement grows large and strong, acquires a big organizational structure, a mass social constituency and a recognized place in society, this very worldly success fosters deradicalization. The acquisition of a mass membership inevitably dilutes the movement's radicalism, and the influence of the relatively less radical rank-and-file will make itself felt in various ways at the leadership level. Moreover, when society begins to accord a measure of acceptance to a radical movement, this may tend to weaken, if not eventually dissipate, the sharp sense of alienation from this world and the commitment to a future order which characterized the movement in its earlier phases. Above all, a movement that grows strong and influential and has prospects of further growth acquires a definite stake in the stability of the order in which this success has been won—a stake that is no less real for the fact that it goes unacknowledged. Robert Michels stressed this point in his study of socialist parties. Observing that the revolutionary political party is at first a state within the state, pursuing the avowed aim of supplanting the present social order with a new one, Michels argued that the growth of the party as an organization weakens the commitment to the revolutionary aim. For revolutionary action can only endanger the position of a party that has achieved a mass membership, a bureaucracy, a full treasury, and a network of financial and moral interests extending all over the country. So it is that "from a means, organization becomes an end" and that "the party grows increasingly inert as the strength of its organization grows; it loses its revolutionary impetus, becomes sluggish. . . ."[8]

[8] *Political Parties* (New York: Dover Publications, 1959), pp. 370, 371, 372–373.

III. DERADICALIZATION OF SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES

Michels' thoughts on the deradicalization of revolutionary political parties were generalizations from the observed experience of European Marxist parties in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) in particular. The 1880's had witnessed the emergence in various West European countries of mass working-class parties professing revolutionary Marxism as their ideology. The largest and most influential was the SPD, which in 1875 had become a united body under the leadership of Wilhelm Liebknecht and August Bebel and with Marx and Engels as its mentors and advisers. Notwithstanding the harassment and repression endured under Bismarck's Anti-Socialist Law of 1878–1890, the SPD waxed strong in late nineteenth-century Germany. In the elections of 1890, it received nearly a million and a half votes—about a fifth of those cast—and thirty-five seats in the Reichstag. Thirteen years later, a remarkable electoral victory gave the party over three million votes and eighty-one Reichstag seats. And by the elections of 1912, its membership totalled nearly a million and its electoral strength exceeded four million votes, making the SPD both the largest party in Germany and the largest socialist party in the world.

In the aftermath of persecution under the Anti-Socialist Law, the party firmly restated its radical goals and principles in the new program adopted at its Erfurt Congress in 1891. Yet by the turn of the century if not earlier, this formidable mass Marxist party and the movement over which it presided were far along in the process of deradicalization. Marx and Engels were now both dead, and a second generation of leaders, typified by Eduard Bernstein and the party theorist Karl Kautsky, had come to the fore. The party's radical orientation was tempered by its association with a decidedly unradical trade-union movement whose whole tendency was to work toward piecemeal economic reform. And deradicalization was fostered by the great growth of the movement—its wealth, organizational strength, widespread influence, and seeming prospects for further gradual increase of power under the prevailing social system.

It is beyond question that around the turn of the century the German and other European Social Democratic movements were settling down and coming to terms with the existing order. But what were the symptoms of this process? In what ways did the movements reflect and react to it? The principal manifestations of deradicalization were of four different kinds, having to do with the action-pattern of the movement, its relation to its ideological goals, the development of its strategy and tactics, and, finally, its inner conflicts. Taking the German Marxist movement as a classic case in point, let us now examine these points in order.

The accommodation with the existing system was shown first of all in the emergence of a reformist, as distinguished from a revolutionary, pattern of action. The movement's political action lost all meaningful orientation toward the coming great upheaval foretold in the Marxist ideology, and concentrated more and more on what was called the *Gegenwartrarbeit*, or everyday work of the party. The electoral activity of the party expanded with its electoral success. "Everywhere there is action for reform, action for social progress, action for the victory of democracy," wrote Eduard Bernstein in the famous articles in *Neue Zeit* that proved the manifesto of Marxist revisionism. "People study the details of the problems of the day and seek for levers and starting points to carry on the development of society in the direction of socialism." It would therefore be better, he argued, if the Social Democracy "could find the courage to emancipate itself from a phraseology which is actually outworn and if it would make up its mind to appear what it is in reality today: a democratic socialistic party of reform."[9]

But that is precisely what the party, or rather its dominant, so-called "orthodox" faction, refused to do. It reasserted its ideological revolutionism at the very time when its practical reformism was becoming most pronounced. In the Erfurt Program, as mentioned above, the party had reaffirmed its radical mission as a revolutionary anti-capitalist organization destined to unite and lead the working class in what was described as an ever more bitter class war between bourgeoisie and proletariat. And this in essence remained the party's line in the aftermath of appeals by von Vollmar, Bernstein and others for abandonment of the Marxist theory of catastrophe and the gospel of revolution through class war. Not only did Kautsky at the turn of the century defend the radical goals and principles of the movement in response to Bernstein's critique. The party formally condemned the latter at its Hanover Congress in 1899 and again at the Dresden Congress of 1903. Furthermore, the Dresden Congress' resolution on

[9] *Evolutionary Socialism* (New York: Schocken Books, 1961), pp. 197, 199.

this point was adopted by the Socialist International at its Amsterdam Congress the following year and thus was made binding upon all member parties. And right up to the eve of 1914, when the German party's support for war credits in the Reichstag demonstrated conclusively how far it had gone in deradicalization, it officially continued to regard itself as utterly alienated from bourgeois society. "Social Democracy differs from all other parties through its fundamental opposition to the social and governmental system of capitalism," declared the report of the Parliamentary Party to the SPD Congress in 1912.[10]

So it was that a deradicalized Social Democratic movement pledged its allegiance anew to ideological orthodoxy while adhering in practice to a reformist policy line. Instead of abandoning its radical principles and aims in accordance with the revisionist program, the party renewed and even intensified its formal commitment to these aims and principles. Why the dominant element of the leadership moved in this direction was hinted in a letter from an elder German Socialist, Ignaz Auer, to Bernstein. "Do you think it is really possible that a party which has a literature going back fifty years, an organization going back forty years and a still older tradition, can change its direction like this in the twinkling of an eye," he inquired. "For the most influential members of the party to behave as you demand would simply mean splitting the party and throwing decades of work to the winds. My dear Ede, one doesn't formally decide to do what you ask, one doesn't say it, one *does* it."[11] Th s was to say that the party's interests militated against any tampering with its ideological *raison d'être*. To preserve the unity and stability of the movement, its leaders had to show great care and restraint in their capacity as custodians of its revolutionary ideology. Similar reasoning underlay the resistance of Austrian Social Democratic leaders like Victor Adler to demands raised in the movement in the 1890's for a theoretical reappraisal of some fundamental concepts of orthodox Marxism which were not being vindicated by contemporary economic development. Such demands, we are told, were "strenuously resisted by Adler, not so much on ideological grounds, for he was anything but a doctrinaire Marxist, but rather for fear of provoking dissensions which might once more endanger party unity."[12]

All this suggests that the process of deradicalization has a certain inner "dialectic." For deep-seated reasons, theory and practice diverge. The movement intensifies its theoretical adherence to revolutionary goals at the very time when in practice it moves down the path of reformism. The dominant leadership resists the counsel of the Bernsteins who want the radical theory to be revised to accord with the reformist practice and follows the contrary counsel of those who argue that "one doesn't say it, one *does* it." Far from succumbing to doctrinal revisionism, it resoundingly reaffirms its official revolutionism and pledges its allegiance anew to its original radical outlook. And it does so, at least in part, in an effort to preserve the movement's integrity, to prevent or lessen the demoralization and disunity that open avowal of reformism would tend to provoke. As we shall note presently, it may also be impelled in this direction by accusations from strongly radical elements within the movement that it is betraying the revolutionary cause.

The appearance of a serious discrepancy between revolutionism in theory and reformism in practice is thus one of the hallmarks of deradicalization. But for subjective reasons as well as vulnerability to accusations of hypocrisy from within the movement, the leadership is uncomfortable in the presence of this discrepancy and does what it can to lessen or blur it. While rejecting the formal revisionism that would disavow the radical principles or eschatological elements of the movement's ideology, the orthodox leaders modify the *tactical* part of the ideology by stressing immediate short-term objectives and nonradical means of attaining them. And in their exegeses of the authoritative writings and pronouncements of the founders, they highlight those statements that give (or seem to give) sanction to such a development of the tactical doctrine. This, at any rate, was the road taken by the Social Democratic leaders.

What had come to be called the "minimum program" of the movement, embracing lesser goals attainable without revolutionizing the existing order, was emphasized at the expense of the truly revolutionary "maximum program," but on the official assumption that every step in fulfillment of the movement's minimal program would likewise bring closer the realization of the maximal program. The democratic electoral road to power was increasingly treated as the highroad, and a doctrine of socialist "parliamentarianism" arose. Thus in his commentary on the Erfurt Pro-

[10] Quoted by James Joll, *The Second International 1889–1914* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1955), p. 90.

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 93–94.

[12] Norbert Leser, "Austro-Marxism: A Reappraisal," *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1966), at p. 118.

gram, Kautsky reproved the early "proletarian utopians" like Wilhelm Weitling for having viewed as a betrayal of the movement "every form of the class struggle which was not aimed at the immediate overthrow of the existing order, that is, every serious, efficient sort of effort . . . "[13] Again, in lectures delivered before an Amsterdam socialist group in 1902, he extolled democracy as "light and air to the proletariat." Elections were "a means to count ourselves and the enemy," and further: "They prevent premature outbreaks and they guard against defeats. They also grant the possibility that the opponents will themselves recognize the untenability of many positions and freely surrender them when their maintenance is no life-and-death question for them." He foresaw that parliamentarianism, in decline under capitalism, would be "reawakened to new youth and strength when it, together with the total governmental power, is conquered by the rising proletariat and turned to serve its purposes." And how would the governmental power be conquered by the proletariat? Not by an armed uprising, Kautsky cautioned, save possibly in Russia. Unlike some past revolutions, the coming revolution would be a long-drawn-out political "civil war" without battles, barricades and blood, i.e., a figurative civil war. It would not, moreover, be a "battle of mobs," but rather: "It is a battle of organized, intelligent masses, full of stability and prudence, that do not follow every impulse or explode over every insult, or collapse under every misfortune."[14]

In keeping with this concept of a well-behaved class struggle, orthodox Marxism gave an exegesis of the Marxist scriptures which laid particular emphasis upon everything that pointed in its own tactical direction. It is questionable whether Marx and Engels (particularly Marx) ever wavered in their commitment ment to the radical *Weltanschauung* that they formulated as young men. But in their later years, owing in part to involvement in the intricate politics of the revolutionary movement, they made various statements that seemed to sanction gradualism, an electoral orientation, and a belief in a peaceful path of socialist revolution. Thus Marx's inaugural address to the International Workingmen's Association in 1864 welcomed the ten-hour day as a victory for the "political economy of labor," suggesting that more such reforms within the capitalist order represented a real path of progress to socialism. In a speech at the Hague in 1872, after a congress of the International, he allowed that in countries like England and America, and possibly Holland as well, the worker might be able to attain his goal by peaceful means. Engels too referred to the possibility of a peaceful revolution in his critique of the Erfurt Program. More important still, in his 1895 preface to a new edition of Marx's *Class Struggles in France,* Engels gave his blessing to the parliamentary mode of struggle by hailing the German Social Democracy's two million voters as the decisive "shock force" of the international proletarian army. "The irony of world history turns everything upside down," he went on. "We, the 'revolutionaries,' the 'rebels'—we are thriving far better on legal methods than on illegal methods and revolt. The parties of order, as they call themselves, are perishing under the legal conditions created by themselves."[15]

These and like texts proved of great importance to the leadership of a movement in which all policy had to be legitimated by reference to authoritative pronouncements of the founders of the ideology. Having undertaken to paper over the discrepancy between its theoretical revolutionism and practical reformism by prescribing gradualist and peaceful *tactics* of revolutionary struggle, Social Democratic Marxism naturally gave special attention and emphasis to such statements by Marx and Engels as those just cited. By the same token, it tended to de-emphasize the many Marx-Engels texts

[13] *The Class Struggle* (*Erfurt Program*) (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1910), pp. 196, 197.

[14] Karl Kautsky, *The Social Revolution* (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr, 1913), pp. 79–82, 88. All this bears out the comment of Alfred Meyer that "Kautsky still spoke about the proletarian revolution but demanded that it be a tame and civilised revolution." *Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1963), p. 135. A detailed and useful discussion of trends in Social Democratic Marxism at the end of the nineteenth century is contained in chapters 5 and 6 of this book.

[15] Marx, *The Class Struggle in France*, pp. 27, 28. Michels suggests that this influential endorsement by Engels of parliamentary methods for attaining socialism did not give expression to his true opinions. In this connection he quotes from a letter that Engels wrote to Kautsky saying, with reference to the preface: "My text had to suffer from the timid legalism of our friends in Berlin, who dreaded a second edition of the anti-socialist laws—a dread to which I was forced to pay attention at the existing political juncture." Michels concludes on this basis that "Engels would seem to have been the victim of an opportunist sacrifice of principles to the needs of organization, a sacrifice made for love of the party and in opposition to his known theoretical convictions": *Political Parties*, p. 370 n.

which visualized the socialist revolution as the forcible overthrow of all existing conditions by "illegal methods and revolt" and which visualized the regime of the revolution as a violent dictatorship of the proletariat. Thus a definite line in the exegesis of classical Marxism was part of the general process of deradicalization of the Social Democratic Marxist movement. A sort of retrospective deradicalization of the radical godfathers of the movement, Marx and Engels, was one of its manifestations.

So, finally, was conflict in the movement between the orthodox leadership and elements whose radical alienation from the existing order and commitment to the revolutionary vision of a new world remained unimpaired by the movement's worldly success. Reflection shows that such conflict is virtually inescapable when a movement is in the stage of deradicalization, so much so that the absence of it may be treated as a sure sign that no fundamental deradicalization is taking place. What explains this fact is that the leadership (not to mention the rank-and-file) of a radical movement is never homogeneous in outlook. There are bound to be differences of temperament, of relationship to the ideology, of position in the movement. For reasons touched on above, some of the more adaptable leaders will preside over the movement's deradicalization. But other, more consistently radical-minded elements will rebel against this process, and here lie the seeds of inner conflict or even schism in the movement.

Seeing the discrepancy between the officially-avowed revolutionary theory and the unrevolutionary day-to-day practice, the genuine radicals will be profoundly worried by the direction the movement is taking. What is happening?, they will ask. Are we not giving up in practice our cherished goals, our effort to transform society totally? Is not the movement drifting into opportunism? Are we not, then, betraying the founders of the doctrine in whose name we continue to speak? Among the prominent figures in the Social Democratic movement who raised such troubled and troublesome questions were Rosa Luxemburg, Anton Pannekoek, and Wilhelm Liebknecht's son Karl, of whom it has been said that he inherited his father's political romanticism without his common sense.[16] Like revisionists of the Bernsteinian persuasion, the genuine radicals craved consistency. But the two groups moved in opposite directions in search of it. Whereas the revisionists wanted to revise the revolutionary theory to accord with reformist practice, the radicals wanted to abandon reformist practice out of fidelity to the revolutionary world-image; they took the movement's eschatology seriously.

The inner conflict attendant upon a movement's deradicalization may be all the more deep and disruptive if it is an international movement, as Marxist Social Democracy was in the early years of this century. For heterogeneity of outlook among the leaders is even more to be expected on an international scale than within a given national branch of the movement. One reason for this is that at any given time the movement may be in different stages of development in various countries. This may result in the ascendancy of a group of one outlook in one branch of the international movement, and of a group of opposed outlook in another. In that event, a schism may occur, as it did in the international Marxist movement in 1917 and after. German orthodox Marxism had a counterpart in the Menshevik wing of the younger Russian Social Democracy. But the Marxism that came to power in Russia in the October Revolution of 1917 was the radical Bolshevik Marxism of Lenin and his associates. The international Marxist movement was consequently split in two, and soon a deradicalized Social Democracy with its center of gravity in Western Europe found itself in hostile confrontation with a radical Marxist movement of Leninist persuasion centering in Soviet Russia and laying undivided claim to the Marxist heritage.

IV. RADICALISM AND DERADICALIZATION UNDER LENIN AND STALIN

It is always risky to interpret a massive historical event in terms of a single cause or issue. But it seems undeniable that rebellious protest against the deradicalization of Social Democracy was a central motif in the great Marxist schism and in the rise of Communist Marxism as a new world-wide movement. The younger Lenin had venerated Kautsky as a Marxist teacher and adversary of revisionism. But during the World War, in which Kautsky and many other European Social Democratic leaders failed to oppose the warring governments in the name of the previously espoused principle of international working-class solidarity, Lenin turned against them. In a pamphlet published in Geneva in 1915, he accused Kautsky of paying mere "lip service" to Marxism. Speaking of the Kautskys of the international Social Democratic movement, he went on:

[16] Joll, *op. cit.*, p. 100. On the radicals' rebellion against the tendency of deradicalization, see Meyer, *op. cit.*, pp. 136–139. He writes of Rosa Luxumburg, in particular, that "her entire political life was one momentous attempt to reunite the theory and practice of Marxian socialism in the radical spirit of its founders" (p. 137).

"Those people castrate Marxism; they purge it, by means of obvious sophisms, of its revolutionary living soul; they recognize in Marxism *everything except* revolutionary means of struggle, except the advocacy of, and the preparation for, such struggle, and the education of the masses in this direction."[17] In 1917, on the eve of taking power, Lenin insisted on changing the name of his party from "Social Democratic" to "Communist" in order to sharpen symbolically his break with Social Democratic Marxism. The subsequent creation of the Third International was a logical outgrowth of this step.

Leninist or Communist Marxism emerged as a kind of Marxist fundamentalism, a revival of the radical essence of Marx's thought. On the opening page of *The State and Revolution*—one of the great documents of Marxist radicalism—Lenin declared that the pressing need was to restore to Marxism its revolutionary soul and thus combat the efforts of vulgarizers like Kautsky to omit, obliterate and distort the revolutionary side of the doctrine. Here and in other writings of this period, he hammered out the foundations of Communist Marxism in a savage polemic against Kautskyan Social Democracy and its interpretation of Marx and Engels. Kautsky, he contended, was guilty of "petty-bourgeois distortion of Marxism and base renunciation of it *in practice*, while hypocritically recognizing it *in words*."[18] The essence of Kautskyism, as Lenin saw it, was, in our terms, the discrepancy between revolutionary theory and non-revolutionary practice which shows up when a movement undergoes deradicalization.

Kautsky's exegesis of the Marx-Engels texts was a particular target of Lenin's polemic. "How Kautsky Transformed Marx into a Common or Garden Liberal" was the title of the opening section of *The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky*. And Lenin argued in this and other writings of the period for a fundamentalist reading of the views of Marx and Engels on revolution and dictatorship. To be a true Marxist, one had not only to accept the class struggle but also the proletarian dictatorship as its culmination and the necessary way-station to the new world of communist society. A proletarian revolution meant the taking of power by an armed uprising; and Marx, were he alive now, would no longer allow for the possibility of a peaceful path to socialism in Britain and America, since the exceptional conditions that might have made peaceful revolution possible there in the nineteenth century no longer obtained. And the dictatorship of the proletariat—the theory of which constituted the very essence of Marxist teaching—was a revolutionary regime relying upon force and violence to suppress its class enemies.

Thus Communist Marxism took shape as the political doctrine of a new anti-Social Democratic Marxist radicalism. Now, nearly a half-century after Lenin, the Soviet Communist movement still claims to be authentically "Marxist-Leninist." But if deradicalization, as suggested above, is the general fate of radical movements, the question arises whether this fate has been overtaking Soviet Communism in the recent past. One way of approaching it may be to inquire whether Soviet Communism has begun to show such symptoms of deradicalization as those displayed in its time by the Social Democratic movement. Such comparative treatment seems logically feasible despite the fact that in the one case we are dealing with a radical movement that came to power, while the other movement remained out of power.

It could be argued that Soviet Communism entered upon the phase of deradicalization long before Stalin's death. There were, for example, indications of deradicalization as early as the period of the New Economic Policy in the 1920's, most notably in the regime's action-pattern in both international and domestic affairs. True, the revival of revolutionary militance at the close of the 1920's, both internally and to some extent externally, points to the inconclusiveness of those earlier signs. Soviet foreign policy in the Popular Front period of the middle 1930's, however, could again be seen as symptomatic of deradicalization—and some in the West so saw it. Moreover, two of the factors in deradicalization that have been emphasized in these pages—change in the composition of the leadership and the worldly success that gives a one-time radical movement a stake in the existing order—were evident, or becoming so, as the Bolshevik old guard began to be replaced by a new generation of Soviet leaders. It might be mentioned, too, that the charge of deradicalization—couched in such terms as "bureaucratic degeneration" and "Thermidor"—bulked large in the Trotskyist polemic against Stalinist Soviet Communism. It was, in particular, Trotsky's fundamental thesis in *The Revolution Betrayed* (1937) that Soviet Communism, despite continued lip-service to revolutionary Marxism, had undergone a far-reaching deradicalization under the aegis of a basically conservative bureaucracy of

[17] V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947), Vol. II, p. 359.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 163.

which Stalin himself was the personification. The Great Purge of the middle 1930's and Stalin's super-cautious foreign policy of that time appeared to Trotsky, along with much else, as evidence in support of this thesis. The Great Purge, in which most of the still-surviving old Bolshevik revolutionaries perished or were sent once more to Siberia, was seen as a counter-revolution of conservatism.

There is no denying that Stalinist Soviet Communism showed conservative features, particularly in its later years. But apart from the fact (or in connection with it) that Stalin himself was fundamentally misconstrued as a mere personification of the Soviet bureaucracy, there were deep flaws in the Trotskyist analysis. Although the Soviet Communist movement undoubtedly underwent very considerable deradicalization during the Stalin era, Stalin himself, a man of the original revolutionary generation, represented in his peculiar way a link with the radical Leninist past and a bar to *full-scale* development of the deradicalizing tendencies that had become strong in Soviet Communism. In internal policy, for example, he espoused in his *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* (1952) the idea that the Soviet agrarian economy should soon begin to be based not on monetary relationships but on direct "product-exchange"; and this radical prescription, along with his projection of a policy of economic austerity for the Soviet Union in its further advance towards "full communism," may help to explain why, in subsequent years of Soviet de-Stalinization, the Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung has defended Stalin as a great Marxist-Leninist mentor for Communist movements.

In foreign policy, moreover, Stalin demonstrated his surviving—or reviving—commitment to Marxist revolutionism by presiding over a largely forcible expansion of the Communist system to other countries after the end of the Second World War. And whatever the mixture of motives actuating him, it is notable that an analysis of his action widely accepted in the West saw it as deriving from continued commitment to radical Marxist-Leninist goals.[19] It is true that Stalin's postwar revolutionism had its limits. Possibly fearing great-power competition from within the international Communist movement, he did not, for example, show initial enthusiasm for a Communist takeover of China. It is likewise true that Stalin acted with a certain circumspection and caution in the process of exporting Communism to other countries. This is understandable when we consider that the age of atomic weapons had dawned and that Russia was not only without them but also weakened by the ordeal of war. But caution in the pursuit of radical ends is no derogation of radicalism itself. To this it should be added that so long as Stalin lived, there was no serious departure from the strategic and tactical fundamentals of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of world revolution as codified in the 1920's and 1930's under Stalin's aegis. This fact is all the more significant in the light of available evidence, to which I shall refer presently, that Stalin in the last years of his life was strenuously resisting some doctrinal changes which were being advocated by other Soviet political leaders and which would have been indicative of Soviet deradicalization.

[19] I refer to the analysis by George Kennan in his article on "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in *Foreign Affairs* (July, 1947).

V. DERADICALIZATION SINCE STALIN

The real question, then, is not whether Soviet Communism began to deradicalize before Stalin died, although there are strong indications that it did. Rather, the question is whether the deradicalizing tendency already apparent in earlier years but always held in check may have come to much fuller fruition in the post-Stalin period, whether the passing of Stalin and the consequent emergence of a new generation of Soviet leaders has brought the Soviet Communist movement into a highly advanced or even final phase of deradicalization. In short, is Soviet Communism of the late 1950's and early 1960's to be seen as a basically deradicalized Marxist movement? If we can take the symptoms that were shown by the Social Democratic Marxist movement in its phase of deradicalization as criteria for judgment, an affirmative answer is indicated.

We see, to begin with, a coming to terms with the existing order, both internationally and internally, in the action-pattern of the Soviet Communist leadership. In Soviet foreign relations there have, it is true, been episodes in which force was egregiously employed or serious risks incurred; the Hungarian intervention of 1956 and the Cuban missiles venture of 1962 are, respectively, the obvious cases in point. Yet neither of these Soviet actions is necessarily to be interpreted as the action of a revolutionary power intent upon altering the international socio-political *status quo*.[20] And

[20] In the Hungarian intervention, the Soviet motivation was probably mainly defensive, since the preservation of the Soviet position in Eastern Europe was threatened by Hungarian departure from the Warsaw Pact. In the Cuban missiles

the general pattern of Soviet international behavior in the post-Stalin period has been distinctly unrevolutionary. The Soviet regime has sought a *rapprochement* with non-Communist nationalist regimes in the underdeveloped areas of the world. In certain critical junctures in international affairs, it has found it possible to support a non-Communist India engaged in conflict with Communist China. It has attempted to mediate a dispute between non-Communist India and non-Communist Pakistan. It has shown a desire to settle the war in Vietnam, even at the expense of full (or early) realization of Communist aims in South Vietnam. In addition to all this, it has intermittently sought to improve relations and institutionalize a measure of cooperation with the leading non-Communist power of the West. In internal policy, moreover, the Soviet regime has increasingly turned away from doctrinaire schemes toward a more pragmatic policy line in the economic and other spheres. The recent experimentation with market principles in the economy is only one of many expressions of this.

But the "dialectic" of deradicalization seems to have been operative too in the post-Stalin period. The tendency of the regime to adjust its conduct at home and abroad to existing situations and realities has been accompanied by no diminution of ideological rhetoric. On the contrary, verbal protestations of fidelity to Communist ideas have intensified, and there has been something of a Leninist revival in Soviet propaganda. Frequently and in the strongest terms the leadership has reaffirmed its dedication to the final goals of Communism as laid down by Marx, Engels and Lenin. It has insisted, as mentioned earlier, that peaceful coexistence can never embrace "ideological coexistence," i.e., that the ideological gulf between Communist and non-Communist societies remains unbridged and unbridgeable. It was, moreover, in this very period that a Soviet leader issued the warning that Soviet Communists would not renounce their Communist principles until "the shrimps whistle" and flung down the gauntlet to capitalist America in the famous phrase: "We will bury you!" The image of the future Communist social order reappeared in shining form in Khrushchev's address to the Twenty-First Party Congress in 1959 and again in the new Party Program in 1961; and never in Soviet history was so much official public attention bestowed upon the utopian vision of the Communist future. It is symptomatic that the new Party Program envisages, with the advent of a full Communist society in Russia some time after 1980, the radical transformation of Soviet man himself into "a new man who will . . . combine spiritual wealth, moral purity and a perfect physique."[11]

The pledging of allegiance anew to Communism's eschatology has, however, been accompanied by the third symptom of deradicalization—revision of the tactical doctrine, changes in the official conception of the *means* by which the ultimate goals may be achieved. As noted earlier, these changes center in the general idea that Communism can spread in the world by peaceful means, without "export of revolution" (i.e., the use of armed force to impose Communist revolutions from without) or internal civil war. In elaborating the programmatic notion of a peaceful path to Communism, Soviet sources have put forward a new doctrine of parliamentarianism which strikingly parallels the above-mentioned Kautskyan picture of a takeover of power through the winning of a parliamentary majority by the working class. In keeping with this same trend of thought, Soviet official writings have endorsed the essentially gradualist tactic (originally developed by the Italian Communist leader Palmiro Togliatti) of Communist advocacy of economic "structural reforms" within the frame of the existing order. And on the broader plane of general strategy, Soviet doctrine has broken with the Leninist thesis on the inevitability of wars and espoused, as we saw, the view that the Soviet Union can best contribute to the further spread of Communism by winning the battle of economic development in peaceful competitive coexistence.

These doctrinal developments have been accompanied by appropriate adjustments in the official Soviet image of the movement's founders. To some extent, in fact, we see a retrospective "deradicalization" of the Marxist-Leninist classics. Thus the 1961 Party Program, in elaborating upon the theme of parliamentary transition to socialism, ascribes to Marx and Lenin the view that it may prove

episode, the Soviet aim may have been to redress an adverse balance of nuclear power inexpensively.

[11] Arthur Mendel (ed.), *Essential Works of Marxism* (New York: Bantam Books, 1961), p. 468. It may be noted that Khrushchev's phrase, "We will bury you!," was widely misunderstood abroad. In colloquial Russian, the words carry the meaning: "We will be present at your funeral," i.e., we will outlive you. The flamboyant statement was not, then, a threat to destroy but rather a boast that Soviet Communism would outlive the non-Communist system in the long-range competition of systems that Khrushchev called "peaceful coexistence."

possible to buy out the bourgeoisie: "It may well be that . . . there will arise in certain countries a situation in which it will be preferable for the bourgeoisie, as Marx and Lenin foresaw it, to agree to the means of production being purchased from it and for the proletariat to 'pay off' the bourgeoisie."[22] Lenin is said to have granted (and by implication to have preferred) the possibility that the Russian revolution would develop peacefully.[23] And great emphasis is placed upon an obscure Lenin statement to the effect that "We exert our chief influence upon the international revolution through our economic policy."[24] Thus, neo-Communist Marxism is projected back upon the radical founders of the movement, including Lenin.

The fourth mark of deradicalization—conflict in the movement between those who take the lead in this process and those who resist it—has also been present. The rise of neo-Communist Marxism in the Soviet Union was not a smooth and painless development reflecting a consensus of the Communist leadership. These doctrinal changes were the subject of an intense and bitter debate that began while Stalin was still alive. Irrefutable evidence on this point is contained in his final published work, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.*, which is a record of Stalin's interventions in a discussion carried on inside the Soviet regime in 1951–1952 in preparation for the Nineteenth Party Congress. There he took issue with unnamed "comrades" who were contending that Lenin's thesis on the inevitability of wars under imperialism was obsolete and in need of revision, and that such wars had ceased to be inevitable. In other words, the new doctrine on non-inevitability which was first promulgated at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 *had been advocated behind the scenes in Stalin's final years.* But Stalin would have none of it.

"These comrades are mistaken," he declared. "To eliminate the inevitability of war, it is necessary to abolish imperialism."[25] Since, in other words, wars would remain inevitable so long as the world Communist revolution remained basically incomplete, the only road to peace was the round-about road of forcible Communist revolution, with all that this implied for further growth of international tension. The call to moderate Communist tactics implicit in the thesis on the non-inevitability of wars in our time was thus rejected. This obdurate defense by Stalin of Marxist-Leninist ideological orthodoxy was indirectly a demand for indefinite prolongation of the cold war pending the spread of Communist revolution to other countries. It was of a piece, moreover, with his concluding speech at the Nineteenth Party Congress in October, 1952. In what was to prove his valedictory, Stalin applauded the continuing progress of the world Communist revolution and set the course of the movement towards its further advance in the coming years. In the light of this and other evidence, it is impossible to accept the view of some Western scholars that Stalin in the final period of his life was preparing the realignment of Soviet foreign policy which took place after his death.[26] On the contrary, he was engaged in a determined struggle against change, against forces within his own regime that were pressing for an international *détente* and realignment of policy.

Stalin's death removed the most formidable opponent of the revision of the Leninist thesis on inevitability of wars and related doctrinal as well as policy changes. But "heirs of Stalin" remained strong within the Soviet leadership, and post-Stalin ideological change was contested. As late as October, 1961, on the eve of the Twenty-Second Party Congress, Vyacheslav Molotov addressed a letter to the Party Central Committee protesting against the doctrinal revisions in the draft Party Program scheduled for adoption by the Congress; and the storm of abuse he thereby brought down upon himself at the Congress suggests that his message struck a sensitive chord in many Soviet Communist minds. By this time, however, the conflict over the post-Stalin trend of development in Soviet Communism had been internationalized. Resistance to this trend from within the international Communist movement had found a powerful and vigorous champion in the Maoist leadership of the Chinese Communist Party.

Soviet sources have asserted that the great Sino-Soviet ideological dispute began in April,

[22] Mendel, *op. cit.*, p. 402.

[23] See, for example, Khrushchev's public speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.

[24] I. Inozemtsev, "Leninizm—nauchnaia osnova sovetskoi vneshnei politiki," *Kommunist* (No. 7, 1966), p. 23.

[25] *Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* (New York: International Publishers, 1952), pp. 27–28, 30.

[26] See, for example, Marshall D. Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963). For a fuller presentation of the evidence against the view that Stalin was preparing a realignment of foreign policy, see this writer's *The Soviet Political Mind*, ch. 2.

1960, when the Chinese Communist press published, on the occasion of the ninetieth anniversary of Lenin's birth, a series of implicitly polemical articles entitled "Long Live Leninism!" Chinese Communist sources have contested this, pointing out that "It takes more than a cold day for the river to freeze three feet deep." The real starting point, according to the Chinese view, was the Twentieth Party Congress: "Ever since the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U., we have watched with concern as the C.P.S.U. leadership took the road of revisionism." To substantiate this claim, the Chinese have revealed that in April, 1956, shortly after the adoption of an anti-Stalin line by the Twentieth Congress, Mao Tse-tung emphasized to Mikoyan and the Soviet Ambassador in China that Stalin's "merits outweigh his faults." Repeatedly in subsequent months, the Chinese leaders, in private conversations with Soviet officials, opposed the anti-Stalin line. And in November, 1957, when a conference of Communist leaders from all over the world took place in Moscow to formulate the international Communist line, conflict broke out over the issue of peaceful parliamentary transition to socialism. In an "Outline of Views on the Question of Peaceful Transition" which was submitted to the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, the Chinese maintained that it would be inadvisable to lay much stress on the possibility of peaceful transition, and especially on the possibility of seizing state power by winning a majority in parliament, for "it is liable to weaken the revolutionary will of the proletariat, the working people and the Communist Party and disarm them ideologically." The Chinese document went on to express doubt whether there was a single country where the possibility of peaceful transition was of any practical significance. And recalling Lenin's insistence that in a Communist revolution the old state apparatus must not simply be taken over but destroyed, the Chinese warned that peaceful transition should not be interpreted in such a way as solely to mean transition through a parliamentary majority. That, the document concluded, would be a Social Democratic view, and: "On the question of socialist revolution, our position is fundamentally different from that of the Social Democratic parties. This distinction must not be obscured."[27]

Soviet sources have furnished no evidence to refute this account of the early development of the conflict that in our time has shaken and threatened to disrupt and even split in two the international Communist movement. In the subsequent stages of the dispute, Chinese warnings against obscuring the distinction between the Social Democratic and Communist positions on socialist revolution have given way to the charge that the Soviet leadership has gone the deradicalizing way of the Social Democratic leadership in Lenin's time. Khrushchevism has been seen as a new version of the Kautskyism that took over European Marxism a generation ago, and Lenin's writings of that time have been studied anew in search of insight into contemporary Soviet development. "As Lenin pointed out, the 'orthodox' Marxists headed by Kautsky were virtually hidden opportunists," declared a Chinese Communist study of "Kautskyism" published in 1962. "Under their leadership the Second International adopted some revolutionary manifestos and declarations, but their aim was not to put them into effect but to win the trust of the masses by fraud and to continue to manipulate the workers' movement."[28] Four years later, all pretence of merely historical reference was thrown aside, and the Chinese Communist leadership was saying: "After Stalin's death, the leaders of the C.P.S.U. headed by Khrushchev gradually revealed their true features as betrayers of Lenin and Leninism and embarked on the old path of the German Social Democrats Bernstein and Kautsky, who betrayed Marx and Engels and Marxism."[29]

VI. CHINA AND DERADICALIZATION

Detailed treatment of the Sino-Soviet conflict is beyond the scope of the present paper. The point I wish to make in conclusion is simply that in its inception, development and basic content, this inner conflict in international Communism shows a deeply significant similarity to (as well as significant differences from) the inner conflict that split the international Social Democratic Marxist movement

[27] *The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the C.P.S.U. and Ourselves* (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1963), pp. 11, 12, 59, 61. Soviet sources have asserted that the possibility of a parliamentary path of transition was mentioned in the 1952 new program of the British Communist Party on the suggestion of Stalin. It should be observed, however, that he did not at that time make a corresponding general revision in *Soviet* Marxist doctrine.

[28] Li Fu, Li Ssu-Wen and Wang Fu-ju, "On Kautskyism," *Hung-ch'i*, Nos. 8/9, April 25, 1962. Quoted in Alexander Dallin (ed.), *Diversity in International Communism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 277–278.

[29] "Chinese Communist Party Cannot Send Delegation to C.P.S.U. Twenty-Third Congress," *Peking Review*, March 25, 1966, no. 13, p. 5.

a generation ago. Once again we see the leadership of some parts of the movement showing in their conduct and ideological pronouncements the symptoms of deradicalization. And once again we see rebellion against this trend on the part of radical elements of the movement in whom the need for integrity of theory and practice is still strong. Once again, moreover, the predominance of one element or the other is connected with the difference between the stages of development of the movement in one country and the other.

All this bears emphasizing in part because of a tendency of the Western mind to view the Sino-Soviet ideological controversy as a mere smokescreen for clashing national ambitions or great-power rivalry between Russia and China. To ignore the national, imperial and personal factors in the conflict would be wrong. But it would be no less an error, and perhaps a greater one, to fail to perceive that ideological and political fundamentals of Communism really are at stake in this dispute.

As recent events have clearly shown, moreover, the concern about Soviet deradicalization is accompanied in the mind of the Maoist leadership in China by a fear of deradicalizing tendencies in Chinese Communism itself, and the conflict now in progress in the Chinese Communist movement turns in large measure on this issue. To combat deradicalizing tendencies in the higher leadership as well as in the party and state apparatus throughout the country is an avowed main aim of the great Maoist "cultural revolution" that has convulsed the internal life of Communist China in 1966 and early 1967. This aim—and in general the radical mentality—is epitomized in the slogan that has been given the youthful Maoist Red Guards: "Let us destroy the old world, and build a new world!" Mao and his closest adherents appear to realize more clearly than radical leaders of the past that the changing of the generations is always a threat to the radical mentality. "Imperialism pins its hopes of 'peaceful evolution' on the third and fourth generations," runs their reasoning as expressed in the Maoist press. "China's young people must remember class hatred and carry the proletarian revolutionary cause through to the end." To inoculate Communist China's young in advance against the bacilla of "revisionism" appears to be the purpose of the frenzied campaign of indoctrination. But it is not by indoctrination that genuine radical minds are created. The history of radical movements, Marxist ones included, suggests that Mao's fear of the coming deradicalization of Chinese Communism is well founded.

* * *

Not often does a theoretical problem have such immediate relevance to the practical concerns of political leaders as in the present instance. Since statesmen in our time have had to deal with radical movements that have come to power and may have repeated occasion to do so in the future, an understanding of the dynamics of the behavior of such movements at various stages of their development is of great importance. Both the lack of such understanding and the need for it find illustration in the recent history of our thinking about Soviet Communism. The Western mind has tended to anticipate a mellowing of the Soviet Communist movement in terms of what has been called "ideological erosion." A decline or softening of official commitment to the final goals of the movement has, in other words, been taken as the prime criterion for judging whether Soviet Communism is undergoing genuine change away from its radical foundations. The analysis presented in this paper leads to a very different view. Not only would a Soviet Communist movement in process of deradicalization go on proclaiming its adherence to the final goals of the movement; it would, by virtue of the dialectic of the process, reaffirm the goals in very strong terms, as it has done. For intensified *verbal* allegiance to ultimate ideological goals belongs to the pattern of deradicalization.

What a sociologist has written of religious change seems to be applicable also to ideological movements of radical persuasion: "Religious change is usually a latent process, carried on beneath symbols of nonchange."[30] Not the end of ideology but rather the growth of a stable discrepancy between ideological symbols and political deeds is the true mark of deradicalizing change in once-radical movements.

[30] J. Milton Yinger, *Sociology Looks at Religion* (New York: Macmillan 1963), p. 70. See also John H. Kautsky, "Myth, Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, and Symbolic Reassurance in the East-West Conflict," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 9 (March, 1965), at pp. 11–12. Of particular relevance to my argument is Kautsky's statement: "One may expect that the more the Soviet government changes its policies from those that were once associated with the goal of World Communism, the less can it afford to stop insisting that it continues to stand for this goal."

REGISTRATION AND VOTING: PUTTING FIRST THINGS FIRST[1]

STANLEY KELLEY, JR., RICHARD E. AYRES, AND WILLIAM G. BOWEN
Princeton University, Yale Law School, Princeton University

In their book *Non-Voting*, published in 1924, Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell reported that many persons otherwise eligible to vote had been disfranchised by Chicago's registration requirements. Their data showed that "there were three times as many adult citizens who could not vote because they had failed to register as there were registered voters who had failed to vote in the particular election"[2] and that "entirely different reasons [for not voting] were emphasized by those who were not registered than by those who were registered but did not vote . . ."[3] Their observation can hardly be said to have been influential. Until very recently most students of voting have paid little attention to the temporally prior act of registration.[4]

Failure to do so has had important consequences. It has made it easy to discount unduly the significance of *political* influences on the size and composition of electorates; easy to argue unrealistically about the value of efforts to increase the turnout of voters; and easy to be puzzled about some aspects of the behavior of voters.

I. THE DESIGN OF THE STUDY

The study out of which this article grows was undertaken in an effort to find answers to two questions: To what extent can differences from

[1] We are indebted to a great many people for help given us in the course of this study. The staff of the project included Mr. Paul Corcoran, Duke University; Mrs. Ronald Gebhardt; Mr. Charles J. Peischl, University of Pennsylvania Law School; and Mr. Lawrence C. Petrowksi, Columbia University Law School. We were given valuable information, suggestions, and other forms of assistance by Dr. George Graham, The Brookings Institution; Mrs. Alice Hamm, League of Women Voters of the United States; Messrs. Lloyd Bentsen and Jonathan Holman, Stanford Business School; Professor John Kessel, Allegheny College; Mr. Michael McClister, Democratic National Committee; Mr. Thomas G. McHale, U. S. Bureau of the Census; Professors Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, University of Michigan; Professor Ralph Miwa, University of Hawaii; Professor John Strange, Duke University; Mr. Michael Traugott, University of Michigan; Mrs. Rosalie Feltenstein, Princeton University; and Representative Frank Thompson, Fourth District, New Jersey. The aid of local Leagues of Women Voters and Boards of Election was indispensable to the success of the project, and so, too, was that of the Roger W. Straus Council of Human Relations of Princeton University, which provided the financial support for our research. In the course of our work substantial use was made of computer facilities supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant, NSF-GP579.

[2] Charles E. Merriam and Harold G. Gosnell, *Non-Voting: Causes and Methods of Control* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1924), p. 251.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 232.

[4] Angus Campbell and his associates at the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan discuss the relation of voting to certain of the legal arrangements governing suffrage in *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), 276–286, and Warren Miller has reported additional findings on the subject in a memorandum to the President's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation. V. O. Key examined the effect of poll taxes on voting in his *Southern Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950), 599–618, and Howard Freeman, Arnold Simmel, and Murray Gendell discuss the turnout of registered voters in William N. McPhee and William A. Glaser, *Public Opinion and Congressional Elections* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1962), 240–250. Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro report findings about rates of registration among Negroes in the South in two articles: "Social and Economic Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," this REVIEW, 57 (March, 1963), 24–44, and "Political Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," *ibid.* (June 1963), 355–367.

Much earlier, Gosnell presented some interesting information on the relation of registration procedures to turnout in elections in *Getting Out the Vote* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1927) and *Why Europe Votes* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930), as did Joseph P. Harris at about the same time in his *Registration of Voters in the United States* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1929), 106–108. There are of course comments on the relation of registration to voting in works not cited here, but very few additional sources of systematic information about that relationship.

place to place in the turnout of voters in elections be accounted for by differences in the number of those registered to vote? What factors are most strongly associated with variations in the percentage of those of voting age who do register to vote in different localities? We tried to find answers to these question by analyzing registration and voting in 1960 in 104 of the nation's largest cities.[5]

Our analysis was guided by Anthony Downs' discussion of voting in his *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. Downs assumes that "every rational man decides to vote just as he makes all other decisions: if the returns outweigh the costs, he votes; it not, he abstains";[6] and that assumption enables him to make a number of interesting deductions about which voters are likely to vote and which are not. We decided to assume that both the voter's decision to register and decisions made by party organizations about efforts to induce citizens to register are made after a similar rational calculation of benefits and costs. If one makes that assumption, it follows that variations in rates of registration among cities are the consequence of differences among them in the way voters assess the value of registering, in the interest politicians have in adding new names to the registration rolls, in costs voters perceive to be associated with the act of registering, and in costs of mounting registration drives. About such assessments, interests, and perceptions we had no direct information, but they could reasonably be supposed to be affected by several factors about which information was available.

The value that voters attach to the act of registering and that politicians put on registration drives should vary, for instance, with the competitiveness of a state's party politics and with the offices that are at stake in an election. As the probable division of the vote for the major parties in a state approaches 50–50, presidential candidates and all candidates for state-wide office have an increasingly strong incentive to induce their partisans to register, and the voter has an increasingly large (if still very small) chance to cast a ballot that will decide the outcome of a contest. As the number of officials to be elected in any given election rises, or, perhaps more accurately, as the scope of governmental power at stake in any election increases, so should the voter's estimate of the importance of the election. We therefore decided to examine the relationship of registration to both these variables.

There are three rather different sorts of costs that voters may see as involved in the act of registering to vote. In the first instance there are *monetary* costs. In 1960 some southern cities literally charged a fee, the poll tax, for putting one's name on the list of eligible voters; but in other places registering might also mean a loss of income through loss of time on the job or time away from a business.[7] Perhaps a more important cost is simple *inconvenience*. To get their names on a registration roll almost all voters must go out of their way to a greater or lesser extent and in some places the bother involved is very considerable indeed. Finally, there are costs of *obtaining information* about registering to vote. A voter must find out where and when he can register and if he is eligible to do so, and acquiring this information may take an appreciable amount of time and effort. We postulated that the magnitude of one or more of these sorts of costs would be greater, and would be seen as greater, in cities where citizens must take a literacy test;[8] where all voters must reregister at frequent intervals; where it is necessary to register considerably in advance of

[5] For a list of the cities included in our sample, see p. 373 below. Originally we planned to study factors affecting rates of registration in all cities in the United States with populations above 100,000; we were unable to proceed as planned, however, because we were unable to secure information about registration or registration procedures in some of these cities. Most commonly we could not secure accurate data regarding the percentage of the population of voting age registered to vote or verify the accuracy of such data as we could get. This was the case for 16 cities: Mobile, Montgomery, Tucson, Savannah, Chicago, Evansville, Indianapolis, Shreveport, Jackson, Albuquerque, Knoxville, Amarillo, Beaumont, El Paso, Lubbock, and Wichita Falls. We could not get accurate information regarding times and physical arrangements for registration in eight additional cities: Phoenix, Anaheim, Long Beach, San Jose, Denver, Providence, Madison, and Milwaukee. A figure for the percentage of recent migrants from out of state was missing for Yonkers, New York. Washington, D. C. had no procedures for registering voters in 1960, since, at that time, it had no voters.

[6] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1927), p. 260.

[7] Merriam and Gosnell reported that a substantial number of the non-voters they studied had given fear of loss of income through loss of time away from work as an important reason for not voting; see *Non-Voting*, 86–95.

[8] Literacy tests tend to lower registration, of course, not only because they are a bother but also because they disqualify a certain number of voters.

election day; and where the hours during which, and places at which, one can register are restricted.

The findings of the major studies of voting were a second important influence on our early speculation about factors that might account for differences among cities in rates of registration. Registration is hardly ever represented as anything but a purely instrumental act: one registers in order to vote. One would suppose, therefore, that most of the factors that encourage or discourage voting also encourage or discourage registering to vote. Proceeding on that supposition, we posited a strong relationship between registration and those socio-economic and psychological factors that have figured prominently in explanations of the turnout of voters in elections.[9] We could not, of course, hope to discover whether a relationship actually existed between registration and each such factor; no data were available to us on the psychological states or personal traits of persons of voting age in the cities we studied.[10] We could and did, however, try to find out if the proportion of citizens of voting age who were registered to vote in a city was associated with the median income and average educational attainment of the city's residents and with the numbers of recent migrants, young people, males, and Negroes in its population.

There has been less agreement on why various socio-economic factors are related to turnout in elections than on the fact that they are related, but such is the present state of the literature on voting. Downs attributes differences in the turnout rates of various classes of citizens to their varying abilities to bear the costs of voting or variations in what voting costs them. Thus, to make sense of the choices an election offers him, the educated man needs less additional information than someone who is poorly educated, and higher income groups are in a better position to pay the costs of finding out how their interests are affected by alternatives (and to pay other costs of voting) than are low income groups.[11] S. M. Lipset offers very similar explanations for the relationship of income and education to turnout, and both Downs and Lipset note also that the turnout rates of low-income groups may be lowered by confusion resulting from exposure to a largely conservative press.[12] Campbell and his colleagues argue that "The educated person is distinct from the less educated not only in the number of facts about politics at this command, but also in the sophistication of the concepts he employs to maintain a sense of order and meaning amid the flood of information";[13] the educated man is therefore less likely to abstain from voting out of a feeling that politics is too complicated to understand. Low rates of participation in elections among young voters have been explained by reference to their fluid occupational interests, greater mobility, lack of firm attachments to political parties, and absence of clear positions in the social life of their communities.[14] The low turnout of women relative to men is usually attributed to the cultural definition of politics as the concern of men, and that of Negroes relative to whites is attributed to deliberate efforts to discourage Negro voting and to the status of Negroes as a low-income group. It has been argued that newcomers to a community are less likely to vote than old residents because they have less contact with locally dominant groups, because their mobility is likely to have exposed them to politically relevant cross-pressures, and because they are likely to be disqualified for voting by local residence requirements.[15]

Certain common sense considerations were a third influence on our guesses about the factors that might make for higher or lower levels of registration. States require varying periods of residence in the state, and in the county and voting district, before a person is eligible to register even if he is otherwise qualified to do

[9] The most important have been race, place of residence, education, age, income, marital status, sex, ethnic group affiliation, occupation, geographical mobility, intensity of partisan preferences, perceived closeness of the election, interest in the campaign, concern with the outcome of the election, sense of the efficacy of voting, sense of civic duty, attitudes with respect to issues of public policy, attitudes toward candidates, and level of political information.

[10] Nor could we study the relationship of urban and rural residence to rates of registration, since we limited ourselves to the study of registration in large cities.

[11] See Anthony Downs, *op. cit.*, 232–236, 260–273.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 235, and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), p. 205.

[13] Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller and Donald Stokes, *The American Voter*, p. 476.

[14] See particularly Seymour Martin Lipset, *op. cit.*, 202, 209–211; Robert Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), 48–49; Angus Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter*, 496–497; and Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), p. 135.

[15] See Seymour Martin Lipset, *op. cit.*, 202–208

so. All states also require voters to be citizens of the United States. One would therefore expect that variations from place to place in residence requirements and any local variations in numbers of resident aliens would make a difference in the proportion of persons of voting age who are registered to vote in different cities. Further, rates of registration are known to vary regionally. This relationship might reflect differences in the culture of regions rather than regional differences in the values of the variables so far discussed. Finally, those cities having systems of permanent registration employ methods of differing efficiency to remove from registration rolls the names of voters who have died, moved away, or failed to vote for a specified period, a fact which could also account for some of the variation in registration rates from city to city.

It should be apparent that testing some of the hypotheses of interest to us entailed formidable problems in gathering data. We chose to study registration in 1960 because we were able to secure data on registration for a number of jurisdictions from the national committees of the two major parties; moreover, the presidential election of 1960 coincided with a decennial census year. We chose the nation's large cities as units of observation because there were a sufficient number of them to make statistical analysis fruitful and because we could secure data for them that was unavailable either for states or counties. Several of the states, for instance, collect no information on the numbers of their citizens registered to vote. Registration, voting, and census data are reported by counties, but the hours, days of the week, and kinds of places where citizens can register are frequently determined at lower levels of government, and so may vary considerably within counties.

Cities are units of observation well suited to examining the effects on registration of differences among localities in the extent of interparty competition, residence requirements, closing dates for registration, and the availability of places to register. Inter-city analysis is less appropriate for an examination of the effects on registration of individual characteristics such as sex, age, education, and income, which can be better studied by treating the individual as the unit of observation. For instance, it is obviously better to draw inferences about the effects of sex on registration from a direct comparison of registration rates between males and females (after allowing for the effects of other variables) than from a comparison of inter-city differences in registration associated with inter-city differences in sex-ratios. The main reason for including variables which measure individual characteristics in our inter-city analysis was to guard against the possibility that substantial differences among cities in, for example, the proportion of men in the population, might obscure the true effects on registration of variations in such factors as the degree of inter-party competition, residence requirements, and so on. It was also of interest of course, to see if the variables which measure individual characteristics were sufficiently powerful to cause differences among cities in registration rates.

In analyzing differences among cities in the percentage of the voting-age population registered to vote, we used ordinary multiple-regression techniques, and we assumed that linear fits could be used to approximate the true relationships among our variables. Other aspects of our procedures can be explained most conveniently as we present our findings.

II. FINDINGS

Registration Related to Turnout. Our findings with respect to the first of the two major questions in which we were interested—that concerning the relationship of registration to the turnout of voters in elections—can be reported in a few sentences. In the full sample of cities, 78 percent of the variation in the percentage of the population of voting age that voted could be accounted for by variations in the percentage of the population of voting age that was registered to vote.[16] As one would expect, the relationship was almost one-to-one; that is, if the percentage of the population of voting age registered to vote in city *A* was one percent higher than in city *B*, then the percentage of the population of voting age actually voting in city *A* was, on the average, almost exactly one percent higher than in city *B*.[17] Moreover, it seems clear that registration requirements are a more effective deterrent to voting than anything that normally operates to deter citizens from voting once they have registered, at least in presidential elections. The mean percentage of *those of voting age who were registered to vote* in the full sample of cities was 73.3 percent and the standard deviation was 14.3 percent. In contrast, the mean percentage of *those registered to vote who voted* was 81.6 percent with a standard deviation of 11.7 percent. Thus the latter was not only higher but also varied within a narrower range.

[16] The F-ratio for the regression was 361.39.

[17] The regression coefficient of the rate of registration in this regression was .96, its standard error was .05, and its "t" value was 19.01.

Variations in Proportion Registered. What factors account for the wide range of differences among cities in the proportion of the population of voting age that is registered to vote? Discussion of our findings with respect to this second question must be considerably more extensive. To begin with, we will report what we found to be the most important influences on rates of registration in our full sample of cities. We will then present additional information obtained by examining registration only in those cities with systems of permanent registration (the reason for this separate analysis of cities with systems of permanent registration will be apparent later), by controlling for regional influences, and by analyzing the pattern of residual variance.

Findings With Respect to the Full Sample of Cities

Table 1 summarizes the results of our analysis of the registration of voters in the full sample of cities.[18] It seems clear that we included among our explanatory factors a number of highly significant ones: Together, the twelve independent variables in Regression I.1 "explain" (in the sense usual when interpreting multiple regression equations) nearly 80 percent of the variation among cities in percent-

[18] The results in all of our text tables are reported in terms of partial regression coefficients, standard errors of these coefficients, and t-values. Appendix III contains partial correlation coefficients and Beta-weights.

TABLE 1. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES AMONG CITIES IN PERCENTAGES OF THE POPULATION OF VOTING AGE REGISTERED TO VOTE (104 CITIES, 1960)

Variables[a]	Expected Sign	Regression I.1[b] b	(s)	t	Regression I.2[c] b	(s)	t
Independent Variables:							
Socio-Economic Factors:							
Age (% 20–34)	−	−0.47	(0.20)	2.33*	−0.50	(0.18)	2.79**
Sex (% Male)	+	−0.18	(0.63)	0.28			
Race (% Non-white)	−	−0.14	(0.07)	2.05*	−0.17	(0.07)	2.46*
Education (Median Yrs. Completed)	+	2.13	(0.99)	2.16*	2.88	(0.72)	4.02*
Income ($100/Yr.)	+	0.23	(0.16)	1.43			
Length of Residence (% From Out of State)	−	−0.20	(0.15)	1.33			
Factors Affecting the Value of the Vote:							
Inter-Party Competition (%)	−	−0.30	(0.10)	3.02**	−0.41	(0.07)	5.60**
Factors Affecting the Costs of Registration:[d]							
Provisions Regarding Literacy Tests	+	0.09	(0.04)	2.17*	0.12	(0.04)	3.29**
Closing Date for Registration	+	0.18	(0.04)	3.45**	0.15	(0.03)	4.28**
Times and Places of Registration	+	2.20	(2.00)	1.10			
Registration System (Permanent or Periodic)	+	0.06	(0.04)	1.52			
Other Factors:[d]							
Residence Requirements	+	0.04	(0.04)	0.96			
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Population of Voting Age Registered to Vote							
Mean			73.3			73.3	
Standard Deviation			(14.3)			(14.3)	
F-Ratio			28.05			52.20	
Standard Error of Estimate			7.0			7.2	
Number of Cities			104			104	
R^2			.79**			.76**	

Notation: b = Net (partial) regression coefficient;
(s) = Standard error of regression coefficient;
t = t-value of regression coefficient (t-values may differ from b/(s) ratios in table because of rounding);
** = Significant at 99%;
* = Significant at 95%.

[a] Defined in Appendix I.

[b] Includes all variables.

[c] Includes only variables significant at 95% level in Regression I.1.

[d] As we indicate in Appendix I, these sets of variables are measured by indices whose scales are arbitrary. Thus, no units of measurement are shown in parentheses, and no meaning can be attached to the absolute values of the regression coefficients of these variables without bearing in mind how each index was scaled. The "t" values can, however, be interpreted in the usual way as indicators of statistical significance.

ages of the population of voting age registered to vote. Only one of these twelve variables (the percentage of males in the population of voting age) failed to have the expected sign, and six had "t" values large enough to imply that their regression coefficients were significantly different from zero at a level of confidence of 95 percent or better. In a second regression (I.2 in Table 1) that included only these six variables, the value of R^2 fell just three percentage points, and all six continued to show statistically significant relationships to the dependent variable.[19]

Socio-Economic Factors

Regression I.1 included six socio-economic variables—age, race, education, income, sex, and length of residence.[20] Only three—age, education, and race—were significantly related to variations among cities in rates of registration. The implications of the regression coefficients of these variables may be stated as follows:

A. If the number of persons in the age-group 20 to 34 relative to the number of persons of voting age in a city was larger than the average of all cities in the sample by one percent, the city's rate of registration tended to be one-half of one percent below the average of all cities in the sample.
B. If the residents over 25 years of age in a city had a median educational attainment one year above the average of all cities in the sample, the city tended to have a rate of registration that was two to three percent above the average of all cities in the sample.
C. If the percentage of non-whites in a city's population was greater by one percent than the average in all cities of the sample, the city tended to have a rate of registration that was a little less than one-fifth of one per cent below the average of all cities in the sample.

The relationship described in (C) is of particular interest, since it held even when allowances had been made for the use of literacy tests in some cities and even when our race variable was included in the same regression with variables that reflected differences between whites and non-whites in average income, average educational attainment, and ratios of younger to older persons of voting age.

That we did not find variations in the median income of the populations of cities to be significantly related to rates of registration is also of some interest. Although higher median incomes for the populations of the cities of our sample were associated with higher rates of registration in our multiple regression, the regression coefficient for the income variable was not quite significant at the 90 percent level of confidence. We did find that we could easily push the "t" value for the income variable high enough to indicate a relationship significant at the 99 percent level of confidence if we dropped our race and education variables from the analysis, since both of these had fairly high correlations with the income variable.[21] But various experiments of this kind showed that the income variable, by itself, had less explanatory power than either of the other two. Where intercorrelations of this kind exist, it is impossible on the basis of the statistical techniques we used to sort out the "independent" effect of any of the variables in a precise way. Nevertheless, our results do give some further support to the conclusion of the authors of *The American Voter* that a voter's education has more directly important consequences for his participation in elections than does his income.[22]

We found that differences in the relative numbers of men and women of voting age in the populations of the cities of our sample had no observable effect on rates of registration in our cities. There were, we think, several reasons for this result. In the first place, differences in the ratios of men to women in the population of voting age in the cities of our sample were relatively slight: The standard deviation of the variable was only 1.49 percent around the mean percentage of males in the population of voting age. Secondly, our data concerned reg-

[19] The R^2's reported in Table I are not corrected for degrees of freedom; the R^2's for Regression I.1 must therefore be larger than the R^2 for Regression I.2, since the latter contains only six of the twelve independent variables included in the former. Actually, as the F-ratios indicate, Regression I.2 gets higher marks on the statistical significance scale than does Regression I.1, although it is important to remember that we already knew something about the behavior of the variables included in Regression I.2 before it was run. A "t" value significant at the 95 percent level in Regression I.1 was the criterion for the inclusion of variables in Regression I.2, and in such circumstances the meaningfulness of standard significance tests is open to some question.

[20] Precise definitions of these and other variables are given in Appendix I in order of which the variables are discussed below.

[21] See Appendix II for the matrix of simple correlations.

[22] Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter*, 475–476.

istration in large cities, and the differences between men and women in turnout in elections have been found to be smaller in metropolitan areas than elsewhere.[23] Finally, colinearity of our sex variable with other variables tended to obscure any relationship it might otherwise have shown to rates of registration; those cities in the sample with the largest percentages of males in their population of voting age, it turned out, also tended to have unusually large concentrations of young voters and recent migrants from out of state.

The last of the socio-economic variables included in Regression I.1, length of residence, was positively related to rates of registration, but the relationship was not statistically significant. The authority of this finding is compromised somewhat, however, by our reliance on a rather imprecise measure of length of residence, and it is entirely possible that we would have obtained a significant result if we had been able to use a better one.

Factors Affecting the Value of the Vote. From our efforts to detect any effects on rates of registration of factors affecting the value of the vote, we can report two findings. The first, made at an early point in our study, is that differences from city to city in the offices that were at stake in the election of 1960 had very little, if any, impact on registration; the correlation between rates of registration and an index we constructed to reflect such differences was small and not significant. What this result suggests is what the marked differences in turnout for presidential or other elections would also seem to indicate: That the interest of voters in presidential races in the United States is so great that few additional voters are attracted to the polls by an interest in the outcome of other contests.

Rates of registration in our sample of cities were, however, very strongly related to another factor affecting the value of the vote: The normal degree of competitiveness of partisan politics in statewide contests. As Table 1 indicates, the regression coefficient of our index of inter-party competition was easily significant at the 99 percent level of confidence in both regressions.[24] This result is consistent with evidence bearing on the relationship of turnout in elections to party competition that has been presented by a number of students of voting[25] and with our own expectation that a high level of competition between parties would increase the incentive for people to register and for politicans to get them to register. It is somewhat at variance, however, with conclusions that Robert Lane and that Angus Campbell and his associates have reached about the relationship between turnout and party competition.

Lane has argued that "although closeness of contest tends to enlist certain politicizing motives and, where habitual, to create stronger parties, the relationship between closeness of contest and turnout in the United States and Britain is small."[26] His conclusion with respect to Great Britain is hardly compelling, since Gosnell has offered equally good evidence for the contrary view.[27] With respect to the United States, Lane acknowledges the closeness of elections in states to be related to turnout but makes much of the fact that variations among *counties* in rates of non-voting did not appear to be associated with variations among *counties* in the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote in the 1952 presidential election.[28] That fact is quite consistent with our own hypothesis about the relationship of party competition to participation in elections, however, since we expected the relative closeness of contests to affect rates of participation only when the former had relevance to the value of voting; and the level of partisan competition in counties has no meaning for the value of voting in presidential elections.[29]

Angus Campbell and his colleagues found that voters in the election of 1956 with only a weak preference for one party or the other were

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 487.

[24] Because of the way this variable was measured (See Appendix I), low values imply a high level of competition in a state's party politics; hence, the correlation between the variable and rates of registration is negative.

[25] See especially Harold F. Gosnell, *Why Europe Votes*, 182–183, 199–203; Lester W. Milbrath, "Political Participation in the States," p. 43 in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965); and Herbert Tingsten, *Political Behaviour* (London: P. S. King and Son, 1937), p. 216.

[26] Robert Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

[27] Lane's data for the election of 1950 are as reported in H. G. Nicholas, *The British General Election of 1950* (London: Macmillan, 1951), p. 318; Gosnell's data were for the election of 1924.

[28] Robert Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

[29] It does have meaning for the value of the vote in county elections, of course; and if county elections were held in years when major state and national offices were not at stake, one would expect to find a relationship between the competitiveness of a county's politics and the turnout of voters.

no more likely to go to the polls whether they saw the election to be one-sided or close. Voters with strong partisan preferences were more likely to vote if they expected the election to be close, but, according to the authors of *The American Voter*, "The question we have used to classify respondents according to their expectations about the election have referred to the contest *in the nation as a whole* . . . the analysis of answers to a question referring to the presidential race within the respondent's state indicates that it is the election *as a whole* that has cognitive and motivational significance, despite the existence of the electoral college."[30]

These findings are not easy to reconcile with our own. It could be that differences in the behavior of highly motivated voters from place to place are indeed an important source of local variations in rates of registration, but it does not seem likely that this is true, and it would not account for our result in any case if such voters do not pay attention to the closeness of the presidential race in their states. It could also be, and this seems more probable, that the factor intervening between the greater competitiveness of a state's party politics and higher turnout is not, for most voters, any conscious assessment of the likely outcome of the current election (such as is assumed by the analysis of *The American Voter*) but rather generalized feelings about how much votes have counted in the past; these generalized feelings may in turn be shaped by campaigning as this typically varies from state to state. Such an hypothesis would be consistent with data which show that Southern voters attribute less efficacy to voting than do Northerners,[31] and not inconsistent with either our own findings or those of Campbell and his co-authors. Finally, it could be that differences in rates of registration between cities of competitive and non-competitive states should be attributed largely to the actions of party activists; they undoubtedly are quite aware both of the level of party competition in a state and of its significance for the value of efforts to entice voters to register.

Factors Affecting Costs of Registration. The four variables we inserted in Regression I.1 in order to examine the relationship between rates of registration and practices or procedures affecting the costs of registering were indices especially constructed for that purpose.[32] All were so scaled as to lead us to predict positive correlations of each variable with the percentage of the population of voting age registered to vote. While all showed the predicted relationship, it was statistically significant in two cases only.

The use of literacy tests was associated with lower rates of registration, as those who put provisions for such tests into election codes doubtless intended it to be.[33] In William Riker's words, "Eighteen states have adopted the [lit-

[30] Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *The American Voter*, p. 100 *f.n.*

[31] Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson and Company, 1954), p. 193.

A re-arrangement of data presented in *The American Voter*, Table 17.4, p. 479, yields the following results:

Sense of Political Efficacy	*Non-South*	*South*
High	43%	32%
Medium	28	24
Low	30	44

[32] The assignment of values in these indices was arbitrary, as has been indicated in the notes to Table 1, but a few words about the kind of arbitrariness involved are in order here. This can best be done, perhaps, by indicating how we arrive at the scale of values for one of these indices, that for the variable we have called "registration system." The four positions on that index were assigned values of 10, 25, 34, and 100. This set of values was chosen because it was our guess that a system of permanent registration (valued at 100) was ten times less demanding on voters than a system which combines a cumulative poll tax with annual registration (valued at 10), four times less demanding than a system of annual registration coupled with a non-cumulative poll tax (valued at 25), and three times less demanding than a system of annual personal registration (valued at 34).

In a moment of less boldness, we eschewed estimates of how much more restrictive one system was than another and constructed a simple ordinal scale which involved only guesses as to which systems had a greater, and which had a lesser, tendency to restrict registration. The substitution of the ordinal indices had little effect on our results. The cardinal indices showed somewhat stronger relationships to registration than those with ordinal scales, but if one of our cardinal indices was significantly related to registration, so was its ordinal equivalent, and if one of our cardinal indices was not significantly related to registration, neither was its ordinal equivalent.

[33] *Cf.* Lester Milbrath, "Political Participation in the States," p. 48 in Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, and Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Political Factors and Negro Voter Regis-

eracy test], seven to disfranchise Negroes, five to disfranchise Indians and Mexicans and Orientals, and six to disfranchise European immigrants."[34] The disfranchising effect of literacy tests appears to have been considerably less severe in cities outside the South, however, than in Southern cities. In one regression involving data from non-Southern cities only, literacy tests continued to be correlated with lower rates of registration, but the relationship was no longer significant even at a level of confidence of 90 percent.

A more striking finding is the extremely strong relationship between the date at which registration rolls are closed and the percentage of the population of voting age that is registered.[35] This variable had the largest "t" value of any of the twelve in Regression I.1, and the second largest "t" value in Regression I.2. Its regression coefficient of .15 in Regression I.2 implies that extending the closing date for registration from, say, one month to one week prior to election day would tend to increase the percentage of the population registered by about 3.6 per cent. For politicians, varying the closing date for registration would thus appear to be a very effective way in which to manipulate the size of the potential electorate.

Why this should be so can be suggested here, if not demonstrated. A longer period in which one may register increases considerably the convenience of doing so, of course, but we doubt that that is all there is to the matter. A late closing date for registration also probably tends to increase rates of registration because it allows the campaign to serve as a reminder to weakly motivated voters that they need to register and as a stimulus to find out from others how they can do so. Such an interpretation of our finding would be consistent with the results of Gosnell's experimental efforts to stimulate registration in Chicago, and with his observation that ". . . if all the adult citizens in the city had been properly informed regarding registration dates, 10 percent more of them would have registered."[36]

Even though the index we constructed in an effort to assess the effect on rates of registration of differences in systems of registration (permanent or periodic) failed to show a statistically significant relationship to variations in percentages of the population of voting age registered to vote, we are unwilling to deprecate the importance of such differences. Though it is by no means wholly persuasive, there is other evidence that systems of permanent registration are associated with higher rates of registration than are systems of periodic registration.[37] Moreover, our examination of these relationships could not in the nature of the case be very conclusive. For one thing, only fifteen of the cities in our sample had a system of periodic registration or its equivalent. For another, variations in systems of registration were highly correlated with variations in closing dates for registration (+.64). With both these factors working to obscure any relationship that our registration-systems variable might have to rates of registration, that relationship nonetheless just missed significance at a level of confidence of 90 percent.

The variable labelled "times and places of registration" failed to correlate significantly with rates of registration in the full sample of cities. Our index was constructed to reflect the relative difficulty that the average citizen in each city would face in finding a registration place open at hours convenient to him. In constructing it, however, we did not take into account the fact that cities face different tasks in registering voters, depending on whether they use systems of permanent, or periodic, registration. In cities with periodic registration, about one-half of the adult population succeeds in registering, on the average. Cities with permanent registration, again on the average, do not have to deal with anything like this many people; in such cities, at any given time, most potential registrants are already registered. Thus, the convenience of equal facilities in

---

tration in the South," this REVIEW, 57 (June, 1963), at p. 358.

[34] William H. Riker, *Democracy in the United States* (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 66.

[35] To the best of our knowledge only Warren Miller has previously presented systematic evidence tending to show non-voting to be related to an early closing date for registration. In his memorandum to the President's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation, Miller reported that "One out of every four or five citizens lives in a state where registration closes in September, before an election campaign is well under way. . . . Non-voting by two or three percent of the population is associated with the September closing dates, both North and South."

[36] Harold F. Gosnell, *Getting Out the Vote*, p. 104.

[37] See Joseph P. Harris, *op cit.*, 106–108, and Robert Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 315. Warren Miller reported to the President's Commission on Registration and Voting Participation that "The absence of any prevoting registration requirement and the provision for permanent registration are clearly associated with higher turnout at the polls." V. O. Key has shown the poll tax to depress turnout in *Southern Politics*, 599–618.

cities having registration systems of the two different sorts cannot be equated. We therefore decided to analyze the effect of variations in the times and facilities for registration in cities using systems of permanent registration—that is, in a set of cities facing really comparable problems in registering voters. The results of that analysis are reported below.

We found that differences among cities in rates of registration were not significantly related to differences in the length of residence in states and localities required of voters. This finding is surprising. No other aspect of the legal provisions relevant to voting has received nearly so much attention from students of voting as residence requirements; indeed, some writers have seemed to regard residence requirements as proto-typical of requirements of registration.[38] We may have obtained these results because differences from place to place in requirements of residence were not sufficiently great to make any great difference in the relative percentages of the population of voting age qualified to vote; or it may have been that the differences in the proportion of recent migrants in the populations of our sample of cities were not great enough to affect rates of registration.

It seems to us, however, that some aspects of the reasoning that leads one to expect residence requirements to make a difference in registration rates may be faulty. It is a fact that, in any given year in the United States, many people change residence and are therefore disqualified for voting in many localities. It is true also that respondents to opinion surveys will frequently cite an inability to meet local requirements of residence in explanation of their failure to vote or register,[39] and that survey data show recency of residential change to be negatively correlated with turnout in elections. It does not follow from these facts that residence requirements keep large numbers of adults from voting who would vote if such requirements did not exist. Residence requirements may disqualify recent migrants as voters, but there are other reasons why they might not vote, some peculiar to their status as recent migrants and some not. Moreover, their own explanations of their conduct can hardly be taken at face value; inability to meet legal qualifications is a "good" reason for not voting and one that is therefore likely to be invoked frequently. Thus, we may have exaggerated the significance of residence requirements not only for differences among cities in rates of registration but also as a cause of non-voting and non-registration.

Findings With Respect to Cities With Systems of Permanent Registration. The results of our analysis of registration in the 89 cities of our sample having systems of permanent registration are given in Table 2. The twelve independent variables included in Regression II.1 account for 70 percent of the variation in rates of registration among these cities; the five variables retained in Regression II.2 account for 65 percent of the variation.

For reasons already cited, we included in this analysis a variable not included in Regression I.1: methods of purging registration rolls. To "purge" a registration roll is to remove from it the names of voters no longer qualified to vote. State laws usually specify the circumstances in which a voter's name is to be purged; in most states it will be purged when a voter dies, moves away, or fails to vote within a certain period of time. Both the reasons for purging a voter's name and the procedures for discovering whether there is cause for purging the name of any particular voter, however, vary considerably from city to city. We expected such variations to be related to differences among cities in rates of registration, but they were not significantly related, as Table 2 indicates.[40]

Variations in our index of the convenience of the times and places of registration were significantly related to variations in rates of registration. The relationship was significant at the 95 percent level of confidence in Regression II.1 and at the 99 percent level of confidence in Regression II.2. This finding is important,

[38] This seems to be the sense of Lipset's statement that he does not wish to consider the effects of "legal and technical restrictions like residence requirements, poll taxes and property qualifications, literacy tests (often used as a cover for racial discrimination) and burdensome registration requirements" on the ground that his interest is in *voluntary* (his emphasis) non-voting. (See Seymour Martin Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 181 *f.n.*) But for the greatest numbers of those who fail to register, non-registration is just as voluntary or non-voluntary as is failure to vote.

[39] See Angus Campbell, *et al.*, *The Voter Decides*, p. 37; Charles E. Merriam and Harold F. Gosnell, *op. cit.*, 79–86; and Phillips Bradley and Alfred H. Cope, "A Community Registration Survey," this REVIEW, 45 (September, 1951), at p. 777.

[40] It is possible, of course, that the index we constructed did not reflect with sufficient exactness the actual differences in purging practices that exist from city to city. The procedures for purging were difficult to document.

for it suggests that local officials, by varying the convenience of registration procedures, may be able to affect appreciably not only the size, but also the composition, of local electorates.

The education variable explained much less of the variation in rates of registration among cities with systems of permanent registration than it did among the cities in our full sample. In our analysis of registration in cities with systems of permanent registration, the regression coefficient of this variable was not significant even at the 90 percent level of confidence. Moreover, changes in its value were associated with changes in rates of registration only about half as great as in Regression I.1.

These last two findings—together with analyses of registration of Northern cities, in cities with rates of registration above 78 percent, and in cities with late closing dates for registration—lead us to propose the following generalization: When the costs of registering are generally high, differences from place to place in the value of variables affecting the motivation to vote—education, for example—will account for a considerable part of the variation in rates of registration; when the costs of registering are generally low, differences from place to place in the value of such variables will be relatively less important, and differences in the convenience of arrangements for registration relatively more important, in their effects on rates of registration.

Controlling for the Effects of Region. A classification by region of the 104 cities of our sample reveals a considerable difference among the cities of the various regions in average rates of

TABLE 2. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES IN RATES OF REGISTRATION AMONG CITIES WITH SYSTEMS OF PERMANENT REGISTRATION (89 CITIES, 1960)

Variables[a]	Expected Sign	Regression II.1[b] b	(s)	t	Regression II.2[c] b	(s)	t
Independent Variables:							
Socio-Economic Factors:							
Age (% 20–34)	−	−0.42	(0.22)	1.94*	−0.19	(0.18)	1.05
Sex (% Male)	+	−0.13	(0.71)	0.18			
Race (% Non-white)	−	−0.17	(0.08)	2.26*	−0.25	(0.07)	3.74**
Education (Median Years Completed)	+	1.11	(1.10)	1.01			
Income ($100/Yr.)	+	0.26	(0.18)	1.46			
Length of Residence (% from out of state)	−	−0.19	(0.16)	1.23			
Factors Affecting the Value of the Vote:							
Inter-Party Competition (%)	−	−0.28	(0.14)	2.05*	−0.51	(0.09)	5.54**
Factors Affecting the Costs of Registration:[d]							
Provisions Regarding Literacy Tests	+	0.07	(0.06)	1.21			
Closing Date for Registration	+	0.15	(0.05)	3.43**	0.17	(0.04)	4.09**
Times and Places of Registration	+	7.86	(3.67)	2.14*	9.71	(3.31)	2.93**
Other Factors:[d]							
Methods of Purging Registration Rolls	+	0.004	(0.05)	0.08			
Residence Requirements	+	0.05	(0.05)	1.01			
Dependent Variable: Percentage of Population of Voting Age Registered to Vote							
Mean			76.3			76.3	
Standard Deviation			(11.6)			(11.6)	
F-Ratio			14.80			31.00	
Standard Error of Estimate			6.8			7.0	
Number of Cities			89			89	
R^2			.70**			.65**	

Notation: b = Net (partial) regression coefficient;
(s) = Standard error of regression coefficient;
t = t-value of regression coefficient (t-value may differ from b/(s) ratios in table because of rounding);
** = Significant at 99%;
* = Significant at 95%;

[a] Defined in Appendix I.
[b] Included all variables listed.
[c] Includes only variables significant at 95% level in Regression II.1.
[d] As we indicate in Appendix I, these sets of variables are measured by indices whose scales are arbitrary. Thus, no units of measurement are shown in parentheses, and no meaning can be attached to the absolute values of the regression coefficients of these variables without bearing in mind how each index was scaled. The "t" values can, however, be interpreted in the usual way as indicators of statistical significance.

registration. Those averages were as follows:

Region	Average Rate of Registration
Midwest	82.5
West	80.7
Northeast	76.1
Border	70.7
South	55.9

In order to discover if these differences might stem from some difference in the culture of regions rather than from regional variations in the values of the variables discussed so far, we re-computed Regressions I.1 and I.2 with a set of regional dummy variables included. (That is, we re-computed these regressions after having denoted whether a city was in, or not in, each of the five regions by assigning a "1" in the first case and a "0" in the second.) Following is the matrix of t-values needed to show in which instances the regional dummies were significantly different from each other:[41]

	West	North-east	Border	South	Mid-west
West	—	1.63	2.23*	0.81	0.07
Northeast	1.63	—	0.99	0.43	1.53
Border	2.23*	0.99	—	1.25	1.97*
South	0.81	0.43	1.25	—	0.37
Midwest	0.70	1.53	1.97*	0.37	—

* Significant at the 95% level of confidence.

Two findings revealed by this matrix warrant comment. First of all, the relationship of the South dummy to registration was not significantly different from that of any of the other four regional dummies. This result is important, because it implies that the low rates of registration characteristic of Southern cities (on the average, 17.4 percent below the mean registration rate for all 104 cities) can be explained mainly in terms of the variables included in Regression I.1.

Secondly, only two pairs of regional dummies did differ significantly from each other in their relationship to registration, Border-West and Border-Midwest. The regression coefficients for the regional dummies shown in Table 3 (Regression III.1) indicate that our regression equation over-predicts the rate of registration in the cities of the Border states by about seven percentage points relative to that in Midwestern cities and by about 10.5 percentage points relative to that of Western cities. The equation also tends to under-predict registration in Western cities relative to registration in the rest of the country. We have no ready explanation. It may be that statutes which on their face are not particularly discouraging to registration are administered in a way that does discourage registration in the cities of the Border states. It may also be that voters in the West are more likely than those elsewhere to regard voting as a civic duty. These are mere conjectures, however, which cannot be tested with the data available to us.

Comparisons of the regressions reported in Tables 1 and 3 indicate one additional fact of importance: When regional dummies are included in the regression, the explanatory value of the age and education variables is appreciably lessened. A part of the apparent effect on registration of these two variables thus seems to be associated with factors varying by region that were not taken into account in Regressions I.1 and I.2. For the rest, however, findings already reported can stand without further qualification.

Results for Particular Cities and the Pattern of Residual Variance. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the actual rates of registration for the cities of our full sample and the rates of registration predicted on the basis of Regression I.2. If the predictions had been perfect, all of the 104 observations would lie on the 45 degree line. They do not, but it is encouraging that the regression equation predicts about equally well over the whole range of values for the dependent variable.


Table 4 reports actual and predicted rates of registration for each of the cities of the full sample. Cities are listed according to the size of their residuals, starting with Memphis, which had the largest positive residual, and ending with Wichita, which had the largest negative one. The reader may use this table, as we did, as a starting point for efforts to think of variables that will account for the pattern of residual variance.

We found two variables that seem to account for a very small part of it. The regression equation led us to under-predict registration in cities with large percentages of Catholics in their populations.[42] It also led us to over-pre-

[41] These "t" values were obtained by running five versions of Regression III.1, dropping a different regional dummy each time, and using the t's for the other dummies to find whether or not they are significantly different from the omitted dummy.

[42] Actually, for cities in *counties* with large percentages of Catholics in their populations. Our source was National Council of the Churches of

FIG. 1. Relationship of Actual Rates of Registration to Predicted Rates (104 cities 1960).



dict registration in the relatively few cities where there were substantial number of resident aliens.[43]

By far the most important statement we can make about our effort to explain the pattern of residual variance, however, is simply this: Not much came of it. The size or sign of a city's residual had little if any relation to the size of the city,[44] the state in which it was located, its provisions for absentee registration,[45] the percentage of its population that was foreign born,[46] or whether or not it had less stringent residence requirements for voting in presidential elections than it did for voting in state and local elections. There were no substantial dif-

Christ in the United State of America, *Churches and Church Membership in the United States*, New York, 1956–1958.

[43] Our source for percentages of aliens in the population of our cities was U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *U. S. Census of Population 1960: Characteristics of the Population*, Table 55.

[44] To avoid forcing a linear pattern on this variable, we used a set of dummy variables; however, none had a "t" value as high as 1.00.

[45] *Cf.* Lester W. Milbrath, "Political Participation in the States," p. 47 in Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*

[46] This variable had the expected negative sign, but the "t" value of its regression coefficient was only 1.19.

TABLE 3. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES AMONG CITIES IN PERCENTAGES OF THE POPULATION OF VOTING AGE REGISTERED TO VOTE, WITH REGIONAL VARIABLES (104 CITIES, 1960)

Variables[a]	Expected Sign	Regression III.1[b] b	(s)	t	Regression III.2[c] b	(s)	t
Independent Variables:							
Socio-Economic Factors:							
Age (% 20–34)	−	−0.39	(0.21)	1.89	−0.43	(0.18)	2.36*
Sex (% Male)	+	−0.38	(0.66)	0.57			
Race (% Non-white)	−	−0.17	(0.08)	2.25*	−0.18	(0.07)	2.52*
Education (Median Years Completed)	+	1.07	(1.16)	0.92	2.13	(0.91)	2.36*
Income ($100/Year)	+	0.19	(0.18)	1.08			
Length of Residence (% from out of State)	−	−0.25	(0.16)	1.58			
Factors Affecting the Value of the Vote:							
Inter-Party Competition (%)	−	−0.29	(0.12)	2.37*	−0.37	(0.08)	4.68**
Factors Affecting the Costs of Registration:[d]							
Provisions Regarding Literacy Tests	+	0.10	(0.04)	2.39*	0.14	(0.04)	3.73**
Closing Date for Registration	+	0.15	(0.04)	3.83**	0.16	(0.04)	4.62**
Times and Places of Registration	+	1.50	(2.12)	0.71			
Registration System (Permanent or Periodic)	+	0.04	(0.04)	0.93			
Other Factors:[d]							
Residence Requirements	+	0.02	(0.05)	0.38			
Regions:							
West		2.20	(3.15)	0.70	3.06	(2.53)	1.21
Northeast		−3.56	(2.32)	1.53*			
Border		−7.05	(3.58)	1.97*	−5.50	(3.04)	1.81
South		−1.66	(4.48)	0.37			
Dependent Variable: Percentage of the Population of Voting Age Registered to Vote							
Mean			73.3			73.3	
Standard Deviation			(14.3)			(14.3)	
F-Ratio			22.09			40.99	
Intercept			67.5			48.2	
Standard Error of Estimate			6.9			7.0	
Number of Cities			104			104	
R^2			.80**			.78**	

Notation: b = Net (partial) regression coefficient; (s) = standard error of regression coefficient; t = t-value of regression coefficient; ** = significant at 99%; * = significant at 95%.

[a] Defined in Appendix I.

[b] Includes all variables listed.

[c] Includes only variables significant at 95% level in Regression I.1, plus the two regional dummies whose coefficients were significantly different from each other.

[d] As we indicate in Appendix I, these sets of variables are measured by indices whose scales are arbitrary. Thus, no units of measurement are shown in parentheses, and no meaning can be attached to the absolute values of the regression coefficients of these variables without bearing in mind how each index was scaled. The "t" values can be interpreted in the usual way as indicators of statistical significance.

ferences in the residuals of Southern cities as between those with larger or smaller concentrations of Negroes.[47] Our predictions were neither markedly better nor markedly worse for cities that used roving deputy registrars or mobile registration units and those that did not, for cities with high and low percentages of college graduates in their populations,[48] and cities with the most and the least stable populations.[49] Finally, cities with unusually small or unusually

[47] *Cf.* Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Social and Economic Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," this REVIEW, 57 (March, 1963), 28–32.

[48] Our source for this variable (actually the percentage of those over 25 years of age who are college graduates) was U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book 1962*, Table 6.

[49] Stability of population was measured by the percentage of persons in a city's population over five years of age that were living in the same house in 1960 as they had in 1955. The source for these figures was U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book 1962*, Table 6.

TABLE 4. ACTUAL AND PREDICTED[a] REGISTRATION RATES, AND RESIDUALS (104 CITIES, 1960)

City	Actual	Predicted	Residual	City	Actual	Predicted	Residual
1. Memphis	84.7	69.3	15.4	53. Portland (Ore.)	85.8	86.9	−1.1
2. Berkeley	90.5	75.2	15.3	54. Salt Lake City	87.0	88.2	−1.2
3. Gary	87.3	72.4	14.9	55. Fort Wayne	81.7	82.9	−1.2
4. Detroit	92.0	78.2	13.8	56. Oklahoma City	80.4	81.7	−1.3
5. South Bend	96.4	83.5	12.9	57. Topeka	81.9	83.3	−1.4
6. Baton Rouge	64.7	52.4	12.3	58. Tampa	68.8	70.2	−1.4
7. Torrance	87.7	76.9	10.8	59. Elizabeth	75.6	77.1	−1.5
8. Camden	81.3	70.8	10.5	60. Dayton	73.6	75.1	−1.5
9. Dallas	65.0	55.1	9.9	61. Rockford	82.0	83.5	−1.5
10. Seattle	92.0	82.5	9.5	62. Syracuse	79.3	81.0	−1.7
11. New Orleans	55.6	46.4	9.2	63. Akron	77.0	78.7	−1.7
12. Corpus Christi	61.8	52.8	9.0	64. Sacramento	77.3	79.1	−1.8
13. Houston	60.0	57.3	8.7	65. Toledo	76.9	78.7	−1.8
14. Scranton	90.4	81.7	8.7	66. Richmond	46.5	48.5	−2.0
15. Lansing	91.9	84.6	7.3	67. Atlanta	33.8	35.8	−2.0
16. New Bedford	82.4	75.6	6.8	68. Norfolk	43.6	45.8	−2.2
17. Tacoma	87.3	80.6	6.7	69. Santa Ana	75.1	77.3	−2.2
18. Des Moines	92.6	86.0	6.6	70. Erie	78.8	81.2	−2.4
19. Jersey City	81.1	74.7	6.4	71. Utica	77.1	79.8	−2.7
20. Buffalo	83.0	76.7	6.3	72. Columbus (O.)	72.4	75.2	−2.8
21. Albany	88.4	82.2	6.2	73. Springfield	77.1	80.1	−3.0
22. Spokane	89.4	83.4	6.0	74. Duluth	85.1	88.8	−3.7
23. Cincinnati	79.4	73.8	5.6	75. Greensboro	66.6	70.4	−3.8
24. Peoria	87.4	81.8	5.6	76. Patterson	68.4	72.2	−3.8
25. Minneapolis	92.5	87.2	5.3	77. Cambridge (Mass.)	73.8	77.8	−4.0
26. Winston-Salem	71.2	65.9	5.3	78. Oakland	71.9	76.0	−4.1
27. Youngstown	81.0	76.0	5.0	79. Louisville	59.0	63.2	−4.2
28. Fresno	81.1	76.8	4.3	80. Little Rock	61.2	65.5	−4.3
29. St. Paul	91.2	86.9	4.3	81. Hartford	70.7	75.0	−4.3
30. Philadelphia	77.6	73.6	4.0	82. Lincoln	79.4	83.7	−4.3
31. Canton	80.9	77.0	3.9	83. Rochester	74.9	79.3	−4.4
32. New Haven	79.2	75.8	3.4	84. Austin	48.3	52.8	−4.5
33. Trenton	75.8	72.4	3.4	85. Bridgeport	70.6	75.6	−5.0
34. Hammond	84.0	80.7	3.3	86. Boston	74.0	79.2	−5.2
35. Chattanooga	70.7	68.1	2.6	87. St. Louis	68.5	74.7	−6.2
36. Birmingham	39.1	36.8	2.3	88. Portsmouth	38.0	44.3	−6.3
37. Waterbury	81.4	79.2	2.2	89. Fort Worth	48.4	54.7	−6.3
38. Kansas City (Kans.)	78.9	76.7	2.2	90. Honolulu	60.0	66.9	−6.9
39. Pasadena	83.2	81.5	1.7	91. Newark	61.4	68.6	−7.2
40. Pittsburgh	81.2	79.6	1.6	92. Omaha	79.8	87.1	−7.3
41. Flint	79.6	78.6	1.0	93. San Antonio	42.6	50.1	−7.5
42. Glendale	84.9	84.2	0.7	94. Nashville	55.9	64.0	−8.1
43. Grand Rapids	83.2	82.9	0.3	95. Jacksonville	54.9	63.5	−8.6
44. Cleveland	71.5	71.6	−0.1	96. St. Petersburg	69.7	79.4	−9.7
45. Baltimore	68.1	68.7	−0.6	97. San Francisco	68.0	78.4	−10.4
46. Tulsa	82.4	83.0	−0.6	98. Newport News	35.0	45.5	−10.5
47. Columbus (Ga.)	32.1	32.7	−0.6	99. Niagara Falls	67.7	78.6	−10.9
48. Worcester	81.0	81.6	−0.6	100. Miami	59.2	71.1	−11.9
49. Los Angeles	77.0	77.7	−0.7	101. New York	65.7	77.7	−12.0
50. San Diego	73.9	74.7	−0.8	102. Allentown	67.7	80.6	−13.0
51. Charlotte	69.9	70.9	−1.0	103. Kansas City (Mo.)	65.8	83.8	−18.0
52. Dearborn	89.3	90.3	−1.0	104. Wichita	62.2	82.7	−20.5

[a] Based on Table 1, Regression I.2.

large concentrations of young voters, males, and non-white residents showed no common tendency, and neither did cities whose populations had an unusually high or low median educational attainment. Thus, it seems that our simplifying assumption of linear relationships between these variables and the rate of registration did not lead to serious error.

III. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

One conclusion to be drawn from our study of registration can be put as follows: Local differences in the turnout for elections are to a large extent related to local differences in rates of registration, and these in turn reflect to a considerable degree local differences in the rules governing, and arrangements for han-

dling, the registering of voters. Some of our other conclusions may be of greater interest to practicing politicans, but this one contributes most to a better understanding of the electoral process.

This conclusion lends support, first of all, to Gosnell's explanation for the difference in the normal rates of turnout of voters in the United States, on the one hand, and in other democracies, on the other. This difference, one that has produced considerable commentary on the civic virtues of Americans relative to those of other peoples, was thought by Gosnell to be due in large measure to differing practices in the registration of voters:

> In the European countries studied, a citizen who is entitled to vote does not, as a rule, have to make any effort to see that his name is on the list of eligible voters. The inconvenience of registering for voting in this country has caused many citizens to become non-voters.[50]

The probable accuracy of this observation is strongly suggested not only by findings that we have already reported but also by a comparison of turnout rates in Canada, France, and Great Britain (all of which have systems of automatic registration) with those in the cities of our sample where more than 90 percent of those of voting age were registered to vote. In 1960 the rate of turnout of registered voters in such cities was, on the average, 78.5 percent. In post-war elections in Canada, France, and Great Britain it has been, again on the average, 74.3, 77.4, and 77.6 percent, respectively.[51]

Secondly, our findings regarding the interrelation of turnout, registration, and registration procedures suggest the solution to a problem discussed by V. O. Key:

> A major question posed by the trend of voting [in U.S. presidential elections] is why the decline in electoral interest since the 1890's. The blunt truth is that nobody knows the answer. A frequent explanation has been that the enfranchisement of women in 1920 brought into the electorate large numbers of persons not in the habit of voting. Yet popular interest began to shrink before the adoption of the women suffrage amendment.[52]

We suspect that a major part of the explanation for the trend of voting in presidential elections lies in the following facts: In the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the turnout of eligible voters was between 75 and 85 percent, voters were not required to register in many parts of the country, and in many places where they were, there were systems of automatic registration. In the period from 1896 to 1924, when the turnout declined almost steadily, state after state enacted registration laws which typically required registration annually and in person of all voters in the nation's large cities; the registration procedures of this era have been described by one student of registration practices as "expensive, cumbersome, and inconvenient to the voter."[53] In the period from 1924 until the present, during which time the turnout has gradually risen, more and more states have been liberalizing their registration laws, particularly as these apply to the larger cities. In short, turnout in presidential elections in the United States may have declined and then risen again, not because of changes in the *interest* of voters in elections, but because of changes in the *interest demanded* of them.

Thirdly, our findings suggest a quite different view of the electorate from that implicit or explicit in many discussions of voting. It is fair to say that the electorate is treated by many students of voting, especially Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and their co-authors, as if it were the product of socio-economic forces. In *The People's Choice* they conclude that " . . . three-quarters of the non-voters stayed away from the polls deliberately because they were thoroughly unconcerned with the election. . . . A long range program of civic education would be needed to draw such people into the orbit of political life. . . . "[54] In *Voting* they

[50] Harold F. Gosnell, *Why Europe Votes*, p. 185. That differences in turnout for elections in Europe and America may be largely a function of differences in systems of registration has also been suggested by Seymour Martin Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 181 *f.n.*, and Philip E. Converse and George Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Spring, 1962), 8–9 *f.n.*

[51] These averages were for six post-war Canadian elections (1945, 1949, 1953, 1957, 1958, 1963), five post-war elections for the French National Assembly (1946, 1951, 1956, 1958, 1962), and six post-war elections in Great Britain (1945, 1950, 1951, 1955, 1959, 1964). The average rate of turnout of registered voters in the cities of our full sample was 81.6 percent, and in Northern cities only it was 84.6 percent.

[52] V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), fifth edition, p. 578.

[53] Joseph P. Harris, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[54] Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Helen Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), p. 47. This

observe that "It is often a mistake to give purely political explanations for non-participation. . . . Non-voting is related to persistent social conditions having little to do with the candidates or the issues of the moment."[55]

While no one could quarrel with the above statement if enough weight were put on the "purely," our study indicates, not only that electorates are much more the product of political forces than many have appreciated, but also that, to a considerable extent, they can be *political artifacts*. Within limits, they can be constructed to a size and composition deemed desirable by those in power. Our matrix of simple correlations (Appendix II), for instance, shows a definite association between restrictive rules and procedures for registration and limited competition between major parties in the states in which the cities of our sample are located. Presumably, it is easier for a party in power to pursue a restrictive policy toward registration if its opposition is weak. Conversely, success in restricting registration presumably indicates some success in influencing the composition of the population of registered voters, which in turn makes it easier for the party in power to stay in power. While the abilities of Southern politicians to construct electorates have long been appreciated, relatively little curiosity has been shown about any similar endeavors on the part of their Northern colleagues. It seems unlikely that the latter, any more than the former, have always acted without design in establishing rules for registration.[56]

Finally, the findings of this study have a bearing on the continuing debate between those who favor and those who oppose efforts to get out the vote. A frequent objection to such efforts is that voters not interested enough to vote are not apt to vote wisely and so should be left alone. This view recalls the statement of a New York voter regarding the adequacy of the facilities for registering in New York City in 1964: "I sure do want to vote against that man [Senator Barry Goldwater], but I don't think I hate him enough to stand on that line all day long."[57] How much interest should a voter have to qualify him for voting? Enough to stand in line all day? For half a day? For two days? We cannot say, but those who think voting should be limited to the "interested" ought to be prepared to do so.

APPENDIX I

Definitions of Variables and Sources of Data

1. *Age:* the number of persons in the age group 20 to 34 divided by the number of persons over 21 years of age. Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1960 Census of Population: Characteristics of the Population.* Table 20.
2. *Education:* median school years completed by persons over 25 years of age. Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book 1962,* Table 6.
3. *Race:* percentage of non-whites in the population. Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book 1962,* Table 6.
4. *Income:* dollars received per year per family unit divided by 100. Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *County and City Data Book 1962,* Table 6.
5. *Sex:* percentage of males in the population over 21 years of age. Source: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1960 Census of Population: Characteristics of the Population,* Table 20.
6. *Length of Residence:* the number of persons over five years of age in the state economic area in which a city is located who resided in another state in 1955, divided by the total number of persons over five years of age in the state economic area in which that city is located. "State economic areas" are as defined in our source for these data: U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *U. S. Census of Population 1960: Selected Area Reports, State Economic Areas,* Table 2.
7. *Offices at Stake:* the number of contests for the offices of President, U. S. Senator, U. S. Representative, Governor, and Mayor in which any one voter might vote. Source: Richard M. Scammon, *ed., America Votes 4* (Pitts-

conclusion is not well supported even by the data adduced as evidence for it. Some 27 percent of the voters who said they had no interest at all in the campaign nonetheless voted. See *Ibid.*, p. 46.

[55] Bernard Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 32.

[56] One of the authors of the present study found, for instance, that there was a very high positive correlation between an index of the convenience of registering in Chicago wards and differences among wards in the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote, a fact which suggests that Mayor Richard J. Daley's organization is alert to the possibilities of manipulating the composition of Chicago's registered voters: See Richard E. Ayres, *Registration 1960: Key to Democratic Victory?* (Princeton University senior thesis, 1964), 34–35.

[57] New York *Times*, September 6, 1964.

burgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962).

8. *Inter-Party Competition:* the difference between 50 and the average percentage of the two-party vote received by Democratic candidates in elections for Governor from 1956 to 1960 inclusive and for President in 1956 and 1960. Source: Richard M. Scammon, *ed.*, *America Votes 4* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1962).
9. *Provisions Regarding Literacy Tests:* values of this variable were assigned as follows: test of literacy lending itself to discriminatory administration, 20; simple and straightforward test of literacy, 80; no test of literacy, 100. Where a "20" was assigned, the test required a registrant to show "understanding" or give a "reasonable interpretation" of sections of the U. S. Constitution or state constitutions or to make application without "aid, suggestions or memorandum"; or a registrant might qualify without showing literacy provided he was of "good character" or owned a stated amount and kind of property. Where an "80" was assigned, registrants were not required to interpret passages from the Constitution, and members of minority groups were not at a disadvantage in qualifying for any exemptions to the requirements of literacy. Source: Constance E. Smith, *Voting and Election Laws* (New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1960), and the election codes of the relevant states.
10. *Closing Date for Registration:* in all cases in which registration (or period in which the poll tax could be paid) closed 100 or fewer days before the election, the value assigned was the number of days before the election at which registration was closed subtracted from 100. In all other cases, the value assigned was zero. Source: Constance E. Smith, *op. cit.*, election codes of relevant states, and answers to questionnaires sent to local boards of elections.
11. *Registration System:* values for this variable were assigned as follows: annual payment of cumulative poll tax required, 10; annual payment of a non-cumulative poll tax required, 25; annual personal registration required (with no requirement for the payment of a poll tax), 34; system of permanent registration, 100. Source: Constance E. Smith, *op. cit.*, election codes of the relevant states, and answers to questionnaires sent to local boards of election.
12. *Times and Places of Registration:* assignment of values for this variable involved calculating an index of convenience for each *kind* of registration place open in 1960 and summing the values of such indices to arrive at a convenience score for the registration facilities of the city as a whole. For example, a value for the index of convenience for precinct registration places alone was arrived at by adding the number of hours that precinct registration places were open in 1960 during working hours to two times the number of hours that they were open during the non-working hours, multiplying this number by the number of precinct registration places, and dividing the whole by the number of persons of voting age. Other kinds of registration places for which we calculated indices of convenience were central (e.g. County Court House or City Hall); branch; ward; hospital, plant, or other institutions; mobile units; and roving deputy registrars. "Non-working" hours were defined as hours before 8 a.m. or after 6 p.m. on week days and all hours on Saturday and Sunday. We also treated all hours during which mobile units were in service, all hours put in by roving deputies, and all hours in hospitals, plants, and other institutions as "non-working hours." Sources: Constance Smith, *op. cit.*, election codes of relevant states, answers to questionnaires sent to local Leagues of Women Voters and local Boards of Elections, and telephone interviews with officials of local Boards of Elections.
13. *Residence Requirements:* the values of this variable were assigned as follows: residence of two years or more required in the state, 20; residence of one year required in the state and of more than three months in the county or city, 56; residence of one year required in the state and of three months or less in the county or city, 60; residence of six months required in the state and of more than thirty days in the county or city, 96; residence of six months required in the state and of thirty days or less in the county or city, 100. Source: Constance E. Smith, *op. cit.*, and the election codes of the relevant states.
14. *Methods of Purging Registration Rolls:* high values of this variable were assigned to cities where it is easy for a voter to keep his name on the registration rolls, low values to cities where it is not. Two steps were involved in assigning values. An initial score was assigned as follows: provision is made for a mandatory general canvass *or* for a mandatory canvass by mail *or* for public agencies to notify boards of elections of deaths and changes of residence *and* a voter's name is removed upon his failure to vote during a period of less than four years, 15; provisions as just stated except that a voter's name is removed upon his failure to vote during a period of four years or more, 25; provision is

made for an optional general canvass *or* for an optional canvass by mail *and/or* for public agencies to notify boards of elections of deaths but not of changes of residence *and* a voter's name is removed upon his failure to vote during a period of less than four years, 45; provisions are as just stated except that a voter's name is removed upon his failure to vote during a period of four years or more, 55; provision is made for an optional general canvass *or* for an optional canvass by mail *and/or* there is no provision for public agencies to notify boards of elections of deaths or changes or residence *and* a voter's name is removed upon his failure to vote during a period of less than four years, 65; provisions are as just stated except that a voter's name is removed upon his failure to vote during a period of four years or more, 75; no provision is made for a canvass, either general or selective, optional or mandatory, *and* there is no provision for public agencies to notify boards of elections of deaths or changes of residence *and* a voter's name is removed upon his failure to vote during a period of less than four years, 90; provisions are as just stated except that a voter's name is removed upon his failure to vote during a period of four years or more *or* there are no provisions of any kind with respect to canvasses, notification of boards of deaths and changes of residence, or removal of names for non-voting, 100.

Scores assigned as follows were then *subtracted* from scores assigned in accordance with the scheme just described: provision is made for removing the names of all non-voters, deceased persons, and those who have changed residence automatically and there is no requirement that notice be given the person whose name is being removed, 15; provisions are as just stated except that boards of elections are required to give notice to persons whose names are being removed for a change of residence *and* such persons must apply in person to prevent the removal of their names, 12; provisions are as just stated except that those alleged to have changed residence may testify to the contrary by mail and so prevent removal of their names, 10; boards of elections are required to give notice to persons whose names are being removed either for an alleged change of residence or for non-voting and such persons must apply in person to prevent removal of their names, 7; provisions as just stated except persons whose names are being removed may prevent such action by applying for reinstatement by mail, 5; provisions as just stated except boards of election are required to give notice twice to persons whose names are being removed, 0.

Source: Constance Smith, *op cit.*, election codes of the relevant states, answers to questionnaires sent to local boards of elections and local Leagues of Women Voters, telephone interviews with officials of local Boards of Elections.

14. *Region—West:* Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona, Washington, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii.
15. *Region—Northeast:* Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania.
16. *Region—Border:* Delaware, Maryland, West Virginia, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma.
17. *Region—South:* Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Louisiana, Texas.
18. *Region—Midwest:* Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, North Dakota, South Dakota.

APPENDIX II. REGRESSION I.1: MATRIX OF SIMPLE CORRELATIONS (104 CITIES, 1960)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)
1. Registration	1.00	−0.46	−0.05	−0.54	0.26	0.57	−0.28	−0.71	0.40	0.56	−0.10	0.66	0.57
2. Age (% 20–34)	−0.46	1.00	0.39	0.34	0.21	−0.11	0.15	0.38	−0.11	−0.32	−0.33	0.13	−0.32
3. Sex (% Male)	−0.05	0.39	1.00	0.05	0.12	0.30	0.23	−0.18	0.11	−0.08	−0.12	0.06	−0.15
4. Race (% Non-white)	−0.54	0.34	0.05	1.00	−0.29	−0.41	0.23	0.39	−0.22	−0.36	−0.22	−0.10	−0.17
5. Education (Median Years Completed)	0.26	0.21	0.12	−0.29	1.00	0.54	0.19	−0.00	0.08	0.02	0.08	0.19	0.01
6. Income	0.57	−0.11	0.30	−0.41	0.54	1.00	−0.17	−0.55	0.30	0.19	0.27	0.02	0.27
7. Length of Residence	−0.28	0.15	0.23	0.23	0.19	−0.17	1.00	0.24	−0.07	−0.24	−0.18	0.03	−0.04
8. Inter-Party Competition	−0.71	0.38	−0.18	0.39	−0.00	−0.55	0.24	1.00	−0.39	−0.39	−0.56	0.28	−0.55
9. Residence Requirements	0.40	−0.11	0.11	−0.22	0.08	0.30	−0.07	−0.39	1.00	0.43	0.28	−0.14	0.23
10. Literacy Tests	0.56	−0.32	−0.08	−0.36	0.02	0.19	−0.24	−0.39	0.43	1.00	0.43	0.07	0.37
11. Closing Date	0.66	−0.33	−0.12	−0.22	0.08	0.27	−0.18	−0.56	0.28	0.43	1.00	−0.31	0.64
12. Times & Places of Registration	−0.10	0.13	0.06	−0.10	0.19	0.02	0.03	0.28	−0.14	0.07	−0.31	1.00	−0.32
13. Registration System	0.57	−0.32	−0.15	−0.17	0.01	0.27	−0.04	−0.55	0.23	0.37	0.64	−0.32	1.00

APPENDIX III. PARTIAL CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS AND BETA-WEIGHTS

Variables	Regression											
	I.1		I.2		II.1		II.2		III.1		III.2	
	p	β	p	β	p	β	p	β	p	β	p	β
Age (% 20–34)	−.24	−.16	−.27	−.17	−.22	−.16	−.11	.07	−.20	−.13	−.24	−.14
Sex (% Male)	−.03	−.02			−.02	−.02			−.06	−.04		
Race (% Non-white)	−.21	−.13	−.24	−.15	−.25	−.19	−.38	−.28	−.23	−.15	−.25	−.16
Education (Median Years Completed)	.22	.17	.38	.22	.12	.11			.10	.08	.24	.17
Income ($100/Yr.)	.15	.12			.17	.17			.11	.10		
Length of Residence (% from out of state)	−.14	−.08			−.14	−.09			−.17	−.10		
Inter-Party Competition	−.30	−.26	−.49	−.36	−.23	−.24	−.52	−.44	−.25	−.25	−.43	−.33
Provisions Regarding Literacy Tests	.22	.14	.32	.19	.14	.11			.25	.16	.36	.22
Closing Date for Registration	.34	.24	.40	.28	.37	.25	.41	.28	.38	.28	.43	.30
Times and Places of Registration	.11	.06			.24	.16	.31	.19	.08	.04		
Registration System	.16	.12							.10	.08		
Residence Requirements	.10	.05			.12	.08			.04	.03		
Purging Methods					.01	.005						
South									−.04	−.05		
West									.07	.06	.12	.08
Northeast									−.16	−.11		
Border									−.21	−.12	−.18	−.09

Notation: p = partial correlation coefficient.
β = Beta-weight.

PARTY, REGION AND THE DIMENSIONS OF CONFLICT IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1949–1954*

GERALD MARWELL
University of Wisconsin

Recent publications indicate a continuing interest among political scientists in both the aggregating of discrete acts of legislative behavior into underlying dimensions and the empirical specification of voting blocs. The latter interest is served by the former, as aggregation often produces sets of dimensions useful for descriptive purposes, as well as aiding other types of analysis. Recent studies include MacRae's work on the House of Representatives using various forms of scaling, Alker's paper on voting patterns in the sixteenth General Assembly of the United Nations using factor analysis, and Grumm's work on the Kansas legislature using another form of factor analysis (Q-technique).[1]

As these papers have described in some detail, the technique of factor analysis is particularly useful in producing empirical dimensions which are unitary, stable, exhaustive and parsimonious.[2] This paper presents three such analyses—one each for the 81st, 82nd and 83rd Congresses—and interprets the results in terms of the effects on the stability of the dimensions through time of changes in the Party and regional composition of the House, as well as other historical events. The analysis demonstrates the remarkable consistency of congressmen in their legislative voting over a seemingly broad range of issues, and the factors provide the basis for describing the underlying themes which separate blocs of congressmen from one another. Although on their face the issue contents of the three congresses are remarkably dissimilar, the basic structure of voting behavior is demonstrated to be equally remarkable for its persistence through time. The sources of this stability thus become more amenable to understanding through comparisons of voting blocs through the congresses.

I. PROCEDURES

Subjects for this research are the members of the United States House of Representatives, and the test items are the bills which came up for roll call votes during the 81st, 82nd and 83rd Congresses. Either because of death, resignation, sickness or apathy several members of each congress voted on only small proportions of the bills considered. Any member who did not vote on more than half the bills was judged to be contributing more error than reliable variance and was dropped from the analysis. This left 420 representatives as the sample for the 81st Congress, 428 for the 82nd, and 430 for the 83rd.

In the 81st Congress the House "gave the nays and yeas" 275 times, in the 82nd, 181 times, and in the 83rd 147 times. All these votes were retained for preliminary correlation analysis with the exception of those meeting one of the following three criteria:

(a) Less than 15 percent of the membership was in opposition to the majority. Such highly skewed items tend to produce unreliable correlations.

(b) Less than 80 percent of the membership voted. Items with high proportions of non-

* The author is particularly indebted to Seymour Yellin, Edgar F. Borgatta, N. J. Demerath III and Robert Alford for their suggestions and assistance. This work was supported in part under a grant from the Ford Foundation through the Committee for Research on Public Affairs, New York University.

[1] D. MacRae, Jr., "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," this REVIEW, 59 (December, 1965), 909–926; H.R. Alker, Jr., "Dimensions of Conflict in the General Assembly," *ibid.*, 58 (September, 1965), 642–657; J. G. Grumm, "A Factor Analysis of Legislative Behavior," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 7 (November, 1963), 336–356. Earlier work in this area includes D. MacRae, Jr., *Dimensions of Congressional Voting* (Berkeley, Calif.: The University of California Press, 1958); C. D. Farris, "A Scale Analysis of Ideological Factors in Congressional Voting," in J.C.Wahlke and H. Eulau (Eds.), *Legislative Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill: The Free Press, 1959), 399–413; and C. W. Harris, "A Factor Analysis of Selected Senate Roll-Call Votes, 80th Congress," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, (1948), 582–591.

[2] For a more complete discussion and critique of the existing literature see G. Marwell, *Dimensions of Legislative Cleavage* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Sociology, New York University, 1962). This work also contains more complete descriptions of all the procedures used in this paper and of the bills which comprise the various factors.

voters contribute substantial error variance. In addition, Belknap presents a fairly convincing argument for high-absentee votes being the least important roll calls.[3]

(c) Correlation with party of .9 or higher. This criterion was used partially for practical reasons. The maximum number of items which the computer program used could treat was 150. In the 81st Congress more than this number of roll calls remained after exclusions based on the other two criteria. It was anticipated, from the writings of MacRae and others, that a party-related factor would perhaps dominate the domain. It seemed preferable to have the first factor oriented more toward content than party allegiance, and to enhance the chances of shifting the location of the first factor away from party. Results of the three factor analyses show that party still defines the first factor despite the exclusion of these items.

Using these criteria, 150 votes were retained for analysis in the 81st Congress, 114 in the 82nd, and 92 in the 83rd.

Before entering the factor analysis two further criteria for exclusion were used. Examination of the correlation matrix revealed that there were substantial clusters of items defined exclusively by a series of roll calls with extremely high correlations and a single bill as their focus. Thus there would be a vote on recommitting the bill to committee, another on passing the bill, a third, fourth and fifth on debilitating amendments to the bill, a sixth on accepting the report of the conference with the Senate, etc. Decisions on some of these, e.g., the amendments, might relate to issues containing new content. On the other hand, several of these roll calls were mere duplications. If three such repetitious votes do not correlate very highly with one of the major common factors they will produce their own residual factor. Varimax, the rotational procedure used in the analysis, tends to emphasize these smaller factors, pulling their variance out of the more general factor. For this reason the preliminary correlation matrices were examined and most repetitive items deleted.

Finally, roll calls having no correlations greater than .5 with any other items were also discarded. These items could have little effect on the factor structures and, in comparison with other items, would tend to have very small loadings on the factors. By these procedures the number of items retained for analysis was reduced to 70 for the 81st and 82nd Congresses, and 68 for the 83rd.

[3] G. M. Belknap, "Scaling Legislative Behavior," Wahlke and Eulau, *op. cit.*, 388–398.

The 81st, 82nd and 83rd Congresses were selected for analysis because they were probably as different from one another in structure, substance and circumstance as any three consecutive congresses in recent history. Where the 81st and 82nd were organized by the Democrats and faced a Democratic President the 83rd faced a Republican President and was organized by the Republicans. The 82nd Congress took place during the Korean War, while the 81st just saw its beginning and the 83rd its end. Although McCarthy began his headline-making during the 81st Congress, McCarthyism became an issue only in the 82nd, and reached a climax during the 83rd. Where civil rights legislation was a primary concern of the 81st Congress, the 82nd and 83rd had little formal interest in the issue. On the other hand the McCarran-Walter immigration issue, hotly debated, appears only in the 82nd Congress, and such business-oriented issues as tax relief for stockholders and the private development of atomic-energy projects appear only in the 83rd. Thus, if similar structures emerge from analyses of the three congresses they do so in the face of many variables seemingly operating to produce difference.

Consecutive congresses were selected so that the relationships between factor structures could be empirically described. Overlapping memberships allow comparison of the positions of given legislators on dimensions in one congress with their positions on dimensions in the other congresses. In addition, it should be noted that the selection of consecutive congresses maximizes the possibility of rejecting the notion of stability of structure through time. If such stability does not obtain for congresses close in time it is improbable that congresses further spaced would produce similar structures.

The roll-call votes of each congress were submitted to a principal components analysis, using squared multiple correlation coefficients for communality estimation. A "blind"[4] Vari-

[4] In recent factor-analytic works by political scientists the merits of oblique rather than orthogonal factors have been strongly advanced: cf. MacRae, "A Method of Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," *op. cit.*; and H. R. Alker, Jr. and B. M. Russett, *World Politics in the General Assembly* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). This is not the place for extended discussion of the merits of the two approaches, but it may be noted that differences between results of orthogonal and oblique rotations tend to be important where there are a large number of factors retained for rotation, and

max rotational procedure was used to locate orthogonal simple structure.

II. RESULTS

In general the three factor structures seem easily interpretable. They each produce three major factors which together account for a substantial proportion of the variance of the data (about 50 percent) and most of the predictable variance (over 75 percent).[5] The common thread connecting the items defining each factor is usually clear, but the huge number of these items makes interpretation somewhat risky. Whereas an item loaded .6 in most studies would constitute a strong marker variable, such items are often dwarfed in these analyses by numerous items loaded .8 and .7. Nevertheless, roll calls loaded .6 or .5 must be taken into consideration when interpreting the factors.

The 81st Congress. The factors elicited from the analysis of the 81st Congress present, in general, a clear picture of the major divisions of opinion in that congress. Four basic factors account for over 50 percent of the total variance of the items in the matrix, and over 80 percent of the predictable variance.[6] Loadings of all the items on all factors are reported in Table 1. Unfortunately, an adequate description of the roll calls appearing in the analysis would take several pages to present. Thus, the page and identifying number of each bill in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac[7] is given so that the reader may check any particular set of items. *Marker* variables for each factor, those roll calls whose particularly high loadings indicate that they *best* estimate the "true" meaning of the factor, are denoted by an asterisk.

Forty-three roll calls, over 60 percent of the items in the matrix, have loadings of .4 or more on the first factor. In addition, the 18 roll calls excluded from the analysis because of their high correlation with party would have loaded highly. Thus, the first factor approaches the status of a "general" factor, one which accounts for a pre-eminent amount of the data's variance; a general explanatory variable. It accounts for 44 percent of the predictable variance and almost 30 percent of the total variance of the data.

Perusal of the roll calls defining this factor indicates a common thread of government interference in the society, particularly in the economy, leading to the factor being labelled "Active Role of Government in Society." With the crucial exception of the vote on the Taft-Hartley bill (54683), congressmen on one side of the issues of the factor would be in favor of giving the government, particularly the executive branch, greater power and flexibility, and for enlarging its functions. As will be seen later, these congressmen generally would be Democrats, although the relationship is by no means perfect.

The factor might also be considered a "Fair Deal" dimension. Many of the relevant items may be found specifically mentioned in President Truman's program as presented in his State of the Union message. In general, roll calls on the factor seem to represent a liberal

---

where the factors are poorly defined. Since the analysis below essentially involves the rotation of only three very well defined factors, and since a dominant-cluster technique for the generation of factor scores is used, results from the two approaches should be very similar. A look at figures 1–3 and the accompanying discussion should illustrate this. Note also that many analysts argue the theoretical advantages of orthogonal rotations, especially for domains with nearly general first factors. For a detailed discussion of factor analysis, see H. H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960).

[5] The "Total Variance" of the data is equal to the number of items, since factor analysis conventionally standardizes each item to unit variance. Thus, for the seventy-item matrices the figure is seventy, and "proportion of total variance" indicates the amount of variance accounted for by the factor, divided by seventy. "Predictable Variance," sometimes called "common variance," is the total amount of variance shared by the items of the matrix, or the sum of the communalities of the items in the matrix. Any item's communality is the amount of its variance which is common to other items in the matrix, and which may thus be predicted from these other items.

[6] Several additional factors were also extracted in this and the following two factor analyses, but are of no interest here. Most had just one item loaded above .4, precluding interpretation of *common* characteristics. The rest had two clearly *duplicative* items defining the content, and no other substantive content.

[7] *Congressional Quarterly Almanac*, Vols. V–X (Washington, D.C.; Congressional Quarterly News Features, 1949–54). The five-digit number should be interpreted as follows: the first digit gives the volume number, with 0 standing for volume ten; the next three digits give the page number; the last digit gives the number on the page given to the bill. More complete descriptions of the contents of relevant bills may be found by looking in the Almanac.

Roll Call		Factor Loading			
		I	II	III	IV
51783	Repeal oleo tax, color restrictions	−24	−14	39	18
51785	Expand rural telephone service	−38	−18	01	−55*
51786	Agricultural Act: Continue past rigid supports (A)	79	−25	−07	03
52526	Red Run-Clinton River project funds: Army Civil Functions Ap. (A)	62	−12	−15	03
52544	Limit extension of temporary ap. to Sept., 1949 (A)	70	−20	−07	05
52561	No funds for a National Capitol Sesquicentennial (RCI)	73	06	−11	09
53283	Loyalty oath for employees; Housing Act (A)	69	−43	00	−02
53285	National Housing Act: Public Housing, slum clearance, etc.	−72	22	19	07
53288	Extend, liberalize Social Security (LD)	−85*	−07	19	−08
54244	Continue Presidential export controls to 7/51	−66	−16	30	−19
54247	ECA: $5.4 bil. for foreign aid	−15	09	67*	−09
54264	Less funds for West Europe: Mutual Defense (A)	71	−04	−30	−04
54267	Mutual Defense Assistance Act (C)	−37	−03	61*	03
54683	Kill attempt to water down Taft-Hartley (R)	−82*	24	04	−05
54684	Increase, extend minimum wage; substitute weaker bill for strong (LD)	−75	−04	21	−18
55504	Kill $90 per month veterans pension bill (R)	−19	08	21	02
56742	Reduce power of Rules Committee (LD)	−69	11	11	−09
56747	2% D. C. Sales tax	33	−32	02	−01
56748	Extend D.C. rent control, recontrol some housing	−45	19	21	−03
56761	D.C. Revenue Act: sales tax, other revenue	45	−40	−03	−07
56762	No segregation in Women's Reserve of Coast Guard (A)	−02	81*	00	−02
56768	For Antipoll tax on procedural point (LD)	01	71	−05	10
56782	Kill Antipoll tax by adjourning	08	−74	−05	−04
56785	Antipoll tax	−03	84*	06	−03
58201	Allow states, localities to decontrol rents (A)	81	−20	−10	−02
58203	Reduce rent control extension from 15 to 3 months (RI)	76	−02	−20	04
58204	Extend rent controls 15 months	−54	27	22	08
58208	Exempt independent gas producers from FPC jurisdiction (LD)	43	−51	−02	−07
58200	Exempt independent gas producers from FPC jurisdiction	38	−66	−04	−05
58223	No loosening, laws on price discrimination, fixing (basing pts) (RCI)	−64	00	05	−05
61001	Kill increasing cotton, peanut acreage allotments (R)	43	37	−09	50*
61002	Kill increasing cotton, peanut acreage allotments (RC)	23	36	04	61*
61004	Kill long-range cotton, peanut acreage allotment formula (R)	50	33	−08	37
61523	Reduce general appropriations $600 mil. (A)	67	−28	−04	−03
61524	Prohibit filling more than 10% civil service vacancies (A)	84*	−06	−10	04
61527	Guarantors not pay if Mex. laborers return illegally to Mex. (A)	16	−54	−01	−38
61528	Not automatically end ECA, countries trading with Communists (LD)	−80	−16	26	−09
61961	Kill establishing National Science Foundation (R)	61	−18	−24	09
61965	Funds to promote rural library serivces	−67	00	11	−14
61966	Housing Act: no loans for cooperative housing projects (A)	76	−36	01	−04
61981	Reduce Fed. power over states, admin. of Social Security (LD, RC)	76	−34	01	05
62602	$60 mil. for Korean ECA aid	−63	13	45	05
62604	Aid for Korea and Formosa	−50	12	61*	03
62606	Kill Point 4, aid to underdeveloped countries, in ECA (RI)	66	−03	−48	−01
62607	Foreign Economic Assistance Act; ECA, Korean aid, Point 4, etc.	−32	05	76*	02
62622	Funds for emergency relief to Yugoslavia	−40	−08	45	−09
62626	Allow Export-Import Bank to guarantee foreign investments	−76	−10	36	−09
62903	Allow union shop, dues check-off, on railways	−16	42	04	08
63563	Nullify some Negro civil service appointments with new exams (A)	25	−51	−12	−27
65442	Increase power of Rules Committee (A)	50	−56	−05	−01
65461	Kill postal rate increase (R)	56	25	−22	−02
65465	No cuts in other services when restore some postal deliveries (A)	−18	−60	09	−19
65467	Restore some postal delivery services	−15	50	−02	16
65482	Delay FEPC by parliamentary maneuver	−11	62	01	06
65483	Delay FEPC by adjourning	−01	−84*	11	−17
65486	Delay FEPC by adjourning	10	−81	−08	−11
65488	Delay FEPC by adjourning	−05	−90*	03	−05
65507	Limit FEPC to investigation and recommendation (A)	39	−68	−09	−21
65521	FEPC (without compulsory powers)	09	82*	10	−01
65526	Statehood for Hawaii	−02	49	−02	−11
65564	Cite E. A. Rumley; lobbyist for conservative group, for contempt	−84*	08	15	−06
65588	Kill bill for two new Asst. Secretaries, Agriculture Dept. (R)	76	12	−13	28
65607	No new Dept. of Health, Education and Security	59	−37	−06	−06
67147	Subsidize exploration, conservation of strategic minerals	−31	09	−02	−16
67148	Exempt independent gas producers from FPC jurisdiction (C)	27	−63	01	03
67162	Loosen laws, price discrimination, fixing (basing pts)	56	−04	−02	14
67165	Extend rent control to 1/51	−68	25	15	05
67168	Extend rent control to 4/51	−68	09	24	03
67203	Confine credit controls to consumer, real estate credit (A)	86*	−02	−16	03
67204	No controls for commodity speculation	67	−42	−06	−06
	Percent of Predictable Variance	44%	24%	8%	4%
	Percent of Total Variance	30%	16%	5%	3%

*=Marker items for the factor; A=Amendment; RCI=Recommit to Conference with instructions; LD=Limit debate; RI=Recommit to Committee with instructions; RC=Recommit to Conference; R=Recommit to Committtee; C=Conference report.

thrust. They are either on bills to expand government power and activity or on amendments and motions designed to debilitate or kill such bills. This is not just a "government spending" dimension; several of the highest loaded items (e.g., 65564, 54683) would not have cost the government anything. Rather, the whole range of the conservative-liberal debate, with the exception of civil rights, seems to contribute to the factor.

The second factor emerging from this analysis is also very strong, accounting for 24 percent of the predictable variance and 16 percent of the total variance. A large number of roll calls were eliminated from the analysis because they duplicated the highest loaded items on this factor. Roll calls were faced every step of the parliamentary way on almost every civil rights bill. Despite this, almost one-third of the items retained for analysis are loaded .4 or higher on this factor. The roll calls defining the factor most clearly are easily interpretable as to common meaning. The nine highest loaded items concern Negro civil rights. Except for one roll call on segregation in the Women's Reserve of the Coast Guard, these votes deal with either the attempt to establish a Fair Employment Practices Commission, or a constitutional amendment to abolish the Poll Tax.

It would be quite simple to name this factor "Civil Rights," if we were to ignore the quite substantial loadings of several other roll calls. As previously noted, items related to a factor at a .6 level, even when there are "better" items, should be considered seriously in interpretation. Issues other than civil rights which are involved in this factor include the controversy over federal regulation of natural gas producers, statehood for Hawaii, restrictions on Mexican farm laborers, a variety of farm issues, curbs on the power of the Rules Committee, and a bill to prevent payment of salaries to employees refusing to sign an anti-Communist affidavit. If we interpret the bill concerning the Rules Committee as being highly involved with the civil rights issue, all of the roll calls loaded on this factor have a thread of special restriction or special privilege for groups within the society. They have a ring of particularism. The factor is, therefore, labelled "Protection of Private or Local Interests." There is more than a strong suspicion that the dimension is associated with regional location and, in general, congressmen on one side of the factor are for giving special treatment, while those on the other side are for greater "universalism."

There is a considerable decrease in relative importance, as judged by the amount of variance explained, as we move from the second to the third factor. Nevertheless, this third factor does account for close to 8 percent of the predictable variance and more than 5 percent of the total variance. The four items which dominate the factor are all concerned with some form of foreign aid. Thus, the title "Foreign Aid" is considered more appropriate than "foreign policy" which would imply issues such as international trade which are not related highly to this factor. For example, roll call 54244, involving export controls, correlates only .30 with this factor, but has a loading of .66 on the "Active Role" Factor. Intriguingly, one roll call ostensibly involving foreign aid displays a similar pattern. This is roll call 54264, which loads .30 on Factor III and .70 on the "Active Role" Factor. The vote was supposedly for authorizing aid for western Europe in Mutual Defense Assistance. It is probable that some other issues became involved in this particular discussion which colored the effect that passage of this amendment would eventually have had. Perusal of Table 1 reveals that no other obvious issue was related to this factor, so that interpretation is clear at a face level.

Factor IV is the last factor in this analysis which has two or more clearly non-duplicative items loaded .4 or higher. Thus, despite the factor's accounting for only 3 percent of the predictable variance and 2.5 percent of the total variance, it is a possibly significant dimension. In fact, its apparent "poor" definition is poor primarily in relation to the three previous factors. In analysis of psychological and other data a factor with three items loaded .5 or higher is often considered an important dimension. Two of the three items involve peanut and cotton acreage allotments. The third concerns a bill to help expand rural telephone service. The factor has been tentatively labelled "Rural Problems." This again is an easy and fairly clear factor to comprehend. It is somewhat interesting that roll call 51783, concerning oleo taxes, loads only .18, and that the farm program advanced by President Truman, vote 51786, loads more heavily on the "Active Role" than the "Rural Problems" factor. One roll call on Mexican farm laborers (61527) and a roll call involving both peanut and cotton acreage allotment, and, probably in a more central way, appropriations for general soil conservation (61004), had significant, if comparatively small, loadings of .37 on the "Rural Problems" dimension.

Although this fourth factor does have some importance it does not arise again in either the 82nd or 83rd Congress, and involves only a few

items as the principal explanatory factor. Thus, in the discussions which follow it will not be considered further, as attention is concentrated on the three major factors which define the continuing basic structure of cleavage.

82nd Congress. Analysis of the 82nd Congress results in a structure roughly similar to the corresponding findings for the 81st Congress. The major difference, at first glance, is the absence of the fourth common factor. No factor beyond the third accounts for as much as 3 percent of the predictable, and 2 percent of the total variance. The fourth factor in the preceding analysis, however, was comparatively weak, and it is the similarity of the three dominant factors in each analysis which is striking. In the 82nd Congress, these three factors together account for 79 percent of the predictable, and 54 percent of the total variance, figures remarkably close to the results for the 81st Congress. Loadings of all the items on all the factors are given in Table 2.

The first factor is slightly weaker than before, accounting for just over one-third of the predictable, and 23 percent of the total variance. Thirty-four items, one less than half of those retained for analysis, loaded .4 or higher. In addition, seven roll calls correlating .9 or higher with party, and 26 roll calls duplicating items loaded high on this factor would have been strongly related. In short, this factor, which also correlates highly with party, resembles the "Active Role" factor of the 81st Congress analysis in many ways.

Scanning Table 2 reveals a difference in content emphasis as well as a thematic similarity between these two dimensions. In the 82nd Congress, Factor I becomes somewhat more directly involved with the costs of bureaucracy. In addition, a new element of restricting executive discretion in foreign dealings is introduced at a high level. The defense budget appears on this factor, and public works projects seem to be more plentiful as important items. Bills for public housing construction emerge for the first time, but at a lower level of relationship. Almost all of these bills concern governmental costs or expenditures in some fashion, but the common thread of governmental activity seems to remain. The votes for cutting the civil service, for example, may be understood as attempts to debilitate the federal executive's potential for action, as well as attempts to cut costs. Thus the title, "Active Role of Government in Society," is retained. Again, it seems that Republicans are against governmental activity. It would be interesting, however, to know how the votes would have distributed, at least on the issue of Presidential discretion, with a Republican President. Analysis of the 83rd Congress indicates that the results might have been somewhat different.

Factor II is almost as large as Factor I, accounting for 31 percent of the predictable variance, and 21 percent of the total variance in the matrix. Thirty-four items, one less than half the items in the matrix, load .4 or higher on the factor. This is in decided contrast to the corresponding factor in the 81st Congress. Also in contrast is the decline of Negro civil rights as the definitive element for the factor. Only one item, involving the construction of a segregated hospital for Negroes in Virginia, 73105, has a civil rights cast, and it loads only .59. In fact, there seems to be a definite shift in the emphasis of the factor. A bill dealing with Mexican laborers loads .7, (71044) whereas a bill on a similar subject previously loaded .5 (61527). There is a similar shift for bills dealing with the power of the Rules Committee. Nevertheless, this factor, once again, seems to be composed basically of issues of special restriction or favor. The highest loaded items try to: (a) recover special consideration for a small group of entrepreneurs, (b) discriminate aginst specific groups in immigration possibilities, (c) question the purposes of private foundations, (d) ask the president to stop a *particular* strike by taking action against a *particular* union, and (e) distribute oil resources to states rather than keep them under federal control, with the former course being vigorously supported by private oil companies. Thus, the title "Protection of Private or Local Interests" is retained.

On the other hand, several bills load heavily on this factor which are relative surprises. Public housing might be considered to have an element of "help for the downtrodden" or competition with private home builders, as well as a public vs. private aspect, and thus fit the previous interpretation. The bills on wage and price stabilization, however, have a predominantly universalistic ring. Despite these questionable items, congressmen on one side of the factor are generally in favor of special treatment, while the remainder are against.

Although not to the same extent as the "Local" factor, Factor III shifts in obvious content between the 81st and 82nd Congresses. While it retains much of its previous meaning, an entirely new aspect becomes dominant. The factor is considerably stronger this time, accounting for over 14 percent of the predictable variance and almost 10 percent of the total variance. Both of these figures are almost double their counterparts from the 81st Congress. In

TABLE 2. ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS: 82ND CONGRESS

Roll Call		Factor Loading		
		I	II	III
71041	Kill increasing peanut acreage allotments (R)	58	−28	−13
71043	Kill insuring loans, facilities to market perishable goods (R)	69	12	−15
71044	Authorize agreement with Mexico on importing farm labor	12	74*	−02
71663	No SW Power Admin. projects in Western Missouri (A)	69	44	−13
71666	Cut funds for Bureau of Reclamation (A)	62	39	−06
71667	No funds, public power projects where gov't. has private contracts (A)	66	39	−10
71681	Fill no more than 25% of vacancies, Interior Dept. (RI)	84*	26	−20
71682	Cut funds, Voice of America (A)	54	28	−37
71683	Limit U.S. to paying 1/3 budget of any internat'l.org. (A)	−58	−28	35
71701	Cut funds for Commodity Credit Corp. (A)	82*	03	−14
71702	Fill no more than 25% of vacancies, Agriculture Dept. (A)	79*	29	−19
71721	Allow law changes (housing cuts) in appropriation bill	50	53	−21
71722	Cut new public housing from 50 to 5 thousand units (A)	55	52	−17
71723	Cut Pres. emergency fund from $12.5 to one mil. (A)	77*	26	−17
71725	Cut new public housing from 50 to 5 thousand units (RCI)	44	48	−37
72003	Gov't cannot buy housing sites near defense installations (A)	73	36	−29
72005	Unemployment insurance, Federal employees (rules suspension)	−13	−49	25
72601	Have Tariff Comm. set "peril points" to protect industry (A)	76	20	−21
72603	Loan India funds to buy U.S. wheat	−12	−37	42
72622	Cut funds for economic aid; Mutual Security Act (R)	63	33	−28
72623	Mutual Security Act: funds for economic, military aid	−24	−27	63*
72625	Increase lending authority, life of Export-Import Bank	−21	00	50
73102	Kill extending draft, lowering age to 18 1/2 (R)	28	18	−44
73103	Extend draft, lower age	−13	−06	34
73105	Kill new Negro veterans hospital in Virginia	32	−59	−05
73123	Cong. Com. approval needed to transfer large defense properties	48	56	−04
74003	Restore powers of Rules Com. cut in 81st Cong.	32	73*	−17
74025	Extend D.C. rent control one year (C)	−36	−36	59
75361	Continue wage, rent, import, price controls, one month (LD)	−28	−21	63*
75362	Ban rollbacks, new price ceilings during controls extension (A)	12	78*	−21
75363	Extend import controls, fats, peanuts, dairy, rice, 2 yrs. (A)	27	73	−16
75364	Establish agency to decide state, local construction needs (A)	68	20	−31
75365	No controls, amount of livestock handled by any one processor (A)	27	73	−23
75366	No authority to Pres. to acquire or build new plants, etc. (A)	78	35	−21
75368	No beef price rollback to less than 90% of May prices (A)	−04	74*	−29
75381	No ceilings, beef products not showing "reasonable profit" (A)	37	46	−40
75382	Freeze all prices, wages, salaries, but agricul. goods below parity (A)	31	55	−34
75383	Ceiling formula, minimum of 85% high average previous profit (A)	13	62	−35
75384	No ceilings, stategic minerals, metals, under certain conditions (A)	56	26	−37
75385	No use of licensing authority to enforce price controls (A)	43	63	00
75386	No authority to control commodity speculation (A)	33	73	−21
75388	Defense Production Act: price, rent, wage, other controls	−21	−24	77*
75403	Individual, corporate, excise tax increase & revision	−66	−14	35
75404	Individual, corporate, excise tax increase & revision (RC)	−39	23	31
75408	Tidelands oil resources to states	37	65	−05
81281	Cut Defense Dept. funds for year, $207 mil. (A)	65	31	−08
81282	Limit debate on funds for Independent Offices (LD)	25	68	−17
81284	Cut T.V.A. funds $14 mil. (A)	67	27	−15
81285	Cut new public housing; reduce personnel; add VA hospital funds (RC)	53	50	−30
81302	Cut Bureau of Mines conservation funds (A)	59	40	−03
81305	Cut Coast Guard funds $1.6 mil. (A)	49	39	−20
81306	Cut European military aid $146 mil. (A)	60	29	−32
81321	Cut Immigration & Naturalization Service funds $3 mil. (A)	36	59	−12
81501	Increase, extend Social Security benefits	−24	−43	34
81781	Kill forcing disclosure, agreements between Pres. & Great Britain	−80*	16	21
81801	Cut European economic aid $615 mil. (A)	59	45	−19
81802	Cut Asian technical, economic, military aid $111 mil. (A)	39	55	−23
81803	Mutual Security Act: economic, military, technical aid	−21	−30	60*
81805	McCarren-Walter immigration quota system	29	74*	−10
82261	High school & summer military training programs (A)	40	17	−42
82262	Kill Universal Military Training; all 18 yr. olds (R)	36	06	−24
82965	Create Com. to investigate tax-exempt foundations	09	68	−04
82966	Funds for Com. to investigate tax-exempt foundations	10	60	−06
83005	Continue Pres. emergency war powers to 7/53	−25	−15	53
83761	No price ceiling, items sold below ceiling 3 mos. or not rationed (A)	39	61	−32
83762	Guarantee customary mark-up to wholesalers & retailers (A)	45	60	−24
83763	Abolish Wage Stabilization Board; new Com. may recommend only (A)	47	69	−11
83764	Request Pres. invoke Taft-Hartley in steel strike (A)	32	67	−09
83765	End price & wage controls in one month (A)	24	45	−56
83767	Defense Production Act: Extend controls, allocations one year	−10	03	65*
	Percent of Predictable Variance	34%	31%	15%
	Percent of Total Variance	23%	21%	10%

addition, the number of items loading .4 or higher more than doubles to 13.

The three highest loaded items on Factor III are votes to impose or extend the general Defense Production Act. This is the overall program for mobilization of resources in the Korean war effort. It includes price, wage, and rent controls as essential factors. It is to be particularly noted that only the program *as a whole* is relevant to this factor. Amendments, or changes in *aspects* of the program load pri marily on the preceding two factors.

Foreign aid, primarily in the form of "Mutual Security" aid continues to load high on this factor. Another aspect of foreign aid enters at a lower level with the inclusion of loans to India. Except for a bill on the Export-Import Bank, the rest of the roll calls related to this factor have a decidedly war-orientated cast. The draft and Universal Military Training, as well as the War Power Act, all have this quality. Presence of D. C. rent control on the factor is probably related to the "control" aspects of the Defense Production Act. In general, this war orientation pervades the factor and a title other than "Foreign Aid" seems appropriate. The provisional title chosen is "Foreign Involvement." This is meant to be understood in terms of reactions to problems generated by involvement in foreign affairs.

83rd Congress. The dimensional structure of voting in the 83rd Congress seems, on the surface, to be very similar to the structures from the previous analyses. The same three-factor solution emerges, with each factor having about the same weight as its counterparts. These three factors account for 70 percent of the predictable, and more than 50 percent of the total variance, figures again roughly comparable to those from the previous analyses. Loadings of all the items on all the factors are given in Table 3.

As in the 81st Congress, the first factor is pre-eminent, accounting for 45 percent of the predictable variance and 30 percent of the total variance. Some two-thirds of the 68 retained items load .4 or higher, another indication of the importance of the factor. Only two items were excluded from the analysis because of their high correlation with party, however, and only seven items were excluded because they duplicated items loaded high on this factor. This might be one reason for the large number of relevant items as compared to previous analyses.

Again, there seems to be a shift in the content of the defining items. There is a new set of roll calls loaded .8 on the first factor, which seem to pivot on attempts by business interests to gain concessions in developing atomic energy. Coupled with the roll calls on taxing dividend income and the rest of the 11 highest loaded items, the "government intervention" concept, in a negative sense, continues to have some weight. There are, however, other, more surprising, roll calls. Hawaii statehood, the question of summary discharge for federal employees, construction of veterans hospitals, postal rates and the pay structure for postal employees, and a bill on labelling foreign trout are all involved with what has been previously called "particularistic" questions. They seem to be the type of bills which have previously loaded heavily along Factor II, the "Protection of Private or Local Interests" dimension. In fact, even the "atomic energy" issue, which included the famous Dixon-Yates controversy, could have been expected to relate strongly to Factor II. Furthermore, some of these bills seem to be related to the factor in the "wrong" way. Some items which appear to be "conservative" or anti-activity fall in the same direction as items which appear to be "pro-activity." A vote *for* 04441, for example, seems to be a vote against civil rights. In actuality, however, it is a vote for placing a federal court permit between the federal investigator and the person whose wire is to be tapped. The unamended bill had no such provision. The Democrats were against postal pay rates in 04481, whereas they are usually *for* greater bureaucracy strength. Investigation reveals that they were against the attached postal rate increase, considering it regressive taxation, and intended to vote *for* pay raises if they were introduced as a separate motion or bill. However, in the 81st Congress, Democrats voted *for* postal rate increases. Voting against a National Advisory Committee on Education is another slight reversal of form for the Democrats, as support is a similar reversal for the Republicans. The votes on the national debt limit are also unexpected. In light of all these considerations, the title "Active Role of Government in Society" seems somewhat suspect. However, primarily because of the nature of the defining items, this title is retained. The real difference seems to be that the bills have more of a conservative thrust than before. There are definite moves against "big government" and attempts to reduce government intervention. The atomic energy development items are the clearest case, but 02476 and 94618 also have this characteristic. Any tax reduction scheme also fits under this interpretation.

Factor II is weak compared to its counterparts in the two previous analyses. It accounts for only 18 percent of the predictable variance

TABLE 3. ROTATED FACTOR LOADINGS: 83RD CONGRESS

Roll Call		Factor Loading		
		I	II	III
91261	Extend allowing Mex. agricultural workers, 3 years	−12	−74*	−13
91781	Cut soil conservation funds $55 mil. (A)	−56	16	07
91784	Add $2.2 mil., Missouri River Bank project (RCI)	81	24	09
91796	Add $6 mil. aid to school districts with federal projects (A)	60	23	15
91797	Add $25 mil. for hospital construction (RI)	67	33	18
91801	35,000 new public housing units (RI)	45	51	32
91803	Let V.A. decide if certain veterans get free hospital care (RI)	70	26	11
91821	Add $8 mil., Southwest, Bonneville Power Admin. (RI)	82	27	10
91822	Mutual Security Ap.: military, economic, technical aid	16	07	87*
91823	Cut European military assistance $212 mil. (RCI)	08	−36	−64
91824	Mutual Security: military, economic, technical aid (C)	−07	28	75*
91825	No summary discharge of personnel, State & other Depts. (A)	77	17	16
91838	$12.5 mil. for airports (A)	65	23	15
91841	Add $10 mil., V.A. medical, hospital, domiciliary (RCI)	76	30	13
91854	$10 mil., rural telephone loans	74	01	−09
91855	Add $20 mil., Voice of America; no personnel cuts (RI)	54	37	30
92061	Maximum FHA loan interest of 6% on unpaid balance (RI)	47	69	09
92062	Use Unemployment Comp. reserve only to pay compensation (RI)	38	75*	15
92521	Do not add one member to Tariff Com. (RI)	87*	08	10
92523	Petroleum products import quotas; sliding tariff, lead, zinc	20	−03	−26
92536	Mutual Security Act: $5 bil. to continue aid one year	19	05	84*
92537	Mutual Security Act: $5.2 bil. to continue aid one year (C)	20	−01	75
92543	Special quota immigration visas; refugees, expellees, others	−27	50	40
92544	Kill Pres. use of gov't. food for foreign emergencies (R)	38	−33	−28
92545	1 mil. tons wheat for Pakistan	−06	12	48
93823	Early creation of Health, Education & Welfare Dept.	−40	−07	09
93824	Speed consideration of Agricul. Dept. reorganization	73	10	02
93835	Disapprove reorganization of Defense Dept.	48	23	03
93841	Kill Hawaii statehood (R)	73	06	00
93842	Statehood for Hawaii	−36	37	11
93844	Create Com. to study tax-exempt foundations	−27	−48	−32
94582	Tidelands oil resources to states	−36	−70*	−15
94584	Federal control, Tidelands beyond "historic state boundaries"	−32	−68*	−08
94585	Kill selling government-owned rubber-plants	29	65	13
94602	Allow new private Niagara River power facilities	−50	−35	18
94603	Increase base period for calculating excess profits, new companies (RI)	47	−15	−22
94604	Extend excess profits tax to 1/54	00	11	30
94605	Increase national debt limit only until 1/55 (RI)	82	11	03
94616	Increase national debt limit $15 bil.	−43	−11	30
94617	Kill ending Reconstruction Finance Corp. before 7/54 (RI)	85*	24	15
94618	Kill ending annual stockholder listing, national banks (R)	54	44	12
01411	Flexible, lower parity; wheat, cotton, other farm products (A)	−69	09	08
01414	Kill Gov't. recruiting Mex. farm labor (R)	30	62*	16
01843	No funds, administer sales of FNMA mortgages below par (RI)	83*	26	08
01854	Mutual Security Ap: $5.2 bil. to continue aid one year	14	19	80*
01857	Add $17 mil. subsidy to air carriers (A)	−26	−41	−03
02441	35,000 new public housing per year, 1955–58 (RI)	40	45	36
02463	Establish National Advisory Com. on Education	−73	−08	05
02464	Authorize White House Conference on education	−49	40	17
02476	Kill federal reinsurance of voluntary prepayment health insurance (R)	59	05	−21
02481	Improve, expand social security (LD)	−43	38	15
02495	Increase unemployment compensation, number of weeks paid (RI)	44	72	13
02925	Pres. cannot waive some laws in Mutual Security buying (RCI)	−03	−16	−75*
04441	Existing wiretap evidence admissable, Courts may allow getting new (A)	76	18	07
04481	Increase postal rates, postal pay	−83*	−28	−13
04484	Adjourn; not consider postal pay bill	−68	−26	−08
04496	Kill giving public lands to timbermen as pay for land bought (R)	44	30	17
05701	No dividend tax cut; increase personal income tax exemption (RI)	87*	21	08
05702	General revisions of Internal Revenue Code	−36	−19	−04
05703	No 4% dividend tax credit (RCI)	81	28	06
05704	General revisions of Internal Revenue Code (C)	−40	−18	−02
05718	Fed. Reserve not buy Treasury securities if U.S. funds in Reserve (RI)	55	49	03
05722	Create Corp. and provide funding for St. Lawrence Seaway	−10	11	−01
05724	Allow diverting water from Lake Michigan to control level	−51	−13	−02
05737	Hardboard; new tariff & limit imports from Communists	−41	−41	−17
05738	Restaurants must show origin of imported trout	−53	−01	01
05741	Normal patents, privately developed, non-military atomic inventions (A)	−72	−23	−13
05742	Kill exchange of atom info. with allies & private atom develop. (R)	82	29	03
	PerCent of Predictable Variance	46%	18%	13%
	PerCent of Total Variance	30%	12%	9%

and 12 percent of the total variance of the matrix. Seventeen items, about one-quarter of those retained for analysis, are loaded over .4 on this factor. The bills are somewhat more in line with expectations than are the bills relevant to Factor I. Treatment of Mexican agricultural workers and submerged oil resources (Tidelands) have been related to the second factors of the other analyses. The immigration-quota bill is clearly within this genre. The two roll calls on unemployment compensation involve a special aspect of the program. Administration of the program and decisions on who shall receive how much compensation for how long are ultimately in the hands of the states. The states are only limited by the amount of money the federal government contributes to their programs. Several states, mostly in the South, have programs which Northern liberals feel are not equitable. Both roll calls loaded on this factor represent attempts to bring these states into line. Argument against the motions heavily involved these states rights aspects. Once again, housing loads on the factor at a low level, and the persecution or special treatment of specific groups may be thought of as being involved in the vote on tax-exempt foundations. Sale of rubber-producing facilities would have been to specific companies. In view of all of the above, the title "Protection of Private or Local Interests" is retained.

The third and last major factor for the 83rd Congress retains content very similar to its counterparts from the previous congresses. It accounts for 13 percent of the predictable and slightly less than 9 percent of the total variance. The nine roll calls loaded .4 or higher on this factor clearly support an interpretation of the factor as "Foreign Aid."

III. COMPARISONS OF FACTORS THROUGH TIME

Despite the shifts in emphasis from congress to congress, it is clear that the three-factor structures have a rough equivalence. This conclusion is embodied in each congress having one of its three major dimensions interpreted as reflecting the question of the government's role in society, another interpreted as reflecting the question of protecting local interests, and a third interpreted as reflecting questions of foreign affairs. Because of the overlap in congressional membership it is possible to test the extent of these relationships through congresses. The method employed is simple. Scores on each factor are assigned to each congressman. Those congressmen who "overlap" two congresses constitute the sample for cross-tabulation and correlation of the factors from those congresses.

There are several methods available for the construction of tests to represent factors. Perhaps the most widely accepted is the method of "test composites" specified by Thurstone,[8] or some minor variation. In this procedure, each item is weighted according to its relationship with the factor (i.e., its factor loading) and each individual's response to each item is multiplied by the item's weight. The resultant weighted item scores are then summed to give the individual's factor score. In this research an alternative procedure has been used. The above description of the Thurstone method clearly indicates that the highest loaded items on the factors will have by far the most effect on the factor scores. Using just these items produces a very high quality estimate of the factor scores. As has been previously noted, the factor analyses done in this research include unusually large numbers of variables. The traditional method of factor score assignment requires repeated manipulation of *all* the items in the matrix, a job much more arduous than the anticipated improvement of score assignment over an estimation procedure would justify for such large matrices. In addition, there is some reason to suspect that this "dominant cluster" approach produces more stable score assignments through repeated factorizations of the same items with different samples. The *clusters* vary less than the factor locations. Evidence presented later in this paper illustrates that this might be true in this study.[9]

For the ten factors extracted in this analysis, the number of items used to construct factor estimates varied from three to five. Scores on Factor IV from the 81st Congress (Rural Problems) were derived from the only three roll calls loaded above .4. Similarly, for "Foreign Aid" in the 81st Congress the only four roll calls above .6 were used. All other factors were described by five items, usually the five with the highest loadings. On three of the factors more "unidimensional" items replaced items with high loadings on factors other than the one they were supposed to represent. Items used in

[8] For a complete discussion see Harman, *op. cit.*, 337–361.

[9] It might also be noted that the use of dominant clusters tends to produce scores much more similar to those which would have been derived using the results of an oblique rotation. The use of unweighted scores within *clusters* is obvious. However, the generally questionable value of weighting is pointed out by L. R. Aiken in "Another Look at Weighting Test Items," *Journal of Educational Measurement* (1966), 183–185.

TABLE 4. INTERCORRELATION MATRIX: ALL FACTOR SCORES
(MISSING DATA CORRELATIONS—UNEQUAL N'S)

	81-II	81-III	81-IV	82-I	82-II	82-III	83-I	83-II	83-III
81st Congress									
I. Government Action	−.030	.501	−.381	.881	−.537	.537	.854	−.664	.379
II. Local Interests		−.018	−.363	.182	.572	.000	.295	.437	−.216
III. Foreign Aid			−.172	.496	−.385	.719	.511	−.291	.610
IV. Rural Problems				−.507	−.080	−.102	−.539	.086	.053
82nd Congress									
I. Government Action					−.444	.518	.909	−.545	.284
II. Local Interests						−.441	−.343	.768	−.452
III. Foreign Involvement							.483	−.320	.630
83rd Congress									
I. Government Action								−.501	.222
II. Local Interests									−.312
III. Foreign Aid									

creating factor scores are designated by asterisks in Tables 1, 2, and 3.

Because each of these items had roughly similar loadings on the factors they represent no weighting procedure was used. Each item counted equally, with a "pro" position adding three points to the congressman's factor score, a non-vote counting two, and an "anti" position adding one. Although these scores were used in all correlations the estimates were also recoded as either "high," "medium," or "low" for use in tabular presentations. For example, where five items were used to generate a factor score, a score of thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen would be classified as "pro," a score of five, six or seven as "anti." Thus, congressmen casting four or more "pro" votes, or three "pro" votes and two non-votes, would be classified as "pro." Since most of the original scores fell at one extreme or the other, as fifteens or fives, this procedure basically collapses the non-extreme congressman into a single "moderate" category.

At this point we are primarily concerned with the relationships among those factors we have posited as having common content through congresses. Are these factors persistent through time? Do the same dimensions emerge in consecutive congresses? It must be remembered that the method employed here allows only extremely tentative conclusions. Factor invariance is reliably testable through congruence (statistical) between factor *loadings* not between factor scores. The latter procedure opens correlations to a variety of problems, at least one of which will be documented below.

Table 4 contains the correlations among all the factors. It is clear that the first factor from each analysis (Active Role) represents about the same content. The lowest correlation among the three factors is .85, an indication of considerable consistency.

The three "foreign affairs" factors evidence somewhat less definite, but still very strong stability. The lowest correlation is .61, while the highest is .72. Table 5 shows the cross-tabulations of these factors, revealing few shifts of position through time. Interestingly, it is not the factor from the 82nd Congress which seems to produce the most changes, despite the fact that it has been singled out as having "different" content. One reason for

TABLE 5. STABILITY OF CONGRESSMEN'S POSITIONS THROUGH CONGRESSES

		FACTOR III: FOREIGN AID INVOLVEMENT					
		Pro	Mod	Anti	Pro	Mod	Anti
81st Congress	Pro	193	27	5	135	23	16
	Mod	16	13	14	18	6	9
	Anti	5	26	42	6	8	41
82nd Congress	Pro				162	25	14
	Mod				22	11	23
	Anti				9	11	49

TABLE 6: STABILITY OF CONGRESSMEN'S POSITIONS THROUGH CONGRESSES

FACTOR II: PROTECTION OF PRIVATE OR LOCAL INTERESTS

		82nd Congress			83rd Congress		
		Pro	Mod	Anti	Pro	Mod	Anti
81st Congress	Pro	86	19	0	69	14	0
	Mod	34	10	4	30	2	3
	Anti	50	19	102	66	23	60
82nd Congress	Pro				160	18	0
	Mod				41	16	6
	Anti				8	20	63


this finding could simply be item emergence. It is clear that the issues differentiating this factor from similar factors in the 81st and 83rd Congresses are *additions* to the base content of foreign aid. If there had been war mobilization during these two other congresses, the relevant bills should also have appeared high on the "Foreign" factors.

In contrast to the above two sets, the second factors from the three analyses show an erratic pattern. Whereas the correlation between the factors from the 82nd and 83rd Congresses is quite high (.77), relationships with the factor from the 81st Congress are comparatively low (.44, .57). The cross-tabulations of these three factors in Table 6, however, reveal some interesting information.

The empty cells in Table 6 call for explanation. Looking over the correlation matrix in Table 4, we find that only in the 81st Congress are "Active Role" and "Local Interest" highly unrelated. What this might indicate is that only in the 81st Congress are there "pure" marker variables for the second factor. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show the relative positions of marked variables on the first two factors from the three analyses. It is clear that the cluster for the second factor of the 81st Congress is "purer" than the counterpart clusters in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses.

Inspection of the factor matrices reveals that items which appeared to be related to the "Local Interest" factor in the 81st Congress about .55 seem to have content very close to the items *defining* the factor in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses. Two examples would be Rules Committee power (56742, 74003) and treatment of Mexican laborers (61527, 71004, 01414). Thus, in the absence of the relatively clear Negro civil rights items there has probably been some slight rotation of the axes toward the content of these items. Although Figure 3 makes the point much more clearly than Figure 2, the items loaded .6 or above are much more likely to fall in the same quadrant in the 82nd or 83rd Congress than in the 81st. If Factor I is reflected in the 81st Congress, eight of thirty-one items have different signs (or one of the weights is zero) on Factor I and Factor II. In the 82nd Congress only one of eighteen items does not have the same sign on the two factors. In the 83rd Congress all 24 items loaded above .6 have the same sign on the two factors. In other words, there seem to be more orthogonal clusterings in the 81st Congress than in either the 82nd or 83rd. As an approximation, a rotation of approximately 17 degrees would seem to give a better positioning of the first axis relative to the items loaded high on Factor I, in both the 82nd and 83rd Congresses (see dotted lines in Figures 2 and 3). This seventeen degree rotation would, of course, also pertain to the second factors as well. With such a rotation loadings of the defining items for "Local Interests" in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses would all fall between .5 and .72. The Rules Committee vote in the 81st Congress (56742) loads .56. Mexican worker roll calls would load .68 in the 82nd Congress (71044) and .67 in the 83rd Congress (61527), while the counterpart roll call 01414, loads .54 in the 81st Congress. In general, such rotations would tend to further equalize the locations of the factors through congresses. However, it should be noted that the *defining items* would remain essentially the same after rotation. The exceptions would be that 81781 would decrease in importance in defining Factor I (new loading would be .73), and 73105, on building a Negro veterans hospital, would gain in importance in defining Factor II in the 82nd Congress. In general, however, the positions of the congressmen relative to each other on these items would remain stable. We see that less "unidimensional" items are the marker items for "Local Interests" in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses. There are no clusters of roll calls in these congresses which represent

Fig. 1. 81st Congress.
Factor I vs. Factor II: Marker Items
(Some Items Reflected)




the unique content of the factor as clearly and purely as do the Negro civil rights bills in the 81st Congress.

In fact, the marker items for "Local Interests" in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses tend to represent a less extreme pro-local position than do the bills defining the factor in the 81st Congress. On a "face" level we can appreciate this by studying the contents of these votes. If an assumption that the marker variables are "cutting" the same dimension at different points is correct we can explain the low correlations in Table 4 and still maintain the position that the dimensions are essentially the same. In fact, the cross-tabulations tend to bear this assumption out. Forgetting, for the moment, the "moderate" category and treating the factor scores as dichotomies, we may diagram the situation as shown in Figure 4.

In line with the above analysis, the "cutting point" between being "pro" or "anti" Local Interests lies closer to "pro" in the 81st Congress. In other words, it is "easier" to be classified as "anti" than as "pro." Just the opposite situation is postulated for the 82nd and 83rd Congresses; the cutting point lies closer to "anti." Thus, we find that the group near the middle which was classified as "anti" in the 81st Congress is classified as "pro" in the 82nd and 83rd. Even with exactly the same dimension three times, the "cutting point" phenomenon would produce correlations with the factor from the 81st Congress of about .5. There would be no shifting between congresses

FIG. 2. 82nd Congress.
Factor I vs. Factor II: Marker Items
(Some Items Reflected)



from "pro" to "anti;" only from "anti" to "pro." In other words, there would be zero cells in the cross-tabulations. Returning to Table 6, we see that the zero cells appear, as predicted, and are in the appropriate locations. Not a single congressman who was *for* "Local Interests" in the 81st Congress voted *against* this position in either the 82nd or 83rd. The group in the middle, who, as we shall see in the next section, are mostly Republicans, found that the specific items which defined the factor were less pro-local in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses. Thus, although their attitude towards the underlying "problem" remained the same, they received different scores on the factor.

IV. PARTY, REGION AND DIMENSIONS OF CLEAVAGE

One need not be a particularly sophisticated political scientist to expect that the opposing blocs defining the emergent factors are in turn largely defined by party allegiance and regional location. Such is, in fact, the case. The first factor in each of the analyses is correlated highly with party. The correlations are .81, .91, and .96 in the 81st, 82nd and 83rd Congresses respectively. Thus, as would be expected, location on the most important single dimension of voting is strongly, if not perfectly, related to the most important single structural element of American political life. Although

many analysts have pointed out that American parties do not have much power in *demanding* votes from their members the parties *do* predict behavior on many votes very well. In fact, party allegiance predicts the location of individual congressmen on the factors better than it predicts their behavior on almost any single bill. The highest correlation between party and voting on any single bill in this analysis is .89. Thus, we may assume that the parties do tend to recruit or advance as candidates men with essentially different ideas about how active a role the government should take in society.

The second and third factors are primarily defined by cleavages within one party or the other. The presence of votes on Negro civil rights indicates that the second factor is related to the North-South split in the Democratic party, at least in the 81st Congress. The location of Republicans on this factor is also of some interest. Table 7 contains the correla tions between bloc location and voting on this factor for Democrats only, (Border Democrats are here classified as Northern), and then for the entire congress; first by region and then by grouping the Republicans with the Southern Democrats in opposition to Northern Democrats.

The results in Table 7 indicate that within the Democratic party regional location specifies voting on the "Local Interests" factor to a very high degree in all three congresses and that Republicans from all areas tend to vote as a bloc. This bloc shifts from a coalition with the

FIG. 3. 83rd Congress.

Factor I vs. Factor II: Marker Items
(Some Items Reflected)





FIG. 4. Types of Congressmen.

Votes on Factor II: All Three Congresses



Northern Democrats in the 81st Congress to a coalition with the Southern Democrats in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses, where the more extreme Negro civil rights bills do not define the factor. Thus, the Republicans constitute the bulk of that group of "shifting," "in-the-middle" Representatives on this factor discussed in the previous section.

Following the work of Grassmuck and others, the "Foreign-related" factors were examined, paying attention to the "midwestern" vs. "coastal" split within the Republican Party.[10]

[10] G. Grassmuck, *Sectional Biases in Congress on Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1950). The definition of "Midwestern" districts used in this analysis combines Grassmuck's "Lake" and "Great Plains" states.

Table 8 contains correlations with the third factor, first for region within the Republican party alone, then by dividing the Democrats as well as Republicans into "Midwest" and "Coastal," and, finally, by grouping all Democrats with the "Coastal" Republicans.

Although a large amount of the variance in voting behavior is accounted for by these groupings the results are not as striking as they were for the other two major factors. In particular, Midwestern Democrats do not vote with their Republican counterparts. In fact, more Southern than Midwestern Democrats vote against "foreign involvement." The Southerners are fairly well split on this issue. Nevertheless, within the Republican party regional location does seem to have predictive utility.

TABLE 7. BLOC MEMBERSHIP AND POSITIONS ON FACTOR II: "LOCAL INTERESTS" CORRELATIONS, ALL THREE CONGRESSES

	81-II	82-II	83-II
North vs. South, Democrats only	.88	.84	.82
North vs. South, all congressmen	.81	.25	.30
Southern Democrats vs. all "others"	.81	.25	.30
Northern Democrats vs. all "others"	.40	.71	.82

TABLE 8. BLOC MEMBERSHIP AND POSITIONS ON FACTOR III: FOREIGN AID/INVOLVEMENT CORRELATIONS, ALL THREE CONGRESSES

	81-III	82-III	83-III
Midwest vs. Coastal, Republicans only	.50	.42	.53
Midwest vs. Coastal, all congressmen	.38	.40	.31
Midwest Republicans vs. all "others"	.57	.53	.43

The importance of region in structuring voting on these two factors invites again the question of why region should act as an important independent variable. Few theorists who have confronted the issue present satisfactory explanations. From Holcombe to Key, Alford, Grassmuck, Turner and MacRae the finding has been duly noted and then quickly passed over.[11] This might partially stem from the perspective most of the theoretically oriented researchers have taken; they tend to analyze voting behavior in publics and try to explain differences in party strength in various regions. Here, however, regionalism has its most important influence on cleavage *within* parties. Perhaps the best we can do at this point is to speculate that region tends to act as a sort of collective variable, adding the effects of a variety of influences all distributed geographically.

Changes in the Dimensions of Cleavage: Elections, Presidents and War. Although the basic dimensional structure remains the same through congresses, obvious changes in the contents of these factors have also been noted. In part these changes relate to the changing composition of the congress; in part they relate to a change in the type of President and administration with which the congress had to deal (Truman vs. Eisenhower); and in part they relate to other historical events, particularly the advent and cessation of the Korean War.

The nature of the changes in the composition of the congress should be presented in some detail. Four important blocs for the generation of cleavage dimensions have been distinguished above—Northern Democrats (ND), Southern Democrats (SD), Midwestern Republicans (MR), and Coastal Republicans (CR). Except for the Southern Democrats each of these groups experienced substantial changes in the size of its membership between the 81st and 83rd Congresses. Table 9 contains the approximate (only full-term members included) number of congressmen in each of the four blocs for each congress.

Most immediately striking about these statistics are: close to a 30 percent drop in number of Northern Democrats from the 81st to the 83rd Congress; a 25 percent rise in Midwestern Republicans; and a 34 percent rise in Coastal Republicans. The increase in Midwestern Republicans came wholly in the 1950 elections, while most of the increase in Coastal Republicans came during the 1952 elections. Northern Democratic losses were somewhat higher in the 1950 elections, but accounted, as might be expected, for almost all Republican gains. With these changes in mind we may turn to an examination of the changes in the dimensions of cleavage.

1. *Changes in Factor I; Active Role of Government:*

Factor I, the strongest factor in each analysis, and in some ways the least varying through time, still has an interesting history. In the 81st Congress the factor is marked by the rela-

[11] A. N. Holcombe, *The New Party Politics* (New York: Norton, 1933); V.O. Key, Jr., *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Knopf, 1961); R. Alford, *Party and Society* (Chicago: Rand-McNally, 1963); Grassmuck, *op. cit.*; J. Turner, *Party and Constituency: Pressures on Congress* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951); and D. MacRae, Jr., *Dimensions of Congressional Voting, op. cit.*

TABLE 9. BLOC MEMBERSHIP, ALL THREE CONGRESSES

	81	82	83
Northern Democrats	154	127	112
Southern Democrats	99	101	99
Midwest Republicans	71	89	89
Coastal Republicans	94	109	128

tive strength of the pro-action coalition of Northern and Southern Democrats. They hold a 3-to-2 majority over the Republican coalition underlying the anti-action forces. By the 82nd Congress, this lead has dwindled to the point where the defection of approximately 20 votes reverses the results of any roll call primarily oriented toward this dimension. As defined by actual voting behavior (factor scores), however, the relative strength of the voting blocs seems to have actually shifted to the anti-action forces by a very slight majority because of a substantial number of Southern "defectors." In the 83rd Congress, the Republicans barely outnumber the Democrats, with the anti-action votes having a 5-to-4 majority.

Perusal of the roll calls defining Factor I for the 81st Congress shows a content indicative of a strong liberal thrust. The roll calls tend to be either on bills trying to extend liberal programs or on amendments or motions seeking to debilitate or kill essentially liberal bills. This latter kind of roll call tends to represent defensive measures by anti-action forces against pro-action proposals. In the 82nd Congress the factor concentrates more on government costs, with anti-action forces seeming to take the offensive in decreasing spending. These roll calls also tend to be amendments, but this is primarily because appropriations measures are almost always submitted as hopeful overestimates. Thus, any economy drive, even one to reduce the budget from what it was the previous year, tends to take the form of amendments. In addition, the "Active Role" factor seems to be weaker in the 82nd Congress than in the other congresses, accounting for less variance and having fewer items loaded above .4. Where the factor has a sense of stalemate in the 82nd Congress, it seems to represent a slightly tenuous counter-thrust by the anti-action forces in the 83rd. Tax cuts for stockholders are proposed, and atomic energy patent rights are granted to private business. The pro-action forces have to fight defensive battles to increase proposed funds for the Air Force, veterans' hospitals, public power projects, and rural telephones. Amendments must be made to lessen the effects of wiretapping and summary discharge bills. As a final difference among the three congresses, we should remember that the "Active Role" factor correlated more highly with party in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses than in the 81st.

These findings suggest that where control or predominance by a given coalition is in doubt, the majority coalition will tend to stick together to a much greater extent, and press for positions which are acceptable to its less committed members. Where the size of an "extreme" bloc, such as the Northern Democrats, is especially large, issues more in its image will emerge, and more of the less committed members will desert the coalition to vote with its opponents. For a real thrust to be generated, the number of highly committed members must be quite sizeable.

Besides the changes in bloc sizes it is probable that at least two major historical events shaped the changes in this factor. President Truman, in view of his State of the Union message and his voting record as a Senator, would almost undoubtedly be classified as having "pro-action" tendencies. On the other hand, Eisenhower seemed to belong in either the anti-action, or, perhaps, the moderate category. Despite the fact that anti-action forces seemed to have slight control over the 82nd Congress, they might not have advanced a strong program because of pressure from the President. In the 83rd Congress, with Eisenhower, they could grow bolder. The second probable major influence was the Korean War. The effect of the war seems concentrated in the 82nd Congress. Congressional reaction to the war at the end of the 81st Congress tended to be quick accession to the demands of the President and unified voice votes. Since congress had almost adjourned, most of its program had already been considered. Thus, if the war were to have any effect in the 81st Congress, it would tend to be in terms of additions to legislation already considered, and should not drastically affect the basic dimensional structure or content. On the other hand, the war provided an excellent opportunity for anti-action, anti-government-spending forces to press their position in the 82nd Congress. With so much of the nation's funds being diverted to the war effort, it seemed natural that attempts to cut other costs would gain headway. If the anti-action forces had had an anti-action president, or an anti-action majority of considerable size, they might have tried more drastic cuts. For the 82nd Congress, however, they could successfully throttle attempts at expansion of spending and cut back on many programs as well. By the 83rd Congress, the war had subsided from its emergency state and the anti-action forces could begin to press their advantage. With a Republican president of moderate persuasion, however, they probably held back from demanding changes as great as they wished.

2. *Changes in Factor II; Protection of Local and Private Interests:*

It is in Factor II that the greatest changes took place. Not one, but two coalition patterns

TABLE 10. FACTOR II: PROTECTION OF PRIVATE OR LOCAL INTERESTS SIZES OF ALTERNATIVE COALITION PATTERNS AND ACTUAL VOTING BLOCS, ALL THREE CONGRESSES

	81-II	82-II	83-II
Northern Democrats (Anti)	164 (38%)	128 (30%)	112 (27%)
All other congressmen (Pro)	264 (62%)	299 (70%)	316 (74%)
All other congressmen (Anti)	319 (76%)	326 (76%)	329 (77%)
Southern Democrats (Pro)	99 (24%)	101 (24%)	99 (23%)
Anti	235 (66%)	122 (36%)	82 (23%)
Pro	118 (33%)	218 (64%)	277 (77%)

have relevance for this factor. Table 10 gives each of these coalitions and the "actual" sizes of the opposed voting blocs.

Although there are definite changes in the relative coalition sizes, it does not seem that this structural variable is the major source of change in the factor. We have already noted that the shift in coalition patterns is probably due to a "cutting-point" phenomena, which, in turn, stems from the absence of unidimensional and strongly anti-local civil rights bills in both the 82nd and 83rd Congresses. Instead, it is probable that the great reduction in the number of Northern Democrats, the most committed group for Negro civil rights, accounts for these highly anti-local bills not emerging in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses.

In other words, we might take the position that a given bloc must be particularly strong to bring to the floor a bill that all three other blocs prefer not be raised. If this is the case, the mechanism for withholding items from consideration is probably control over committees. Thus, the votes which took power away from the Rules Committee in the 81st Congress and and then returned it in the 82nd are both symbolic and significant. We might assume that the "shifting" Republicans preferred not to have civil rights bills brought up, but that if the bills *were* moved, they would vote with Northern Democrats on the roll calls. Another possibility is that when Republican strength grew large enough they made a "deal" with the Southern Democrats, suppressing civil rights bills in return for votes on other pro-local and anti-action measures. This might account for the large number of roll calls having high loadings on both the "Local Interests" and "Active Role" factors in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses.

Another strong possibility is that the war was a primary source of change in Factor II. The integrative problems of a society faced with war tend to center around problems directly rising out of war-necessitated societal change. War may be viewed as a decisive external force on the given societal system which eventually leads to a new set of important integrative problems and attempted solutions. Thus, society might not be prepared, while threatened, to reopen the divisive question of reallocation of resources by racial groups.

Although this "war" argument might hold for the 82nd Congress, it is more difficult to see how it works for the 83rd. In all probability, the general inactivity and balance of forces in the 83rd Congress produced the comparatively small amount of variance accounted for by Factor II. Everything seemed to gravitate towards the party split, Factor I, de-emphasizing the differences within the parties.

3. *Changes in Factor III; Foreign Aid/Involvement:*

The major change in Factor III seems to have more obvious roots in historical events than do changes in either of the factors discussed above. The factor is somewhat concerned with military aid in the 81st Congress, but, in general, is more orientated towards foreign aid in the more altruistic sense. With the coming of war, the aid bills of Factor III become more uniformly military in nature. In addition, the factor becomes partially defined by war mobilization roll calls in the 82nd Congress and takes on more importance, as defined by amount of variance involved. Although mobilization is no longer an important issue by the 83rd Congress, the effects of the recent war are still felt, as military aid still defines most of the items on Factor III.

One other change in Factor III should be noted. In the 83rd Congress, the proportion of Coastal Republicans who were pro-involvement increased markedly, while the proportion of Southern Democrats taking this position declined. The most probable explanation of

these findings seems to be relationship with the President. Eisenhower took a pro-foreign involvement position, and this probably influenced large numbers of Coastal Republicans, who had previously tended towards the "moderate" range, to move to positive positions. The same factors probably were at work on the Southern Democrats when Truman was president.[12]

V. CONCLUSION

In the preceding section, the major changes in each factor occurring through time were related to contemporary changes in other political and societal elements. Three major external sources were posited. The first primarily involved the progressive decline in importance of the Northern Democratic bloc. This bloc was identified as probably defining one extreme position on *each* of the major factors. On Factor I, "Active Role," both Republican blocs seem equally extreme in defining the opposite position. On Factor II, "Local Interests," Southern Democrats are almost uniform in their opposition to the Northern Democrats. The other side of Factor III, "Foreign Aid/Involvement," was defined by Midwestern Republicans. With the decline of Northern Democratic power and the increase in Republican strength, no single bloc could gain even partial dominance over the congress and the committees. Thus, the 82nd and 83rd Congresses saw extreme bills suppressed and an atmosphere conducive to "deals" among the blocs.

The second major event posited as important was the transfer of the presidency from a pro-action Democrat to an anti-action, pro-foreign Republican. This probably influenced Factor I in the differential extent anti-action groups in the 82nd and 83rd Congresses could press their position. On Factor III, the presidential shift probably caused redistribution of moderates of both parties into more extreme positions, Southern Democrats swinging towards anti-foreign voting and Coastal Republicans changing in the other direction.

Finally, from among the notable historical events of the six-year period, the Korean War was advanced as having by far the most pervasive influence. Some issues were probably suppressed and others raised primarily because of this change in the environment. All three factors seemed to feel the weight of this influence.

[12] In comparing foreign policy votes in the 81st (Truman), 86th (Eisenhower) and 87th (Kennedy) Congresses, Kesselman documents this point. Significant proportions of Democrats moved from internationalist to isolationist positions after Eisenhower's election while a similar number of Republicans changed in the opposite direction. After Kennedy's election the process was reversed, several Republicans becoming isolationist and several Democrats changing to internationalist positions: M. Kesselman, "Presidential Leadership in Congress on Foreign Policy, A Replication of a Hypothesis," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 9 (November, 1965), 401–406.

AN ATTEMPT TO SIMULATE THE OUTBREAK OF WORLD WAR I[1]

CHARLES F. HERMANN
Princeton University

MARGARET G. HERMANN
Educational Testing Service

Political games and simulations are models or representations of particular political systems and their associated processes. They are techniques for reproducing in a simplified form selected aspects of one system, A, in some independent system, A'. Games and simulations have a dynamic quality produced by the complex interaction of properties in the model. This feature enables them to generate states of the system that differ radically from those present originally. The kinds of transformations that may occur between the initial and final states of a simulation or game are difficult to represent by other means, despite a diversity in modeling procedures ranging from verbal descriptions to differential equations. Because of their apparent applicability to many problems of politics, as well as their novelty, games and simulations have been developed in a variety of areas in political science.[2] They have been used in research, instruction, and policy formation. Although the application of these techniques has been increasing, systematic evaluation of their performance is only now beginning. This essay reports one type of evaluation.

The researchers sought to structure a simulation of international politics so it would reproduce features of the political crisis that preceded the beginning of the First World War. Two separate trials or runs of the simulation were performed as a pilot project. With two runs, the data are sufficient only to illustrate what might be done in an expanded research program.[3]

[1] This research was conducted under Contract N123(60530)25875A from Project Michelson, U. S. Naval Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California. An earlier report on this project was distributed by the contractor as *Studies in Deterrence X: Validation Studies of the Inter-Nation Simulation*, NOTS Technical Paper 3351, December, 1963. The authors wish to acknowledge their indebtedness to Harold Guetzkow, principal investigator and mentor; Thomas W. Milburn, director of Project Michelson; and Robert C. North and his colleagues at the Stanford Studies in Conflict and Integration who generously shared their document collection and data analysis on the outbreak of World War I. The Center of International Studies at Princeton University supported the first author during the preparation of the present article.

[2] In addition to the studies cited elsewhere in this paper, the variety is suggested by the following illustrations: Oliver Benson, "A Simple Diplomatic Game," in James A. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1961), 504–511; William P. Davison, "A Public Opinion Game," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (1961), 210–220; Robert P. Abelson and Alex Bernstein, "A Computer Simulation Model of Community Referendum Controversies," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (1963), 93–122; Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Barton Whaley, "The Political-Military Exercise: A Progress Report," *Orbis*, 8 (1965), 854–870; Andrew M. Scott with William A. Lucas and Trudi M. Lucas, *Simulation and National Development* (New York: Wiley, 1966); J. David Singer and Hirohide Hinomoto, "Inspecting for Weapons Production: A Modest Computer Simulation," *Journal of Peace Research* (1965), 18–38; James A. Robinson, Lee F. Anderson, Margaret G. Hermann, and Richard C. Snyder, "Teaching with Inter-Nation Simulation and Case Studies," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (1966), 53–65.

[3] The simulation runs were conducted in the summer of 1961 at Northwestern University. The exploratory nature of these runs led the authors to question whether the pilot study should be published. The supply of the original Navy report, however, is now exhausted. Moreover, no more complete set of historical runs has been conducted to date. Because a number of other published materials have discussed these pilot runs, it seems appropriate to make a fuller description of the World War I simulation more widely available. In doing so, the authors wish to caution that the work is primarily an examination of a means of evaluating simulations rather than a direct validation of the Inter-Nation Simulation. For examples of how this pilot project has been discussed elsewhere, see Arthur Herzog, *The War-Peace Establishment* (New York: Harper, 1963), esp. 183–184; Sidney Verba, "Simulation, Reality, and Theory in International Relations," *World Politics*, 16 (1964), esp. 507–515; James A. Robinson and Richard C. Snyder,

The study was undertaken to investigate the use of a historical situation as a means of validating simulations. The problems of model validity are critical in determining the value of the simulation-gaming technique not only to political science, but to all the social sciences. In a fuller discussion of simulation validity elsewhere,[4] one of the authors has indicated that model validity is always a matter of degree and is affected by (1) the purpose for which the model is used, (2) whether or not human participants are involved, and (3) the types of criteria employed. The World War I simulation explores the third area—criteria for estimating validity. It focuses on possible standards or criteria for establishing the goodness of fit between the simulation and the system represented. To what extent do features of a political system or its processes correspond to their simplified representation in a model? One means of investigating this question is to ascertain if a simulation produces events similar to those reported in a historical situation. Another approach is to determine whether the simulation supports more general hypotheses about political phenomena which previously have been confirmed by independent methods. Both events and hypotheses are used as validity criteria in the simulation of the 1914 crisis.

Although the validity issue is the primary reason for conducting the simulation of World War I, several other purposes are served by the exercise. First, it provides a milieu in which to explore the relative effect on political actions of personality characteristics as compared to variables more frequently associated with political analysis. Second, the simulation of past events offers a possible device for teaching and studying history.

I. PROCEDURE

The Inter-Nation Simulation. Researchers differ as to the distinction between games and simulations. A number of experimenters, however, have associated "games" with operating models that involve human participants and "simulations" with models which do not.[5] Usually human participants are involved when the procedures or rules for designating the interplay of all components in the model have not been explicitly determined. When the model's relationships are incompletely programmed, human players and administrators are required to make judgments during the game. If the relationships are programmed, the need for human decision makers is reduced. In this essay an operating model will be defined as a simulation rather than a game, if a separate staff or computer is required to execute the programmed features. Thus, it is possible to have a simulation that is partially programmed and partially determined by human participants.

The model of international politics used in this study is such a hybrid. Developed by Harold Guetzkow and his associates,[6] the Inter-Nation Simulation incorporates both human participants and programmed calculations. In its usual format the Inter-Nation Simulation involves five or more nations. The government of each simulated nation is represented by human participants who assume one of several decision-making positions. During the 50-to-70 minute periods into which the simulation is divided, the decision makers allocate the military, consumer, and natural-industrial resources available to their nation. These various types of resources have different functions in domestic and international affairs. Using their resources the participants make decisions about internal matters such as economic growth, government stability, defense preparations, and research and development programs. At the international level nations may enter alliances, negotiate trades or aids, engage in various kinds of hostilities, and participate in international organizations.

Every period, which represents approximately one year of "real" time, the decision makers record their actions on a standardized decision form. Then, either a calculation staff or a computer applies the programmed rules to the decision form to determine the net gain or loss in the various types of resources. The structured part of the model also establishes whether the decision makers have maintained

---

"Decision-Making in International Politics," in Herbert C. Kelman (ed.), *International Behavior* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), 445, 512; and J. David Singer, "Data-Making in International Relations," *Behavioral Science*, 10 (1965), p. 77.

[4] Charles F. Hermann, "Validation Problems in Games and Simulations with Special Reference to Models of International Politics," *Behavorial Science*, in press.

[5] For a discussion of the distinctions made between games and simulations, see Charles F. Hermann, "Games and Simulations of Political Processes," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, in press.

[6] Harold Guetzkow, Chadwick F. Alger, Richard A. Brody, Robert C. Noel, and Richard C. Snyder, *Simulation in International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

TABLE 1. FOUR SIMULATION PARAMETERS FOR 1914 NATIONAL PROFILES

Nation	Basic Capability Units[a]	Force Capability Units[b]	Validator Satisfaction[c]	Decision Latitude[d]
Austria-Hungary	45,540	14,560	4	7
England	86,940	25,000	6	3
France	62,100	20,800	4	3
Germany	120,000	24,500	7.5	8
Russia	78,660	23,000	4.5	9
Serbia	less than 4,140	less than 1,700	not given	not given

Note.—With the exception of decision latitude, the 1914 data and procedures for estimating these parameters were derived from James A. Winnefeld, "The Power Equation Europe, 1914," Stanford University (1960).

[a] Basic capability units represent the human, natural, and industrial resources available in a country. For the 1914 period the following indices were combined: steel production, national income, and total population weighted by the rate of male literacy.

[b] Force capability units are the military component in the simulation and were calculated by combining two indices, regular peacetime armies and capital ships.

[c] Validator satisfaction is the degree to which a decision-maker's policies are acceptable to those elite groups with power to authenticate his office holding. A "crisis coefficient" composed of the frequencies of certain types of events (e.g., civil disturbances and insurrections, assassinations) in a given country in the 50 years preceding 1914 was combined with an indicator of national security (relative military strength). The integrated estimates of satisfaction were placed along a 10-point scale. Higher values represent more satisfaction with the government.

[d] Decision latitude is an ideological element. It is defined as the degree to which probability of office holding is responsive to changes in validator satisfaction. To estimate decision latitude, judges rated the nations on a 10-point scale. Higher values represent greater latitude for the government (i.e., less sensitivity to the demands of validators).

the support of the politically relevant sectors of the nation whose endorsement is required for them to remain in office. The calculated results are fed back to each nation, thus beginning a new period of interactions and decisions by the participants.

Adapting the Simulation. Five nations were represented in the simulation runs of the 1914 crisis. Each government was staffed by two decision makers. A third participant in each nation acted as a messenger. The five simulated nations were intended to replicate features of Austria-Hungary, England, France, Germany, and Russia. Italy was excluded altogether and Serbia was represented symbolically by the researchers without participants. Several reasons can be offered for this treatment of Italy and Serbia. Reliable records of their diplomatic communications (a major input in the simulation of the other nations) were not available. Secondly, one can argue that although Serbia seemingly precipitated the immediate conflict and Italy was a member of the Triple Alliance, both nations were on the periphery in determining the question of world war when compared to the five other countries. Their exclusion, therefore, did not hinder the purposes of the exploratory runs. Although frequently other runs of the Inter-Nation Simulation have included more nations and more participants per nation, these changes are not as fundamental as several others.

Two major modifications were made in the basic simulation model. The first alteration established the initial conditions which the experimenters deemed important to characterize the international situation in the summer of 1914. Participants were introduced to some of the attributes of the historical setting by means of (1) a brief history of selected international affairs prior to the beginning of the crisis, (2) a statement of the current domestic and foreign policies of the participant's nation and the reasons they were being pursued, (3) a sketch of several personality traits of the historical policy maker whose role the participant occupied, and (4) a set of relevant historical diplomatic messages, conversations, and newspapers for the time between the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian Archduke on June 28 and the Serbian reply to the ultimatum on July 25, 1914. In addition, an effort was made to fit the programmed parameters and variables of the simulation to the national profiles of the countries involved.[7]

Several of these inputs require elaboration. Values for most of the components in the programmed part of the simulation were based on 1914 statistical indices (e.g., population, gross national product, size of armed forces) that approximated the meaning of the model's parameters. The 1914 indices were multiplied by an arbitrary constant to convert them to amounts convenient for use in the simulation. Individuals familiar with recent European history were asked to estimate decision latitude, the parameter that indicates how sensitive policy makers must be to the politically-relevant segments of their nation. These judges rated the decision latitude of each nation on a 10-point scale. Higher values were assigned to

[7] The international history, the statements of domestic and foreign policy, and the personality sketches appear as appendices in Technical Paper 3351, *op. cit.* A complete set of the diplomatic messages in the form in which they were used in the simulation is on file with the contracting agency and with the International Relations Program, Northwestern University. For values assigned the basic parameters, see Table 1.

nations whose policy makers enjoyed greater freedom of action. Table 1 displays the values of each nation's basic parameters as they were reported to the simulation participants at the beginning of both runs. The historical diplomatic materials used in the simulation were compiled from hundreds of communications and documents which had been translated, edited, and verified by the Stanford Studies in Conflict and Integration under the editorship of Howard Koch.[8] The procedures for determining the personality characteristics are described in the section on participants and their historical counterparts.

All of the structured inputs were masked to avoid revealing to the participants that an actual historical situation was being modeled. Proper nouns, e.g., the names of individuals, countries, and alliances, were falsified. Misleading cues casting events in the future were introduced into the world history. In addition, after a pretest the assassination at Sarajevo was modified to avoid disclosing the identity of the historical setting. In the revised simulation account, several major Austro-Hungarian officials were killed by a strafing aircraft while they were on a reviewing stand in Serbia. These precautions were taken in order that the participants' knowledge of history would not bias their responses. The introduction of an extensive amount of structured material in the initial phase of the operating model represented an important modification of the usual practice in the Inter-Nation Simulation.

The second major alteration in the Inter-Nation Simulation affected the time units represented in the model. Usually the simulation is divided into 50-to-70 minute periods which constitute the equivalent of a year in the "real" world. These intervals are associated with a year because of the programmed calculations. Every period the policy makers allocate their national resources. The consequences of their allocations are determined by the relationships between a number of variables in the programmed part of the simulation. Examples of these variables include the rate of depreciation in existing military equipment, the amount of lead time required for a new research program, and the extent of shift in popular support for the government. The equations used to calculate these and other variables are designed to reflect changes that might occur on roughly an annual basis. As a result, decisions taken by the participants and submitted for calculation normally represent the allocation of resources for approximately twelve months.

The present exercise, however, required the representation of not years, but the few critical days in late July, 1914. This reduction in time necessitated several seemingly contradictory changes. On the one hand, the existing programmed calculations had to be made relevant to the participants. If the basic model was to be maintained, persons involved in the exercise had to experience the constraints and demands imposed on their immediate behavior by the programmed features of the simulation as it is usually constituted. On the other hand, participants required a time framework that would allow them to deal with the kinds of decisions that policy makers might encounter on a daily rather than annual basis. In sum, the individuals in the simulation had to be able to make short-term decisions, while being aware of the long-term consequences as represented in the programmed calculations.

To meet these requirements only individuals who had previous experience with the Inter-Nation Simulation were invited to participate in the exercise. These experienced participants were told that the first few simulation periods would represent days. Moreover, there was the implication that these short time frames would be followed by periods which would be equivalent to years as in previous simulations. To further the impression that the initial periods were to be embedded in a series of longer time units, the participants received an annual decision form and were instructed to submit an updated version for calculations when the simulation periods began to represent years. These arrangements were made to encourage the participants to take account of the basic programmed variables and parameters in conducting their immediate interactions. A decision maker is more likely to act in a short-term situation so as not to damage such programmed variables as the probability of his continuing in office or the annual amount of consumer goods available to his nation, if he believes that the simulation is going to continue for "years." Notwithstanding the information given the participants, both simulation runs were terminated before the anticipated conversion to the longer time units had occurred. Hence no calculations were made in any of the programmed components of the model.

In addition to designating the periods as days, the shortened character of the time units was promoted by the diplomatic messages. These historical documents reflected events

[8] Howard E. Koch with the staff of the Stanford Studies in Conflict and Integration, *Documentary Chronology of Events Preceding the Outbreak of the First World War: 28 June-6 August, 1914* (Stanford University, mimeographed, 1959).

and decisions that were developing day by day, if not hour by hour. Finally, as an aid to short-term decision-making, a new form was introduced into the simulation. On the new instrument each nation's decision makers were able to indicate more immediate changes in the intensity of their action toward other nations. Participants were advised that daily variations in their nation's level of commitment would influence such annually computed variables as total available resources and the likelihood of office-holding. Thus, the intensity scale provided an explicit link with the long-term elements present in the programmed calculations of most Inter-Nation Simulation exercises.

Historical Figures and Their Simulation Counterparts. An attempt was made to select participants with personality traits similar to some of those manifested by political leaders in the crisis of 1914. This task involved three subproblems. First, a restricted number of historical figures who were active in the crisis had to be selected. Second, a judgment had to be made regarding which personality characteristics of these men were salient in their political behavior. Finally, a method had to be devised for selecting simulation participants with similar personality profiles.

The resources available to the researchers necessitated that the total number of decision makers in each run be limited to 10—two participants for each nation. Consequently, we sought the two policy makers in each of the five European nations who were major contributors to the critical decisions during the crisis. More specifically, three criteria guided the selection: (1) which persons had a dominating influence on the foreign policy decisions of their nation at the time of the crisis? This criterion recognizes that the loci of decision making may not correspond with the "legitimate authority" to make such decisions. (2) Which persons received and dispatched (or at least read) diplomatic cables and related foreign policy documents? The historical figures whom the simulation participants represented should have occupied a reasonably central position in the diplomatic communication net because diplomatic messages acted as a major source of simulation inputs. (3) About which persons was autobiographical and/or biographical material available to help in the assessment of personality traits? Utilizing these criteria, the following historical personages were chosen for representation in the simulation:

Austria-Hungary
- Berchtold (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
- Conrad (Chief of General Staff)

England
- Grey (Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)
- Nicolson (Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs)

France
- Poincaré (President of the Republic)
- Berthelot (Acting Political Director of Foreign Ministry)

Germany
- Wilhelm II (Kaiser)
- Bethmann-Hollweg (Chancellor)

Russia
- Nicholas II (Czar)
- Sazonov (Minister for Foreign Affairs)[9]

Once the political leaders judged to have assumed critical roles in the crisis were selected, it was necessary to establish which personality characteristics were salient to their political behavior. This determination was made by a cursory content analysis of personal letters, autobiographies, and biographies of the chosen policy makers.[10] Each document was content-

[9] Some illustration of how the criteria were employed is appropriate. The selection of Berthelot provides a good example of the application of the first two criteria. Although Berthelot did not have the legitimate authority to make binding decisions for his government, he nevertheless extensively influenced French foreign policy during July of 1914. With the president, premier (who was also the foreign minister), and political director of the foreign ministry on a mission to Russia in July, Berthelot was placed in charge of the foreign ministry. He became the chief advisor during this time to Bienvenu-Martin, acting Premier and Foreign Minister. Bienvenu-Martin, officially the Minister of Justice, was a novice at foreign affairs, and relied heavily on Berthelot. For further evidence on the role of Berthelot, see Richard D. Challener, "The French Foreign Office: The Era of Philippe Berthelot," in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (eds.), *The Diplomats: 1919–1939* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1953), 49–85. The third criterion was important in the choice of Conrad. Far less autobiographical and biographical material is available on the Austro-Hungarian political leaders than on those from the other countries. Most information concerns Emperor Franz Joseph, a logical selection in addition to Berchtold for the simulation. However, because Franz Joseph was quite old and recovering from a serious illness, he was not as influential on the decisions as other officials. Among the key figures, Conrad had the most available material.

[10] No inter-coder reliability was performed in the content analysis of the personality traits. For this reason, as well as because of the very limited

analyzed for psychological characteristics or traits identified by one of several tests for measuring personality.[11] On the basis of the content analysis, dominance, self-acceptance, and self-control appeared to be characteristics which differentiated among all 10 of the political leaders. Furthermore, the personality of one or more of the selected individuals was strongly characterized by his attitude toward such concepts as fate, frankness, making decisions, his own country, peace, self-confidence, success, suspicion, and war. No claim is made that these traits provide a complete personality profile of the historical individuals under examination. Undoubtedly some important characteristics have been overlooked. This list of traits, however, yielded a distinctive profile for every leader which was consistent with features stressed in documents describing that individual.

Two psychological tests were used to measure the personality characteristics that the researchers associated with the selected historical figures. The California Psychological Inventory (CPI)[12] not only measured the three traits judged to be relevant to all the policy makers, but it also contained measures of some secondary characteristics identified in the content analysis. The second instrument was the semantic differential.[13] The nine attitudes were estimated with this testing device. Utilizing a suggestion made by Gough,[14] one of the researchers responded to both instruments as if she were the historical policy makers. The tests were completed after the biographical and autobiographical material on each of the chosen figures had been read. Test profiles for all 10 individuals were made in this way. These 10 profiles provided a standard against which to compare the responses of potential simulation participants on the same personality tests.

Some 101 high school students, who had participated in the Inter-Nation Simulation experiment in the summer of 1960,[15] were tested. As previously noted, persons already acquainted with the operation of the simulation were used in order to facilitate the shift in the time dimension. Furthermore, experienced participants freed the experimenters from training participants in basic simulation skills. The CPI profile of each prospective participant was compared with that of each historical figure. Particular attention was paid to profiles that matched exactly on dominance, self-acceptance, and self-control and were within one standard deviation of the other traits measured by the CPI. The semantic differential was utilized as a final selection step. In other words, those individuals chosen through the CPI matching were screened further by means of the semantic differential until three individuals per role were selected. Of the 10 individuals best matched to the historical figures, six were able to participate in the runs—five in the first run and one in the second. The balance of the participants in each run were second and third choices. Because of the interest in using individuals whose profiles most closely corresponded to those prepared for the actual leaders, the participants were not controlled on sex. Four women participated in the first run and three in the second.

Conducting the Revised Simulation. To provide an overview of the procedures used in the modified Inter-Nation Simulation, we will describe the operations in the two attempted replications of the pre-World War I crisis. Both simulation exercises were conducted in two days. On the first day, the participants in the runs assembled together for a general introduction and review of simulation procedures. After these activities, the remainder of the first day was used to introduce the structured input for each run.

At the beginning of the input phase, each participant was assigned to a separate cubicle. There they started by reading a disguised statement of pre-1914 "world history" and a description of the individual whose role they would assume. Upon completing this material, every participant was given a set of masked diplomatic communiques, newspapers, and memoranda which might reasonably have come

sample of materials that could be examined for each figure, the selected traits must be considered only as tentative approximations. A list of the sources used in the content analysis appears in Technical Paper 3351, *op. cit.*

[11] Sources for the personality categories were Raymond B. Cattell, *The Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire*, rev. ed. (Champaign, Ill.: IPAT, 1957); Allen L. Edwards, *Edwards Personal Preference Schedule* (New York: Psychological Corp., 1953); Harrison G. Gough, *California Psychological Inventory* (Palo Alto, Calif.: Consulting Psychologists Press, 1956).

[12] Harrison G. Gough, *ibid.*

[13] Charles E. Osgood, George J. Suci, and Percy H. Tannenbaum, *The Measurement of Meaning* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1957).

[14] Personal correspondence from Harrison G. Gough, dated July 25, 1961.

[15] For a description of this earlier simulation research, see Richard A. Brody, "Some Systemic Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Technology: A Study through Simulation of a Multi-Nuclear Future," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 7 (1963), 663–753.

to the attention of his historical counterpart. To the extent that such information was available, messages were ordered in the sequence in which they were received by the historical figure. For example, although the simulation began with an incident representing the assassination of the Archduke on June 28 (known to the participants as Day 1), some participants learned about that event the same day; others did not. In general, a participant received an incoming message and then the recorded reaction, if any, which his counterpart had made to that message. If evidence indicated that the historical figure had been aware of responses made to a message by other members of his government, the simulation participant also received this information. Thus, the Kaiser's marginal notes on diplomatic communiques were seen by the individual assuming the role of the German Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg. The input phase terminated with the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum on July 25 (Simulated Day 28). As the historical events became more rapid and complex in the latter part of the input phase, the order in which participants received information took on considerable importance.

The participants were allowed to read the set of messages available to them at their own pace. They were encouraged to write their reactions to each communication in a space opposite the message. The researchers believed that the participants would become more involved in the situation if they recorded their thoughts about the messages as they read. Moreover, these reactions provided a source of data. For the same reasons, after Day 15 and again after Day 28, every individual was required to write a summary of the events that had occurred. On these two simulated days, the participants also were provided sheets of paper and asked to draw a map of the world as they conceived it at that time.[16] After completing the second history and map, the participants were dismissed until the following day. They were cautioned not to discuss the material they had read.

The first run was concluded on the morning of the second day (hereafter designated the M-run) and the second was finished that afternoon (the A-run). When the participants returned to their respective simulations, they were informed that the world would continue with the situation as it had evolved up to that point. They were told that there would be no more structured messages. Thereafter, the situation could be handled in whatever manner they chose. Each nation's decision makers were given an annual decision form and an intensity of action scale to indicate their country's resources and commitments at the beginning of the free activity phase of the simulation. They were instructed to designate each 50-minute period as one simulated day, but the number of such periods that would occur remained unspecified. Following these initial instructions, the two participants in each nation were assigned to a room in which they were separated by a partition. A messenger or courier sat at one end of the partition to prevent unauthorized conversations, to relay messages, and to operate a tape recorder during conferences between the decision makers. Written messages and periodic conferences were used as means of communication both within and between nations.

At the end of three periods (representing July 26–28, 1914), each participant was asked to draw another map and update his statement of world events. Much to the surprise of the participants, upon completing this task they were informed that the simulation was over. A post-mortem or debriefing session was held with each simulation run. The participants first completed a questionnaire and then described their plans and reactions to events in the simulation.

II. RESULTS

Two different standards or criteria were employed in estimating the validity of actions taken by the decision makers in the free activity phase of the simulation runs. First, both macro and micro level events in the 1914 crisis were used as standards with which to compare incidents that occurred in the simulation. Second, two general hypotheses, previously tested with documents from the outbreak of the First World War, were explored using simulation data. Findings on the hypotheses from the two data sources were checked for comparability.

Macro and Micro Events. In the present context, "macro event" refers to the occurrence of

[16] Geographical features are not incorporated in the Inter-Nation Simulation and no explicit geographical statements were included in the masked historical communiques. Therefore, the participants' maps provided data about the changing conception of relationships among nations. The distance between allied and hostile nations as well as the relative size of the nations represented in the maps were analyzed. Although the measuring device is worthy of further exploration, the results from these pilot runs proved to be quite ambiguous and are not reported here. They are included in Technical Paper 3351, *op. cit.*

general war. Did war break out in the simulation runs as it had in Europe in 1914? In neither run did war—or more accurately, the representation of war—occur during the last three periods. Historically, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28th, the final day represented in the simulation runs. In 1914, the declarations of general war between the other European nations did not occur until after the last time period portrayed in the simulation.[17] Although no war had been declared when the simulations were terminated, hostilities were imminent in the M-run.

In the researchers' opinion, if the M-run simulation had been continued for another 50-to-100 minutes (one or two more simulated days), war would have been declared along lines similar to the historical situation. This position is confirmed by 10 of the 15 M-run participants and messengers in their debriefing questionnaires. Throughout the free activity phase of that run the two alliance structures held. Germany[18] was prepared to give secret aid to Austria-Hungary for an attack on Serbia while signing neutrality pacts with England and France to keep them out of the war. This effort was intended to localize the conflict and to assure victory for the Dual Monarchy. If Russia then considered assisting Serbia, she would lack the support of her allies—a fact which Germany and Austria-Hungary believed would deter such action. France and England, however, had plans to go to war if Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia. That attack by Austria-Hungary was being planned at the close of the simulation run. An internal conference between the German participants on the next to last simulated day illustrates the direction in which the M-run was moving.

Central Decision Maker [Kaiser]: Is their war started yet? [Austria-Hungary's attack on Serbia]

External Decision Maker [Bethmann-Hollweg]: I don't think so.

CDM: Here's the problem—we can certainly give them [Austria-Hungary] the aid but the aid must be kept secret because if monetary aid isn't kept secret then the promises—written promises—which I am giving to Bega [England] and Colo [France] will mean absolutely nothing; total war is bound to break out. . . . If Enuk [Russia] enters it, we have to send secret aid; if Enuk [Russia] doesn't enter it, then he [Austria-Hungary] can defeat Gior [Serbia] by himself and that will be a thorn out of our side. We have already driven a wedge into the Tri-Agreement [Triple Entente].

EDM: Another question: Suppose Colo [France] enters, then we go in?

CDM: If Colo [France] enters the war we go in. . . .

In the A-run the participant representing Lord Grey of England called for an international conference on the first simulated day of the free activity phase. Thereafter, most of the simulation time was spent in obtaining agreement from all nations to attend this meeting. At the conference Austria-Hungary was charged with making far too extreme demands against Serbia and was pressured into withdrawing them. This retraction resulted in substantial conflict among the decision makers in Austria-Hungary as well as a bitter dispute between Germany and the Dual Monarchy. Germany had pledged complete support to Austria-Hungary and was highly irritated at the failure of Austria-Hungary to consult privately before changing its policy.

Two observations should be made about these developments in the A-run. First, some historians have expressed the opinion that England should have taken a stronger position more quickly, forcing moderation upon the Triple Alliance.[19] Second, and perhaps of greater importance, if the input phase had been extended for one more historical day, the participants would have received England's diplomatic communiques proposing an international conference and the prompt rejection of this suggestion by several nations. Thus, an alternative actually considered and subsequently

[17] The chronology of hostilities during this critical period in 1914 was as follows: July 28—Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia; July 29—Russia orders and then cancels general mobilization; July 30—Russia again orders general mobilization, France alerts troops along German border; July 31—Austria-Hungary begins general mobilization, Germany issues ultimatum demanding Russia stop mobilizing within 12 hours or Germany will mobilize; August 1—France and Germany start general mobilization, Germany declares war on Russia. After August 1, formal declarations of war follow in quick succession from the other major European states.

[18] It is to be understood that the references to nations here are to the student decision makers in the simulated nations.

[19] See, for example, Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, edited and translated by Isabella M. Massy (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), Vol. 2, p. 514; and Sidney B. Fay, *The Origins of the World War* (New York: Macmillan, 1930), Vol. 2, p. 556.

excluded by the historical figures provided the avenue which the simulation participants followed for the resolution of the imposed situation.

Several major divergences from the outbreak of World War I developed in the A-run. Least parallel to historical events is the indication in some messages that England was considering the initiation of war on Germany while the advantage appeared on her side. This war was represented in communications as a defensive strategy resulting from the military and economic threat of Germany. A second significant variation was the agreement of Austria-Hungary to withdraw her ultimatum. The Austro-Hungarian decision maker, intended to represent Conrad, revealed pacifistic tendencies and readily accepted the objections to his nation's militaristic actions. This behavior suggests a need to match more closely the social-political attitudes of the historical figures and the simulation participants.

This account of the A-run's divergences fittingly introduces the analysis of smaller, more specific events that occurred in the simulation and in the last days of July, 1914. By comparing numerous micro occurrences, validity depends not on the correspondence between isolated events (war or no war) but on the overall goodness of fit between a distribution of events. In other words, we are interested in whether the overall pattern of simulation occurrences is more or less like the pattern of reported incidents prior to World War I.

To illustrate this approach a sample of micro events was drawn from the simulation (the M-run) that at the macro level displayed a higher degree of correspondence to 1914. In this analysis an action mentioned by the participants in their written communication constituted a micro event. Eighteen separate micro events were identified in the M-run messages during the first simulated day of the free activity phase. A somewhat longer series of events would probably have been discovered for that day if transcripts of conferences had been examined in addition to the written communications. No reason, however, has been found to suggest that the types of events produced in face-to-face interactions differ for validity purposes from those indicated in written messages.

After the simulation events had been abstracted, a major historical study of the beginnings of the First World War was examined for comparable events.[20] In Table 2 the simulation events are indicated in the left-hand column and the reported historical events are listed in the corresponding space in the right-hand column.

Several alternative means of comparing the events were identified. Comparable activity is one way to match events in both the pre-World War I crisis and the simulation. We describe this as occurrence similarity. A second basis of comparison involves intent or purpose. Men's purposes in initiating or manipulating events may be similar, regardless of differences in format or activity. For example, in Item 16 in Table 2 the simulation action is the reverse of that reported in the observable world of 1914, but the intentions of the decision makers in both actions were probably similar. Germany was concerned that any war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia be kept localized without the intervention of other countries. To achieve this objective the simulation decision makers chose to elicit pledges of neutrality from two important nations. In actuality, the German decision makers decided that quick action, before commitments and reactions could be made, was the preferable policy. Another way of comparing events is through temporal equivalence. The timing of some simulation events closely matches that of similar events in reality; others deviate sharply in this temporal aspect.

One of the researchers rated the 18 simulation events on each of the three bases of comparison. For each simulation event, temporal equivalence was given a score of one (i.e., assumed similarity) if it occurred within one day on either side of the reported 1914 event to which it was compared. If the time disparity was greater than the arbitrary threshold, it was coded as nonsimilar and assigned a zero. The same zero or one scoring was used for comparing events on intention and on occurrence similarity. The estimated scores for each event are presented in the center column of Table 2.

If the scores for the three categories are combined for the 18 events, the highest possible goodness of fit score is 54. The overall score for the distribution of events in the first simulated day of the M-run is 31. More specifically, all 18 events were judged similar in intent to developments that occurred in the 1914 crisis. Weighed against the significance of this finding must be the recognition that it is difficult to ascertain the intent of simulation participants, to say nothing of historical policy makers. Rules for guiding such coding are exceedingly hard to devise. For half of the simulation events (9 of 18), the researchers were able to

[20] Luigi Albertini, *ibid.*, Vol. 2.

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF SAMPLE OF SIMULATION EVENTS WITH HISTORICAL EVENTS

Simulated July 26, M-run	Estimated Score[a]	Reported Historical Events[b]
1. Germany requests Russia to demobilize.	T = 0 I = 1 O = 1 — 2	*July 29:* German note to Russia: "... further progress of Russian mobilization measures would compel us to mobilize and then European war would scarcely be prevented" (p. 491).
2. Russia notifies Germany that no demobilization will occur until safeguards are established for Serbia.	T = 1 I = 1 O = 0 — 2	*July 28:* Russian foreign minister informs German ambassador that Russia is ready to assist in "procuring legitimate satisfaction for Austria-Hungary without abandoning the standpoint, to which Russia must firmly adhere, that Serbia's sovereignty must not be infringed" (p. 404). There is no explicit mention of making demobilization conditional on such safeguards.
3. In a conference Russia asks England and France to mobilize; both refuse.	T = 0 I = 1 O = 0 — 1	*July 24:* Conversation between Russian foreign minister and ambassadors from France and England. France agrees to fulfill all obligations of her treaty. England more evasive but conciliatory. (Pp. 294–96.)
4. In a conference England and France inquire as to Russian military needs.	T = 0 I = 1 O = 1 — 2	
5. Germany notifies Russia that the latter's support of Serbia would be aggression.	T = 0 I = 1 O = 0 — 1	*July 28:* No evidence found of direct communication between Germany and Russia on this matter; however, Albertini concludes that this was a German objective. In support he cites several telegrams emanating from the German foreign office on July 28 including a note from the Kaiser: "It is an imperative necessity that the responsibility for a possible extension of the conflict to the Powers not immediately concerned should in all circumstances fall on Russia" (p. 474 and p. 476).
6. Austria-Hungary warns Russia not to mobilize further.	T = 0 I = 1 O = 1 — 2	*July 29:* There is some suggestion that the Austro-Hungarian ambassador warned the Russian foreign minister against Russian intervention on this date, although the conversation was interrupted by information that Austria-Hungary had bombed Belgrade. (Pp. 552–53.) On July 26 Austria-Hungary's alliance partner, Germany, issued warnings through her ambassador to the Russian foreign minister: "I made detailed and urgent representations to the Minister about how dangerous it seemed to me to attempt to strengthen diplomatic action by military pressure" (p. 481).
7. Discussion on need for attack on Serbia in Austro-Hungarian internal conference.	T = 0 I = 1 O = 1 — 2	*July 7:* Austro-Hungarian Council of Ministers for Joint Affairs: one of a number of internal conferences before delivery of the Serbian ultimatum in which plans for attack on Serbia and the expected Russian reaction were discussed. No explicit program to make Russia appear the aggressor is mentioned although this appears to have been part of the Triple Alliance strategy. (P. 166.)
8. Discussion in Austro-Hungarian internal conference on making Russia appear the aggressor in an expansion of hostilities.	T = 0 I = 1 O = 0 — 1	
9. Austro-Hungarian note to Russia charges Russia's action is aggressive.	T = 0 I = 1 O = 1 — 2	*July 30:* Austro-Hungarian foreign minister tells Russian ambassador: "Austria-Hungary had mobilised solely against Serbia, not against Russia. . . . By the fact that Russia is obviously mobilising against us we should also have to extend our mobilisation. . . ." (p. 662).

[a] "T" stands for temporal equivalence, "I" for intention, and "O" for occurrence similarity. Each of the three categories was assigned a "1" if the simulation and 1914 event were judged as similar on that criterion; or a "0" if they were judged dissimilar. Simulation and historical events rated as similar on each of the criteria received an overall score of three.

[b] The source for the reported historical events is Luigi Albertini, *The Origins of the War of 1914*, edited and translated by Isabella M. Massy (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), Vol. 2. All page references are to this volume.

TABLE 2—(*Continued*)

Simulated July 26, M-run	Estimated Score[a]	Reported Historical Events[b]
10. Austro-Hungarian note to Russia states Austria-Hungary must hold Serbia accountable.	T = 0 I = 1 O = 1 — 2	*July 30:* On the basis of above conversation with Berchtold, the Russian ambassador telegraphs his own foreign minister: "[Berchtold] is of the opinion that it is impossible for Austria to stop her operations against Serbia without having received full satisfaction and solid guarantees for the future" (pp. 662–63).
11. In note France assures England of friendship.	T = 0 I = 1 O = 0 — 1	*July 29:* France appears to have repeatedly probed England on the issue of unified action and support. For example, the July 24 three-way conversation in St. Petersburg (pp. 294–96) or the inquiry to the British ambassador by his French colleague in Berlin, July 29 (p. 520n). A major discussion on this point took place between the British foreign minister and the French ambassador on July 29. In a follow-up conversation on July 31, the ambassador asked Grey if England would "help France if Germany made an attack on her." (P. 646.) However, the type of military aid was not specified.
12. France requests military aid in note to England.	T = 0 I = 1 O = 1 — 2	
13. France urges a united front in a note to England.	T = 0 I = 1 O = 1 — 2	
14. Germany makes internal decision to give secret aid to Austria-Hungary.	T = 0 I = 1 O = 1 — 2	*July 5–6:* The Hoyos mission occurred, and Germany agreed to the so-called "blank check." Subsequent conversations between the Kaiser, his Chancellor, and military staff also reveal a discussion of military assistance to Austria-Hungary. (Pp. 133–59.)
15. Germany's internal decision to seek neutrality pact with France and England to keep them from aiding Russia should latter intervene in Austria-Hungary's war against Serbia.	T = 0 I = 1 O = 0 — 1	While no direct documentation was found for verifying this internal decision, Albertini concludes: "The study of the German documents shows beyond all shadow of doubt (1) that in allowing Austria to attack Serbia, Germany started from the assumption that, if the attack developed into a European war, England would remain neutral; (2) that Grey's conduct until the afternoon of July 29 . . . strengthened the German leaders in this opinion. . . . ." (p. 514).
16. Germany urges Austria-Hungary not to attack until neutrality of France and England is assured.	T = 1 I = 1 O = 0 — 2	*July 26:* Austria receives Germany's message urging military operations against Serbia as quickly as possible: "Any delay in coming military operations is regarded here as a great danger because of the interference of other Powers" (p. 453).
17. Decision in Russian internal conference not to reveal, at present, their plan to attack Austria-Hungary if she attacks Serbia.	T = 1 I = 1 O = 0 — 2	*July 25:* Russian crown council decides on mobilization to be followed by war if Serbia is attacked. (P. 762.)
18. Decision in Russian internal conference to announce their intention to give Serbia full military aid.	T = 1 I = 1 O = 0 — 2	

find historical actions which seemed to be equivalent in physical format. Four of the 18 simulation events took place at approximately the point in time that the simulation was intended to replicate. One possible explanation for the low correspondence on temporal equivalence involves the problem of equating intervals in the simulation to actual days. The simulation may not have been adequately structured to provide the participants with the impression that each 50 minute period represented 24 hours of "real" time.

Hypotheses. In one sense the comparison of simulation and historical events includes the investigation of a hypothesis. The hypothesis is that a macro event or a distribution of events in system A is comparable in a specified characteristic to a given event or distribution of events in system A'. Such a proposition, however, is oriented exclusively to the two systems

involved—in the present case, the outbreak of World War I and the simulation of those events. In this section, attention is directed to more general hypotheses. These statements of relationship are intended to apply not only to the situation as it existed in Europe in the summer of 1914, but to other configurations of nations in international politics. Two hypotheses which have been tested with data from the 1914 crisis will be explored with the simulation data.

The three researchers who have studied the first hypothesis in the 1914 context have stated it as follows:

> If a state's perception of injury (or frustration, dissatisfaction, hostility, or threat) to itself is "sufficiently" great, this perception will offset perceptions of insufficient capability, making the perception of capability much less important a factor in a decision to go to war.[21]

To explore their hypothesis, the members of the Stanford Studies in Conflict and Integration content analyzed 1,165 communications exchanged between the European states in the weeks prior to the beginning of the First World War. The purpose of this analysis was to determine the frequency of perceptions of capability and hostility. In the content analysis a perception of capability was defined as an assertion "concerning the power of another state or a coalition of states, or a statement with regard to the changing power of either a state or a coalition of states." A perception of hostility was defined as "a statement by one country about the hostility directed toward it by a second country, or about the hostility directed by a second country toward a third country. . . . Statements of hostility are defined to include statements of threat, fear and injury."[22]

The number of hostility and capability statements that the Stanford group found for the nations subsequently represented in the simulation are reported in the first columns of Table 3. Perceptions of hostility exceed those of capability for every nation. The overall difference is statistically significant ($p < .05$) by a sign test. Using the same definitions of hostility and capability, the messages written during the two simulation runs were content analyzed in a similar fashion.[23] As shown in the second and third sections of Table 3, the perceptions of hostility were significantly greater ($p < .05$) than those of capability in both runs. Thus, the simulation runs and the 1914 data produce comparable results on this general hypothesis.

TABLE 3. NUMBER OF HOSTILITY AND CAPABILITY STATEMENTS FOR NATIONS IN 1914 AND IN SIMULATION

Nation	1914[a]		M-Run		A-Run	
	Hostility	Capability	Hostility	Capability	Hostility	Capability
Austria-Hungary	179	26	91	38	63	28
England	32	16	17	13	24	7
France	26	18	41	36	21	5
Germany	138	34	53	35	107	26
Russia	50	28	30	16	69	20

[a] The 1914 data are in Dina A. Zinnes, Robert C. North, and Howard E. Koch, "Capabilities, Threat and the Outbreak of War," in James A. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1961), p. 476.

A further check was made on the goodness of fit between the simulation and the 1914 data. The difference between the number of hostility and capability statements was determined for each nation. Within each of the three sets of data these differences were placed in rank order, that is, with the nation having the largest difference being given the first rank, etc. Then the order of the ranks for each of the simulation runs was compared with the order produced by the 1914 data. The resulting rank-order correlation (.90) between the 1914 data and that of the M-run was statistically significant ($p = .05$). The correlation for the A-run was not significant, however.

The second general hypothesis asserts that when opposing alliances or blocs emerge in international politics, the communication between blocs will be much less than that among alliance partners. Zinnes, who has tested this hypothesis with the 1914 data, states the relationship as follows: "Frequency of interaction within the bloc will be greater than the frequency of interaction between blocs."[24] To

[21] Dina A. Zinnes, Robert C. North, and Howard E. Koch, "Capabilities, Threat and the Outbreak of War," in Rosenau, *op. cit.*, p. 470.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 472.

[23] The inter-coder reliability for the simulation content analysis of hostility was .82 and for capability .83. For a description of the statistics used in this paper (the sign test, rank-order correlation, and Mann-Whitney U test) see Sidney Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956).

[24] Dina A. Zinnes, "A Comparison of Hostile Behavior of Decision-Makers in Simulate and Historical Data," *World Politics*, 18 (1966), p. 477. This article is one of the few efforts to explore simulation validity by what we have de-

TABLE 4. EFFECTS OF ALLIANCE STRUCTURE ON COMMUNICATION IN 1914 AND IN SIMULATION

Source of Data	Number of Intra-Bloc Dyads (n_1)	Number of Inter-Bloc Dyads (n_2)	Mann-Whitney U[a]	Significance
1914	8	12	15	<.01
M-Run	8	12	10.5	<.01
A-Run	8	12	43	—

[a] It should be noted that for a given n_1 and n_2, the smaller the U the greater its likelihood of being significant.

explore this hypothesis, a count was made of the number of communications that each nation dispatched to the other four nations primarily involved in the 1914 crisis. The number of messages exchanged between each possible combination of two nations was established. Rates of communication in dyads composed of nations in the same bloc were compared with those in dyads consisting of nations from opposing blocs. A Mann-Whitney U test applied to the rank-order positions of these dyads supports the hypothesis.[25] The results are shown in the first row of Table 4. Identical procedures were followed for the M- and A-runs using the messages sent by the decision makers to other nations. The results for the M-run, shown in the second row of Table 4, are statistically significant. By contrast, as indicated in the third row of Table 4, the findings for the A-run are not significant. Once again, the data from the M-run appear to be a better fit with that drawn from 1914 than do the data produced in the A-run.

III. EVALUATION

Replication of the 1914 Crisis. Can the Inter-Nation Simulation replicate occurrences in the observable universe such as the outbreak of World War I? Regardless of how intriguing this question is, for a number of reasons we cannot fully answer it with the present data. The exploratory nature of this initial research has been emphasized. A more complete study would require many more runs. It would be desirable to engage more mature participants whose previous experiences and backgrounds might lend themselves to the simulation problem. Moreover, the calculations used to set the beginning values of the parameters and the procedures used to code the simulation data need further refinement.

Even if one were tempted to make rough judgments on validity based exclusively on this pilot study, the divergence between the two runs imposes constraints. Using both events and general hypotheses to check the "fit" between 1914 and simulation data, the M-run approximates the political crisis prior to the First World War more closely than the A-run. At the macro event level, the M-run appeared on the verge of war with the same alliance commitments as observed in 1914. On the other hand, the A-run averted the immediate threat of war and involved several incidents in sharp contrast to those reported in the historical situation. In data from both runs, as in the material from 1914, perceptions of hostility were significantly more frequent than perceptions of capability. Only in the M-run, however, did the differences between these two kinds of perceptions correlate with similar data from the actual nations of 1914. Furthermore, the hypothesis that communication would be greater within alliances than between them was supported both by the 1914 data and the M-run data; but it was not confirmed in the A-run. These differences occurred despite a common introductory briefing, identical materials in the input phase, and the same set of initial values for the simulation parameters.

The two runs, however, did not share the same human participants. Although an effort was made to select participants in both runs with similar personality characteristics, it will be recalled that the matching was limited to a few traits. Moreover, on those characteristics for which an attempt at correspondence was made, the personality profiles of some individuals more closely matched their historical counterparts than others. As we noted previously, five of the six individuals whose profiles corresponded most completely with those designed to represent the historical figures participated in the M-run and only one in the A-run. In other words, half of the participants in the run that best approximated the 1914 crisis were first choices on the personality matching, whereas only one of the 10 decision makers in the more divergent run was a first choice. (In the A-run, six participants were second choices and three were third choices. Of the other five participants in the M-run,

scribed as the hypothesis approach. Statistical tests are conducted on hypotheses using data from World War I and from another series of Inter-Nation Simulation runs which made no attempt to replicate those historical events.

[25] The 1914 data for this analysis were obtained from Zinnes, *ibid.* She performed a similar statistical test using Serbia as well as the five nations represented in the simulation. It is interesting that with the addition of Serbia, the result is not significant.

TABLE 5. SITUATIONS VIEWED AS SIMILAR TO THE SIMULATION ON THE DEBRIEFING QUESTIONNAIRES

Situation	M-Run Decision Makers (N = 10)		A-Run Decision Makers (N = 7[a])		Totals (N = 17)		
	Similar	Almost Exact	Similar	Almost Exact	Similar	Almost Exact	Overall Total
World War I	3	2	1	1	4	3	7
Hitler's Ultimatum to Poland	1	2	2	1	3	3	6
Berlin Crisis	2	2	1	1	3	3	6
Hitler's Ultimatum to Sudetenland	2	1	2	1	4	2	6
Israeli-Arab Conflict	3	0	2	1	5	1	6
French-Algerian Conflict	1	1	2	1	3	2	5
Korean War	3	0	1	1	4	1	5
19th Century Colonialism	4	0	0	1	4	1	5
Spanish-American War	1	0	2	1	3	1	4
Attack on Pearl Harbor	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
World War II	1	0	0	0	1	0	1

[a] Three of the A-run participants were unable to attend the debriefing session.

three were second choices and two were third choices.) Correspondence between a simulation and its reference system appears to have been facilitated by closer matching of the personalities of the participant and the historical figure.

Procedural Issues. These initial runs do not establish whether the Inter-Nation Simulation can replicate aspects of historical events, but they do uncover several procedural issues that a more complete study would confront. One problem is the participants' awareness of the historical events being simulated. We have described the efforts to mask the historical clues to avoid biasing participant responses. Despite these attempts, the disguise was not fully successful. On the debriefing questionnaire, the participants were asked to check from a list of historical situations those incidents that appeared "somewhat similar" and those that seemed "almost exactly like" their simulation run.[26] Table 5 indicates that five of the 10 participants in the M-run and two of the seven who completed the questionnaire in the A-run perceived some degree of similarity between their simulation and World War I. No other historical situation was identified by seven participants, but four others were each chosen by six individuals.[27]

Even though the results from this questionnaire item are not conclusive, they suggest the need for more vigilance in making past events unrecognizable. When, however, the content of historical situations is changed or misleading clues are added, there is the danger that essential attributes of the actual events will be so distorted they will not provide a validity

[26] In retrospect, this questionnaire item was not totally satisfactory. Estimating the difference between situations rated "exactly alike" and those rated "somewhat alike" is difficult. Because most participants checked several historical situations, it is not clear how much more the simulation resembled the 1914 crisis than, for example, Hitler's ultimatum to Poland. Furthermore, participants were not asked to state when they became aware of the apparent similarity between the simulation and a past event. Some evidence indicates that a messenger suggested the parallel to World War I to several individuals near the end of the M-run. An unstructured question, which provided no list of historical events, might have reduced the number of references to World War I. The alternative situations in the questionnaire item were selected from events mentioned by high school students who pretested the material for the input phase.

[27] The messengers in both runs also completed this questionnaire item. Six out of nine messengers reported a similarity to World War I. It may be that the overall view of events provided by this role increased their awareness of the similarities.

check. This difficulty can be handled by selecting a less well-known situation—providing sufficient information exists on it to construct the necessary inputs. Alternatively, means of comparing the simulation and the actual event can be chosen which are unlikely to be affected if the participants identify the general situation. For example, in the present runs even those participants who saw a similarity to World War I were less likely to know the relationship between perceptions of hostility and capability, or to be aware of the micro events that occurred on July 26, 1914.

Another issue is the distinction between "self-structured activity" and "role playing." Should a simulation participant be required to play the role of a historical decision maker whose characteristic behaviors have been described to him or should the participant be free to structure his own activity? This problem is illustrated by an incident in one of the runs. A participant confronted a decision which he felt his assigned historical figure would answer one way, but he personally would answer another. Should he assume the role or play himself? Given difficulties in constructing profiles of historical figures and problems in matching participants on numerous characteristics, role playing may supplement incomplete personality correspondence. On the other hand, without detailed information one individual's interpretation of the probable behavior of another individual is likely to produce major distortions. Supplying such information would disclose the identity of the historical figure. Investigations probably should be limited to a few personality traits that are part of the natural disposition of the participant. In the event, however, that participants are asked to "play" a historical personality, selection procedures might include some indicators of the empathic qualities required for role playing or acting.

Some explicit reference should be made to the procedural problem of selecting the kind of historical situation that the simulation is intended to represent. All models—including games and simulations—are simplifications of the systems they are designed to replicate. This simplification is achieved in part by completely excluding certain properties of the referent system from the model or by combining numerous detailed elements in an aggregated form. Obviously, a simulation cannot be validated by comparing its output with historical phenomena the model was not designed to represent.

In several ways the effectiveness of the present research for validating the Inter-Nation Simulation is reduced because the 1914 crisis was selected as the historical situation to be replicated. The conversion of the basic time units in the simulation from years to days furnishes one example. With the time units scaled-down, the components in the programmed part of the model acted as constants, though many of them normally operate as variables. In these exploratory runs, then, the part of the simulated world contained in the structured programs affected the behavior of the participants only insofar as they recalled its impact on their previous simulation experience. The 1914 crisis did not provide a means of investigating the programmed relationships as they operate in the usual Inter-Nation Simulation. Although such short-term crises may be excellent for determining the validity of other simulation models, they seem somewhat less appropriate for the Inter-Nation Simulation.

The micro event analysis provides a second illustration of the problem. The variables in the programmed portion of the simulation are broad representations of properties within a nation (e.g., the sum of all human and natural resources, or overall military capability). The events in the micro analysis, however, were at the more specific level of a diplomatic conference or a decision to mobilize ground forces in a certain district. The Inter-Nation Simulation was able to produce events at this level of specificity, but it is not clear that they are produced by the aggregate variables that compose the model.[28]

IV. HISTORICAL SITUATIONS AS AN APPROACH TO VALIDITY

The procedural problems that emerged in the exploratory attempts to replicate the 1914 crisis are not insurmountable obstacles to the use of historical situations as validity tests for simulations. With careful attention to the selection of both participants and the past occurrences to be simulated, these difficulties can be minimized. Broader concerns about the use of historical data for verifying models, however, also must be considered. One challenge to this validity technique is raised by the developers of a simulated underdeveloped economy.

[28] For further discussion of the level of specificity issue, see Harold Guetzkow, "Simulation in International Relations," in *Proceedings of the IBM Scientific Computing Symposium on Simulation Models and Gaming*, December, 1964, Thomas J. Watson Research Center, Yorktown Heights, New York, esp. pp. 264–267.

When a simulation of a particular economy has been formulated, it should be subjected to shocks and exogenous trends like those that have impinged on the actual economy in the past so that its responses may be compared with historical records. It would seem that such tests would yield an independent verification of the model. Actually, in most cases it is unlikely that this ideal can be fully realized. . . . The difficulty, fundamentally, is that the information available in almost all countries is insufficient to establish a model without using all the relevant historical data in the formulation and in the adjustment of parameter values.[29]

The economic model mentioned above is a completely programmed computer simulation and, accordingly, requires more data for establishing its initial values. Nevertheless, the problem is applicable to all historical validation attempts. Clearly, a simulation cannot be validated against the same historical material used to determine its parameters and beginning variable values. Historical replication always will be limited by the record of past events. Not only must there be a detailed account of decisions and actions, but the sequence of events must continue over a sufficient period of time without major changes which require resetting the model's parameters. For this reason historical verification may be more feasible for some types of simulations than others. The smaller the number of variables and parameters which require historical data, the more uncommitted historical material is available for establishing the goodness of fit. Moreover, if the content of the simulation deals with the kind of phenomena that recur frequently in the observable world, then historical validation is more applicable. Thus, a simulation of American judicial decision making is more readily verified with historical data than an operating model of disarmament processes.

Let us assume for the moment that sufficient historical data exist and that the content of a given simulation model permits the use of the validity approach described in this essay. Furthermore, let us assume that a comparison of events in simulation and in history reveals a high degree of correspondence. This correspondence does not demonstrate that the simulation correctly represents the structure and processes that were operative in the historical occurrence. We are speculating on the similarity between the historical and simulated inputs on the basis of the similarity of their outputs. Different relationships among various combinations of properties in the simulation conceivably could produce outcomes like those in the historical situation.

A simulation of the 1960 national Presidential election predicted the percentage of the vote for each candidate—the outcome—with considerable success. The designers of that simulation observe, however, that "it may legitimately be asked what in the equations accounted for this success, and whether there were parts of the equations that contributed nothing or even did harm."[30] Further analysis of the equations in the simulation revealed that the outcome was predicted despite the fact that at least one equation misrepresented aspects of voter turnout. Part of the structure of the simulation was incorrect, but the simulated result still matched the actual outcome. Despite this difficulty, our confidence that the simulation has captured some aspects of the voting process is greater than it would have been if the simulation had failed to replicate the campaign outcome. Confidence in the simulation would increase further as the operating model demonstrated ability to produce outcomes that corresponded with various elections. In sum, the similarity between simulation and historical events can provide at best only indirect and partial evidence for the correctness of the simulated structures and processes that produced the outcome.

Historical material can be used for validity purposes in other ways than by providing events for simulations to reproduce. In the exploratory runs, two validation techniques were tried—event comparisons and hypothesis testing. Although general hypotheses can include events as variables, they also can involve the processes by which events are produced. When events do become variables in a hypothesis, they tend to be more the micro events that occur with sufficient frequency to permit an adequate test. Hypothesis testing, therefore, is less susceptible to the criticisms of event comparisons made above. Verba has argued that difficulties in validly simulating a macro event (such as the outbreak of war) may exceed a model's potential contribution to theories of international politics. "Even if one could design a successful simulation in that respect, it

[29] Edward P. Holland with Robert W. Gillespie, *Experiments on a Simulated Underdeveloped Economy* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1963), 207–208.

[30] Ithiel Pool, Robert P. Abelson, and Samuel L. Popkin, *Candidates, Issues, and Strategies* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965) rev. ed., p. 64.

might not be useful for future situations, which would not match the historical one in many important ways." Instead, he proposes that "if the situation can be decomposed into many subprocesses, such as communications flows, emotional states of decision-makers, and so forth . . . it may be possible to develop more widely applicable principles that can deal with many political situations."[21] Historical material may prove more useful for simulation validity explorations if it yields frequency distributions of events and processes that can be employed in hypothesis testing.

We have described some important procedural problems as well as two major limitations to using the replication of historical situations as a means of validating political simulations. In addition to event comparisons and hypothesis testing, alternative ways of verifying simulations are available. But they also have substantial liabilities.[22] In part because no one approach can fully establish the correspondence between a simulation and its intended referent system, simulation validity is always a matter of degree. Yet we cannot abandon the efforts to determine the goodness of fit between verifiable empirical observations and our conceptualizations—be they stated as verbal theories, mathematical equations, or simulation models. To improve our estimates of simulation validity, a strategy is required that includes multiple methods for discerning the degree of correspondence. In such a multimethod strategy one approach is historical replication. Until more validation exercises are conducted, it is premature to accept or reject simulation as an important new tool for studying political phenomena.

[21] Sidney Verba, *op. cit.*, 511, 513.

[22] For a survey of various validity approaches and a discussion of their assets and liabilities, see Charles F. Hermann, *Behavioral Science, op. cit.*

CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT: A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS*

J. S. NYE
Harvard University

"Private Vices by the dextrous Management of a skillful Politician may be turned into Publick Benefits."

—Bernard Mandeville, 1714

I. THE STUDY OF CORRUPTION IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Corruption, some say, is endemic in all governments.[1] Yet it has received remarkably little attention from students of government. Not only is the study of corruption prone to moralism, but it involves one of those aspects of government in which the interests of the politician and the political scientist are likely to conflict. It would probably be rather difficult to obtain (by honest means) a visa to a developing country which is to be the subject of a corruption study.

One of the first charges levelled at the previous regime by the leaders of the coup in the less developed country is "corruption." And generally the charge is accurate. One type of reaction to this among observers is highly moralistic and tends to see corruption as evil. "Throughout the fabric of public life in newly independent States," we are told in a recent work on the subject, "runs the scarlet thread of bribery and corruption . . ." which is like a weed suffocating better plants. Another description of new states informs us that "corruption and nepotism rot good intentions and retard progressive policies."[2]

Others have reacted against this moralistic approach and warn us that we must beware of basing our beliefs about the cause of coups on post-coup rationalizations, and also of judging the social consequences of an act from the motives of the individuals performing it.[3] Under some circumstances Mandeville is right that private vice can cause public benefit. Corruption has probably been, on balance, a positive factor in both Russian and American economic development. At least two very important aspects of British and American political development—the establishment of the cabinet system in the 18th century and the national integration of millions of immigrants in the 19th century—were based in part on corruption. As for corruption and stability, an anthropologist has suggested that periodic scandals can sometimes "lead to the affirmation of general principles about how the country should be run, as if there were not posed impossible reconciliations of different interests. These inquiries may not alter what actually happens, but they affirm an ideal condition of unity and justice."[4] However, the "revisionists" who echo Mandeville's aphorism often underestimate tastes for moralism—concern for worthiness of causes as well as utilitarian consequences of behavior. There is always the danger for a corrupt system that someone will question what it profits to gain the world at the price of a soul. The purpose of this paper is less to settle the difference between "moralists" and "revisionists" about the general effect of corruption on development (although a tentative conclusion is presented) than to suggest a means to make the debate more fruitful. After discussing the problem in the usual general

* The author is indebted to Samuel P. Huntington, Leon Lindberg and Robert Erwin for reading an earlier version of this paper.

[1] C. J. Friedrich, *Man and His Government* (New York, 1963), p. 167. See also "Political Pathology," *The Political Quarterly*, 37 (January–March, 1966), 70–85.

[2] Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins, *Corruption in Developing Countries* (London, 1963), pp. 11, 12. K. T. Young, Jr., "New Politics in New States," *Foreign Affairs*, 39 (April, 1961), at p. 498.

[3] See, for example: Nathaniel Leff, "Economic Development Through Bureaucratic Corruption," *The American Behavioral Scientist*, 8 (November, 1964), 8–14; David H. Bayley, "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation," *The Western Political Quarterly*, 19 (December, 1966), 719–732; J. J. Van Klaveren in a "Comment" in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 6 (January, 1964), at p. 195, even argues that "recent experience in the so-called underdeveloped countries has most vividly brought home the fact that corruption is not a mass of incoherent phenomena, but a political system, capable of being steered with tolerable precision by those in power."

[4] Max Gluckman, *Custom and Conflict in Africa* (Oxford, 1955), p. 135.

terms of possibility, we shall turn to more specific hypotheses about probability.

This paper is concerned with the *effects* of corruption, but a word should be said about causes to dispel any impression that corruption is a uniquely Afro-Asian-Latin American problem. I assume no European or American monopoly of morals. After all, Lord Bryce saw corruption as a major American flaw and noted its outbreak in "virulent form" in the new states in Europe.[5] Yet behavior that will be considered corrupt is likely to be more prominent in less developed countries because of a variety of conditions involved in their underdevelopment—great inequality in distribution of wealth; political office as the primary means of gaining access to wealth; conflict between changing moral codes; the weakness of social and governmental enforcement mechanisms; and the absence of a strong sense of national community.[6] The weakness of the legitimacy of governmental institutions is also a contributing factor, though to attribute this entirely to the prevalence of a cash nexus or the divergence of moral codes under previous colonial governments or to the mere newness of the states concerned may be inadequate in light of the experience with corruption of older, non-colonial less developed states such as Thailand or Liberia. Regardless of causes, however, the conditions of less developed countries are such that corruption is likely to have different effects than in more developed countries.

Most researchers on developing areas gather some information on corruption, and this paper will suggest hypotheses about the costs and benefits of corruption for development that may lure some of this information into the open. However, in view of the fact that generalizations about corruption and development tend to be disguised descriptions of a particular area in which the generalizer has done field work, I will state at the outset that generalizations in this paper are unevenly based on field work in East Africa and Central America and on secondary sources for other areas.

Definitions pose a problem. Indeed, if we define political development as "rational, modern, honest government," then it cannot coexist with corruption in the same time period; and if corruption is endemic in government, a politically developed society cannot exist. "Political development" is not an entirely satisfactory term since it has an evaluative as well as a descriptive content. At least in the case of economic development, there is general agreement on the units and scale by which to measure (growth of per capita income). In politics, however, there is agreement neither on the units nor on a single scale to measure development.[7] Emphasis on some scales rather than others tends to reflect an author's interests.

In this author's view, the term "political development" is best used to refer to the recurring problem of relating governmental structures and processes to social change. It seems useful to use one term to refer to the type of change which seems to be occurring in our age ("modernization") and another to refer to capacity of political structures and processes to cope with social change, to the extent it exists, in any period.[8] We generally assume that this means structures and processes which are regarded as legitimate by relevant sectors of the population and effective in producing outputs desired by relevant sectors of the population. I assume that legitimacy and effectiveness are linked in the "long run" but can compensate for each other in the "short run."[9] What constitutes a relevant sector of the population will vary with the period and with social changes within a period. In the modern period we tend to assume that at least a veneer of broad participation is essential for establishing or maintaining legitimacy. In other words, in the current period, political development and political modernization may come close to involving the same things.

In this paper, political development (or decay) will mean growth (or decline) in the

[5] James Bryce, *Modern Democracies* (New York, 1921), Vol. II, p. 509.

[6] Colin Leys, "What is the Problem About Corruption?" *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3, 2 (1965), 224–225; Ralph Braibanti, "Reflections on Bureaucratic Corruption," *Public Administration*, 40 (Winter, 1962), 365–371.

[7] Nor, by the nature of the subject, is there likely to be. In Pye's words, "no single scale can be used for measuring political development": Lucian Pye (ed.), *Communications and Political Development* (Princeton, 1963). See also Lucian Pye, "The Concept of Political Development," *The Annals*, 358 (March 1965), 1–19; Samuel Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, 17 (April, 1965), 386–430; Robert Packenham, "Political Development Doctrines in the American Foreign Aid Program," *World Politics*, 18 (January, 1966), 194–235.

[8] See Huntington, *op. cit.*, 389.

[9] S. M. Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City, 1959), 72–75.

capacity of a society's governmental structures and processes to maintain their legitimacy over time (i.e., presumably in the face of social change). This allows us to see development as a moving equilibrium and avoid some of the limitations of equating development and modernization. Of course, this definition does not solve all the concept's problems. Unless we treat development entirely ex post facto, there will still be differences over evaluation (legitimate in whose eyes?) and measurement (national integration, administrative capacity, institutionalization?) as well as what constitutes a "long" and "short" run. Thus we will find that forms of corruption which have beneficial effects on economic development may be detrimental for political development; or may promote one form of political development (i.e., defined one way or measured along one scale) but be detrimental to another. We shall have to continue to beware of variations in what we mean by political development. (Alternatively, those who reject the term "political development" can still read the paper as relating corruption to three problems of change discussed below.)

The definition of corruption also poses serious problems. Broadly defined as perversion or a change from good to bad, it covers a wide range of behavior from venality to ideological erosion. For instance, we might describe the revolutionary student who returns from Paris to a former French African country and accepts a (perfectly legal) overpaid civil service post as "corrupted." But used this broadly the term is more relevant to moral evaluation than political analysis. I will use a narrower definition which can be made operational. Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence.[10] This includes such behavior as bribery (use of a reward to pervert the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (bestowal of patronage by reason of ascriptive relationship rather than merit); and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of public resources for private-regarding uses). This definition does not include much behavior that might nonetheless be regarded as offensive to moral standards. It also excludes any consideration of whether the behavior is in the public interest, since building the study of the effects of the behavior into the definition makes analysis of the relationship between corruption and development difficult. Similarly, it avoids the question of whether non-Western societies regard the behavior as corrupt, preferring to treat that also as a separate variable. To build such relativism into the definition is to make specific behavior which can be compared between countries hard to identify. Moreover, in most less developed countries, there are two standards regarding such behavior, one indigenous and one more or less Western, and the formal duties and rules concerning most public roles tend to be expressed in terms of the latter.[11] In short, while this definition of corruption is not entirely satisfactory in terms of inclusiveness of behavior and the handling of relativity of standards, it has the merit of denoting specific behavior generally called corrupt by Western standards (which are at least partly relevant in most developing countries) and thus allowing us to ask what effects this specific behavior has under differing conditions.

[10] The second part of the definition is taken from Edward C. Banfield, *Political Influence* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961), p. 315.

II. POSSIBLE BENEFITS AND COSTS

Discussion of the relation of corruption to development tends to be phrased in general terms. Usually the argument between moralists and revisionists tends to be about the possibility that corruption (type unspecified) *can* be beneficial for development. Leaving aside questions of probability, one can argue that corruption can be beneficial to political development, as here defined, by contributing to the solution of three major problems involved: economic development, national integration, and governmental capacity.

1. *Economic Development.* If corruption helps promote economic development which is generally necessary to maintain a capacity to preserve legitimacy in the face of social change, then (by definition) it is beneficial for political development.

There seem to be at least three major ways in which some kinds of corruption might promote economic development.

a. Capital formation. Where private capital is scarce and government lacks a capacity to tax a surplus out of peasants or workers openly, corruption may be an important source of

[11] See, for example: M. G. Smith, "Historical and Cultural Conditions of Political Corruption Among the Hausa," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 6 (January, 1964), at p. 194; Lloyd Fallers, "The Predicament of the Modern African Chief: An Instance from Uganda," *American Anthropologist*, 57 (1955), 290–305. I agree with Bayley on this point: *op. cit.*, 720–722.

capital formation. There seems to be little question about the effectiveness of this form of taxation—Trujillo reputedly accumulated $500 million and Nkrumah and relatives probably more than $10 million.[13] The real question is whether the accumulated capital is then put to uses which promote economic development or winds up in Swiss banks.

b. Cutting red tape. In many new countries the association of profit with imperialism has led to a systematic bias against the market mechanism. Given inadequate administrative resources in most new states, it can be argued that corruption helps to mitigate the consequences of ideologically determined economic devices which may not be wholly appropriate for the countries concerned.[13] Even where the quality of bureaucrats is high, as in India, some observers believe that "too much checking on corruption can delay development. Trying to run a development economy with triple checking is impossible."[14] Corruption on the part of factory managers in the Soviet Union is sometimes credited with providing a flexibility that makes central planning more effective.

c. Entrepreneurship and incentives. If Schumpeter is correct that the entrepreneur is a vital factor in economic growth and if there is an ideological bias against private incentives in a country, then corruption may provide one of the major means by which a developing country can make use of this factor. This becomes even more true if, as is often the case, the personal characteristics associated with entrepreneurship have a higher incidence among minority groups. Corruption may provide the means of overcoming discrimination against members of a minority group, and allow the entrepreneur from a minority to gain access to the political decisions necessary for him to provide his skills. In East Africa, for instance, corruption may be prolonging the effective life of an important economic asset—the Asian minority entrepreneur—beyond what political conditions would otherwise allow.

2. *National Integration.* It seems fair to assume that a society's political structures will be better able to cope with change and preserve their legitimacy if the members share a sense of community. Indeed, integration is sometimes used as one of the main scales for measuring political development.

a. Elite integration. Corruption may help overcome divisions in a ruling elite that might otherwise result in destructive conflict. One observer believes that it helped bridge the gap between the groups based on power and those based on wealth that appeared in the early nationalist period in West Africa and allowed the groups to "assimilate each other." Certainly in Central America, corruption has been a major factor in the succession mechanism by integrating the leaders of the new coup into the existing upper class. Whether this is beneficial for political development or not is another question involving particular circumstances, different evaluation of the importance of continuity, and the question of the relevant period for measurement.

b. Integration of non-elites. Corruption may help to ease the transition from traditional life to modern. It can be argued that the man who has lived under "ascriptive, particularistic and diffuse" conditions cares far less about the rational impartiality of the government and its laws than he does about its awesomeness and seeming inhumanity. The vast gap between literate official and illiterate peasant which is often characteristic of the countryside may be bridged if the peasant approaches the official bearing traditional gifts or their (marginally corrupt) money equivalent. For the new urban resident, a political machine based on corruption may provide a comprehensible point at which to relate to government by other than purely ethnic or tribal means. In McMullan's words, a degree of low-level corruption can "soften relations of officials and people" or in Shils' words it "humanizes government and makes it less awesome."[15]

However, what is integrative for one group may be disintegrative for another. The "traditional" or "transitional" man may care far more that he has a means to get *his* son out of jail than that the system as a whole be incorruptible, but for "modern" groups such as

[12] A. Terry Rambo, "The Dominican Republic," in Martin Needler (ed.), *Political Systems of Latin America* (Princeton, 1964), p. 172; *New York Times*, March 5, 1966. Ayeh Kumi's quoted statement has almost certainly greatly underestimated his own assets.

[13] On the economic problems of "African socialism," see Elliot Berg, "Socialism and Economic Development in Tropical Africa," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 78 (November, 1964), 549–573.

[14] Barbara Ward, addressing the Harvard Center for International Affairs, Cambridge, Mass., March 3, 1966.

[15] M. McMullan, "A Theory of Corruption," *The Sociological Review* (Keele), 9 (July, 1961), at p. 196; Edward Shils, *Political Development in the New States* (The Hague, 1962), p. 385.

students and middle classes (who have profited from achievement and universalism) the absence of honesty may destroy the legitimacy of the system. Finally, it is worth noting again Gluckman's statement that the scandals associated with corruption can sometimes have the effect of strengthening a value system as a whole.

3. *Governmental Capacity.* The capacity of the political structures of many new states to cope with change is frequently limited by the weakness of their new institutions and (often despite apparent centralization) the fragmentation of power in a country. Moreover, there is little "elasticity of power"—i.e., power does not expand or contract easily with a change of man or situation.[16]

To use a somewhat simplified scheme of motivations, one could say that the leaders in such a country have to rely (in various combinations) on ideal, coercive or material incentives to aggregate enough power to govern. Legal material incentives may have to be augmented by corrupt ones. Those who place great faith in ideal incentives (such as Wraith and Simpkins) see the use of corrupt material incentives as destructive ("these countries depend considerably on enthusiasm and on youthful pride of achievement . . .")[17] of governmental capacity. With a lower evaluation of the role of ideal incentives, however, corrupt material incentives may become a functional equivalent for violence. In Mexico, for instance, Needler has described the important role which corruption played in the transition from the violent phases of the revolution to its institutionalized form.[18] At the local level, Greenstone notes that while patronage and corruption was one factor contributing to an initial decline in governmental capacity in East Africa, corrupt material incentives may provide the glue for reassembling sufficient power to govern.[19]

Governmental capacity can be increased by the creation of supporting institutions such as political parties. Financing political parties tends to be a problem in developed as well as less developed countries, but it is a particular problem in poor countries. Broad-based mass financing is difficult to maintain after independence.[20] In some cases the major alternatives to corrupt proceeds as a means of party finance are party decay or reliance on outside funds. Needless to say, not all such investments are successful. The nearly $12 million diverted from Nigeria's Western Region Marketing Board into Action Group coffers from 1959–1962 (and probably equivalent amounts in other regions)[21] seem to have been wasted in terms of institution-building; but on the other hand, investment in India's Congress Party or Mexico's *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* has been more profitable for political development.

Those who dispute the possible benefits of corruption could argue that it involves countervailing costs that interfere with the solution of each of the three problems. They could argue that corruption is economically wasteful, politically destabilizing, and destructive of governmental capacity.

1. *Waste of Resources.* Although corruption may help promote economic development, it can also hinder it or direct it in socially less desirable directions.

a. Capital outflow. As we mentioned above, capital accumulated by corruption that winds up in Swiss banks is a net loss for the developing country. These costs can be considerable. For instance, one source estimates that from 1954–1959, three Latin American dictators (Peron, Perez Jimenez, and Batista) removed a total of $1.15 billion from their countries.[22] It is no wonder that another source believes that economic development in some Latin American countries has been "checked" by corruption.[23]

b. Investment distortions. Investment may be channeled into sectors such as construction not because of economic profitability, but because they are more susceptible to hiding corrupt fees through cost-plus contracts and use

[16] See Herbert Werlin, "The Nairobi City Council: A Study in Comparative Local Government," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 7 (January, 1966), at p. 185.

[17] Wraith and Simpkins, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

[18] Martin Needler, "The Political Development of Mexico," this REVIEW, 55 (June, 1961), at pp. 310–311.

[19] J. David Greenstone, "Corruption and Self Interest in Kampala and Nairobi," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 7 (January, 1966), 199–210.

[20] See J. S. Nye, "The Impact of Independence on Two African Nationalist Parties," in J. Butler and A. Castagno (eds.), *Boston University Papers on Africa* (New York, 1967), 224–245.

[21] Richard L. Sklar, "Contradictions in the Nigerian Political System," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 3, 2 (1965), at p. 206.

[22] Edwin Lieuwen, *Arms and Politics in Latin America* (New York, 1960), p. 149.

[23] F. Benham and H. A. Holley, *A Short Introduction to the Economy of Latin America* (London, 1960), p. 10.

of suppliers' credits. This was the case, for instance, in Venezuela under Perez Jimenez and in Ghana under Nkrumah.

c. Waste of skills. "If the top political elite of a country consumes its time and energy in trying to get rich by corrupt means, it is not likely that the development plans will be fulfilled."[24] Moreover, the costs in terms of time and energy spent attempting to set some limits to corruption can also be expensive. For instance, in Burma, U Nu's creation of a Bureau of Special Investigation to check corruption actually reduced administrative efficiency.[25]

d. Aid foregone. Another possible wastage, the opportunity costs of aid foregone or withdrawn by outside donors because of disgust with corruption in a developing country could be a serious cost in the sense that developing countries are highly dependent on external sources of capital. Thus far, however, there has not been a marked correlation between honesty of governments and their per capita receipt of aid. If corruption is a consideration with donors (presumably it weighs more heavily with multilateral institutions), it is not yet a primary one.

2. *Instability.* By destroying the legitimacy of political structures in the eyes of those who have power to do something about the situation, corruption can contribute to instability and possible national disintegration. But it is not clear that instability is always inimical to political development.

a. Social revolution. An argument can be made that a full social revolution (whatever its short-run costs) can speed the development of new political structures better able to preserve their legitimacy in the face of social change. Thus, in this view if corruption led to social revolution, this might be a beneficial effect for political development. But it is not clear that corruption of the old regime is a primary cause of social revolution. Such revolutions are comparatively rare and often depend heavily on catalytic events (such as external wars).

b. Military takeovers. If corruption causes a loss of legitimacy in the eyes of those with guns, it may be a direct cause of instability and the disintegration of existing political institutions. But the consequences for political development are again ambiguous. Much depends on differing evaluations of the ability of military regimes (which tend to comprise people and procedures oriented toward modernity) to maintain legitimacy in a democratic age either by self-transformation into political regimes or by being willing and able to foster new political institutions to which power can be returned. To the extent that this tends to be difficult, then if corruption leads to military takeover, it has hindered political development.[26]

The degree to which corruption is itself a major cause of military takeovers is, however, open to some question. Despite its prominence in post-coup rationalizations, one might suspect that it is only a secondary cause in most cases. Perhaps more significant is military leaders' total distaste for the messiness of politics—whether honest or not—and a tendency to blame civilian politicians for failures to meet overly optimistic popular aspirations which would be impossible of fulfillment even by a government of angels.[27] Indeed, to the extent that corruption contributes to governmental effectiveness in meeting these aspirations, it may enhance stability.

Crozier sees "revulsion against civilian incompetence and corruption" as a major cause of coups in several Asian countries including Burma, but he also states that the main cause of Ne Win's return to power was the Shan demand for a federal rather than unitary state.[28] Similarly, corruption is sometimes blamed for the first coup in Nigeria, but the post-electoral crisis in the Western region and the fear of permanent Northern domination was probably a more important and direct cause. In Ghana, corruption may have played a more important role in causing the coup, but not so much because of revulsion at dishonesty, as the fact that corruption had reached an extent where it contributed to an economic situation in which real wages had fallen. Nonetheless, its impact in relation to other factors should not be overestimated.[29]

c. Upsetting ethnic balances. Corruption

[24] Leys, *op. cit.*, at p. 229.

[25] Brian Crozier, *The Morning After: A Study of Independence* (London, 1963), p. 82.

[26] In Pye's words, the military "can contribute to only a limited part of national development," *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston, 1966), p. 187.

[27] "Have no fear," General Mobutu told the Congo people, "My Government is not composed of politicians." Mobutu alleged that political corruption cost the Congo $43 million: *East Africa and Rhodesia*, January 13, 1966; *Africa Report*, January 1966, 23.

[28] Crozier, *op. cit.*, pp. 62, 74.

[29] For two interpretations, see Martin Kilson, "Behind Nigeria's Revolts"; Immanuel Wallerstein, "Autopsy of Nkrumah's Ghana," *New Leader*, January 31, 9–12; March 14, 1966, 3–5.

can sometimes exacerbate problems of national integration in developing countries. If a corrupt leader must be fired, it may upset ethnic arithmetic as happened in both Kenya and Zambia in 1966. Of course this can be manipulated as a deliberate political weapon. In Western Nigeria in 1959, an anti-corruption officer was appointed but his jurisdiction was subject to approval by the cabinet, which meant that no case could be investigated "unless the party leader decided that a man needed to be challenged."[30] But as a weapon, charging corruption is a risky device. Efforts by southern politicans in Uganda to use it in 1966 precipitated a pre-emptive coup by the northern Prime Minister in alliance with the predominantly northern army.

3. *Reduction of Governmental Capacity.* While it may not be the sole or major cause, corruption can contribute to the loss of governmental capacity in developing countries.

a. Reduction of administrative capacity. Corruption may alienate modern-oriented civil servants (a scarce resource) and cause them to leave a country or withdraw or reduce their efforts. In addition to the obvious costs, this may involve considerable opportunity costs in the form of restriction of government programs because of fears that a new program (for instance, administration of new taxes) might be ineffective in practice. While this is a real cost, it is worth noting that efficient bureaucracy is not always a necessary condition for economic or political development (at least in the early stages), and in some cases can even hinder it.[31]

b. Loss of legitimacy. It is often alleged that corruption squanders the most important asset a new country has—the legitimacy of its government. This is a serious cost but it must be analyzed in terms of groups. As we have seen, what may enhance legitimacy for the student or civil servant may not enhance it for the tradition-oriented man. It is interesting, for instance, that there is some evidence that in Tanganyika petty corruption at low levels seems to have increased during the year following the replacement of an "illegitimate" colonial regime by a "legitimate" nationalist one.[32] Loss of legitimacy as a cost must be coupled with assessment of the power or importance of the group in whose eyes legitimacy is lost. If they are young army officers, it can be important indeed.

III. PROBABILITIES

Thus far I have been discussing *possible* benefits and costs. I have established that under some circumstances corruption can have beneficial effects on at least three major development problems. I have evaluated the importance of a number of frequently alleged countervailing costs. It remains to offer hypotheses about the *probabilities* of benefits outweighing costs. In general terms, such probabilities will vary with at least three conditions: (1) a tolerant culture and dominant groups; (2) a degree of security on the part of the members of the elite being corrupted; (3) the existence of societal and institutional checks and restraints on corrupt behavior.

(1) Attitudes toward corruption vary greatly. In certain West African countries, observers have reported little widespread sense of indignation about corruption.[33] The Philippines, with its American colonial heritage of corruption. and appreciation of the politics of compromise, seems able to tolerate a higher level of corruption than formerly-Dutch Indonesia. According to Higgins, the Indonesian attitude to corruption (which began on a large scale only in 1954) is that it is sinful. He attributes the civil war of 1958 to corruption and argues that in the Philippines, "anomalies" are taken more for granted.[34] Not only is the general level of tolerance of corruption relevant; variations of attitude within a country can be as important (or more so) than differences between countries. Very often, traditional sectors of the populace are likely to be more tolerant of corruption than some of the modern sectors (students, army, civil service). Thus the hypothesis must take into account not only the tolerant nature of the culture, but also the relative power of groups representing more and less tolerant sub-cultures in a country. In Nigeria, tolerance was by many accounts considerable among the population at large, but not among the young army officers who overthrew the old regime.

(2) Another condition which increases the probability that the benefits of corruption will outweigh the costs is a degree of security (and perception thereof) by the members of the elites indulging in corrupt practices. Too great

[30] Henry Bretton, *Power and Stability in Nigeria* (New York, 1962), p. 79.

[31] Bert Hoselitz, "Levels of Economic Performance and Bureaucratic Structures," in Joseph LaPalombara (ed.), *Bureaucracy and Political Development* (Princeton, 1963), 193–195. See also Nathaniel Leff, *loc. cit.*, 8–14.

[32] See *Tanganyika Standard*, May 15, 1963.

[33] McMullan, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

[34] Benjamin Higgins, *Economic Development* (New York, 1959), p. 62.

TABLE 1. CORRUPTION COST-BENEFIT MATRIX

Types of Corruption	Political Conditions	Development Problems: 1. Economic development a. capital	b. bureaucracy	c. skills	2. National Integration d. elite	e. non-elite	3. Governmental capacity f. effectiveness	g. legitimacy	General Probability that Costs Outweigh Benefits
1. Level									
top	F	low	uncertain	uncertain/low	low	uncertain	low	low	low/uncertain
bottom	F	high	uncertain	uncertain/high	uncertain	low	high	low	high
top	U	high	high	uncertain/low	high	high	low	high	high
bottom	U	high	uncertain	uncertain/high	little relevance	high	high	high	high
2. Inducements									
modern	F	low	uncertain	uncertain/low	low	low	low/uncertain	uncertain	low/uncertain
traditional	F	high/uncertain	uncertain	high	high	uncertain	high	uncertain	high
modern	U	high	uncertain	uncertain/low	high	high	low/uncertain	high	high
traditional	U	high/uncertain	uncertain	high	high	uncertain	high	high	high
3. Deviation									
extensive	F	uncertain	high	uncertain	uncertain	low	uncertain/low	uncertain/high	high
marginal	F	uncertain	low	uncertain/low	low	low	low	low	low
extensive	U	uncertain	high	uncertain	high	high	uncertain	high	high
marginal	U	uncertain	low	uncertain/low	high	high	low	high	high

Notes: F favorable political conditions (cultural tolerance, elite security, checks).
U unfavorable political conditions
High high probability that costs exceed benefits
Low low probability that costs exceed benefits
Uncertain little relationship or ambiguous relationship

insecurity means that any capital formed by corruption will tend to be exported rather than invested at home. In Nicaragua, for instance, it is argued that the sense of security of the Somoza family encouraged them in internal investments in economic projects and the strengthening of their political party, which led to impressive economic growth and diminished direct reliance on the army. In contrast are the numerous cases of capital outflow mentioned above. One might add that this sense of security, including the whole capitalist ethic, which is rare in less developed countries today, makes comparison with capital formation by the "robber barons" of the American 19th century of dubious relevance to less developed countries today.

(3) It is probable that for the benefits of corruption to outweigh the costs depends on its being limited in various ways, much as the beneficial effects of inflation for economic growth tends to depend on limits. These limits depend upon the existence of societal or institutional restraints on corruption. These can be external to the leaders, e.g., the existence of an independent press, and honest elections; or internalized conceptions of public interest by a ruling group such as Leys argues that 18th-century English aristocrats held.[35] In Mandeville's words, "Vice is beneficial found when it's by Justice lopt and bound."[36]

Given the characteristics of less developed countries, one can see that the general probability of the presence of one or more of these conditions (and thus of benefits outweighing costs) is not high. But to conclude merely that the moralists are more right than wrong (though for the wrong reasons) is insufficient because the whole issue remains unsatisfactory if left in these general terms. Though corruption may not prove beneficial for resolution of development problems in general, it may prove to be the only means to solution of a particular problem. If a country has some overriding problem, some "obstacle to development"—for instance, if capital can be formed by no other means, or ethnic hatred threatens all legal activities aimed at its alleviation—then it is possible that corruption is beneficial for development despite the high costs and risks involved. While there are dangers in identifying

[35] Leys, *op. cit.*, p. 227. See also Eric McKitrick, "The Study of Corruption," *Political Science Quarterly*, 72 (December, 1957), 502–514, for limits on corruption in urban America.

[36] Bernard Mandeville, *The Fable of the Bees*, Vol. I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, by F. B. Kaye, 1924), 37.

"obstacles to development,"[37] and while the corruption that is beneficial to the solution of one problem may be detrimental to another, we need to get away from general statements which are difficult to test and which provide us with no means of ordering the vast number of variables involved. We are more likely to advance this argument if we distinguish the roles of different types of corruption in relation to different types of development problems.

The matrix in Table 1 relates three types of corruption to three types of development problems, first assuming favorable and then assuming unfavorable conditions described above. Favorable conditions (F) means a tolerant culture or dominance of more tolerant groups, relative security of the elite corrupted, and societal/institutional checks. Unfavorable conditions (U) means intolerant culture or groups, insecure elite, and few societal/institutional checks. The development problems are those discussed above: economic development, national integration, and governmental capacity. The scores are a priori judgments that the costs of a particular type of corruption are likely to outweigh the benefits for a particular development problem or sub-problem. They represent a series of tentative hypotheses to be clarified or refuted by data. Under economic development, the specific sub-problems discussed are whether capital accumulation is promoted (benefit) without capital flight (cost); whether cutting bureaucratic red tape (benefit) outweighs distortion of rational criteria (cost); whether the attraction of unused scarce skills such as entrepreneurship (benefit) is greater than the wastage of scarce skills of, say, politicians and civil servants (cost).

Under the problem of national integration are the sub-problems of whether a particular type of corruption tends to make the elite more cohesive (benefit) or seriously splits them (cost); and whether it tends to humanize government and make national identification easier for the non-elites (benefit) or alienates them (cost). Under the problem of governmental capacity are the sub-problems of whether the additional power aggregated by corruption (benefit) outweighs possible damage to administrative efficiency (cost); and whether it enhances (benefit) or seriously weakens the governmental legitimacy (cost).

1. *Level of Beneficiary.* Shils argues that "freedom from corruption at the highest levels is a necessity for the maintenance of public respect of Government . . ." whereas a modicum of corruption at lower levels is probably not too injurious.[38] On the other hand, McMullan reports that West Africans show little sense of indignation about often fantastic stories of corruption by leaders, and impressions from Mexico indicate that petty corruption most saps morale.[39] In India, Bayley notes that "although corruption at the top attracts the most attention in public forums, and involves the largest amount of money in separate transactions, corruption at the very bottom levels is the more apparent and obvious and in total amounts of money involved may very well rival corruption at the top."[40]

The matrix in Table I suggests that under unfavorable conditions neither type of corruption is likely to be beneficial in general, although top level corruption may enhance governmental power more than it weakens administrative efficiency. It also suggests that under favorable conditions, top level corruption may be beneficial but bottom level corruption probably is not (except for non-elite integration). If these judgments are accurate, it suggests that countries with favorable conditions, like India, which have considerable bottom level corruption but pride themselves on the relative honesty of the higher levels may be falling between two stools.

The rationale of the scoring is as follows: (A) Capital. Bottom level corruption with smaller size of each inducement will probably increase consumption more than capital formation. While top level corruption may represent the latter, whether it is invested productively rather than sent overseas depends on favorable political conditions. (B) Bureaucracy. Other factors seem more important in determining whether expediting is more important than distortion; except that those with the power of the top levels will probably distort investment criteria considerably in conditions of uncertainty—witness the alleged selling of investment licenses under a previous government in Guatemala. (C) Skills. Whether top level corruption permits the use of more skills than it wastes depends upon their supply. Where they exist, as with Asians in East Africa or "Turcos" in Honduras, it is probably beneficial. Corruption of those at lower levels of power may be more likely to waste energies than to be im-

[37] See Albert O. Hirschman, "Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi-Vanishing Act," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 13 (July 1965), 385–393.

[38] Shils, *op. cit.*, p. 385.

[39] McMullan, *op. cit.*, 195; Oscar Lewis, *The Children of Sanchez* (New York, 1961).

[40] Bayley, *op. cit.*, p. 724.

portant in permission of use of new skills simply because their power is limited.

(D) Elite Integration. It is difficult to see a clear relation between bottom level corruption and elite integration. At the higher levels under unfavorable conditions, e.g., a powerful intolerant part of the elite such as students or army, corruption would probably have a more divisive than cohesive effect. Under favorable conditions it might be more cohesive. (E) Non-elite integration. Under unfavorable conditions it seems likely that both types of corruption would tend to alienate more than enhance identification, whereas under favorable conditions corruption by the lower levels that the populace deals with most frequently might have the humanizing effect mentioned above, and alienation would be slight in the tolerant culture. Top level corruption might have the same effect though the connection is less clear because of the lesser degree of direct contact.

(F) Effectiveness. Bottom level corruption is more likely to disperse rather than aggregate power by making governmental machinery less responsive than otherwise might be the case; whereas at top levels the ability to change the behavior of important power holders by corrupt inducements is likely to outweigh the loss of efficiency, even under unfavorable conditions. (G) Legitimacy. Whether corruption enhances or reduces governmental legitimacy depends more on favorable conditions than on level of corruption. Much depends on another factor, visibility of corrupt behavior, which does not always have a clear relationship to level of corruption.

2. *Inducements.* Another distinction which can be made between types of corruption is the nature of the inducement used, for instance the extent to which they reflect the values of the traditional society or the values of the modern sector. A traditional inducement such as status in one's clan or tribe may be more tolerable to those who share the ascriptive affinity, but others outside the ascriptive relationship would prefer the use of money which would give them equality of access to the corruptee. Weiner writes of India that "from a political point of view, equal opportunity to corrupt is often more important than the amount of corruption, and therefore . . . an increase in *bakshish* is in the long run less serious than an increase in corruption by ascriptive criteria."[41]

[41] Myron Weiner, *The Politics of Scarcity* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 236.

As scored here, our matrix suggests that under favorable political conditions (e.g., India?) Weiner's hypothesis is probably correct but would not be correct under unfavorable conditions. (A) Capital. Modern inducements (i.e., money) probably lead to capital formation (at top levels) which may be invested under favorable conditions or be sent abroad under unfavorable conditions. Traditional inducements (kin status) do not promote capital formation (and may even interfere with it) but probably have little effect on capital flight. (B) Bureaucracy. What edge modern inducements may have in expediting procedure may be offset by distortion of criteria, so the relation between type of inducement and this problem is scored as uncertain. (C) Skills. Assuming the existence of untapped skills (as above), modern inducements increase the access to power while traditional ones decrease it. (D) Elite Integration. Under favorable conditions modern inducements are unlikely to divide elites more than make them cohere, but traditional inducements tend to preserve and emphasize ethnic divisions in the elites. Under unfavorable conditions, both types of inducements tend to be divisive. (E) Non-elite integration. Whether modern inducements promote identification or alienation varies with political conditions in the expected way, but the effect of traditional inducements is more ambiguous and probably varies from positive to negative according to the prevalence of traditional as against modern values in the particular country in question. (F) Effectiveness. Modern inducements probably give the government greater range to aggregate more sources of power than traditional inducements do. The probabilities will vary not only with political conditions but also by the opportunity costs—whether there is an efficient administrative machine to be damaged or not. (G) Legitimacy. Under favorable conditions whether traditional or modern inducements will decrease legitimacy more than they enhance it remains uncertain because it will vary with the (above mentioned) degree of existence of modern and traditional values in a society. Under unfavorable conditions, both will likely have higher costs than benefits.

3. *Deviation.* We can also distinguish types of corruption by whether the corrupt behavior involves extensive deviation from the formal duties of a public role or marginal deviation. This is not the same thing as a scale of corrupt inducements, since the size of the inducements may bear little relation to the degree of deviation. For instance, it is alleged that in one Central American country under an insecure recent

regime, a business could get the government to reverse a decision for as little as $2000, whereas in a neighboring country the mere expediting of a decision cost $50,000. Such a distinction between types of corruption by extent of deviation is not uncommon among practitioners who use terms like "speed-up money" or "honest graft" in their rationalizations.[42]

(A) Capital. It is difficult to see that the extensiveness of the deviation (except insofar as it affects the scale of inducement) has much to do with the probabilities of capital formation or flight. (B) Bureaucracy. On the other hand, marginal deviations (by definition) are unlikely to involve high costs in distortion of criteria and even under unfavorable conditions may help expedite matters. Extensive deviations are likely to have high costs in terms of rational criteria regardless of conditions. (C) Skills. It is not clear that extensive deviations call forth more unused skills than they waste administrative skills; nor is the matter completely clear with marginal deviations, though the costs of administrative skills wasted may be lower because the tasks are simpler.

(D) Elite Integration. Under unfavorable conditions, the effects of corruption on elite cohesiveness are likely to be negative regardless of the extent of deviations, though they might be less negative for marginal deviations. Under favorable conditions, marginal deviations are likely to have low costs, but the effect of extensive deviations will be uncertain, varying with other factors such as existing cohesiveness of the elite and the nature of the extensive deviations. (E) Non-elite integration. Under unfavorable conditions, corruption is likely to have more alienative than identification effects regardless of the nature of the deviations. Under favorable conditions, marginal deviation will not have high costs in terms of alienation, and extensive deviation may have special appeal to those who are seeking human and "reversible" government more than impartial or "rational" government. (F) Effectiveness. It is difficult to see that extensive deviations alone would increase governmental power more than weaken administrative efficiency, but with marginal deviation, the extent of the latter would be sufficiently small that the benefits would probably outweigh the costs. (G) Legitimacy. Under unfavorable conditions either type of corruption would be more likely to weaken than to enhance legitimacy, but under favorable conditions the lesser challenge to rationality might make marginal corruption less detrimental than extensive—though this would depend on the proportion and dominance of groups in society placing emphasis on modern values.

[42] Cf. William Riordan, *Plunkitt of Tammany Hall* (New York, 1948), p. 4.

IV. CONCLUSION

The scoring of the matrix suggests that we can refine the general statements about corruption and political development to read "it is probable that the costs of corruption in less developed countries will exceed its benefits except for top level corruption involving modern inducements and marginal deviations and except for situations where corruption provides the only solution to an important obstacle to development." As our matrix shows, corruption can provide the solution to several of the more limited problems of development. Whether this is beneficial to development as a whole depends on how important the problems are and what alternatives exist. It is also interesting to note that while the three conditions we have identified seem to be necessary for corruption to be beneficial in general terms, they are not necessary for it to be beneficial in the solution of a number of particular problems.

At this point, however, not enough information is at hand to justify great confidence in the exact conclusions reached here. More important is the suggestion of the use of this or a similar matrix to advance the discussion of the relationship between corruption and development. The matrix can be expanded or elaborated in a number of ways if the data seem to justify it. Additional development problems can be added, as can additional types of corruption (e.g., by scale, visibility, income effects, and so forth). The above categories can be made more precise by adding possibilities; for instance intermediate as well as top and bottom levels of corruption, or distinctions between politicians and civil servants at top, bottom, and intermediate levels.

Despite the problems of systematic field research on corruption in developing countries mentioned above, there is probably much more data on corruption and development gleaned during field work on other topics than we realize. What we need to advance the study of the problem is to refute and replace *specific* a priori hypotheses with propositions based on such data rather than with the generalities of the moralists. Corruption in developing countries is too important a phenomenon to be left to moralists.

SOCIAL BACKGROUND IN ELITE ANALYSIS: A METHODOLOGICAL INQUIRY*

LEWIS J. EDINGER AND DONALD D. SEARING
Washington University (St. Louis)

I. INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts to comment empirically upon certain assumptions about the relationship between social background patterns and attitudinal patterns in elite analysis. All political systems are more or less stratified and their elites constitute that minority of participating actors which plays a strategic role in public policy making. As the incumbents of such key positions they have a far greater influence than the masses in structuring and giving expression to political relationships and policy outputs at various levels of authoritative decision making. They wield this influence by virtue of their exceptional access to political information and positions and their consequently highly disproportionate control over public policy making and communication processes which relate society to polity and governors to governed.

Usually exceeding no more than about five percent of the members of a political community, such elites not only know a good deal more about the internal workings of the pertinent system than do the rest of its members, but they can do a good deal more to give shape and content to general input demands and supports, as well as to formal governmental rulings at the national or sub-national level.[1] Therefore, their behavior patterns represent a crucial dimension of behavior patterns in a political system, providing important clues to characteristics making it like or unlike other systems.

Quantitative data on aggregate elite behavior are not easy to come by, except in the case of legislative roll call analysis and similar studies, but data on elite attitudes have of late become more abundant. And while attitudinal and behavioral dimensions are not necessarily identical or equivalent—other variables, such as situational factors may intervene—elite attitudes undoubtedly represent an important component of elite behavior.[2]

* Extensively revised version of a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Conference of Political Scientists in Chicago, Illinois, April 28–30, 1966. We are indebted to the Yale University Political Science Research Library for the data used, to John D. Sprague and Robert H. Salisbury for comments on an earlier draft of this article, and to Theodore D. Sterling for making his Robot Data Screening program available to us. Data processing was carried out at the Washington University Information Processing Center with the aid of John Wick. The research was supported by the Washington University Faculty Research Fund, and by NIMH fellowship IFIMH33 32501.

[1] The concept is variously defined in the literature according to the particular research focus of the scholar using it in his work. Thus Karl W. Deutsch associates elites with key communication and command functions: *The Nerves of Government* (New York: The Free Press, 1963), 154–160, whereas Harold Lasswell defines as elites those who enjoy the greatest proportion of values in a society: *Politics: Who Gets What, When, How* (New York: Meridian Books, 1960). Elsewhere elites have been defined as those who hold high position and perform the function of making major social decisions in a society; see, for example, Raymond Aron, "Social Structure and the Ruling Class," *The British Journal of Sociology*, 1 (March, 1950), at p. 9; Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959), 303–307; C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 3–5; S. F. Nadel, "The Concept of Social Elites," *International Social Science Bulletin*, 7 (1956), at p. 414; and Harold Lasswell, Daniel Lerner, and C. Easton Rothwell, *The Comparative Study of Elites* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952), p. 6. Gaetano Mosca's broad category of "ruling class" embodies all three criteria: *The Ruling Class* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1939), p. 50; while Suzanne Keller emphasizes the criterion of wielding moral responsibility: *Beyond the Ruling Class; Strategic Elites in Modern Society* (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 4. For a good review of the literature see, Carl Beck, James M. Malloy, and William R. Campbell, *A Survey of Elite Studies* (Special Operations Research Office, The American University, 1965).

[2] We recognize that expressions of individual attitudes are usually distorted by coding procedures and that survey data—especially in the case of elite samples that are usually relatively small—must be interpreted with caution. We also recognize that a distinction exists between underlying attitude and expressed opinion, though, following common practice, we treat the two as synonymous in this article.

Though it would seem that the central concern of political science is competition for and the exercise of leadership by various elites, quantitative elite analysis has on the whole lagged behind advances in other areas, particularly mass voting and opinion studies. Thus, elite studies published in recent years have tended to rely heavily on social background or behavior, rather than upon intervening attitudes which might provide a link between backgrounds and behavior. Also, particularly in the United States, elite analysis has tended to focus on investigations of *either* national *or* local elites.[3] These have for the most part been treated as analytically exclusive categories, though they are empirically interrelated.[4] In part this has been due to the propensity of investigators to deal with clearly distinct units of political analysis; in part, too, it has reflected sensitivity to pitfalls involved in indiscriminately seeking to draw analogies between American local and national "power structures" in the United States and elsewhere.

Moreover, whereas empirical studies of local power structures in the United States have lately produced a host of studies in theoretical and explicitly methodological contexts, investigations of national elites have been comparatively few in number and have often lacked the closeness to the data displayed by the local studies.[5] Here we seem to find less rigorous approaches still quite adequate, perhaps because no better ones seem available, perhaps, too, because we have been inclined to make a virtue of a necessity.[6] Elite studies beyond the local level are not only more costly and time consuming, but involve more difficult methodological problems, particularly in identifying leaders, gaining access to them, and ascertaining their attitudes and styles of behavior. Whatever the reasons, there has been considerably less quantitative analysis and a much greater bifurcation between empirical investigations and theorizing than in the local community studies.[7] A particular problem for students of cross-national elite analysis has been the fact that empirical studies of national leaders tend to be either restricted to secondary social background data or to largely non-comparative attitudinal and behavioral data.[8]

[3] For an exception, see Wendell Bell, Richard J. Hill, and Charles R. Wright, *Public Leadership* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1961).

[4] Just as the national political system may be conceptualized as functioning in an environment—the international system—so the local political system can be seen to function in the environment of the national system. While each remains susceptible to description and analysis in terms of a set of self-contained, integrated systemic roles, the central empirical fact of political decision making in the American small community is its permeation by state and federal structures. For the most part local political values are in effect authoritatively allocated by superior governmental units in the United States as elsewhere. See, Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (New York: Anchor Books, 1960), and the abstracts by Rossi, Clelland, Arensberg, Sjoberg, and Warren, in Charles Press (ed.), *Main Street Politics, Policy Making at the Local Level: A Survey of the Periodical Literature Since 1950* (East Lansing, Michigan: Institute for Community Development, 1962). A good deal of research on this subject is now in progress and may yield significant findings on the interdependence and similarity of national and subnational elite structures.

[5] See, for example, Vidich and Bensman, *op. cit.*, Robert A. Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963); and Robert E. Agger *et al.*, *The Rulers and the Ruled* (New York: Wiley, 1964). For convenient summaries of community elite studies see, Press, *op. cit.*; and Bell, Hill, and Wright, *op cit.* An interesting synthesis of the stratification and pluralistic approaches has recently been attempted by Robert Presthus in *Men at the Top; A Study in Community Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).

[6] See Harold D. Lasswell, "Agenda for the Study of Political Elites," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.), *Political Decision-Makers* (New York: The Free Press, 1961), 264–389; T. B. Bottomore, *Elites and Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1964); and Keller *op. cit.*

[7] Some recent exceptions are Wendell Bell, *Jamaican Leaders: Political Attitudes in a New Nation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964); Lucian W. Pye, *Politics, Personality and Nation Building* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), Ch. 5; Victor T. LeVine, *The Conflict of Elite Generations in the Context of Independence in French Speaking Africa* (Hoover Institution, forthcoming); Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass.; MIT Press, 1965); and Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Ambition and Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).

[8] For example, James N. Rosenau, *National Leadership and Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Donald R. Matthews, *United States Senators and their World* (New York: Vintage Books, 1960); Floyd Hunter, *Top Leadership, U. S. A.* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1959); Frey, *op. cit.*; W. L.

Thanks to the availability of "who's who" type of information, the compilation of social background inventories has become one of the more feasible research strategies for national elite analysis, and studies based on such data have largely preempted the field. This approach relies on descriptive material about the incumbents of elite positions from which the more comparative studies attempt some sort of configurative analysis of elite attitudes and behavior. The stated or implicit underlying assumption is that leadership, social background and recruitment patterns will facilitate understanding of the political system because we can infer from them a good deal about the system's homogeneity and dominant values, about elite-elite relationships and about elite-mass relationships.[9]

Where elite political behavior is associated with latent and manifest political attitudes, these are frequently assumed to be intervening variables that are a function of socio-economic and psychological characteristics which in aggregate can be related to relevant background data. The linkages are said to be the socialization experiences through which leaders are inducted into political process from childhood onward.[10] Social circles, to use Simmel's concept, whose members have had similar socialization experiences, are presumed to hold similar attitudes. The analysis of social background variables, in this sense, represents an attempt to classify the contexts of the aggregate socialization experiences in which elite attitudes are formed in order to explain the collective orientations of members of influential social circles, or to forecast probability distributions of these orientations among them.[11]

Undoubtedly the most impressive research efforts built upon these foundations are the Hoover Institute RADIR elite studies, most of which were recently republished in a single volume.[12] This project was based on a contextual approach similar to other schemes of configurative analysis, except that it placed

---

Guttman, *The British Political Elite* (New York: Basic Books, 1963); Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959); Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), *World Revolutionary Elites* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1965); and W. L. Lloyd Warner, *The American Federal Executive* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963).

[9] Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government*, 155–56. See also, Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (Garden City, N. Y.; Doubleday and Company, 1954); Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1964); and Morris Janowitz, "The Systematic Analysis of Political Biography," *World Politics*, 4 (April, 1954), 405–412. Although it has been rightly objected that most studies dealing with recruitment and elite composition are primarily descriptive and fail to explain why particular elites were recruited and why they act the way they do, information about social background characteristics may well be a prerequisite for this sort of explanatory analysis. See Lester G. Seligman, "The Study of Political Leadership," in Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz (eds.), *Political Behavior; A Reader in Theory and Research* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1956), p. 178.

[10] For example, Harold D. Lasswell asserts, "Elite members who prepare to play active political roles usually become differentiated at an early age from their more passive contemporaries. Such differences of perspective affect motivation to acquire the base values appropriate to politics, notably the skills essential to leadership . . . ." See Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), *World Revolutionary Elites*, 12–14, 21. See also, Henry Robert Glick, "Political Recruitment in Sarawak: A Case Study of Leadership in a New State," *Journal of Politics*, 28 (February, 1966), 81–84. For more general recent treatments of political socialization, see, *inter alia*, Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959); Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, *Political Socialization* (Boston: Little Brown, forthcoming); Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), Ch. 3; Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959); and Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965).

[11] Thus, according to Lasswell and Lerner, " . . . elite perspectives can be accounted for by exploring the perspectives that were incorperated on the road toward active power or at least toward an adult status. . . . Not only predispositions but environments count": *op. cit.*, p. 18. The ultimate step is the inference of elite behavior patterns from collective attitude patterns. But since that process goes beyond the socialization experiences which concern us here, it will not be considered in this paper.

[12] Lasswell and Lerner (eds.), *World Revolutionary Elites*.

greater emphasis on a developmental process.[13] The location of an elite within a "developmental context" involved a description of what we have referred to as social background variable inventories, beginning in childhood and extending through the elite's adult years.[14] Trend analysis and elite composition and circulation were studied in terms of the frequency distribution of these life history characteristics among elite members at different points in time.

These inaugural efforts in quantitative cross-national elite analysis were important steps and potentially very fecund, but they have failed to produce their potential fruit in a second generation of studies which would actually relate social background variables to elite attitudes. By and large, applications of the social background approach have left unanswered the question of how and to what extent data of this nature actually can be used to forecast attitudinal distributions. Which social background variables best predict which attitudes under what conditions? Are all background variables presently used equally good attitudinal indicators? Might not some need to be refined, and should we not add others to our inventories?

Granted that it is plausible that social background variables are related to elite attitudes, it seems equally plausible that, (1) some background characteristics have more relevance than others for elite attitudes in a particular national political system, (2) some attitudes are more strongly related than others to background characteristics in such a system, and (3) the relative importance of the association between background and attitude varies from one system to another. We hope to demonstrate in this article that such is actually the case among elite members in two national political systems, and, at the same time, suggest a method for handling multivariate analysis of this type of data relatively easily.

Social background categories are usually chosen *ad hoc* and assumed to be *prima facie* operational. But it seems to us that we must face questions raised by the above propositions, if we are to justify their use for projecting elite attitudes.[15] Our argument is that the typical research procedure in elite studies—flowing as it does from social background data into attitudinal orientations—has not, and perhaps cannot, by itself resolve the problems which have been raised. Attitudes are described and organized in terms of social background variables brought to the research from the outside and not themselves evaluated within the context of the research project. Moreover, not only does the relevance of the social background variables as a set remain unquestioned, but the relative strength of one background variable vis-à-vis another is rarely determined. In other words, in the absence of any evaluative criterion, each background variable is treated as if it were, in all cases, as important as any other. What we would like to know, however, is whether we can predict with a high degree of probability that particular background variables are associated with particular attitudes, whether conditionally or unconditionally. That is, can we expect that a given elite background will also yield certain orientations, and to what extent? Before we can seriously attempt such a task in comparative analysis, it will be necessary to explore background-attitudinal relationships extensively and intensively through cross-national research.

Here the optimum strategy, in our opinion, is to follow the approach of the biological sciences and gather and prepare for analysis large amounts of comparative elite attitudinal *cum* social background data from diverse political systems. Such information has of late become more abundant and its availability is likely to increase in the future.[16] It will consequently become easier to begin analysis with

[13] Gunnar Heckscher, in contrast, seeks to approach social background in elite studies from a more problem-oriented, functional perspective. See his *The Study of Comparative Government and Politics* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957), 108–120.

[14] Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (eds.), *World Revolutionary Elites*, 6–8.

[15] The search for attitudinal predictors does not necessarily imply, of course, a commitment to a determinism of the type underlying some socio-economic and psychological theories. (See Wilbert E. Moore, "The Utility of Utopias," *American Sociological Review*, 31 (December, 1966), 765–773. While most men are creatures of habit and believe and behave in patterned ways, such patterns and their antecedents are admittedly complex and ephemeral. Ours, however, is not an argument against the possibility of their study, but rather a plea for a probabilistic approach dictated by the complexity of multivariate elite data.

[16] See, for example, John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, James Buchanan, and Leroy C. Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York: Wiley, 1962); Wendell Bell, *Jamaican Leaders*; Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis,

the attitudinal data and proceed to locate those background variables most frequently associated with attitudes and attitudinal clusters in diverse milieus, both in particular political systems over time and in different political systems across space as well as time.

Such a research strategy rests upon the development of adequate multivariate techniques for tracing social background-attitudinal relationships in large and complex elite data. The nature of such data suggests that these techniques should, ideally, satisfy three key criteria: (1) we want a technique to deal with discrete rather than continuous data; (2) we want a way to find the best multivariable (combinations of background variables) predictors of attitudes in the data; and (3) we need a simple procedure for examining many variables relatively quickly. Thus, if we had collected data for forty background variables and wanted to relate them to ten elite attitudes on the basis of the best combination of three of these background variables (triplets), the number of possible combinations of background variables to be examined would be

$$10\left(\frac{N(N-1)(N-2)}{3}\right)$$

or 197,900 possible combinations. Obviously, we could not possibly examine the predictability of each combination in a short time, if at all.

Fortunately a computer program has recently been developed by Theodore D. Sterling and his associates which meets our three criteria, and we have employed it in the following analysis. The program's *predictability* measure, which we have used throughout this article, is a *maximum likelihood estimator*, easily interpreted as the percent of correct classifications of respondents which would have been made on dependent attitude x, by using independent background variable(s) Y. In other words, if background variable Y has a predictability of .70 for attitude x, and we had predicted the distribution of attitude x among this elite group on the basis of background variable Y, we would have been correct in seventy cases out of a hundred. This straightforwardness in interpretation seems to us a strong point favoring this procedure over currently employed statistical approaches to multivariate analysis. Therefore when we use the term "predict" in this paper, we are referring to this measure of classificatory accuracy in the data we are examining.[17]

II. DATA

During the summer of 1964 eight American university professors conducted extended interviews with French and German national leaders in connection with a project directed by Karl W. Deutsch under the auspices of Yale University.[18] The questions asked were designed to elicit the respondent's attitudes about his political system and its domestic and foreign policies, with particular reference

and Richard L. Merritt, *France, Germany and the Western Alliance* (New York: Scribners, 1967); James N. Rosenau, *National Leadership and Foreign Policy;* Lester G. Seligman, *Leadership in a New Nation* (New York: Atherton Press, 1964); and Frank Bonilla and José A. Silva Michelena (eds.), *Studying the Venezuelan Polity* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, forthcoming).

[17] The program was designed for use on discrete data and employs a "logical," as opposed to a "statistical" criterion for multivariate analysis, to group data into deterministic models. This alone appeared to make it preferable to factor analytic techniques, which are further limited by the element of arbitrariness introduced with axis rotation. Robot data screening performs a selective search of the data in stepwise fashion, utilizing all possible combinations of N-1 variable predictors at each new level of combinations, until no further combinations of independent variables are found which would raise the predictability of the dependent variable. It allows for manipulation of the significance level and includes an entropy measure of uncertainty derived from information theory. See T. Sterling *et al.*, "Robot Data Screening: A Solution to Multivariate Type Problems in the Biological and Social Sciences," *Scientific Applications: Communications of the A.C.M.*, 9, 7, (July, 1966), 529–532; T. D. Sterling, *et al.*, "Robot Data Processing Techniques for Multivariate Epidemiological Predictions," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 126 (August 6, 1965), 779–794; and T. D. Sterling and S. V. Pollack, *Computers and the Life Sciences.* (New York: Columbia Press, 1965).

[18] Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt, *Arms Control and European Unity: Elite Attitudes and Their Background in France and the German Federal Republic* (New Haven: Yale Political Data Library, 1966); and Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, Richard L. Merritt, and Helga Voss-Eckermann, *French and German Elite Responses, 1964: Codebook and Data* (New Haven: Yale Political Data Library, 1966). See also Karl W. Deutsch, "Integration and Arms Control in the European Political Environment: A Summary Report," this REVIEW, 60 (June, 1966), 354–365.

to European integration and arms control issues.

After identifying seven elite groups believed nearest to the national political decision-making process (military, political, civil service, and business leaders, other key interest group elites, mass media leaders, and intellectuals in France, university professors in Germany), the names of individuals who were to be representative of their elite, as well as themselves political influentials, were sought from a panel of recognized experts in the politics of contemporary France and the German Federal Republic. This "reputational" sample was, in effect, largely based on "positional" criteria and the sample was subsequently enlarged by the addition of other incumbents of key offices.[19]

In response to letters requesting talks with the individuals thus selected, 44 percent of the French and 74 percent of the German leaders contacted agreed to be interviewed. This criterion of "self-selection" was further complicated by scheduling problems, but on the whole efforts to fill stipulated quotas for each of the six elite groups, and to contact the respondents believed to exercise the greatest influence from among those answering the initial letter, were quite successful. All told, the respondents interviewed included 147 French and 173 German leaders. However, it should be kept in mind that the respondents who provided the data on which our study is based, represent an analogous rather than an exact sample of the elite groups in their respective countries. Since, "interview studies of leaders are as rare as interview studies of workers are frequent in Europe,"[20] the information which was collected provided data extremely useful for our purposes.

Three different instruments were employed in the project's data collection phase. The first, a precoded Manifest Attitude Schedule, consisted of twenty major and seventy-eight subsidiary questions, most of them "open-ended," on which the interviews were based. The second, a Biographical Data Schedule, coded information about the socio-economic background of each respondent. In part these data were ascertained in the course of the interviews, in part they came from standard reference sources.[21] Finally, the latent attitudinal orientations of each respondent were assessed by the interviewer according to the dimensions of information, involvement and influence, and recorded in a Latent Attitude Schedule.

Using these data, which were primarily collected for purposes of assessing French and German elite opinion on arms control and European integration, we have taken preliminary steps in the direction of a broader investigation based on secondary analysis of these and similar materials.[22] Toward this end we are reexamining the Yale data in our investigation; the questions we asked of them for this article are different from those they were originally meant to answer.[23] Our concern here is more methodological than substantive. First, we hope to emphasize the need for a discriminating use of background variables in elite analysis, and to explore the utility of a proposed strategy for enriching the social background approach by discovering those multiple combinations of background variables in a body of data which best predict particular attitudes. Secondly, we hope to suggest some of the payoffs in using this strategy by outlining briefly some of our preliminary findings.

III. MANIFEST ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

We asserted earlier that in practice the social background approach has tended to employ all background variables as though

[19] The combination of reputational and positional approaches yielded an initial group of 441 French and 650 German leaders which for operational purposes was understood as representative of elites in both political systems. *Cf.*, Deutsch, Edinger, Macridis and Merritt, *op cit.*, Ch. 1.

[20] Ralf Dahrendorf, "Recent Changes in the Class Structures of European Societies," *Daedalus*. 93 (Winter, 1964), at p. 242.

[21] Categories for this instrument were based upon Lewis J. Edinger's previous studies of West German elites. They included many of the most frequently employed background characteristics in elite studies.

[22] As a first step in the secondary analysis of such data recorded on punch cards, it is often necessary to recode the information, rearranging it in such fashion as might be more amenable to the new questions that are to be asked. Since we sought to make considerably greater comparative use of the Yale data than was intended when it was originally collected and coded, we had to recode most of it so as to develop commensurable categories for both nations.

[23] In addition to treating the French and West German elites as separate populations (in which case one must invoke a *caveat emptor* in so far as the samples are analogous rather than exact) we have sometimes treated the French and German respondents as an analytic universe. Not as a sample of all French and German elites, that is, but rather as an elite population within which we may examine the relationships between social background variables and attitudinal patterns.

they were equally strong indicators for general elite attitudes. More importantly, in the absence of any assessment of the predictability of a *specific* attitude by *particular* background variables in the data, all background variables have often been treated as equally good indicators of that specific attitude. We sought to shed some light on these assumptions by examining the relationships between social background variables and all manifest and latent attitudes of German and French elite respondents.[24]

Finding: While most social background variables showed some degree of association with manifest elite attitudes in the German case, some background variables were clearly better predictors of manifest attitudes than others.

Looking at Table 1 we see that 38 out of 40 background variables are predictors of at least one of the German elite's manifest attitudes. In order to compare the overall predictability of one background variable with another, we have employed two indices: *scope*, which simply refers to the number of all attitudes the background variable predicted; and *strength*, which refers to the mean of all the background variable's attitudinal predictions.

By the *scope* criterion we find that 38 out of the 40 background factors did, in fact, allow us to predict at least one manifest attitude. But some background factors predicted far more such attitudes than others. The first two, both occupational categories, predicted eleven to twelve attitudes, while 30 other categories predicted only four or fewer.[25]

As to their *relative strengths* as predictors, some background factors clearly were more important than others, the range extending from .41 for the lowest to .84 for the highest. Moreover, in almost all cases, background categories were not steady predictors of those attitudes they did predict. The *prediction range* in Table 1 shows that many variables predicted some attitudes considerably better than others. To take an extreme example, principal occupation 1952–64, the background variable that predicted the greatest number of attitudes, (i.e., had the widest *scope*) varied in its predictions between .39 and .85.

In sum, while the predictive strength of 16 background categories among the German elites was fairly high—.61 or better—the number of attitudes they predicted was generally very small. Moreover, an examination of the entire prediction matrix—too large to reproduce here—indicated that in most cases it would have been practically impossible to have forecast which background category would have predicted what attitude(s) of the German leaders.

Note that the five background categories which predicted the greatest number of German elite attitudes (i.e., *scope*)[26] were all related to adult socialization experiences during the preceding 14 years. On the other hand, level of education, a background variable often highly associated with attitudes in mass opinion surveys, was near the bottom of the scope scale. It predicted only one of the 48 elite attitudes. Another point worth noting is the type of attitudes that were most susceptible to probabilistic prediction. The four attitudes predicted by eight to twelve background categories were all associated with particularly salient political issues.[27]

Next, let us look at the French elite data and compare it with the German.

Finding: Among French elites, as among German, some social background factors were considerably better predictors of manifest atti-

[24] The number of latent attitudes (11) used was the same for both the French and German leaders. However, with regard to manifest attitudes less data was available for the French (39 attitudes) than for the Germans (48 attitudes). With regard to the biographical or social background data, there was considerably less data available in the French case (11 variables), than for the German (40 variables). We felt that for theoretical reasons it was worthwhile to utilize the greater body of German data, which will explain differences in our tables. Whenever the French and German respondents were compared, however, this was done using only the attitudes and background variables for which adequate data were on hand for both.

[25] It is worth emphasizing that even the background variable predicting the greatest number of attitudes allowed us to do so for only twelve, that is, 25 percent, of all 48 attitudes.

[26] We use *scope* rather than *strength* as a summary measure because for purposes of the present discussion—demonstrating that some background variables have more relevance than others for elite attitudes in a national political system—the number of attitudes a background variable predicts seems more to the point.

[27] These were responses to the following interviewer questions: (1) What development in domestic policy are likely to bring about a change in German foreign policy? (2) Would the recognition of East Germany ease international tension? (3) How would recognition of the Oder-Neisse line affect efforts toward German reunification? and, (4) What is the greatest threat to German security at the present time?

AND SET OF 48 MANIFEST ATTITUDES BY SCOPE, STRENGTH, AND PREDICTION RANGE*

Background Factor	Relationship to Set of 48 Manifest Attitudes			
	Scope		Strength (by Mean)	Prediction Range
	Number of Attitudes Predicted	Percent of all Attitudes Predicted		
1. Principal Occupation, 1952–1964	12	25	.62	.39–.85
2. Present Occupation	11	23	.62	.40–.85
3. Political Party Leader, 1964	9	19	.65	.39–.86
4. Political Party Affiliation, 1956	9	19	.61	.38–.79
5. Political Persecution, 1933–1944	8	17	.51	.37–.65
6. Nazi Political Activity, 1933–1944	8	17	.61	.40–.83
7. Present Political Party Affiliation	6	13	.69	.48–.80
8. Membership in Two Voluntary Economic Associations	5	10	.66	.50–.84
9. Religious Affiliation	5	10	.57	.46–.77
10. Incumbent Governmental Office, 1956	5	10	.56	.41–.78
11. Political Party Leader, 1956	4	8	.56	.37–.78
12. Principal Occupation, 1945–1952	4	8	.61	.59–.68
13. Region of Birth	4	8	.56	.39–.62
14. Size of Town of Birth	4	8	.48	.37–.63
15. Political Party Affiliation, 1933–1934	4	8	.59	.41–.73
16. Membership in One Voluntary Economic Association	3	6	.55	.41–.67
17. Military Service	3	6	.60	.51–.75
18. Level of Political Governmental Office, 1956	3	6	.50	.36–.71
19. Number of Years in Present Elite Position	3	6	.50	.41–.64
20. Membership in One Voluntary Non-Economic Association	3	6	.68	.65–.71
21. Membership in Three Voluntary Non-Economic Associations	3	6	.52	.44–.66
22. Principal Occupation, Pre-1933	3	6	.54	.38–.76
23. Political Party Affiliation, 1946	3	6	.55	.41–.74
24. Political Party Leader, 1946	3	6	.47	.42–.56
25. Social Class Background	2	4	.59	.57–.60
26. Highest Academic Degree Attained	2	4	.57	.47–.66
27. Country of Birth	2	4	.49	.38–.60
28. Principal Occupation, 1933–1945	2	4	.64	.63–.64
29. Age	2	4	.59	.57–.61
30. Positions in Two Voluntary Economic Associations	2	4	.58	.51–.64
31. Level of Political Governmental Office, 1946	2	4	.55	.53–.56
32. Membership in Three Voluntary Economic Associations	1	2	.78	—
33. University Specialization	1	2	.73	—
34. Level of Education	1	2	.41	—
35. Political Party Leader, Pre-1933	1	2	.68	—
36. Membership in Two Voluntary Non-Economic Associations	1	2	.46	—
37. Highest Military Rank Attained	1	2	.61	—
38. Position in Three Voluntary Economic Associations	1	2	.84	—
39. Position in One Voluntary Economic Assn.	0	0	—	—
40. Political Party Affiliation, Pre-1933	0	0	—	—

* *Scope* is the number of manifest attitudes predicted at .05 level or better (48 possible attitudinal predictions). *Strength* is the mean of the background factor's attitudinal predictions at the above level. *Prediction Range* specifies the lowest and highest attitudinal predictions made by the background factors at this level.

Number of Respondents (N) = 173.

Number of Attitudes = 48.

TABLE 2. FRENCH AND GERMAN RESPONDENTS: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COMMON SOCIAL BACKGROUND FACTORS AND MANIFEST ATTITUDES BY SCOPE, STRENGTH, AND PREDICTION RANGE*

Background Factor	French Respondents Prediction of Manifest Attitudes				German Respondents Prediction of Manifest Attitudes			
	Scope				Scope			
	Number of Attitudes Predicted	Percent of Attitudes Predicted	Strength (by Mean)	Prediction Range	Number of Attitudes Predicted	Percent of Attitudes Predicted	Strength (by Mean)	Prediction Range
1. Present Political Party Affiliation	9	23	.65	.53–.77	4	10	.68	.48–.75
2. Political Party Affiliation, France, 1958; Germany, 1956	9	23	.68	.50–.81	6	15	.60	.38–.75
3. Present Occupation	6	15	.65	.40–.82	7	18	.68	.44–.85
4. Social Class Background	4	10	.75	.67–.80	2	5	.59	.57–.60
5. Size of Town of Birth	4	10	.64	.42–.86	1	3	.47	—
6. Principal Occupation, France, 1958–1964; Germany, 1952–1964	3	8	.54	.48–.61	8	21	.66	.45–.85
7. University Specialization	3	8	.67	.60–.75	1	3	.73	—
8. Level of Education	2	5	.71	.63–.79	0	—	—	—
9. Age	1	3	.77	—	2	5	.64	.63–.64
10. Region of Birth	0	0	—	—	3	8	.53	.39–.62
11. Principal Occupation, France, 1945–1958; Germany 1945–1952	0	0	—	—	2	5	.60	.59–.60

* *Scope* is the number of manifest attitudes predicted at .05 level or better (39 possible attitudinal predictions). *Strength* is the mean of the background factor's attitudinal predictions at the above level. *Prediction Range* specifies the lowest and highest attitudinal predictions made by the background factors at this level.
Number of Respondents (N) = French, 147; German, 173.
Number of Attitudes = 39.

tudes than others, and some manifest attitudes were again more frequently predicted by background categories than were others.

While nine of the eleven French background factors predicted at least one French elite attitude in the data, Table 2 shows the differences in their relative *scopes*. Two were related to nine manifest attitudes, while six were related to only three or fewer attitudes. In predictive *strength* they varied between .64 and .77 for particular attitudes and the *prediction range* indicates that the same background categories were far from being steady predictors for the set of attitudes they did predict. As in the case of the German elites, however, when the background variables predicted attitudes, their strength was usually high, but their scopes, the number of attitudes they did predict, were low. Here too, it would for the most part have been difficult to have forecast which background factors would predict which attitudes.

Observe that the background factors with the widest scope (predicting in this case six to nine of all attitudes) were again associated particularly with adult socialization experiences—especially occupation and party affiliation. And again, level of education was a relatively poor predictor of elite attitudes.

In order to contrast these results with the German findings, let us look at those background variables and attitudes for which comparable results were available (see Table 2). While age and social class background had the highest predictive *strengths* for the French elites they were comparatively low in the German data. As we have already noted, party affiliation and occupation have relatively wide *scopes* for both French and German elite attitudes. On the whole, however, the rank orderings of all background variables by scope in the French and German social circles was highly dissimilar. The Spearman r^s is .16 for the two rankings.

But scope is a crude index, describing only the total number of attitudes a background variable predicted. It could be that the same background factor, at least, predicts the same attitudinal responses to identical questions for both German and French elite respondents. In our analysis, this might have been the case for 24 background-attitude combinations.

But it proved to apply to only four of these: the same background factors generally predicted different attitudes in the French and German data.

Shifting our perspective from the background categories to the attitudes predicted, we find, as in the German case, that some attitudes were predicted by more background variables than were others: two attitudes were predicted by four to five background factors, but twenty of the remaining attitudes were not predicted by any background factors.[28] None of these attitudes were among those most frequently associated with the same background variables in the case of the German elites. They did however touch upon extremely salient issues in French politics—just as the German attitudes most often predicted by German background variables were particularly salient issues in German politics.[29] This suggests that, generally, elite socialization experiences associated with social background factors may possibly be more strongly related to orientations toward highly salient issues than to orientations concerning issues of lower saliency. If this hypothesis should be sustained by further research, future analysis would require considerable discrimination among attitudes conditioned by the differential saliency of issues in various political systems and periods of time.

[28] Since only eleven French background categories were examined, we prefer not to extend our interpretation to argue that because fewer French elite attitudes were related to background factors, background as such was less related to French attitudes than to German. However, this limitation imposed upon the present analysis by the nature of the data employed merely emphasizes the need to expand and coordinate data collection for more extensive cross-national comparisons.

[29] Those attitudes predicted by more background variables (three to five) than other attitudes were responses to the following questions put by the interviewers: (1) Are you content with the present governmental system in France? (2) Are you satisfied with the government's foreign policy measures? (3) Which group or groups do you feel have gained in political power over the last few years? (4) Which features of French foreign policy, if any, are likely to remain after deGaulle? (5) Do you expect an appreciable change in the relations between France and the countries of Eastern Europe during the next few years? and, (6) Is an independent nuclear deterrent necessary for a nation's prestige in the world?

IV. NATIONALITY AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

Nationality is frequently believed to be an important social background variable, with widespread and powerful effects on elite attitudes. However, its actual relationship to elite attitudes has infrequently been analyzed quantitatively and cross-nationally. Most studies focus on elites of the same nationality and do not include cross-national attitudinal responses to identical questions which permit comparison. But if all respondents are Germans, for example, there is no way to assess the relative importance of their "Germanism" for different attitudes.

The Yale group, however, did ask the same questions of French and German respondents, affording us an opportunity to compare the relationship between the nationality factor and manifest attitudes to similar relationships between other background variables and the same attitudes. To explore this problem we combined the French and German elite responses, and utilized nationality as a social background predictor of differential attitudes. We then compared our findings with those of other background factor predictions in the French and German groups treated separately.

Finding: Nationality had a significantly greater scope (i.e., predicted more attitudes) than any other background variable in either national group. However, its strength as a predictor was about the same as that of other elite background variables in Germany and below the average in France.

In *scope*, nationality predicted 85 percent of the manifest attitudes in the combined groups. When they were examined separately, no other social background factor proved a predictor for more than 25 percent of the same set of attitudes and most others predicted far less than that. But on the *strength* index, nationality had only a mean predictability of .60 for the combined groups; taken separately the average background variable for the German elites had practically the same mean predictability (.59) and for the French it was higher (.67).

The extremely wide scope of nationality as a predictor might lead us to inquire whether or not this factor affects the attitudinal predictions of other background factors. In other words, we are now interested in the relative impact nationality had on the relationships we have already observed between other background categories and manifest attitudes among French and German elites considered by themselves. The method for determining this is a simple control. When we examined the re-

TABLE 3. FRENCH AND GERMAN RESPONDENTS: COMPARISON OF ATTITUDINAL PREDICTIONS BY BACKGROUND FACTORS IN SEPARATE NATIONAL SAMPLES CONTROLLED FOR NATIONALITY WITH ATTITUDINAL PREDICTIONS AFFECTED BY NATIONALITY IN COMBINED GROUP*

Background Factor	French Respondents		German Respondents	
	Number of Attitudinal Predictions in Separate Sample Controlled for Nationality	Number of These Attitudinal Predictions Affected by Nationality	Number of Attitudinal Predictions in Separate Sample Controlled for Nationality	Number of These Attitudinal Predictions Affected by Nationality
1. Principal Occupation, France, 1958–1964; Germany, 1952–1964	3	3	8	5
2. Present Occupation	6	4	7	6
3. Political Party Affiliation, France, 1958; Germany, 1956	9	7	6	6
4. Present Political Party Affiliation	9	8	4	3
5. Principal Occupation, France, 1945–1958; Germany, 1945–1952	0	0	2	2
6. Region of Birth	0	0	3	4
7. Size of Town of Birth	4	4	1	0
8. Social Class Background	4	4	2	1
9. Age	1	1	2	2
10. University Specialization	3	3	1	1
11. Level of Education	2	2	0	0
Totals	41	36	36	30

Significance Level .05.

Number of Respondents (N) = French, 147; German, 173.

* The criteria for attributing a nationality effect to a background factor's attitudinal prediction are whether or not this predictability decreases or drops below the .05 level in the combined French-German group compared to its attitudinal prediction in the separate sample controlled for nationality.

lationship between background variables and manifest attitudes in each country separately, we were controlling for nationality. By combining the two groups we no longer do so. Thus, if another background factor's prediction of an attitude now decreases in predictability or drops below the .05 significance level we have been using when compared to its predictability in the controlled samples, we can attribute this effect to nationality.[30]

As shown in Table 3, nationality affected over 80 percent (36 out of 41 for the French and 30 out of 36 for the Germans) of the attitudinal predictions made by other background variables among the French and German elites. Those background factors less affected by nationality in their attitudinal predictions again referred to contexts of adult socialization experiences.

[30] By combining the French and German data we are once again limited to examining only those background variables (11) and those attitudes (39) for which we have comparable information. Moreover, we can observe a drop in predictability in the combined groups for only those background predictions that were already found to be significant when the two national elites were considered separately.

V. LATENT ATTITUDES AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND

The data provided through the Latent Attitude Instrument of the Yale Study present an opportunity to examine the social background approach from yet another perspective. It enables us to consider—apart from manifest response patterns—eleven implicit attitudinal orientations, such as respondents' level of political affect, sense of involvement, level of information, resistance to new information (cloture), and alienation from the prevailing political order.

The Latent Attitude Instrument, it will be remembered, coded the interviewer's intuitive judgements of response patterns. In that sense it provided ostensibly "softer" data than the actual responses coded in the Manifest Attitude Instrument and the social background information included in the Biographical Data schedule. In view of this we first sought to check its reliability as a source for data evaluating the respondent's orientations. Included in these latent ratings were questions requesting the interviewer to categorize each respondent's degree of information along an ordinal scale. If accurate, the interviewer's judgement should correspond roughly to the total number of "don't know" answers the respondent gave

TABLE 4. GERMAN RESPONDENTS: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SOCIAL BACKGROUND FACTORS AND SET OF 11 LATENT ATTITUDES BY SCOPE, STRENGTH, AND PREDICTION RANGE*

Background Factor	Relationship to Set of 11 Latent Attitudes		
	Scope of Attitudes Predicted	Strength (by Mean)	Prediction Range
1. Military Service	6	.71	.55–.86
2. Principal Occupation, 1952–1964	4	.67	.58–.78
3. Present Occupation	3	.70	.62–.78
4. Political Party Leader, 1964	3	.70	.63–.79
5. Political Party Leader, 1956	3	.68	.62–.79
6. Membership in Two Voluntary Non-Economic Associations	3	.60	.59–.62
7. Present Political Party Affiliation	3	.69	.60–.78
8. Political Party Leader, Pre-1933	2	.71	.64–.77
9. Political Party Leader, 1946	2	.68	.57–.78
10. Principal Occupation, 1933–1945	2	.78	.77–.78
11. Membership in Three Voluntary Non-Economic Associations	2	.67	.63–.70
12. Political Party Affiliation, 1946	2	.70	.64–.76
13. Age	2	.81	.77–.84
14. Level of Political Governmental Office, 1946	2	.69	.59–.78
15. Level of Political Governmental Office, 1956	2	.70	.62–.78
16. Principal Occupation, 1945–1952	2	.69	.60–.78
17. Nazi Political Activity, 1933–1934	1	.77	—
18. Incumbent Governmental Office, 1956	1	.84	—
19. Highest Military Rank Attained	1	.62	—
20. Highest Academic Degree Attained	1	.53	—
21. Membership in One Voluntary Economic Association	1	.61	—
22. Position in One Voluntary Economic Association	1	.77	—
23. Membership in Two Voluntary Economic Associations	1	.55	—
24. Membership in Three Voluntary Economic Associations	1	.78	—
25. Position in Three Voluntary Economic Associations	1	.78	—
26. Political Party Affiliation, 1933–1944	1	.73	—
27. Political Party Affiliation, 1956	1	.78	—
28. Number of Years in Present Elite Position	1	.77	—
29. University Specialization	1	.77	—
30. Religious Affiliation	0	—	—
31. Social Class Background	0	—	—
32. Size of Town of Birth	0	—	—
33. Country of Birth	0	—	—
34. Region of Birth	0	—	—
35. Level of Education	0	—	—
36. Position in Two Voluntary Economic Associations	0	—	—
37. Membership in One Voluntary Non-Economic Association	0	—	—
38. Principal Occupation, Pre-1933	0	—	—
39. Political Party Affiliation, Pre- 1933	0	—	—
40. Political Persecution, 1933–1944	0	—	—

* *Scope* is the number of latent attitudes predicted at .05 level or better (11 possible attitudinal predictions). *Strength* is the mean of the background factor's attitudinal predictions at the above level. *Prediction Range* specifies the lowest and highest attitudinal predictions made by the background factors at this level.

Number of Respondents (N) = 173.

Number of Attitudes = 11.

to explicit questions in the Manifest schedule.[31] While such a reliability measure is by no means ideal, it seemed a reasonable and feasible estimate given the nature of the data.

We took the number of "Don't Know" answers given by each respondent as a percent of the total number of questions put to him from the Manifest Attitude Schedule. Respondents were ranked from high to low according to this criterion, and the ranking was compared to a similar ranking of the same respondents according to their degree of information as estimated by the interviewer in the Latent Attitude Schedule. For the latent ratings of the German sample, we found seven ranking errors (4% error), and four ranking errors (3% error) in the French sample. This low percentage of error appeared to lend sufficient credence to the Latent Attitude ratings to permit us to employ this data in further exploration of the social background hypothesis.

Finding: For both the German and French elites there was considerable association between social background factors and latent attitudes, though not as much as between background factors and manifest attitudes.[32] *Again, some background variables proved better predictors of latent attitudes than others in the two sets of elites.*

As shown in Table 4, in *scope* twenty-nine of the forty German background variables predicted at least one latent attitude, but only seven predicted more than two. Predictive *strength* varied considerably among different background factors (from .53 to .84), and also within each one, as indicated by the *prediction range*. The two background variables with the widest scope proved to be military service and principal occupation 1952–1964, whereas for the manifest attitudes, it was political party factors and present and past occupations that were the most frequent predictors. However, note that in both instances the highest predictors relate particularly to adult socialization experiences, while level of education is at the bottom, and in the case of the latent attitudes does not even qualify as a predictor.

Among the French elite respondents, eight of the eleven potential background predictors for which data was available were related to at least one latent attitude (see Table 5). Once again the background factors varied in scope: two predicted four to five latent attitudes, while three predicted none. As with the German elites, strength varied—though not as much—among different factors (from .58 and .72) and again certain background factors generally predicted some attitudes better than other attitudes. In France too, the factors with the widest scope, present occupation and present political party affiliation, related to adult socialization experiences. These two thus proved to be among the strongest predictors of manifest as well as latent elite attitudes in both countries, while level of education, with equal consistency, was a very poor predictor. Note, however, that the comparison between the predictive scopes of the same latent attitudes by all identical French and German background factors in Table 5 shows their overall rank order to be quite dissimilar in the two countries.

As with the manifest attitudes, differences in the comparative scope of a background factor does not preclude that it might have predicted the same latent orientations of both German and French elites. In our analysis this could have occurred eight times. In fact, however, only three such orientations—level of involvement, level of affect, and cloture of thinking—were predicted by the same factor in both countries, all three being predicted by a single one, namely present occupation.

To sum up, we found latent attitudes to show associative patterns similar to those for manifest attitudes among French and German elites. When predictions were made by the background categories their *strength* was acceptable and, in many cases, quite high. Predictive *scope*, on the other hand, proved rather limited, and indicated wide differences in the associative patterns in France and Germany apart from the consistency with which occupation and party affiliation turned out to be high predictors of latent as well as manifest attitudes.

Repeating our study of the nationality factor with the latent attitudinal data, we found

[31] The expectation was that if the ratings were accurate, a respondent rated low on degree of information in the Latent Schedule should have given a high number of "D.K." answers in the Manifest Schedule, and vice-versa. While our check indicated a relatively low number of interviewer errors and appeared to justify an assumption of high accuracy for the "Latent" estimates, we should note that an estimate of this nature is purely quantitative, while it is likely that qualitative judgments were to some measure a component of the original ratings.

[32] We had expected the association to be greater because the Latent Attitude Schedule listed much more diffuse orientations than the Manifest. However, the Latent Attitude data seems comparatively weak and limited; it includes only about one-quarter as many items as were covered by the Manifest Schedule. We are presently exploring this problem in greater depth.

TABLE 5. FRENCH AND GERMAN RESPONDENTS: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COMMON SOCIAL BACKGROUND FACTORS AND LATENT ATTITUDES BY SCOPE, STRENGTH, AND PREDICTION RANGE*

Background Factor	French Respondents Prediction of Latent Attitudes			German Respondents Prediction of Latent Attitudes		
	Scope (Number of Attitudes Predicted)	Strength (by Mean)	Prediction Range	Scope (Number of Attitudes Predicted)	Strength (by Mean)	Prediction Range
1. Present Occupation	5	.68	.63–.74	3	.70	.62–.78
2. Present Political Party Affiliation	4	.70	.66–.79	3	.69	.60–.78
3. Political Party Affiliation, France, 1958; Germany, 1956	3	.71	.65–.80	1	.78	—
4. University Specialization	2	.59	.52–.65	1	.77	—
5. Social Class Background	2	.58	.50–.66	0	—	—
6. Level of Education	1	.58	—	0	—	—
8. Age	1	.63	—	2	.81	—
9. Size of Town of Birth	0	—	—	0	—	—
10. Principal Occupation, France, 1945–1958; Germany, 1945–1952	0	—	—	2	.69	—
11. Principal Occupation, France, 1958–1964; Germany, 1952–1964	0	—	—	4	.67	.58–.78

* *Scope* is the number of latent attitudes predicted at .05 level or better (11 possible attitudinal predictions). *Strength* is the mean of the background factor's attitudinal predictions at the above level. *Prediction Range* specifies the lowest and highest attitudinal predictions made by the background factor at this level.

Number of Respondents (N) = French, 147; German, 173.

Number of Attitudes = 11.

nationality again to have an impressively broader scope than other background variables. Nationality was related to 73 percent of the latent attitudes, while on the average other French and German background factors were respectively related to only 16 and 13 percent of those attitudes. However, its strength, or mean predictability, was .63, below the average for other background predictors for the French (.65) and the Germans (.72). Once more we combined the French and German elites and compared resulting attitudinal predictions with those made by the same background variables when nationality was held constant. Here we found that nationality affected the attitudinal predictions of more than three-quarters of the background variables in both French and German cases, about the same proportion as with manifest attitudes.

VI. ATTITUDINAL COHESION AND SOCIAL BACKGROUND WITHIN NATIONAL ELITES

As a further step in our cross-national analysis, we reduced the ninety-eight questions in the Manifest Schedule to eight basic questions which could serve as a core for a comparison of attitudinal consensus and disconsensus among French and among German leaders. For purposes of identifying clear attitudinal dimensions on the basis of these eight questions, we next dichotomized them into two distinct and mutually exclusive sets of manifest orientations, bearing in mind the purposes which underlay the original formulation and employment of the questions in the Yale Project. Following this procedure, we constructed a matrix depicting the distribution of answers to each of the eight questions across replies to each of the remaining seven. A simple examination of the cells for those cases where a proportion of the respondents reversed themselves—indicating a division of opinion *across* our two dimensions—allowed us to identify attitudinal orientations of relatively high agreement and disagreement.

Finding: German elites displayed an exceptionally high attitudinal consensus, while French elites showed considerable dissension.

French leaders generally identified the positive features of their regime with its effective "leadership" and the contents of "policy-making." While in their orientation toward internal or external problems relating to the purpose of European integration French respondents divided approximately 5:3 in favor of an internal orientation, this division did not show up as a cleavage across any of the other dimensions.

Not surprisingly, the most significant elite cleavages in the deGaulle Republic were found to exist along the approbation/alienation, nationalist/supranationalist, and European/Atlantic dichotomous dimensions. Those who

TABLE 6. DEGREE OF ELITE CONSENSUS AND INTEGRATION AS MEASURED BY AGREEMENT ON MULTIPLE QUESTIONS

Number of Questions	Elite Respondents			
	French		German	
	N	%	*N*	%
1	106	72	161	93
2	74	50	143	83
3	61	41	99	57
4	36	24	69	40
5	19	13	47	27
6	11	07	30	17
7	06	04	11	06
8	0	0	06	03

evaluatively (*i.e.*, instrumentally) and affectively (*i.e.*, emotionally) approved of the present governmental system, also tended to take a "nationalist" position on NATO strategy and to focus cognitively upon "European" as opposed to common "Atlantic" interests. This Gaullist position was opposed correspondingly on the same dimensions by the anti-Gaullists who were evaluatively and affectively more or less alienated from their political system.[33] In short, while the French respondents manifested high disagreement along the lines of Gaullist–anti-Gaullist questions, their agreement was usually in areas where leadership and foreign policy issues were less salient.

The German elites, in sharp contrast to their French counterparts, appeared highly consensual and integrated. The contrast between the two elite groups in terms of their integration may be seen clearly in Table 6, which summarizes the proportion of individuals within each sample who agreed with one another—that is, gave identical responses on one or more of our eight questions.[34]

Looking at Table 6, we find that on three questions the German respondents demonstrate higher consensus than the French in taking a position by an average ratio of 4:3; on four through six questions the Germans show about twice the amount of agreement on a position than do the French.

When the German respondents were in disagreement it was along the trust/non-trust and European/Atlantic dichotomous dimensions. However, these two divisions did not show up along any other dimensions; there were no cleavages across multiple questions, as in the French sample. Also, in contrast to the French, the German elites, on the whole, supported their political system and were strongly oriented toward structural, regime features rather than leadership and policy features. They manifested internationalist orientations in both NATO strategy and evaluative perceptions of prospective European union partners. But they were concerned more with internal—primarily economic—European problems than with world bi-polarism in their evaluations of the purpose of European integration.

In sum, whereas the German sample demonstrated a generally high degree of consensus along our eight dimensions, the French respondents seemed deeply divided on all of them. In France the most basic elite cleavages appeared related to approbation vs. alienation toward the political system, or, more specifically, to lie along dimensions which can be labeled Gaullist and anti-Gaullist.

In comparing the manifest attitudes over which there was high disconsensus among the French elites with those attitudes that were found to have been frequently predicted by social background factors, we found that they were not identical. This led us to hypothesize that, though the strength of social background predictions of manifest attitudes for the French group as a whole was relatively high, background variables would not be as strongly related to attitudes if we narrowed the focus from the entire national samples to intra-national groups in high agreement and disagreement.


To pursue this hypothesis, we divided our respective French and German leaders into two groups for each country—four altogether—which agreed internally and disagreed between each other on three attitudinal dimensions. The members of each group had in common that they all took precisely the same position on a number of questions, while the distinction between the two groups was that their respec-

[33] Moreover, these alienated elites are generally oriented beyond the boundaries of France: not only are they on the whole supra-nationalists, but their cognitive focus extends to a "larger European" and "Atlantic" outlook, *i.e.*, to a diffuse internationalism.

[34] Our procedure was as follows: starting with the question on which responses by both French and German elites showed the greatest consensus (*i.e.*, where the greatest number of respondents agreed on one or another position) we separated out the groups of greatest agreement. We then culled from these those who were in highest agreement on a second question as well and continued this dichotomizing selection process through all eight questions.

FIGURE 1

FRENCH AND GERMAN RESPONDENTS: DEGREE OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS AND SELECTED MANIFEST ATTITUDES OF DICHOTOMOUS GROUP MEMBERS COMPARED TO DEGREE OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN THE SAME SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND ATTITUDE IN ENTIRE ELITE SAMPLES*



*Measure of Association = Pearson's Contingency Coefficient

Note: Groups I and II are in internal agreement but dichotomous in attitude.

tive members took exactly opposite positions on these questions. Thus, respondents within each agreed with each other but absolutely disagreed with all members of the other group. If all in Group I answered a question one way, then all members of Group II had answered it in the opposite direction.

Now, if social background factors are indeed strong indicators of elite attitudes they should clearly discriminate between groups within a country that are internally homogeneous in attitudes but in absolute disagreement with each other. As Groups I and II in each country are distinguished by the opposite attitudes of their members, if social background is highly related to attitudinal group membership, the two groups should have highly dissimilar backgrounds because they have dissimilar attitudes. Or at least, they should show greater dissimilarity in their backgrounds than would be found in the entire French and German elite samples when there are no internal controls for attitudinal group membership. On the three attitudes which define attitudinal group membership, common background characteristics should be highly associated with these attitudes, or at least more highly associated than in the entire elite samples.

Finding: 1) *In the German sample, background characteristics were more highly associated with attitudes in dichotomous groups than they were for the German elites as a whole on the three responses.* 2) *In the French sample the relationships between background and attitude in dichotomous groups was less highly associated than they were for the entire French sample on the same three responses.*[35]

In Figure 1 the German background-attitude relationships are depicted by solid lines and the French by broken lines. It shows that among German elites background remained an adequate attitudinal indicator when they were divided into groups which agreed internally and disagreed with each other. Among the French exactly the opposite happened. With the exception of size of town of birth, significance of background decreased in relationship to attitude in the case of the two groups below what it was in the French entire elite sample.[36]

[35] Our measure of association was Pearson's contingency coefficient. If background characteristics were distributed indiscriminately, or in the same way, in both Groups I and II which were in absolute disagreement on three attitudes, then they could not have been related to these attitudes and the coefficient would be zero. As the coefficient increases, however, the background characteristic increasingly discriminates between the two groups, and is therefore a more reliable indicator in predicting attitudinal group membership.

[36] Two control groups of the same size as Groups I and II were randomly selected from each of the entire French and German elite sam-

TABLE 7. GERMAN RESPONDENTS: BACKGROUND FACTOR COMBINATIONS YIELDING HIGHEST PREDICTIONS FOUND IN DATA OF SELECTED MANIFEST ATTITUDES

Attitude Predicted	Background Factors in the Combination and Their Relative Contributions to the Combined Prediction				Combined Predictions
1. Approbation—Alienation Toward Governmental System	Social Class Background	.62	Political Party Leader —Pre-1933	.62	.66
2. Policy, Government—Structure, Regime Orientation	Region of Birth	.60	Principal Occupation, 1952–1964	.60	.64
3. Secure, Trust Society—Bad Portents, Distrust Society	Highest Degree Attained	.50	Membership in Two Voluntary Economic Associations	.51	Political Persecution, 1933–1944 .50 .57
4. Nationalist—Supra Nationalist	Membership in One Voluntary Economic Association	.59	Membership in Two Voluntary Economic Associations	.59	Number of Years in Present Elite Occupation .64 .70
5. European—Atlantic Orientation	Military Service	.51	Political Party Affiliation, 1946	.50	.53
6. Little European—Larger European Orientation	Highest Degree Attained	.49	Principal Occupation, Pre-1933	.60	Political Persecution, 1933–1944 .56 .72
7. Internal Problem—External Problem Orientation	Membership in One Voluntary Economic Association	.68	Number of Years in Present Elite Occupation	.68	.68
8. Communist Threat—No Communist Threat Perception	Membership in Two Voluntary Economic Associations	.73	Present Political Party Affiliation	.76	.80

Thus, social background became a stronger indicator for attitudinal group membership in the German sample, while its significance actually decreased in the French case.

In terms of our thesis that social background factors vary in their relationship to attitudes—and more particularly, that social background is likely to be differentially related to attitudes among various nations even within the same "Western" culture area—the above finding seem persuasive. It suggests that where background data on elite members is collected for comparative purposes on the assumption that it is significantly related to elite attitudes, the researcher should therefore proceed with caution. With regard to elite attitudes, at any rate, our analysis indicates to us that social background categories do not necessarily have equal meaning and significance in different political systems.

VII. CONCLUSION

This paper has attempted to make a modest contribution to cross-national comparisons of political systems in general and to the study of their leaders in particular. Analysis of the relationships between the social backgrounds of elites on the one hand, and their orientation patterns on the other, has obvious relevance for the study of sub-national and national, as well as supra-national political systems. For example, where nationality is a significant factor relating to elite attitudes, it may tell us a good deal about the cohesiveness of old and new national states and about the prospects for supra-national political entities. Strong relationships or, conversely, weak relationships, between attitudes and religious or age cohort socialization experiences may similarly reveal significant patterns of elite ties and cleavages within, between, and across political communities.

The social background approach comes to us with a long lineage and a history of diverse applications. Its employment in elite analysis, however, has usually had rather specific purposes. Whether these have emphasized the projection of trends in attitudinal distributions in a policy science context, or stressed less policy-oriented studies of elite socialization, the implicit common goal has been to relate background variables as contexts of elite socialization experiences to elite attitudes.

---

ples. They moved in the opposite direction from Groups I and II for the Germans, and remained about the same as the French entire elite sample or moved but slightly in the direction of the French Groups I and II.

At the present juncture, the background data that have been collected are often used undiscriminatingly for lack of conclusive evidence on the actual relationships between particular background variables and particular attitudes in different cultural circumstances. Our analysis suggests the following qualifications: (1) some background variables are considerably better predictors than are others of attitudes within a single national political system;[37] (2) some elite attitudes in a particular national polity are more frequently related to background variables than are others; and (3) relationships between social background and attitude vary from one national political system to another even within the same supranational culture area.[38]

If the social background approach is to fulfill its purposes and justify its promises of making background data a powerful predictive index of attitudinal distributions, it seems to us that it must first come to grips with the very complex problems of the relationship between the two. This calls for data including many background-attitude relationships under diverse cultural and structural circumstances and their analysis in terms of comparative socialization theories yet to be developed.[39]

In this article, we introduce a multivariate technique which makes the necessary manipulation of large quantities of such complex data at least feasible. The Robot Data Screening program we employed permits the investigator to examine readily all possible combinations of variables in search for those which have the highest predictive scope and strength in a given body of data. Moreover, it allows us to discover combinations of several "causal" variables which together have a greater predictive power than any one of them alone.

For example, in the case of our German data we were confronted with the need to examine the predictive strength of 40 background factors for 48 elite attitudes. By running our data through the Robot Data Screening program—rather than undertaking to study more than a million tables for possible combinations of up to three background predictors—we found that 43 attitudes could be related to single background factors. Going further, we learned that in some instances the predictability of 40 attitudes was increased by a combination of background factors. Table 7 illustrates this procedure in the case of the eight key German elite attitudes considered earlier.

A technique, however, cannot substitute for interpretation. It may be that even if sophisticated methods of ascertaining elite attitudes permit us to distinguish "real" attitudes from expressed attitudes, the data may still be inadequate for our purpose. We may be unable to obtain sufficiently detailed information on the social background histories of elite group members to allow us to achieve satisfactory explanations and predictions. And we may not find sufficient attitudinal consistency related to social background to do better than investigators employing less quantitative and more intuitive approaches. If we are to do better, both requirements will have to be satisfied.

In any event, our admittedly tentative findings and inferences based on a comparative analysis of two groups of national leaders seem to us to raise some doubts about several assumptions implicit in the standard social background approach to elite studies. We believe they underscore the need to sharpen social background studies through comparative research into empirical relationships between specific social background variables and attitudes within the framework of socialization processes.

[37] In the case of the data used here predictive strength often proved acceptable, but the scope of prediction was frequently lower than might have been expected and did not seem to conform to any obvious patterns beyond those we suggested rather tentatively. Moreover, the relevance of the diffuseness or specificity of the attitudes in question remained to be resolved. Despite our contrary findings in comparing latent with manifest attitudes among French and German elites, we suspect that quantitative forecasting may be more successful with diffuse than with specific attitudinal responses.

[38] This was underscored in our study of attitudinal cohesion, while the pervasive effects of nationality emphasized the theme from a different perspective.

[39] Some indications of a possible approach were suggested to us by our finding that adult socialization experiences—particularly those isolated by occupation and party affiliation categories—were consistently highest in relationship to attitude, and that those attitudes most frequently predicted by the background data usually were related to salient political issues. We realize, of course, that the data base for these particular findings was extremely limited and our conclusions correspondingly tentative.

PROTEST PARTICIPATION AMONG SOUTHERN NEGRO COLLEGE STUDENTS

JOHN M. ORBELL
The Ohio State University

A recent article in this REVIEW has drawn attention to the inadequacies in our knowledge of how great social movements arise.[1] On the Negro protest movement there are many hypotheses but few attempts to relate them to differences in individual behavior. Considerable confusion also exists in the variety of explanatory terms involved. James A. Geschwinder lists five hypotheses that focus variously on economic conditions and the psychological meaning given them. They are the *Vulgar Marxist* hypothesis—that Negro dissatisfaction results from a progressive deterioration in the social and economic position of the race; the *Rising Expectations* hypothesis—that Negro expectations are rising more rapidly than their fulfillment; the *Sophisticated Marxist* hypothesis or the *Relative Deprivation* hypothesis—that Negro perceptions of white life have led to dissatisfaction with their own rate of improvement; the *Rise and Drop* hypothesis—that improvement in conditions followed by a sharp drop is responsible; and the *Status Inconsistency* hypothesis—that a group possessing status attributes ranked differently on various status hierarchies of a society will be dissatisfied and prone to rebellion.[2]

This paper will suggest that theory based on variations in the structure of intergroup relations can go some way toward integrating the different kinds of explanation that have been advanced. A more general aspiration is to draw attention to one set of terms that might be useful in the long overdue development of a genuinely comparative study of social movements such as the Negro movement. The broad hypothesis arising from—but by no means fully tested by—an examination of several individual and contextual variables is that *proximity to the dominant white culture increases the likelihood of protest involvement.* The analysis will give a priority to structural considerations, but will also suggest something about intervening psychological variables.

Most of the existing knowledge about this and other social movements comes from case studies of one, or at best very few, cities or districts.[3] Consequently, we know little about the variation in participation *among* such areas. The data on which the present study is based are drawn from a survey of Negro college students conducted in 1962, about two years after the sit-in movement began, by Professors Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro as part of their wider study of Southern attitudes and behavior.[4] Included were 264 Negro students who attended, in all, thirty colleges of various kinds in all eleven former Confederate states. Although there were never enough students interviewed in any one college to treat them as a separate sample, the breadth of the survey lets us test a variety of ecological and institutional variables as well as many individual variables.

The dependent variable of this study is participation in the Negro college student protest movement. Presumably this should be conceptualized, in the manner of more general political participation, as stretching on a continuum of related activities.[5] A number of

[1] See Jack Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," this REVIEW, 60 (June, 1966), at pp. 293–295.

[2] James A. Geschwinder, "Social Structure and the Negro Revolt: An Examination of Some Hypotheses," *Social Forces*, 43 (December, 1964), at pp. 248–249.

[3] See for example, Lewis Killian and Charles Grigg, *Racial Crisis in America* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964); Daniel C. Thompson, *The Negro Leadership Class* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1963); Jack Walker, "Protest and Negotiation: A Case Study of Negro Leadership in Atlanta, Georgia," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 7 (May, 1963), 99–124.

[4] See Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, *Negroes and the New Southern Politics* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966). The present survey was made in addition to their surveys of the adult Negro and white populations in the South. The author is most grateful for their permission to use these data and their helpful suggestions at several stages of the research.

[5] See, for example, Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), p. 92; and Matthews and Prothro, *op. cit.*, 53–58. The latter uses a cumulative scale of political participation stretching from talking politics, voting, taking part in campaigns, belonging to political organizations and holding party or public office, and demonstrates that these factors " . . . are not only related to one another but are, in fact, different forms of the same phenomenon" (p. 53).

TABLE 1. THE DIMENSIONS OF PROTEST PARTICIPATION

		Participation in Freedom Rides or Sit-ins		
		Yes	No	Totals
Membership in Protest Organizations	yes	42	41	83
	no	23	158	181
	Totals	65	199	264

different kinds of behavior suggest themselves. Students belonged to protest organizations, marched, picketed, took part in sit-ins and freedom rides. Simply giving support to the protest movement was nearly universal among the students and of little use in differentiating them. In this case, however, the various kinds of protest behaviors reported by the students could not be related acceptably as a Guttman scale[6] and instead a simple index was adopted. In what follows, the term "participants" refers to those students who had either taken part in a sit-in or a freedom ride or belonged to one of several kinds of protest organizations.[7] Although these two variables are strongly associated, in several instances it will be appropriate to examine them separately. Table 1 gives the distribution of students according to these categories.

I. COLLEGE VARIABLES

Not all protest activities that Negro college students get involved in have their origin in the colleges they attend, but the data suggest that at least two college variables have a significant impact on protest, independent of all other factors.[8] These are the manner in which the college is supported—by state or private finance—and its quality.

Control of the College

The reasons for believing that college control may have an impact on protest are straightforward: state-run institutions are open to many kinds of pressures from which private colleges are free. Undoubtedly the willingness and ability of college administrators to resist such pressures vary from college to college and state to state, but there is ample evidence that they can be most compelling. At Southern University, Baton Rouge, students became involved in demonstrations shortly after the sit-in movement began in North Carolina. On March 29, 1960, a large number of Southern's students were arrested following sit-ins at S. H. Kress and Co. and the Greyhound Bus Station. As had already happened elsewhere, the all-white State Board of Education immediately warned that "stern disciplinary action" would be taken against any future demonstrators. The president of the University, Dr. Felton Clark, was reported as saying he had "no alternatives," and further demonstrations resulted in eighteen students being expelled from the University.[9] In a speech to the students he said, "Like Lincoln who sought to preserve the Union, my dominant concern is to save Southern University."[10]

Colleges not run by state governments can be divided according to whether their administration is formally secular or denominational. Participation was about equally likely among students attending these two kinds of colleges: 55 percent in the former and 53 percent in the latter participated. However, only 33 percent of the students attending state colleges were participants. Table 2 shows that both organizational membership and participation in demonstrations were less probable among state college students—although it also suggests that the difference between the two modes of participation at state colleges was less than at either of the two kinds of private colleges. All plausible situational or individual control variables failed to eliminate this relationship.

Some further data support the conclusion that more restrictive circumstances do exist at the state colleges and also suggest something

[6] See R. N. Ford, "A Rapid Scoring Procedure for Scaling Attitude Questions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 14 (Fall, 1950), at p. 507.

[7] The protest organizations included were: The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), The Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee (SNCC), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), The Urban League and any other Negro Voters' League. No students claimed membership in the black Muslims.

[8] In *Organizational Measurement and Its Bearing on the Study of College Environments* (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1961), Alan H. Barton gives useful guidance to the dimensions of colleges that may be measured and may have an impact on the behavior of individuals in them.

[9] *The New York Times*, April 11, 1960, p. 25.

[10] Quoted in Louis E. Lomax, *The Negro Revolt* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1962), p. 209.

TABLE 2. PERCENT OF STUDENTS PARTICIPATING IN DIFFERENT FORMS OF PROTEST BY COLLEGE CONTROL*

Control of College:	Type of Participation	
	Sitting-in	Membership
State	19% (169)	23% (169)
Denominational, private	37% (62)	57% (62)
Secular, private	30% (33)	55% (33)

* The entry in each cell is the percent of respondents in colleges of a given kind who reported participation of the type indicated. In this table and those following, the figures in parentheses are the base from which the percentages were calculated.

about sub-culture tensions accompanying the development of protest. Louis Lomax has commented on such tensions between Negro teachers and their students:

'Intellectual Uncle Tom!' That's the phrase one hears throughout the South nowadays. It is uttered by college students and their supporters, and it is used in the open, at public meetings and rallies. It is the students' way of talking about the 'failure' of Southern Negro intellectuals—school teachers, for the most part—to support the revolt in clear, open terms.

This is excruciatingly painful.[11]

The interview schedule included two questions asking sit-inners for their perceptions of what their college administrators and professors thought about what they were doing. Although such perceptual data should not necessarily be taken as recording an *actual* state of affairs, the responses were different between state and private colleges. For each sit-inner who perceived neutrality from a given group, a score of zero was recorded; "strong approval" and "strong disapproval" were scored +2 and −2 respectively; while "approval" and "disapproval" were scored +1 and −1 respectively. The resulting figures were then normalized in percentage terms. The final scores, shown in Table 3, suggest plenty of scope for the development of the hostilities Lomax writes about: no matter where the students attended

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 207.

TABLE 3. SIT-INNERS' PERCEPTIONS OF SUPPORT FROM PROFESSORS AND ADMINISTRATORS IN STATE AND PRIVATE COLLEGES

Perceived Attitudes	Type of College	
	Private	State
of Professors	46%	50%
of Administrators	46%	15%

college, their perceived support from both professors and college administrators fell far below the possible 100 percent. On the other hand, the striking thing about these data is the similarity of all the scores except that recording the attitudes of state college administrators. Private college sit-inners saw little difference in the attitudes of their professors and administrators; but at state colleges, while support from professors is seen at about the same level as at private colleges, support from administrators is seen far less frequently than from their private counterparts. Perhaps evidence can also be found in these perceptual data that points to differences of opinion between professors and administrators at state colleges. At any rate, the conclusion seems justified that sub-culture tension arising from the student movement is most acute in state colleges, and that it centers on those roles which mediate between the sub-culture and the dominant white culture.

Quality of the College

College quality was measured in essentially the manner developed by Lazarsfeld and Thielens in *The Academic Mind*.[12] Five indicators of quality were selected, the appropriate data on the thirty colleges included in the sample were collected from a number of standard sources, and an acceptable Guttman scale was developed.[13] Four categories of quality were used.

[12] P. F. Lazarsfeld and Wagner Thielens, Jr., *The Academic Mind* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), p. 412.

[13] Lazarsfeld and Thielens developed an index rather than a scale. In this case the scale was preferred because it gave the added assumption of uni-dimensionality in the indicators selected. The index, however, did have some advantages. It was not necessary for Lazarsfeld and Thielens to dichotomize their indicators, and as a result the index could take into account disproportionate "contributions" of quality by one of the indicators. An index was also developed in the present case and findings based on it were found to compare

The resulting data show quite clearly that protest participation—both organizational membership and participation in demonstrations—increased as the quality of the college increased. Only 22 percent of the students in the lowest category colleges claimed participation, 41 percent did so in the second lowest, while in the highest two participation was nearly equal—around 54 percent. In each category of colleges organizational membership was more frequent than activism, but both increased as the quality of college increased.

Several explanations are available for this association between college quality and protest participation. On the one hand, high-quality colleges may selectively recruit students whose participation can adequately be accounted for by certain individual variables; on the other hand, high quality in Negro colleges may be associated with some other situational factor which itself explains the levels of protest. Perhaps the distribution reflects the spatial spread of protest throughout the South; perhaps protest spread first to the comparatively few high quality colleges in the South, and only later to the poorer institutions. Without a panel design surveys are poorly suited to treat such longitudinal processes as the spread of a social movement through time, but even if this spread were systematically associated with college quality we would still be left with the original question unanswered.[14]

As might be expected, the data leave no doubt that the higher quality colleges recruit from the higher status part of the Negro popu-

---

closely with those derived from the scale method. As it resulted, the scale findings were the more conservative of the two in terms of fulfilling expectations of an association between college quality and protest participation.

Obviously no single indicator of quality would do justice to variations in such a heterogeneous collection of colleges; agriculture and technical colleges, teachers' colleges, and some of the most outstanding of southern Negro colleges concentrating on the humanities were all included. The indicators adopted were as follows:

> The number of books in the college library
> The ratio of books in the library to students
> The proportion of Ph.D.'s on the faculty
> Dollars in the college budget per student
> The faculty-student ratio

The last mentioned indicator was not used by Lazarsfeld and Thielens, despite the fact that it is one of the most frequently used "rules of thumb" about the quality of the education a college offers. Two indicators used by them were not used in the persent case. They were tuition fees paid and the Knapp and Greenblaum index of scholar productivity. Lazarsfeld and Thielens argued that higher tuition fees gave a college greater financial resources with which to provide education, and also that "tuition to some extent indicates the demand for a college's educational 'product'" (p. 412). However appropriate this indicator might have been for the population of colleges they studied, for the present state and private colleges it does not seem likely to make valid distinctions of quality. The Knapp and Greenblaum index of scholar productivity, used by Lazarsfeld and Thielens, was not used here for the very good reason that the data on which it was based were not available for the colleges under consideration. It is also true that scholar productivity might not be a particularly good indicator of quality in a mechanical or agricultural college.

The variables were dichotomized in the following ways:

Student-faculty ratio:	better than 1:11.8
Ph.D.'s on faculty:	better than 22.5%
Books in library:	better than 38,000
Books per student:	better than 25
Dollars per student:	better than $800.00

The decision was made by inspection in each case. The coefficient of reproducibility for the scale was .889.

The sources from which the college data were collected were: *The College Blue Book*, 1962 (10th ed.; New York: The College Blue Book, 1962); *American Universities and Colleges* (8th ed.; Washington: American Council on Education, 1960); *American Junior Colleges* (5th ed.; Washington: American Council on Education, 1960); *The World Almanac 1961*. In addition, use was made of G. W. Jones, "Negro Colleges in Alabama," *Journal of Negro Education*, 31 (Summer, 1962), 354–361.

[14] Newspaper reports of student demonstrations give reasonably good grounds for believing that geographic patterns were well established by the time the survey was taken in the early months of 1962. Examination of *The New York Times* for the two years between that date and February 1960, when the movement started in Greensboro, N. C., suggests that it took only a matter of two or three months for sit-ins to spread to other states outside the Deep South and then to penetrate the Deep South itself. It would be extremely hard to demonstrate from historical data that protest had still to reach the large number of low-quality colleges scattered throughout the whole South two years after the movement had begun, although the possibility must be admitted.

lation, but they also show that such high status is strongly associated with protest participation. Only 35 percent of students from households where the head was classed as semi-skilled or unskilled were participants, while 53 percent of the skilled or professional group could be similarly classed. There is a nearly linear association between participation and family income from the under-$2,000 bracket in which only 13 percent were participants to the above-$6,000 bracket in which 53 percent participated.

However, the data given in Table 4 show that quality of college has an effect even when family income is held constant, although the *strength* of the quality-participation relationship varies between income categories.

TABLE 4. PERCENT OF STUDENTS PARTICIPATING BY QUALITY OF COLLEGE AND INCOME OF STUDENT'S FAMILY

Quality of College:	Income of Student's Family*	
	High	Low
High	57% (44)	50% (34)
Low	46% (63)	25% (102)
Difference:	11	25

* The cut-off point between the "high" and "low" income categories was $4,999.

There are signs here of what Hubert M. Blalock and others have called a "multiplicative effect." In one kind of situation—called "additive"—there is no evidence that independent variables X_1, $X_2 \ldots X_n$ interact with each other in their impact on the dependent variable Y; their effect remains the same regardless of empirical juxtapositions with each other. In a multiplicative situation the combined impact of two or more independent variables is greater than expectations based on knowledge of each acting in isolation from the others. "In a fairly common kind of theoretical situation," says Blalock, "one assumes that a given phenomenon is most likely when two (or more) factors are *both* present, but that it is unlikely whenever either of these factors is absent."[15]

This crude dichotomization of income and quality modifies the conclusions that can be drawn from examination of both variables acting in isolation from each other, while failing to eliminate the original association in either case. Adopting the method used by Blalock to infer interaction, we can observe a 14 percentage point difference between the two difference scores in Table 4. If low family income and low college quality are both present the depressing effect on participation is substantially greater than additive expectations.

The data also confirm the suspicion that most high-quality Negro colleges in the South are private and that most low-quality ones are state-run. But again that fact is not sufficient to eliminate the original association between college quality and participation. Holding control of college constant and varying quality produces an eight percentage point difference in participation among state college students—31 and 39 percent at the high and low quality state colleges respectively—and a twenty percentage point difference among private college students—41 and 61 percent respectively. As in the previous case, the relation between the three variables appears to be multiplicative. When quality and control are acting together to boost participation, their impact is greater than the sum of each acting in isolation.

II. SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE COUNTY

County-level social variables have been shown to relate importantly to many aspects of Southern politics. Two in particular should be tested in the present case: the urban-rural character of the county and the Negro proportion of the population.

Urbanism

Matthews and Prothro find that urbanism and industrialization ". . . are vastly overrated as facilitators of Negro registration. Urbanization and industrialization may provide necessary conditions for high levels of Negro participation but, by themselves, they are not sufficient to ensure them."[16] Protest participation is markedly different from Negro voter registration in this respect, but the relation is a threshold rather than a linear one. Variation in the proportion of the population that is rural-farm in the county where the college is situated makes very little difference in protest until the least rural category is reached. At that point

[15] Hubert M. Blalock, "Theory Building and the Statistical Concept of Interaction," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (June, 1965), at p. 375.

[16] Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Social and Economic Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," this REVIEW, 52 (March, 1963), at p. 28.

(0–4.9% rural-farm), there is a jump of 23 percentage points—from 29 percent participating to 52 percent. Student protest, unlike other forms of Negro political activity, is characteristically an urban phenomenon.

The addition of further variables to the analysis elaborates on this association. Table 5 shows percent rural-farm and quality of college have an independent impact on participation, but it also suggests that when they are acting together their impact goes considerably beyond simple additive expectations. The difference between the differences in this case is 14 percentage points. Interestingly, a comparable finding does not appear when control of colleges and percent rural-farm are considered together; the data confirm that each variable has an impact independent of the other, but the difference-of-differences score is almost zero.

TABLE 5. PERCENT OF STUDENTS PARTICIPATING BY PERCENT OF COUNTY POPULATION RURAL-FARM AND QUALITY OF COLLEGE

Quality of College:	Percent of County Population Rural-farm[a]	
	Low	High
High	71% (44)	38% (45)
Low	43% (84)	24% (91)
Difference:	28	14

[a] The cut-off point between the "high" and "low" categories was 4.9% rural-farm.

TABLE 6. PERCENT OF STUDENTS PARTICIPATING BY PERCENT OF COUNTY RURAL-FARM AND INCOME OF FAMILY[a]

Income of Family:	Percent of County Population Rural-farm	
	Low	High
High	54% (62)	44% (45)
Low	46% (55)	20% (81)
Difference:	8	24

[a] The cut-off point between "high" and "low" categories of income was $4,000.

When income and percent rural-farm are considered together in relation to participation, however, there is once again evidence of interaction. The data are given in Table 6.

The presence of two interaction effects such as these raises the possibility of what Blalock calls a "second-order" interaction—that all three variables may interact to produce levels of participation beyond additive expectations for the three individually.[17] Unfortunately, testing this possibility involves frequencies too small to use with any confidence. The data do suggest, however, that such a higher level of interaction also exists.[18] When urban living, high college quality and high income all occur together, participation is boosted beyond what would be the case if all three variables were acting independently. In other words, although the generalization does not include variations in the control of colleges, adding successive favorable conditions to attending college in an urban county produces an accelerating curve of participation.

Percent Negro in the College County

The power of the percent Negro in a Southern county to predict many aspects of its social and political life has been repeatedly documented.[19] Matthews and Prothro conclude that

[17] H. Blalock, *op. cit.*

[18] Testing for such a second-order interaction involves relating college quality and percent rural-farm to participation with income held constant. It is thus possible to arrive at a difference between the two difference-of-differences scores. In this case the difference of difference-of-differences scores was 11 percentage points. The data are as follows:

Quality:	High Income		Quality:	Low Income	
	Percent rural-farm Low	High		Percent rural-farm Low	High
High	67% (24)	45% (20)	High	67% (15)	37% (19)
Low	47% (38)	44% (25)	Low	38% (40)	16% (62)
Difference:	20	1	Difference:	29	21

(20-1) − (29-21) = 11

[19] For example, see V. O. Key, *Southern Politics* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949); John H. Fenton and K. N. Vines, "Negro Registration in Louisiana," this REVIEW, 51 (September, 1957), 704–713, and H. D. Price, *The Negro in Southern Politics* (New York: New York University Press, 1957).

the variable is "more strongly associated with the county's rate of Negro registration than any other social and economic attribute on which we have data."[20] There are, however, good reasons for expecting its impact on student protest participation to be somewhat muted. H. D. Price has argued that the percent Negro should not be seen as working in some mechanical way on the behavior in question, but as representing in a summary way the history and cultural traditions of race relations in the area.[21] Thus, where Negroes are a large part of the population there is also likely to be a history of a particular kind of race relations often dating to slavery times. A student population, however, is often a distinct community with its own mores and traditions that may run quite counter to those of the locality. Even in colleges where no such community exists—possibly a majority of those included in this study—the population is distinct in age, socio-economic status, education, and usually the frequency of social roots outside the area itself. The history and cultural traditions of the area seem likely to have less impact on participation in the student protest movement than on other kinds of political participation among the general Negro population in the county.

Despite these expectations student protest participation seems to be inversely related to percent Negro, in line with other kinds of behavior. Participation increases in a linear fashion from about 22 percent among those students attending college in areas with more than 40 percent Negroes to about 62 percent among those where there is less than 20 percent Negroes. The association is maintained when all other individual and contextual factors are held constant, and there is little evidence of interaction between percent Negro and any of the other variables tested. The data also show only a very slight and probably insignificant association between the percent Negro in the students' home counties and protest participation of any kind.

Matthews and Prothro have demonstrated that areas where Negroes are a high proportion of the population have whites with considerably less permissive attitudes toward Negro political participation,[22] and James W. Vander Zanden has pointed out the general role that resistance to social movements can have in shaping the course of a movement.[23] Perhaps this opposition is an important factor in explaining the varying rates of student protest participation by percent Negro, just as the opposition of state college administrators seems to be important in explaining the power of variations in college control.

But the question of motivation is also relevant here. Matthews and Prothro have demonstrated that "Negro commitment to voting declines as white disapproval of Negro voting increases. Not only are fewer Negroes registered where white attitudes are less permissive, but fewer Negroes express a desire to vote." This lack of desire, they suggest, represents in part, "a realistic adjustment to the environment and in part the psychological mechanism of rationalization. Some Negroes will realistically calculate that they do not want to vote if the costs in terms of possible social, economic, or physical reprisals are too great."[24] Quite possibly such a lowering of motivation extends across the barriers that separate the college from the population at large and is responsible, in turn, for lowering rates of student protest participation.

If overt pressures are involved, however, there is no sign of it in the reports from demonstrators of the white hostility they encountered as a consequence of their participation. There was no difference in the number or character of the incidents reported by students in areas with a high proportion of Negroes and those with only few—although the *n*'s involved are admittedly very small. While it seems quite likely that differences in Negro assertiveness are associated with differences in the percent Negro in the area, how much of this is a "mechanical" result of white attitudes in the area and how much is due to other properties of the social structure must remain an open question.

III. PSYCHOLOGICAL VARIABLES

Personality variables have not been successful in predicting more than a slight amount of the variance of other kinds of political behavior.[25] However, in the light of much theoriz-

[20] *Op. cit.*

[21] H. D. Price, "The Negro and Florida Politics, 1944–1954," *The Journal of Politics*, 17 (May, 1955), at pp. 198–200.

[22] Matthews and Prothro, *Negroes and the New Southern Politics*, p. 118.

[23] James W. Vander Zanden, "Resistance and Social Movements," *Social Forces*, 37 (May, 1959), at pp. 312–315.

[24] *Op. cit.*

[25] On the subject of party identification, for example, *The American Voter* concludes: "In the broad electorate devoted in an habitual way to a pair of traditional parties, there is little reason to expect much visible instruction of personality dynamics in the determination of who is a Republican and who is a Democrat": Campbell *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 510.

ing about social movements, two such variables do demand attention. They are anomia and frustration.

Anomia

Leo Srole's conceptual distinction between *anomie* and *anomia* is worth repeating. "For semantic neatness," he suggests that the *eunomia-anomia* continuum should be used to refer to variations among *individuals* "as they are integrated in the total action fields of their interpersonal relationships," and that *anomie* should be kept as a societal rather than an individual term.[26] We are dealing here with the individual level of analysis. Whatever the propensity of anomic *societies* for mass movements of various kinds, there are common sense grounds for expecting participation in the protest movement to increase as the individual anomia decreases. "The principal advocacy of social change, as is implied in the term desegregation," says Melvin Tumin, "comes from those who have the widest perspective on themselves and their communities, and the deepest sense of stake in the community-in-progress."[27]

When discussing the impact of a different personality variable, the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* comment: "Personality is mainly a potential: it is a readiness for behavior rather than behavior itself."[28] There are, they argue, a situational and a personality factor, both of which have to be taken into account for complete explanation. Before third variables are taken into account anomia does have a measurable impact on participation in the direction predicted: across four scale types, participation increases by about 12 percentage points as anomia decreases.[29] However, this variable appears to operate differently in different social contexts. In rural counties a dichotomy between 'high' and 'low' anomia is associated with a 16 percentage point difference in participation; in urban counties the difference is an insignificant one percentage point. At state colleges there is a difference of 12 points, compared to an insignificant two points at private colleges. Although there is no such interaction effect between the psychological variable and percent Negro, there is evidence here that when the situation is not generally supportive for protest, anomia differences are more likely to have an impact than when it is supportive. The data do not permit an extensive exploration of the hypothesis. It seems, however, that this personality variable, and perhaps others, should not be considered out of the social context.

Frustration and Aggression

There has been much easy hypothesizing about the relation between social movements and aggression. "No great social movement," says Norman R. F. Maier, "is possible unless it rests primarily on frustration."[30] In conformity with most observers, James W. Vander Zanden has pointed out that American Negroes characteristically experience most severe frustrations arising from their ascribed status in American society. He goes further, however, and relates the present protest to resulting aggressive drives. Participation allows Negroes to indulge in aggressive action against the frustrating agent—the white community—while the non-violent credo lets them rationalize their behavior to conform with a more passive Negro tradition.[31]

There are two related problems here that should be kept analytically distinct. On the one hand, data from this survey are relevant to the question of student hostility toward whites.

[26] Leo Srole, "Social Integration and Certain Corollaries," *American Sociological Review*, 21 (December, 1956), at p. 710.

[27] Melvin J. Tumin, *Desegregation: Resistance and Readiness* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 199.

[28] T. W. Adorno *et al.*, *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1950), pp. 7–10.

[29] The questions used to measure anomia were those originally developed by Srole. They were, from "hardest" to "easiest," as follows: "Sometimes I think people ought not bring children into the world, the way things look for the world"; "In spite of what some people say, the conditions of the average man is getting worse, not better"; "Nowadays a person has to live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself"; "These days a person doesn't really know whom he can count on"; One question was rejected because it failed to meet the Ford criterion that the positive category should contain more than 20 percent of the respondents (R. N. Ford, *op. cit.*, p. 515). Interestingly, this question was: "There's not much use in people like me voting because the candidates are usually against what I want." Only 11 of the 264 students were willing to agree with this proposition. Political alienation among southern Negro students, it seems, is very low.

[30] Norman R. F. Maier, "The Role of Frustration in Social Movements," *Psychological Review*, 49 (November, 1942), at p. 594.

[31] James W. Vander Zanden, "The Non-Violent Resistance Movement Against Segregation," *The American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (March, 1963), at p. 546.

From the broad hypothesis associating protest with a structural position in Negro society closer to the dominant white culture, we may expect the students who participate to be less overtly hostile toward that culture than those who do not; there is, after all, a large literature on the effects of intergroup contact and interaction in reducing such hostility toward minority groups, and there seems no reason why the same effect should not work in the case of minority group attitudes toward the majority group. This appears to be borne out in fact: across several questions the participants were significantly less likely to express hostility toward whites than were those who did not take part.[32]

On the other hand, it is not valid to argue from data on hostility to matters of aggression. Robin Williams and others have pointed out that one can be aggressive without being hostile, or hostile without being aggressive. The two are conceptually and empirically distinct.[33] The nearest approach to operationalizing frustration included by the schedule of questions was a battery of questions probing the extent to which the respondents anticipated frustration in their future life experience. The student was asked, first, what part of the country he wished to live in on completion of a college career, and second, what part of the country he expected to live in. A "frustrated" response was then taken as one in which aspirations and expectations did not match.[34]

[32] The questions and data are as follows:

	Percent giving "hostile" answer	
	Participants	Non-participants
All whites are prejudiced?	5% (106)	23% (158)
Arrested Negroes get fair treatment?	70% (106)	79% (158)
Can't change white attitudes?	6% (106)	17% (158)

[33] Robin Williams, *Strangers Next Door* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 86.

[34] There are two conceptual shortcomings in the use of responses to these questions as indicators of frustration. First, they deal with the anticipation of future frustrating experiences and it is perhaps stretching a point to argue that this is the functional equivalent of present experiences. Second, there is no way of telling from the responses the centrality of these expectations to the respondents. Mobility expectations might be unimportant to some individuals but loom large for others. One other battery of questions might have been used to strengthen these responses had the pattern of answers differentiated the students more than it did. They were directed in the same way toward expectations and aspirations on future jobs, but—interestingly—all kinds of students overwhelmighly anticipated job satisfaction.

The findings parallel those on hostility. There is no support for the hypothesis that frustration is linked to participation in the protest movement. Only 31 percent of the students who anticipated frustration in this respect were participants, compared to 39 percent of those who anticipated satisfaction. A claim that this particular "great and effective" social movement "rests primarily on frustration" would be difficult to sustain in the light of these data.[35]

IV. PROTEST AND THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

A full explanation of the variance in protest would require consideration of such things as the role of initiators and accidents of leadership in certain places, underlying economic conditions, the role of resistance from groups opposing the movement, geographic spread and many other factors. Nothing so ambitious has been attempted here. Rather, the suggestion is made that by focusing on one factor—the structure of intergroup relations—some advance can be made toward integrating various theoretical propositions about the origin of the Negro protest movement. In a nutshell, the argument runs as follows: Certain structural positions in Negro society are characterized by higher awareness of the wider society and, as a consequence, individuals occupying these positions are more prone to develop the particular set of attitudes and perceptions that lead to

[35] Of course we are not concerned here with riots and other kinds of unpremeditated mob action that might more plausibly be related to frustration. See Philip Worchel, "Hostility: Theory and Experimental Investigation," in D. Willner (ed.), *Decisions, Values and Groups* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1960), cited in Robin Williams, *op. cit.* In frustration, "there are changes in the perception of the field, widespread psychological involvements, interference with complex learning, and an affectual component of hate." Described in this way we might even expect frustration to be *dys*functional to planned social action of the kind under consideration here—a speculation not inconsistent with the present slim data.

protest. Resistance from the white community, particularly as it is channeled through state college administrators and, possibly, as it occurs in certain kinds of areas, plays a role in modifying and shaping the particular patterns of protest that arise.

Unfortunately, it is necessary to rely on a rather small amount of data and a rather large amount of inference in arguing that such structural factors as high quality in colleges, high socio-economic background, and urban residence all involve high levels of interaction with the wider society. The inferences, however, are not too strained. All the respondents in the survey were students and therefore more likely to have higher levels of general awareness than the rest of the Negro population; high quality colleges might not unreasonably be expected to increase that awareness. In fact the data show that students attending these colleges were more able to answer correctly a series of factual questions about politics than were the others.

In his large study of intergroup relations in several communities, Robin Williams finds support for the basic proposition that

> exposure to intergroup situations available in a community depends to a large extent upon the individual's daily living patterns—which in turn are strongly influenced by his position and function (or status and role) in the community.[36]

He also shows that in these communities, ". . . the more educated Negro has more opportunity for contact with whites than the less well-educated," and that higher occupational status works the same way.[37] Data from the present study show that students attending high-quality colleges do have considerably higher levels of social interaction across the race barrier—particularly with white students and teachers, although the generalization extends to a wide variety of contacts. The same applies to students from high socio-economic backgrounds.

Attending college in an urban county is likewise associated with a higher frequency of intergroup contact than doing so in a rural county. The presence of such contact seems to make the urban environment a particularly fertile ground for protest. When urban living is considered in conjunction with several indicators of intergroup contact, a marked multiplicative effect appears. Matthews and Prothro comment that urban living appears to provide the necessary conditions for high levels of Negro voter registration.

> The urban-industrial life is more rational, impersonal and less tradition-bound; both Negroes and whites enjoy more wealth and education; the Negroes benefit from a concentration of potential leaders and politically relevant organizations in the cities. The urban ghetto may provide social reinforcement to individual motivations for political action.[38]

When intergroup social fluidity is added to these conditions, the data suggest that such individual motivations are particularly high.

Intergroup communication is, of course, a most difficult concept to operationalize; social contact across the race barrier is only one indicator of a complex process that can go on in a great variety of informal and formal ways. There are, nevertheless, several reasons why it is congenial to focus theory building in the present case on such communication and the structural conditions that promote it. First, it provides a firm basis for what Sherif and Sherif call a "clear functional picture" of the factors that lead to protest participation.

> . . . Social psychological theories of intergroup relations which base the whole edifice primarily on a universal instinct (e.g., aggression), on displacements of aggressions always as the product of frustrations in personal life history, on a leadership principle, on situational factors, on culture, on national character, or, in a direct and mechanical way, on economic considerations result in one-sided pictures . . . . Compilations of these factors side by side in the form of a syllabus have not led to a clear functional picture.[39]

Economic and psychological variables are, from this perspective, placed in a theoretical context from which their importance in the whole structure of explanation can be assessed. Data have been given indicating that feelings of discontent about *personal* prospects in a bi-racial world are not associated with particularly high levels of protest. On the other hand, there is a marked association between protest and feelings about the general position of the *whole Negro race:* among students who recorded "high" on a measure of satisfaction with the present racial situation 28 percent were participants; among those recording

[36] *Op. cit.*, p. 146.
[37] *Ibid.*
[38] Matthews and Prothro, "Social Factors . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 34.
[39] M. Sherif and C. W. Sherif, *Groups in Harmony and Tension* (New York: Harper & Row, 1953), p. 136.

"low" 52 percent were participants.[40] Evidently, explanation that focuses on feelings of personal relative deprivation must be modified to emphasize perceived deprivation of the *group* with which the individual identifies.[41] The present data do not detail just what objective social and economic conditions might lead to such feelings, but it is clear that such feelings would be particularly likely to develop in situations that constantly emphasize the differences between the races. The objective conditions are there for the whole group; but only some individuals are constantly exposed to the fact that they are differences. It is among this population that protest is most likely to develop.

A further advantage is that such a theoretical position also provokes useful speculation about why the Negro protest developed at this particular point in American history and about its likely future course. Arguing that protest can be explained adequately in terms of the economic fortunes of the Negro group as a whole fails to explain why the movement did not develop when—as seems quite possible—comparable conditions existed in the past. By emphasizing that other structural changes have a priority over purely economic ones, we are led to search for factors that can increase the visibility of whatever objective situations may lead a group to revolt. They are readily available in the increased mobility of all groups in United States society, the development of modern mass communications, and major wars that have at once increased mobility and brought different groups into close proximity with each other. So long as the objective conditions exist, we can expect that increased communication between the races will bring a furtherance of protest, not a quieting. Conservative Southern claims that the progress of integration will only bring an increase of Negro assertiveness seem quite plausible from the present theoretical position.

Much significant contemporary history concerns massive demands from various groups for large-scale adjustments in their social, economic and political positions, but there has been little systematic theory-building about such phenomena. Existing knowledge about the conditions that give rise to various kinds of social movements is generally couched in terms unique to the movement being considered and meaningless to the analysis of others. The structural perspective on the Negro movement suggested here does point to one direction in which research might be fruitful. If analysis were to concentrate, first, on the objective economic, social and political differences between groups, and then on the processes by which such differences are communicated and given meaning to the individuals concerned, major advances might be made. A large literature on the relation between communication and national integration has appeared in recent years. Analysis of the structure of communication between groups might lead to a better understanding of why some groups—such as the American Negroes—produce integrative movements, while others—such as the French Canadians—produce disintegrative ones. It would at least cast the analysis of broadly comparable phenomena in comparable terms.

[40] The students were given a self-anchoring scale and asked to indicate where on a continuum between the "very worst" and the "very best" possible race situations they would place the South at the present time.

[41] For example, see Ruth Searles and J. A. Williams, "Negro College Students' Participation in Sit-Ins," *Social Forces*, 40 (March, 1962), 215–220. The authors argue that reference groups have changed for a large part of the Negro middle class that now identifies with the middle class standards of the wider society. The result is feelings of relative deprivation that have led to the protest movement.

THE MEASUREMENT OF INTER-PARTY COMPETITION AND SYSTEMIC STABILITY*

DAVID G. PFEIFFER
Keuka College

The American two-party system is a constant object of study by many political scientists, yet there exists no adequate scale by which to measure inter-party competition and the stability of our two-party system. It is the purpose of this article to present a simple index by which the condition of any two-party system (national or state or foreign) can be determined in relation to its expected behavior.

I. EXISTING MEASURES

Four types of measures have been applied to inter-party competition: the pendulum effect, percentage of elections won, percentage of the vote, and alternation in office by parties. Sometimes in place of the second measure there is used percentage of legislative seats held, the latter being somewhat a function of the former.

The pendulum or "tide" effect appears most often in non-technical discussion. When no other explanation suffices, political commentators use the idea of a pendulum swing to explain why a party unexpectedly gains or loses votes. Although this idea lends itself well to graphic illustration, it is limited in precision and explanatory power.[1] It does, however, turn up again in a new guise discussed below.

The first major attempt to measure inter-party competition employed the pendulum concept. It was used not by a political scientist, but by an economist, Louis Bean, who was fascinated with the idea that some states seem to be barometers of Presidential elections.[2] Using percentage of the vote, Bean figured what percent of the vote the Democrats would receive in each state when the nation voted from 40.0% to 60.0% Democratic in a Presidential election.[3] With Bean's data it is possible to classify each state, but the results lack much in precision. To be able to say that when the Democratic candidate for President receives a 60.0% vote nationwide he will receive only a 41.4% vote in Vermont indicates little about inter-party competition in Vermont.[4] It does indicate that Vermont's Republican Party is strong, but how strong? How does the Vermont party system of 1942 compare with that of 1940 or 1944 in regard to inter-party competition? Obviously such a question cannot be answered with Bean's typology, but then, in all fairness, he was not asking just that question. The major use of Bean's approach today is to describe national and sometimes state trends in voting.[5] The reasons for its simplicity detract from its usefulness.

As noted above, the second basis used for inter-party competition measurement is the percentage of elections won or, alternatively, the percentage of legislative seats held. Whenever one is concerned with welfare or other policies embodied in legislation, a measure of the seats, i.e., votes, held is useful. When one is concerned with comparing the performance (inter-party competition in this case) of a party system in two or more elections, percentage of legislative seats held is of less efficacy. It was used, however, in the first

* I wish to thank my colleague Mrs. Verna Engstrom-Heg, Assistant Professor of Mathematics, Keuka College, for her invaluable aid and to thank my fellow participants in the Summer, 1965, Conference on Mathematical Applications in Political Science for comments on an earlier draft of this paper especially in regard to the problem of establishing adequate categories.

[1] Attempts to delineate this phenomenon more precisely have been made: cf. Donald E. Stokes and Gudmund R. Iverson, "On the Existence of Forces Restoring Party Competition," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Summer, 1962), 159–171; and Charles Sellers, "The Equilibrium Cycle in Two-Party Politics," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 29 (Spring, 1965), 16–38.

[2] Louis Bean, *How to Predict Elections* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948). In an earlier work, *Ballot Behavior: A Study of Presidential Elections* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1940), Bean discussed how state trends differ from the national trend (chapters 2–5), but he was interested in predicting elections and not measuring inter-party competition. Bean's ideas were presented in a more sophisticated way by Harold F. Gosnell, *Grass Roots Politics: National Voting Behavior of Typical States* (Washington, D.C.: American Council on Public Affairs, 1942).

[3] *How to Predict Elections*, Table 8 (pp. 186–87) and chapter ten, especially pp. 120–21.

[4] Bean's data extend from 1916 to 1944.

[5] For example, cf. E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semisovereign People* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 89–90.

actual categorising of states according to inter-party competition.[6] While the three categories established by Zeller were sufficient for her purposes, it is necessary to have more refined ones in order to go beyond superficial analysis.[7] An attempt to place Zeller's categories on a firmer analytical basis while avoiding other pitfalls can be found in an article by Robert T. Golembiewski.[8] He improved upon the basis for classification, but his inter-party competition index still suffers from two problems in common with Zeller's: (1) the index, if based only on the office of governor and the percentage of legislative seats, has a limited utility; and (2) three categories are insufficient to comprehend the complexity of inter-party competition found in American states. Malcolm Jewell's work on state legislatures transcended the latter problem by establishing seven categories four of which can be divided between Democrats and Republicans giving a total of eleven categories.[9] Certainly eleven is a sufficient number for complex analysis of inter-party competition, but they are determined in such a way as to be limited to Jewell's topic, American state legislatures.

Percentage of elections won does have greater explanatory power when measuring inter-party competition than the pendulum concept, but it is a function of the next type of measure: percentage of the vote. A fundamental contention of this article is that over a "sufficient" period of time the percentage of elections won adds no significance to the percentage of the vote in measuring inter-party competition. The two measures have been used jointly, but a blurring of certain types of competition is the only result. For example, during the period 1940–1964 in state-wide elections in California the Republicans received an average of 53.35% of the vote winning 20 out of 37 elections. In Nevada the Democrats received an average of 55.03% of the vote winning 28 out of 37 elections. In New Hampshire the Republicans received an average of 54.88% of the vote winning 31 out of 42 elections. By measuring percentage of vote alone, all three states are competitive, two-party systems. When considering the number of elections won, California's 54.05% for the Republicans places it into a competitive category while Nevada's 75.67% for the Democrats and New Hampshire's 73.81% for the Republicans place them out of the competitive category. However, when the elections are more closely examined the following distribution is found.

MINORITY PARTY VOTE, 1940–1964

	0.0%	1.0%–29.9%	30.0%–39.9%	40.0%–49.9%	50.0%+
California Democrats	3	none	2	16	16
Nevada Republicans	none	1	9	18	9
New Hampshire Democrats	none	none	13	22	7

In 27 out of 37 elections (72.97%) in Nevada, the Republicans received more than 40.0% of the vote. In 29 out of 42 elections (69.05%) in New Hampshire the Democrats received more than 40.0% of the vote. Although the California Democrats did better (86.48%), the Nevada Republicans and the New Hampshire Democrats fared well enough to be contenders in each election. Only once did the Nevada Republicans fall below 30.0% and never did the New Hampshire Democrats, while the California Democrats fell below 30.0% of the vote three times. Although the three states have varying degrees of competition, they are closer than percentage of elections alone would indicate. Resorting to Occam's Razor, the inter-

[6] Belle Zeller (ed.), *American State Legislatures: Report of the Committee on American Legislatures, American Political Science Association* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954), chapter 12.

[7] Essentially this criticism holds true for the inter-party competition index based on percentage of elections won applied to Iowa counties by David Gold and John R. Schmidhauser, "Urbanization and Party Competition: The Case of Iowa," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 4 (1960), 62–75, and to the rather crude inter-party competition index used for purposes of illustration by V. O. Key Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (fifth edition; New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1964), chapter 11.

[8] Robert T. Golembiewski, "A Taxonomic Approach to State Political Party Strength," *Western Political Quarterly*, 11 (1958), 494–513.

[9] Malcolm E. Jewell, *The State Legislature: Politics and Practice* (New York: Random House, 1962).

party competition index presented below disregards number of elections won.

Percentage of elections won and percentage of vote were used in the first successful inter-party competition index developed by Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall.[10] Their index marks the inception of virtually all recent research on the ecology of party systems from the viewpoint of competition. Ranney recently presented a more sophisticated version his inter-party competition index designed specifically for state politics.[11] While useful for complex analysis (on the state legislative level only, however), the earlier contention must be raised: percentage of elections won and percentage of seats held (or terms) both are functions of percentage of vote in almost every case.

Perhaps the simplest way to measure two-party competition with percentage of vote is to find the average margin of victory for the winning candidate. This index has drawbacks: it is not possible to handle non-competitive states in this manner, or, alternately, to specify party domination over a period of time. If, for example, only Democratic margins are used to classify states from one-party Democratic to one-party Republican, a problem arises when a Democrat fails to win. If the margin is counted as a negative quantity, the average difference (upon which the states are classified) is affected in a way that the average vote is not affected. If defeats are not counted, it is possible to have conflicting results when both Democratic and Republican wins are computed. The problem can be surmounted by squaring the margins before averaging, but this procedure defeats the simplicity of the method. In addition it is more intelligible in a common sense way to say that a state is, on the average, 58.0% Republican in its voting behavior rather than saying that the average winning margin for the Republicans in a state is 16.0%.

In an attempt to be more precise some analysts have used a fourth measure: alternation in office by parties.[12] This concept is another

[10] Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, "The American Party Systems," this REVIEW, 48 (1954) 477–485; it will also be found in their work *Democracy and the American Party System* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1956), pp. 161–64. The same technique with variations was used extensively by others: V. O. Key, Jr., *American State Politics: An Introduction* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), used gubernatorial elections in 21 non-Southern states over a varying span of time; Coleman B. Ransone, Jr., *The Office of Governor in the United States* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1956), added two needed categories but restricted himself to gubernatorial elections; Heinz Eulau, "The Ecological Basis of Party Systems: The Case of Ohio," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 1 (1957), 125–135, limited himself to the Ohio House of Representative elections and reduced the categories to three; William H. Standing and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition and Primary Contesting: The Case of Indiana," this REVIEW, 52 (1958), 1066–1077, objected to the Ranney-Kendall index but applied the same technique to three state-wide races; Avery Leiserson, *Parties and Politics: An Institutional and Behavioral Approach* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), changed the terminology but used the technique; Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), and *The Politics of State and Local Government* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), shortened the base period from 40 years to 16 and considered only Presidential and gubernatorial elections; Edward F. Cox, "The Measurement of Party Strength," *Western Political Quarterly*, 13 (1960), 1022–1042, added some statistical sophistication to the Ranney-Kendall index; Phillips Cutright, "Ubanization [sic] and Competitive Party Politics," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (1963), 552–564, used the Ranney-Kendall technique to verify the substantive results of Eulau, *op. cit.*, while rejecting those of Gold and Schmidhauser, *op. cit.*; Frederick M. Wirt, "The Political Sociology of American Suburbia: A Reinterpretation," *Journal of Politics*, 27 (August, 1965), 647–666, also used the Ranney-Kendall technique while acknowledging its limitations; all of the studies cited below are also indebetd to Ranney and Kendall.

[11] Austin Ranney, "Parties in State Politics," *Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis*, Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1965), chapter 3.

[12] Joseph A. Schlesinger, "A Two-Dimensional Scheme for Classifying the States According to Degree of Inter-Party Competition," this REVIEW, 49 (1955), 1120–1128, and "The Structure of Competition for Office in the American States," *Behavioral Science*, 5 (1960), 197–210. Avery Leiserson, *Parties and Politics: An Institutional and Behavioral Approach*, *op. cit.*, used the same terminology as Schlesinger but not his technique using instead percentage of vote; Thomas W. Casstevens and Charles Press, "The Context of Democratic Competition in American State Politics," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (March, 1963), 536-543 used the results from Schlesinger's 1955 and 1960 articles, from Ranney and Kendall, and from Key's *American State Politics* to discuss the ecological basis of American party competi-

way of describing the pendulum effect. Short swings of the pendulum produce frequent alternation. Long swings produce periods of one party holding an office. Such a measurement as alternation has great use when studying one office, but when an entire party system with several offices is to be viewed, alternation measurement produces problems in data gathering and in presentation of results which lower its attractiveness. Again using Occam's Razor, alternation in office is disregarded—for reasons further elaborated below—when constructing the inter-party competition index presented in this article. Alternation is not necessarily a poor unit of measurement, but it is not useful when certain problems arise.

One more inter-party competition index must be mentioned. Richard Hofferbert has presented one of the best discussions of the problem of an inter-party competition index to appear in print.[13] But his own index suffers from certain drawbacks discussed below.[14] Hofferbert was concerned with establishing a rank order of the states in order to investigate correlations with certain variables. Using percentage of elections won he ranked the states in six ways and then calculated the average of these six rank scores for each state and ranked them according to it.

II. THE MEASURES CRITICIZED

The main criticism of the pendulum concept, as stated above, is that it lacks the precision necessary for complex analysis. The same is true of measurement by percent of elections won and by percent of seats held. The illustration of the California Democrats, the Nevada Republicans, and the New Hampshire Democrats should suffice. The problem with the Ranney and Kendall technique is that by combining percent of elections won with percent of vote an element of imprecision is introduced. While this imprecision could be removed, it is much simpler to drop percent of elections won and to expand the categories as is done in the inter-party competition index presented below. The problem with Ranney's most recent index is three-fold: first, it is concerned only with state offices; second, it is overly and unnecessarily complicated; and third, its results are liable to be skewed by Gerrymandering and by differing lengths in terms of office.

Schlesinger's contention about alternation in office has often been noted but rarely examined. There are several minor criticisms of his index connected with alternation,[15] but the major criticism has to do with its interpretation and convenience. Regarding interpretation, one loss out of five elections means a 20.0% turnover. If these five elections are Presidential elections, they span 20 years. If they are U. S. senatorial elections, they span either 20 or 30 years depending on whether you treat the offices as separate. Two losses out of ten elections would also give a 20.0% figure, but now over spans of 40 and 60 years respectively.

---

tion (cf. also a comment upon Casstevens and Press' article by Phillips Cutright, *American Journal of Sociology*, 69 (November, 1963), 291–292, and a rejoinder by the authors in *ibid.*, 69 (November, 1963), 292–294, centering on the economic indicators used and on the inter-party competition index); Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "Inter-Party Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (1963), 265–289, combined the technique of Ranney and Kendall with that of Schlesinger and found a high correlation between them when ranking the states according to inter-party competition.

[13] Richard I. Hofferbert, "Classification of American State Party Systems," *Journal of Politics*, 26 (1964), 550–567.

[14] Its analysis is put off in order to criticize all the major attempts with their suggested techniques at one time. Hofferbert has used his index in his article "The Relation between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this REVIEW, 50 (March, 1966), 73–82.

[15] Such as not indicating trends, not revealing much about the Southern states, and not always being able to measure alternation after reapportionment of the U. S. House, all of which Schlesinger mentioned. One criticism which he implicitly noted on page 208 of his 1960 article, but the import of which he did not seem to realize, is that a measure of alternation in the office of U. S. Representative measures Congressional district competition, not state-wide competition. To compare a district measure with state-wide measures certainly does produce "a special effect upon the result" as he said on page 200 of the same article. Furthermore, as he presents it, there is no party identification connected with the rate of alternation. This identification can easily be added and probably would have produced different configurations in his diagrams (pages 202–205 of his 1960 article). Finally, because there are two offices with the same title (U. S. Senator) Schlesinger treated them as if they were one office being held by two persons at the same time. Measuring alternation in office for the two offices of U. S. Senator produces no more problems than measuring it for a four-year-term governor and two-year-term U. S. Representative.

Caution is necessary to avoid misinterpretation of such results, but even if caution is observed, such a measure can give the appearance of arbitrariness. Regarding convenience, the researcher is compelled to process his raw data three times in different ways each time. First, he must obtain the "overall" dimension, that is, percent of elections won. Second, he must calculate the precent of turnover. Third—to distinguish cycles, if any—he must determine how long it is between alternations. This process must also be repeated for each office.

With Hofferbert's index, as with Schlesinger's, there are several minor criticisms,[16] but the major criticism involves Hofferbert's basis of computation. As explained above, Hofferbert ranks each state six ways and then averages these rankings to obtain a new ranking. To begin with, rank correlation is not necessarily the most significant statistical operation available. It depends on the data and one's purpose because in many instances rank correlation can be misleading. Yet Hofferbert says a rank ordering by competitiveness taking both the "overall" and the cyclical dimensions into account will produce a greater amount of statistical utility than any other approach. The only other alternative he presents is grouping, which, he says, obscures relationships; but so does ranking if the data cluster. Further, Hofferbert says that one can always obtain groups from ranks, but not necessarily ranks from groups. Very crude or broad groupings can be obtained from ranks if one is willing to say that the dividing line between two ranks is sufficient to divide two groups; but then one may be forced to have as many groups as ranks, hardly any gain. Again, if the numerical basis for grouping is retained, then ranks can be easily obtained.[17] Finally, the major criticism of Hofferbert's technique centers around the similarity of Presidential, U. S. senatorial, and gubernatorial elections. Schlesinger emphasizes that different levels of office have different amounts of inter-party competition. Why then should the rankings (both percent of elections won and alternation in office) for the three elections be averaged to produce another ranking? If three (or six) items are logically similar, then their average rankings may have some meaning. Otherwise such a procedure only compounds error.

To sum up the criticisms: (1) The categories in most cases are too crude and are not sufficient for complex analysis. (2) Often the data is too limited: only one office, or only state offices, or only the Presidency, or only a few years covered providing not enough cases upon which to generalize. (3) The techniques are inadequate to handle the data. (4) The results are presented in such a way as to be misleading, as to be usable in only a limited way, or to be unusable by anyone else.

Although the criticisms of the indices presented by Bean, by Ranney and Kendall, and by Schlesinger could be overcome with sufficient refinement of method, there is one major problem remaining: a fundamental divergence over goals. Schlesinger primarily wants to indicate that competition varies among levels of office and he does so. Ranney and Kendall want to show that competition varies among states and they do so. The question is whether one or the other of these techniques can do both and the answer is that neither is adequate to do its own job much less the other's. There is a third relevant goal for which neither technique is adequate: to show that competition varies from one election year to another. (Bean, in a very crude way, heads in this direction.) There is a fourth goal: measuring trends toward or away from two-party competition. And a fifth goal is estimating the stability of the party system. When all five of these goals are combined one comes out with the objective of measuring the

[16] Hofferbert has the same trobule as Schlesinger in handling the office of U. S. Senator; he includes only three offices; he considers his base period (1932–1962) as one which "adequately reflects the contemporary alignment between the parties" (page 558) but nowhere substantiates his contention or even tries to do so and in fact has to shorten the period to 1946–1962 for Minnesota and Wisconsin; his ranking system fails to distinguish between parties; his method requires even more computations than Schlesinger's; his example to show the efficacy of ranking turned out to be a poor one (a Rho of only+0.58 was an unfortunate result although the term "significant correlation" is open to debate); and gremlins were very active with his Table I (pp. 562–563) because Kansas was left out entirely, Georgia's average rank is an obvious typographical error, Vermont's is also incorrect, and New Mexico seems to have been wrongly ranked.

[17] An attempt, not very successful, was made to obtain groupings (two-party, weak two-party, modified one-party, and one-party) from Hofferbert's ranking. Actually the rank versus group quibbling is silly because we still do not know exactly what we want to do with these data. Both methods must be used and results compared. More important, however, is that changing an interval scale into an ordinal scale (as Hofferbert had done) unnecessarily limits applicable procedures.

FIGURE 1. CATEGORIES OF COMPETITION

One-Party Democratic	Modified One-Party Democratic	Weak Two-Party Democratic	Two-Party	Weak Two-Party Republican	Modified One-Party Republican	One-Party Republican
$100.0\% \geq V_D \geq 71.0\%$	$70.9\% \geq V_D \geq 61.0\%$	$60.9\% \geq V_D \geq 56.0\%$	$49.0\% \leq V_D \leq 55.9\%$	$60.9\% \geq V_R \geq 56.0\%$	$70.9\% \geq V_R \geq 61.0\%$	$100.0\% \geq V_R \geq 71.0\%$

V_D = Democratic percentage of the vote.
V_R = Republican percentage of the vote.

behavior of a party system. Each technique or approach is partially adequate in relation to its goal, but no one technique nor any combination of them is adequate to measure inter-party competition on a systemic basis. A new measure is needed.

III. A SYSTEMIC MEASURE

The basis for the inter-party competition index here presented is that each political unit has a systemic electoral behavior which can be described in terms of percentage of vote received by the parties. Although the index is designed to be used at any level providing sufficient data, it will be applied to the electoral behavior of the fifty states using different offices and election years. In the tables illustrating the index, differences among the states, between offices, and in election years can be observed and from the tables trends regarding competitiveness and stability can be established. In addition the tables suggest problems for further research.

In the construction of any index certain decisions must be made: what base period,[18] which offices,[19] and how to measure the competition. It is the last decision which adversely affects other inter-party competition indices. The advantages of measuring competition by percentage of vote are: (1) simplicity of computations, (2) simplicity of presentation, (3) expression of percentages on an interval scale which means that they are subject to all common parametric statistics and tests,[20] and (4) with percentages and total vote the vote received by each party can be computed and expressed on a ratio scale subject to all statistical tests.

Once the above decisions are made, the categories of inter-party competition can be established. The categories presented below had their origin in the work of Ranney and Kendall and were modified on the basis of the states' clustering within them (although some exceptions exist). In addition they were intuitively agreeable to many persons. Beyond these two arguments justification cannot go at present.[21]

[18] Cf. Cox, *op. cit.*, pages 1022–28.

[19] *Loc. cit.* and Schlesinger (1960), *op. cit.*, page 198.

[20] Ranks, on the other hand, are expressed on an ordinal scale suitable only for calculating some nonparametric correlation coefficients.

[21] It is hard to escape the contention that all of these decisions must be arbitrary. Perhaps they must remain so for the present. An awareness of the problems involved and of the limitations are the only real bench mark at this time. Cf. Golem-

During the collection of the data and the computations, certain problems of classification were encountered. Until the whole endeavor is on firmer ground, these problems must be resolved by the researcher who makes clear both the problems and the solutions.[22] The categories decided upon are to be found in Figure 1.

In order to establish a norm for the electoral behavior of each state, vote data were gathered for all state-wide general elections beginning in 1940 and ending with the 1964 elections. (Included were the third parties as well as the two major ones.) The offices chosen were President, U. S. senator, governor, and any other official elected on a state-wide basis. The other officials varied not only because of the difference in number elected in the various states, but also because of lack of information in certain cases. Elections for U. S. Representative at Large were included and so was a composite U. S. Representative vote, calculated by adding the party vote in each Congressional district for a state-wide total. Percentages were computed for each election for the Democrats, for the Republicans, and for "Others" consisting of all third party votes. The arithmetic mean of the percentages for the 1940–1964 base period was calculated for the Democrats, for the Republicans, and for the Others. On this basis each state fell into a category of inter-party (i.e., Democratic v. Republican) competition. Third party votes were counted in order to give an accurate reflection of how much the majority party received of the total vote.

The arithmetic mean was chosen over the median and the geometric mean precisely because the arithmetic mean emphasizes or is greatly affected by the extremes. That is, an election with a 90.0% Democratic vote will be emphasized more than one with a 55.0% Democratic vote. This emphasis is to be desired because in the former election the Republicans had no chance to win while in the latter election there was "competition." It is these non-competitive elections which need to be emphasized when an inter-party competition index is constructed, because their shift toward or away from the category of "two-partyness" is more relevant to systemic competition than a shift from a 55.0% Democratic vote to a 51.0% Democratic vote.

One must remember at all times that an index measures only that for which it is constructed. In this case the indices measure "two partyness" or "competition" and "stability" on a systemic basis. That is, the index does not measure whether the system produced a Democratic or Republican victory; rather how close the vote split came to a perfectly "competitive" or "two-party" state: 50.0% Democratic, 50.0% Republican, 0.0% Other with a majority party receiving one vote more in order to pro-

---

biewski, *op. cit.*, pp. 494–499; Jewell, *op cit.*, p. 13; Dawson and Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 273; Hofferbert, *op. cit.*, pp. 554–555, although on page 558 he appears to have forgotten. In any event, the appearance of arbitrariness will disappear when satisfactory results are obtained.

[22] In this instance the following problems were encountered at this point. In New York the votes cast in one party's column for a candidate of another party were counted for the candidate's party. In the three state-wide elections in California (during the time selected) in which there was only one major party candidate due to cross-filing, his votes were attributed to his party. Although not a satisfactory solution, it can be defended (perhaps) on the ground that one party was not strong enough to field a candidate who could win over the opposition party's candidate in the first party's primary. In Wisconsin the Progressive Party was counted as a third party—cf. Leon D. Epstein, *Politics in Wisconsin* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1958), chapter III. One-party Southern states were counted as one-party although there is strong opposition to doing so—cf. Allan P. Sindler, "Bifactional Rivalry as an Alternative to Two-Party Competition in Louisiana," this REVIEW, 49 (1955), 641–642. As noted in the text below, a composite vote for U. S. Representative was obtained for use by adding the votes in each district to get a state-wide total for each party. (In Arkansas the vote in unopposed races is not tabulated so when there were opposition candidates in only a few of the U. S. Representative districts from 1958 to 1964, it was not possible to compute the percentages accurately. In these cases the elections were not counted. If there were no opposition candidates at all, then the candidates' party received 100% of the vote.) Whenever conflicts appeared in vote totals, the governmental source was taken as authoritative. The source for the data was primarily the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (1940–1964) supplemented where necessary by Richard M. Scammon (ed.), *America Votes 5* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburg Press, 1964), the *World Almanac* for various years, the *CQ Weekly Report, The Political Almana, 1952* (New York: B. C. Forbes & Sons Publishing Co., Inc., 1952), and *The New York Red Book, 1944* (Albany: Williams Press, Inc., 1944). As soon as the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research has completed its data bank, it will be the best source of election data.

duce a victor. It must also be remembered that each state is to be viewed as an element in the national party system. The indices presented below measure how the system at one point in time compares (a) with the competitive behavior of the system at another point in time, (b) with the amount of possible change on the scale toward perfect competition or two-partyness, (c) with the amount of possible change on the scale in absolute terms (the stability scale), and (d) with the normal competitive behavior of the system over the twenty-five year base period. The next-to-last measurement—the stability index—is necessary because it is possible for the elements of system to cancel each other's moves on the two-party scale and to present the picture of a stable election. In such an event the stability index will indicate how much activity or shifting of categories occurred.

The scale by which the indices are computed is reproduced in Figure 1 and the states in each of the categories are listed in Table 1.

Index of Two-Party Change

Since the 1964 Presidential election was the genesis of this article, the Presidential election years from 1940 to 1964 were chosen to illustrate the indices. Each state was located on the scale according to its normal competitive behavior. Then the total number of moves it could make on the scale toward the two-party category was determined. For example, a normally two-party state could make zero moves while a one-party state could make three moves. The figures for all the states were added giving the number of shifts on the scale necessary for a completely competitive election. Next, each state was categorized according to its vote for the Presidency in that year and the

TABLE 1. THE STATES CLASSIFIED BY DEGREE OF INTER-PARTY COMPETITION

One-Party Democratic

Alabama (79.03%)
Arkansas (82.34%)
Florida (73.62%)
Georgia (90.50%)
Louisiana (84.46%)
Mississippi (88.06%)
South Carolina (87.30%)
Texas (80.03%)

Modified One-Party Democratic

North Carolina (66.44%)
Tennessee (64.60%)
Virginia (66.56%)

Weak Two-Party Leaning Toward the Democrats

Alaska (58.89%)
Arizona (56.28%)
Hawaii (59.94%)
Oklahoma (56.67%)
Rhode Island (58.67%)

Two-Party

California (53.35% R)
Colorado (50.36% R)
Connecticut (50.21% D)
Delaware (49.99% R)*
Idaho (51.84% R)
Illinois (50.01% R)
Indiana (51.50% R)
Iowa (53.46% R)
Kentucky (54.48% D)
Maryland (53.91% D)
Massachusetts (51.56% D)
Michigan (50.00% R)
Minnesota (50.48% R)
Missouri (54.98% D)
Montana (52.93% D)
Nevada (55.03% D)
New Hampshire (54.88% R)
New Jersey (51.39% R)
New Mexico (54.68% D)
New York (49.55% R)*
Ohio (51.26% R)
Oregon (55.29% R)
Pennsylvania (50.56% R)
Utah (49.97% D)
Washington (51.25% D)
West Virginia (54.84% D)
Wisconsin (51.08% R)
Wyoming (52.05% R)

Weak Two-Party Leaning Toward the Republicans

Kansas (56.25%)
Maine (57.05%)
Nebraska (59.43%)
North Dakota (56.38%)
South Dakota (58.10%)

Modified One-Party Republican

Vermont (62.12%)

One-Party Republican

(None)

* In Delaware, New York, and Utah the split was so close to 50.00% that the third party vote produced the following: Delaware, 49.79% Democratic, 49.99% Republican, 0.22% Other; New York, 46.87% Democratic, 49.55% Republican, 3.57% Other; and Utah, 49.97% Democratic, 48.46% Republican, 1.57% Other. In Michigan the following held: 49.55% Democratic, 50.00% Republican, 0.45% Other.

total number of shifts made by all states in that election was figured. If a state moved away from the two-party category the moves were rated negatively. Thus a normally two-party state which fell into the modified one-party category was rated as "−2". A modified one-party Democratic state which fell into the weak two-party Republican category received a "+1" (two plus a minus one) while if it had gone further and had become a modified one-party Republican state it would have received a zero (two plus a minus two). It would have ended up no closer to the two-party category than where it had begun. If a state was carried by a third party, as happened in four states in 1948 and one state in 1960 (all one-party Democratic states), the total number of moves from its normal category to the nearest one-party category was counted, one was added, and the result was made negative. The sum of the moves in the particular Presidential election was then divided by the sum of all possible moves to give the Index of Two-Party Change for that election in that year. In other words:

$$I_t = \frac{\Sigma t}{\Sigma p}$$

where I_t is the Index of Two-Party Change, t is the number of moves on the two-party scale, and p is the number of moves possible from the base period category to the two-party category. If Σt is negative it will make I_t negative, indicating that more moves were made away from the two-party category than toward it. If $I_t = 0$, then either it is a normal election or else the shifts cancelled each other. (To disclose the latter event a stability scale was used and will be discussed below.) The results as computed for the seven Presidential elections (represented by the symbol I_t) are to be found in Table 2.

Serious objection can be raised to treating all states as equal. Obviously New York's shift to the one-party category can be of more significance to the winner of the Electoral College vote than Nevada's shift to the one-party category. The same is true for any and all offices unless one is making a purely state to state comparison. Consequently the moves (potential and actual) were also weighted by the state's electoral vote. Although this weighting gives the smaller states with the minimum of three electoral votes more proportionate weight than the larger states, the role of the Electoral College in electing the President cannot be overlooked. It can be argued in addition that for the sake of convenience and uniformity this weighting should be used for all offices. The result of such weighting (designated by the symbol I_{tw}) is also given in Table 2.

TABLE 2. INDEX OF TWO-PARTY CHANGE FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1940–1964*

Year	I_t	I_{tw} (weighted)
1940	−19.51%	−19.49%
1944	+10.00%	+ 3.54%
1948	+17.50%	+17.47%
1952	0.00%	+21.46%
1956	−17.50%	−22.98%
1960	+54.76%	+64.82%
1964	−64.29%	−96.52%

* As I_t or I_{tw} approach +100% all moves toward a perfect two-party system are made in an increasing amount; as I_t or I_{tw} approach −100% all moves possible are made away from a perfect two-party system in an increasing amount.

Looking at the unweighted figures in Table 2, one can see that the 1964 Presidential election was obviously detrimental to the two-party system, while in the 1960 Presidential election the reverse was true. The 1952 Presidential election coincided with the norm after all the shifts had been made. How many shifts were made is revealed below by the stability scale. Notice that when the moves are weighted the differences between the two indices in 1940 and 1948 are very small, that 1944, 1956, and 1960 vary by only about 10% or less, and that the differences between the two indices in 1952 and 1964 are much greater. Notice also what happens to the 1952 index when it is weighted. Which index (the weighted or unweighted) should be used depends on how one views the states: are they equal partners within the system or unequal ones? The unweighted index is simpler, but the weighted one seems to conform more to the realities of American Presidential politics. When using the index in other ways the unweighted index would be preferable. In each case one must determine what is to be measured keeping in mind the implications of weighting and non-weighting.

Index of Stability

Due to the possibility which occurred in the 1952 election (unweighted index), an index of the stability of the entire system was figured. The stability scale is identical to the two-party change scale. The only difference is the elimination of negative values so that a two-party state shifting to the modified one-party category would receive a "+2" and a one-party Democratic state shifting to the one-party Republican category (as Mississippi did in 1964)

would receive a "+6". If a state was carried by a third party, the shift was counted as seven moves. As with the Index of Two-Party Change, the sum of the shifts on the stability scale for the election under study was divided by the sum of the possible shifts for the base period:

$$I_s = \frac{\Sigma s}{\Sigma b}$$

where I_s is the Index of Stability, s is the number of moves on the stability scale, and b is the largest number of possible moves on the stability scale from the base period category in either direction. Again the shifts were weighted by the electoral votes and the results (represented by the symbols I_s and I_{sw}) are presented in Table 3.

TABLE 3. INDEX OF SYSTEMIC STABILITY FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1940–1964*

Year	I_s	I_{sw} (weighted)
1940	+ 8.65%	+ 5.35%
1944	+ 5.43%	+ 4.43%
1948	+27.72%	+24.70%
1952	+30.43%	+26.80%
1956	+35.33%	+36.75%
1960	+22.92%	+21.25%
1964	+50.52%	+51.42%

* As I_s or I_{sw} approach 0.00% the system approaches complete stability; as I_s or I_{sw} approach +100.00% the system has shifted on the scale as much as it can. There can be no negative figures due to the way shifts are counted.

Index of Competition

Not only would it be informative to know how much change toward or away from two-partyness occurred (as well as the system's stability), but it would also be valuable to have an index of how competitive the system was in the particular year under study. Therefore an Index of Competition was devised by putting a value on each category as follows: two-party, 4; weak two-party, 3; modified one-party, 2; one-party, 1; if carried by a third party it was valued as zero. A sum was figured for each Presidential year and divided by the sum of a perfect two-party system (the number of states times four):

$$I_c = \frac{\Sigma c}{\Sigma g}$$

where I_c is the Index of Competition, c is the value of the two-party scale categories for the election under study, and g is the value of the two-party scale categories in a perfect two-party system.[23] This index was weighted also by electoral votes and the two results (I_c and I_{cw}) can be found in Table 4. The closeness of the weighted and unweighted indices is noteworthy as is the change from 1956 to 1960 to 1964.

TABLE 4. INDEX OF COMPETITION FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, 1940–1964*

Year	I_c	I_{cw} (weighted)
1940	+75.00%	+78.06%
1944	+81.25%	+82.06%
1948	+82.81%	+84.65%
1952	+79.17%	+85.36%
1956	+75.52%	+77.07%
1960	+90.50%	+93.30%
1964	+66.50%	+63.08%

* As I_c or I_{cw} approach +100.00% the system approaches a state of perfect two-partyness.

An Index of Total Competition (I_z) for the entire twenty-five year period for all elections was calculated. If the American party system was composed of only two-party states the weighted (by category) value would be $4 \times 50 = 200$. By adding the sum from the norm (Table 1) and dividing it by 200 one obtains an Index of Total Competition (I_z): $158/200 = 79.00\%$. A system composed of all one-party states would have $I_z = 25.00\%$; a system composed of all modified one-party states would have $I_z = 50.00\%$; a system composed of all weak two-party states would have $I_z = 75.00\%$; and a system composed of all two-party states would have $I_z = 100.00\%$. Since the electoral votes for the different states as well as the total number of electoral votes varied over the years, it was not possible to calculate a weighted Index of Total Competition (I_{zw}).

IV. CONCLUSION

Once the computation has been done it is easy to compare the competitiveness of the states as Ranney and Kendall wished to do. Table 1 is such a comparison. Tables 2, 3, and 4 present the five indices for the office of President. Similar tables can be constructed for all state-wide offices in selected states as Schlesinger wanted to do. Such tables could also be used for comparing election years as Bean tried to do. Many other indices can be constructed without changing the scale. The indices are applicable as well to other two-party systems

[23] For the years 1940–1958, $\Sigma g = 48 \times 4 = 192$; for the years since 1960, $\Sigma g = 50 \times 4 = 200$.

besides the one in this country.[24] One of the most pressing problems in political science today is cross-national studies, and with the indices here presented two-party political systems can be closely studied and compared. With a multiparty index the scope can be expanded even further. By converting the scale from party competition to ideological position (left to right?), one could make even more indices.[25] The use of the scale and index is vast.

The advantages of such an index (or indices) as presented here are many. Besides advantages in computation and presentation, there is the advantage that the data can be stored on punch cards along with necessary programs. As new election data are collected it will take only moments to have current indices. Furthermore, in a time such as today when many political scientists lack both computer and statistical knowledge the indices can be calculated using only simple arithmetic.

Properly speaking a conclusion cannot be drawn from the presentation of a new research tool. Perhaps warnings should be issued, but the pitfalls are too obvious. One must keep in mind that figures can be made to indicate anything he desires whether warranted or not. All mathematical applications to political science must begin and end with interpretation. The index presented here is only a tool to help formulate hypotheses concerning party systems: before one can analyze a phenomenon, he must be able to measure it.

[24] An index applicable to multiparty systems is now under development as is one to be used for primary elections.

[25] On this problem cf. Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," this REVIEW, 57 (June, 1963), 368–377.

A NOTE ON LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH: LABOR REPRESENTATION IN RHODE ISLAND*

JAY S. GOODMAN
Wheaton College, Massachusetts

In the last ten years, an extensive and useful literature has developed on state legislative behavior.[1] This paper reports on an exploratory study of three questions about state legislative processes: (1) What is the relationship between labor representation and legislative outcomes? (2) Are there measurable connections between a legislative role and perceptions of political events and relationships? (3) Does simultaneous individual association with labor and a legislative party result in measurable cross-pressures? The responses of sixty-two Rhode Island activists provide the data. The research was designed to provide an empirical basis for comparisons of the perceptions of various participants.

The study utilized differentiated sets of legislators plus a set of interest group leaders. *Labor legislators* were Democratic legislators serving between 1952 and 1962 who, in their *Rhode Island Manual* biographies (for which they personally provided all the information), listed one of these associations with labor: official union position, union membership, or a source of livelihood in manual or crafts work. Fifteen of a universe of thirty were interviewed; the sample was weighted for legislative tenure. *Rank and file Democratic legislators* were legislators who served one or more terms in the General Assembly between 1952 and 1962, listed no association with labor in their biographies, and were not elected party leaders. Fifteen were sampled from a universe of one hundred twenty-three; the survey was weighted for legislative tenure. In addition, seven elected leaders, *Democratic legislative leaders*, were interviewed from a universe of ten. *Labor executive board members* were local union leaders between 1952 and 1962 who sat on the executive board of the Rhode Island AFL, CIO, or AFL-CIO (the product of a 1958 merger). Twenty-five were interviewed of a universe of sixty-one; the sample was weighted for terms on the board as well as to obtain the proper proportion from each group's pre-1958 governing structure. None served in the Assembly.

I. LABOR REPRESENTATION AND LEGISLATIVE OUTCOMES

The discipline knows a great deal about state legislators. They are often, unlike their federal counterparts, part-time politicians whose main source of livelihood is outside legislative halls. Typically, their private occupations allow time for politics and may be furthered by such participation. State legislators are customarily open-minded about interest group activity.[2] When one goes a step beyond, however, and turns to organized labor's relationship to the state legislative process, the literature is less complete. A 1954 special committee of the American Political Science Association noted the presence of union men in the legislatures of most states. Rhode Island was, interestingly, foremost among these, but the Association study yielded little of theoretical utility.[3] A different report served only to mark the coordinate rise of organized labor and the Democratic party in Oregon.[4] Yet, *potentially* organized labor was important in state systems. Harry M. Scoble argued:

The most fundamental post-war change in the

* I am grateful to the Woodrow Wilson Foundation for the Dissertation Fellowship which allowed me a year of uninterrupted research, and to Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., C. Peter Magrath, Raymond E. Wolfinger, John Sprague, David Conradt, and Arthur English, who were kind enough to read and comment upon this article in an earlier draft.

[1] See, for example, John C. Wahlke *et al.*, *The Legislative System* (New York: Wiley, 1962); Duane Lockard, *New England State Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959); James D. Barber, *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965); Gilbert Steiner and Samuel Gove, *Legislative Politics in Illinois* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960); and Malcolm Jewell, *The State Legislature* (New York: Random House, 1962).

[2] See Duncan MacRae, Jr., "The Role of the State Legislator in Massachusetts," *American Sociological Review*, 19 (April, 1954), at p. 185; Heinz Eulau *et al.*, "Career Perspectives of American State Legislators," in Dwaine Marvick (ed.), *Political Decision Makers* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1961) pp. 237–238, 247; and John C. Wahlke *et al.*, "American State Legislators' Role Orientations Toward Pressure Groups," *Journal of Politics*, 27 (May, 1960), at p. 212.

[3] Belle Zeller, *American State Legislatures* (New York: Crowell and Co., 1954), p. 72.

[4] See L. G. Seligman, "Political Change: Legislative Elites and Parties in Oregon." *Western Political Quarterly*, 17 (June, 1964), 177–187.

structure and process of political parties has been the entrance of organized labor into electoral activity at the precinct level and up.[5]

Beyond such impressionistic assertions, there was little. Scoble himself asked:

Who in the political sicence profession is carrying out trend analyses to find out whether, regardless of labor propaganda, labor ideology is in fact being advanced by increasing union representation in state legislatures?[6]

The same problem in more generalized form was recognized by the authors of *The Legislative System*. They wrote:

. . . in spite of the critical importance of the relationship between interest groups and law-making institutions, research offers surprisingly little theoretical explanation and few cumulative or comparative empirical data about this phase of the representative process.[7]

The Rhode Island project utilized several approaches to uncover relationships between labor representation and legislative outcomes. One method was to test correlations between the number of labor-associated legislators (using *Manual* biographies as the source) and the number of labor bills passed between 1934 and 1962 (using the forty-four categories of labor legislation listed in the *Rhode Island General Laws*). A rank order correlation analysis (ranking each session on the quantity of labor legislators and the proportion of labor bills to total legislative output) revealed no significant relationship. The r_s was .225. When the 1934–1962 span was split in half, with 1934–1948 representing the New Deal-Fair Deal era and 1948–1962 a post-war period, the results were slightly different. The first period showed a r_s of .536 where .05 significance was .714; this could be interpreted as a very weak positive correlation. The second yielded a r_s of .042, no correlation. Quantitative devices cannot judge the saliency of individual bills, but they do suggest that in Rhode Island it was not the number of labor legislators which brought about labor legislation.

Correlation analysis does not prove that labor legislators were without use to organized labor. To find out if they did perform political tasks for labor, I asked them about their interactions with labor officials and their Assembly actions. A mixed picture emerged. Not all of the fifteen labor legislators maintained the same kind of communications with labor leaders. Six said they conversed frequently with such officials; six said, in effect, "we were in touch now and then"; and three said they never talked with anyone from labor. Seven said they worked in Assembly committees to help labor, and the same number said they spoke for it in the party caucus. Three said they talked informally with colleagues on labor's behalf, and the same number recalled giving pro-labor floor speeches. The data indicate that organized labor could count on the help, in differing degrees, of about half of its associated representatives.

The interviews revealed that the most important service labor legislators provided labor was transmitting information to the rank and file Democratic legislators. These ordinary Democrats, who perceived themselves as backers of organized labor, said they found out about labor's bills from the labor legislators. They ranked their labor colleagues far ahead of both labor officials and party leaders as sources of information. The Democratic legislative leaders ranked labor officials outside the Assembly first and labor legislators second. The leaders seemed to behave like Wahlke's "facilitative" legislators; they described their activity as *choosing* which parts of a labor-conceived and -initiated package they would support.[8] Running a highly cohesive party unit, the Rhode Island leaders customarily announced in the caucus which of labor's bills would have the party's blessing, but they often waited until the last legislative day of the term (usually lasting all night) to do so.[9] For most of the session, routine communications on labor's program for rank and file Democrats came primarily from labor legislators.

II. LEGISLATIVE ROLE AND LEGISLATORS' PERCEPTIONS

The Wahlke researchers maintained that the concept of role would have the most utility in explaining legislative behavior in relation to interest groups. They defined role as a "status" consisting of mutual expectations about behavior. All the participants in the legislative process possessed such expectations about each other and the legislative member role was itself distinctive. A legislator's perceptions of what constituted legitimate group activity and what "the supposedly objective 'facts' of such activity" were, were tied to his own role.[10] The per-

[5] "Organized Labor in Electoral Politics: Some Questions for the Discipline," *Western Political Quarterly*, 16 (September, 1963), p. 666.

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] Wahlke, "American State Legislators' Role Orientations," *op cit.*, p. 203.

[8] *Ibid.* p. 226.

[9] Cf. Lockard, *op. cit.*, pp. 217–218; and Jewell, *op. cit.*, pp. 51–52.

[10] Wahlke, "American State Legislators' Role Orientations," *op. cit.*, p. 205.

ceptions connected with role were as important in determining legislative behavior as

> number, size, strategy, skill or other choices of pressure groups themselves, the individual group affiliations and identifications of legislators, or the peculiarities of personality and personal whim of the legislators.[11]

Part of the Rhode Island research was designed to test hypotheses about a legislative role. Comparative populations were used in order to go beyond the conclusion in *The Legislative System* that "our data provide only inferential evidence that the legislative role tends to take precedence over the interest-group member role in cases of conflict."[12]

If the authors of *The Legislative System* were correct in arguing that group affiliation is overridden by the legislative role, then, in terms of my data, labor legislators should have the same perceptions as rank and file Democratic legislators when the latter differ from the labor executive board members. If they were incorrect, there are several other possibilities. Labor legislators could have perceptions different from both labor executive board members' and rank and file Democratic legislators'. Such a finding would suggest that dual labor-party membership produces distinctive perceptions in a legislator. Or, labor legislators could have perceptions identical to those of their labor associates but different from those of their political colleagues; this would point towards group affiliation predominating over legislative affiliation. Or, labor legislators could be more like their fellow legislators than their labor associates, but still distinguishable. Would one then talk of an influential but not dominant legislative role? The interviews were structured to allow for any of these possibilities.

It should be interjected here that there were no major differences among the three sets in age, education, ethnic origin, or tenure in office. This increases the confidence that differences in role orientations are not products of intervening variables and that all that differentiates the three sets is group affiliation (labor executive board members) versus group and party association (labor legislators) versus party affiliation only (rank and file Democratic legislators).

The data are consistent with the theory of a legislative role. The labor legislators *do* respond like rank and file Democratic legislators on a number of perceptual questions; furthermore, on another series, comparing both sets of legislators with labor executive board members, measurable differences are present. To begin with examples of similarities, there is no statistical difference between the two sets of legislators in the distribution of responses to a question designed to measure self-perception of behavior in a situation of labor-party conflict. As Table 1–1 shows, two Democratic legislators and one labor legislator said they would go with labor; six and five respectively said they would stick with the party. Table 1-2 indicates a symmetry of labor legislators' and rank and file Democratic legislators' views on questions about Rhode Island politics at the time of the interviews, 1964–1965. They offered similar assessments of organized labor's statewide power and its importance to the Democratic party. (Democratic legislative leaders saw these relationships differently than the two other sets of legislators. Four of them said labor was as powerful as ever and three said it was not; four of them said labor was not as important to the party, one had reservations, and only two said its importance was the same.)

There are differences among the three sets of activists on three other questions. Table 1-3 contains a suggestive dissimilarity. Labor executive board members are inclined to assess labor's "over-all political activities" between 1952 and 1962 in a favorable light. Fifteen of twenty-five said labor was effective and eight ventured it was even "very effective." Rank and file Democratic legislators, while not denying labor's contribution, were markedly less enthusiastic. Surprisingly, seven labor legislators chose to opt out of this question entirely. If one takes the not illogical analytical step of interpreting their "no answer" responses as "ineffective" signals and their score is placed in a cell opposite the "ineffective" replies of the other two sets, there is a difference significant at the .10 level. When labor legislators and rank and file Democratic legislators are each compared separately with labor executive board members, there are in each instance differences at the .05 level. When the legislators are compared to each other, there are no differences. Thus, in perceptions of labor's political effectiveness, the two sets of legislators appear to be like each other but unlike the labor leaders.

Table 1-4 was designed to ascertain if the three sets of activists perceived a decline in labor's influence in the Rhode Island Democratic party from the 1950's to the early 1960's. Once again the two sets of legislators were closest in response: six out of fifteen of each set said labor was more influential in the party during the 1950's (a view shared by five of seven Democratic legislative leaders). Seventeen of twenty-five labor executive board mem-

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 206.

[12] p. 333.

TABLE 1. ACTIVISTS' PERCEPTIONS OF LABOR-PARTY RELATIONS IN RHODE ISLAND

	Rank and File Democratic Legislators (*N*-15)	Labor Legislators (*N*-15)	Labor Executive Board Members (*N*-25)
1. *How They Perceived Their Own Actions in Situations of Labor-Party Conflict:*			
Sided with Labor	2	1	
Sided with Party	6	5	
Don't Remember any Cases	5	5	
Other Response	2	4	
2. *Assessments of Labor's Current (1964–1965) Position in Rhode Island Politics:**			
(a) Is Labor as Powerful as Ever?			
Yes	9	7	
No	4	5	
No Answer	2	3	
(b) Is Labor as Important to the Democratic Party?			
Yes	8	7	
Yes/with reservations	4	4	
No	3	4	
No Answer	—	—	
3. *Assessments of Labor's "Over-all Political Activities" Between 1952 and 1962:***			
Very Effective	4	2	8
Effective	5	6	15
Ineffective	4	—	2
No Answer	2	7	—
4. *Perceptions of Labor's Influence in the Rhode Island Democratic Party:****			
Labor More Influential in the 1950's (than 1960's)	6	6	17
Labor Equally Influential in the 1950's and 1960's	8	5	5
Labor Less Influential in the 1950's (than 1960's)	1	3	3
No Answer	—	1	—

* On both issues, when rank and file Democratic legislators' and labor legislators' responses are combined into a 2+2 Yes-No table, there are no significant differences on the Fisher Exact Probability Test.

** A chi-square table was constructed in which labor legislators' "no answers" were placed in a cell opposite the "ineffectives" of the other two sets. Chi-square for all three sets equalled 9.19, significant at the .10 but not at .05 level. When labor legislators are compared to labor executive board members, chi-square equals 8.39, significant at .05; when rank and file Democratic legislators are compared to labor executive board members, chi-square equals 6.22, significant at .05. When labor legislators and rank and file Democrats are compared to each other, there is no difference. Although some statistics texts warn against the use of chi-square when more than 20% of the cells have frequencies of less than five (see Sidney Siegel, *Nonparametric Statistics*, New York, 1956, pp. 178–179), the test has been utilized in political science when no other means of analyzing small sample data are available (see Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Ziegler, *Voting Patterns in a Local Election*, Philadelphia, 1964, pp. i–ii).

*** When the three groups are compared, chi-square equals 7.51, not significant at .10. When labor legislators are compared to labor executive board members, chi-square equals 4.38, significant at .05, and when the rank and file Democratic legislators are compared to the labor executive board members, chi-square again equals 4.38, significant at .05. When the two sets of legislators are compared to each other, there is no difference.

TABLE 1.—(*Continued*)

	Rank and File Democratic Legislators (*N*-15)	Labor Legislators (*N*-15)	Labor Executive Board Members (*N*-25)
5. *Perceptions of the Labor Party Relationship Between 1958 and 1962:*****			
Very Satisfactory	8	3	3
Satisfactory	5	6	6
Unsatisfactory	—	—	1
No Answer	—	1	—
Very Satisfactory to 1958/Unsatisfactory thereafter	2	3	10
Satisfactory to 1958/Unsatisfactory thereafter	—	—	5
Very Satisfactory to 1960/ Satisfactory thereafter	—	2	—

**** When only post-1958 evaluations are considered and Very Satisfactory and Satisfactory responses are combined into cells compared to Unsatisfactory replies, the following frequency table results (with chi-square equal to 11.59, significant at .01):

	Rank and File (*N*-15) Democratic Legislators	Labor (*N*-15) Legislators	Labor Executive Board Members (*N*-25)
Very Satisfactory/Satisfactory after 1958	13	11	9
Unsatisfactory after 1958	2	3	16

bers offered this evaluation. There is not quite a significant difference among the three sets at .10, but when two-by-two comparisons are repeated, once again both sets of legislators are different from the labor executive board members but like each other.

Table 1-5 is interesting on two counts. First, it is a graphic illustration that sophisticated political respondents will not always allow themselves to be put into questionnaire slots arranged beforehand by a social scientist. The last three response categories were suggested spontaneously, repeatedly, and emphatically by those interviewed. In an evaluative, if not a quantitative sense, I am inclined to pay special attention to such respondent insistence. Second, this question brought out a significant difference among the activists upon what may be the most important political perception of How the diners feel they were served will determine their future appetites (the actual nutritive value in politics is often of less consequence than the aftertaste).

Most noteworthy in Table 1-5 are the drastic differences in perceptions depending upon position. The accompanying condensed frequency table makes this clear. Both labor legislators and rank and file Democratic legislators consider the labor-party relationship to have been at least "satisfactory." The labor executive board members, using the post-1958 distinction which they interjected, are split in virtually the opposite direction. Yet these participants are looking at the same reality, the same labor-party interactions. Whether the interactions were acceptable or not obviously depended upon one's position, one's role in the situation. all: how well has the labor-party relationship gone? From a theoretical perspective, if the various sets of participants perceive differently the satisfactions accruing from their relations, they are likely to have difficulty cooperating at some not-too-far distant point in time, especially if one set is actually dissatisfied. Furthermore, it is the perception that counts. Furthermore, the labor legislators have the perceptions connected with the party role, not those of the labor role. The findings support the Wahlke group's hypothesis of the predominance of a distinctive legislative role.

III. CROSS-PRESSURES ON LABOR LEGISLATORS

The concept of cross-pressures has a long history in the literature, primarily in voting

studies.[13] Although withdrawal is the main response of voters to cross-pressures, this is, as Robert Lane noted, "only one of several means of solving the conflict problem."[14] Another is "identification with one of the conflicting reference groups (*sometimes because of frustration in the other*)."[15] David Truman, in applying the cross-pressure concept to the internal politics of interest groups, observed that "*felt conflicts of this sort are painful.*"[16] Truman later implied that legislative parties, as "mediate groups," shared many typical group characteristics.[17]

For the Rhode Island project, the question was as follows: even if there is a dominant legislative role, is it reasonable to expect no measurable consequences of dual pulls on the loyalties of labor legislators? Labor legislators would be prime prospects because the process through which they adapt themselves to the legislative role could well be accompanied by feelings of being cross-pressured. On the other hand, such tensions in labor legislators are not self-evident; conceivably they could adopt the Assembly-member role without strain. If they did have difficulties as a consequence of dual membership, what would be expected are feelings of bitterness or frustration toward one, the other, or both affiliations. Voters may withdraw when experiencing cross-pressures, but state legislators, by definition relatively highly involved in public life, do not have such an option.

During the interviews, questions were posed about instances of labor-party conflict in Rhode Island, because legislative cross-pressures would be most likely to be felt when labor legislators were not subject to complementary labor and party demands. In assessing these disputes, labor legislators said they acted much as rank and file Democratic legislators did. The labor legislators, however, offered a remarkable series of unsolicited additional responses. Seven expressed discontent with organized labor; three revealed similar sentiments about the Democratic party. Thus, two-thirds of the dual membership legislators volunteered feelings which I interpret as highly suggestive of cross-pressures on them. Their responses are not likely to occur by chance; of fifteen rank and file Democratic legislators, only two expressed discontent with labor and one with the party. Comparing these distributions on the Fisher Exact Probability Test shows a difference significant at the .025 level.

What the labor legislators feel is mirrored in selected quotes from the protocols. Speaking of the fact that his conferences with labor officials are very rare, a labor legislator said, "There's no direct pipeline. They know how I feel. I don't always agree with union leadership." Another labor legislator, after describing his close cooperation with AFL leaders, recalled that "over the years I had my quarrels with some labor leaders, particularly some from the CIO." A different labor legislator told of a traumatic experience early in his Assembly career:

> I can remember when I first came here. I had a run-in with [a prominent CIO leader]. He threatened to beat me unless I went along and Roberts [the govenor] arranged for him to apologize.

Finally another labor legislator volunteered:

> Labor expected too much of me; they thought I was going to get everything through the Labor Committee for them because I was a labor man. I was abused many times by labor leaders because of my independence.

In a similar vein, but with a different focus, a few labor legislators expressed uneasy feelings about their legislative party. One said:

> The House [sic] had elected more and more conservative Democrats. There are not real liberals in the House any more. Liberalization of the labor laws has diminished because of fear of losing industry. It's afraid to make improvements. We're not a labor state now even if we were ten or fifteen years ago.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

This paper has reported the results of a pilot project on three aspects of state legislative processes. The Rhode Island data on labor representation seem to generate three hypotheses for testing by those concerned with group representation in general in stage legislatures: (1) such representation will be useful primarily because associates will transmit information for the group to other legislators; (2) group association will be superceded by a distinctive legislative role in structuring the individual legislator's perceptions of events and relationships; and (3) group-associated legislators will be subject to cross-pressures.

[13] See Paul Lazarsfeld *et al. The People's Choice* (New York; Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1944), Chapter Six; and Angus Campbell *et al., The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 86–88.

[14] *Political Life* (New York: The Free Press, 1959), p. 203.

[15] *Ibid.* Italics added.

[16] *The Governmental Process* (New York: Knopf, 1951), p. 162. Italics added.

[17] *The Congressional Party* (New York: Wiley, 1959), p. 95.

REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE TYPES: A RESEARCH NOTE

NORMAN MELLER
University of Hawaii

As part of their state legislative research project, Professors Wahlke, Eulau, Buchanan, and Ferguson subjected Edmund Burke's classical phrasing of the dilemma of representation to an empirical examination.[1] Burke postulated the style of representation in terms of either-or: the legislator is either a mere spokesman for his constituents or he represents them as he believes best. The 4-state survey findings did not bear Burke out; rather, they disclosed a trichotomy, three major representational role types, with a classification of "Politico" appearing along with "Delegate" and "Trustee." The Politico expresses an overlap of both orientations, so that representative types can be conceived of along a continuum, rather than constituting two polar positions, with the Politico placed toward the mid-point. In numerical frequency, as well, the Politico type was also found to fall between the other two. Left to be determined is the universality of the 4-state formulation of representational roles.

Over the last decade I have periodically observed the evolution of legislatures functioning in the American-administered regions of the Pacific. Here are to be found a number of under-developed societies, or to employ a more informative description, distinctive cultures in transitional status adapting introduced political forms to customary political practices. These traditional practices are fundamentally premised upon the resolving of differences through the reaching of consensus for taking political action.[2] In 1956, when the Marshall Islands Congress in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands[3] was intensively studied, and in 1958 when the *Fono* (Legislature) of American Samoa was the focus for similar research, both were advisory bicameral legislatures, with lawmaking power legally residing in the executive. Both were patterned upon the model of American bodies on the mainland United States, although each incorporated nuances peculiar to its respective area. For purposes of considering representational roles, only reference to the lower houses in each is pertinent, as members of Samoa's Senate are chosen *Fa's Samoa* (by traditional ways) while the upper house in the Marshalls was nominally composed of hereditary *Iroij* and *Leiroj* (male and female nobles).[4] However, American Samoa's Representatives, as in the United States, are elected by universal adult suffrage, while the Assemblymen who sat in the 1956 Marshallese Congress owed their selection to a number of electoral devices, frequently secret election but also indirect choice by vote of the atoll councils which in turn were usually composed of *alabs* (the senior heads of families) residing on the atoll. To complete this brief sketch of the political settings of these Pacific Island areas, it need only be added that at that time neither knew political parties, and formalized pressure organizations were only just beginning to appear.

After the publication of the Wahlke survey, the 1956 and 1958 field notes were re-examined within the frame of representation there formulated, and the legislators of these two American outposts were found to fit both taxonomically and in corresponding numerical rank order within the representational roles of Trustee, Politico, and Delegate. Indeed, the same continuum could be reconstructed, with their replies nicely evidencing the lack of sharpness between the roles:

Trustee: The Marshallese legislator who categorically stated he had received no instructions from his home atoll, that he could use his own discretion in the deliberations of the Marshallese Congress, and that he was not bound to act as the atoll council might instruct him.

Politico: The Marshallese legislator who stated he could use his own discretion and did not have to follow the views of his atoll council, but who then immediately qualified it by adding, "but not always."

[1] John Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy Ferguson, *The Legislative System* (New York: Wiley, 1962), 267 ff; also see "The Role of the Representative: Some Empirical Observations on the Theory of Edmund Burke," this REVIEW, 53 (September, 1959), at p. 742.

[2] See Norman Meller, "Three American Legislative Bodies in the Pacific," in Roland W. Force, (ed.), *Induced Political Change in the Pacific* (Honolulu: Bishop Museum Press, 1965).

[3] The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands is divided into six administrative districts, of which the Marshalls comprise the easternmost. This archipelago of but 70 square miles of land, habited by 18,200 people, is scattered over some 180,000 square miles of ocean.

[4] In 1960 the Marshallese Congress was converted into a unicameral body, with *Iroij* and *Leiroj* enjoying life membership.

Delegate (shading over to Politico): "If there is [sic] any decided matters [that is, decided at the county *fono* meeting called pursuant to *Fa'a Samoan* custom] which I am against, I can say right there that I am against it. But, if my people insist, then it is my duty to bring it up before the *Fono*. If the *Fono* is not in favor of it, I will not fight for it."

Delegate (a Samoan): "If the people ask me something which I don't approve of introducing, I let it be determined by the number of villages which request it. My county consists of five villages, and if three villages think that a certain matter must be brought to the *Fono*, then I have to, even though I do not agree . . . ."

Unfortunately, due to data having been gathered in some cases through interpreters and also questionnaire responses requiring translation, representational role orientations for all members of these two legislative bodies could not be delineated.[5]

The Wahlke study, in seeking an explanation for the different representative role orientations, and their numerical distribution, suggested "it is likely . . . that the representative has become less and less a Delegate and more and more a Trustee as the business of government has become more and more intricate and technical as well as less locally centered."[6] It was therefore to be expected that in the areas of "simple" government, like Samoa or the Marshall Islands, the Delegate component would loom larger, if not predominate over the Trustee. In fact, the reverse was true, but this finding was hardly conclusive, suffering from the disadvantage of being based upon the manipulation of data amassed without prior formulation of the existence of trichotomous representational roles and the drafting of specific probes to test them.

The convening of the First Congress of Micronesia[7] for the whole Trust Territory in July of 1965 provided the opportunity for pursuing the tentative conclusion that these three representational roles apply equally as well to beginning as to established legislatures, and to amass further data on the hypothesis that they derive from the very nature of the legislative process. As a bicameral legislating body, its members elected by secret ballot,[8] the new Congress is comparable in composition and function to the four state legislatures previously surveyed. It thus also afforded opportunity for extending research beyond mere replication to determine whether the representative's own role perception was consonant with the role he believed his constituents thought he ought observe. In the attempt to avoid the pitfall of evoking merely formal responses designed to please the interviewer—always a danger in Micronesia, and as suggested subsequently, possibly constituting a methodological inadequacy of the whole trichotomous representational role formulation—questionnaires posing the handling of a specific problem viewed from different dimensions were completed by the Congressmen-elect in the opening morning of a pre-session training workshop under the instructions that they were thereby helping to structure the balance of the training.[9]

TABLE 1. DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE ORIENTATIONS IN CONGRESS OF MICRONESIA

Representational Roles	Own Role (32 members)	Constituents' View of Role (29 members)	4 State Legislatures (from Wahlke Study)
Trustee	69%	55%	63%
Politico	25	14	23
Delegate	6	31	14
	100%	100%	100%

All twelve members of the House of Delegates and twenty-one members of the General Assembly replied to the inquiries concerning their and their constituents' views on representational roles, and all but one Assemblyman also commented on the effect upon role conception of personal or party[10] program promises to support an issue.[11] The responses clearly

[5] The 17 utilisable replies from the 42-member Marshallese House and the 13 responsive Samoan Representatives of the 16 interviewed (17-member House) provided a coverage which compares well with that reported for California in the State Legislative Research Project.

[6] *The Legislative System*, p. 281.

[7] Established by Secretary of Interior order 2882, dated September 28, 1964.

[8] In some areas, due to illiteracy, a "whisper" vote was employed.

[9] See Norman Meller, "Trust Territory," *East-West Center Today*, 6 (January-February, 1966), p. 9.

[10] Different parties ran candidates in two of the six districts.

[11] However, in a few cases replies classed as "Other," which did not fit any category, had to be eliminated.

demonstrated that the Congressmen-elect were, if anything, more Trustee- and less Delegate-oriented than the average of the four state legislatures surveyed.

Nothing was found to substantiate the hypothesis that the Trustee representational role evolves with novelty or complexity of government. Even the Wahlke group's findings on Tennessee did not bear it out, and to explain this the authors added "it may be that 'complexity' is a function of perception, regardless of the real situation."[12] To the Micronesians the Trust Territory government and its problems appear highly intricate and technical, simple as they may seem to an American observer. Expanding government in the Trust Territory will continue to remain relatively complex, and although the Trustee's role may partially shift to that of the Politico with greater political sophistication in the area, it is difficult to conceive of a marked expansion of the Delegate role at the expense of the Trustee.

The largest single group of Micronesian Congressmen (thirteen) saw their representational role of Trustee paralleling that expected of them by their constituents, which well coincides with political reality encountered in many parts of the far-flung Trust Territory where representatives tend to be chosen for their ability to face problems beyond their constituents' ken. Only one member viewed his own role and that projected by his constituents as being a Delgate. Significantly, over half of the Micronesian legislators (fifteen of twenty-nine) indicated their role conceptualizations did not accord with those of their constituents. In part this was due to a Congressman holding to the role of Trustee while stating his constituents considered him a Politico or Delegate. But, in addition, other Congressmen voluntarily limited the scope of their roles, adopting that of Politico or even Delegate while recognizing that their constituents expected performance as a Trustee. As stated by one Delegate:

(legislator's role) "I feel that such matter should be put into full [consideration before the Congress] since it is the desire of the people—the majority—for such law to be passed. I therefore will do my best . . ." to introduce and support the measure.

(constituents' view of role) "The voters in my district place the responsibility on me to make the wise decision . . . . they expect me to put every effort to help the people . . . "

(effect of personal or party promise) "there is no difference . . . . the voters of my district choose their representatives from those that they put their entire trust upon as their leaders."

Half of the Congressmen (sixteen) concurred with the Delegate quoted above in believing neither a personal promise on their part when they ran for office nor a pledge to a political party program made any difference in how they ought to conduct themselves. However, an equal number disagreed with them or entirely avoided the issue by giving a non-responsive reply (deliberately, I believe). All representational role types were found divided over the moral issue inherent in the question. It would appear that this whole area of personal and party commitment as it applies to legislative role warrants further inquiry.

Coding the responses so as to fit them neatly within the trichotomous categories posited was difficult. Frequently, befitting the consenus societies of Oceania, reference was made to the judgment of fellow legislators in resolving the dilemma of representation. In view of the sense of solidarity generally engendered by membership in a legislative body, and the strength of legislative norms in determining action, this mention by Micronesian legislators of peer judgment suggests positing the values of the individual legislator, legislative norms, and constituent instructions as the three major referents for the legislator. The Politico type then becomes a catch-all for the representative who refuses to commit himself to any conceptual category.

Finally, there remains a suspicion that the Politico representational role is of entirely different nature than the Trustee and Delegate types originally projected by Burke. The polar roles are ideal types, acknowledged, legitimate, safe to disclose. The Politico role constitutes nothing more than a description of what a legislator does when he fails to follow a recognized norm. This he may be reluctant to disclose, if indeed he is cognizant that his behavior

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIONAL ROLE ORIENTATIONS IN TRUK DISTRICT LEGISLATURE (26 REPLIES)

Representational Role	Own Role	Constituents' View of Role
Trustee	46%	8%
Politico	31	—
Delegate	19	77
Other	4	15
	100%	100%

[12] *The Legislative System*, p. 282.

does not comply with sanctioned representational roles. An illustration is provided by the replies of Truk District[13] legislators to the same representational questions asked a month after they were posed to the members-elect of the Congress of Micronesia. An added factor contributing to this distribution of replies was an informal session conducted some time previously by a Trust Territory administrator in which he had stressed the right of the constituent in a democratic system to expect his elected representative to follow the constituents' instructions. Not alone does the Truk District legislator's expressed response to the view of representation held by his constituents conform to this norm, but his own stated representational role perception appears to reflect this, as well.

The same reluctance to reveal non-compliance with accepted norms was earlier revealed in the 1958 interviews in American Samoa when the legislators reported transmitting to the center of government viewpoints expressed at village and county *fonos* composed of *matais* (holders of titles granted by their families) and, similarly, in post-session meetings orally informing these constituents of legislative decisions and proposed Administration actions. Parenthetically it may be added that such servicing of the communication function of legislative bodies is not synonymous with adopting a Delegate-type representative role. Queries directed to other sources revealed that in fact the practices of Samoan Representatives varied and local *fonos* were not being called in all districts reported by the legislators. Tradition required holding such *fonos* bracketing the regular legislative session, and the Samoan legislators had responded in terms of accepted behavior and past practice, rather than volunteering information regarding their current flaunting.

In Micronesia and Polynesia, where American-style legislatures with limited functions and restricted legislating capacity have been structured, a new political elite, both paralleling the chiefly elite and also comprised of those traditional leaders who have been able to make the adaptation, observe appropriate representative practices. In these transitional areas, constituent participation in self-government through introduced Western forms is more dependent upon the cues derived from the representative than would characterize more developed areas. Nevertheless, interviews revealed the same representative roles are replicated, and in corresponding rank relation, as found in the four American states surveyed by the state legislative research project. Moreover, these Pacific areas furnish the additional note that legislator specification of their role perceptions may constitute but a formal nod to legitimated roles, and that the latter may not in fact conform with role behavior. All this suggests further consideration of the nature of the three representational role types posited, and particularly that attention be turned to verifying verbalization through observed performance.

[13] The Truk District, which comprises the midzone of the Carolinas, is the most heavily populated of all districts in the Trust Territory (24,500), and embraces the smallest land area.

COMMUNICATIONS

TO THE EDITOR:

Lewis A. Froman, Jr. ("Some Effects of Interest Group Strength in State Politics," this REVIEW, Dec. 1966, pp. 952–962) seeks to make generalizations about the relationships between state constitutions and the strength of the interest groups in the various states. Froman proposes to relate one independent variable, the strength of pressure groups in the various states, to four dependent variables: 1. Length of Constitution, 2. Number of Amendments Proposed, 3. Number of Amendments Adopted, 4. Percentage of Amendments Adopted. The measure of pressure group strength which simply classifies state pressure groups as strong, moderate, or weak, comes unaltered from a book called *American State Legislatures* edited by Belle Zeller and published by Crowell in 1954. The gathering of the judgments is exclusively described in one paragraph on page 192 of the book: "In order to secure a comprehensive and accurate picture of the political situation in all state legislatures for the biennium 1949–51 a questionnaire was sent to two or more competent persons in each state, including political scientists specializing in legislation, political parties, or state government, directors of governmental or adminstrative research agencies or bureaus, legislative officers and politicians. At least one reply was received from each of the forty-eight states—in most cases two or three."

Although I cannot see any commanding reason why we should, let us for purposes of discussion concede the accuracy of these judgments. This raises at least two very serious questions about the interpretation of these judgments. The authors of *American State Legislatures* were explicitly trying "to secure a comprehensive and accurate picture of the political situation in all state legislatures for the biennium 1949–51," but Froman relates these judgments to constitutions whose length, in the overwhelming proportion of the cases, was effectively determined in the nineteenth—and in some cases the eighteenth—century. (See the table in *The Book of the States*, 1964–65, p. 12) Froman nowhere shows us the effective dates of the constitutions with which he is dealing. A glance over the table will show that of Froman's forty-five cases thirty-five have constitutions written before 1900 and forty have constitutions written before 1913. I do find it "unduly unrealistic" (in spite of Froman's assurances) to assume that strength of pressure groups in states is stable over periods of time like those involved here, especially given the vast social and economic changes which occurred in these periods.

The second point is that the respondents do not indicate, when rating pressure group strength, the direction in which the strength, where present, is exerted. Among the twenty-four states said to have strong pressure groups are ten of the eleven states of the old confederacy, seven western states, plus Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Nebraska, and Wisconsin. Only one, Maine, is east of the Alleghenies and north of the Mason-Dixon line. Only one, Michigan, could reasonably be perceived as being dominated by liberal pressure groups. I am suggesting, in short, that when the Zeller Committee's respondents indicated the presence of strong pressure groups in their respective states, it is quite likely that they were thinking of conservative ones. If this is so, even in part, considerable doubt is cast on Froman's positive relationship interpretation.

Froman summarizes the information presented in the table with respect to length of constitution by simply telling us that for twenty-four cases described as strong the average length of constitution is 33,233, for fourteen "moderates" the average length is 17,985, and for seven "weaks" 14,828. No mention is made of the fact that the range for "strongs" is 8,220–227,000, for the "moderates" 4,840–45,000, and for the "weaks" 6,750–40,000. The coefficient of correlation supporting the proposition "The stronger the interest groups, the greater the length of the state constitution" is .36—interpreted from a purely statistical point of view, good enough to explain no more than 12% of the variance. I doubt that pressure group strength in the 1949–51 biennium has anything whatever to do with length of constitution and a coefficient of correlation of .36 doesn't persuade me. Clearly, in order to establish any meaningful connection we would have to know when and under what circumstances the constitutions attained their respective lengths. Froman never says a word about the circumstances or dates in any state whatever. Let me only mention a few of the more obvious ones.

Louisiana, of course, has the longest constitution. By itself, its 227,000 words inflate the "strong" average by about 40%. Louisiana's French legal tradition obviously makes it an orange among apples, but Froman makes no attempt to control for it—he doesn't even mention it. Neither is there any mention of Ala-

bama's (80,000 words) or California's (70,000 words) constitutional peculiarities which result in the unusual length of their constitutions.

Froman's generalization makes perhaps even less sense at the other end of the scale. Seven of the smallest eight (including New Hampshire) and eleven of the smallest fourteen constitutions belong to states admitted to the union before the presidency of Andrew Jackson. It may be that the shortness of these constitutions has rather more to do with the Constitution of the United States, something over 7,000 words in length, than with pressure group strength in 1950. I would likewise not be surprised to discover that the length of the constitutions of the former confederate states had something to do with the writing and rewriting which resulted from the Reconstruction Era. (Check the dates at which constitutions were adopted for these states.) One must also wonder how Froman would explain the fact that Missouri with its weak pressure groups managed in 1945—a time to which the judgments of the 1949–51 biennium would quite likely be relevant—to write the fifth longest constitution of 40,000 words. Once the alleged relationship between length of constitution and pressure group strength is dismissed, then the remaining contentions are insignificant. Consider propositions 2–3 and 5–10 listed in the summary on page 961. I submit that these relationships are a function not of pressure group strength as Froman contends but simply of the fact of long constitutions and of things that long constitutions are likely to involve, e.g., more elected officials, more necessity for amendment, easier amending procedures, etc.

The strongest thing that Froman says in the entire article is put in the second paragraph of the second column on page 957: "It is interesting to note that both strength of interest groups and length of constitution have an independent effect on the number of amendments adopted. When each is held constant the relationship with the other and number of amendments adopted is attenuated but still present." In the Statistical Appendix on page 962 we find the following phrase, ". . . the relationship between interest group strength and number of constitutional amendments adopted, with length of constitution held constant is .19." Adequate in a raw statistical sense to account for 4% of the variance.

THOMAS LANDON THORSON
University of Toronto

TO THE EDITOR:

For the benefit of readers who may not remember my original article, or for those who do remember it but, like its pained author, find it unrecognizable in Professor Thorson's critique, let me offer a few brief words of reminder. The article contains thirteen propositions, relating three independent variables (strength of interest groups, length of constitution, and difficulty in amending the constitution) to nine dependent variables (length of constitution, number of proposed amendments, number of amendments which are adopted, difficulty in amending the constitution, number of state elected officials, number of state agencies with elected officials, method of selection of state public utility commissions, method of selection of state courts of last resort, and length of terms of judges on state courts of last resort. Evidence from a variety of sources, some good, some not-so-good, is offered in support of these propositions, along with an overall interpretation of the results.

Thorson addresses very little of this in his communication. Rather, he has a theory of his own to propound. He submits no evidence in support of this theory, and seems irked that I did not supply much evidence in support of it in my original article. But now that we have been made aware of his theory, perhaps it can be subjected to critical evaluation. Among its major propositions are:

(1) The present length of a state constitution is determined by its antiquity.

(2) When "experts" think of interest groups, they think only of conservative ones.

(3) The French legal tradition makes for long constitutions.

(4) Alabama and California have "constitutional peculiarities."

(5) Long constitutions are likely to involve more elected officials, more necessity for amendment, easier amending procedures, etc.

Let us work backward. My original article discusses and gives evidence on relations between length of constitutions and (a) number of amendments adopted and (b) ease of amendment. I am pleased Mr. Thorson is willing to include my observations in his new, original theory. With respect to number of elected officials, the evidence seems to show that there is no relationship: length of constitution and number of elected officials are correlated .03. I offer this as a further contribution to the Thorson theory. "Necessity for amendment" and "etc." as dependent variables, I daresay, must await further specification from minds more supple than my own.

Proposition 4 has a sharp, intuitive appeal

to readers of the daily newspapers; I am not disposed to dispute it.

Proposition 3 will probably excite chauvinistic protests from the French. But I urge Professor Thorson to hold fast to the findings of value-free empirical social science that he submits on this point. It is interesting to observe, in passing, that the present French constitution is approximately the same length as that of the United States.

Proposition 2 would make an excellent MA thesis; perhaps Professor Thorson would like to try his hand at it.

Finally, Proposition 1. I am uncertain as to the meaning assigned to this proposition by Thorson. If he means that the *Book of the States* gives the lengths of state constitutions at the times of adoption, then he is incorrect. The lengths, as reported in my article, incorporate amendments since the dates of adoption. If Thorson means that different historical periods produce constitutions of different lengths, then he may or may not be correct—data on the original lengths of the fifty state constitutions would help solve that question. To then draw the conclusion that present lengths of state constitutions are determined by past lengths would then require an analysis of the number of words added or subtracted since the dates of adoption. By implication, however, Thorson assumes that the present constitutions are now either approximately the same lengths as when adopted, or that all have changed length at similar rates. Given the data presented in my original article, neither assumption is warranted.

It is no doubt appealing to make reference to the influence of history on contemporary institutions. When one has no data from which to argue such allusions may seem especially tempting. But just as it is not entirely bootless to study the forces that presently shape the contemporary U. S. Congress, the Presidency, and the Court, so, I think it fair to say, is it interesting to study the living constitutions of the fifty states and their relations with other contemporary phenomena.

LEWIS A. FROMAN, JR.
University of California, Irvine

TO THE EDITOR:

I am consulting the traditionalist firm of Mendelson, Roche & Tresolini on the feasibility of taking legal action against the REVIEW for the libellous accusations against me published in the March 1967 issue.

It is clear that the research in question was conducted solely for the purpose of placing me on the periphery of the whole field of public law. Department chairmen have been known to read the REVIEW. They are now informed by Fig. 4, p. 122, that I am as far away from "rationality" and "values" as one can get. *Science*, not the author, would seem to have certified me as the least rational and most unprincipled member of the field. This is now said to be my "ideological position in small space." That this was meant to shrink my position in financial space strikes me as obvious and culpable. Science will soon prove that I *am* rational and principled; I am preparing a behavioral study now towards this end.

THEODORE L. BECKER
University of Hawaii

TO THE EDITOR:

In the March 1967 edition of the REVIEW, Duane Lockard makes the following statement in his review of Jacob and Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis:* "Indeed the author who has the greatest difficult in the present volume is the one who writes on interest groups; he devotes much of his space to the Almond and Verba survey research findings in attitudes about interest groups which do not allow for any significant comparative state analysis at all."

This statement is domonstrably erroneous. The essay is 40 full pages in length (excluding references). Of these 40 pages, four discuss the Almond and Verba findings. Therefore, since 10 percent of the space is devoted to the Almond-Verba findings, Lockard's statement is in error, unless one assumes that the word "much" means something substantially different than either common sense or a dictionary definition.

HARMON ZEIGLER
University of Oregon

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Lenski, Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification. HEINZ EULAU... 482

Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, Elections and the Political Order. JAMES W. PROTHRO..... 485

Shell, Bedrohung und Bewährung: Führung und Bevölkerung in der Berlin-Krise. RICHARD L. MERRITT..... 486

Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Societies: A Setting for International Affairs. FRED W. RIGGS..... 488

Rossiter, 1787: The Grand Convention. DONALD L. HAFNER..... 491

McLane, Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: An Exploration of Eastern Policy under Lenin and Stalin. THOMAS W. ROBINSON..... 492

Pike, Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. ROBERT A. RUPEN..... 493

Colton, Léon Blum: Humanist in Politics. *Ziebura*, Léon Blum: Theorie und Praxis einer sozialistischen Politik, Band I: 1872 bis 1934. HENRY W. EHRMANN.... 495

Anderson and Bowman, Education and Economic Development. *Cowan, O'Connell, and Scanlon*, Education and Nation-Building in Africa. *Ikejiani*, Education in Nigeria. GWENDOLEN M. CARTER..... 497

Galambos, Competition and Cooperation: The Emergence of a National Trade Association. OLIVER GARCEAU..... 498

BOOK NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY..... 499

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS..... 514

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS..... 529

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION..... 552

BOOK REVIEWS

Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification. By Gerhard E. Lenski. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966. Pp 495. $8.50.)

There is something majestic in the analysis of human societies across time and space. It is the splendor of global and historical perspective that makes the works of a Comte, a Spencer, a Pareto or a Weber lasting and ever stimulating monuments of inquiry into the social ways of mankind. Their daring willingness and exemplary ability to mobilize contemporary knowledge of history and geography, of politics and economics, for sociological synthesis and endow it with theoretical significance made for a genre of writing at once truly civilized and truly scientific. Its shortcomings notwithstanding, this genre still awes the modern social scientist who aspires to being civilized and scientific. But it is a genre that few modern social scientists care to practice. The explosion of social science knowledge, both cause and consequence of the scientific division of labor in the modern university, seems to have an intimidating effect on the contemporary analyst of human societies who seeks universal validity for his theoretical constructions. The few who are still inclined to practice the art of global analysis do not really offer a rich intellectual fare. What they provide is largely a kind of empirically disembodied theoretical framework, global in aspiration, to be sure, but grossly neglectful of the rich diversity of human experience. I do not wish to minimize their efforts or achievements. But I prefer something else.

Although it is modestly subtitled "A Theory of Social Stratification," Gerhard Lenski's *Power and Privilege* is a far-ranging and profound inquiry into the causes and effects of human inequality as well as into the foundations and consequences of political and economic power. Of the book's thirteen chapters, eight are devoted to the structure and dynamics of distributive systems in hunting and gathering societies, in simple and advanced horticultural societies, in agrarian societies and in industrial societies. In a *tour de force* of sweeping scholarship Lenski guides us through the centuries to the most remote corners of the earth. The Northern Maidu Indians of California, the Siriono of eastern Bolivia, the Arunta of Australia, the Roro of New Guinea, the Yoruba of Nigeria, the Ankole of Uganda, the Mayas, the Aztecs and the Incas, the Greeks and the Romans, the Chinese and the Japanese, Ottoman Turkey, Czarist Russia, medieval and modern Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States—all of these and many more societies provide the data for Lenski's analysis of stratification around the world. If, in what follows, I sound unduly abstract, it is because I must limit myself to a discussion of Lenski's theory and method of inquiry. It is all the more important to emphasize, therefore, that even if one were to find fault with his theory and method, the great bulk of Lenski's book is a fascinating empirical account of human experience concerning the classical question of "who gets what and why?"

There are two theories in Lenski's book—the theory with which he began and the theory which evolved in the course of his investigations. Not that they are totally different. Rather, the "final" theory is largely a modification of the initial theory. This is as it should be. Lenski's candor is admirable:

> The high degree of support for the theory was not completely unexpected because of the manner in which the theory was constructed. Despite some appearances to the contrary, the theory presented in the early chapters was not a simple exercise in deductive logic. Rather, it represented the end product of an already extensive process of both induction and deduction. In a sense, the theory was designed to fit the facts, or at least those facts with which I was familiar when I began writing this volume. However, the theory with which I began writing was not the same that I had taught ten years previously. On the contrary, over the course of that decade I constantly shifted and modified my theoretical position to try to get a better fit between theory and data. In the process I found myself shifting from what was basically a functionalist position to what I have called a synthetic or synthesizing position. In other words, I found an increasing need to incorporate hypotheses and postulates which had little or no part in the functionalist tradition, yet without wholly abandoning the latter (p. 435).

Methodological absolutists will undoubtedly dissent from this mode of theory construction. But I am quite convinced that in the present state of the social sciences premature (and often pretentious) theoretical closure is the surest way to some sort of neo-scholasticism. The social scientist, it seems to me, is at his best if he is sensitive to the open-endedness of all current theories and maintains a healthy respect for those facts that do not fit his particular working theory of the moment. Lenski's

work exemplifies the soundness of this position. It takes the kind of truly cross-cultural analysis that he undertook to abuse us of the intellectual Olympianism implicit in much current "pure" theory.

The central problem of Lenski's theory is the phenomenon of human inequality. What moved him to tackle the problem, apart from its intrinsic importance, was the diversity of "explanations" that have been offered for social inequality through the ages, and especially his dissatisfaction with those two major contemporary approaches which go under the name of "functionalist" and "conflict" theories. Behind these alternate formulations lie more basic issues predicated on differing behavioral assumptions about the nature of man and society as well as their interrelations. Although Lenski accepts, for working purposes, the assumption that "societies, like individuals, are basically self-seeking units" (p. 42), the assumption does not become an ideological straitjacket. But more about the basic issues later on.

What of the initial theory itself? It consists of two postulates, two derivative "laws," two major hypotheses and a central proposition, as well as of a variety of auxiliary hypotheses and a good deal of supportive explication. Assuming the self-seeking nature of man, the first postulate states that "power alone governs the distribution of rewards." But as selfish interests can only be satisfied through cooperation, it is a second postulate that "men's selfish interests compel them to remain members of society and to share in the division of labor." The first law of distribution follows: "men will share the product of their labors to the extent required to insure the survival and continued productivity of those others whose actions are necessary or beneficial to themselves." But this law says nothing about the distribution of societal surplus goods and services. Again assuming self-interest and short supply of surplus values, there will be conflict over control of the surplus. Defining power, with Weber, "as the probability of persons or groups carrying out their will even when opposed by others," the second law of distribution follows: "power will determine the distribution of nearly all of the surplus possessed by a society" (all quotes on p. 44). This second law, in turn, points to the critical relationship between the two chief variables, power and privilege:

> If privilege is defined as possession or control of a portion of the surplus produced by a society, then it follows that *privilege is largely a function of power, and to a very limited degree, a function of altruism.* This means that to explain most of the distribution of privilege in a society, we have but to determine the distribution of power (p. 45).

Lenski then introduces two hypotheses: first, "in the simplest societies, or those which are technologically most primitive, the goods and services available will be distributed wholly, or largely, on the basis of need"; and second, "with technological advance, an increasing proportion of the goods and services available to a society will be distributed on the basis of power" (p. 46).

At this point Lenski warns against a general theory of distribution or stratification that would be universally applicable. Just as the economist eschews a single general theory of market behavior and takes account of the existence of different kinds of market (perfect competition, monopoly, duopoly, oligopoly, and so on), Lenski recommends the same approach for a theory of stratification. He argues, therefore, that if the two laws of distribution and the two hypotheses are valid, then "the nature of distributive systems will vary greatly, depending on the degree of technological advance in the societies involved" (p. 47).

I cannot possibly summarize here the whole of Lenski's explication of his theory. Suffice it to say that by classifying societies in terms of their technologies, he is in fact controlling, wholly or partly, many other relevant variables. Moreover, he frankly acknowledges the possibility of second-order variations that may be due to the physical environment, the "military participation ratio," within-society technological variations, or "political cycles" that make for different degrees of constitutional legitimacy. To deal with these, Lenski is prepared to rely on inductive logic in order to formulate both causal and descriptive generalizations. In further explicating his theory, he has also much to say about force and its transformation into social power, the rule of right, the varieties of institutionalized power and the reactions of classes to the ongoing system of distribution.

Lenski's view of stratification is multidimensional—that is, there may be a political class system, a property class system, an occupational class system, or an ethnic class system, and so on, all of which may constitute a particular distributive system. Class systems differ in importance, complexity, span, shape, degree of mobility, degree of hostility and degree of institutionalization. In view of the great variety of class systems in different societies, Lenski does not underestimate the difficulties involved in comparing highly diverse distribu-

tive systems. But he does not hesitate to propose meaningful, if rough, comparisons between distributive systems in terms of their degree of inequality, their rate of vertical mobility and their degree of class hostility. In summary, then, Lenski's theory predicts that "variations in technology will be the most important single determinant of variations in distributive systems" (p. 90). But this does not preclude other factors from also being considered as possible sources of variations in stratification. Indeed, "one of the most important concerns in the analysis which follows will be the identification of these factors and the determination of the magnitude of their influence" (p. 90).

In this summary of Lenski's initial theory I have neglected to mention the great care taken in the definition of the concepts that represent the variables in the hypotheses whose interrelations constitute the theory. In many respects, Lenski's book is a model of theory construction that is highly instructive. In reformulating problems and concepts for empirical inquiry, he demonstrates the utility of two techniques: first, the technique of transforming categorical concepts into variable concepts; and second, the technique of breaking down compound concepts into their constituent elements. This strategy of theorizing is mandatory, it seems to me, if comparative analysis of dozens of societies is to have the theoretical payoffs that one hopes for in the crucible of empirical research.

Where does Lenski's test of his initial theory come out? In general, theory and evidence corresponded reasonably well, but modifications and changes were necessary. In the first place, the study of advanced horticultural and agrarian societies showed that the relationship between technology and political organization is more complex than expected:

> In these societies one finds significant variations in level of political development associated with apparently limited variations in technology. This suggests that we must think of the level of technological advance either as a *necessary*, but not sufficient, cause of political advance, or as the generator of a "threshold effect," whereby a limited advance in technology causes (or makes possible) a major advance in political organization. Perhaps both apply . . . . This has significant consequences for the distributive process because the level of political development is clearly a major determinant of the character of distributive systems (pp. 435–36).

Second, Lenski came to the conclusion that a sharper analytic distinction must be made between the concepts of "technology" and "economy." He found that "economic variations which occur independently of technological variations appear to have effects on distributive systems comparable to those produced by political variations" (p. 436), possibly as a result of the influence of different environmental factors.

Third, especially in the more advanced societies, ideology seems to have more of an impact than anticipated: "The importance of ideology was seen most clearly in the somewhat unexpected halting, and possible reversal, of the trend toward increasing social inequality, so pronounced in the evolution from hunting and gathering to agrarian societies." It had been predicted that the degree of inequality would vary directly with the size of a society's surplus, though the hypothesis had been qualified for democratic societies with an egalitarian or socialistic ideology. The evidence "strongly suggests that the average level of inequality in the most advanced industrial societies is no greater than that in the average advanced agrarian society, and probably less" (p. 437).

Fourth, Lenski found that in the more advanced societies variations in the personal attributes of political leaders have a greater impact on distribution than expected, particularly when constitutional government is at low ebb: "Though there are obviously limits to the influence which the personal factor can exert, they are not so narrow as to make it trivial. Though the variable involved is essentially nonsociological in character, sociological theories must find a place for it" (p. 438).

There are other modifications of the original theory. For instance, type of polity seems to have an effect on the size of the surplus: "The creation and preservation of an economic surplus in agrarian societies would probably have been impossible without an authoritarian, undemocratic, and exploitative political system" (p. 440). Other changes of the initial model involved the separation of certain variables from a cluster of factors originally labeled "constitutionalism," such as "degree of external threat," which was found to be linked with variations in type of polity, at least in advanced horticultural societies. Similarly, "rate of economic development" seems to be linked with variations in distribution: "Specifically, a high rate of economic development appeared to be linked with a greater willingness on the part of the dominant classes to make sacrifices in *relative* terms, i.e., in their share of the gross national product, in order to insure increases in absolute terms" (p. 440).

Finally, Lenski returns to the eight issues

that have divided functional and conflict theorists, "conservatives" and "radicals." He finds that on three of the eight issues (the nature of man, the inevitability of inequality, and the conception of class) his final theory leans heavily in the conservative direction; on two issues (the nature of society and the degree to which inequality makes for conflict) it leans heavily in the radical direction. On the three remaining issues (the degree to which inequality is maintained by coercion, the question of how rights and privileges are acquired, and the nature of the state and the law), the final theory "involves a complex mixture of elements in both traditions: strongly conservative with respect to economically and technologically backward societies, and radical with respect to more advanced societies. In summary, it is *an extremely complex mixture of elements from these two older traditions, yet at the same time unique and different*" (p. 443).

In conclusion, I cannot do better than quote Lenski's own assessment of what I think is a masterpiece of comparative social analysis. Referring to the transformation of his theory from its initial to its final formulation, he writes:

> These changes direct attention to what has proven a highly rewarding feature of the methodology of our analysis: the practice of constantly alternating the processes of induction and deduction. . . . This is not done often enough in contemporary sociology, with the result that the fit between theory and data is often poor or unclear. By constantly comparing theory and data, and, when necessary, modifying the theory to conform to the data, cumulative growth and development are achieved. The possibility of this is further enhanced by working with an open theoretical system which permits the addition of new variables and the elimination or modification of old ones. As a consequence, a considerable number of important insights have emerged which were by no means obvious at the start of the analysis (p. 440).

HEINZ EULAU
Stanford University

Elections and the Political Order. By ANGUS CAMPBELL, PHILIP E. CONVERSE, WARREN E. MILLER, AND DONALD E. STOKES. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966. Pp. ix, 385. $8.75.)

Anyone who needs reassurance about the cumulative nature of political science as a discipline need only compare this book with the pioneering work on electoral behavior by Paul Lazarsfeld and his associates (*The People's Choice*, 1944) or with the present authors' own early work (*The Voter Decides*, 1954). The theoretical focus of these studies was on the explanation of the individual's decision-making process. Although they were concerned with voting behavior in general rather than with the description of particular elections, the data for the first study came from a single county and both were confined to single elections in the United States. In fact, then, they remained largely descriptive and particularistic.

The theoretical focus of the present work is considerably broader. Taking advantage of the series of election studies that has now been accumulated, the authors undertake to deal with the vote as a collective event, to use each election as a unit of analysis in a universe of elections, and to examine the functions of elections in the total political system.

In the first two parts of the book—"The Flow of the Vote" and "Voting and the Party System"—the first two of these commitments are realized with impressive success. Here the pervasive emphasis is on the importance of party identification as a stabilizing factor in the American political system. Indeed, one of the two major substantive contributions of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center team to political science centers on party identification as an autonomous factor in the explanation of political behavior. The flow of the vote through time (because they think in terms of spatial configurations, the authors would say "across" time) and the importance of this flow for the American party system are elucidated thoroughly and, in some cases, brilliantly.

In the course of this analysis, the authors demolish by example—without fanfare and with great finesse and patient understanding—the old charge that the "behavioral approach" is somehow inherently "anti-historical." The authors would probably be the first to agree that the earliest systematic studies of electoral behavior were largely a-historical but their use of different samplings of public opinion through the last twenty years contributes greatly to our understanding of American political history. Without direct data on mass attitudes, preceding generations of historians and political scientists were forced to employ collective events, *e.g.*, legislative enactments or election outcomes, to draw inferences about individual attitudes. The authors demonstrate convincingly that this downward flow of inference from collective event to individual opinions can be spectacularly erroneous. And their findings on the flow of the vote over the last twenty years suggest that some of the facile interpretations

of nineteenth century elections need careful revision.

In this line of analysis lies the second major substantive contribution of the Michigan Survey Research Center—the rarity with which ideologically structured opinions are found at the mass level. In the third part of the book—"Comparative Political Analysis"—the implications of this finding are extended to France. As is so often the case when direct factual data replace inference, we discover that previously accepted interpretations of French politics as reflecting a highly politicized electorate are flatly wrong. The multi-party system had once been thought of as intensifying political interest by affording voters parties that more exactly matched their own preferences; instead the French voter finds the large number of parties confusing and he typically argues that fewer parties would be helpful. But this does not mean that a multi-party system is always associated with lower levels of politicization. A companion article on Norway finds party identification to be comparable to that in the United States (even with the requirement that weak no less than strong identifiers in Norway say they "*wholeheartedly* support one special party"). Unfortunately, the article on Norway does not include data on political involvement or political socialization to permit a comparison with those for France. But had the data been presented, they would apparently have differed greatly: in discussing French socialization the authors say that "responses to a similar question in the Norwegian multi-party system look like our American results, and not like the French" (p. 281).

Why the difference in the response of the French and Norwegians to their multi-party system? The authors only incidentally address this question in the suggestion that the difference stems from a break-down of the socialization process in the French family. One reason why this important question is not frontally attacked is perhaps that each of the relevant chapters was written as a separate article with its own theoretical focus. But a more important reason may lie in the nature of the authors' data and the difficulty of their third task—the examination of the function of elections in the total political system. They propose to reverse the direction of inference and to elucidate collective events from data on mass attitudes. But in demonstrating that the lack of "fit" between collective outcomes and mass attitudes weakens the effort to infer from the former to the latter, do they not also expose the difficulty of inferring from mass attitudes to collective outcomes? Whether for this or for other reasons, the authors' broad question of the functions of elections for total political systems is never really confronted. The book offers so much of value that this lament would not be called for if the title of the book and the promise in the introduction to relate their findings to "the sweeping institutional complexes of politics" did not create the expectation that this problem would be central to the work.

The last part of the book—"Institutional Analysis"—successfully links popular attitudes to the attitudes and votes of Congressmen. Here the authors accomplish the difficult feat of linkage with which the late Professor V. O. Key was concerned but for which he never had appropriate data. With the line of analysis begun in this article, the authors may be on their way to a successful confrontation of the broader functions of elections for the political order. By the introduction of historical, comparative, and institutional dimensions into the study of elections, they have already contributed richly to our understanding of the electoral process. If they can carry the analysis through to the outputs of the political system, we shall be even more heavily in their debt.

Fourteen of the sixteen chapters in this volume have appeared elsewhere in the same or in modified form. In addition to the listed authors Gudmund R. Iversen and Henry Valen are each co-authors of one article and Georges Dupeux is co-author of two articles. The work is a credit to all of these people. Because they are operating with common concepts and a common body of data, the book has a unity that lifts it above the category of another book of readings.

JAMES W. PROTHRO
Escuela Latinoamericana de Ciencia Política y Administración Pública.
Santiago de Chile

Bedrohung und Bewährung: Führung und Bevölkerung in der Berlin-Krise. By KURT L. SHELL. (Köln and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965. Schriften des Instituts für politische Wissenschaft, Band 19. Pp. xvi, 480. DM 36,-.)

On the 13th of August in 1961, one of the most spectacular political events of the postwar world took place. Shortly after one o'clock in the morning members of the East German People's Police, People's Army, and militia systematically sealed off the border between East and West Berlin, and began to build the 27-mile long wall that would separate the people in the two halves of the city. Anyone in the West who read the newspapers had known

that something was afoot. No one, however, knew exactly what Ulbricht had planned. That the Wall shocked and outraged the West, and particularly the two and a quarter million West Berliners, is a fact well known to us all. That it also changed the character of the political struggle in Germany and in Europe as a whole is a less well-known, but doubtless more important, fact of modern life.

Kurt L. Shell's study is largely the story of the Wall itself, how West Berliners reacted to it and to the policies of the Allied Powers, and, above all, how the city's leadership was able at least partially to resolve the many dilemmas it faced. Methodologically, it rests upon a contextual analysis of the press, interviews with Berlin leaders and other participants in the crisis, an opinion survey in West Berlin and West Germany, and the personal experience of the author, who, at the time of the crisis, was performing research at the Institut für Politische Wissenschaft of the Free University of Berlin. Substantively, it is a narrative description of the day-to-day struggles and incidents that altogether made up the "Berlin crisis" of 1961–62.

The building of the Wall posed a series of dilemmas for West Berlin's political leadership. On the one hand, these men were responsible to the stunned electorate, to people who wanted "action, not words." On the other hand, Mayor Willy Brandt and his co-workers were also responsible to the commandants of the American, British, and French forces that protect the city, men who, after consultation with their governments, refused to take any action so long as Allied rights in the city remained untouched by the East German moves. To respond to the understandable outrage of the people without at the same time encouraging them to storm the Wall, to explain the Allied position without giving the citizens an impression either that the Berlin leadership agreed with it wholeheartedly or that their "protectors" had let them down, proved a difficult task. Equally problematic was the longer-ranged task of maintaining the very viability of the city. If the dramatic element of the Wall were stressed, might not the city fathers scare away potential visitors and investors, not to speak of some of the more jittery West Berliners? How could the city express to the world its continued indignation without giving comfort to those who have claimed that West Berlin is a troublemaker, an anomaly that must somehow be normalized before it sparks a new war? How could the city maintain high standards of civil liberties and at the same time prevent an influx of propagandists from the East or the spread of subversive sentiments? How could the city follow a firm policy of nonrecognition of the East without jeopardizing its concurrent efforts to build bridges between East and West Berliners. These are but a few of the problems of political leadership that Shell investigates.

But Shell's study also goes beyond this focus on political leadership in a crisis. It tells in rich detail the story of those events that splashed across the headlines of the world's press in 1961 and 1962—the confrontation of Soviet and American tanks at "Checkpoint Charlie," for instance, or the Berliners' reaction to the death of Peter Fechter, shot while trying to flee East Berlin and left to bleed to death on a narrow strip of no-man's land in the East. It tells about events that are less well known and understood outside the city too: the boycott by West Berliners of the East-Berlin-controlled elevated railway; the wearying negotiations leading up to the first agreement, in late 1963, that permitted some West Berliners to visit relatives in the East during the Christmas holidays; the efforts made in Berlin and Bonn to ease economic pressures on the city. The real heroes of the story are the West Berliners themselves. Their high morale, continued confidence in the willingness of the Western Allies to support the city, and their genuine concern mixed with characteristic Berliner humor provided nourishment for the city's leadership at crucial points between the onset of the crisis in the summer of 1961 and the fall of 1962, when the consequences of the Cuban missile crisis apparently relieved the pressure on Berlin.

Until additional documents are released and the principal actors have seen themselves free to discuss their own and others' behavior, Shell's study will doubtless remain the standard work on the Berlin crisis of 1961–1962, *viewed from the perspective of West Berlin*. The author has something to say about other perspectives as well—for instance, he corrects the popular image that Chancellor Konrad Adenauer had done nothing but continue "politics as usual" in the 1961 parliamentary election after Brandt broke off his campaign tour to return to Berlin. But comprehensive studies focusing upon the role of the Berlin crisis in alliance politics in both West and East remain to be written. As a careful analysis of the consequences of and reactions to a contemporary event, however, Shell's book is outstanding.

Students of systematic politics and political behavior will nonetheless not be completely happy with the book. Shell's description of it as a "decision-making study" (p. xiv) is inaccurate. Although we are told about what deci-

sions were made and what factors may have contributed to them, key questions are left unanswered. What are the normal political decision-making processes in Berlin and how was the sequence of decisions in the Berlin crisis exceptional? How were the various decisions—such as that by Brandt to write an angry letter to President Kennedy or that to close the West Berlin offices of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED)—actually reached? What role did public opinion and interest group activity play in these decisions? Which advisors were consulted and which ignored? What alternatives were considered? Shell provides some of the basic material for a study of decision processes in Berlin, but his book, whatever its other merits, is not that study.

Equally disappointing is his use of the wealth of public opinion data he gathered through sample surveys in West Berlin and West Germany in April and May 1962. For one thing, it is questionable how accurately a survey taken eight or nine months after a crisis will reflect sentiments felt at the time of that event. (This would be the case particularly for West Germans, who were not so directly involved with the Wall and its consequences, and for whom the half-life periods of memory would be fairly short; a survey by the Institut für Demoskopie five years after the event revealed that only 56 per cent of West Germans could remember what happened on the 13th of August 1961!) But there is little point in wishing that Shell had been able to initiate his inquiry on the morning of that famous Sunday in August 1961. Second, and more relevant, there are extremely few time-series data for comparisons. If we are to believe that the Wall created a crisis and hence an exceptional situation, we need information about the norms in Berliners' imagery. Shell's data on pre-Wall images and attitudes are too sparse for comparative purposes. Third, although the idea of conducting surveys concurrently in West Berlin and West Germany is extremely good, Shell fails to realize its potential. Quite a few of the 97 tables in Chapter 4 compare the responses of the two populations, frequently broken down into demographic subgroups. The absence of any tests of significance, however, leaves the reader wondering whether the differences or similarities between their responses are statistically significant or attributable merely to sampling error. Finally, alas, the 116-page chapter reporting the survey results is needlessly dull. One reason for this is that, since he did not use statistical tests of significance, Shell was apparently unable to determine which group-breaks were relevant, and hence reported many superfluous and uninteresting figures which, at best, belong in an appendix. Another and more basic reason seems to be the fact that Shell had no underlying conception that would enable him to differentiate between important and unimportant findings and to integrate the former into a meaningful whole. Despite these faults, Shell's data, particularly in their punch-card form, will be of immense value to other political scientists interested either in the Berlin crisis or human behavior in crisis situations.

One final critical point: Shell is doubtless not to blame for the fact that, throughout the book, the East German Democratic Republic (DDR), as well as its official organs, are always referred to in quotation marks or preceded by the phrase "so-called," implying that these agencies do not "legally" exist. The decision, I would guess, stemmed from those who supported the research and the publication of the book. In my view, however, scholarly monographs are not an appropriate place for petty "Cold-War" propaganda of this sort.

That Shell has not slain all the dragons with one book should not detract from the value of the study he did write. It is thorough, well-informed, and in some places gripping. Its forthcoming publication in English will give it the wide audience it deserves.

RICHARD L. MERRITT
Yale University

Modernization and the Structure of Societies: A Setting for International Affairs. BY MARION J. LEVY, JR. (Princeton, N. J.; Princeton University Press, 1966. 2 Vol. Pp. xx, 855. $22.50.)

A giant book raising innumerable problems, often an exasperating book, yet important and likely to be much referred to by writers on comparative politics and administration: such is the work under review. Marion Levy, Princeton sociologist, is well known for his neo-Parsonian structural-functional framework as expounded in *The Structure of Society* (Princeton University Press, 1952). For many years he has also carefully studied China and Japan. He uses them here as his primary examples, augmented by many American and some European references, to illustrate propositions about the broad changes in social structure which he calls "modernization." The basic categories of his analysis will be familiar to readers of the earlier book. They are re-presented, with some modifications, as a comprehensive framework for the analysis of structural changes in societies undergoing modernization.

Fundamentally, he argues, all modernized societies, ranging from the U.S.A. to the

U.S.S.R., have more in common with each other than they do with any nonmodernized society, and despite the wide range of variation among nonmodernized societies, they all have more in common with each other than they do with any modernized society. Modernization Levy defines in terms of the increasing use of "inanimate sources of power and/or tools" to multiply the effect of human effort. In short, Levy's concept of modernization embraces the consequences of the industrial revolution, but he rejects the word "industrialization" because he wants to include the technical revolution in agriculture and he prefers a broader term.

Levy hypothesizes that modernized societies are characterized by increasing specialization of component units which become correspondingly interdependent, by a more universalistic ethic, growing centralization, more generalized media of exchange and the use of markets, increasing use of bureaucracy and a persistent though changing role for families. Relationships among persons in a modernized society tend to be characterized by increasing rationality, universalism, functional specificity, and avoidance. However, he notes the persistence of traditionalism, particularism, functional diffuseness and intimacy, prevalent characteristics of relationships in nonmodernized societies. He also points to the existence, in embryo, of the modern aspects of relationships even in nonmodernized societies. Thus he seeks to distinguish his treatment of these aspects as "polarities" from the binary treatment of "pattern variables" by Parsons.

Throughout the work Levy relies heavily on these relationship aspects, which he calls the cognitive, membership criteria, substantive definition and affective aspects, adding also goal orientation (individualistic-responsible) and stratification (hierarchical-nonhierarchical) aspects. In the second part of the book he applies them to an analysis of aspects of any society, which he identifies as role differentiation, solidarity, economic allocation, political allocation, and integration and expression. Political allocation, which interests us particularly here, is defined as "the distribution of power over and responsibility for the actions of the various members of the social systems concerned. . ." (p. 181). Power and responsibility are the key concepts; the way they are used and particularly the extent to which they are balanced, are central to Levy's analysis.

The analytic aspects (which are universally found in all societies, according to Levy) apply to a range of organizational contexts or concrete structures (which need not be found everywhere). However, he finds kinship and family organizations to be universal and governments to be almost ubiquitous. A government, he says, is "a predominantly politically oriented organization considered by its members and the other members of the society to be the organization in terms of which the general problems of order as a whole for the society. . . are handled" (p. 436). Other organizations include markets, armed forces, churches, schools, "predominantly recreationally oriented organizations," etc. Levy insists on calling a government "a predominantly politically oriented organization" rather than a "political organization" because he stresses its multifunctional role, as he does of all organizations. In Part III, which takes up most of the second volume, he examines variations in organizational forms as they relate to the various aspects of relationships and societies which are associated with modernization. The work closes with a fourth part dealing, in summary, with the main lines of variation in societies and with modernization and stability as major problem foci of international affairs.

Critics will undoubtedly attack the book for its phlegmatic and often apodictical style, for its high level of abstractness and its sweeping generalizations, and for the paucity of concrete illustrations drawn from other than American, Chinese and Japanese materials. Despite some validity in these charges, I find the book an important contribution, even if largely a re-statement and expansion of *The Structure of Society* as applied to the problems of social change and modernization.

Criticisms which concern me more are matters of substance, matters which require an extended essay rather than a brief review. For example, by appropriating the word "modernization" for industrialization, Levy makes it more difficult to deal with other important concepts often meant by this word, and blocks comparisons with the work of other writers on "modernization" (in a different sense). His use of the word "organization" for any concrete social structure, such as a market, is at the opposite pole from those, like Theodore Caplow, who restrict the word to what is often called "formal organization" or "complex organization."

By using the word "structure" quite often to mean an "analytic structure," and then not using the word structure for an "organization" or "concrete structure," the unwary reader is likely to regard such aspects of society as "political allocation" or "role differentiation" as "structures" rather than the concrete structures, such as "governments."

This may seem like a terminological quibble, but it underlies one of the most profound misunderstandings in contemporary political sci-

ence, a misunderstanding which manifests itself sharply in the gulf between "traditional" comparative government and modernistic "comparative politics." The attack on the "institutional approach" has been accompanied by a rejection (or misunderstanding) of the need for a clearcut structural analysis (in the concrete, not the analytic, sense). The re-interpretation of structural-functionalism in political science has been largely in terms of "functional" categories. But these functions are carried out by abstract, disembodied entities all too often defined, tautologically, in terms of the functions they allegedly perform. The substitution of the term "political system" for government or state is a conspicuous example.

Levy's analysis is clear in pointing to concrete structures like the family and government "in terms of" which—to use one of his pet phrases—the political and other aspects are carried out. But his own typology of governments and of "associated units" fails to provide a useful framework for structural analysis. He classifies governments in terms of his own neo-Weberian categories as "predominantly particularistic, charismatic, and universalistic" and as local, feudal, and national, but rejects other distinctions sometimes used in the classification of governments. However, I find Levy's own distinctions to be equally nonstructural. His first set of terms refers to the basis of legitimacy of government, not intrinsic concrete structures, and his second set points essentially to the territorial domain of governments. If one had an appropriate typology of governmental structures, then one might hypothesize about the conditions under which they could govern "national" domains, or sustain "universalistic" norms in the recruitment of governmental leaders.

Other characteristics which Levy relates to government seem unsatisfactory to me. For example, he discusses increasing centralization and the problem of democratic versus authoritarian government without distinguishing between territorial and functional distributions of power. What is crucial in modernized governments is not so much the territorial distribution as the functional. Both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. have power distributions which are somewhat centralized territorially, but much more importantly, power in the U.S.A. tends to be functionally dispersed, whereas in the U.S.S.R., through the coordinating role of the Communist Party, it tends to be functionally concentrated. Although problems of territorial centralization and localization are critical for "relatively unmodernized societies," it is the problems of functional concentration and dispersal which are critical for the modernized. Since modern authoritarianism is associated especially with the concentration, not the centralization, of power, Levy's discussion of this subject also misses fire. The reason, of course, is his exclusive concern to distinguish the modernized from the unmodernized, not to make distinctions between different modernized societies.

But Levy's approach not only lacks good criteria for distinguishing between modern societies; it also—and this is even more damaging—lacks categories for the distinctive marks of those societies which are neither "relatively modernized" nor "relatively unmodernized." These marks of the intermediate or transitional society are, in my view, quite distinctive. I call them "prismatic" but the reader may have a better word for them. The qualities of a "prismatic" system are no more equivalent, by definition, to those of a transitional society than is, for example, a "parliamentary" system equivalent to "British," although in both cases, the indicated system may be found in the designated society. Levy's failure to develop such intermediate categories means that, although he speaks of his relationship aspects as polarities, he gives us no convenient way of identifying the traits of a relationship which is not, for example, just "somewhat particularistic" or "somewhat universalistic" but distinctively intermediate between these poles.

By combining a mode of viewing intermediate characteristics with a more precise typology of governments, he would have been able to describe more exactly the changing roles of political parties, bureaucracies, and armies, in the process of modernization. For example, he speaks of armed force organizations as "the most efficient type of organization for combining maximum rates of modernization with maximum levels of stability and control" (p. 603). In my judgment, however, armed forces assert a dominant role in "modernizing" societies only in the presence of a power vacuum created by the failure of other "predominantly politically oriented" organizations, such as political parties, legislative bodies, and courts, to exercise power effectively by imposing responsibility on the armed forces. Thus the very conditions which bring armed forces into power are the imbalances in which stability and control have been undermined. Nor can an armed force, as a ruling circle, readily create the conditions for effective re-establishment of modernization since the price that must be paid is the conquest of power by new organizations which are not armed. Those who exercise irresponsible power are almost always reluctant

to surrender control and become responsible public servants.

FRED W. RIGGS
Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences

1787: The Grand Convention. By CLINTON ROSSITER. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966. Pp. 443. $7.95.)

"There are risks in telling a twice-told tale," a reviewer has written in discussing another book on the Constitutional Convention, and the risks lie in the pitfall of reworking old materials without fresh insight. Professor Rossiter has not departed from the old materials, and his insights are not novel. But he has succeeded in presenting the Convention in an interesting and significant light.

On first impression it seems that the book might more aptly be titled *The Grand and Not-So-Grand Founding Fathers.* Rossiter devotes a major portion of his work to excellent capsulated biographies of the Framers, as they were both before and after the Convention, and to the political principles they represented as individuals and as a collective group at Philadelphia. The Framers emerge as neither demigods nor conniving, self-interested politicos conspiring against the creed of the Revolution. Rossiter prefers to view them as very human figures who were sent to Philadelphia, some because of their exemplary leadership talents, some because of their political perspicacity, and a few for reasons Rossiter admits he cannot fathom.

In presenting the Framers cloaked in their human foibles, Rossiter removes them from their pedestals as individuals while leaving them elevated as a collective group. As individuals, he labels several of the Founders as mere "ciphers," some as "visibles," and others as "inexplicable disappointments" at the Convention. Upon completion of their work at Philadelphia, Rossiter relates, some of the Framers went on to achieve greatness in the Republic, some to die in penury and drunkenness, and a few to fall to the ignominy of treason.

Gathered in "the archtype of the constituent assembly," the Framers were an outstanding group possessing collective and complementary wisdom, in Rossiter's view, but they were not unique. "The Republic had in reserve at least one team, and perhaps two, that would have been no less eminent and capable than the team actually chosen" (p. 150), and Rossiter opines that if the composition of the Convention had been different and notables such as Jefferson, Adams, and Patrick Henry had been included, "the Constitution would have read almost exactly as it does" (p. 253). The basis for this assertion is that the eminent men of the day shared a "consensus" of political and constitutional thought, an insight not original with Rossiter, and that they concurred both on the necessity of strengthening the Union and on the republican principles that this alteration should reflect.

An interesting perspective on the events at Philadelphia begins to form when Rossiter turns from the Convention itself to its finished product and the consequences of its deliberations. Though Rossiter does not intend it, the impression is fostered that the actions of the Founders, while not irrelevant, were certainly secondary in determining the character of the Union. As Rossiter discusses the document's aspects that have had greatest impact on American history, one is left with the impression that the Framers either hedged in deciding, failed to consider, or blundered in formulating significant sections of their work. The Founders "refused stubbornly," Rossiter notes, to think about the emergence of political parties, and they would have opposed such a development if they had thought it imminent. On substantive phrases such as "executive power," "general welfare," "commerce . . . among the states," and "necessary and proper," Rossiter suggests that "the Framers themselves were not sure what they meant by some of their neatest phrases" (p. 259–60). In several cases these phrases were inserted without full consideration of their implications. The manner of electing the President, by Rossiter's narrative, was patched together in the closing days by delegates who had been "running around in circles" on the problem, and the form they devised survived only two elections before being altered "beyond recognition." The question of judicial review was raised but not specifically answered, according to Rossiter, until Hamilton asserted the power of the Court to invalidate laws in *Federalist #78* and thus "put the last stone in place in the foundation of 1787" (p. 315). On the issue of slavery, Rossiter suggests (perhaps correctly) that the Framers struck the best bargain they could get and then left the issue to be resolved by later generations. Rossiter finally asserts that it was men such as Hamilton, Jefferson, Marshall, and Washington who "brought the Constitution to life" through their post-Convention efforts, settled much of its ambiguity on their own terms, and answered the crucial question of whether a nation could function under the document.

When this enumeration of post-Convention contributions is completed, one ponders why the Founding Fathers, as Rossiter presents them, are worthy of praise. The provisions of the Constitution that have been expanded to make it a viable document represent "postponed and evaded decisions" to Rossiter, "that were the consequence of dissension or apprehension or lack of imagination among the Framers" (p. 263). Even the unique "invention" of federalism Rossiter suggests was little more than "the result of an ill-tempered struggle for power" among the Founders, that fortuitously, but incidentally, reflected the realities of the American political situation (p. 192–94). One is left with the impression that praise for forming the Union was earned more by Washington in signing the Bank Bill, Hamilton in *Federalist #78*, and Marshall in *Gibbons v. Ogden* than by the Founding Fathers. Rossiter insists in his first chapter that the Convention is the primary event in American history and all else is secondary, but his subsequent chapters come close to presenting a contrary case.

Nonetheless, *1787: The Grand Convention* taken in its entirety is a well-executed survey of the Convention, the ratification, and the early years of the Republic. Rossiter has approached his subject with obvious affection and enthusiasm that the reader will doubtless find infectious.

DONALD L. HAFNER
University of Chicago

Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: an Exploration of Eastern Policy Under Lenin and Stalin. BY CHARLES B. MCLANE. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. xv, 563. $12.50.)

Charles McLane, Professor at Dartmouth College, has written an exhaustive, penetrating, and lucid study of Soviet policy toward Southeast Asia through 1953. Although not written for the general reader, since it presumes a general knowledge of the history of communism in that area, the book breaks new ground in terms of the completeness of its survey and in its success in tying down more closely a number of factual points which were in doubt before. McLane's book therefore complements the work done by others before him (particularly that by Beloff, Brimmell, Kennedy, Thornton, and Trager *et al*) as well as serves as a sequel to his own previous work on Soviet policy toward the Chinese Communists. Two particular features are, first, that McLane apparently used almost all of the Soviet sources on the subject available in the West, and, second, that the author conducted a large number of interviews in Southeast Asia with governmental officials and current and ex-Communist leaders. Those features lend a degree of authority to the results which will not easily be overcome by subsequent research.

McLane surveys the history of Soviet Southeast Asian policy from its beginning in Lenin's pronouncements on the "Eastern" question through the twists and turns of the Comintern period and on through the time of Stalin's death near the end of the Cominform period. His method is the inductive-historical one of allowing the evidence istelf to determine both his hypotheses and conclusions. To his credit, he sketches just enough of the histories of the indigenous parties to allow the reader to match Soviet policy turns with changes in the local picture. The conclusions are two fold: on the one hand, Soviet policy toward this area was never of primary concern to Russian Communists, and stood distinctly second to more important policy matters with regard to Europe. This conclusion stands despite a much greater degree of Soviet interest, knowledge, and involvement in Southeast Asia than was apparent previous to McLane's work. On the other hand, despite the Soviet proclivity to treat first the fostering of Communist parties in the area and then relations with those parties as subordinate to its greater national and ideological interest in European affairs, McLane concludes that whatever the Russians did (or did not) do in the area was always central to the development of communism there, that local parties depended to a very great degree on Soviet directives, and that in particular the influence of local conditions on party strength and policy was only half the story, the other half being the necessity of obtaining some guidance from the Soviet Union. "Their strength was impressive; their morale was high. They awaited only a sign from Moscow." Since Soviet guidance was absent for long periods of time (such as during the war), the local parties were, in McLane's opinion, forced to rely on whatever they considered the best substitute—such as directives from the metropolitan parties or contact with occasional Soviet visitors or returnees from the Soviet Union. Southeast Asian Communist parties supposedly were mere instrumentalities of Soviet policy there, which was, in turn, a tool serving Soviet European policy.

I believe that McLane overstates the real influence of the Soviet Union on the activities of the parties operating in Southeast Asia. While it is true that in the very early stages of

party formation dependence on the Soviet Union was probably very great, as time went on the necessity to come to terms with local conditions became more and more crucial. If most of the parties in the area were unable to come up with a winning policy, the cause was a combination of inexperience, colonial repression, and doctrinal rigidity flowing directly from the Communist propensity to look at reality with heavily tinted glasses; Soviet policy could influence these factors only peripherally. And what Communist successes there were (i.e., Indochina) stemmed not from correct learning from the Soviet Union but from a mastery of those same problems and from close attention to local circumstances.

A methodological problem arises over the question of how one determines Soviet policy during these (sometimes lengthy) periods when there was a relatively complete absence of official pronouncements. McLane assumes that there *always is* a policy and that if one looks hard enough one can always *find* it. Thus, if official spokesmen are silent, the Soviet press, especially Soviet orientalists, must be consulted; if that is of little help, foreign parties, especially metropolitan parties, should be referred to; and if the latter are of no avail, then one must look at the actions of the local parties themselves. Thus, in McLane's model, all levels contribute to, and make up, the generic term Soviet policy. The trouble with such an approach is that it tends to lump the activities of all these levels under the rubric of Soviet (i.e., Moscow's) policy, making them all into dependent variables. But that is not the case: in reality as one moves further away from the level of official pronouncement and closer to the local level, the propensity to independent behavior becomes more pronounced. At the local level itself, parties may in fact be quite independent of Soviet policy. And, in fact, in those periods when the Soviet Union is officially silent, the local parties *do* act independently. (That is how some of them managed to come to power.) The point is that often there may be *no* Soviet policy and that one should not then have to go looking for it.

Despite these aberrations, McLane's work remains a significant contribution to the literature of both Southeast Asian communism and Soviet foreign policy.

THOMAS W. ROBINSON
The RAND Corporation

Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. By DOUGLAS PIKE. (MIT Press, 1966. Pp. 490.)

The medium exerts more influence than the message: the organizational structure outperforms the theory or ideology it carries. Political organization is more critical than military: the organization of the Viet Cong, National Liberation Front, and North Vietnam, poses far more danger to South Vietnam and to us than guerrilla warfare. But even within the less important military sector, organization does more than ideology can to justify Communism's way to man. Motivation derives from effective organization and professional competence more than from philosophy, theory, and ideology. Lenin's organizational lessons, via Ho Chi Minh, accomplish far more than Marx's ideological pedagogy, at least in Vietnam.

Such represent the main message of Douglas Pike's impressive new book. Our enemy in Vietnam constitutes an organizational juggernaut. The organizational weapon represents the most formidable one in his arsenal. Capable cadres and specific structure mold the masses. Enmeshing men in the structure shapes their consciousness and their actions and defines their deeds. Hanoi holds helpless helots in its hands by the strings of organization.

The National Liberation Front (NLF) first created a paper network of village associations and then fleshed it out with reality. Tireless effort from 1959 to 1962 resulted in a tight apparatus of control. A Politburo, Secretariat, and Central Committee exercise control over three interzonal headquarters, seven zones (six regions and Saigon-Cholon), and thirty province committees (leaving thirteen South Vietnamese provinces without such organizations), down to the basic unit for the hamlet embracing one to seven three-man cells. Some 35,000 persons, half of them from North Vietnam, staff this structure.

The Secretariat includes five sections: personnel recruitment; liaison with subordinate organizations; agitation and propaganda; military proselyting aimed at destroying South Vietnam government armed forces by encouraging defection and desertion; and headquarters administration. Pike stresses the agitprop as most significant of all. He points out the important face-to-face contact element in this operation, and also illustrates how a neutral peasant gets drawn into the Viet Cong. The apparently innocuous first minor step of participation, in a demonstration or just going to a meeting, leads to further steps, and the coils tighten as the involvement escalates. The individual act rapidly becomes a group act, and then the individual loses his autonomy. The Viet Cong recruited large numbers of peasants in the intense organizational campaign of

1959–1962. Widespread disenchantment began in 1962 and grew along with increasing Viet Cong coercion and intimidation in 1963. Many of the individual peasants wanted to withdraw, but the web of control prohibited this, and they had to continue to render support, now involuntarily.

This analysis calls to mind the similar argument of Mu Fu-sheng (*The Wilting of the Hundred Flowers*), which indicates the way simple participation in a public meeting involves the individual in surrender of his own will. In Pike's words, "Once momentum in the group was developed, the group itself tended to restrict freedom of expression to the sentiments acceptable to the NLF-created group norms. The individual became submerged, the group became the unit, and great social pressure was brought to bear against the deviant. . . ." Pike concludes generally that the Chinese rather than the Russian model of communication and control guided the NLF.

The author insists that most observers vastly overrate the importance of guerrilla warfare in Vietnam; he stresses civilian organization as far more significant. While stressing the importance of organization and denigrating the importance of ideology, even his own statements suggest a more complex interrelationship than Pike admits. He refers to NLF "totality as a social revolution." He indicates it demands drastic changes in institutions, new property relations, new forms of production, and new legal and political systems. It would recruit leaders from different social strata, and would fundamentally change the educational system and the religion. He suggests that this differentiates the NLF from the Viet Minh, the present war from the war against the French. In a sense, he presents the earlier Vietnam war as organization plus nationalism, and this one as organization plus Communist ideology. Perhaps the effectiveness of the medium does depend on the message: with the same organization, nationalism obtained better results than Communism.

Concerning the question of NLF ties to North Vietnam, evaluation of which often turns out to be a key element differentiating hawks and doves, Pike assigns the NLF to Hanoi less categorically than P. J. Honey does, although briefly referring to, and indicating general agreement with, Honey's postion. Pike's conclusion runs, "The NLF was not an independent, indigenous organization as it asserted. But neither was it simply a hammer in the hand of the long arm of the DRV [North Vietnam]." He does say that the NLF program from the first, "projected a social construction program of such scope and ambition that of necessity it must have been created in Hanoi and imported." But he indicates definite phases in North Vietnamese manipulation: the "Northern takeover phase" began in mid-1963; led to an open split in the NLF Central Committee between the original "more indigenous elements from the South" and newly-arrived Northern cadres in 1964; and by the end of 1965 cadres from North Vietnam managed the NLF "even down to the village level." Presentation of considerable evidence in increasing control of the NLF by Hanoi implicitly challenges Harrison Salisbury's suggestion that the NLF continues to grow increasingly independent of Hanoi the longer it operates.

The NLF formulates various alternate victory scenarios. They include a possible military ending, with third-stage regular unit military success; a social ending, involving a general uprising, relying as much or more on South Vietnamese rebellion as on regular military activity; and a political infiltration and takeover ending, after a negotiated settlement. The Southern NLF-element tends to favor the general uprising, and the Northern element the military. Increased Northern influence in the NLF means increased militarization of the conflict. The NLF, and North Vietnam, believe that a South Vietnam neutralized through negotiations would leave a virtual political vacuum there, easy to capitalize on and exploit, since American military strength would no longer deter NLF political aggression.

Ngo Dinh Diem fell November 1, 1963. Pike indicts Diem: "The Diem Government had no national policy or even official attitude toward the NLF's struggle movement, nor was there any systematic effort at the district and village operational levels to develop techniques designed either to head off a struggle movement as it was being launched or to blunt it once underway. The posture of the Diem government was to pretend it did not exist or, if forced to take notice, to characterize it as an insignificant and ineffectual Communist effort to create disorder." Diem's fall resulted in improvement, in that NLF support decreased greatly; and near-disaster, in that virtual anarchy raged in the countryside.

Pike differentiates the first (French) and second (U.S.) Vietnam wars. He considers the first one, the Viet Minh war, to have been anticolonial, clearly nationalistic, and of nearly equal appeal to all Vietnamese in all parts of the country, North, Central, and South. The second war, with North Vietnam calling for reunification, lacks the effective nationalistic

and patriotic appeal to the South. He assesses the Viet Minh war against the French as nationalistic, and the present one as ideological.

Hate, according to Pike, summarizes the NLF in a single word. He finds in this a close analogy to Chinese Communism.

The source of this kind of book involves the problem of official influence and the possible diversion from objective scholarship. The author has served six years in Vietnam as a USIA official, since October 1960, and he wrote the book while on temporary leave at MIT in 1964–1965. He claims, "I wrote without instruction, mandate, or proscription. No one in or out of the government ever told me, or 'suggested' to me, what to put in or leave out." The internal evidence provides no reason to doubt this assertion.

In conclusion, this indispensable book on the Viet Cong must be counted among the very best on any aspect of contemporary Vietnam.

ROBERT A. RUPEN
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

Léon Blum: Humanist in Politics. BY JOEL COLTON. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966. Pp. xvi, 512. $10.00.)

Léon Blum: Theorie und Praxis einer sozialistischen Politik Band I: 1872 bis 1934. BY GILBERT ZIEBURA. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1963. Pp. ix, 526.)

In 1965 the French Political Science Association convened a meeting for the purpose of discussing Léon Blum's political role during the thirties. It was rightly felt that in present-day France far too little study was devoted to thought and action of one of the few outstanding personalities of the Third Republic during the inter-war years. Hence it is not surprising that the first two scholarly studies dealing with Léon Blum are due to an American and a German author (after a thoughtful essay on Blum by a British historian had appeared in James Joll's *Three Intellectuals in Politics*).

Solid, comprehensive and brilliant though both the works by Colton and Ziebura are, they leave the political scientist somewhat unsatisfied. Professor Colton's work is a political biography in the best tradition viewing with felicity French history between 1914 and 1950 through the prism of the life of a "humanist" whose great personal qualities proved to be fatal flaws in his career as a political leader. Professor Ziebura proposes to furnish the sorely needed theoretical analysis of the development which European social democracy has undergone since the First World War. To him the figure of Léon Blum, however carefully he has scrutinized his words and deeds, only provides a "*Demonstrationsobjekt.*" But his study breaks off in 1934 just before the movement which was to bring Blum to the Premiership came into being. The decisive eras of socialist excercise of power in both the Third and the Fourth Republic are therefore not yet dealt with in the initial volume of a work of quite extraordinary sweep. Hence the hoped for theoretical insights cannot emerge even though suggestive hints abound.

For all their difference in perspective and in scope the two books provide a largely concordant picture of the man and the events through which he lived. Both authors convey their admiration for the lucid style and logical mind of an apostle of social justice and fraternity, but they also admit that his contribution to political philosophy and socialist thought was neither original nor forceful. They agree that Léon Blum during periods when antisemitism was rampant in France had found an exemplary equation between his Jewishness and his complete assimilation into French culture. They correctly see consistency between the man of letters and *fin-de-siècle* esthete, the highly gifted administrative lawyer and the party leader. But both works also leave no doubt that it is far from unjust to identify Léon Blum with the shortcomings and the ultimate failure of his party and thereby of an important branch of European social democracy.

His unending and seemingly hairsplitting discussions of the conditions under which socialism might control the country's government, the distinctions he made between the "exercise of power" and the "conquest of power" have laid Blum open to the reproach that he was a sterile doctrinaire, unsuited to gain and hold that political power about which he disserted so much. Certainly he was a man who by temperament and predilection was incapable of divesting action from thought. It is also true that in the present age of decisionism the socialist concept for which the existing bourgeois state is merely a transitory phenomenon never evoked much ardor for the defense and the perfection of republican institutions.

But instead of being rigid and doctrinaire, Blum's "doctrine" was in fact infinitely malleable and designed to serve a political purpose. That purpose was to hold together a party which from its beginnings never had the organization, the membership and the trade union support characteristic of other European labor parties. Jaurès' mantle fell on Blum's shoulders about the time of the post-war com-

munist split (which Professor Ziebura describes in superb and quite behaviorist fashion). Since the split, the loss of many segments of the working class, the wide gap that existed between the orientation and interests of party militants and of representatives in parliament, the ideological fractioning of the organization at all levels, made it appear at times doubtful whether the SFIO would ever qualify for a share in governmental power. To preserve the party as a political instrument was the task which Léon Blum assigned to himself during the inter-war years and which he had to resume after his return from captivity. His daily editorials, his massive and at times bewilderingly subjective orations before party gatherings as well as his speeches in the Chamber of Deputies all served ultimately the same end: to provide a platform acceptable to the disparate elements in the party he led.

In the midst of the First World War the Councillor of State Léon Blum had expressed in a lucid *Letter about the Reform of Government* his anxiety about the future of a parliamentary regime which was devoid of modern disciplined parties. Yet in the years that followed, he was never able to make his own party into an organization of the kind he considered indispensable for the satisfactory working of the system. The relatively high degree of voting discipline in the parliamentary group had to be paid for by constant maneuvering leading to the immobilism which the Socialists shared with all other French parties and to those exercises in dialectics by its leader which have been taken as evidence of doctrinairism. His efforts did not prevent frequent splits in the parliamentary group under circumstances quite similar to those General de Gaulle was to experience during his brief tenure as a party leader after 1947. Blum's final failure became apparent in 1940 (to himself not less than to others) when after the capitulation and under the pressure applied by Laval, his party broke into pieces—events that are painstakingly recorded by Professor Colton.

When during his captivity he mused about the reasons for such failure, Blum had the intellectual courage to admit (in his *For all Mankind*) that given the absence of a valid party system a regime based on the separation of balanced powers was more suitable for France than the representative traditions of the past. But after his return to Paris, as soon as the reality of French politics was gripping him once more, all his republican instincts condemned the early constitutional proposals of de Gaulle. He saw nothing in him but the bonapartist and "pretender," sensing moreover quite accurately that in a regime presided over by de Gaulle, powers might be separate but never balanced.

If Blum emerges from these books as a tragic figure, this is also due to the fact that he was miscast in the very role he considered his own. He always regarded himself as the ideal conciliator, as particularly suited to seek and build consensus, in his own party, in the French nation and ultimately in the concert of nations. Yet instead of unity he produced antagonism. His eloquence and sophistication repulsed rather than attracted the working class, at least in the urban centers of mass industries. Those who have watched him in such encounters recognized easily in him the type of bourgeois socialist leader whom Robert Michels has described so aptly. Ironically he impressed his judges far more as a defendant in Vichy's Riom trial than he did the Parisian workers when he tried to woo them during the heydays of the Popular Front. The attempts he made, both before and after the war, to form a cabinet of national unity in the face of grave dangers came to naught. His endeavors aggravated distrust from all sides. That *he* would want to become a symbol of national cohesion was enough to arouse a more fervent hatred of Frenchmen for Frenchmen.

Professor Colton's book discusses competently and at length the sources of Blum's errors in the field of foreign affairs. As a journalistic observer, as party leader and as Prime Minister he often misjudged events when he viewed them with a blind faith in the ultimate triumph of reason and measured them by the yardstick of his commitment to pacifism. Perhaps it would be fair to admit that here the legacy of Jean Jaurès for whom Blum felt uncritical admiration, weighed heavily. The attempted synthesis of patriotism and internationalism, however beautifully the earthy prose of Jaurès had expressed it, proved quite unsuitable to deal with the realities of the Ruhr Occupation and of Bolshevism, of the Spanish Civil War and of the rise of totalitarianism in Central and Southern Europe.

The study of decision-making by the Popular Front Government, which the sequel to Professor Ziebura's volume promises to furnish, will undoubtedly be fascinating. But will he not have to stress how narrowly confined Blum's freedom of maneuver was by international events which he would have been unable to control even if he had understood them better?

HENRY W. EHRMANN
Dartmouth College

Education and Economic Development. EDITED BY ARNOLD C. ANDERSON AND MARY JEAN BOWMAN. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1965. Pp. x, 436.)

Education and Nation-Building in Africa. EDITED BY GRAY L. COWAN, JAMES O'CONNELL AND DAVID G. SCANLON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. x, 403. $7.50.)

Education in Nigeria. EDITED BY OKECHUKWU IKEJIANI. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963. Pp. xix, 234. $6.00.)

Few subjects, if any, are as important for developing countries, and especially for the independent African states, as the relation of education both to economic development and to nation-building. No people have expected more from formal education than do Africans, as the able historical and analytical introduction and carefully selected excerpts from documents and speeches in *Education and Nation-Building in Africa* so amply confirm. But in no part of the world have formal educational institutions fewer "supportive roots and branches in families and jobs," as Mary Jean Bowman points out in her penetrating and thought-provoking contribution, "From Guilds to Infant Training Industries," to the 1963 Conference in Chicago on The Role of Education in the Early Stages of Development.

If there is one particular lesson to be drawn from the outstanding series of interdisciplinary papers, edited by her and her husband, C. Arnold Anderson, both of the Comparative Education Center of the University of Chicago, it is that formal education, economic opportunities, and training-on-the-job are all essential and interrelated ingredients for broad scale economic development. Basic education—the three Rs—are, especially in Africa, essential for breaking out of tribal modes of life, for building a sense of human dignity among people whom history and stereotypes have all too often condemned to roles of subordination, and for opening the way to adopt and be adaptable to institutions and discoveries. But as the wealth of historical and analytical material in *Education and Economic Development* makes clear, formal education, whether of an academic or technical type, cannot of itself, and should not be expected to produce either agricultural or industrial incentives and skills. Only training that demonstrably results in economic returns can have such an impact, and this training can ordinarily be better provided on the job than isolated from it in the classroom.

These lessons, drawn from experience of development in early stages of economic growth in Great Britain, Sweden, Russia, and the United States, as well as countries still in early stages of development cast significant light on the much disputed question of how useful widespread basic general education and especially literacy are in the constant effort of developing countries to satisfy "the revolution of rising aspiration." The emphasis on "academic" rather than technical education in developing countries is frequently harshly criticized as being a mere apeing of the standards of former colonial masters, without relevance to the hard task of building economies that can support such aspirations as universal literacy, rising standards of living, and external representation. But in the early stages of growth, especially in a colonial setting, most of the jobs that offer important returns are clerical ones. Not surprisingly, therefore, it is training for such opportunities that attracts the most able. Only as internal growth and external aid stimulate the production, and sometimes the processing of raw materials and primary products, and nationalistic aspirations insist on a proportion of local employment at higher and higher levels, do new opportunities attract local talent into new kinds of training.

That African-controlled states expect education to do more than aid economic development is highlighted by the association of education and nation-building in the title of the book edited by L. Gray Cowan, James O'Connell and David G. Scanlon. Confronted by internal ethnic divisions, reinforced by distinctive languages and mores, the leaders of Africa's new states look to education to break down the barriers between their peoples and provide some overriding sense of mutual responsibility and pride. Yet, as American experience also documents, education, especially at the higher levels, often reinforces differences, rather than overriding them. Areas with particular opportunities, either through the siting of administrative centers or the possession of particular resources, tend to be those where secondary schools and universities are established. These institutions, unless with boarding facilities, are inevitably more accessible to the local ethnic group, which may also enjoy the advantages of better primary schools and an inherited predisposition towards work and adaptation. That the energetic Ibo people were formerly to be found in all Nigeria's universities was not a mark that these institutions had successfully overbridged ethnic divisions—though to some degree this process was at work in the student bodies—, but chiefly a reflection of the significant economic role played by Ibos outside their ethnic base and especially

in the North. Particularly devastating therefore, for the possibility of building Nigeria's huge population—probably one-sixth that of all Africa—into at least a rudimentary nation were the violent ethnic riots in 1966 that decimated and drove the Ibos from the North and forced a vast movement of population back to the regions of origin.

The work that deals exclusively with Nigerian education, and is edited by Dr. O. Ikejiani, does not overlook the danger to its development of a jealous and divisive ethnicity but appears to place more emphasis on what is seen as discrimination in the earlier stages of Nigerian education, particularly at the university level, in favor of expatriates as compared to native Nigerians. Some at least of this emphasis appears to be the result of what the editor himself experienced at the University of Ibadan, a story recounted in some detail in his chapter on "Nigerian universities" which should be read jointly with Dr. Mellanby's *The Birth of Nigeria's University*. What is most disappointing about *Education in Nigeria*, however, is the degree to which it deals in generalities and pious aspirations rather than getting to grips, as *Education and Economic Development* does so admirably, with the issue of how to implement aspirations.

In sum, two of these books—*Education and Economic Development* and *Education and Nation-Building in Africa*—should be required reading for anyone concerned with these vital subjects. Particular attention should be given to the former book which provides a remarkable range of material of an interdisciplinary character which is by far the most illuminating and stimulating this reviewer has encountered. One can only hope that all its essays and the thoughtful introductions to them will be widely read and duly taken into account by aid-receiving and aid-giving states and, indeed, by all those to whom the future of the developing countries is a matter of genuine concern.

GWENDOLEN M. CARTER
Northwestern University

Competition and Cooperation: The Emergence of a National Trade Association. BY LOUIS GALAMBOS. (Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. 329. $7.50.)

Nobody in his right mind wants unrestrained competition, at least not for himself. Society will not tolerate the consequences of vigorous price competition in large segments of the economy, once production has become roundabout, mechanized, with heavy overhead costs. But it took us a good many generations to work out a suitably contradictory body of myths and a set of institutions that would mitigate competition and yet leave administration in the hands of decentralized, nominally private business enterprise. Nor is the end of the argument anywhere in sight today, with a government policy of vigorous inflation in search of full employment paired with guide lines and threats of price freeze, materials allocation, and restraints on capital movement. We are no nearer to a coherent and rational statement of trade regulation policy than were the contending forces when N.R.A. was launched. But we have made some basic choices of policy direction. This book, as a case study, explores in detail one strand in that record.

The author distinguishes three major phases in the development of industrial association in the cotton textile industry. During the last half of the 19th century, "dinner clubs" afforded opportunity for discussion of price, technology, legislative reform, labor unions, buyers, regional competition. Manufacturer members were themselves Rulers of America, sat in Congress and state legislatures, hobnobbed with the mighty, and took action directly on policy issues they could agree on. They could not agree on prices or production controls.

A second period, 1900 to 1924, was characterized by "service associations," regional and then national in scope, with long tenure staff and both initiative and execution in the association's own personnel. A wide range of expedients were explored to restrain the destructive force of competition and to rescue a periodically very sick industry, in New England a chronically dying industry. There were efforts at cooperative advertising and research. A sustained effort was made to get uniform accounting and to teach manufacturers enough cost accounting so they would not unwittingly sell below cost. World War I showed the virtues of standardized products. Product groups tentatively used "open price" policy to steady prices on declining demand. This was a period, toward its close, when Hoover in the Department of Commerce afforded encouragement to trade association initiative.

The Cotton Textile Institute, established in 1926, was a "policy shaping association," which finally approached, but did not achieve, the role of a full fledged cartel. By the time of the Great Depression, the CTI was well advanced in a program of circulating data on output, inventories, unfilled orders, costs and prices. Some product groups were trying for production quotas. All data were filed with the Department of Commerce and FTC; and in 1927

the Department of Justice allowed "emergency curtailment" of output. CTI got White House support for curtailing night shifts in the name of labor reform. But compliance was always poor. It was exceedingly hard to get 80% to sign up, to say nothing of obey. Voluntary efforts were explored to the fullest, without any perceptible success in stabilized prices or profits.

N.R.A. was the logical sequel in this line of trade policy. CTI drew up and pretty much administered for itself the first N.R.A. code, which included control over machine hours per week. At the very end of N.R.A., the trade association executives, not the member manufacturers, were designated to plan and administer production quotas in advance of market collapse. This would have at last reached the full stature of a cartel. But N.R.A. itself died a quick death from political contradictions in the New Deal, the Court's decision, and the hostility of many trade associations and entrepreneurs, who distrusted the pattern of regulation. With the fall of N.R.A., the CTI rapidly lost control of trade policy; voluntary controls collapsed as they always had before. The "policy shaping association" became once more a service association, lobbying for the industry in Washington. The implacable logic of the cartel had been rejected.

The author recounts the tale in meticulous detail, based on careful research in primary sources. This is a valuable type of scholarship, allowing the author to question and correct many a broad generalization circulated by more popular and more politically oriented writers. Particularly is this welcome as a corrective to the attribution of paramount power to trade and peak associations, so favored by Brady and others operating with Marxian stereotypes. The author advances an "institutional approach" to the history of political economy, as a corrective to "progressive and reform history." There is merit in this way of examining the organizational revolution of our times.

It is by no means clear, however, that we have now chosen, post N.R.A., a definite course, using the giant corporation and oligopoly to stabilize price and profit and yet to preserve competition and a chance for innovation. The author sees this compromise as "economically and socially preferable to the guild-government condominium." So it may be. But the search for a policy is concerned not merely with the ideological convenience of covering oligopoly with a decent bit of antitrust, nor with the institutional adjustments of monopolistic competition to White House guide lines. There is also a struggle for power between business management élite and intellectual-governmental élites for control of economic decisions. Trade policy can hardly escape being a principal arena for competition between these, our present competitors for prestige, power and pay-off. The larger political forces are somewhat muted in this narrative of trade policy.

OLIVER GARCEAU
East Boothbay, Maine

NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT AND METHODOLOGY

Comparative Politics and Political Theory. Essays Written in Honor of Charles Baskerville Robson. ED. BY EDWARD L. PINNEY, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 215. $6.00.)

The device of a "festschrift" not to commemorate but to honor a living teacher and colleague approaching his official retirement is particularly pleasing and appropriate in the case of "Pat" Robson. The thirteen students and friends who collaborated to produce this volume will be applauded by every one who ever came under the influence of his personality during forty years of stimulating teaching and constructive contribution to political science. The nine essays composing it are less a testimonial to the unity and integration of the discipline than to its richness of content and catholicity of points of departure. To this reviewer, at least, the editor perceptively conveys a great deal of Robson's pedagogical conviction by arranging the authors' original, scholarly efforts so as "to present the major dimensions of comparative politics: normative, conceptual, institutional, behavioral and methodological . . . " and to suggest that "the study of political science is ultimately the study of political theory."

It is perhaps instructive to proceed by cavilling at editor Pinney's five-fold categorization of the dimensions of comparative politics (political science?), and the way he classifies the essays. The distinction between 'normative' and 'conceptual'

is not made clear, nor is that between 'behavioral' and 'methodological.' Accepting the five categories rather than three for purposes of elaboration, however, I would have placed McCleery's fresh discussion (a la Weldon) of the relation between *equality* as an ideal, evaluative criterion and *power* as an empirical variable for "factual" political analysis, under the heading of 'the conceptual dimension,' whereas Alan Grimes' presentation of "the ideological orientation" (sociological-determinist theory of knowledge) is *par excellence* an example of the 'normative' perspective toward politics. Lester Milbrath's program of research into political beliefs is a model of how the 'behaviorist' connects previous research findings with ongoing and projected investigation, which with respect both to style and method belongs with Matthews and Prothro's report on "Negro Participation in the South: An Overview." Further, I would have considered Cleaveland and Dawson's review of the evolution of top-level national security organization in Britain and the U.S., in the light of changing military technology and the requirements of strategic and budgetary planning, an admirable case of 'institutional' analysis and therefore properly grouped with Gil and Martz' survey of recent developments toward regional economic integration in Latin-America, and with Taylor Cole's discussion of federalism in West Germany.

The conceptual ambiguity and index instability of analytical categories in political theory and comparative politics have been commented upon many times, and I do not raise the problem here in order to reflect invidiously on the state of the discipline or the quality of research in the volume under review. Contrariwise, it seems to me that the progress of the discipline consists precisely in the ways old questions are reformulated and fresh insights revealed by just such processes of symbolic transformation as are exhibited in most of the papers herein. As a matter of research procedure, however, there is a significant lesson and contrast between the rigorous, systematic method whereby Goldrich goes about determining the extent to which his categories for reporting political orientations among Costa Rican and Panamanian students are distorted by their cultural predispositions ("response sets"), and the way that Hughes and Pinney, after rejecting the Goldhamer-Shils-Parsons categories of cognition, cathexis and evaluation (pp. 68–69), drag them in extraneously to "explain" (pp. 95–96): (a) variations in the meaning of 'political culture' and (b) varieties of cultural behavior observably existing in India, without establishing to any perceptible degree the extent to which these categories are *evidence* for propositions asserted about the ambiguities and uncertainties in the Indian pattern of political development.

As a teacher, Robson must be chuckling over the variations among his intellectual progeny, whose high conceptual abilities take such different modes of "operationalization."—AVERY LEISERSON, *New Delhi Centre for Study of Developing Societies.*

Behavior in Public Places. By ERVING GOFFMAN. (New York: The Free Press, 1963. Pp. 248. $2.45, paper.)

In this book Erving Goffman continues the analysis of social interaction he began in the minor classic, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life.* Goffman has brought to sociology a freshness and perception unique among practitioners in that field, and for this reason one anticipates eagerly the journey into Goffman's sociological world. It is therefore especially regrettable to report that *Behavior in Public Places* is an unsatisfying book. Major reasons for its lack of success spring, paradoxically, from both the strengths and weaknesses of Goffman's vision.

What Goffman does for us in this book is to dissect meticulously and imaginatively that portion of human behavior which requires rules to regulate interaction. Such behavior is regularly found in places which are "open," *i.e.*, "freely accessible to members of that community" (p. 9), or in social "occasions" to which individual participants owe obligations. Examples of the latter are cocktail parties and funerals. In many of these situations actors are previously either unknown to each other or only minimally acquainted. Goffman specifically excludes from consideration interaction among those well known to each other in entirely private, non-visible circumstances. However, he does consider the obligations of friends and lovers to social gatherings of which they are part. Broadly characterized, the book presents an inquiry into the rules governing the more formal aspects of social interaction—a kind of anatomical sociology of etiquette.

Goffman's major premise is that such face-to-face interactions and the occasions of which they are a part embody rules which have their own logic regardless of whether behavior occurs in a board room, an army headquarters, or a public street. The author claims that our definitions of mental illness are derived in many cases from our desire to protect such interaction from transgressors of these rules. It is not surprising, therefore, that many of his brilliant examples are drawn from observed behavior of the "mentally ill" and from the examples adduced by writers of etiquette manuals.

The book is replete with acute observations—sometimes bitingly ironical—of the way in which such rules are observed, subverted or manipu-

lated. Thus, Goffman discusses conditions under which individuals need to pay close attention to what others are doing, as well as conditions under which involvement may be witheld or withdrawn. He also analyzes the legitimacy of "side-involvements" (such as doodling in the classroom), the process of getting acquainted, and the ways in which social gatherings adjust their foci of involvement to meet demands put upon them. Perhaps his most arresting insight involves the major role played by "civil inattention" in the structuring of social relations and the definition of personal identity. "Civil inattention" is that studied ignoring of those whom we don't know which we practice in public places. Thus, for example, we employ "civil inattention" when we stare at the floor or out a window while waiting with a stranger for an elevator. According to Goffman, were we not to practice such avoidance of interaction, we would implicitly suggest that there was something "funny" about the object of our attention. By so doing, we would reduce him to the level of a specimen. Thus, our self-respect requires that strangers ignore us in public places. As can be seen by this description, Goffman's implied conclusion is that we gain knowledge of ourselves almost entirely by the reaction of others to our behavior. "Civil inattention" is only one of the unspoken but widely shared rules of public behavior which the author uncovers.

Why, then, is the book disappointing? First, Goffman's concern with existant rules governing interaction is purchased by the exclusion of considerations involving the growth, flourishing and decay of such rules. The book lacks sufficient consideration of the dynamic changes in rules which alter interaction. Furthermore, though Goffman specifically notes that the same behavior may be more or less appropriate in different contexts, he does not systematically consider reasons why such shifts in evaluation occur. Therefore, the conclusions of the book exist in a curiously static, disembodied form.

The origin of Goffman's static perspective becomes apparent when one re-examines the major premise of his argument. We may grant that there are common properties of interactions in different institutional contexts; yet what produces change in social life are the motivations, the content, and the outcomes of such interactions. Each of these three aspects is much more closely regulated by quite diverse institutional norms than is the process of interaction itself, which proceeds along lines which Goffman so ably describes. Institutional diversity, in short, is a major cause of social change. Goffman describes for us only the frosting on the cake of social life, not its filling.

It is perhaps for these reasons that Goffman's formulations have had somewhat less impact on the main body of sociology than one might have expected. Yet it remains true that, with sufficient effort, some of Goffman's formulations can be applied to studies of bargaining, small groups, and decision-making—all of which are relevant to the political scientist. However, Goffman's unwillingness to consider possible relations between his conclusions and other problems in the social sciences and his invention of terms which are frequently obscure and occasionally unnecessary for his analysis do not aid the process of translation. This reader remains unconvinced that all the fine distinctions and the abstruse terminology exemplified by the following terms—"involvement shields," "engagements," "occasions," "gatherings," "face work," "situations," "situation at large"—are entirely necessary for Goffman's purposes. Goffman himself does not use some of these terms ("copresence," for example) much after he defines them. His arguments are quite intelligible without some of these terms. It is, of course, true that science proceeds by giving names to new or newly discovered phenomena. However, such new terms are justified only by the extent to which they aid comprehension, not by the extent to which they confuse it.

None of these *caveats*, however, is intended to belittle the importance of the book's contributions to the sociology of everyday life. Goffman remains our most inventive navigator in these familiar, yet uncharted waters. One anticipates the application of his considerable talents to fields potentially more challenging and ultimately more significant.—RICHARD M. MERELMAN, *University of California at Los Angeles.*

The Radical Papers. ED. BY IRVING HOWE. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1966. Pp. vi, 378. $5.95.)

How to Argue with a Conservative. BY NEIL STAEBLER AND DOUGLAS ROSS. (New York: Grossman Publishers, 1965. Pp. xiv, 203. $4.95.)

In a well-known essay included in *The Radical Papers* Bayard Rustin argues that the civil rights movement must shift from protest to politics because equality for the Negro cannot be achieved within the framework of existing social institutions. Radical changes are in order, and they can only be accomplished through the exercise of political power. The Negro must join with a coalition of progressive forces—trade unionists, liberals, religious groups—which will eventually become the effective political majority (pp. 344–345). With some small differences, Rustin's coalition strategy is endorsed in the essays by Michael Harrington and Emanuel Geltman and Stanley R. Plastrik. Their hope is that a new grouping of radical political forces will not only

deal effectively with the challenges posed by Negro inequality, the poor, automation, and a deteriorating physical environment, but will gradually transform the private enterprise system from within, to the point where economic resources will be used in a positive way to improve the human quality of American life through democratic socialism.

The coalition proposal is the most cogent defense of the notion that major political change can be achieved in the United States, and is typical of the gradualism of the "radicals" represented in this collection (a significant exception is the essay by Tom Hayden, "The Politics of the Movement"). Other essays in *The Radical Papers*, however, raise serious doubts about the possibility of a radical coalition, primarily because its proposed recruits appear singularly unsuited or unwilling to join up. Harvey Swados and Paul Jacobs both portray a labor movement grown increasingly conservative and static, with little interest in fundamental social change (pp. 238-239, 262-263). Harrington himself points out that the "new poor" are presently demoralized and psychologically unequipped to sustain a mass political movement. He attributes this mood to the shortage of dignified blue collar jobs which once provided a chance for escape from poverty, and advocates self-organization of the poor through their own institutions (pp. 127 ff.). But how can such organizational efforts succeed so long as apathy persists? And how can apathy be dispelled until (in the terms of Harrington's argument) there is some hope that organization will lead to substantial changes in economic opportunities? Could not the infusion of a substantially increased level of welfare funds—or even direct subsidy of individual incomes, as through the proposed negative income tax—smother present discontent without any substantial threat to the established system? George Lichtheim, in his contribution, holds that it is more likely that men will choose a higher level of material consumption rather than sacrifice it for more equality, less competitiveness, and the socialist humanist deal (pp. 69-70).

The shortcomings of the coalition strategy do not mean that the radical critique of American society is necessarily incorrect, or without value. The issues raised in *The Radical Papers* about the relatively high level of inequality and economic favoritism in the United States, about the serious dimensions of current social problems and the challenge they pose to traditional values and institutions, about the unsatisfying nature of work, about the paradox of private affluence and public decay, about the inadequacies of social welfare in basic areas such as medical care and retirement, about the cold war mentality and its effect upon foreign policy, about the quality of our lives and its relationship to the private enterprise economy—surely consideration of these issues is crucial to understanding the shape of American politics and society today.

The value of the critique offered by *The Radical Papers* is made quite clear when it is contrasted to the conventional liberal approach articulated in *How to Argue with a Conservative*. In providing a set of counter-arguments to the conservative line, Staebler and Ross often seek to out-flank the conservative by insisting that modern liberalism is a more sophisticated way to maintain the private enterprise system (pp. 70–73, 76–78, 129–133), traditional values and institutions (p. 200), and American cold war predominance (pp. 156–160), with little questioning of underlying premises or problems. The book resembles a debate between old (laissez-faire) and new (limited government intervention) liberals, with both sides sharing the same basic values, but differing on the most effective means of realizing them, given contemporary socioeconomic conditions. The radical would insist that both positions are now outmoded, or at least ignore important social developments, and that the modern liberal is as out of touch with fundamental problems as the conservative.

The assumptions which pervade *How to Argue with a Conservative* are that no substantial changes are required in American capitalism, that liberal welfare state policies have been a genuine success and need only be perfected in a gradual way, that American society offers a high level of psychic satisfactions, that the aim of our foreign policy is to counter-act an expansionist "Sino-Soviet bloc" (pp. 155–156) through a mixture of social reforms and military measures. Such a viewpoint may enable someone to argue with a conservative that the liberal approach is the most effective way of sustaining the status quo. It is unlikely to lead to any serious consideration of the problems and prospects of American society.—PAUL LEARY, *Dartmouth College*

John Dewey. By RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN. (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 213. $3.95.)

This volume in the "Great American Thinkers" series will be found useful by the beginning professional student of philosophy as well as by more mature scholars in other fields. In the whole history of American philosophy, Dewey's place of eminence and encyclopedic breadth is securely established. In our own century, Dewey's preeminence in American thought has not been seriously challenged, although in the last decade or so there has been some decline of interest in his work. By contrast, his reputation abroad and the

interest in his work have remained on a persistently high level, partly perhaps because he is considered abroad as the most characteristic American thinker of the last hundred years. Since Hegel, there has been no world figure in philosophy matching Dewey's range of major interests, such as logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, esthetics, religion, education, and politics.

While the author is by no means a blind worshipper of Dewey—in fact, toward the end of the book he points to some serious shortcomings—he nevertheless accepts the fundamentals of Dewey's thought. Considered throughout much of his life a radical positivist, Dewey is increasingly seen as occupying a middle position between the traditional quest for metaphysical certainty and the more recent extremes of logical positivism and linguistic analysis. Contrary to these two fashionable trends in recent philosophy, Dewey would have "abhorred the new dogma," the author writes, "that the ethical philosopher's task is essentially completed when he has sympathetically and accurately described the complex ways in which we argue and reason about moral issues" (p. 175). Dewey was a "confessed moralist" (p. 174), not in the sense of dogmatic sermonizing, but in his conviction that the chief task of philosophy and the philosopher is to criticize and reconstruct human experience and behavior. Unlike traditional metaphysicans and moralists, however, who lay down specific norms and values, Dewey sought to discover "those procedures that provide us with the most enlightened and intelligent values" (pp. 122–123). The complex relations between scientific inquiry and formulation of ends and values occupied Dewey's mind throughout much of his life, but just as he rejected the traditional views of eternally valid truth, divinely revealed or rationally arrived at, he was unwilling to accept the newer dogma that there is no relation between the growth of knowledge about the nature of man and moral ends and values. Dewey held high hopes for the impact of the social sciences on the process of civilizing society. For a time, it seemed that the approach of the "policy sciences" in political science and economics, for example, would gradually bridge the gap between theory and practice. Yet more recently, the author argues, as the social sciences have developed, the dichotomy between theory and practice has widened rather than narrowed. As a result, the author says, "the crisis resulting from the divorce between scientific inquiry and knowledge and its application to our moral and social problems is even greater today than when Dewey lived" (p. 181).

Since Reinhold Niebuhr has exercised an enormous influence on American political theorists in the last two decades, Bernstein's comments on the relations of existentialism—particularly its religious version—to Dewey are of considerable interest. The author concedes that Dewey's analysis of the self is the weakest part in his entire philosophy, and that his basically optimistic outlook markedly differs from the "tragic sense" inherent in existentialism. Yet, in the last analysis, the author rightly observes, "the labels of 'optimism' and 'pessimism' are irrelevant to assessing Dewey's outlook. The greater our awareness of the alienation that affects so much of man's life, the greater the challenge to make intelligence effective" (p. 177). While Dewey's philosophy may lack the intellectual fireworks, dazzle, and glamour of some recently fashionable philosophical "isms," his "sane, piecemeal approach to reconstruction of human experience" (*ibid.*) will continue to prove the more effective and realistic method of moving forward through intelligent action.

It is one of the oddities of the present state of the social sciences in general, and of political science in particular, that derivative fashions of thought persist more stubbornly than their original sources. At the very time when the dogmas of logical positivism and linguistic analysis—not to speak of existentialism—are losing their grip on philosophers, social scientists still cling to them in a desperate search for "scientific certainty." Bernstein's brief introduction into the various facets of Dewey's thought may help social scientists feeling intellectually lost and bewildered to rediscover a sense of orientation and direction closely linked to the classical direction of the western liberal and scientific outlook.
—WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, *University of California, Santa Barbara.*

Thorstein Veblen. BY DOUGLAS F. DOWD. (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966. Pp. xvii, 205. $3.95.)

In several respects, this little work is one of the most readable of the many analyses of Veblen's influence on modern economic theory. After describing Veblen's unsuccessful university career and his two marriages, Dowd devotes four chapters to his theories of American capitalism, his economic theory, his more interesting and important judgments and predictions, and Dowd's evaluation of these against relevant historical events and processes. His book concludes with an examination of the main components of Veblen's theory in order to illuminate its strengths and weaknesses. An appendix contains selections from Veblen's *The Higher Learning*, and a rather good bibliography (pp. 191–195), divided into Veblen's books, books about Veblen, and "Books in the Tradition of Veblen."

There are, however, two puzzling aspects of Dowd's handling of this great theoretician. In the first place, while he treats Veblen in a masterly way, he makes hardly any attempt to build his treatment on the numerous other critical evaluations of this great thinker—and there have been many of them as certified to by Dowd's "Books about Veblen" (p. 193)—not to speak of the many, many articles published in recent years. Secondly, Dowd limits himself almost entirely to the economic aspects of Veblen's theories (possibly because he is Professor of Economics at Cornell University), although Veblen's conspicuous influence has persisted and continues today not only in economics but also in sociology and history. In fact, history and sociology are not even listed in Dowd's index, although Veblen's technological evolutionism has been much less influential than his incisive and ironic depiction of leisure class behavior and of the competitive emulation of that class by most of the rest of society. It is true that Veblen's theory of the leisure class is handled by Dowd, but Veblen's impact on several aspects of a social-action theory, especially in the field of political sociology, could have been more definitely pointed out. From the beginning, Veblen's economics was more than analysis of economic phenomena: it included higher learning, science and civilization, political economy, and stratification. Even his interests in economic phenomena included many issues that fell outside the sphere of traditional economics; in fact, Veblen was developing a form of social-action theory which, in many respects, bears comparison with that of Max Weber.

In short, then, Dowd's coverage of Veblen's life and theories is satisfactory, but it should have indicated in a subtitle that its focus is mainly on economic theories.—JOSEPH S. ROUCEK, *University of Bridgeport.*

Contemporary French Political Thought. By ROY PIERCE. (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. x, 276. $5.75.)

Professor Pierce's study of Mounier, Simone Weil, Camus, Sartre, de Jouvenel, and Raymond Aron deserves two cheers. All French buffs in this discipline, whether occupied with the speculative or the empirical aspects of French political culture, will welcome its appearance. Students will find it a useful guide to an otherwise roundabout excursion. And because of the notable cohesiveness of the French intellectual spirit, the book will very likely appeal to still wider tastes. Instinctively, this is the kind of work one is hungry for.

The author is similarly to be commended for clarity of expression, a certain taut elegance, a knowledgeable and obviously painstaking weighing of diverse materials and themes. There is no teasing about with paradox, no ellipsis or digression, no aestheticism. On the other hand, except in the essay on Sartre, there is a considerable fund of detached sympathy for the subjects. The topics chosen for treatment are well blocked out, and, where possible, circumstantial and intellectual relationships of the political thinkers are indicated.

Unfortunately the book is unsatisfying at the level where it needs most to be justified. It is less a work about traditions or contexts of thought—despite its introductory chapters—than about six thinkers, some directly, some rather more obliquely concerned with political theorizing. Professor Pierce's *dramatis personae* must be his own and are no doubt popular ones. Still, one may wonder if Camus really has more to say about politics than, for example, Georges Burdeau, or why, since Marxism is a locus of concentration for all these writers except de Jouvenel, we cannot see a French Communist (perhaps Henri Lefebvre) at work, just in the interests of the debate.

The deeper problem is the analytical conception. Pierce gives bits of political orientation, biographical information about his personnel, fragments of milieu. They are *à propos*, but do not create a truly unified frame of discourse. The three pre-war "traditions"—Alain, Maurras, Marxism—are suspect. Do they refer to qualities of political thought? Premises of society? We are not sure. Do they implicate politics as played under the Third Republic? If so, where can one really place Poincaré, Tardieu, Daladier—even Blum? What about Sorel, Péguy, "solidarisme," Bonapartism, technocracy? If one is to explain thinkers by the continuity (or, as here, discontinuity) of tradition, one must see the tradition as the complex thing it is. Pierce's triad can and does help to explain the collapse of politics in 1940, but it is inadequate as a tool for locating the political ideas with which he chiefly deals. After the particular essays, which furnish the bulk of the writing, we are not reassured by the re-entry of the "tradition" theme in a two-page reprise (pp. 253–54). At best we have a definition *a contrario*, with both thinkers and tradition somewhat arbitrarily chosen.

Correctly fastening on the war and Resistance as a major watershed, Pierce fails to do justice to the depth of the French social schism that was a second determinant. If many French writers tend to sentimentalize this situation, Americans often ignore its force. This, I think, leads especially to the treatment of Sartre as a disembodied thinker who has devised "an analytical scheme which desperately needs help if it is to be of any use to anyone except writers with a penchant for un-

resolved dilemmas" (p. 151). Of course, philosophy—political philosophy, too—deals precisely with unresolved dilemmas. And Sartre's own *praxis* is too well known to need defense: twenty per cent of French youth admits to being under his spell. They must see something more tangible in his dialectics than Professor Pierce. The Sartre essay is, in fact, by far the weakest. Picking and choosing from a philosopher in development is not always the surest way to grasp him. A close, coherent exposition of the *Question de méthode* would have dissipated some of the problems found so vexing.

Space precludes further particular comment. In general, the Aron and Weil (was this cult-figure, who thought the New Deal worse than fascism, really a superior political thinker?) essays are highly intelligent. All others, except the Sartre, have moments of real illumination. But throughout, the discourse is at an ambivalent level woven between the raw material of politics and political philosophy, losing some of the insights of each. Regarding the latter, I was much struck by the continual absence of a name: Kant. Not only did the spirit of Kantian legalism penetrate the Third Republic tradition, but, on the higher plane of ideas, one sees a perpetual dialogue between Kant and the modern French thinkers. Mounier's personalism, Weil's regulative utopia and "Hobbesian" psychology, Camus's rebellion (Kant said in *Religion Beyond the Limits of Mere Reason* that man, knowing the moral law, can never be an absolute rebel), Sartre's attack on "idealism" and his interpretations of capitalism, Aron's "usage régulatif" of determinism are all in some way inspired from this source. Only de Jouvenel, who studied law and not German philosophy, is basically unaffected. Aron, too, having overcome his German studies, assimilated America, and clung to Montesquieu, is chiefly outside the question. But the vision of an ethical commonwealth without the *a priori* assurance of the moral law has affected French political philosophy deeply. Another point, highly relevant to Kant, is the deep suspicion of legalism in the tradition Pierce describes. Except for de Jouvenel, who laments that "the law has lost its soul" (p. 190), ethics, will, revolution, or the absorption of law by sociology have become the critical tools of political reparation. That, surely, is a significant bond of the "new tradition" on which one would have been glad to have the author's insights.

Finally, the array of comparisons at the end seems to me a perplexing tic-tac-toe because the matrix—whether as concrete society or as a fretwork of ideas—is not designed to hold them. This is a book to be read with profit for fundamental reliability and special exegetical skills, but it does not fulfill the promises of its title.—GEORGE ARMSTRONG KELLY, *Harvard University.*

Max Weber's Political Ideas in the Perspective of Our Time. By KARL LOEWENSTEIN. (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1966. Pp. xii, 104. $2.00.)

This little volume is a very much needed attempt to bring the modern student of politics closer to the sources of Max Weber's political ideas while presenting them in the context of political developments since Weber's time. It has always been a source of dismay to this reviewer that Weber's political ideas scattered among his many writings have not yet found their way into an English collected edition. A German one exists since 1958 when Mohr Verlag published Weber's *Gesammelte Politische Schriften* which Professor Loewenstein uses for giving us this admirable interpretation of Weber's thinking on the more practical aspects of politics and their significance for our time. It seems necessary to make this distinction between Weber's practical and theoretical analysis of politics in view of the often stated criticism of his ideas as contributing further to the glorification of the state and state-controlled violence. On the theoretical side Weber dealt carefully with the antinomies that as he saw it, dominated politics: the difficulty of reconciling action oriented to an ethic of ultimate ends with one that emphasizes an ethic of responsibility, the tensions created by the insistence on absolute morality over against the demands of a limiting reality. It is in his practical analysis of politics, however, that Weber most often ran afoul of the views of even his admirers. This was because in this practical approach he reflected the political temper of the Wilhemine empire and wrote, almost journalistically as Loewenstein points out, on his hopes and fears for a Germany burdened with the task of preserving Western continental culture against the onslaught of bureaucratism from the East and the technological functionalism of the Anglo-American countries. The particular merit of Loewenstein's approach is that he is able to single out the more lasting and universal qualities of Weber's political ideas and show, in his own words, "where the scholar has eclipsed the politician."

Loewenstein recognized that much of the confusion over Weber's role as a practical political analyst derived from his undisguised espousal of nationalism as the necessary premise for a realistic approach to politics. Whether he was designing an executive more responsive to popular pressures, denouncing the injustice of an unequal, indirect electoral system, or recommending a viable parliamentarism as a bulwark against an

expanding and arrogant bureaucracy and as a training ground for a responsible political leadership, Weber was motivated by his desire to create a German unity that would forsake the purely imperial ambitions of Bismarck for a Germany that could maintain its place within the mainstream of traditional Western European culture. Once this cultural nationalism is accounted for and recognized as an almost inevitable byproduct of the temper of the time (to which even Thomas Mann and others were not immune) Loewenstein is able to present Weber's valuable insights concerning the need for continuous recruitment of political leadership, the advisability of using the techniques of direct democracy as a means of resolving conflict between the highest organs of government, and his warning that even the most democratic parties cannot avoid assuming the characteristics of rigid bureaucratic organizations embroiled in jealously competing with each other for the spoils of political power.

Weber honored the right of the practical politician to engage in compromise to resolve conflict—yet he was equally insistent that the scholar's task was not to glorify these compromises for their own sake but to reveal clearly why the need for them arose, how they could be best accomplished, and what consequences could be expected to follow. But it is in his concept of political leadership not by the demos but for the demos that Weber's "realistic" counsel has raised the greatest doubts and triggered heated controversy.

For Weber the real political leader, i.e., the professional, did not make his living off politics but dedicated himself to the pursuit of politics for its own sake. Not ordinary ambition but the desire to lead, ethically and even heroically, to accomplish in fact the impossible would represent his sole motivation. In other words, Weber disdained the tedious practicality of *Realpolitik* which most of the time simply meant swimming with the tide, but favored instead the dedication of the true visionary to his task: to attempt the impossible in order to achieve the possible. This position has to be clearly understood if one is to avoid the trap of regarding Weber as an advocate of dictatorial plebiscitarianism. That Weber's introduction of a popularly elected President into the Weimar Constitution inevitably paved the way for Hitler represents an obvious misreading of a provision which was specifically designed to create a political leader who had the confidence of the people and could be removed by legal means. The Caesaristic leader is not an inevitable outgrowth of the plebiscitary leader though a plebiscitary leader can create the climate for the successful assumption of dictatorial powers. Weber, however, according to Loewenstein, had simply too much confidence in the limitations of a constitutional order to regard this as a serious danger. Loewenstein also engages in a much needed reexamination of Weber's concept of charismatic leadership, correctly segregating that concept from the political sphere where it is lately used quite indiscriminately, emphasizing instead its primarily religious meaning and much greater usefulness in the analysis of social and mass psychological phenomena.

It is true that many of Weber's political insights have become the self-evident truths of today but this fact in no way impairs the enduring aspects of his political thinking. Of these his insistence that the reality of power does not absolve the holders of power from responsibility and who therefore must bring to their tasks the "faculty of contemplating reality with serenity and composure," can hardly ever lose its value to political leaders.

Modern liberals understandably act suspicious when first confronted with Weber's "liberalism" steeped as it is in the context of the German nation state. But as Karl Jaspers noted, "human dignity and Germany's position in world affairs were Weber's concern, not one without the other." Loewenstein's little volume provides further evidence of the essential honesty and truthfulness with which Weber regarded the political phenomena of his time and that for Weber the quest for scientific objectivity was not to be confused with scientific indifference to human responsibility. This is advice which still can be profitably heeded by modern political scientists.—H. P. Secher, *Western Reserve University.*

Constructive Typology and Social Theory. By John C. McKinney. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. Pp. xiii, 250. $5.00.)

Political scientists familiar with sociology and with methodological problems, in particular, should find Professor McKinney's book of considerable interest because he has written the most extensive discussion yet on social science typologies and "typologizing." As a leading student of such matters, McKinney's views are obviously informed and thoughtful.

An extended analysis of the nature of typologies is the focal point of the book but there is much more in the way of both methodological discourse and substantive theory. McKinney offers a typology of typologies, critiques of most of the better-known types, an examination of types as they are related to various research tools and theory, a reasoned and reasonable defense of their utility or functions in furthering sociological inquiry, and, finally, some suggestions for the codification of typological procedures. At times the discussion takes McKinney somewhat away from

the specifics of "constructive typologies" as he prefers to call types but the apparent irrelevance of the commentary is more than made up for by the inherent worth of the observations.

Interest on the part of some political scientists is apt to wane somewhat when they discover that this is a book written for sociologists, primarily, rather than social scientists, generally. One finds no references to the "grand tradition" of typologies in political philosophy nor to contemporary usages in political science. The typologies of political systems elaborated by Plato, Aristotle, Montesquieu among others are not mentioned nor are the types of such contemporary luminaries as Almond, and Friedrich and Brzezinski. Lasswell's typology of political man, Duverger's political parties, Down's rational model of democracy, Key's types of elections, e.g., are neither mentioned nor discussed. Specific critiques of these efforts in political science would have enhanced the meaningfulness of McKinney's conceptions for political science. Of course, the inclusion of illustrations from other fields than sociology would have enlarged the volume considerably and perhaps not added to its value for sociologists. Perhaps some enterprising political scientist will take up the challenge.

In any event, McKinney is surely right that all of the social sciences have employed and continue to employ typological practices, and he is probably right that they cannot be avoided entirely even if one's predilections run toward other approaches and techniques of research and/or theory building. Yet, most of the discussion is cast in terms more familiar to sociologists and most of the case-studies were produced by sociologists. Typologies in psychology and anthropology are less prominent while those in economics and political science, as noted above, are absent. Two questions arise in this connection: Has sociology spawned more typologies and relied more upon their use than the other social or behavioral sciences? If so, why? Could an answer to this second question be that the early synthesizing tradition in sociology required some economical means for handling so great and varied data?

Of particular interest to this reviewer was McKinney's exceedingly brief reference to deductive model-building and constructive typology. Apparently he feels that they have something in common (pp. 4; 82–85), but the discussion is too cryptic to be certain. He asserts that "types" and "systems" can be models but most are not. The renowned typologies of sociology (Weber, Sorokin, Parsons, Becker, Redfield, and others) do not enable strictly controlled logical deductions of behavioral theorems from limited sets of formal axioms. Perhaps, they could be converted but no one, to my knowledge, has made the attempt. I mention this matter of models and typologies because both sociology and political science are, as McKinney recognizes, experimenting rather more frequently with formal deductive models. I am inclined to believe that these models will prove more useful than most typologies in political science. Whether this may be so in sociology I do not pretend to know although the recent work of Homans, Coleman, Mills and Gamson is exciting and highly relevant to the study of politics. McKinney is more impressed by the achievements of constructive typologies.

Let it be said in concluding these observations that Professor McKinney has tackled an important methodological problem and done so with a balanced judgment. He clearly favors the further development of constructive typologies and begins such an effort in the final chapter with some advice on the codification of typological procedures. Behaviorally-inclined political scientists will be disappointed in this chapter if they expect a handbook of techniques on how to typologize. This is a book on methodology and not a research handbook. Hopefully, someone will one day provide detailed instructions that can be taught to students. In the meanwhile, political scientists who have a strong penchant for general methodology or typing political systems will find this volume interesting and rewarding. Professor McKinney has thought about and successfully engaged in his own constructive typologizing.—WILLIAM C. MITCHELL, *Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences.*

Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Age of International Civil War (2nd Ed.). By SIGMUND NEUMANN. (New York, Washington, London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. 402. $7.50.)

This is essentially a new printing of the late Sigmund Neumann's study of the "total state in a world at war," as the book's subject-matter was described in the sub-title of the original edition published in 1942. Although it has been equipped with a preface by Hans Kohn, a new sub-title, and a supplement to the original bibliography, the text is republished without alteration. Had Professor Neumann lived to rework it or add a substantial epilogue on postwar developments, the value of the book would of course have been enhanced. But nevertheless, this is a classic in comparative politics, and its republication is very much to be welcomed by teachers and students of the subject. It is available in a paper-cover edition.

Permanent Revolution was one of the seminal works of the school of thought now generally known as the theory of totalitarianism. In a series

of chapters with titles like "The Leader," "The Amorphous Masses Emerge" and "The Impact of Permanent War," it formulated empirical generalizations about the phenomenon of "modern dictatorship," as Neumann liked to describe the single-party systems of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Soviet Russia. It also filled in the picture with a mass of vivid descriptive detail particularly pertinent to the cases of modern dictatorship with which the author seems to have been most directly familiar—Germany and Italy. Indeed, although many of the generalizations were broadly applicable to communism too, the book, as its author underlined in the introduction, was more than anything else a study of fascism.

Not only does it remain one of the most readable and informative general interpretations of the modern single-party system, especially in its fascist version; in some ways it holds up rather better than other widely read books of its genre. Neumann, for example, was virtually alone among theorists of totalitarianism in stressing the key importance of the dictator himself in the motivation of totalitarian politics. Instead of starting with the ideology as the motivational mainspring, he began with a consideration of the leader of the dictatorial system, whom he characterized as "its beginning, its moving spirit, its fate," and suggested the hypothesis that the totalitarian leader is "a *marginal man* of a marginal group." His emphasis on the role of the dictator appears to have been both sound and prophetic in the light of all that is now known—but was not known at the time of writing—about the effect of the personalities of Hitler, Stalin and Mussolini upon the political behavior of their respective totalitarian systems.

A second respect in which the study holds up well is its pervasive concern with the dynamism of the total state. Neumann does not slight the importance of structural aspects, first of all the totalitarian party. But for him the essence of totalitarianism lies in its "boundless dynamics." Totalitarianism's first aim, as he puts it in the introduction, is to perpetuate and to institutionalize revolution, to make it permanent. But in Neumann's image of it, the total state is pursuing not so much the politics of permanent revolution as the politics of permanent war. "The dictatorial regimes," he says, "are governments at war, originating in war, aiming at war, thriving on war." And the elaboration of this theme, with special reference to the prewar fascist states, is a salient achievement of the book. Whether it was Neumann who first coined the suggestive phrase "garrison state," I do not know; but it appears here, and the discussion of the topic still reads with interest.

Taking the position that the dynamics of totalitarianism were dynamics of permanent war, Neumann found it natural to work the consideration of foreign policy and international relations into his study of the total state, and ignored the unfortunate dichotomy of internal and external politics. Indeed, he included belligerence in world politics as a major element in the very definition of modern totalitarianism, and his concluding chapter was appropriately entitled "Definition from Without: Dictatorship in International Politics." It gave a lucid survey of international politics in Europe during the interwar period as affected by the dictatorial dynamics of permanent war.

Political science in our time is moving beyond the old theory of totalitarianism into a more flexible comparative politics of modern authoritarian systems. We have learned—at any rate we are learning—that no modern single-party state is so totalitarian as to extinguish the politics of faction inside the one party. We are trying to build conceptual schemes that make room for the single-party system in its nationalist as well as its communist and fascist variants; to explore not only the common characteristics of these polities but also the significant differences between the various types; to look at modern authoritarianism in relation to the dynamics of modernization as well as the dynamics of war and revolution; and much else besides.

Rereading *Permanent Revolution* today, one feels that its author, if he were still among us, would have been in the forefront of this work.—ROBERT C. TUCKER, *Princeton University.*

Marxism and Alienation: A Symposium. ED. BY HERBERT APTHEKER. (New York: Humanities Press, 1965. Pp. 158. $4.00.)

This is a particularly elusive series of essays to review. Under the auspices of The American Institute for Marxist Studies, seven scholars have contributed to the discussion of alienation in modern American society. Yet it is not really the diversity of contributions to the symposium, ranging in concern from "The Artistic Expression of Alienation" by Sidney Frankelstein to "Alienation and Socialism" by Miklos Almasi, that presents the major barrier to an informed criticism.

The difficulty, I believe, lies in the internal logic of the collection and the modes of political conceptualization they express. Consider with due care the following characteristics of this collection.

The ideological consistency

Every selection not only begins with Marxist premises, as one would expect in this symposium, but there are a series of internal interpretations of Marx and Marxism reflecting, less an exposi-

tion of Marxist thought, than an "insider's knowledge" of what Marx meant in numerous, not always specified, passages. There is no mention that "alienation" might not be a useful way to view American society, even for Marxists, but that intensely conveyed assumption is acted upon as if its existence was somehow ordained. Gaylord C. LeRoy, whose introductory essay on "The Concept of Alienation: An Attempt at a Definition," does at least raise the question of alienation's function in explaining reality. But, on balance it is a vain attempt, because the questions are never really relevant to the subsequent contributors for whom, one must assume, the problems of American society are very great and naturally "explained" by selective attention to Marxist literature. Even on Marxist terms, one misses the subtle interpretation of an Erich Fromm, a Herbert Marcuse, or indeed, a George Luckacs whose influence pervades several of the essays.

Conceptual diffusion

If major ideological premises are self-evident then it is not very important to define a concept, much less operationalize it, with any consistency or clarity. Here, again, Mr. LeRoy raises our expectations about the quality of political discourse to follow. "The difficulty with the concept of alienation is that it is *too* useful—it explains, in a way, too much" (p. 1). But unless I have badly misread this book, nowhere in the ensuing six essays could I uncover a clue as to what behavior did *not* connote alienation in American society. Mr. LeRoy notwithstanding, stories of crime and the machinations of a ruling elite, the low status of Negroes and workers, and the high status of political leaders and industrialists, all are related to the oceanic void of alienation that, in the present case, engulfs the contributors to this collection. Alienation has an *a priori* existence and urgency, any social, psychological, or economic factor is subsumed under the all-embracing rubric, therefore any node of a concept from human relationships to political powerlessness is excluded.

If there is a unifying concept in these essays it is a philosophical mood of existential pessimism, but style is not conceptualization in behavioral terms or any other one might select. Since "alienation" is a key intellectual (and emotional?) term in the prevailing belief system *everyone* knows what it means, therefore the task is never to see its relationship to specific links between power and man in American society. Rather the task is to show how, in fact, alienation pervades all aspects of American life. And in this bill of indictments the evidential base of critical thought is also impaired.

Evidence as stylized rhetoric

"Soon you begin to see that a term that explains so much actually explains very little." It is Mr. LeRoy speaking again about the diffuse uses of alienation I have already noted. But, in the key sentence that follows, "The way to establish a measure of precision in our thinking is to look at the history of the term" (p. 2). Now it would be exceedingly dogmatic to deny the relevance of historical evidence in enlightening our understanding of so critical a term as alienation in modern thought. The significance here, and in the subsequent essays, is that *no* systematic evidence is needed in unraveling the complex and subtle influences of personal dislocation on politics. Since the basic texts of Marx have been posited, in a scant eight pages, one need only refer to that, and all that stands behind it in an influential Western intellectual tradition, to *avoid* looking at evidence in some systematic way.

Moreover, the telltale phrase, "as is well known," performs the important function of maintaining congruence between specific examples of depersonalization and their political significance. There is a tribal rite within these pages, and, no doubt due to the limitations of the reviewer, one must wonder what contribution is being made to even those American college students who attempt to relate to this closed circle of internal criticism and internal scholarship.

Three generations of social science have not made a dent in the mode of political thought before us and perhaps one utility of this book in the classroom would be to read it alongside, say, Robert Lane's *Political Ideology* (especially chapters 23, 24 on epistemology) to test some propositions about political conceptualization and its functions.

But is this all we can say about these contributions? Are the labors of men attempting in the words of the sponsoring A.I.M.S. to "help bring Marxist thought into the forum of reasonable debate to produce a meaningful dialogue among Marxist and non-Marxist scholars and writers" to be treated as so much 'agit-prop' telling the beads of a self-fulfilling prophesy of diffuse disintegration? I think not, and my reasoning extends beyond the contributions of Marxist thought, even in the diluted case before us, to the enrichment of our political comprehension.

I found Sidney Finkelstein's "The Artistic Expression of Alienation" and Howard D. Langford's "The Imagery of Alienation" most valuable. They share three related characteristics that distinguish them in this setting. First, the writing style is lively and cogent. Second, these essays contain the fewest political and historical references (justifications?) for the points they are

making. I think it important to note that their authors are artists to whom the expressive act and its creation, not political diatribes, are the core of the matter. Finkelstein's account of *avant-garde* art as an exasperated style of intellectual work is meaningfully related; close to the personal experiences of their author. In Langford, I find an informed literary critique, based on Nathanael West's novelette *Miss Lonelyhearts*, pertinent to the uses of literature in relating the supposed alienation of contemporary man. Both of these men are reflecting on their craft, as artist and writer, not as political ideologists, and this impact on work styles is importantly relevant to a sociology of intellectuals in post-modern America.

It is the reference to the sociology of intellectuals that leads to the third difference between these contributions and the rest of the book. Cultural alienation, the disassociation of man and his self-expression in art and literature, has seemed to me the most effective subject to which intellectuals might direct themselves. It is this concern, and this approach, rather than an explicit interest in politics or power relations, that animate the sureness of content to which I referred. These men are craftsman and, so they tell us, conditions of modern life have divorced them from their publics, as reflected in their artistic efforts. The consequences of political (and other) acts on human sensibility, not an explicit focus on political maladies, has been a contribution of literary and artistic expression to understanding our present condition. In these pages the legacy of the humanities is more fruitful than an abstracted Marx linked to a hodgepodge of power elites and criminal acts in the modern society.

In addition, the careful reader may find other themes that inform his political understanding. One idea, expressed in at least two essays, is that the disassociation between private man and his political role are potentially greatest, not among the poor and neglected, but among those who occupy the critical roles in the power system. The reference is to dehumanization with profound political consequences in that "role strains" become so great that political leaders may behave totally within the confines of their "official" status, and the apparatus of power and bureaucracy defines not only who they are but the only "rational" basis of human conduct. To my knowledge this idea (placed in the form of testable propositions) has not received much attention, except, of course, in the latter sections of C. Wright Mills' *The Power Elite*.

Yet, beyond the nourishment of critics and humanists, there is potentiality in examining the extent to which definitions of political reality, and their consequences, are functions of the divorce between public man (as fulltime Secretary of Defense or administrator) and his private concerns. Lasswell once observed that political scientists steer clear of critical studies involving professional elites (people like us? people we would like to be?) and confine too much attention to more middling mortals. Indeed, without the alienation premise as a intellectual cover, these insights in a Marxist symposium might enrich the boundaries of other studies using other methodologies.—EDGAR LITT, *University of California, Berkeley.*

Morality and the Law. By SAMUEL ENOCH STUMPF. (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 247. $5.00.)

Does the law have any moral connotations whatsoever? Professor Stumpf poses the age-old question and then proceeds to answer it in a resounding affirmative. He builds his case by dealing with, among others, such tough areas as the Soviet Union and the international community, and he argues that all systems of political organization must, in the final analysis, construct and operate legal systems on a moral foundation. Moreover, he attempts to prove that even such avowed positivists as Austin, Bentham and Hobbes conceived of law as something more than simply commands of the sovereign, that even for them the law contained an essence springing from the nature of man and of society. The study is both a defense of the natural law tradition, albeit in modern dress, and an attack on the notion that law has no real connection with moral values.

The first chapter of the study deals with the moral element in judicial opinions, particularly those of the United States Supreme Court. Stumpf argues that law has always "been shaped to fit the contours of moral conviction," that the law "has never been able to dissociate itself fully from the notion that there is a difference between an arbitrary command and a law." His evidence for this is a very brief allusion to the classical and medieval periods and to Justice Cardozo's assertion that today's judges respond to a "moral urge." Stumpf suggests that the judge in the present day, however, has often attempted to adhere to the concept that the law has no real concern for moral and ethical values, or at least to the view that if there is a moral base for law, it must be infused in the law by the legislature and not by the judge. But a more profound influence on the American judge is the modern philosopher, whether it be Whitehead ("The conception of the universe as evolving subject to fixed eternal laws regulating all behavior should be abandoned.") or John Dewey ("The sanctification of . . . universal principles as methods of thinking is the chief obstacle to . . . social advance by means of law."). No matter how hard a judge may try, however, he cannot eliminate subjective judg-

ments, values, or a moral element from his decisions.

But the moral element in law in Stumpf's view is universal, and is an integral part of those very systems that loudly disclaim it. The Soviets produced a society, for example, dedicated to the abolition of the rule of law in the traditional sense. Theoretically the dictatorship of the proletariat is its own source of authority without constitutional or statutory limitation. This follows from the Marxian idea that law is the reflection of the material order by the mind of man. Since all law is the law of the ruling economic class and contains within it no *a priori* principles, the mind is not free to create rules of human behavior, only to transform the material forces which impinge upon it into conscious formulations of rules. The consequences of this Marxist theory of the source of law are significant, says Stumpf, for when law is viewed not as the embodiment of justice but as a reflection of the material interests of the dominant class, it is reduced to the naked force of that class, and it cannot embody anything permanent. But the Soviets have not practiced what they preach. Not only have they not been able to eliminate law from their system, they have actually used the law for moral ends, for creating a moral consciousness. Law in Russia is no longer simply a power mechanism; it is "viewed as a moral vehicle which should be respected because of its intrinsic moral content." It is to be obeyed not because it is the command of the sovereign but because of the moral ends—fulfillment of norms of socialist law—it is seeking to achieve. Ideology has not only become respectable but has assumed the ethical characteristic of "ought." Even though law and morality are tied together in Soviet law, this does not mean, Stumpf tells us, that Soviet law as a legal system is under any moral restraint since the validity of law is still conditioned upon the consent of the Communist party. However, the very fact of the revival of Soviet law indicates that man's nature requires more than a command of the sovereign; it requires reasons for the command.

Probably the most interesting essays in the study are those dealing with Austin, Bentham and Hobbes. The distinction between law and morals has been a powerful influence on jurisprudence ever since Austin's time, says Stumpf, but men have always been uneasy about it. While almost all of the Austinian legal theory is found in the three concepts of sovereign, command and sanction and suggests in the abstract that the sovereign is a "morally indifferent entity," Austin is, in Stumpf's view, far from considering law in such arbitrary terms since he sees law as a corrective of evil proceeding from a "good" which in Austin's words is "bottomed in the common nature of man." And even Bentham whose contempt for natural law was unequivocal was much concerned over law reflecting the "good" of the community when he urged that in order for law to be complete, its commands must take into account the moral concerns of society. Hobbes, too, insisted that law and morality have the same content and that the obligatory force of law was to be found in morality. Hobbes speaks of "natural reason" throughout his discourses, and although he once said that there can be "no unjust laws," he did not deny, says Stumpf, that sovereigns could give erroneous interpretations of natural law. Sovereigns can err, said Hobbes, and their acts of authority are not equivalent to morality. Fitting Hobbes into the natural law tradition depends upon one's definition of natural law, and the author is quite aware of this when he suggests that it is not necessary to say that a known set of unchanging, absolute values exists in order to have a viable theory of natural law: it is important only to agree that human nature has a permanence from which one can—as Hobbes did—derive certain natural laws. And this returns us to the central point of this study: that law is a matter of thought or consciousness, that it represents the capacity of man to transcend himself and to look at his social organization objectively. In spite of the "high degree of analytic imprecision in most natural law discourse" and "the difficulties of epistemological relativism" there is a nagging persistence that moral ends cannot be separated from law. We must conclude then that no organized legal system is ever completely positivistic and, we might add, no individual is totally a positivist.

Professor Stumpf has produced a creative and imaginative book. It adds a new dimension to the growing body of literature that is attempting to capture the idealism and morality of a great tradition in political and legal theory, that of natural law. Professor Stumpf is persuasive, not dogmatic; analytical, not autocratic; learned, not shallow. Each chapter, incidentally, is a neat, self-contained essay, but the study has a systematic unity and wholeness because the author never loses sight of his noble theme.—ROBERT J. STEAMER, *Lake Forest College.*

The Real World of Democracy. By C. B. MACPHERSON. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966. Pp. 67. $2.00.)

Human Aims in Modern Perspective. By D. W. GOTSHALK. (Yellow Springs, Ohio: The Antioch Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 122. $4.00.)

Scholarly observers of the human condition often aspire to assist in straightening out the mess in view. Some offer a modest clarification of the situation from a new perspective; the bolder may

present plans for a comprehensive redirection of human life. These books are examples of the two types. C. B. Macpherson's *Real World of Democracy* is the modest and successful essay. D. W. Gotshalk's *Human Aims in Modern Perspective*, immodestly subtitled *Outlines of a General Theory of Value*, is not so satisfactory.

Professor Macpherson's book, the text of the Massey lectures delivered in 1965 for the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, is a minor intellectual delight. There is a skillful analysis of the historical meanings of "democracy" and of their implications. The claims of liberal, communist, and developing states to be "democratic" are examined (and, incidentally, validated). But there is a broader theme running through this academic exercise. Although the democratic imperative is a general one, the "liberal" model of western systems does not preempt the category of "democracy." The liberal democratic form is, in fact, likely to become outmoded, for the conditions accounting for its appeal are disappearing. Liberal democracy is a response to the "dilemma of scarcity," a condition of limited production in relation to unlimited desires. The production of abundance is now foreseeable, and we can now understand that the source of unlimited desire is not human nature itself but rather the inability to produce abundance. Professor Macpherson concludes that "in the world from now on, power and influence will depend on moral advantage." To conserve their moral stature and power, liberal democracies must undertake "nothing less than massive aid, which will enable the poor nations to lift themselves to recognizable human equality."

Reading Macpherson's book is very much like discussing the political condition of the world with an amiable and clever friend in one's study. If the analysis is no breakthrough, nonetheless is it stimulating and satisfying. Traditional references and contemporary data are combined in just the right proportions. The argument is sharp and systematic; the prose is clear; the assertions challenge one to debate points with the author from time to time. If two hours of scholarly discussion in one's study are worthwhile, so is this book.

D. W. Gotshalk's theme is more ambitious by far. He essays not only to place human aims in a modern perspective but to suggest how we must reorient our approaches to public policy to give humanism a "scientific" framework. The book is disappointing because the aims which government is to implement, the specific features of our reorientation, are left either vague or for future determination. Both the underlying analysis of human nature and the prescriptions offered bear a resemblance to the philosophy of John Dewey. Political scientists' reactions to Gotshalk are likely to be the same as their reactions to Dewey—lukewarm and puzzled.

Gotshalk's argument proceeds from the idea of a tension between man's causal position—his ability to manipulate his environment—and his telic position—the sense of, or need for, a direction in life. The latter, as expressed in acquisitive and creative impulses in human nature, have typically been at the service of the former. Consequently, man has greatly improved his power to go somewhere, but has really very little idea of where he should go or why. Acquisitivity [sic] and creativity are said to be modes of self-determinacy, the basic telic trait. Professor Gotshalk pleads for "the progressive articulation of the telic nature of the human being," articulation in pragmatic spheres, where we have been doing pretty well, and in reflective areas—"fine arts, theoretical science, philosophy, and personal and social life of ethical quality"—where we have generally fallen behind.

This is a book by a philosopher apparently written for philosophers. The political scientist is likely to be confused when the author insists (pp. 28–29) that he is not committing the Naturalistic Fallacy of determining what ought to be from what is. Even granting Gotshalk's assumption that Nature is "value saturated," political theorists have been so often warned against implying "ought" from "is" that they will likely find his argument that man's telic nature should be progressively articulated without a convincing foundation. On the other hand, it appeals as a reasonable, common-sensical idea, which may not really need such an elaborate philosophical rationale to commend it.

The more specific the recommendations in this book become, the more disappointing they are. To assert that "the minimum procedure that seems appropriate to government under the proposed aims would be a combination of detailed, expert empirical inquiry and elementary nonpartisan democracy" is no noticeable advance on ideas long ago presented by democratic theorists. To show, in this frame of reference, what a world political institution could do, does not lead any further toward establishing one when the problem is not so much its desirability as the obstacles to its institution. A political scientist reading this book will be exasperated rather than stimulated. He will find no answers here, nor even very interesting questions.—DELOS D. HUGHES, *Washington and Lee University.*

Negro Social and Political Thought: 1850–1920. ED. BY HOWARD BROTZ. (New York: Basic Books, 1966. Pp. 608. $12.50.)

Mr. Brotz' anthology is based on the idea that there were "two poles of thought" among Negroes

between the Civil War and the period immediately following World War I. "On the one hand, those voices which clearly projected civil assimilation as the goal of Negro aspirations and which thought through what this aim would entail; and on the other hand, those nationalist and separatist voices which despaired of having a dignified future in a bi-racial society." The record must be strained beyond the point of credibility to have it bear out that primary tensions in social and political thought among Negroes have been divided altogether (or even mainly) between those who would emigrate and those who would assimilate.

Another weakness in the Brotz attempt to provide a comprehensive picture of Negro thought from 1850 to 1920 is inherent in any effort to place in proper perspective the political and social thought of legal and extralegal slaves. It is exceedingly difficult to ascertain, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, attitudes among the Negro masses on social and political matters. For example, it may very well have been that, had modern polling techniques been available, a significant number of illiterate slaves (once the proposition had been effectively explained) would have expressed views in favor of emigration rather than assimilation. There seems to have been little in American civilization that would have warranted hope among slaves, and among the majority of so-called "free Negroes." Yet, there is no indication that Brotz was concerned with this facet of the problem.

Rather, Mr. Brotz is critical of Delany; Marcus Garvey, the pioneer Pan African Nationalist; Edward Blyden; and others whom he lists as emigrationists. He is also critical of DuBois' "spirit of resentment," as Brotz labels DuBois' reaction to the status quo. His heroes among those whose ideas and writings make up the anthology are Frederick Douglass and Booker T. Washington; he considers them "practical" and "commonsensical."

It may be that Brotz, in his eagerness to establish a dichotomy between emigrationists (implicitly "bad guys") and assimilationists ("good guys"), overlooked some vital features of social and political thought, not only among Negroes, but also among many other "out groups," at numerous levels of separation from the mainstream. Representatives of "out groups" react to the status quo, and their place in it, in a variety of ways. For instance, all the multiple and mutually antagonistic approaches to the problems of workers and trade unionism in the 1930's and 1940's probably contributed to improving living standards and the status of workers.

Similarly in contemporary America, if only "practical," "commonsensical" men such as Roy Wilkins, Martin Luther King, Whitney Young, Lester Granger, and their type were reacting, the problem would soon be "settled." (And it may be of relevance to note that ten years or so ago the "commonsensical" men of today were "radical.") There may be room not only for DuBois, Delany, Marcus Garvey, and others who are not "commonsensical"; there may also be legitimate and positive places for Stokely Carmichael, Malcolm X, Bayard Rustin, Leroi Jones, and the entire spectrum.

It is not to be forgotten that the Congress, the Federal Courts, and the president, with approval of a wide range of influential private citizens and private groups, have combined to expand the constitution considerably beyond what was *advocated* by "radicals" such as DuBois, Vito Marcantonio, Henry Wallace, and Paul Robeson less than two decades ago. And while at that time the non-"commonsensical" "radicals" were villified, their contributions to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Brown Decision in 1954, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 may not be insignificant.

Criticism can also be easily directed toward the author's implicit assumption that folk thought is not relevant to an anthology of political and social thought. Certainly the men included in the anthology would indicate that by standards of the masses of Negroes in their respective times, they were among the "privileged." Men in "privileged" positions may not always be able accurately to interpret folk needs and folk thought. In the contemporary world, it could very well be that one of the characteristics of "protest" is that self-appointed "Negro leaders" from among Franklin Frazier's *Black Bourgeoisie* often do not accurately convey folk thought. This gap between the "Black Bourgeoisie" and the folk may be the basic reason that Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael are able to attract great followings among urban masses.

Probably the principal virtue of *Negro Social and Political Thought: 1850–1920* is that it focuses on one of the deep-rooted human problems, and, in addition to maintaining focus on the centuries-old problem, aids in keeping alive a basis for dialogue. And as Brotz suggests in his analysis, many facets of the problem as it existed in the nineteenth and early twentiety centuries exist today. One problem that remains constant is, "is color prejudice of such a magnitude and of such a fixed character that the Negro was (is) not assimilable?"

Mr. Brotz' rhetorical question leads into another: "Would assimilation make much difference in the lives of the masses of Negroes?" Mass poverty; widespread unemployment in the greatest era of "prosperity" in history; ghetto living, with all that it connotes in terms of human suffering; and reputable statistics suggesting that since

1850 the gap in income and standard of living between Negroes and other American citizens has widened, suggest a negative answer, notwithstanding Brotz' view of assimilation as being "commonsensical."—ADOLPH REED, *Arkansas A.M. and N. College and University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine From Its Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution. BY W. B. GWYN. (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1965. Pp. vii, 159. $3.00, paper.)

Urging that contemporary constitutional theorists should clearly understand the evolution of the separation of powers, Gwyn sets out to fill the gap he perceives in their knowledge. In his view, most modern political scientists have erred both by restricting their attention to one version of the doctrine and by failing to trace its origins behind Montesquieu and Locke. Its real roots lie in the turbulent politics of Stuart England. Moreover, it took five distinct forms during its development. Gwyn's aim is to disentangle them. For this he deserves praise, as he does on two other counts—first for extensive examination of seventeenth century sources, and second for including explicit criticisms of the work of other recent scholars. It is refreshing to find an author who does not write in an amiable vacuum of charity for all and criticism for none.

For three reasons, however, the book is less successful than it might have been.

First, the organization is inadequate—notwithstanding the author's prefatory justifications. Could not the chapters have been arranged to highlight rather than to camouflage the doctrine's five versions? The reader will find it unduly difficult to discover who first said what, when, where.

Second, he will not be helped by the persistent lack of narrative focus. At times the author seems to be writing an essay in the history of ideas. At other times he seems more interested in the effects of ideas upon Stuart politics. Often the link is only unsophisticated, interstitial explanation. For example, the author observes that it is difficult to fathom how the norm of separate Governmental and Parliamentary spheres of authority could have grown by the 1650's out of the early seventeenth century assumption of shared legislative, executive, and judicial functions. His 'explanation' does not really explain: "So marvelous are the simplifying and abstracting powers of the human intellect" (p. 30). On other occasions erudite analyses of minor seventeenth century thinkers are interrupted with out-of-place comments like: "Because latter day conservatives have placed the rule of law and the separation of powers in their ideological arsenals, the modern radical need not conclude that they are necessarily inconsistent with his own political outlook" (p. 60). Such intrusions are the odder inasmuch as the author expressly eschews "the mixing of exposition, criticism, and construction within the covers of a single book" (p. 127). I get the impression that he is straining anxiously—and needlessly—to convince the reader of the importance of his subject. Furthermore, while many of the author's assessments of scholarly disputes are relevant and useful (though unnecessarily hard to follow since they sprawl between the text and the footnotes without apparent rhyme or reason), many are not. For example, I fail to see how the exposition of Algernon Sydney's views is helped by sidetracking the reader's attention while Merle Fainsod is dragged over the coals for using "an 18th century view of human nature" in the first edition of *How Russia Is Ruled* (p. 23n). And *particularly*, when the paragraph which Gwyn attacks has been deleted from later editions. A considerable number of Gwyn's strictures strike me as equally gratuitous. Some of them are worth articulating—but in another place.

Third, it would be sheer kindness to call his style 'Baroque.' Granted the extreme burden which it imposes on the reader, there is something comic about Gwyn's assessment of English translations of Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois.* None is "completely adequate . . . although Thomas Nugent's translation . . . is not without its felicities" (p. 100n). Unfortunately, Gwyn's style *is* without its felicities.

In sum, Gwyn has his hands on interesting material but he has not yet subdued it. Perhaps the most fitting judgment is his own comment about Locke's *Second Treatise.* "It cannot be said that the Treatise, written and revised over a period of years, is a model of clear exposition" (p. 71).—A. E. KEIR NASH, *University of California, Santa Barbara.*

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Public Administration and Democracy: Essays Honoring Paul H. Appleby. ED. BY ROSCOE C. MARTIN. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1965. Pp. vii, 355. $7.95.)

The book may be regarded in two ways, as a deliberate effort by selected scholars to honor a man, or as a selected sample of the thinking of the second and third generations of students of public administration. For the most part, the authors are men who came on the scene in the 20's or 30's, and

lived with "the depression," World War II, and the protracted Cold War which followed. They witnessed and/or participated in the coming of "big democracy" to use Appleby's term, and they reflect concern with the kinds of problems that preoccupied their generation of public administrators, more economic than cultural.

The essays deal with important questions, not trivialities, with questions that matter, and are of importance to more than an academic audience. The editor, Roscoe Martin, starts the volume with a compendious bibliographical essay on Paul Appleby. After that come four blocs of essays on The Field of Administration (Appleby, Waldo, Redford); The Processes of Public Administration (Burkhead, Gross, Mosher, Birkhead); Public Administration and People (Gross, Macmahon, Thompson); International Public Administration (Caldwell, Stone, Emmerich); and Some Enduring Concerns, i.e. ethics, responsibility, and democracy (Bailey, Egger, Appleby).

Roughly speaking, the authors are clinicians who employ that method with great perceptiveness. They are trained observers who know whereof they speak from close contact with government both inside and out, and they demonstrate what can be done (by experts) with the clinical approach.

The book has the merit of style, ranging from good to elegant. The reader is grateful. No jargon, and no lack of ability to communicate. Dean Bailey's essay on "Ethics in the Public Service" is a delight to read for how it is said as well as for its solid content. And Rowland Egger, in his literate, sophisticated, and discriminating treatment of "Responsibility in Administration," demonstrates what can be done with the English language to excite the mind. There are other authors here for whose latest remarks the initiated are always listening. Pick your own favorites.

The authors, although limited in space, have something to say that is worth considering. It is fair to call the essays thoughtful, at points even wise, and always perceptive. If the reader is equally thoughtful he will find much wisdom in these essays, the fruit of experience and understanding, and he will also find much to question and perhaps challenge. The essay on "Bureaucracy in a Democratic Society," for example, bothered the reviewer for its bland assertion of facts which are not documented, for historical comparisons unsupported by longitudinal data, and for generalizations that would be more acceptable if restricted to specified circumstances. But this perhaps results more from limitation of space than from reluctance to be precise. All in all, including this essay, the book has much to offer serious students of public administration. The more they bring to the study, the more rewarding they will find it.—GEORGE A. GRAHAM, *The Brookings Institution.*

Boston: The Job Ahead. By MARTIN MEYERSON AND EDWARD BANFIELD. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. 120. $3.95.)

This little volume consists of some twelve articles appearing as advertisements in the Boston newspapers during the period 1962–1965. They were the brainchild of a public spirited Boston banker who seems to have hoped that the mayoralty of John Collins might be a period of significant civic progress. The articles deal with "The Power to Govern," "The City and the Suburbs," "The Tax Tangle," "Traffic and Transit," "Freight," "Time Again for Enterprise," "Which Way Downtown?," "Housing," "Schools," "Youth," "Law and Order," and "Beauty in the City."

The authors take strong issue with the current fashion to view the city as in crisis. They regard the municipal achievement on the whole as impressive. What is called for is a sober evaluation of costs and benefits, a marginal improvement of a tolerable situation rather than a crash program to avert disaster. They reject the cynicism of an alarmist posture designed mainly to panic the public into ill-considered acceptance of urban quack medicine. The articles were written before trouble overtook Roxbury. Despite the jacket blurb's claim for the general relevance of the volume, the size of the Negro population makes Boston far from typical. The lack of acute concern for race relations can be explained in this way.

Despite their sanguine attitude on the city and its accomplishments, Meyerson and Banfield do not opt for the status quo. There is a "job ahead" and those who have worked at it would consider it a big one. The authors are for a state solution to the metropolitan problems as they envisage them: transportation, real estate taxation, water supply and sewage disposal, air pollution control, and major outdoor recreation areas. In their view "The Governor should be the chief executive in metropolitan area matters—but not in purely municipal matters—both for the Boston area and for all Massachusetts." They make the suggestion that "One of the things the state might do is to assess property and collect taxes, turning the revenue over to local governments to spend. The state would establish a basic tax rate sufficient to provide adequate levels of service throughout the metropolitan area. Those localities wanting to provide themselves with more than this minimum adequate level of service could levy an additional tax which the state would collect for them." These are no small steps. In the advertisements the

authors were unable to outline how they might be taken.

In the article on housing, the authors conclude "The consumer is the key to the situation: if he spends more for housing, the situation will improve fundamentally; if he does not it probably will not improve fundamentally." They do support rent supplements and deplore federal coddling of inefficient builders.

Boston's schools they find in poor shape in an otherwise well run city. Their despair of improvement leads them to suggest that "the city should make a tuition grant, with suitable public safeguards, to the parents of any Boston child who goes to a private school." Competition among schools as they see it would improve matters and break the salary bind where "a kindergarten teacher may be paid more than a high school mathematics teacher—and this although mathematics teachers are in very short supply as compared with kindergarten teachers."

In "Time Again for Enterprise," the authors recount how faced with disaster Boston pioneered the China trade, again faced with disaster it turned to woolens and shoes, more recently to electronics, and now with electronics peaking it needs new help from its creative leaders to keep an environment that will attract and hold this talent. This is a major reason for civic betterment. Despite Boston's problems Meyerson and Banfield say "there is no reason for croaking, then; those whose duty it is to carry forward society need not despair. If they carry it forward in the future as well as they have in the past, the commercial and industrial development of the area will flourish."

Meyerson and Banfield are of the school of liberal individualists who largely reduce citizenship to consumership. Their most potent remedy for social problems is the restoration of competition and the market. The *deus ex machina* that keeps society from becoming a mere market place with every individual maximizing his private satisfaction is the unexplained duty of the saving aristocratic remnant. This is not the crude theory of Thomas Nixon Carver but that of Joseph Schumpeter. It is an honorable philosophy but one that scarcely suffices. A city needs citizens as well as consumers, statesmen as well as businessmen aristocrats. It is doubtful that liberal individualism is a sufficient faith for Urban America.—NORTON LONG, *Brandeis University.*

Nashville Metro: The Politics of City-County Consolidation. By BRETT W. HAWKINS. (Vanderbilt University Press, 1966. Pp. xii, 162. $5.00.)

The defeat time and again of proposals to create metropolitan governments in urban areas so as to bring about a rational solution to the problems of inadequate services, overlapping jurisdictions, government fragmentation, archaic government structures and the diffusion of government responsibility has confounded the proponents of metropolitan reform. These metrophiles simply should have won if for no other reason than they are on the wavelength of history. These same metropolitan reformers are also the bearers of legitimacy who have established the values of progress, economy and efficiency which, they insisted, could be achieved only by an areawide metropolitan government. Representing an alignment of power, wealth, altruism and education, they embraced such diverse interests as the downtown business groups, the areawide newspapers, the planners, the academics and the do-gooders. Moreover, they were fighting waste, inefficiency and those forces of evil—the politicians and the bureaucrats. And yet they lost their battle just about everywhere but in Miami and Nashville.

In the case of Nashville, the charter for a metropolitan government was initially defeated in 1958 despite the support of the Mayor, the metropolitan newspapers, the Nashville Chamber of Commerce, the Nashville Trade and Labor Council, the League of Women Voters, P.T.A. groups and, allegedly, the County Judge (Chairman of the County Government). With such an array of The Good and The Brave, the pro-Metro forces should have been able to overcome the demons of hell itself. Yet at the last moment the charter opponents, concentrating their efforts on the voters outside of Nashville, showed their disdain for reason and enlightenment and appealed instead to fear—fear of higher taxes, fear of city slickers, fear of dictatorship, and most importantly, the fear of losing power. It was this last named fear that prompted the constables, the deputy sheriffs and the employees of the county's private subscription fire, police, and garbage-collection units to take to the streets to alert the citizens of the danger of invasion.

The central city under the tutelage of its strong mayor voted 3 to 2 in favor of a metropolitan government, and the remainder of the county cast approximately the reverse ratio, a 2 to 3 vote. It may be worth noting that the only 3 districts outside the city that supported the 1958 charter contained the wealthier communities in Davidson County, and the two wards within the city that voted against the charter were predominently Negro.

In 1962 the voters again went to the polls but this time they reversed themselves in favor of a metropolitan charter. What happened between 1958 and 1962 to change a typically tired high-level educational campaign about the virtues of Metro into a blood-and-guts political battle is

interestingly related by Professor Bret Hawkins. After the 1958 defeat, the City of Nashville annexed some 50 square miles and approximately 87,000 persons from the unincorporated areas of the county, increasing the population of the city to about 253,000 and reducing that of the county outside of Nashville, including 6 incorporated areas, to about 147,000. The city fathers of Nashville, somewhat tired of providing free services to residents outside of the city, also imposed a $10 green sticker tax on all motor vehicles using the streets of Nashville for 30 days or more. Anguished cries of taxation without representation were heard from the residents outside of Nashville. A vital factor which had been missing from the 1958 election was now remedied with the emergence of the Mayor of Nashville as the arch villain responsible for both horrendous acts, annexation and the motor vehicle tax. The purification rites that Scott Greer speaks of in his *Metropolitics* could now be performed and the demons exorcized.

The Mayor of Nashville, about the strongest supporter of metropolitan government in 1958, was considered at that time the front runner for the position of the mayor of the new proposed government. With his chances rapidly dwindling after 1958, the mayor in 1962 became the strongest opponent of the charter. On the other hand, the County Judge (Chairman), at best a reluctant supporter of the charter in 1958, became an ardent advocate of Metro in 1962 when it appeared that his chances were excellent for being elected its first mayor. Moreover, the charter's provision for the continued election of the county tax assessor and county trustee (tax collector) helped to win over a significant number of county employees to the pro-Metro camp. By the inclusion of fire and police functions in the urban rather than the countywide general service district, the private firemen and policemen who had opposed the charter in 1958 no longer felt their jobs were put in jeopardy, and in 1962 endorsed the charter. (I do wish that Mr. Hawkins had some more details on the charter or had included a copy of the charter in the appendix. In general, there might have been a more extensive use of documentation.)

The new alignments, a grass roots door-to-door campaign of the traditional pro-Metro forces, a much greater involvement of the political professionals, the acquisition of an arch villain plus the still unhealed scars borne by a large part of the electorate as a result of the motor vehicle tax and annexation, and the fear of annexation by the unincorporated areas, combined to provide the required majorities for a metropolitan Nashville government both inside and outside the city of Nashville. The Mayor of Nashville was able to carry the votes of the "old city" (the city prior to annexation) but he lost out to the overwhelming pro-Metro vote of the annexed areas. The unincorporated areas likewise were responsible for the Metro victory in the Davidson County area outside of Nashville.

Although the Nashville experience like that of Dade County (Greater Miami) may provide a number of valuable lessons for other metropolitan areas, the fact remains that the victories in both cases were due to rather atypical and unique circumstances. The Hawkins book, despite the limitations of a local case study, makes another fine contribution to the literature of metropolitan reform.—EDWARD SOFEN, *University of Miami.*

Urban Renewal and American Cities. By SCOTT GREER. (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965. Pp. xiii, 201. $1.95.)

Fully the first two thirds of Scott Greer's critical review of urban renewal consists of uninspired but lucid exposition: first, of the history of housing legislation from 1937 to the 1961 Act; and second, of relationships between local urban renewal authorities on the one hand and an array of local, state, and Federal agencies and political participants on the other. The remaining third shifts mood dramatically, revealing Greer at his best—as an imaginative creator and manipulator of social and economic theory, a skilled synthesizer, a persuasive proponent, and even for a few brief passages as a poet of sorts.

The exposition sections trace the shift in housing legislation emphasis from depression concern about the physical environment of the poor, and the personal and societal pathology presumably flowing from "substandard" housing, to present preoccupation with nonresidential demolition and reconstruction in central business districts. The 1961 Housing Act, with its "workable program" requirement, represents Congress's best attempt to date to delineate objectives and set directions. Greer, however, effectively devastates the legislation's pretentions about being definitive. First of all, there is simply too much loose language. Beyond that, variations in administration at the local level have been extraordinary, particularly in the area of code enforcement (one segment of the workable program package). Assumptions about the psychological and economic attractiveness of rehabilitation and conservation efforts have been nearly discredited by actual experience.

None of this is news to those who have a professional interest in or commitment to urban affairs. The exposition I have been describing is distinctly elementary, suitable for introductory college courses dealing in part or whole with this subject area, or even the highest two grades of

high school. And for ninety pages, when he deals with LPA relationships, Greer inexusably lapses into quotation-stringing of the breeziest sort, as a way, this reviewer felt, of "watering the pig." In brief, midstream in *Urban Renewal and American Cities* one cannot help wondering how this effort warrants inclusion in a publisher's series entitled "advanced studies in political science."

As I have indicated, however, the book redeems itself. Greer turns in the later chapters to a skillfull manipulation of demographic and market theory, demonstrating the interaction of human and structural ecology in producing the problems urban renewal is supposed to cure. His summary of this interaction, pp. 162–4, is brilliant. Appropriate to his stated policy concern, Greer ends with a consideration of goals—those of the urban renewal program, and his own—and the implications they raise for corrective action. The irony of these decades of evolving housing policy is sharp: where once the hope was to improve the life conditions of the poor through public building, now liberals find themselves in the defensive position of trying to minimize injury to the poor traceable to public building policy: a decline in inexpensive housing, overcrowding due to a decline in housing units generally in the central city (although quite the opposite in the metropolis), the social trauma of racial and ethnic residential successions, the personal trauma of relocation, the forcing of higher proportional allocation of limited income to housing.

To move again to the offense, Greer surveys a wealth of possible tactics and programs: rent subsidy, forty-year mortgages, exploitation of positive attitudes toward housing for the elderly, provision (somehow) of means for rapid leapfrogging by Negroes to prevent ghetto-producing invasions, and others. His survey is far too brief and casual to form any sort of agenda. More seriously, there is no political prognosis for most of what is suggested.

Nor can one say much for the political, as distinct from social and economic, diagnosis throughout the book. The simple political information in the first two thirds of the book is not subjected, as are the social and economic data, to a later theoretical refocusing. No work of this type should leave the reader asking how Congress could be so ignorant or malevolent. An incisive analysis of Congressional and local legislative decision-making, of the interplay of private investors with administrators, of the poor as a segment of the electorate, and similar crucial parts of the puzzle, should have been in order. Most of the time there is no analysis; sometimes it is there, but imperfect. For example: Greer suggests that the shift in emphasis from residential areas to the central business district reflects the interests of private investors, urban aesthetes, and a general public who are impressed by new skyscrapers. But doesn't an adequate analysis require some mention of active opposition to residential proposals by certain classes of organized poor in designated renewal areas—opposition helping to force LPAs into less controversial types of clearance and construction (uninhabited areas; areas of small, marginal businesses; etc.)?

Finally, since *Urban Renewal and American Cities* is an open appeal to a set of substantive social values centering on empathy with the poor, one might have hoped Greer would also tackle a discussion of the fundamental procedural political values that always seem to play such a central part in urban renewal: the determination of public or majority interest, consideration of passionate minorities, the choice between short-term damage to lives as against long-term benefit to, say, descendants of those injured. (He does address himself, as his final plea, to the immorality of acting without sufficient information.) Most of these political questions—of political analysis and political philosophy—remain unsettled, unfocused, or unraised.—BRADBURY SEASHOLES, *Tufts University.*

How To Win an Election: The Art of Political Victory. By STEPHEN C. SHADEGG. (New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., Inc., 1964. Pp. 205. $5.00.)

In writing this book Stephen Shadegg set out "to offer to those seriously interested in political action an understanding of campaign management, campaign techniques and procedures." To that end he lays down rules for a wide range of campaign activities: formulating strategy, using polls, developing issues, presenting candidates to the voters, organizing headquarters' staffs, creating "cell groups," canvassing, and using the various media of communication.

The result is a book of very considerable interest to the student of politics. What Shadegg has to say is free of cant. A number of the tactics and strategems he advocates, if not original with him, are in any case new to the literature on campaigning. His discussion of what campaigners should do is more illuminating than most because it is informed by some very general notions of how voters may be expected to think and to act.

In addition the book casts doubt on the prevailing interpretation of Senator Barry Goldwater's strategy in his 1964 presidential campaign. In that campaign the Senator attacked "the regimented society," "handouts," and "unwarranted intervention in our private economic lives," while remaining almost entirely silent about the future of existing programs for social welfare. In this sense his appeal was the most

conservative of any Republican candidate in recent years. Analysts have almost universally assumed that Goldwater did as he did in the belief that large numbers of conservatives who had failed to vote for "me-too" candidates of the Republican Party would turn out to vote for him in 1964, a belief for which there was hardly more to be said before than after the election. Now, although Mr. Shadegg served as Goldwater's manager in his campaigns for the Senate in 1952 and 1958 and as a consultant to the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee when the Senator was its Chairman, belief in a "hidden" conservative vote finds no place whatsoever among his strategic doctrines. If the adviser shows no sign of having taken that idea seriously, is it so certain that the advisee did? That question is all the more to the point because Shadegg, a conservative interested in electing conservatives, does espouse a principle of strategy which makes reasonable most of what the Republicans did in 1964. He advises campaigners to appeal to "indifferent" voters because "The segment of the population which is least interested in politics decides the outcome of most elections." These least interested voters "act more from emotion than reason" and will "frequently respond to the careful development of a difference between candidates which has no valid bearing upon their competence." Such voters have little attachment to political philosophies; indeed, "a voter can be persuaded to give his ballot to a candidate whose philosophy is opposed to the cherished notions of the voter." From these premises one might easily have reasoned, in the circumstances of 1964, that a conservative appeal would put ardor into the efforts of Republican activists while not alienating the great mass of voters who are largely indifferent to issues of policy. The votes of these latter could be won by personal attacks on President Johnson, alarums about moral decay, and talk of crime in the streets.

One final comment. Like Shadegg, leading students of voting behavior have assigned a decisive role in elections to the indifferent and uninformed voter. They, and he, may have exaggerated that role. It is possible that many voters have shown themselves indifferent to issues of policy in those elections most thoroughly analyzed because the candidates in those elections in fact took very similar positions on policy issues. It could also be that many voters who have no awareness of policy issues nonetheless take their cues for voting from those who are aware of them. It is important to know whether, and in what way, Shadegg's strategic assumptions need qualification, not just for the sake of those who want to win elections, but because, in the words of V. O. Key,

> The voice of the people is but an echo. The output of an echo chamber bears an inevitable and invariable relation to the input. . . . Even the most discriminating popular judgment can reflect only ambiguity, uncertainty, or even foolishness if those are the qualities of the input into the echo chamber.

STANLEY KELLEY, JR., *Princeton University.*

Kennedy Campaigning: The System and the Style as Practiced by Senator Edward Kennedy. BY MURRAY B. LEVIN. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. Pp. xix, 313. $5.95.)

For some purposes this is an interesting book. The main body, consisting of the first four chapters, describes in detail the Edward Kennedy-Edward McCormack convention and primary fight for the 1962 Democratic Senatorial nomination in Massachusetts. A large portion of these four chapters reports excerpts from interviews which the author had with convention delegates, campaign managers, aides, and the like. Some emphasis is placed on the strategies and tactics of the candidates and how they used or misused their resources. The major factors in Edward Kennedy's victories according to Professor Levin were that he was the President's brother (which helped him at the convention) and a member of the charismatic Kennedy family (which helped him in the primary). But the reporting by the author is a good deal more detailed than simply this, and those interested should consult the text.

The fifth chapter, somewhat out of context in the book, discusses campaign financing, ways in which Massachusetts' candidates either circumvent the law or violate the law, and the difficulties in enforcing laws to regulate contributions and expenditures.

The sixth and last chapter relies heavily on Daniel J. Boorstin's *The Image, or What Happened to the American Dream* as a framework to interpret what went before. Central to Professor Levin's interpretation is the "pseudo-event" or staged impression. Appearances become reality and what is presented to the voter is the result of a carefully drawn portrait painted by those managing the campaign and candidate. Unfortunately the theoretical underpinnings of this interpretation are not explored (e.g., George Herbert Mead, Erving Goffman), and the implication is that this is something new in American politics. (My own view is that impression management has been going on for as long as the drama could be used as a metaphor for human conduct, and the problem has been raised early, *cf.*, Plato's *Republic.*) It may be that the Kennedys are more adept at it than others, but since this study covers a single campaign no comparative data are analyzed.

Clearly, in the first five chapters, the reporting is of a very high quality. It is, by and large, the kind of political reporting one wishes journalists

would engage in. There are no stupid statements, staged confrontations of ideals with reality, or silly notions of what politics is or should be. Professor Levin is obviously a man who knows better.

The book, however, is undoubtedly not addressed primarily to a scholarly audience. The topic is a single event, and the writing appears designed for the intelligent layman. As a case study it is rich in descriptive detail but, even for case studies, weak in generalization. As a book which will appeal primarily to laymen there is no jargon, few footnotes, some repetition, few insights, and little analysis. For what it is, however, it is done well, and it would be a mistake to judge it from other points of view.—LEWIS A. FROMAN, JR., *University of California, Irvine.*

George Norris: Gentle Knight of American Democracy. BY NORMAN L. ZUCKER. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1966. Pp. 186. $5.00.)

In *George W. Norris: Gentle Knight of American Democracy* Professor Norman Zucker has not attempted to write a definitive biography of the well known Nebraska Senator. In this slim volume the details of Norris' life are sketched only very cursorily, and the author provides no insight at all into such important matters as his personality or his relationships with other people. Norris, the man, does not come through in these pages. While one cannot be abolutely sure of the purpose Professor Zucker intended the book to serve (there is no hint of a statement of purpose in the form of an introduction or preface), it is most aptly described, I think, as a short intellectual biography which attempts to chart the main currents of Norris' political ideas and trace their application in various of the policy stands he took throughout his long tenure in Congress. Taken as such, *George W. Norris* provides a number of interesting insights into one manifestation of the Progressive Mind.

Norris, like most other Progressives, Professor Zucker shows, had the sort of simple faith in "the people" that dictated an equally simple institutional system for the conduct of democratic politics. There should be, in effect, only "the people" and their representatives elected by a simple majority—and as little as possible in between. As befits a notorious maverick, he consistently abhorred the influence of parties in politics, holding that of all the "evils in government, the greatest is partisanship." At no time, as Professor Zucker shows, did Norris ever perceive that parties might serve to maximize popular control over the political process. Rather, he seemed to feel that something like a public will existed in and of itself, that would only be diluted or perverted by the intervention of party. Ever the moralist in politics, Norris elevated civil service to a near-absolute principle—even for the highest offices at the national level; only by eliminating the possibilities for material reward in politics, he felt, could the insidious force of party be eliminated. His preference for simplicity and directness in the political process led him from time to time to advocate abolition of the electoral college and creation of unicameral state legislatures. The same sentiments prompted the Senator to support various judicial reforms ranging from abolition of all federal courts below the Supreme Court to a rule requiring a two thirds majority for a court to declare laws of Congress unconstitutional.

As an advocate of what Professor Zucker calls—without explaining it very precisely—"economic democracy," Norris did battle throughout his long tenure in the Senate with the institutions of large capitalism, which, he thought, tended to crush the little man. Not only did he approve of considerable governmental regulation of large producing units and of a stiff progressive tax policy; he consistently advocated plans for government ownership of railroads, shipping facilities, and electric generating equipment that would strike many liberals as radical even today. Always an agrarian (he accepted, unquestioned, all of the Jeffersonian maxims relating to the virtues of the bucolic and the hideousness of cities), Norris advocated governmental aid to the farmer long before the New Deal. Yet, despite his agrarianism and the overwhelmingly rural nature of his constituency, he remained throughout his career a strong advocate of collective bargaining for the industrial worker. His greatest legacy, however, Professor Zucker argues, was T.V.A. Norris, more than any other individual, deserves credit for defeating Henry Ford's powerful bid to take over the government's facilities at Muscle Shoals in the name of "private enterprise" and for the final emergence of T.V.A. As usual, in fact, the Senator wanted to go further to ensure the public development of all river valleys in the nation, but had to accept what he could get.

In the area of foreign affairs, it seems, Norris, as many another moralist from the interior, was least at home. Although he was not, properly speaking, a consistent isolationist, he never rose above a simple devil theory of profit as the cause of war. Having voted on this ground against entrance to World War I, he entertained the same kind of doubts about the movement of the United States toward entrance into World War II, but reluctantly advocated aiding the Allies on the ground that Hitler's Germany presented a threat to democracy throughout the world. While he theoretically supported international organization, he opposed U. S. entrance to the League of

Nations on the ground that the Versailles Treaty and the plan for the League offended his sense of justice (i.e., contained elements of power politics).

In general, Professor Zucker argues, Senator Norris was not a particularly deep thinker, but rather "an emotional liberal" with "an abiding and passionate devotion to the concerns of his fellow men."

Undoubtedly some readers will find themselves annoyed with this volume. Whatever may be the virtue of the methodological self-consciousness now prevalent among American political scientists, there is little of it here. Professor Zucker writes plainly, with no aspirations toward scientific explanation, and he obviously lays no claim to "value neutralism." For the student of Progressivism, however, there is a good deal of solid, if not brilliant, material here.—W. WAYNE SHANNON, *Louisiana State University.*

Cornbelt Rebellion: The Farmers' Holiday Association. By JOHN L. SHOVER. (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1965. Pp. vii, 239. $5.95.)

The period of the Great Depression and the early years of the New Deal were characterized by protest and violent clashes, as well as by innovative social and economic legislation. Although the conflicts between labor and industry are well known, the Midwestern protests by farmers against the forces of the market place and lending establishments have received less attention.

This is an account of the brief organizational and ideological life of the Farmers' Holiday Association. Growing out of the depression and operating chiefly in the corn-hog and dairy regions west of the Mississippi River, the Association drew its membership chiefly from among owner operators and had little in common with the tenant-oriented, rural groups of the South. All however were characterized as "radical," in contrast to more established farmers' organizations. The Farmers' Holiday Association's economic objective, a governmental guaranteed cost of production to farmers, was borrowed from the Farmers Union which also provided it with leaders and members. Its tactic to achieve this goal, the strike, was not unique among farmers, but the Farmers' Holiday Association made the greatest use of it until it was revised in the same area by the National Farmers' Organization in the late 1950's.

During its brief existence, the attention of the news media and public officials focused upon the Farmers' Holiday Association because of scattered acts of violence on picket lines and sporadic incidents of sabotage. Neither were condoned by the Association's officers, but they aided as well as hindered the organization. The focus upon violence seems to have led to an exaggerated evaluation of the organization's political and economic power. This hastened the response of state legislatures in Nebraska, Iowa and Minnesota, which enacted moratorium laws that slowed down the rate of foreclosures on mortgage delinquent farms. Washington also overrated the organization's threats at times, but its chief response was to undercut the movement by adopting an inflationary policy. On the other hand, the violence of a few, credited to the Association, lost that body much of the sympathy which a wider public had granted it in its early days.

Attracting little attention were the fairly successful conciliatory efforts of the Association, which brought together debtor and creditor to negotiate mortgage settlements which avoided foreclosure. For this needed function, it did not claim credit from its friends, and its foes gave it none.

Problems of organization and leadership are given some attention by the author and could have been given more. At a time when means of communications were less developed and skill in organizing less widely distributed and professionalized, the efforts of a few men to create and guide an organization over a wide area deserve notice. Leadership in the Farmers' Holiday Association was personal. Not only were the tasks of collecting dues not routinized, but neither were the development and dissemination of policy. Top leadership saw the strike as a means of securing political action to guarantee cost of production; the rank and file and their local leaders saw it as a means of securing immediate price increases. Lacking a commonly understood goal within the Association, top leaders saw local members turn to unauthorized violence in frustration or melt away when economic conditions improved.

Of interest to students of politics is the role of the Communist Party in the agrarian protests of the 1930's. Once alert to the situation, Party leaders determined to publicize Party-guided demands for rural relief and to attempt to lead farmers in the direction of Party goals. Despite some early successes, Party fortunes declined once the leaders of the Farmers' Holiday Association were alerted to its challenge and its position was publicized. Ultimately the Party's agrarian movement merged into the Farmers' Holiday Association but by that time the latter was of no significance as a farmers' protest organization.

Like other economic protest movements, the Farmers' Holiday Association disintegrated once a measure of prosperity had been restored. Among its more active leaders, a few remained with the Left, a few others found common cause with the Right. Most became inactive.

The author has written an interesting narrative

of a major protest movement of the 1930's. It would have been more complete had he included the roles and actions of other farm organizations and leaders which opposed the Farmers' Holiday association and its methods.—WILLIAM J. BLOCK, *North Carolina State University.*

Governing Soil Conservation: Thirty Years of the New Decentralization. BY ROBERT J. MORGAN. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 399. $8.00.)

Governing Soil Conservation, by Robert J. Morgan, is an excellent study of the national effort to carry on a nationwide soil conservation program through the agency of independent special-purpose districts, a study doubly useful because it is written on several planes. It will provide interesting and rewarding reading for at least three quite different professional groups: the political scientist, concerned with the political and administrative problems and possibilities of national governance through local instruments; the agricultural economist and the conservationist, concerned with achievement of conservation goals; and finally, those professional and lay workers in soil conservation directly concerned in the administration of the soil conservation district program.

For the political scientist, this study offers a slice of the governmental process. It is a case study of an important effort to meet one of the great unresolved problems of a national government administering a continental democratic society, which holds as one of its basic assumptions the proposition that individual initiative and freedom can best be served through the mechanism of local self-government.

In analyzing the Soil Conservation Service-local conservation district partnership as a device for bringing local government into the formulation and carrying out of a national soil conservation program, Mr. Morgan explores such a wide range of problems as the capacity of the district and its lay supervisors to develop conservation policy; the effectiveness of the district in obtaining voluntary complicance and in enforcing regulations; the representative nature of district governing boards; alternative geographical bases for district organization; the potentialities of the district as a general purpose local unit for coordinating or administering federal agricultural programs; the tangled web of local, state, and national inter-agency relationships which has shaped the conservation program and influenced its effectiveness; the district's impact upon the power structure in agriculture.

Many of the problems Mr. Morgan explores relate particularly to the administration of a national program in a rural environment. The district is undoubtedly a spiritual heir of the old Populist-Progressive traditions of a by-gone America. Nevertheless, the analysis of the federal-local partnership in soil conservation perhaps can provide insight and information applicable in developing devices for local participation in the new urban-based programs of an industrial society.

Because the preservation-restoration of our natural resources is one of the central needs of this urban society, Mr. Morgan's book also will have direct interest and value for the students of agriculture and resource conservation concerned with the national need for a conservation program and administration whose effectiveness is commensurate with the conservation job ahead. Published under the auspices of Resources for the Future, this careful and detailed study of how the program has worked provided a needed objective evaluation of the operation of the program in the light of its accomplishments.

Finally, Mr. Morgan's book will be of particular interest to many of those who have been working directly in the soil conservation district program. His scholarly historical account of the development of the program and his comprehensive survey of the differing ways in which the district program is presently organized in the various states and sections make his study a valuable source book for those interested in discovering how the program in which they are participating has developed over the years and how it operates in other states and sections.—W. ROBERT PARKS, *Iowa State University.*

The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy. BY LOUIS L. GERSON. (Lawrence, Kansas: The University of Kansas Press, 1964. Pp. xxvii, 325. $6.00.)

In several respects, this book is of exceptional interest to the political scientist. It is a study of hyphenated Americans—immigrants and their descendants who couple their American nationality with that of their land of origin. Prof. Gerson, himself a naturalized American, sets forth perceptively the elements which induce these ethnic Americans to respond to the pressures both of their ancestral lands and of the American politicians who exploit the nationality vote to maintain political power bases. Further, the study points out that nationality groups, from time to time, represent divisive forces which have impact on the rational formulation of national policy, especially foreign policy.

Prof. Gerson's inquiry covers the period from 1890 to 1956, with particular regard to the influence of ethnic groups on national problems

which emerged during and following the two world wars. The book describes the exploitation of the nationality groups during the 1920 presidential election by the Republican party—which encouraged the discontents and disappointments of ethnic Americans opposed to the Treaty of Versailles, or which had resisted America's entry into the war, or whose loyalty had been questioned. As the author reminds us, these ethnic groups were an important factor in contributing of the confused "mandate" of 1920. The vote also convinced the nationality groups of their political power. One of the ironies of this moment in history was that their self-consciousness had been developed during World War I as a matter of national policy by the Office of Public Information, which had proclaimed ethnic "days" and generated an ethnic nationalism that these groups had not possessed heretofore.

The author traces the role of ethnic nationalism on events leading up to World War II. By now the nationality groups were better organized and, in different ways and for different reasons, were able to identify the national interest with that of their ancestral lands. And during the Second World War the loyalties of the hyphenated Americans, as during World War I, were of serious concern to the government. Again federal agencies classified certain nationality groups as "patriotic" or "subversive"; alien registration laws were imposed; aliens and naturalized citizens were placed under continual surveillance. At the same time, the government was attempting to achieve support for the war effort among these groups with confused or divided loyalties. On the other hand, as the author notes, the two political parties were making self-seeking appeals to the divergent aims of nationality groups, each concerned with the future of its native lands and potentially in conflict with developing U. S. national policy.

The political power of the ethnic Americans seems to be most clearly evident in the author's description of the presidential election of 1948, in particular the role of the Nationalities Division of the Democratic party. The Truman victory led to the establishment in 1951 of an Ethnics Origins Division by the Republican National Committee in an effort to bid for twenty-eight million nationality votes in seventeen key industrial states. In its appeal for the hyphenated vote, the Republicans adopted a liberation policy for "captive peoples." While this appeal to ethnic groups brought immediate political gains, as Prof. Gerson correctly notes, the pursuance of the nationality vote certainly blurred the future development of viable foreign policies.

What is the future of the ethnic vote? The author tells us that the growing involvement of the U. S. in world affairs means that ethnic groups will have greater influence on foreign policy, although conflicting aims may neutralize the positions of various nationality organizations. He further notes that the "balanced ticket" is becoming more widespread in state and national politics even though there is a lack of reliable information on the abilities of ethnic and political leaders to deliver the foreign nationality vote. To overcome the culpability of politicians in terms of excesses and irresponsibilities, Prof. Gerson proposes a gentlemen's agreement between the parties not to make promises which cannot and will not be fulfilled. From the standpoint of foreign policy, this would doubtless be welcomed by the State Department. As for the other major problem, ethnic political assimilation, the author believes this process would be speeded up if both parties would eliminate their nationalities division and thus, hopefully, bring to an end this ethnic isolationism.

The study underlines the need for further attention to the future political roles of these hyphenated Americans and their organizations. For instance, what effect does the Assembly of Captive European Nations have on the Congressional relations of the State Department? What is the state of political assimilation of third- and fourth-generation Americans? What is the political role of the foreign language press? The author has provided an illuminating start on a political facet of our society that is not too widely acknowledged in much of the current literature.—GEORGE C. BETTS, *Kent State University.*

Economic Advice and Presidential Leadership: The Council of Economic Advisers. BY EDWARD S. FLASH. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965. Pp. vii., 382. $8.95.)

This book needed to be written, but it is only a beginning. For its quality it deserves praise; for its quality it also deserves serious and probing criticism.

Professor Flash has attempted to record the history of the Council of Economic Advisers at two levels. The first level is orthodox history. It is a history of major actions and embroilments of the agency since its establishment by the Employment Act of 1946. Here he follows in the footsteps of the Advisers from their respective antecedent careers and training through to the commitments they helped bring the Federal government to accept. Flash's theme is the relation between knowledge and power, and this hovers over his history throughout, although he does not bring it down from hovering to explicit application as often as he should. However, one still gets the clear impression from the chronicle, if not always directly from the author, that the

knowledge-power relationship through most of CEA's history displayed almost none of the characteristics of the Weberian bureaucratic model in which special knowledge is a base for direct exercise of power upon public policy. Rather, the knowledge-power relationship followed much more closely the model of "Continental Classroom." CEA, despite the extraordinary quality and reputation for expertise of its members, seemed never to possess or exercise much direct power. But still, it often seemed doggedly to shape the directions in which the truly powerful sought to exercise their power. However appealing Keynesian economics is to economists, it required strenuous effort and translation before it became the established ideology and technology of government.

The second level of professor Flash's history is his effort to provide the details of the decision-making process underlying his history of the agency. In a sense his book is a chronicle within a chronicle. He thus, for example, not only attempts to capture CEA's role vis-à-vis the other agency participants in developing NSC 68 and its applications; he also attempts to provide us with a case-study of the internal life of CEA under Keyserling that brought about the particular effort CEA made. Likewise for many other key decisions in the life of CEA, including, perhaps most usefully and with special savor, the ultimate triumph of Keynes by and through the development of tax cut thinking under Kennedy and, less in detail, the development of new values in the lodging of discretionary fiscal power in the President.

Inevitably the book comes up short. But the way it comes up short should be instructive for us all. In its care for detail and loyalty to full and just accounts of men, motivations and efforts, the author deprives us too often of his considered and explicit professional judgements and speculations. Only a man as familiar with the Council as Professor Flash can give us trustworthy judgements, and can place the Council in proper relation to the whole context of American government and modern bureaucratic power. Care for detail, though extraordinarily useful detail, has made the book too behavioristic. As with the early behaviorists in other fields, the author proceeded to collect every observation and datum on the assumption that ultimately the facts will fall into some kind of meaningful pattern. So with Professor Flash's book. It has presented us the parts without the corpus. (And the parts are complete except for the unfortunate omission of the entire Saulnier period, 1956–61).

The giveaway to the reader, and perhaps the beginning of error for the author, is his initial definition of power: "political power is concerned with responsibility for accomplishment and progress, for welfare and survival" (p. 2). This is the beginning of encapsulation by prevailing fashions in liberal ideology and the end of the urge for searching inquiry into the meaning of the Council, the impact of it and its new techniques and technology on the entire apparatus of decision-making, and into the revolution of relationships between government and private life in this country. For example, it is clear from the data on the Fed-Treasury dispute that CEA had almost no impact on the decision-making apparatus, and especially that the CEA has made no contribution to "rationalization of power" in government. The data also make clear an enormous impact of CEA thinking upon government intervention and upon the new uses of government power. This is attested to by the elevation of GNP as an official concept and an official responsibility. It is attested to by "system thinking" implied by GNP, by introduction in government of the notion of the "built-in stabilizers," and by the development and redevelopment of many specific techniques of manipulating the environment of economic conduct without touching the economic actors themselves. It is attested to in an ultimate way in Kennedy's 1962 requests for three new and vastly important requests for discretionary power in the chief excutive. But these extremely significant indexes are left as mere facts in the chronicle and we are deprived of Professor Flash's judgment as to whether these facts have the significance as indexes that they seem to the less informed reader to have.

As a result of this permissive and non-evaluative framework, the author doomed himself to conclusions that are rather more accurately called summaries, summaries indeed that are comparable to the many-page tabularization of "findings" in Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee's appendix in *Voting*. Thus in the last, concluding chapters, the author finds himself pretty much held to an appendix of summaries on the very narrowest and least instructive aspects of the subject: the conditions of performance, what interferes with or facilitates presidential friendship, and how to characterize advice. Professor Flash holds himself modestly to such concluding judgements as " . . . each Council's convictions and conduct will . . . continue uniquely to initiate, facilitate and rationalize economic policy formulation for its own particular administration." He, perhaps deliberately, deprives us of warranted assessments and speculations and theories on the substance and significance of those rationalizations in terms of their place and the place of the Council in the larger system. The subject deserves more than one book, and Professor Flash is one of the few scholars up to the task.—THEODORE LOWI, *University of Chicago.*

Federal Tax Policy. By Joseph A. Pechman. (Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966. Pp. xxi, 321. $2.45, paper.)

Dr. Pechman has written an extremely informative book about one of the most intricate and pervasive aspects of American political economy. His *Federal Tax Policy* adds understanding rather than fuel to the controversy over "who pays."

As one of the Brookings series of Studies of Government Finance, Pechman's book admirably fulfills its educational purpose. It responds to and encourages the growing public interest in economic affairs in much the same way as do such government documents as the President's annual *Economic Report* and the publications of the Joint Economic Committee. In providing a comprehensive survey of federal economic policy, taxation, and the making of tax policy, Pechman describes the nature as well as the problems of individual and corporation income taxes, consumption taxes, payroll taxes, estate and gift taxes, and state and local taxes. The text is well complemented by charts, tables, and appendices including an historical summary and extensive bibliographical notes.

The book's significance lies not alone in its description of tax policy but also in its emphases upon taxation as a "major instrument of social and economic policy" and upon equity as a primary basis for properly allocating the tax burden. It is within the framework of these principles that Pechman considers such phenomena as the automatic and discretionary aspects of taxes as economic stabilizers; the impact of taxes on low income; and the relationships between the level and structure of taxes, between individual and corporation income taxes as the major sources of federal revenue, and between taxes of different public jurisdictions.

Pechman's emphases are natural consequences of the post-war development of Keynesian full-employment policy and of his own long-standing concern about the erosion of the tax base. He has himself contributed much to the acceptance of growth and potential as tenets of economic policy, an evolution that started with the passage of the employment Act of 1946 and matured with the passage of the Revenue Act of 1964. Indeed, as a consultant to both the Treasury Department and the Council of Economic Advisers, Pechman participated in the development of the original tax proposals submitted to the Congress by President Kennedy in January 1963. The significance of full-employment policy for tax policy is clearly evident in the first two chapters and then is frequently applied throughout the book. The concern for greater equity as a counter to unwarranted special privilege is a thread woven most strongly through the discussion of individual income taxes but is also present in the discussions of other taxes and of the tax legislative process.

The reader cannot miss the underlying conclusion that the existing structure of federal taxes and the prospects of structural reform are functions of political as well as economic invention. It is, in fact, Pechman's careful balancing of fact and value throughout the book that contributes so much to its success as an analysis of modern tax policy.—Edward S. Flash, Jr., *Cornell University*.

Political Parties in the United States. By Allan P. Sindler. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966. Pp. vi, 111.)

The Democratic Party in American Politics. By Ralph M. Goldman. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966. Pp. 152. $1.50.)

Presidential Leadership. By Erwin C. Hargrove. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966. Pp. v, 153.)

Interest Groups and Lobbying. By Abraham Holtzman. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966. Pp. v, 154. $1.50, paper)

These four books are parts of two of the new series which apparently are geared to lower division students. Sindler's *Political Parties in the United States* is an analytical and evaluative treatment of the American party systems. However, to the author's credit, the discussion often goes beyond domestic sources to what can be said about parties in general. These achievements depend upon an approach set out as a rather loose functionalism in the first chapter. Competitive two-party systems serve democratizing functions most efficiently; therefore such systems are the answer to the question, " . . . what kind of party system best implements the American political system?"

Although functional thinking often seems to lead researchers to implicit normative conclusions, usually in favor of the *status quo*, Sindler avoids this error. Thus, finding that a particular structure performs some valuable function may result in statements that changing the structure would impair the performance of that function. That this type of statement does not depend entirely upon empirical findings becomes obvious when we note that alternative structures may perform the same function. Sindler does not confuse normative and empirical statements: rather he attempts to compare the effects of structures alternative to two-party competition, and second, when he is normative, he is explicitly so.

In Chapter Two he examines the literature on party competition in America to compare the effects of the alternatives—one-party bi-factional and multi-factional systems, and nonpartisan systems. As most of this body of literature would

indicate, all of these alternatives as democratizing structures are wanting. The third chapter compares two-partyism with multi-partyism and briefly analyzes the role of minor parties in the U. S.

The last two chapters describe the characteristics of parties and consider the arguments of defenders and the responsible party critics of the American parties. Although Sindler analyzes the discontinuities in the arguments, he shows that a similar causal sequence, from the distribution of social-economic interests in the society, to party characteristics, to governmental policy enactments can be found in both. The book concludes that, although the outcome is uncertain, the nationalizing tendencies in American society may move the parties in the direction desired by responsible party advocates.

A second book about political parties, *The Democratic Party in American Politics*, summarizes the history of the nation's majority party from the beginning of the Republic to the present administration. The chapters of the book set out a brokerage theory of politics; trace local party organizations from the patriotic societies, to city and rural machines, to reform clubs; analyze historical patterns at the state level; describe the period of Democratic ascendancy from Jefferson to the Civil War; evaluate the fortunes of the presidential party from the Civil War to the Depression: trace the relative importance of the Congressional wing from 1835 to the present; show the dominance of the Presidential party from the New Deal to the present; and postulate future trends.

Except for the first chapter, the book is descriptive history. What theory exists is the transactional metaphor in which political leaders are viewed as brokers trading in material, decisional, and positional currencies. In the other sections of the work, the author, Ralph M. Goldman, holds to this metaphor only to varying degrees. At times students of parties might quibble with some of the statements in this book, such as, "However, approximately 90 per cent of the voters consider themselves middle class in the United States" and, from 1964 voting data, "From its former position as the most Democratic section of the country, the South has become the least Democratic."

In the final chapter the author sees several trends in store for the Democratic party. One is the participation of the Democratic party in international party alliances. This activity would certainly be a novel but a necessary one the author feels, concluding, "The world is our precinct." In general, this book can be used as background material for students with weak preparation in party history.

In *Presidential Leadership* Erwin C. Hargrove examines the careers of six presidents to develop relationships between political psychology and presidential roles. The book utilizes a biographical approach, with a chapter devoted to each of the six cases. Out of biographical detail the author abstracts qualitative generalizations which are encompassed by a model of personality. This model is composed of the following categories: personal needs, mental traits, values and ideology, and the unity between these in each personality. Hargrove evaluates presidential roles in terms of leadership of public opinion, legislative leadership, and administrative leadership. Three presidents—the two Roosevelts and Wilson, are "presidents of action," while the remaining three —Taft, Hoover, and Eisenhower, are "presidents of restraint." The concluding chapter summarizes the book and in addition briefly examines three additional action presidents—Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson.

In general, the action presidents have had a more reformist and progressive ideology, and greater need for power. These factors led them to develop political and manipulative mental skills. The effects of these personalities therefore have been to enlarge the power and responsibility of the Presidency. The author wonders, then, if the Presidency has not become an uncomfortable office for conservative leaders. He hopes not.

Students of politics who feel that political theories must recognize that government is a form of social control will find this book less than satisfying. It treats personality as an independent variable and makes no attempt to generalize about the effect of situational factors on personality and roles. These additional factors would not be inappropriate for the theoretical purposes of the book. For what do personality variables tell us that values and attitudes by themselves do not? Isn't it that personality gives us insight into the mix of values and skills and that therefore leaders in roughly similar situations have different impacts due to their different personalities? The stimulus-organism-response model has exactly these implications. However, this book does show that biographical materials are a neglected source of social science data and that biographical research need not be theoryless.

Of these four books, Abraham Holtzman's *Interests Groups and Lobbying* provides the best integration of previous research and original materials.

Teachers who have encountered student impatience with overly formal theories will welcome the first chapter of the book. It is a thorough yet unpretentious statement of the current view of interest groups and lobbying based upon previous work by scholars like Truman, Key, Odegard,

Schattschneider and Holtzman's own research. The second chapters deals with factors which relate to interest group effectiveness. The discussion portrays the roles of division of labor and oligarchy within organizations and the potential for a group's opponents to use the legitimizing democratic creed against it. Other factors discussed are organizational cohesion, structure, and multiple memberships. Separate chapters are devoted to the relationships between interest groups and legislators, the executive, the judiciary, and the grass roots. The third chapter takes a comparative approach, analyzing the different patterns of lobbying in three democratic systems —Great Britain, Italy, and the United States. In general the importance of the executive in Great Britain, the importance of the bureaucracy and the presence of a multi-party legislature in Italy, and the fragmented power centers in the United States tend to influence the focus of interest group activity. Holtzman does an impressive job in very few pages.—CHARLES F. CNUDDE, *University of California at Irvine.*

The Lobbyists. By JAMES DEAKIN. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1966. Pp. v, 309. $5.00.)

The politically oriented journalist has much to offer the political scientist. Always close to the scene of action, with access to both official and private decision-makers, the competent journalist can become a perceptive observer and commentator. He develops a "feel" for the political, notes changes in style and mood, learns the character of those political actors with whom he associates, pinpoints and assesses their interrelationships.

James Deakin, who has built a reputation as a Washington correspondent for the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, should have produced a better book. *The Lobbyists* is disappointing in many respects, but all the more so because its author failed to capitalize upon his peculiar advantages. His is not a perceptive, analytical study that reflects his observance of lobbyists at work. Rather it is a hodge-podge of lobbying history, shallow character studies of lobbyists, sensational incidents of lobbying, and rather naive generalizations together with some sound data on lobbyists, much of which has appeared elsewhere.

If one wishes to learn about lobbyists in the nation's capital, Milbrath's *The Washington Lobbyists* is a worthwhile book, and one that Deakin quotes. If one desires the sort of picture that Deakin is interested in portraying, Schriftgiesser and Crawford have already painted it. On the other hand, one who has perused Bauer, Pool and Dexter's *American Business and Public Policy, The Politics of Foreign Trade*, would read Deakin with great incredulity for the two describe different worlds, although they purport to discuss the same one—the relationship of American business and its lobbyists with the Congress.

I have stressed business groups and their lobbyists because these are the ones with whom Deakin appears to be really concerned. Despite a chapter on Labor, and some additional references thereto as well as a few other groups, his real concern is over the perversion of government by business lobbyists. This shows up in Deakin's general orientation toward interest groups and lobbying, in the examples he cites, and in his typology (sic) of lobbyists.

Lobbyists for interest groups, as Deakin calls them to the reader's attention, are to be seen as continually battling against proposals to advance the general welfare. They fight legislation to make cities decent, to expand educational opportunities, and to afford economic opportunities to the disadvantaged. They work at blocking consumer protection, medicare for the aged, and auto safety regulation.

Do all lobbyists oppose the general welfare? At times the author recognizes that some work in its behalf—but they are either weak or, if influential, few in number and often divided. Who are these "public interest" lobbyists? The author defines them as those "non-profit lobbyists" who assert the greatest good for the greatest number principle as against those who insist that the public interest equals the sum of the private interests. The latter, claims Deakin, are known as "profit or status quo lobbyists."

The two kinds of interest groups which most often lobby for the "over-all public interest" are labor organizations and citizens' groups. Whom to include in the latter category may puzzle the reader. No matter, what is clear is that labor is more often battling for the public's interest or, rather, that business is most often opposed. Business has plenty of money; money counts in lobbying—legislators like it or need it for reelection purposes; and grass roots lobbying and public relations campaigns require ample finances. Well financed business groups lobby the Congress successfully and on a tremendous scale. Apparently the author had never examined Bauer, Pool and Dexter's data and conclusions that much of business lobbying is weak, poorly financed and ineffective.

Despite its failings, *The Lobbyists* does have some relevance for the political scientist. First of all, it reports cases where business lobbying was well organized, heavily financed, and effective. Although Bauer, Pool and Dexter concede that that theirs is a study in one policy area, during one period of time, and that some evidence points to contrary conclusions, the impact of their book is

to downgrade the emphasis upon money, organization and the influence of interest groups and lobbying. Additional evidence to the contrary provides a corrective for a more balanced point of view.

The Lobbyists also includes a number of items which might profitably be explored by political scientists. Deakin cites extensively from recent legislative investigations of lobbyists for foreign businesses and countries. Since inter-country relationships have traditionally been conducted by executives and through official channels, the strategy and tactics of foreign countries lobbying in the Congress to affect American domestic and international policies merit serious investigation. A second topic deserving additional study concerns political party-interest group relations. The book indicates that our national parties sometimes subsidize private interest groups. The case in point is the National Council of Senior Citizens which, according to Deakin, received one-third of its budget during a recent period from the Democratic Party and the A. F. of L.

Not only does Deakin call our attention to such phenomena, but he attempts, also, in a mixture of sophistication and naïveté, to grapple with the problem of regulating lobbying within the context of the political system. Unfortunately, his book as a whole adds very little to our understanding of lobbying or lobbyists, misses completely some of the new aspects of lobbying in Washington, D. C., and will most likely mislead the general reader to whom it is obviously addressed.—ABRAHAM HOLTZMAN, *North Carolina State University at Raleigh.*

The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and The Policy Process. By DEMETRIOS CARALEY. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 345. $8.95.)

Demetrios Caraley is Associate Professor of Government at Barnard College. His book is another in the expanding series of studies on defense policy sponsored by the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University. There is a foreword by William T. R. Fox.

According to Mr. Caraley, his purpose is twofold: to describe the controversy over military unification from 1943 to 1947, and "to contribute to the understanding of how conflict develops and becomes resolved more generally as part of the policy process in excutive branch and congressional politics." Mr. Caraley's research has been exhaustive. Much of the material is new. The papers of General Lauris Norstad and Clark Clifford, to which Mr. Caraley had access, throw new light on the unification struggle—as do the numerous interviews with leading congressional personalities which Mr. Caraley reports.

The organization of the book conforms to Mr. Caraley's purpose. The first two chapters (Part I) describe the genesis of the issue. Chapters 3 and 4 (Part II) extract the goals of the War Department and the Navy for independent analysis. Part III describes the resolution of the conflict; Part IV, the determinants of legislative behavior; and Part V contains conclusions concerning conflict and the policy process. Schematically, this makes a tidy outline. Mr. Caraley sets out the bare bones of controversy, then adds flesh in terms of analysis. Doubtless this contributes to the scholarly rigor of the study, and affords the political scientist an interesting and well-articulated conceptual scheme for examining the policy process.

Mr. Caraley treats the unification controversy with admirable depth and precision. No one, for example, has detailed so thoroughly the public relations campaigns waged by the participants, nor their lobbying efforts in Congress. The fact that the competitors in the struggle were broad-based coalitions rather than monolithic military services is carefully documented. Indeed, after Mr. Caraley's study, one feels that there is little left to be said about the controversy surrounding the creation of the Department of Defense.

Professor Caraley is at his best when he discusses the motives and actions of the principal participants. The dominant (but not controlling) influence of President Truman comes across nicely, as do the roles of Secretary Forrestal and the principal military negotiators (Norstad and Sherman). Congressman Clair Hoffman emerges as a significant figure in the final legislation. The possible effects of competing unification proposals are handled deftly. Mr. Caraley's substantive conclusions are judicious. His final chapter capsules the development of U. S. military policy since 1949, and raises pertinent questions concerning the limitations of political foresight. In many respects, the unification of 1947 was no better and no worse than the system it replaced. And the same has been true ever since. As Caraley reminds us: " . . . with a few . . . exceptions . . . the real . . . differences over defense organization have not . . . concerned technical proposals . . . (but) . . . the critical issue of how influence . . . is to be distributed . . . " (p. 283). In short, a question of power.

Professor Caraley writes crisply. This is particularly true when he discusses specifics. It is in his theoretical treatment of conflict that his presentation is weakest. For then, like Bentham, his language sometimes "darkens knowledge." Consider the following:

"Since political conflict has been defined as a kind of interactivity in which one actor promotes and another actor obstructs or interferes with the adoption of some proposed course of

governmental action, its development requires the existence of two actors with incentives for mutual opposition. . . . these incentives can be based on any combination of "pure goal conflict," "goal incompatibility," and "means-end disagreement." Pure goal conflict consists of the goal or goals directly sought to be furthered by the first actor and one or more goals of the second actor being mutually exclusive. Goal incompatibility consists of the goals of the first and second actors not being mutually exclusive by definition but of the second actor's perceptions of reality being such that he expects the proposal in question to bring about a particular empirical situation where, in fact, the advancement of the first actor's goals would be at the expense of his own. Means-end disagreement consists, finally, of the two actors possessing different perceptions of reality and thus disagreeing over the effectiveness of a proposal for furthering goals that they both share" (pp. 247–8).

An unrelated objection—for which Mr. Caraley is in no way responsible—concerns the practice of university presses to place footnotes at the end of the book, instead of at the bottom of the page. This is particularly distressing in studies such as Mr. Caraley's where considerable substantive material has been relegated to footnotes. It is not a question of selectivity; it is a question of access.

I do not mean to be hard on this book. Professor Carley has provided a meticulously documented study of military unification. What he says about conflict in general is interesting, but tends to detract from the central themes of unification and policy development. (This is probably a methodological quibble.) Mr. Caraley has written a fine book. It deserves wide circulation.—JEAN EDWARD SMITH, *University of Toronto.*

Vermont State Government and Administration: An Historical and Descriptive Study of the Living Past. By ANDREW E. NUQUIST AND EDITH W. NUQUIST. (Burlington, Vermont: Government Research Center, University of Vermont, 1966. Pp. xiv, 644. $9.00.)

This book as the authors acknowledge in the preface "Originally was to be one of the series of parallel studies of the governments of the then existing forty-eight states and was to be issued by Thomas Y. Crowell & Company." However, fewer than twenty of the volumes were actually issued under the Crowell publication series.

Virtually the same outline as was suggested by the editor of the American Commonwealth Series, Dr. W. Brooke Graves, was followed by Professor Nuquist and his co-author Edith Nuquist. The only chapter *not* included was the final chapter which in the Commonwealth Series made suggestions as to the future development of state government and administration in the particular state covered in the volume. Probably the reason that the traditional final chapter was not included lies in the fact that in the Vermont study many of the chapters' final paragraphs make suggestions as to what may be the future developments in this particular area.

As would be expected from the sub-title a great deal of historical material is included. In the case of Vermont this is probably easily justified, since its state government's roots are nearly as old as any of the states. It is quite possible that readers not intensely interested in Vermont's historical development may feel on occasion that this aspect of the functional development is too detailed.

Some students of state government may be surprised and possibly disappointed that the authors apparently see no reason to suggest abandonment of the large bi-cameral state legislature in Vermont. Likewise state administration students will find no indication that the role of the chief executive, which in Vermont has been exceedingly weak, should be changed.

The statistical tables that are presented are quite adequate. Very little use is made of systems analysis, flow charts, or diagrams that might assist in demonstrating relationships and areas of responsibility. The over-all style is good. The book is very readable—terms where the least bit complex are defined. Unlike a majority of books published in the field of political science in this decade no use is made of the behavioristic approach.

Because of the paper thickness used in publication this book appears to be a volume of more than 900 pages but in reality it is only 574 pages of textual material plus documentation. The forty-five pages of footnotes demonstrate the care with which the book has been researched.—RUSSELL M. ROSS, *State University of Iowa.*

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Political Systems: Some Sociological Approaches. By H. V. WISEMAN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 254. $6.00.)

Reading this book is a depressing experience. In part, the depression is caused by the book itself, in part by the body of work with which the book deals.

Mr. Wiseman attempts to summarize and give order to some of the leading contemporary systems theorists in the field of comparative politics. This is a major intellectual task and would be an important contribution if done successfully. He also attempts a more modest task: that of providing useful summaries of significant works for students beginning the study of political systems. As he points out, these works are scattered in scholarly journals or in the first and last chapters of large expensive books. The more modest task

would also be useful. The book doesn't succeed on the first task and is only partially successful on the second.

The book contains a series of relatively straightforward synopses of general works in comparative politics. If one wants a *précis* of Almond's introductory chapter to the *Politics of the Developing Areas* or Coleman's conclusion to that book, of Lipset's first two chapters of *Political Man*, of Easton's *World Politics* article, and so forth, and so forth, this is the place to find it. The summaries are rather wooden in quality—more or less what one would expect of a rather hard-working and competent graduate student with a literal mind. At times the literalness leads to confusion, as when the author seems to mix up the concept of integration in the Parsonian sense with the problem of integration of American Negroes into the larger society (pp. 8–9). But in general the summaries are not inaccurate. One can predict that the book will receive much attention before comprehensive examinations.

There is some cross-reference among the authors summarized and at times the parallel summaries are quite useful and even illuminating. The chapter on typologies of political systems—though some confusion is created by the introduction of extraneous material—does summarize side-by-side a variety of the current typologies from Riggs, to Shils, to Almond, to Eisenstadt, to Binder, to Weber. It makes one's head spin and one wishes Mr. Wiseman had provided the synthesis for which they cry out. On the other hand, it is quite useful to have all these together. It is easier to locate the similarities and differences. But, in general, we have parallel discussions of the various authors with almost no attempt to synthesize among them, nor any real attempt to be critical of any of them. Whatever criticism is contained in the book consists of summaries of other people's critiques of some of the works discussed within it.

The selection of works to summarize is pretty good; many of the leading contemporary theorists are included. In addition, we get summaries of chapters on politics from some introductory sociology texts. If a student of political science wanted a quick introduction to functional analysis, he might go to an introductory text in sociology. Or he might go to Mr. Wiseman's book which summarizes a chapter on the subject from such an introductory textbook.

The faults of this book, however, are not all attributable to Mr. Wiseman. His summaries are fairly competent and bring out some of the weaknesses in the literature he summarizes. One thing that strikes the reader is the chaotic number of terms used. And the chaos is heightened because the various conceptual schemes and theoretical structures are not diametrically opposed to each other. Rather they are often closely parallel and partially overlap. They are different enough so that they do not easily cumulate. Yet, they are not so different that one can easily describe how they differ and reasonably choose among them on some legitimate criterion. And too much of the writing consists of elaborate conceptualizations while too little consists of propositions about the relationships among variables that would allow one to develop testable hypotheses.

To return to my first theme, perhaps the depth of my depression results from the combination of the works summarized and the book that does the summarization. These theoretical works do have great potential and one faintly senses within them that common paradigm about which everyone talks these days but which no one has produced. However, this book, which is perhaps the first to attempt to put all of these works together, does not get us closer to that paradigm. Wiseman ends appropriately by summarizing a general article on trends in comparative politics from a general reader in contemporary political science.—SIDNEY VERBA, *Stanford University.*

Left in the Centre: The Independent Labour Party, 1893–1940. By ROBERT E. DOWSE. (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 231. $6.95.)

In this admirable study, Mr Dowse seeks to explain the reasons for the decline of the I.L.P. during the interwar years. It is not in personal influence or the choice of wrong tactics that he finds the causes, but rather in the "logic of the situation." The I.L.P. had taken a leading part in founding the Labour Party and had continued to influence its course during the years before the first World War. In those days the I.L.P. had had a mission: to convert Labour to socialism, and a function: to provide the party with a constituency organization.

In 1918 both mission and function were destroyed. The new constitution of the Labour Party provided for individual membership and so for local branches. New declarations of policy and program at last committed it to "common ownership" and the "Socialist Commonwealth." These two steps sealed the fate of the I.L.P., although it struggled on for another fourteen years in a futile search for purpose until disaffiliation precipitated its final, rapid plunge into nullity.

This seems to me a convincing explanation, so convincing indeed, that I cannot help asking why the leaders of the I.L.P. themselves did not draw the obvious conclusion, instead of waiting on events. One answer might be that the I.L.P. performed a representative role for some sections of

the Labour Movement—for instance, the Scots, or middle class socialist intellectuals. Mr. Dowse, however, has deliberately refrained from analyzing the social base of the party, confining his study to "policy and activity on the national level." This is entirely defensible. Still, even within these limitations, he could have done more to examine the reasons for the I.L.P.'s surprising survival, which is at least as much of a puzzle as its decline.

With this question in mind as one follows Mr. Dowse's detailed chronology of the party's ideological wanderings, one cannot fail to be struck once again by the importance of sheer organizational inertia in political behavior. From nationalization to guild socialism to the "living wage" to the "revolutionary" policies of the Thirties, the I.L.P. program is a kind of palimpsest of the successive leftish fads of the interwar years. The underlying dynamic derives not from socialist conscience or economic conditions, but from the needs of organizational survival.

Such a search for "program material" by organizations that have achieved their original aims can be healthy. One defense of the two party system, for instance, is that it tends to ensure that there will always be a body of men who are moved by their situation as the opposition to offer an alternative way of governing. Similarly, the small political organization in the course of its search for new programs sometimes lights on ideas that refresh and enlighten a major party.

At times Mr. Dowse suggests that the I.L.P. came close to performing this service for the Labour Party in the Twenties and Thirties. Beneath the "fey leftism" of its proposals, he finds it moving towards "a unified theory of political and social change." Although the outlines of this theory never appear in Mr. Dowse's account, his meaning is clear: the I.L.P. had the answer to the problems of the Labour Party, but the Labour Party refused to listen. As a result, Labour failed to acquire that "wider strategy of politics" which would have saved it from the mistakes that have led to "the miserable results of sixty years' work." In short, the I.L.P. did again find a mission. And the cause of its futility lay not with itself or the situation, but with the choice made by the Labour Party.

This line of argument does not fit well with the situational analysis. That approach finds—I think correctly—that the I.L.P., having had a great part in creating Labour's orthodoxy of 1918, continued to share that orthodoxy. It disagreed over tactics, but until the break in 1932, retained it faith in parliamentary democracy. It pushed an underconsumptionist analysis of unemployment, but, so far as one can tell from Mr. Dowse's account, hardly went beyond ideas long familiar in socialist economics. If it had a function in the Labour Party, it was merely that of the "ginger group" which worked to keep the party true to the commitments of its own orthodoxy. I doubt that the I.L.P. had more to offer. Nor do I believe that the results of Labour's sixty years' work have been as miserable as Mr. Dowse seems to think.—SAMUEL H. BEER, *Harvard University.*

Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan Reform. By FRANK SMALLWOOD. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965. Pp. xi. 324. $6.00, cloth; $2.95, paper.)

The 1959–64 session of the British Parliament was not without its dramas, to say the least, but possibly the most controversial legislation it tackled was the London Government Act of 1963. It was the highly charged, sometimes even stirring, debates on this issue which also established the parliamentary reputation of the Opposition's chief spokesman, Michael Stewart, and played its part in hastening the convalescence of the Labour Party, still a little battered after the internecine conflict over nuclear disarmament and clause four, and grateful for an issue which had the support of most of its members and a strong moral overtone as well. The London Act may also have hastened the death of Lord Morrison, possibly the bitterest opponent of the Act, who died symbolically within days of the extinction of his beloved London County Council.

This book is a full account of the origins of the London Act including an appraisal of the Herbert Report on which it was based, the government's maneuvers before the Bill was presented to the House, and the long drawn out struggle of parties and pressure groups both inside and outside Parliament before the new local government structure came into being. Professor Smallwood even treats his readers to a potted history of the metropolis, managing in the process to go one better than most British local councils, never shy about their antecedents, by beginning his story in the Stone Age.

This book is a remarkable achievement. Not only has the author fashioned his facts into a coherent and readable narrative that impels the reader smoothly along the fascinating path from intention to action, but he has mastered the grotesque complexities of English local government which were nowhere more complex than in Greater London. He also displays a thorough grasp of the texture of London politics and the nuances of British political practice. As befits an outside observer Professor Smallwood is detached and always fair. Very little surely remains to be said on this massive change in London local government which for the first time attempts to clothe

the sprawling body of a major world city in a twentieth century administrative suit. This book is essential reading for anyone interested in the reform of urban government.

Two criticisms must be made. In trying to reduce the reform process almost entirely to a conflict between competing groups seeking to further their own interests, a distortion has crept in. It is not merely that groups cannot always know what their own interests are, but that there *was* an element of genuine debate going on which transcended individual group interest about the relationships between area and function, about the competing demands of human geography and functional efficiency, about the respective roles of national and local government. It is possibly this distortion which makes Professor Smallwood's appraisal of the Herbert Commission's report a little hazy at times.

He rightly points out the report's concern not to overplay the functional efficiency card and quotes approvingly its contention that 'local government properly so called seeks to give outward form to the inward unity of the living community.' But what are the inward unities of a vast urban agglomeration? Are they superior or prior to the unities created by existing local government boundaries? In other words, are these unities very much more than Luther Gulick's 'institutional personality . . . seeking to perpetuate itself?' If they are, the report shows very little evidence of it and one suspects that much of its argument on this score, and Professor Smallwood's corroborating support drawn from American studies, are really a defense of a two tier system. This is clearly a central question which lies at the heart of the London reform, precisely because it cuts across the secular trend towards unitary government for major cities. Does then the London scheme mark a turning point in the evolution of city government, or is it an aberration? One would have liked to hear more from the author on this point.

A second criticism of this excellent study is that it tends to strain too hard to assimilate the London reform struggle to American experience. Whereas in the reform process in the United States ultimate power rests with those who can muster the maximum public support, in Britain the final say lies with the Cabinet. Professor Smallwood is of course well aware of this fundamental difference, nevertheless his preoccupation with the Sayre and Kaufman pressure group model appears to have distracted his attention away from the lineup of forces within the Whitehall departments and, more decisively, within the Cabinet itself. After all, local government reorganization has a very low priority on any British government's agenda, and despite the obvious attractions that extinguishing the Labour dominated L.C.C. had for the Inner London Conservatives, there was strong opposition to the reform from outer London Conservatives. Moreover, by the summer of 1962 disturbing cracks were appearing in conservative support nationally. A vast upheaval in the local government of the captial city was manifestly not a vote winner.

Why then the reform? The answer may well lie in the composition of the cabinet which at this time was extremely interesting. No less than six members, most of them powerful figures in their own right, and a few forceful and highly articulate, had been very closely connected with inner London Conservative politics. Two of them, Sir Henry Brook and Geoffrey Rippon, had endured the frustrations of leading the Conservative minority on the London County Council. Two others, Ian McLeod and Enoch Powell, had previously both been organizational directors of the London Conservative machine, the London Municipal Society. Sir John Hare was a member of the executive committee of the Society and the Minister responsible for the London Act, Sir Keith Joseph had been an elected member of the City of London Common Council. Here was a formidable coalition indeed.

It could be that it was this purely fortuitous conjunction of political leaders that had more to do with the final arrival of the London Government Act on the Statute Book than anything else.—L. J. SHARPE, *Nuffield College, Oxford.*

Relative Deprivation and Social Justice. BY W. G. RUNCIMAN. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 338. $6.50.)

"Relative deprivation" is evidently a familiar concept among sociologists, whether American or British (like Runciman), but it may be less well-known among political scientists. I became aware of the concept only just before reading Runciman's book, and then only because a colleague from our university's sociology department used the language of relative deprivation to persuade a faculty meeting that selecting draftees by lottery would introduce a new unfair discrimination. He argued that some middle-class youths, now deferred to attend college, would be deprived, by lottery, of their educational expectations, and so suffer more than the proletarian youths, without such expectations, when they are drafted at age 18. The argument may not be convincing, but it provides a good introduction to the complexities of relative deprivation and so to this book.

Runciman's subtitle, "A Study of Attitudes to Social Inequality in Twentieth-Century England," is a useful summary statement of his sub-

ject-matter. Because the book is entirely about Britain, Runciman's findings may be of limited interest even to those political scientists concerned with the relevance of social attitudes to politics unless they are also British specialists. Much of the author's theorizing, however, should interest anyone with a philosophical turn of mind.

The book has three different aspects. First is a social and political history of the British class structure and of attitudes toward class between 1918 and 1962. Second is a substantial report of the findings of a 1962 survey of British class attitudes, including those revealing a sense of relative deprivation. The findings are based on careful field work and sophisticated analysis. They represent the author's main empirical contribution. The third aspect of the book, while labeled "Conclusions," is really a bold theoretical excursion into the realm of values associated with social justice. There is even an effort to define social justice in such a way as to have a standard for deciding which public policy is most nearly right in its effects on class and status. Here, as elsewhere in his work, Runciman consistently distinguishes between inequality of class and the much more subtle matter of status inequality. Still more emphatically does he distinguish actual status inequality from a sense of status inequality (that is, a sense of being deprived of status). The latter, Runciman believes, has been growing while the former declined. The point can be made more clearly by quoting the author's prime example: "A manual worker who thinks of himself as 'middle-class' will be likelier than one who thinks of himself as 'working-class' to feel relatively deprived of status; and this relative deprivation is likely to be of an 'egoistic' kind" (p. 168).

Among Runciman's empirical chapters, one will especially catch the attention of the political scientist studying Britain. It is the chapter on "The Working-Class Conservatives," and is one of several recent analyses of the persistent one third of British manual workers who vote Conservative rather than Labour. The author convincingly confirms the suspected positive relation between self-rated middle-class status (among manual workers) and Conservative voting, and he specifically refutes the view that this relation can be explained away as a function of income.—LEON D. EPSTEIN, *University of Wisconsin.*

The German Problem: Basic Questions of German Political Life, Past and Present. By GERHARD RITTER. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1965. Pp. ix, 233. $6.00.)

Germany: Yesterday and Tomorrow. By PETER H. MERKL. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. viii, 366. $7.50.)

Germany Between East and West: The Reunification Problem. By FREDERICK H. HARTMANN. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. Pp. x, 181. $4.95.)

The eminent German historian Gerhard Ritter in *The German Problem: Basic Questions of German Political Life, Past and Present* (a revised version of *Europe and the German Question* published in 1948) deals primarily with the era from Luther to World War I, and only devotes a few pages to the turbulent and calm years since then. His purpose is not to write another "definitive" history (that he hopes to do in the future), but to answer the sweeping indictments of Germany made by some historians after the Nazi catastrophe. In his attempt to redress the balance, he scores some points, but probably not enough to convince the hardened skeptic or the emotionally-involved critic.

Professor Ritter argues his case through an argumentative rather than a narrative exposition of crucial events: the Lutheran gospel of obedience could not be blamed for the victory of Nazism; Frederick the Great was an enlightened ruler, not a despot ruling a militaristic Prussia; Bismarck was an honest broker in disputes between the great powers, and secured peace by a balanced system of alliances; political anti-semitism did not exist on any large scale before Hitler; the advocates of pan-Germanism and racism were in a minority, but blurred the image of Germany in other countries. Ritter maintains that many developments—such as imperialism, aggressive nationalism, and the rise of one-party totalitarian states—were not peculiarly German, but in evidence elsewhere too. What then were the specific factors which caused the rise of Hitler? The harsh Versailles treaty, the mistrust of parliamentarianism, the quest for equality among the great powers, the need for self-assertion, and the economic catastrophe—these to him were the most important. Ritter does not deny that Hitler had the support of the masses, and during the period of military successes "was certainly admired by a substantial majority as a national hero" (p. 196). Indeed, he puts some blame on the "mass man" who was more concerned with material prosperity than with individual liberty, and on the French revolution which nourished an egalitarianism that too easily could lead to dictatorship.

Needless to say, these arguments reflecting a "conservative" bias are designed to provoke discussion and reflection. But the author weakens his case with such sweeping statements as: "Except for Hitler, none of us (the Germans) were eager for war, let alone conquest" (p. 203), or, the Soviet Union has become the "world's greatest military power" (p. 203). On the other hand, most readers will concur with Ritter's conclusion: The

will to maintain the constitution of the Federal Republic "can be sustained only if the new democracy proves itself by its achievements—especially in times of crises . . ." (p. 204).

For a logical sequel to the Ritter volume the reader might turn to *Germany: Yesterday and Tomorrow* by Professor Peter H. Merkl. The author also deals with the "undigested" past but concentrates in two-thirds of the book on the evolution of the Federal Republic. An expatriate of Germany and now political science professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara, Merkl likewise contends that German history does not run in a straight line from Luther to Bismarck to Hitler. Rather he contends that Hitler's coming to power was due "chiefly to his demagogic and strategic abilities and to the criminal stupidity of the men who conspired to have him appointed Chancellor" (p. 334). Such an explanation leaves out too many other causal factors, many of which, however, are cited in an earlier chapter, "How Could It Happen?"

Other chapters deal with materials quite familiar to the West German specialist: an introductory history, the postwar economic "miracle," the new society, Americanization, party and political developments, and the future of German democracy. In several chapters dealing with controversial matters, the author lets four actors, representing a West German Christian Democrat, a West German Socialist, a British conservative, and an American liberal, voice contradictory opinions. This dramatic technique is most effective in arousing a high emotional pitch and in highlighting divergent ways in which history can be interpreted. To this reviewer the author overemphasizes the theme of modernization by arguing that Germany has undergone a painful adolescent period of sickness and rebellion. True, he cites certain obstacles to full modernization, such as the passivity of the German voter and his lack of civic consciousness, but he seems too optimistic when he asserts that the Federal Republic is within reach of democratic maturity due to changes in her economy and society. Can a commitment to democracy be measured by the possession of automobiles and refrigerators? Notwithstanding disagreements which are bound to arise, the author has made an able contribution to a controversial subject matter.

Professor Frederick H. Hartmann in *Germany Between East and West: The Reunification Problem* provides the general reader with an overview of the numerous diplomatic attempts made by the four powers to settle one of the key issues in the Cold War, and with the reactions of the West Germans, especially of the political parties. The study is based primarily on documents, including a few West German public opinion polls. It would have been of interest if personal interviews had been undertaken in West Germany and East Berlin to supplement the documentary material gathered primarily in Bonn. Then more comprehensive answers could have been given to the question of how Germans on both sides of the Iron Curtain view reunification, and the intensity of their feelings.

The author does not refrain from putting some of the blame for the lack of progress in reunification on the West with its rigidity towards constructive Soviet proposals. In conclusion, he demolishes the argument that the Germans do not really want reunification, and warns that unless East and West find a peaceful solution it is not inevitable that the West Germans will always act with restraint.

Although this slim volume offers few new insights to the specialist, it might prove useful as a general summation to any reader.—GERARD BRAUNTHAL, *University of Massachusetts.*

Berlin—Bestand und Möglichkeiten. By DIETRICH STORBECK. (Cologne and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1964. Dortmunder Schriften zur Sozialforschung, 27. Pp. 168. DM 18.50.)

Storbeck's analysis of population trends in Berlin from 1939 to 1959 bears an important implication for the study of political communities: the basic stability of population structure in the face of different types of diversity. By 1946, due primarily to wartime evacuations and damage but also to the changing postwar function of the city, Berlin lost more than a quarter of its population. Division among the Occupying Powers, the currency reform of 1948, and the subsequent Blockade broke Berlin's remaining 3.3 million inhabitants into two cities, separated at first by political obstacles and then, after the 13th of August 1961, by a wall of concrete and barbed wire. These developments notwithstanding, Berlin in 1959 had essentially the same population structure that had characterized the city two decades earlier. There was, moreover, despite a decade of separate development, little to distinguish West Berlin from East Berlin in this regard. There were changes, to be sure, such as a loss of population, its "aging," its movement to the suburbs, and its shift to new types of occupations, but by and large both halves of the city were moving in the same direction.

Storbeck's most important conclusion is that this commonness of structure determines the future possibilities for the development of East and West Berlin and the likelihood of their reunification. Thus far its persistence has preserved the city's homogeneity and thereby the preconditions for reconsolidation. There is no reason to expect that future external influences, however

different they may be in East and West Berlin, will change these basic conditions significantly. He goes on to discuss measures that the West German government could take to support and reinforce the ability of the city to withstand such external influences—measures that could not only help to relieve current difficulties but also to strengthen Berlin's auspicious role as a spur to reunification.

The study itself shows how much can be gained from a careful examination of population statistics. Its framework is the changing character of Berlin and the city's evolving function for Germany as a whole. Moving from differences between 1939 and 1959, to differences between East and West Berlin, to changes among the 20 individual boroughs that comprise Greater Berlin, and finally to the relationship between Berlin and its environment, Storbeck casts a searching light upon the structure and development of the population in terms of residential, age, and occupational patterns. An appendix of 17 tables and seven charts, as well as a valuable bibliography on Berlin's population movements, supplements the analysis.

Unfortunately, however, the study also shows how sterile an examination of population trends is in the absence of sound theory and other relevant information. For one thing, the assumption underlying the main conclusion noted above is left unexamined. To what extent is integration facilitated or hindered by structural differences of the type that Storbeck studied? If separate developments in East and West Berlin had been two or three times as extensive as they in fact were, how would this affect current chances for and the ultimate effects of the city's reunification? Would complementary rather than homogeneous structural patterns be the more likely to lead to effective re-union?

Second, Storbeck's criteria of structural stability are surely less than exhaustive. Though some aspects of the Berlin population have remained fairly constant or have changed to an almost equal degree in East and West, others have not. Slowly but surely, for instance, East and West Berliners are developing perspectives and styles of life that differ in crucial respects as far as any future reunification is concerned. If the Humpty-Dumpty of a single German national consciousness ultimately breaks on the Berlin Wall, then it will take more than a large dosage of Storbeck's structural homogeneity to put the city back together again.

Third, Storbeck ignores other psychological aspects of population movements as well. The willingness of the Berlin population to withstand pressures produced by the city's division and exposed position, he rightly points out, preceded and did not follow West German efforts to support this willingness. Storbeck sees this phenomenon primarily as a consequence of a general tendency toward inertia in population movements. Such a view underestimates the key role played by the Berliners' morale. West Berliners, for instance, take seriously assurances by the Western Allies that they will defend the city's freedom. Should it appear to them that these same Western Allies were about to throw West Berlin to the communist wolves, then we can expect highly significant population shifts. In recent polls, about half of the West Berliners say that they would want to leave the city in the event that the Allied troops depart. The basic stability of population structure in the face of different types of diversity may be important. But it alone does not account for the persistence of West Berliners.

Finally, and most important, if we grant Storbeck's argument about the basic stability of Berlin's population structure, then we must pay special attention to any changes that emerge. Structural changes, I would argue, proceed exponentially. Though they may start small, once they begin to snowball they will be hard to stop, let alone reverse. To take a simple example, both populations have become "overaged" compared to prewar Berlin, but the trend has advanced more rapidly in West than in East Berlin: In 1939, 15.1 per cent of Berliners were 15 years of age or under, a percentage that increased to 15.4 per cent in East Berlin in 1959 (19.4% in December 1964) and that dropped to 12.5% in West Berlin (13.7% in 1964); the proportion of people 50 years of age or older grew from 28.6 per cent in 1939 to 44.1 per cent in East Berlin in 1959 (39.3% in 1964) and to 43.8 per cent in West Berlin (45.3% in 1964). It seems needless to add that this trend, already beginning to have serious effects, is one of the greatest worries of West Berlin officials.

The value of Storbeck's study is twofold. First, he does present useful data showing the extent of structural stability in the Berlin population, East and West. Second, and more important, his interpretation of the consequences of the trends he uncovers, although not very helpful by itself, provokes the reader to do some serious thinking about the structural aspects of political communities.—RICHARD L. MERRITT, *Yale University.*

Organization and Revolution: Working-Class Associations in the German Revolutions of 1848–1849. By P. H. NOYES. (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. x, 434. $10.00.)

The rich stores of historical records still available for the study of the revolutionary years 1848–1849 in Germany are currently being used

to reexamine the cultural, social and economic forces which shaped the political behavior manifested most conspicuously in the futilities of the Frankfurt Assembly. An important emphasis in this reappraisal is that the workers who were a major source of the potentially revolutionary unrest were the artisans trained in the guilds who were being threatened by the use of machines, the factory system and the growing competition incident to liberalization of the mediaeval restraints upon employment and trade.

It is with the "working class" in this sense that the book here under review is concerned. At the outset the author presents a dilemma stated in the form of the propositions that "social discontent must find some organized outlet before it can be felt politically. . . . Yet organization . . . can undermine a revolution as well . . . separating the organized expression from its base in mass movements" (pp. 3–4). He proceeds then to demonstrate that this is what happened in Germany by detailed accounts of the development and the distinegration of working class revolutionary associations in 1948–1949.

The basis of the social discontent manifested in demonstrations and riots, Noyes finds in hardships which impinged most grievously upon the handicraftsmen in the proliferating urban centers where the skills of the artisan class no longer provided either economic security or a dignified position in the social order. From the artisans came leaders and organizational impulses derived from the traditions of the guilds. Attempts to form networks of workingmen's associations revealed the conflicts of interests separating the master craftsmen, the poor journeymen, the factory workers and the unskilled day laborers. Neither the romantic glorification of the medieval guilds nor the hesitant use of a socialist vocabulary could provide an ideological orientation conducive to concerted political action. The petitions and programs emanating from workers' associations served only to highlight the gulf between their inchoate aspirations and the economic liberalism of the entrepreneurial and academic elite represented in the Frankfurt Assembly.

Noyes' work commands attention from political scientists as a case study of the interplay of personal, cultural, social and economic forces in relation to political events over a short but critical time period. It might be commended primarily for the insights it supplies for an understanding of the labor movement and socialist politics in subsequent German history. A more adventurous impulse might lead to speculation as to its value for the comparative analysis of revolutionary movements in societies now in stages of development somewhat similar to that of Germany in the mid-nineteenth century. Perhaps, however, its greatest service to political science might be as an incitement to exploit the data contained in historical records through the application of the methods and techniques of behavioral research.

Noyes points out that "a revolution lifts the lid off society, allowing a glimpse, not normally available, of lower social strata." The records which preserve the details of this "glimpse" for the scrutiny of present-day scholars include voluminous proceedings of many working class congresses, the files of numerous local and regional newspapers, and several thousands of petitions representing a cross-section of the demands generating the abortive revolution. While Noyes has made revealing and convincing use of the data contained in these records, their very richness and multiplicity compelled him to be selective. With a theoretical approach refined along the lines of current behavioral methodology and with the techniques for the cumulation and manipulation of data available through the use of computers and statistical analysis, the provocative insights of historians such as Noyes could be transformed into testable propositions of more comprehensive relevance for comparative studies. Conversely, the exploitation of data preserved in many readily accessible depositories of historical records could give behavioral studies a perspective in time not otherwise attainable. Should not the historians and the behavioral scientists of the world unite in an enterprise in which they have only their respective shackles to lose?— CHARLES B. ROBSON, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

The Muted Revolution: East Germany's Challenge to Russia and the West. By WELLES HANGEN. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966. Pp. ix, 231, vii. $5.95.)

In the past, the scant attention which the West paid to East Germany was understandable, even if not quite excusable. As long as the self-styled German Democratic Republic gave signs of being little more than an artificial and highly impermanent political entity and its Communist leadership a mere pawn of Moscow, Western political writers found little to excite their interest. Now, however, developments such as the Communist regime's apparent political consolidation, East Germany's economic reforms and growing economic potential and the first indications of genuine self-assertion on the part of its rulers, have significantly altered all previous calculations. One result has been that some Western political commentators, first and foremost in West Germany, have felt obliged to subject East Germany to closer scrutiny and, incidentally, often to criticize some of the basic assumptions of the Federal Republic's policy on reunifictaion in the bargain. To this new body of Western literature on

East Germany, one must now add Welles Hangen's *The Muted Revolution: East Germany's Challenge to Russia and the West.*

Mr. Hangen, a seasoned newspaper reporter and well-known NBC correspondent, has skillfully interwoven first-hand observations and conversations on the spot during a dozen or so personal visits to East Germany with analytical points gleaned from his reading of the serious Western literature on East Germany. His book does not purport to be a political history of the East German regime or a comprehensive study of all aspects of East German society, much less a systematic examination of various policy alternatives for the West. His purpose is rather to present "a collection of vignettes of East German life," so as "to describe East Germany as it actually is." Writing with real verve, Hangen has turned out an eminently readable journalistic account which should go far in disabusing otherwise uninitiated readers of many badly dated clichés.

This is not, however, to say that Hangen's treatment is uniformly satisfactory even within the limits which he sets for himself. For one thing, some of his best reportage, doubtless quite fresh when first written around the specific developments to which he himself was close witness, now seems slightly stale. This is true, for example, of his otherwise excellent description of the new economic system which has become more complicated in practice and more problematic in outcome than Hangen would have it. Then, too, he often gives opinion as proven fact—most notably at the very outset of the book which dramatically depicts the suicide in December 1965 of East Germany's chief planner, Erich Apel, as an act of defiant protest against the exploitative Russians, a version of the event which enjoyed instantaneous popularity in the West but one that, alas, remains uncorroborated. And if Hangen's reliance on reportorial techniques sometimes makes for potential inaccuracy, his use of the journalistic idiom can also be misleading. One case in point is the chapter on Walter Ulbricht, a brief and basically unobjectionable sketch of the East German leader's career, unfortunately entitled "The Last Apparatchik." While it is true that in many ways Ulbricht personifies the last of his particular breed of German Communist functionary, it hardly follows that he is "the last apparatchik" or that "the age of the apparatchik is drawing to a close in East Germany." Facile formulations of this sort are all too frequent throughout the book and the worst of it is that they are meant to buttress Hangen's most provocative contention, namely, that East Germany is well on the road to its own brand of national communism.

For Hangen it is precisely the growth of national self-consciousness both within the ruling elite and the population at large that constitutes East Germany's most significant challenge. While he does not examine the nature of the threat to the Soviet Union at any real depth, he is openly critical of official Western policy which has neglected East Germany on legalistic grounds and ends up advocating a "direct approach by Bonn to the DDR" along lines now increasingly favored by many West Germans themselves. A more balanced discussion might have paused to consider the real hazards as well as the seeming promise in any such unilateral West German approach to its East German rival. The developments in East Germany which Hangen has described as a "muted revolution" may indeed call for a revision of Western policy. But it would be well to bear in mind that East Germany's self-assertion seems almost certain to make a durable political settlement in Germany and therefore in Europe as a whole more rather than less difficult. This, more than anything else, really constitutes "East Germany's challenge to Russia and the West."—MELVIN CROAN, *Harvard University.*

The New Class Divided: Russian Science and Technology Versus Communism. BY ALBERT PARRY. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966. Pp. xvi, 364. $8.95.)

The argument presented in this book can be summarized as follows: In the course of its economic development, Soviet society is producing an ever more numerous and powerful scientific-technical elite, whose values directly conflict with the Party's. At the same time, the Party is weakened by ideological erosion and the lack of scientific and managerial expertise. The result is that the Party is in retreat before the technical elite and will eventually give way to it in a manner not specified. This Professor Parry sees as a great hope for the future, because in contrast to the Party, composed for the most part of "zealots" and "functionaries," the scientific elite is rational (i.e., non-ideological), peace-loving, pro-Western, and concerned about social justice and equality.

There are many serious objections one could raise against this neat and simple view of Soviet elites. The growth in size and importance of a scientific-technical elite is an observable fact, but reading the Soviet press and interviewing a few Soviet defectors and American visitors—which is basically Professor Parry's methodology—simply cannot yield the assurance that this elite is separate from, and opposed to, the Party, or that "most technocrats of the Soviet Union do not really believe in Marx." Furthermore, there is no reason to accept Professor Parry's assumption that the scientific-technical elite has a common political viewpoint and could act as a cohesive opposition to the solidly entrenched and well-

organized Party. Professor Parry repeatedly refers to the Party and the elite as two separate entities, even though he admits at one point that engineers "are six or seven times as numerous on the Party rolls as men and women of any other occupation" and that "thousands of engineers [are being drafted] into the network of full-time Party functionaries." He tries to preserve this separation by stating that "real [?] scientists, engineers, and managers may be . . . Communist Party members, but they are this reluctantly, mechanically, automatically." He argues that one loses the title of "real" engineer or scientist when one enters the Party and pursues a Party career, despite prior education and training. Thus "neither Brezhnev nor Kosygin is a genuine engineer, economist, or manager" despite the fact that they both received technical education and training.

This leads to one of the central conceptual difficulties of the Parry thesis. If we acknowledge that the Party remains, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the supreme institution of political power in the Soviet Union, it would seem that any future scientist-politician would become less of a scientist, and more of a Party "functionary," as he rose through the years to the top decision-making organs of the Party. Thus he would not be much different from the present-day Brezhnevs and Kosygins in values or background.

Actually Professor Parry is not clear on how the scientific elite will come to power, but he seems to feel that it will displace the Party rather than infiltrate it. In fact, he seems to think that even at present it is not necessary to rise to the top of the Party in order to achieve political power. Thus he advances the novel and preposterous thesis that Soviet missile scientists are kept anonymous because "once identified and praised, they could 'go places,' politically." The chief reason for this secrecy, he concludes, is that "the Party fears that once revealed and publicized these true geniuses of the new rocket age may yet want political plums."

Another problem with this thesis is that in numerous digressive chapters (on Peter Kapitsa, acceptance of Einstein's theories, use of computers, Soviet acceptance of cybernetics and Mendelian genetics, etc.) Professor Parry describes how in recent years the Party has shown remarkable flexibility in moving away from dogmatic and unscientific positions toward accommodation with the scientific community. He views this as a struggle in which the Party is retreating before the onslaughts of the scientific elite, but an equally tenable case can be made for the thesis that the Party gains strength and support by such demonstrations of adaptability. It should be added that since the Party is becoming a Party of former engineers—if not "genuine" engineers—it may prove itself more receptive to the needs of practicing scientists than other governments (such as our own) with non-engineering orientations.

Finally, a very strong objection must be made to Professor Parry's assertions of certainty, based upon a methodology that could at best lead only to tentative hypotheses. Use of the Soviet press is a standard technique of Sovietology, but it is hardly to be considered a source of accurate information on conditions in Soviet society. Professor Parry's documentation consists largely of feuilletons and articles of social criticism from the daily press, but there is no way of knowing whether the evils described occur rarely or frequently in actual Soviet life, or whether the articles are exaggerated or even concocted by Soviet journalists eager to make the moral lesson clear to even the dullest Soviet reader. Of course, if a theme is repeated frequently, one may justifiably suppose that the problem is relatively widespread, but from such a technique one never derives more than a *supposition*. Professor Parry, obviously not feeling bound by such considerations, and not, apparently, having been in the Soviet Union in recent years, draws sweeping conclusions from materials which were *intended* to show the *negative* side of society. Thus he decides that Soviet society "is a greedy, truculent society," and that "men and women fight up the stairs [of social status] grubbily and often desperately." He refers to a "caste system" in Soviet society even though his own "evidence" indicates that education and achievement are the primary indicators of social status.

Illustrations of Professor Parry's cavalier attitude toward standards of evidence abound, but one example would certainly be his statement that "with much astonishment, foreign observers reach the conclusion that the Soviet chasms between class and class are greater, sharper, in fact and in feeling, than such phenomena are in the non-Soviet world." Who are these "foreign observers"? One is a Polish woman reporting her observations of invading Soviet troops in Hungary in 1944–45; the only other mentioned is Mrs. Brooks Atkinson, recording her recollections of a ten-month stay in Moscow in 1945–46. With all due respect to these ladies, if Professor Parry could not find better substantiation of his dubious viewpoint, he should have excised it from the manuscript, and he would have been well-advised to eliminate much else as well.—JEROME M. GILISON, *Johns Hopkins University*.

Comintern and Peasant in East-Europe 1919–1930. By GEORGE D. JACKSON. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 339. $8.50.)

Popular belief, which sometimes even penetrates professional writings, supposes that the successes of a communist sponsored revolution are due to the powerful appeal of Marxism to the masses. In reality communist ideology is necessary only for welding together the small group of hard core professional revolutionaries, who through application of correct tactics explore the existing social dynamics. Marx addressed himself to the urban proletariat and yet the communist struggle for hegemony of political power was never victorious in the industrialized parts of the world. The communist revolutionary effort fell on fertile soil without exception in the traditional agricultural peasant societies experiencing some degree of modernization, which produced dislocation of the social fabric and created "the revolution of expectation." The communist victory depends not on the appeal of Marx, Engels or even Lenin to the illiterate masses, but on the painstaking organization and political mobilization of the peasants. Indeed any other popular oriented ideology of social revolution combined with skillful tactics might have resulted in the same outcome as communism.

The model of the peasant oriented communist revolution was not originated, Professor Jackson argues, during the Russian revolution of 1917 or even in the battles of the Russian Civil War, but was forged in the experience of the Communist parties in Eastern Europe in the period between 1919 and 1930.

> One can discern in the international Communist movement during the 1920's a distinct "peasantist" phase during which the peasant masses almost succeeded in replacing the industrial workers as the expected source of recruits for the regiments of the 'proletarian' revolution. Many who today extol the originality of Mao Tse-tung's peasantism forget that his idea took shape in this decade when the role of the peasant in revolution was being exalted. In many ways the "peasantism" of the 1920's foreshadows the policies of communism in underdeveloped countries today (p. 51).

The originators of the model were those connected with the Krestintern, (Peasant International) constituted at the First International Peasant Conference held in Moscow in 1923. The delegates to the Conference included such prominent international communists as Eugene Varga from Hungary, M. P. Gorov from Bulgaria, Ursulo Galvan of Mexico, W. H. Green from the United States, Sen Katayama of Japan and our old friend Nguyen Ai Quoc (Ho Chi Minh) of Indo-China. Most of the active members of the Krestintern were drawn, however, from Eastern Europe with the actual running of the organization in the hands of the Polish communist, Tomasz Dąbal, who also provided in his speeches and articles most of the theoretical framework for the peasant oriented revolutionary model:

> In practice it is necessary for each Communist party to create a section for work in the country and to send some comrades as missionaries for work among the peasants. These missionaries must enter the existing vocational and political organizations of the peasants, win the confidence of the peasant masses, and strengthen their influence. These missionaries must be primarily of peasant origin (p. 68).

The model, to which Zinoviev and Bukharin added their intellectual brilliancy and their authority, called for organization, mobilization and politization of the peasant masses by tactical employment of the slogan "workers and peasants government." Peasants could be won for cooperation with the communist sponsored movement only "by supporting their concrete and immediate demands": land distribution without payment by the peasants and without compensation to the landlords; drastic reduction in taxes, which were only used for the benefit of the urban bourgeoisie and the militarists; fight against high prices of manufactured goods brought about by exploitation by the native capitalists and foreign imperialists; and finally a campaign against war, which enriched the native and foreign exploiters with the blood of peasant armies. The communist party was to stress the demands of national liberation from foreign exploitation and also if applicable the right of national self-determination for various minority groups.

The communists were to infiltrate the peasant parties, peasant organizations, rural cooperative societies, capture their leadership, and establish a broad popular front in support of peasants' and workers' demands. The front was to be always firmly controlled from inside by the invisible hand of the communist party. The Yugoslav party called for the creation of embryonic workers' and peasants' soviets (local councils) which eventually would mushroom into a pyramid of national government.

The irony of the model was that although conceived in the 1920's and designed primarily for East-Central Europe it had to wait for the fruitful soil of China and South East Asia at least twenty years later to bear the sweet fruit of success. With the exception of Yugoslavia where it was eventually brilliantly applied by Tito, elsewhere in East-Central Europe it met with complete failure. In East-Central Europe the communists were too late. The peasants were already mobilized by their own peasant parties. The nations were flushed with their newly achieved liberation and optimistic as to their future. Land reform was the proclaimed goal of all the governments. The existing social and economic stresses began to split the East-Central European societies not until the 30's. By then the Soviet leadership was consolidated in Stalin's firm hand and peasantism was turned to forceful collectivisation and industrialization.

Professor Jackson's book reads like the primer of the communist revolution in Vietnam. Some historians may be disturbed by his extensive use of secondary sources, but to a political scientist he provides the intellectually delightful missing link between Lenin and Mao Tse-tung. The book is an important contribution to the study of modern communist revolutionary tactics and practices.—JAROSLAW PIEKALKIEWICZ, *University of Kansas.*

Protest in Tokyo; The Security Treaty Crisis. By GEORGE R. PACKARD, III, (Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 423. $9.00.)

Since World War II there has been a critical lack of detailed studies in English of Japanese politics. George Packard's study of the 1960 struggle to change, or prevent the change, to the ten year Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan is, therefore, warmly welcomed. It is regrettable that we do not have at least a dozen such studies about Japan which the recent American ambassador, Edwin Reischauer, rightly characterizes as "one of the biggest countries of the Modern World."

Protest in Tokyo is more than a study of the foreign policy decision-making process or the basic problem of Japan's foreign relations; it is a valuable study of the operation of the Japanese political process at the national level. Since the author personally interviewed many of the leading actors as well as carefully studied the available record of the crisis, the book is itself a source of basic information. It is also sufficiently detailed to permit the reader to go beyond some of the conclusions drawn by the author himself. The readable style makes the four hundred odd pages a pleasure to go through.

The early chapters cover the original security treaty of 1951, conservative party factions involved in treaty matters, the leftwing opposition parties and the People's Council for Preventing Revision of the Security Treaty, the series of aggravating internal political disputes, and the build-up of international tensions which combined to produce the explosion of demonstrations and student violence which startled the world in the spring of 1960. The high point of the story was the night of May 19th of that year when the Socialists, once again resorting to force to block the corridors of the Diet, were carried out bodily by the police. The conservatives who remained were therefore able to push through the treaty bills alone. The ensuing massive demonstrations, abetted by sensational newspaper treatment, only quieted after June 15th when students broke through the police barriers into the Diet Compound, killing a Tokyo University coed in the process. Fearing continued violence Prime Minister Kishi withdrew the invitation to President Eisenhower for a visit, for the sake of his protection, and agreed to resign after the new treaty went into effect.

Although the author's concluding assessment of the political importance of the multitude of events covered in the book is a little confusing, basic interpretations come through quite clearly in the text itself: the rise of nationalism among all segments of the politically active, the seemingly vicious conservative factional quarrels, the violent and emotional behavior of many of the leftwing groups, and especially the failure of even Japanese treaty supporters to "understand" the American idea of collective security which underlay the treaties. The new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan ratified in 1960 allowed for reductions in the size and number of U.S. Forces and bases in Japan. Simultaneously, Japan was encouraged to assume increasing responsibility in defense planning, exclusive of American administered Okinawa. Anti-war opposition groups objected to the relatively active role assigned Japan in the formulation of national security policy. Their campaign in 1960 was directed toward blocking the new treaty, with the hope that the old Security Treaty would remain in effect. The fuller provision for Japanese participation in determining movements and equipment of U.S. forces in the new treaty did not satisfy its opponents, who have subsequently supported only the most narrowly construed defensive arrangement with the U.S. Violent personal antagonism toward Kishi after May 19th, when the Diet ratified the Treaty, delayed immediate examination of Japan's defense needs. The Ikeda Government, which assumed power that July, promoted the subsequent development of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, enhanced significantly under Prime Minister Sato since 1964.

The author betrays the usual uneasiness of sensitive Americans in his conviction that anti-Americanism lies beneath the surface attitude evidenced in repeated public opinion polls which show the United States to be the most-liked of foreign countries (p. 349). The questionable assumption that a generalized and unreasoning emotional hostility towards Americans must be felt by Asians perhaps enables one to believe that reasonable Japanese would otherwise accept the advantages of the American containment policy toward Asia. That a significant proportion still fear American policy, as shown again the in consternation over escalation of the Vietnam War, suggests very few fully accept the collective security arrangements as they apply to Japan. (The book does come to grips with these basic underlying problems of the security treaty crisis and of current Japanese-American relations.)

However, as an eye witness of the treaty struggle and a resident of Japan in recent years, I have never experienced a generalized anti-American hostility. I think it much more likely that criticism of U.S. policy rests primarily upon dislike of specific elements of it rather than some sort of vague emotional resentment, even if justified.

The particularly unrestrained conservative factional quarreling is attributed mainly to the selfish ambition of Japanese parliamentarians which the Japanese themselves call the "ministerial disease." Still the betrayal of those whom Kishi promised to make his successors, as well as an unrestrainedly cavalier attitude towards party and Diet, were too Machiavellian for Japan even today. Kishi, therefore, seems to deserve more blame for the party disarray than he receives—he also provides a salutary lesson to his successors. Nor does such a judgment condone the provocation or excesses of the opposition parties. Rather than group dominance over individual members, it seems to have been group competition that weakened leadership and exaggerated party disunity, but it still failed to prevent, or else provoked, sudden and rather arbitrary actions which had better not have been undertaken. The old treaty would have remained if the new were given up or postponed as former Prime Minister Yoshida and the later Prime Minister Ikeda proposed with good reasoning.

Many Japanese politicians argue that inner party competition and a weak party president are desirable in Japan where group dominance exaggerates the danger of a strong leader. Such an argument is predicated on the belief that no decision is better than one which cannot command sufficient support—long a principle in American politics. If power is so corrupting in Japan, why give more of it to its leaders as the author seems to prefer? Such questions aside, the book is enormously valuable as a record both in coverage and depth.—FRANK LANGDON, *University of British Columbia.*

The First Years of Yangyi Commune. BY ISABEL AND DAVID CROOK. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited for the International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction, 1966. Pp. xiv, 288. $6.75.)

The authors are a British couple long resident in China, who are employed in language work by the Peking government. Their earlier volume *Revolution in a Chinese Village: Ten Mile Inn* (London, 1959) described a north China (Hopei) village to which they were sent by the Communists for a brief period in 1947–48 to study land reform. In this second book, the authors present materials they were permitted to gather during the summers of 1959 and 1960 when the village they had earlier studied was incorporated as a brigade of *Yangyi* commune, one of China's 75,000 such units.

Given this rare opportunity, how do a pair of Western researchers study a commune, even a small, mountainous one like *Yangyi* with some 37,000 people? Unfortunately, this book is innocent of methodology or rigorous analysis. There is not even a detailed and well-focused microstudy of the impact of communization on the Ten Mile Inn villagers whom the authors had previously studied. Instead, the field work seems to have consisted of haphazard visits with cadres and the gathering of heroic accounts furnished primarily by leaders in model brigades. The reader will sense that this is no ordinary commune. Its experienced Party cadres began work there in 1938 when *Yangyi* first became a Communist guerrilla base. In 1960 the commune edited and published a "philosophy" textbook. The commune has occasional visitors from Peking.

The First Years of Yangyi Commune will give the reader a sympathetic sketch of the founding of the commune, of its work organization during the Great Leap Forward, of the 'Rectification' campaign of 1959–60, of the problems created by apathy or over-enthusiasm or private interest as well as difficulties caused by bad weather. There are chapters devoted to land reformation efforts, to farm management, to industry, commerce, social services, and education, as well as to commune military matters. Attention is given to the role of women and youth, to art and literature, to the continuing class struggle in the countryside, and to leadership doctrine and techniques. But these aspects of the commune system have been more rigorously analyzed by Western social scientists using information of about the same reliability which has been gathered, obliquely, through second-hand sources. One such study is Franz Schurman's masterful *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley, 1966).

For the specialist, this book will be a minor contribution to his reference shelf. For the general reader, unacquainted with the full flavor of the revolutionary romanticism with which those committed to the Peking government approach China's rural problems in 1958–1960, the book is highly recommended.—PAUL KOVENOCK, *University of Washington, Seattle.*

The Economy of Communist China—An Introduction. BY YUAN-LI WU. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. viii, 225. $6.00.)

This small, readable volume is designed to provide the non-specialist with an overview of the Mainland Chinese economy—not an easy task in this period of rapid and uncertain change. Be-

sides offering a critical analysis of available data, it undertakes to evaluate economic performance in the light of political and other criteria. These are particularly useful objectives since recent monographs have tended to be either too technical or too narrowly focused to help the layman seeking a general understanding of Peking's economic achievements and failures.

The author, Professor Yuan-li Wu, has earned wide recognition for numerous previous studies of the Communist Chinese economy. He has made notable contributions in the compilation of data on individual economic sectors and particular industries such as steel. Happily, he is also a concise and lucid writer of prose, skills essential in communicating with the non-specialist.

The organization of the present work is simple and clear, proceeding from formal economic structure and plan to actual performance in the various sectors. Of the ten chapters comprising the book, the first four deal with national goals, the economy's decision-makers and planning process, allocative strategies, and income distribution. The following chapters assess the overall economic record (1949–64) including "fluctuations and growth," and sectoral performance in industry, agriculture, and the international economy. Finally, Dr. Wu offers an evaluation of the Communist Chinese economy as a model, respectively, of resource allocation, economic development, income distribution, and the "command economy."

For the political scientist, this study makes a useful contribution in its description of Chinese economic institutions and processes. The analysis of goals, planning procedures, and organs of implementation is enhanced by the presentation of several charts which take account of structural changes over the years. Nevertheless, those unfamiliar with the frustrating paucity of empirical data from the Mainland probably will feel a great sense of inadequacy about this description, particularly as it bears on the dynamics of the economic system. Moreover, one could wish for more information on the role of the Communist Party, as opposed to the administrative bureaucracy, in both the planning and execution of economic policies (e.g., the part played by the CCP regional bureaux).

Dr. Wu's assessments of Chinese economic performance strike this reviewer as being somewhat uneven in quality. His interpretations of pre-1960 developments, when data were relatively more plentiful, seem generally sound and occasionally afford new insights. (To be sure, his estimates of gain production appear to be significantly lower than those of many other authorities.) However, in describing the post-Great Leap period of "readjustment" (1961–65) Dr. Wu would seem to be open to points of serious disagreement. For example, his suggestion of a rapid industrial recovery in 1962 may exaggerate the case. Many would also feel that he fails to draw appropriate conclusions for industrial production and investment from his notably low estimates of agricultural output. Similarly, in the last chapter (unless there has been a misprint) he seems to find a substantial lessening of the annual rate of decline in per capita consumption during 1961–62, though acknowledging earlier that these were years of unprecedented disaster for the consumer.

As an introductory survey of the subject this volume exhibits both strengths and weaknesses. It pulls together in concise form an impressive body of useful information. These data are subjected to critical analysis, going well beyond the descriptive level that characterized earlier surveys, to seek explanations of why developments occurred as they did. The scope and depth of this inquiry, thus, are commendable. Its success, however, is severely limited by the still primitive state of our knowledge of the Chinese economy. One may question whether there has yet been sufficient empirical research or theoretical formulation to provide a solid foundation for a general survey of this nature.

In view of the large gaps in information and the heated controversy surrounding many important points of interpretation, any broad survey should be careful to identify significant areas of both ignorance and disagreement. While Dr. Wu does a reasonably good job of the former (e.g., a frank discussion of the difficulties of measuring industrial performance), he does not always reveal the full range of opinion, the extent of controversy, or the very tentative acceptance of certain assumptions and estimates. The addition of a comprehensive annotated bibliography of the relevant literature would have helped make up for this deficiency as well as generally enhancing the value of the book for students.—WILLIAM F. DORRILL, *The Rand Corporation.*

Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification. By IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. xii, 475. $8.50.)

The author characterizes this book as "a qualitative study of three worlds of development." The first is the world of the United States and its Western Allies, the second, of the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc Allies, and the third, of the non-aligned, but variously committed nations of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. It is "a study in sociological meanings—a causal and interpretive study" and is addressed to "those who have felt the impact of a system of false alternatives with

respect to the 'East-West conflict'; and who are willing to forsake the security of both oversimplified ideologies and overcomplicated models." Furthermore, it is submitted "to all those who share my convictions in the worth of social science as an applied science."

The result is a rambling, disjointed treatise which lacks any rigorous system of approach or analysis. Terminology is vague and imprecise; sharp and clear definitions are not provided; distinctions, where needed, are not drawn; and, indeed, the very rationale for the "three worlds" approach is not fully justified. A wispy fog permeates the book; at times meaning is obscured; when it drifts away, flashes of brilliance appear; but the fog closes in and all is murky again.

Since the author undertakes an exploration of the development process and presumes to distinguish the different development processes in each of his worlds, an operational definition of development is required. The effort at definition on the first page of the Preface is distractingly obscure: ". . . we assume development in human relations to be an ongoing process of human interaction and the relationships between such interaction to advance registered in the technological means they employ at any given historical point, . . . " The next attempt at definition indicates what development excludes (pp. 25–6). It differs from industrialization, change, externally induced transformation, and growth in population or national wealth (although it is apparent at other places—e.g., pp. vii, 324, 335—that the author does not distinguish between development and growth, or is not careful in the use of terms). In contrast to these processes, development "implies" transformation in human relations, irrespective of the level of industrialization; a genuine break with tradition rather than change, which implies a continual adaptation; transformation for the good of the nation, whereas externally induced transformation often benefits the external nation; and new processes, whereas growth is simply a process of adaptation—hardly an operational set of variables.

Then, Chapter II is devoted to "Sociological and Ideological Conceptions of Development" and provides an excellent review of the literature on progress, change, and development from Heraclitos through Marx. The definition which emerges here is a variation of the often repudiated definition of development as Westernization: "those planned and unplanned activities which produce the social structures, technologies, and life styles found in the First and Second Worlds, or else the means for obtaining these advanced forms" (p. 60). Moreover, since development is viewed as an asynchronous process (i.e., political, economic, and social sectors of a nation do not advance at the same rate), the author contends it is extremely difficult to determine whether a nation is developing or stagnating. "Consequently, any judgment as to whether a nation rather than a sector is developing or stagnating, while not entirely arbitrary, ultimately rests on the technique the investigator sees fit to use." The method Horowitz chooses to use is not specified.

Finally (at p. 432), the author decides that development refers to "the level of complexity achieved by a social structure and to the degrees of alteration achieved by a social process. Full development refers to the ideal standards entertained in our perceptions of structures and processes."

In the index the author distinguishes between modernization and modernism, but that distinction becomes blurred in the text. However, the distinction between modernization (or modernism) and development lacks rigor and contributes little to understanding. The first delineation occurs late in the book (p. 306). What is called a "standard definition" of modernization is more a caricature than a definition and the author sees modernism (modernization?) often providing "the gloss of contemporaneity and of self-determination without its substance" (p. 307). Still further he says, "Modernization may be rapid, but development is still a slow and laborious process. The former is defined by industrialism while the latter must locate industrialism in an overall development scheme" (p. 391). In passing, one may also question whether there is an "instinct for modernization" (p. 308).

Horowitz is distinctive when he introduces the concept of "over-development"—"that social condition in which material wealth is maldistributed and the human skills available are not used to a maximum extent"; a society "in which failures at both the social and technical levels lead to breakdowns in production and in distribution and create a perennial crisis in the political institutions and educational establishments" (p. 70). These definitions have obvious infirmities. The term itself implies a terminal state of development which is apparently reached and then surpassed, whereas the author appears to be addressing himself to conditions which others have referred to as decay, negative development, or breakdowns in development.

Since the book is about the worlds of development, one might expect the three worlds to be defined in terms of their approaches to development. Indeed, "the designation Third World is a strategy for economic development" (p. 21). However, the author proceeds to identify the Third World as independent of both power centers, ex-colonial, and thoroughly dedicated to becoming industrialized, drawing its technology

from the First World and its ideology from the Second World (p. 17). "The political posture in relation to the main power blocs is central to defining conditions of 'membership' in the world" (p. 22). Are Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, Thailand, South Korea, Brazil, Venezuela, and Guatemala in the Third World then? South Viet Nam and East Germany are specifically excluded. To add to the confusion, Appendix A, which presents a digest of factors defining the three worlds, is based largely on structural-functional characteristics.

The chapters on the First World discuss the United States only. They are fascinating, impressionistic accounts which give no systematic attention to development—how it started, involving whom, through what processes, and with what effects. The chapter on the Second World is no more effective an interpretation of a strategy for development, highlighted by an appendix on the transition from totalitarianism to authoritarianism. In brief, these worlds are contrasted by seeing an economic basis to politics in the First and Second Worlds and a political basis to economics in most of the Third World (p. 390).

The book is littered with provocative and sometimes debatable assertions. "Africa . . . boasts the highest degree of political stability in the Third World" (p. 123). "The main fact about the mental set of developing man is that he uniformly blames his shortcomings, his failings, and his condition on society rather than on himself as in former times" (p. 291). " . . . [O]verdedication to development may actually work against its requirements" (p. 294). "The persistence of values of ascription once achievement standards are more or less realized may be indicative of the general state of normlessness in the advanced nations" (p. 347).

The book ends with a "model of models" listing propositions about the entire development process. Much greater effort at precision is apparent here, but the propositions do not grow logically out of the previous discussion in many cases and at times the definitions are different from those presented earlier.—Richard W. Gable, *University of California, Davis.*

Morocco: Old Land, New Nation. By Mark I. Cohen and Lorna Hahn. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. ix, 309. $6.50.)

This book begins with a high-speed swoop through history, slowing down as it comes to land in the second half of the twentieth century. The approach is chronological, reportorial, filled with all the important names and dates, although undocumented and somehow lacking in that sweep and depth of analysis which would bring it all to life and make it understandable. "Part II: New Nation" describes unity and security, politics and government, economy and society, and foreign affairs. A good deal of information is included under each heading, to the point where the economic section becomes simply encyclopedic. The political sections are more uneven, less disinterested, less dry in style; it is clear that for the authors the future of Morocco lies with the activist National Union of Popular Forces (UNFP), whose case is racily pleaded. In the process, the chronological treatment becomes abbreviated; the sections on security and on parts of foreign policy pay little attention to events of the last six years. Errors continue to appear: eighteen proper names are wrongly identified and eight Arabic words are used erroneously. The factual catalogue in the social and economic sections does not suffer from the same problem of slants and errors; it is straight-forward and complete.

Generally, the book is a useful reference work on Morocco's first independent decade, prefaced by an historical overview. The crying shame is that this is such a pallid objective compared to what the book could—and should—be. The biggest part of the gap comes from a nearly total absence of evaluation, integration, comparison, weighing, theorizing—in sum, analysis. The political section is a UNFP tract, in simplistic terms, in which the old King was wiley and his son is a sometime villain. But there is no real analysis of the UNFP position, program, source of power, cohesion, tactics, leadership, following—not a word, for example, on the important party congress of 1962—although there is, of course no corresponding analysis of the monarchy, either. The economic section is not tied into the political description in any way, and there is nothing on the governmental or decision-making process in any economic sector—the Safi complex, the economic plans, agrarian and industrial reform programs. Changes in the nature of the economy are stated, but the dynamics of change, the scurces, the methods, and the weaknesses are nowhere evaluated. Population and school enrollment are going up, but there is so much drama, variation, and ramification beneath these simple rising curves—the politics of change in the school programs, the political and economic effects of urbanization and rural migration, for example—that are never even suggested in this book. Foreign policy is logically divided into decolonization, North African cooperation, Arab and African involvement, Communist and American relations. But the content of the sections is a necklace of dates; if Morocco has ever had any thought-out policies, they are never analysed as such and, if it has not, the conflicting pressures of such a situation are not analysed either.

When a unifying theme is hazarded, it is undermined by the subsequent discussion. In the beginning of the U. S.-Morocco section it is suggested several times that the U. S. was to suffer long for its short-sighted military base policy. By the end of the chapter, it turns out that America came out quite well and relations have been fine. In the beginning of the Unity-and-Security chapter, a good brief introduction suggests causes for weaknesses under the dual heading, ending on the foreboding note of problems to come. But according to the rest of the chapter, there have been no unity or security problems since 1959. It is noted that the Istiqlal has a good organization. But there is no discussion of party structure, program, or clientele, so that the real nature of the party remains a mystery.

Finally, there is a too-frequent tendency to describe by innuendo when further research is necessary. De Latour is "*supposedly* still loyal to the official French position" (p. 72), security forces are "*obviously* instructed for political reasons to hold their fire" (p. 102), the King "reacted to UNFP pressures *in his usual way*" (p. 131), election compilers, when uncertain, "*apparently* gave the Istiqlal the benefit of the doubt" (p. 130), the Communist Party "*vetoed* the new constitution," leading to "tactics reminiscent of those of the late United States Senator Joseph McCarthy" (pp. 139–40) (italics added in all cases). Sometimes emotion not only replaces scholarship in the political section; it does not even follow a consistent bias and obscures more complicated motivations.

There is so much work that can and needs to be done on Morocco, from updating, expanding, and deepening existing studies of political sociology and government structures and functions, to opening new case and comparative studies in socio-economic development, public administration, ethnic and religious bases of politics, political pluralism and monarchy, and foreign policy development. This book probably has its place but it misses its challenge.—I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, *New York University.*

The Rise of Indonesian Communism. By RUTH MCVEY. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1965. Pp. xviii, 510. $10.00.)

The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951–1963. By DONALD HINDLEY. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1964. Pp. xvii, 380. $8.50.)

Indonesian political development under Dutch colonialism and since independence is a fascinating subject for any political scientist. The lack of adequate field studies before 1945, when the Dutch discouraged native and foreign scholarship, and in the confused atmosphere of the Sukarno guided democracy, make these two books expecially welcome. The violent upheaval following the October 1965 Indonesian abortive coup, allegedly masterminded by the PKI, brought the anti-communist forces to power and reduced the PKI to its lowest ebb since 1927. Whether or not President Sukarno will remain an impotent figurehead, and the Indonesian Communists a defeated party, we should study the past record of the PKI to understand the strategy of Asian Communism and its conflict with Indonesian nationalism. The same conflict exists in Viet Nam and other Asian-African nations, but the outcome may not be the same.

Communism and nationalism in the ex-colonial states of Africa and Asia conflict after an initial period of cooperation. Even in the few Asian states with a Communist government, the force of nationalism has proven more powerful than the international bond of Marxist-Leninist ideology. Miss McVey's book concentrates on the beginnings of the Indonesian communist movement in the 1920's, mainly the 1921–1927 period before the PKI was suppressed. The McVey book is really an anatomy of revolutionary failure in which the PKI reflected Comintern confusion on stategy in colonial Asia and even more the divisions inside the Indonesian nationalist movement.

The Rise of Indonesian Communism begins with the World War I birth of the party as an off-shoot of the Netherlands Communist party, and continues chronologically and in great detail until the PKI abortive revolt in 1927. The role of Dutch communists, especially Sneevliet (later called Maring), as disillusioned colonialists helping the native activists to resist Dutch rule is a tale worth telling as Chalmers Johnson did in his *Instance of Treason.* Why did the expatriate Dutch turn against their own government when they saw the oppression of the Indonesians? How did they differ on tactics (Socialist vs. Communist) and antagonize their native comrades? Miss McVey's account of Sneevliet and his colleagues and such Indonesian comrades as Tan Malaka is dry, factual, and uninspired. Sneevliet and Tan Malaka, especially, deserve a more colorful treatment of inner motivation and psychological stresses. Willard Hanna, a postwar student of Indonesian affairs, gave my class a better analysis of Tan Malaka in ten minutes than Miss McVey provides in her chronological account.

The failure of the Marxist-oriented movement in the 1920's to make nationalism their primary goal caused them to alienate the strong Moslem and labor groups in Indonesia, despite periodic attempts of the PKI to work with those groups. "They did not take an Indonesian national state to be their supreme goal; this was left to a new

generation of parties that arose only at the end of the period discussed in this volume" (p. 63). Many Dutch Communists felt that proletarian revolution was more important than mere political freedom for the Indonesians, who might succumb to a native capitalist class. Indonesians were more interested in national freedom than class warfare, but their foreign advisors were reluctant to give nationalism more than tactical lip-service. Miss McVey shows how the PKI attempted to work within other Indonesian groups ("the bloc within") then, when expelled by their non-Communist colleagues, to try an equally-unsuccessful "bloc above" strategy.

The ignorance of Russian and Comintern leaders about the actual situation in Indonesia, and their ideological orientation toward Europe and China, is graphically portrayed as a major communications gap in the relations of the Comintern with the Indonesian PKI. Personal rivalry among the Indonesian comrades was an even greater obstacle to united action. The climax of the PKI story in the 1920's was the rather hopeless attempt of a few PKI units to revolt. One is reminded of T.S. Eliot's phrase: "This is the way the world ends; not with a bang but a whimper." The PKI had been splintered and defeated both internally and in its alliances with other Indonesian groups: its minority Trotskyites' silly revolt merely gave the Dutch a chance to suppress all subversive groups for the remainder of the prewar period.

Donald Hindley's study of postwar Indonesian communism is far better written, but goes astray in its political predictions (e.g., "A communist rebellion is out of the question in the foreseeable future" (p. 301). The PKI emerged after 1945 in a better position and with better leadership than before the war, but Sukarno's nationalist party had won the anti-Dutch war and received major aid from wartime Japanese occupation forces. Hindley does not cover the 1945–1951 period, nor does Miss McVey's book explain the Indonesian nationalist movement from 1928 to 1945. George Kahin and others have covered this period to show how the anti-Communist Indonesian forces gained the upper hand in postwar politics, suppressing a PKI rebellion against the embattled nationalists in 1948.

The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951–1963 is also a chronological account of postwar PKI policies, with a brief historical preface. It concentrates on the 1951–1959 period (pp. 27–229) when party leader Aidit overcame the stigma of the 1948 revolt to amass over 2 million members and 21% of the 1955 parliamentary vote (27% in the 1957 national election). Aidit cultivated Sukarno's personal friendship; made the PKI a "lovable Communist party"; and built strong mass support through educational, labor, and even lower-rank military recruitment.

The best chapters deal with PKI political tactics under Sukarno's "guided democracy" after 1959. Sukarno brought some PKI leaders into advisory positions and claimed that Communism was one of the three pillars of Indonesian national policy. He cultivated Peking's friendship while curtailing the freedom of Chinese in Indonesia. Hindley does not analyze Sukarno's motives in trying to balance the PKI against the army, but implies that Bung Karno would control the PKI by neutralizing its influence. "This study makes no pretense to place the Aidit leadership's PKI in its international Communist setting (viii)"—but how can one understand the 1965 debacle in which the PKI was decimated without an understanding of its international setting?

The Hindley volume is excellent for a study of the internal PKI movement between 1951 and 1963, but in the aftermath of 1965 we may ask if Aidit's leadership was really so astute? Did Peking really direct the PKI to mount a coup against its own interests, or was the 1965 coup a general's plot to discredit the PKI (as Peking claims)? The motivation of rank-and-file Indonesians in joining the PKI or its front organizations before or after WWII remains an unanswered question, like the causes of the 1965 coup and its successful suppression.

It may never be possible to reconstruct the historic picture of the PKI in its prewar and postwar failures. One is led to conclude that Indonesian Communists are, after all, subject to the weaknesses of all Indonesians. Their 1927, 1948, and 1965 defeats indicate a victory of nationalism over communist internationalism, but the sources of Indonesian discontent on which the PKI rebuilt its fortunes in the past remain fertile ground for a future movement. Self-defeating strategy was the major cause of the PKI's past failures, but was the strategy devised by native leaders or their foreign comrades? The McVey and Hindley books provide us with much documentary evidence on the PKI, but not enough analysis of its nationalist opposition or its future potential within the complex Indonesian society.—DOUGLAS MENDEL, JR. *University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee.*

Democratic Innovations in Nepal. By BHUWAN L. JOSHI AND LEO E. ROSE. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966. Pp. xvi, 551. $10.75.)

Nepal, often called "the kingdom in the clouds," offers the visitor startling and sometimes exciting contrasts. Autos vie with water-buffalo carts and bicycles on the streets of Kathmandu. Radios blare from the bazaars while animals are sacrificed in religious ceremonies in the pagoda

temples. An American-built electric ropeway carries freight over the southern mountains, while peasant women carry firewood on their backs from highland villages to the town bazaars. None of the contrasts is more interesting, however, than the events portrayed in this outstanding "case study in political acculturation."

Nepal is a unique laboratory of "modernization"—economic and social, as well as political. Till the "Revolution of 1950," Nepal was a replica of a repressive medieval feudalism. Isolated in an implausible terrain of high mountains and narrow valleys lived over 8,000,000 people (95 percent illiterate); most were landless peasants working on the lands of the rich landlord families. Complete political power was seized by a single family, the Ranas, in 1846. It created an hereditary premiership in its own ranks and relegated the Crown to a purely ceremonial role with practical confinement to the palace grounds.

Despite this powerful elite, about all that held the country together was its extreme isolation—and the popular veneration of the king. The Hindu faithful believed (and still believe) him to be the reincarnation of one of their major deities, Vishnu. He played a "legitimizing," not an actual, role in the "conspiratorial" politics of the period.

Our authors, one a Nepoli now teaching in this country, the other certainly the most informed American scholar about Nepal, trace this background in some detail. They analyze the forces which brought about the "revolution" of 1950 and trace the course of events which led to the elimination of Rana rule and restoration of governance by the Crown. Their account is both incisive and informative.

They divide the post-revolutionary period into three stages of development. The first saw the emergence of new personalities and experimentation with new political practices. This stage is divisible into "the search for constitutional democracy, 1951–1955" and "innovation in the 'interim' political system, 1955–59." It witnessed the growth of "agitational" instead of "conspiratorial" politics. Street parades and demonstrations, a proliferating party press, and pamphleteering superseded palace intrigue.

"Parties" formed around personalities. Ministries succeeded each pretty much as the king assessed the locus of preponderant influence among the contending groups. During this period, the Nepoli Congress Party, modeled in structure and program on the Indian Congress Party, emerged as the major democratically-oriented party grouping. At the same time, the Communist Party gained a foothold in the few urban centers and sought to attract the landless peasants. The other parties revolved primarily around personalities seeking leadership in the new Nepal

King Tribhuwan, who was on the throne in 1950, genuinely sought to convert the government into a constitutional monarchy on Western lines. His son, King Mahendra, who succeeded him in 1955, honored his father's commitment. He proceeded slowly but persistently toward the drafting of a constitution and the holding of elections for a national Parliament. Both were accomplished in 1958–59; the second stage, "experiment with parliamentary democracy, 1959–60," became a landmark in Nepali political life.

The Nepali Congress Party was returned overwhelmingly, winning 74 of 109 seats with 38 per cent of the vote. Most of the personal leaders of other party groups were defeated. The largest opposition group, the Ghorka Parishad, a strongly conservative group, won 19 seats with 17 per cent of the vote. The Communists gained four seats with seven percent of the vote.

Leadership of the Nepali Congress Party had been nurtured in the Indian Congress tradition. It proceeded to formulate a progressive legislative program—and to operate in the tradition of parliamentary government. Since the Constitution had left "exercise of the sovereign powers and prerogatives (including the executive power) vesting in us" to the Crown, the Cabinet's actual powers were unclear.

Opposition of the landed groups to the Nepali Congress program was acute. The defeated party leaders were also disaffected. "All these elements magnified the threat of the new political system to King Mahendra's innovation of a dynamic role for the Crown," and a clash of interests was "inevitable." Hence—the *coup* of December 15, 1960. The king arrested the Government, placed many leaders, including the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, B.P. Koirala, in jail; some are still confined.

The *coup* ushered in the third (and current) stage: "Panchayat Raj." All political parties were banned. Some "fundamental (civil) rights" were curtailed. The press was, in a sense, nationalized. A non-political system of government, based on a four-tier structure of councils from the village to the national level (directly elective only at the village level) was instituted. Its powers were consultative rather than elective. Administration was centralized even further, with greater control by central-government administrators over regional, district, and local officials. King Mahendra's concept of "a dynamic, authoritarian, politically oriented monarchy" was achieved.

This illuminating account of political events in Nepal since 1950 provides a backdrop for acute analysis of the country's many economic and social problems, domestic and international.

Our authors underline Nepal's extreme sensitiveness to involvement in the Cold War in the context of its almost total dependence on foreign aid for implementing internal development. Their account of these and related questions is thoroughly objective, but does not conceal the delicate issues involved in the country's future as a viable entity. Their scholarship is attested by their ten-page (only three in English) bibliography. They have given us a major contribution to available sources on Southeast Asia.—PHILLIPS BRADLEY, *Berea College.*

The Mexican Political System. By L. VINCENT PADGETT. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966. Pp. x, 244. $2.75.)

Mexican Marxist: Vicente Lombardo Toledano. By ROBERT PAUL HILLON. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 222. $6.00.)

Mexico is one of the Latin American countries that has consistently attracted the interest of U. S. political scientists in the last twenty years. L. Vincent Padgett's *The Mexican Political System* stands as one of the best available introductions to the subject.

In over 200 pages of compact chapters, the author has managed to include a lot of factual information which is required reading for those who want to know the basic elements of the Mexican polity. Padgett presents his findings in the conceptual framework of political inputs and outputs which has been developed, among others, by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman in their pioneer study on *The Politics of the Developing Areas.* He also gives due consideration in his work to the historical aspects of the subject.

His first chapter, "The Bases of Legitimacy," compresses the essential trends related to the "pantheon of heroes and events which legitimize the system," and it stands as an excellent starting point for the rest of the volume, which includes sections on parties and elections, labor and peasant organizations, the middle sector, and the presidency (the "inputs"); labor and agrarian policies, and modernization (the "outputs"). This last chapter is organized to deal with industrialization, transportation, commerce, education, modernization and marginalism, and the "participating Mexicans," that is to say, those who understand "that the present system is a complex mixture of legal, rational, and modern forms of administration and decision-making operating along with older traditional ways."

Padgett is at his best when summarizing the achievements of the Cárdenas' administration, the role of the President in Mexican politics, the influence of the industrial middle sector from the early 'forties onward, and the balance of the agrarian reform policies. He provides the reader with a clearer view of Mexico than the two previous books written by Robert E. Scott (*Mexican Politics in Transition*) and Frank Brandenburg (*The Making of Modern Mexico*), usually referred to as standard references in the field. Padgett, for example, is not so optimistic as Scott in his appraisal of the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional*, and at the same time offers better evidence than Brandenburg's idea of the "Revolutionary Family" by concentrating instead on the "Revolutionary Coalition" (see his arguments in p. 34 and *passim*).

One serious gap in *The Mexican Political System* is the lack of detailed treatment of Mexican foreign affairs, which should have been greatly expanded because of the relationship they hold *vis-à-vis* domestic policies especially in the United States-Latin American context.

Balancing the pros and cons of the Mexican Revolution, the author closes his book with this warning, in reference to the Indian population: "There remains a Mexico which is not organized, which is politically quiescent, and which understands none of the new and peaceful ways of achieving goals. For this Mexico there is no middle ground between servile conformity and resort to force. This is the Mexico which must be incorporated into the modernizing national culture if violence in the countryside is not to disrupt the new way of life which is developing." Again, we find the problem of dual Latin American societies: the "many Mexicos," the "two Brazils."

Another way of getting a more accurate view of Mexican politics is well shown by Robert Paul Millon in his *Mexican Marxist: Vicente Lombardo Toledano,* the same subject on which he based his doctoral dissertation for the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

This is not an attempt at "personal" biography, but rather an intellectual and political analysis of one of the most interesting personalities in contemporary Mexico. The author deals with Lombardo's vast career as educator and administrator; leader in the national and international labor movements; author; founder, director and contributor to Mexican and foreign periodicals; political militant, first in the "Revolutionary Coalition" and later on (since 1948) in the *Partido Popular Socialista* of which he is at present Secretary-General.

Millon, through extensive research and personal interviews with Lombardo, demonstrates the usefulness of this type of biographic-political approach in Latin American studies. His comments on the role of nationalism in Lombardo's thought, and the stand of the latter as a *Mexican* Marxist are quite relevant to a better understand-

ing of the position of the Leftist *intelligentsia* in Latin America.

The author's final conclusions are a good synthesis of the problems the Mexican Revolution is now facing, and of Lombardo's attempts to further its modernizing and transforming goals.—ALBERTO CIRIA, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement. By HARRY KANTOR. (Washington: Savile Books, 1966. Pp. v, 175. $6.95, cloth; $4.95, paper.)

This sympathetic treatment of the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana, originally written in 1953, has been brought up to date by the inclusion of an epilogue describing APRA's position in the present Peruvian political situation. The importance of studying Aprista ideology stems from the fact that not only is it an interesting attempt to reinterpret and modify European socialist thought so as to adapt it to Latin America's particular problems, but that to a large extent APRA can be considered as the model and source of ideological inspiration for sister parties such as Accion Democratica of Venezuela, Liberacion Nacional of Costa Rica, the Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario of Bolivia and the Paraguayan Febrerista Party. Therefore, Professor Kantor's work—the only one of its kind—becomes one of the necessary starting points for studying this class of parties.

Political theorists will find Aprista political thought both interesting and mystifying. In their attempt to emancipate themselves from European socialist thought and create an indigenous theory more applicable to Latin American realities these Peruvian thinkers achieved some notable successes—as well as some philosophical "howlers." One can applaud, for instance, their rejection of Lenin's interpretation of imperialism as the last stage of capitalism. The Aprista view, that Latin American capitalism was actually started by imperialist penetration, is much more in accord with the facts. Similarly, APRA's campaign for the economic integration of Latin America—begun during its earliest days—seems truly prophetic in retrospect, given contemporary attempts to achieve this through the Central American Common Market and the Latin American Free Trade Area.

At the same time, however, one has the feeling of entering a philosophical "fun-house" when introduced to Victor Raul Haya de la Torre's theory of "historical space-time." Obviously the Aprista leader was trying to emphasize the uniqueness of all human cultures, due to the peculiar historical development of each one. In this way it could be argued that European political theory would not fit in Latin America because an entirely different set of circumstances was present. However, the clarity of this thesis is obscured from the beginning by Haya's unfortunate insistence upon propping up his theory by trying to wed Einstein's concepts of relativity and space-time to a theory of cultural evolution. Perhaps such a fusion is possible, but in Haya's case the result is only confusion and a drift towards mysticism. In the end we are told that historical space-time is all the physical factors that make up a society and "something more which flows from the spirit of the people" (p. 32), or that is an "X" quality: "a certain 'rhythm,' or 'spirit' or 'collective consciousness' which each people develops as a result of all the experiences to which they are exposed" (p. 120). To me, at least, this is not very clear, and it hardly makes *aprismo* more respectable as an explanatory theory.

None of this is Professor Kantor's fault. He can't be held responsible for the shortcomings of his subject. However, there are some minor criticisms that can be made of the author's presentation. It is never quite clear, for example, whether or not APRA can be classified as a socialist movement. Professor Kantor does identify *aprismo* with democratic socialism on page 115, but elsewhere he likens it to the British Labour Party and the New Deal (p. 75). Apparently the Apristas do not consider themselves as socialists (p. 29), although they retain the Marxian dialectic as a conceptual tool, and prefer to label their economic program as "state capitalism" (p. 75). While this confusion may de due in large measure to the Apristas' own contradictory writings, a lengthier analysis might have helped to clarify the subject.

One final criticism concerns the author's identification with his subject. While it is generally refreshing in this era of value neutralism to find an author willing to display a strong ideological commitment—in this case democratic socialism—one wonders at times whether this does not interfere with the description. Out of the history of recent Peruvian political struggles the Apristas in this account somehow always emerge as honest and pure. Now, it simply isn't possible for any group in politics to be so angelic. For instance, when the author discusses the failure of the Aprista-supported reform government of Jose Bustamente (1945–1948) he lays all the blame for its downfall against the conservatives and Bustamente and absolves the Apristas entirely. Considerable debate has revolved around this event—Bustamente claiming that the Apristas wanted to dominate the government for their own ends and simply use him as a stooge, while the Apristas accuse Bustamente of ignoring their demands even though their votes had helped put him in office. Professor Kantor sides firmly with the

Apristas, saying that the crisis arose because the Apristas, "who held a majority in Congress," were blocked by the President, who had forgotten his political debt to them (p. 17). Yet, Professor Kantor's own reckoning on the preceding page the Apristas held only 18 of the 46 Senate seats and 48 of 101 seats in the Chamber of Deputies! Thus, while they may have been a majority within Bustamente's "Democratic Front" (18 out of 35 Senate seats, 48 of 73 in the Chamber), they were by no means a majority in either house of Congress. Presumably, then, Bustamente had to take other demands besides theirs into consideration. And in any case, as events were to show, the Apristas needed Bustamente just as much as he needed them. After all, they fell together.

These criticisms are not intended to suggest any fatal flaws in Professor Kantor's work. Overall, this presentation of APRA's ideology and program is strictly straightforward and factual. The study is deservedly a "classic" in the field of Latin American politics and is "must" reading for those interested in the political parties and political thought of that region.—PAUL LEWIS, *Louisiana State University.*

Church and State in Latin America. A History of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations. Rev. Ed. By J. LLOYD MECHAM. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 465. $8.50.)

The appearance of the first edition of this work, a third of a century ago, represented a noteworthy step forward in the contentious study of the relations of the Latin American states and the Church. The only general work which treated the subject, *Church and State* became the standard source for generations of Latin Americanists. Its author's dispassionate analysis of even such bitter national politico-ecclesiastical experiences as that of Mexico justly won him the respect of the scholarly world not only in this country, but in Latin America as well.

In the present edition, the book follows basically the same organization that it did in the earlier version. That is, there are three broad introductory chapters treating the colonial background of church-state relations, their development through the independence period, and papal relations during that struggle. A country-by-country survey of the topic since their achievement of nationhood follows. Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil each are given a chapter and Mexico, two. Paraguay and Bolivia share a chapter, and the Caribbean and Central America are treated regionally.

Professor Mecham has manfully attempted to bring his book up to date with citations of materials which have appeared since 1934. Unfortunately, while they add to the extensive bibliographical apparatus, they do not substantively (perhaps with the exception of his chapters on Mexico) change the conclusions he drew thirty years ago. The author's approach remains legalistic.

Although Dr. Mecham views the actions of the church as differing in the various national experiences he studies, he does not draw the next conclusion—namely that in each Latin American country the church is a social institution. That is, that it is hardly monolithic in composition, but reflects regional, as well as social diversity in its leadership and in its component parts. In his concern for the legal solutions to the problems besetting relations between the civil and clerical governments, Mecham retains his profound respect for the written law as the highest expression of church-state modi vivendi. True, concordats, as well as constitutional provisions fixing the church's status in a national context, *are* important indices. But they are akin to the small portion of the iceberg visible above the surface of the sea: they reveal only a fraction of the whole.

Let us examine a case in point: Colombia. Mecham concludes (as he did in 1934) that " . . . the clergy regard the status established by the Concordat to be a model one. . . . " Quite the opposite is true. The thoughtful elements in the hierarchy, unwilling to remain pawns in the hands of ostensibly Catholic-but intrinsically self-seeking politicians like Laureano Gómez (1950–1953) and Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953–1957), desire nothing more than divorce from their unhappy marriage to the Colombian State. The old values have changed, and a profound concern with the dynamics of social change has penetrated not merely the ranks of the lower clergy, but far up into the ecclesiastical establishment as well.

Space does not permit other such examples, nor some illustration of the many misspellings of Spanish names and incorrect source citations (carried over from the first edition) which careful checking could have eliminated.

This reviewer does not mean to imply that Professor Mecham has ignored the increasingly important role of Latin American Christian Democracy or that of the exponents of the New Wave within the various Latin American branches of the Church. He has incorporated them, but has superimposed these recent developments on a work which remains oriented and structured toward constitutional and formalistic history of the relations between Church and State. As such a history it remains without peer.—J. LEÓN HELGUERA, *Vanderbilt University.*

Nationalism in Latin America: Diversity and Unity. By Gerhard Masur. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1966. Pp. x, 278. $5.95.)

During the fall of 1962 Professor Gerhard Masur participated in a conference on "Ideas and Social Change in the Western Hemisphere" which met in Mexico City, sponsored by the International Society for the History of Ideas. This book, which attempts to trace the evolution of nationalism in Latin America from its beginnings to the present, grew out of that meeting.

Gerhard Masur is well known among Latin Americanists in this country and abroad for his biography of Simón Bolívar. In this new work, Professor Masur contends that nationalism is the ideology (at times he treats it as a movement) that has penetrated Latin American political and social thought in this century and "has acted as a catalyst for many of the social adjustments which have taken place." This is a logical view for a student of Bolivar to hold.

Recognizing that nationalism was first a European product, the writer seeks to isolate and define its Latin American variants in historic perspective. After a brief (and traditional) examination of the colonial experience, the writer considers the difficulties that have stood in the way of independence and the development of vital and effective nationhood. Masur describes how Latin American nationalism was "held together by personalities" and was often centered around the frustrations of trying to hold a community together in the face of internal difficulties and external pressures during the early years of independence. As a consequence nationalism in this part of the world became xenophobic (anti-North American in large part) and, according to Masur, "a by-product of the encounter with Western capitalism."

Against this background is traced the Mexican Revolution, Aprismo and the prospects of agrarian socialism in a large Indian society, the Bolivian National Revolution, the National Revolution in Brazil, the problems of "enigmatic" Argentina, and the Cuban Revolution. In the Mexican case the writer views the Revolution as "a slow and tortuous process of integration" by which "a society composed of superimposed levels had to be melted down and a new one forged." The impact of Aprismo and the "Indian Renaissance" of the Indian range is explored. The author underlines the weaknesses of the Bolivian Revolution in practice and explains the importance of the Indian in the "visionary nationalism" of the MNR. In the case of Brazil and Argentina primary attention is given to the complex development of the movements associated with Getúlio Vargas and Juan Perón. He draws parallels to Fascist and National Socialist movements in Europe and gives attention to the Latin American characteristics of these developments. Finally, in the case of Cuba, Masur probes the various aspects of the Castro Revolution in the context of Cuban nationalism which first appeared in its modern form in the 1920s.

Looking back on these movements the writer finds that nationalism south of the border first appeared as a "patriotism of regional coloring." Later it evolved into "a cultural and aristocratic nationalism" which in this century has "turned into a popular revolutionary nationalism." With this it is difficult to argue. The broad outlines of Latin American nationalism are drawn in this book, and this is a useful project in itself. Nevertheless there are generalizations in this work which raise questions in the mind of this reviewer. For example, we are told that "Marxism still has a large number of followers in Bolivia." There is the opinion that the Soviet Union "would be willing to pick up the tab" for Bolivian economic stability. Can we accept the idea that the Brazilian armed forces have across time been committed to "the cause of democracy"? Is it a fact that "the economic ills (of Brazil) are more apparent than real"? Certainly judgments of this sort are interesting topics for discussion, but they tend to disrupt an effort to describe systematically the evolution of Latin American nationalism.—Victor H. Gibean, Jr., *University of Alabama.*

Latin America in Soviet Writings, A Bibliography, Volume I: 1917–1958, Volume II: 1959–1964. Compiled by Leo Okinshevich, Ed. by Robert G. Carlton. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Vol. I, pp. xvii, 257; Vol. II, pp. xii, 311. Both volumes, $25; separately, $15 each.)

Upon examining a two volume bibliography of Soviet writings on Latin America prepared in the Library of Congress, the old proverb "It's an ill wind that blows nobody good" readily comes to mind. Surely it is to the establishment of a communist regime in Cuba that we are indebted for this handsome, comprehensive and elaborately organized bibliography. It would be ungrateful to reflect that a bibliography of Soviet writings on Western Europe or China might be more widely used. For the small number of scholars interested in Soviet policy in Latin America this bibliography is invaluable. It contains 8,688 references to books and articles on Latin America published in the Soviet Union from 1917 through 1964. Volume I (1917–1958) contains 3,831 of these entries and Volume II (1959–1964) contains 4,857. This great increase in output reflects, of course, enhanced Soviet interest in Latin Amer-

ica. A special research institute devoted to Latin American affairs was established in 1962 and its growing output compares in quality with Soviet academic writing on other parts of the world.

Since the volumes are organized by topic the scholar new to the subject can orient himself rapidly. The Author Index is particularly useful for those who wish to follow the work of a given writer. A check of books and articles known to the present writer reveals none missing and a perusal of titles uncovered items of interest which had escaped his notice. The bibliographer's nets were very fine indeed. For example even the *Uchenye zapiski*, i.e. collections of scholarly articles of institutes and the journals of universities are included to say nothing of the Soviet journal of poultry raising and the Soviet chess journal.

The non-specialist might not realize how much more useful such a bibliography is now than at an earlier time. Soviet professional writing, even on sensitive subjects, is much less constrained by the official position of the communist party than it once was. The Soviet scholar is now free (within limits) to develop theses which do not have, or do not yet have, official sanction. In the past a scholar working on an particular problem in Soviet studies reached the point of diminishing returns very quickly in the examination of the literature, for variety of view was rare indeed. Now, on the contrary, it is often rewarding to read books published in small editions or articles appearing in the less well known journals. To the scholar who wishes to exploit such opportunities, this bibliography is invaluable.

It is to be hoped that some means for keeping the bibliography up-to-date can be found. Is it too much to hope that similar bibliographies might be prepared for other areas?—HERBERT S. DINERSTEIN, *The School for Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Washington, D. C.*

Guide to Latin American Studies. ED. BY MARTIN SABLE. (Latin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1966. Pp. 850. $25.)

Master Directory for Latin America. ED. BY MARTIN SABLE. (Latin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1966. Pp. 438. $15.)

Periodicals for Latin American Economic Development, Trade and Investment: An Annotated Bibliography. COMPILED BY MARTIN SABLE. (Latin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1965. $2.50.)

Statistical Abstract of Latin America. 1965 ed. (Latin American Center, University of California, Los Angeles, 1965. $8 to libraries; $6 to students, faculty.)

For specialists of Latin American politics and studies, the 1965 edition of *Statistical Abstract* is the most useful of these reference works, although the *Guide* also may serve the needs of the introductory student. The latter work attempts to be comprehensive in its listing of some 5,000 titles in English, Spanish, French, German, and Portuguese. Its compilation, however, is limited to selections from Boston and Los Angeles libraries. The *Master Directory* includes ten sub-directories with names and addresses of U. S., Western European, and Latin American institutions interested in Latin America. The *Periodicals* guide is a bibliography of 220 entries.—R.H.C.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

International Relations in the New Africa. BY I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, A Spectrum Book, 1966. Pp. xi, 175. $5.95, cloth; $2.45, paper.)

I. William Zartman has written a useful survey, not of "international relations in the new Africa," but of the relations among the seventeen states of "Western Africa" stretching from Nigeria through the Maghreb. The geographical limitation rather surprisingly proves not to be a hindrance, since whatever is lost in comprehensive coverage of continental affairs is more than made up in detailed and precise analysis of an area that Zartman obviously knows well. The reader is rewarded with careful expositions not elsewhere equaled of the motivations behind ventures like the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union of African States and the Casablanca and Monrovia groups, as well as of these organizations' subsequent vicissitudes.

After an historical presentation of how relations have developed among the seventeen states, Zartman analyzes the criteria for their foreign policies and the various limitations on their implementation, particularly as they affect the development of broader patterns of political and economic cooperation among African states. Zartman isolates five interrelated characteristics of the foreign relations of Western Africa: 1) The "non-territorial" and unintegrated nature of the states which makes foreign policy depend on the personal preferences (and often whims) of chiefs of state rather than on any national interest; 2) The lack of national power, in the sense that any state's capability of achieving any foreign policy goal is extremely limited, both because it lacks resources and because the foreign-policy making process is haphazard; 3) The substitution of ideology and symbolic statement for pragmatic analysis and implementation of foreign policy; 4) The "searching" and tentative quality of policies, particularly as regards problems of African unity,

in which states seem to be working out their own identities through international interaction; 5) As a culmination of the others, the instability of alliances and patterns of hostility between African governments. Zartman concludes that Western Africa exhibits "a special type of international-relations system. Unlike the more traditional models of balance-of-power, hierarchical or supranational systems, the African system is one of mobile relations carried out within certain limits imposed by ideology and environment." Such characteristics of Western African interstate relations certainly can be generalized to most of the rest of the continent.

If the geographical restriction poses no problems, limiting the discussion to intra-African relations does distort some parts of Zartman's argument. On its first page the book states its assumption that "a state's primary area of interest in foreign relations is with its neighbors." This seems questionable in the case of most nations, and a dangerous assumption in the case of African states, most of which are economically highly dependent on the favor of non-African powers. While Zartman's African focus is a welcome antidote to analyses which explain all by the subtle action of "neo-colonialism" or "international communism," one cannot forget that Africa's mobile international relations take place in a world dominated by big, and sometimes bad world powers. This external reality sometimes intrudes harshly into intra-African politics; thus, Dahomey's and Upper Volta's withdrawal from the Mali Federation came in response more to French threats than to the Ivory Coast pressures that Zartman mentions. In a broader sense, the very freedom of African states to indulge in ideological and "searching" foreign policies results from the major world powers' tacit agreement not to disturb seriously the African international status quo for the moment. External events, like a dramatic collapse of the Soviet-American détente or a determined re-entry of Red China into African politics, could sharply restrict the African states' freedom to act as they wish even more than "the limits imposed by ideology and environment."

This reservation aside, Zartman has produced a valuable study of intra-African politics that is worthy of serious attention from both the Africanist and the student of international politics.—WILLIAM J. FOLTZ, *Yale University.*

The Foreign Policy of African States: Ideological Bases, Present Realities, Future Prospects. By DOUDOU THIAM. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. xv, 134. $4.50.)

False Start in Africa. By RENÉ DUMONT. Translated by Phyllis Nauts Ott. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 320. $7.00.)

These two books, both translations of earlier French publications, deal with important concerns for Africans and for scholars interested in underdeveloped nations. Doudou Thiam, the Foreign Minister of Senegal, discusses the international relations of new Black African states and seeks to delineate the major influences on the policies in this area. René Dumont, a French agronomist with wide experience in Africa, examines the barriers to African economic development and suggests some of the causes and remedies for these problems.

In *The Foreign Policy of African States* Thiam suggests that two basic ideologies—nationalism and socialism—are the prime factors in shaping the international politics of Black African nations. Nationalism has expressed itself in two forms: "micro-nationalism" which emphasizes the sovereignty of the separate states as they emerged from colonial rule and "macro-nationalism," or Pan-Africanism, which stresses broader geographical groupings and African unity. The Pan-African tendency serves as a factor of cohesion in relations with the outside world, and ultimately the nature of the relationship between Africa and the rest of the world will be largely determined by whether Africans can unite or whether the present fragmentation remains. The other form of nationalism, which frequently clashes with the desire for African unity, comes to the fore in the relations between the African states themselves, and the interplay of the often contradictory motivations of the two nationalist concerns explains much of the international politics in Africa. The author examines the different approaches of various states toward wider cooperation and unity, and he assesses the progress made in this direction. Thiam emphasizes that the stronger inclination has clearly been toward protecting the sovereignty of the independent nations.

The second major influence on foreign policy in the view of the author is socialism. In the first section of his book, he describes the attraction of socialism to African leaders and explores the different conceptions of socialism African leaders have developed. He suggests that, although new forms of socialism will be created in Africa, the nature of the expression in a given country will incline it toward the principles of either the people's democracies or the Western democracies, and foreign policy will be influenced in the same direction. In the second part of his book, which examines specific international policies and events, the author establishes, in the opinion of this reader, that the urgent desire for economic development, with the consequent necessity of obtaining outside assistance, is a more general and fundamental influence on foreign policy than socialism, no matter how important an ideology socialism may be for domestic politics.

For a brief analysis of domestic and international factors affecting African foreign policies and an explanation of some of the international actions in contemporary Africa, this is a useful book. Its explanation of the determinants of policy and the application of this theory to actual practices, however, remains at a very general level and does not contribute much in the way of new analytical or factual knowledge. But when one remembers that the author is an important African leader and the book can be viewed as a significant revelation of his outlook and attitudes, then the value of the book is enhanced and respect increases for the calm, rather detached manner in which it is written.

Whereas Thiam's book presents a few broad explanatory theses documented briefly with examples which are incompletely analyzed, Dumont's *False Start in Africa* abounds with specific, detailed references without a sufficient theoretical framework to organize the multiplicity of facts into convincing generalizations. If one is seeking a catalog of mistakes and malpractices in African developmental efforts, this book is an ideal source. Dumont explores, and in many instances offers remedies for, the harmful results of colonial exploitation, the misguided programs of post-colonial aid projects, and the negative contributions made by the practices of many leaders of independent Africa. His targets range from the faulty use of land and machinery to international trade policies and the educational system, to mention only a very few of the multitude. His harsh criticisms are based, however, on a genuine concern for the welfare of the individual human beings who suffer from the wasted opportunities and on an underlying optimism that proper policies and actions can remove the hindrances to African development.

Many of his criticisms are directed at rather obvious targets—e.g., corruption, inflated benefits for elites, or squandering of public funds on prestige items—but much of his discussion, particularly of agricultural problems, will afford new insights to the non-specialist on the extremely difficult circumstances which must be confronted in this area. The concept of underdevelopment is given vivid, concrete meaning through his description of conditions in much of Africa.

Without denying the existence of the innumerable faults he cites, one can question his treatment of many of them. In many instances he discusses problems in complete isolation from the larger political and sociological context, and his analysis and prescriptions imply all kinds of assumptions which cannot always be granted. The causal factors in some of the problems may extend beyond those he mentions, and the ramifications of some of his reforms in areas beyond his specific target are unrealistically and dangerously ignored. The political mechanisms necessary to implement some of his suggestions might lead to consequences equally as undesirable as the original problem to be solved. This does not mean that reforms are not needed and should not be sought; rather, it indicates the need for a greater understanding of the complex relationship of the multiple factors which are involved in the modernization of underdeveloped societies. Especially in regard to agricultural matters Dumont contributes to this understanding; and perhaps much of the specific data which he furnishes on other problems might be useful to those constructing or testing broader and more systematic theories. In addition to this some of his suggestions are obviously informed by good sense and sound experience and should be given attention by those in responsible positions.—CHARLES S. ROOKS, *Duke University.*

The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration. By ANDREW M. SCOTT. (New York: Random House, 1965. Pp 186. $1.95.)

Scholars engaged in the study of international politics have recognized for a long time that formal relations among governments make up only a part—and not always the most important part—of the field of international relations. Of equal if not greater importance, quite often, are the informal relations between non-governmental and quasi-governmental institutions or the relations between the government of one country and the people of another. It is primarily with this last type of informal international relations (or "informal penetration") that Professor Scott is concerned in this book. Specifically the area of study is defined by Professor Scott as "the means by which agents or instruments of one country gain access to the population or processes of another . . . with or without the approval of the government of the second country" (p. 4). Such penetration can be overt or covert and it can be carried out for purposes of attack or defense.

It is a major thesis of this book that the rise in frequency and scope in informal penetration since World War I amounts to a veritable revolution in statecraft. It is claimed: (1) that massive informal penetration has become a distinguishing characteristic between the international politics before and after World War I; (2) that informal penetration has been important in changing the countries so affected; and (3) that informal penetration has reduced the territorial inviolability of nation states thus changing the functioning of the international system. The major reasons for the increase of informal penetration in modern international politics are said to be the

growth in importance of public opinion, the development of strong ideological cleavages, the revolution in technology, the introduction of nuclear weaponry, and the economic dependence of underdeveloped countries on the developed nations.

The structure of the book is roughly as follows. Chapter One attempts to establish a theoretical framework within which to organize the mass of international behavior that would fall into the category of informal penetration. Portions of the theoretical framework serve as an organizing device for the discussion that follows. The next two chapters contain case studies of informal penetration. Soviet and Nazi experiences are used as illustrations of informal penetration for purposes of attack, while American experience is used as an illustration of penetration for defense. Chapter Four deals with the fundamental problem of why some nations seem more vulnerable to penetration than others. Chapter Five deals with penetration by international organizations. The final chapter appropriately is a discussion of the effect of informal penetration upon the international system.

The discussion of the practices of informal penetration by various nations and by international organizations seemed to me to contain little with which one would quibble, but they contained little in the way of new data or new theoretical insight. Of greater interest were the theoretical discussion in Chapter One, the discussion on disloyalty and ideology in Chapter Four, and the final chapter on the effects of informal penetration on the international system.

I certainly do not agree with the author on many points. For example, I accept the contention that informal penetration has increased greatly since World War I. But I would suggest that informal penetration was widespread before the War as well, though the forms of penetration may have varied to be sure. Nor do I think that penetration has affected the international system anywhere as much as Professor Scott says it does.

Such disagreements not withstanding, I found the chapters in question interesting and stimulating reading. The discussion of disloyalty and ideology in Chapter Four was thought provoking. Indeed the whole chapter contained a number of useful insights and interesting points. I only wished that the treatment of the problem were less brief. It is true, of course, that as Professor Scott points out little is known as yet about the process of political socialization. Yet unless I am very much mistaken we know more than is suggested in the chapter. Of course, lack of space may have been an important factor in setting limits to the discussion of the problem. For myself I would have much preferred drastic cuts in other places and more extensive discussion of this problem.—A. F. K. Organski, *University of Michigan.*

Ideas, Ideals, and American Diplomacy. By Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. Pp. xiii, 205. $2.25.)

This is a delightful little book that does precisely what the author claims he attempted to do: "summarize the major themes that have guided the historic course of American diplomacy." It can be recommended highly as supplementary reading for courses in American diplomacy and for the informed public. It shows clearly that American foreign policy has traditionally been a mixture of ideals and concrete national interests supported by whatever rationalizations were necessary to justify the nation's behavior.

Especially well-done are the chapters on isolationism, the idea of mission, and manifest destiny—themes Ekirch traces from the colonial period and which he claims dominated American policy to 1850. Later they merged smoothly into such movements as imperialism and anti-foreignism.

Underlying all the forces discussed there has been, Ekirch claims, a steadily growing nationalism that, unfortunately, contained an excess of egoism and ethnocentrism. Quite often, the author asserts, this was a selfish and inhumane nationalism that claimed more rights for Americans than Americans were willing to allow others. Justifying their dispossession of the Indians, the seizures of foreign territory, or hostility to immigrants was, therefore, not much of a moral problem for most Americans. Consensus on both the rightness and righteousness of United States behavior appears to have been overwhelming.

Professor Ekirch gives the impression, however, that there has been no such overwhelming consensus supporting American behavior in the twentieth century. Drives for expansion abroad, peace and democracy, the renunciation of war, world leadership under arms, and containment of the communist movement have all been accompanied by far more disagreement and debate than seemed to prevail in the nineteenth century. One reason seems to be that the twentieth century has become an "age of dilemmas" not only for the United States but for all states struggling to cope with a myriad of new problems for which the old themes fail to provide answers. Another reason seems to be what Ekirch sees as the implacable determination of the United States to achieve and maintain global economic and political leadership in a world that has an almost equally implacable determination not to follow that leadership without at least some questioning

by both Americans and foreigners. It is this relentless urge for leadership that the author sees as the mainspring for the policies of all our strong policy-makers from Theodore Roosevelt to Lyndon Johnson. It was this urge, it is argued, that generated FDR's interventionism, although it was performed in the name of national defense and with, probably, an exaggerated fear of the threat to American security. The Truman Doctrine and the containment policy are described as responses to this urge also. Thus the cold war is interpreted as essentially a competition for leadership between the super-powers. While this rivalry is not condemned, the author seems to feel that American policy has been applied with more crudeness than has been necessary, especially in America's determination to maintain "peace by force."

Although Ekirch tends to be rather critical of American policy throughout history, his criticism is moderate and not carried to the point of spoiling the quite careful and competent level of scholarship that is sustained throughout the entire book. One is left with the impression that the author is just a bit sad that American society has never been quite as sophisticated as he wishes it had been, or that at least it would show more sign of becoming so.—WILLARD RANGE, *University of Georgia.*

Annihilation and Utopia: The Principles of International Politics. By ERROL E. HARRIS. (New York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1966. Pp. 331. $7.50.)

Technicians concerned primarily with national defense strategy probably will choose to ignore the challenge posed by Professor Harris' stimulating evaluation of contemporary problems of peace and security. For these technicians, who have engineered the theoretical analysis which constitutes the mainstream of American thought on national security policies, will find it difficult to extend this study serious consideration because it examines dimensions that resist quantitative expression and because it eschews consideration of war as a mechanical problem. Yet as Professor Kissinger has recently pointed out, explicitly and implicitly, in his anthology *Problems of National Strategy*, "national security policy is not primarily a technical problem, but a challenge to political understanding and, ultimately, to philosophical insight." What the author has sought to do in *Annihilation and Utopia* is to expand the constricted political horizons and relieve the philosophical poverty which so often in the past has been characteristic of the technician's approach.

This is not to suggest that all applications of quantitative techniques are cursed with congenital sterility; nor, I hasten to add, that Mr. Harris has succeeded in providing a formula for "instant" peace. Indeed his solution is both distant and, in the contemporary sense, utopian. For the author is convinced that current policies fail to offer *logical* methods with which to counter the present drift toward the certain annihilation of civilization, and that the only *realistic* and *responsible* means of guaranteeing human political survival lies in a federated world union.

To the author—a professor of philosophy at the University of Kansas—the nub of the current international predicament is that "for the first time in history, the nations find themselves in the dilemma that their means of self-defense are equally the means of self-destruction, and their attempts to preserve what they value most are liable to result only in the destruction of everything they hold most dear" (p. 27). Although he concludes from this premise that war is no longer capable of performing "any function as an instrument of policy," he believes that unilaterally renouncing the use of force would prove too tempting to "political gangsters" who would destroy that which we value most. However Mr. Harris insists that there is no need to defend civilization to the point of extinction or to place democracy at the mercy of unscrupulous adventurers, "so long as we can assume that men, by and large, are sensible enough to take national measures to meet the predicament in which the contemporary world flounders" (p. 22).

These problems of peace and security the author divides into three broad phases—Part I, "The State and War," Part II, "The Conditions of Peace," and Part III, "The Ideological Conflict." Under the initial topic he scrutinizes war as a social institution, sovereign authority and power, international law and organs, the use and control of force, and the moral implications of war. Here he argues persuasively that international organs are ineffectual because of the overemphasis on national sovereignty, that deterrence systems are "irrational and absurd" because thermonuclear war is an unacceptable risk, that 'pacifism proper is beyond the realm of politics and is in effect the abandonment of political methods altogether" (p. 132), and that disarmament is consequent upon, not a means to, international order and law. Moreover, he believes that these solitary programs are inherently contradictory. In Part II the author subjects to incisive analysis the myth of national self-determination, the philosophical and legal principles of world order, and the conditions and socio-political obstacles to a world community. He contends that, although "the obstacles and difficulties to world integration are real and formidable," it "is by no means established" that they are insuperable (p. 225). He acknowledges that the ideologi-

cal conflict, discussed in Part III, is most challenging but refuses to believe that it warrants despair. Thus he analyzes the ideological antithesis, the relationship of democracy and communism to world order, and the possibility of reconciliation. By focusing on Marxist "humanism," Mr. Harris suggests that a resolution of ideological differences may lie in the apparent shift of communist thought toward Existentialism. However in a more pragmatic vein, he believes that "if both regimes [democracy and communism] could be brought under one world government by some international constitutional device [i.e., a federal system], neither need modify their fundamental beliefs" (p. 285).

To the reviewer Mr. Harris' cogent observations frequently suggest implications that carry beyond the author's consideration. For instance, is "war" today actually incapable of advancing national policies? Do nuclear devices pose the ultimate threat to civilization? Can a world government, sufficiently strong to provide international order, also guarantee that it will not fall victim to a new, higher form of fascism which would be equally repugnant to democracy and communism? Or if the supranational body should not possess such power, would it be able to prevent "civil" war? Can "fear" provoke the necessary development of human rationality? If mankind were motivated to sufficient rationality to create a viable world government, could they not make any one of several insitutions function to establish peace?

Answers to these and scores of other exceptions obviously depend on taking a long look at historical experience, human behavior, and political universals. And yet to be provoked to these questions, and subsequently to be stimulated to logical, realistic rejoinders, is in this reviewer's opinion the ultimate merit of this book. But readers should be forewarned that the author has not been gentle in his challenge: "Those who scoff at the idea [of world government] as unrealistic must face the question whether the alternatives are not both more ridiculous and finally disastrous."—Richard Dean Burns, *California State College, Los Angeles.*

Doctrines of Imperialism. By A. P. Thornton. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965. Pp. 226. $5.95, cloth; $2.95 paper.)

The Colonizer and the Colonized. By Albert Memmi. Translated by Howard Greenfeld. Introduction by Jean-Paul Sartre (1957). (New York: The Orion Press, 1965. Pp. xviii, 153. $4.50.)

Both of our authors, donnish historian of ideas and leftist intellectual of the French tradition, differing as widely in outlook as do their books in scope, are at one in believing that their present writings have relevance for contemporary world politics. As the subject is imperialism, this belief is at once true and untrue. True, because the war of words over this phenomenon rages unabated, with great, if uncalculable, effect on men's hearts, minds and actions. Yet the authors' hope is also in part unjustified, for there has been a crucial shift in the terms of the battle, from the former dispute over the desirability and justice of imperialism, to the present question of its historical meaning and consequences. And neither really comes to grips with the latter problem.

Thornton's accurately entitled book is an extension of his previous work, *The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies*, and, like the latter, is primarily a study in the history of ideas, of the explicit justifications for and attacks on imperialism, rather than an inquiry into the causes of the process. Thus, he defines imperialism in terms of the subjective human reaction to events, rather than the events themselves: "At its heart is the image of dominance, of power asserted" (p. 2). So broad is this that at one point he even describes society's impress on youth, women, and whatnot as forms of imperialism.

More telling, perhaps, is Thornton's observation, in the course of a catalogue of the various rationalizations offered by French, German, British, and Russian proponents of foreign acquisition, that all of the rhetoric was more than anything else an expression of rampant nationalism. Likewise suggestive is his portrayal of 9th to 12th Century Europe as an economically colonized area of "Asia" (principally the Moslem cultures). This is explicitly analogized to the relation of Europe to Africa in the 19th Century (p. 127). On this reading, the Crusades appear as a colonial rebellion against Asia's commercial dominance [but why? and why just then? Alas! no answer is offered]: the Crusades contain "the embryo of every species of European imperialism . . . afterwards."

The perspective from which this essay is launched is impressively urbane and detached, though for someone without Professor Thornton's broad historical acquaintance, the occasionally rather self-indulgent elegance of its writing is sometimes hard to follow. That it does not contribute to our understanding of the aspect of the imperialism question that has greatest contemporary significance—the controversy over the part played by imperialism in the economic development of capitalism, and its effect on current conditions in the Third world—is not in itself a criticism of the book, since this presumably was not its author's intent. But this fact does limit its usefulness for most political scientists.

Albert Memmi's short essay, written in an

execrably choppy, elliptical style (the fault of the translation?) sets before us an account of what the author believes to be the inescapable tendencies of psychology and attitude that issue from the relationship of colonizer to colonized. His birth as a Tunisian Jew qualified him to comment; and his French education and associations with the French Left gave him access to that group, so that when in 1957 he announced his conclusion [no hope for reform or gradual solutions, such as assimilation; the necessity of a complete, revolutionary break with the past, including the cultural], it had, we are told, a considerable impact on the evolution of the attitude of the European Left toward the Algerian war. Its retrospective value is presumably enhanced by Memmi's successful prediction (only implicit, to be sure, for he stops short of saying so openly) that the Europeans would have to get out.

This American edition of Memmi's book is "dedicated to the American Negro, also colonized." And there are, indeed, obvious parallels between the colonial psychological stereotypes Memmi describes [Arab seen by European as lazy, shiftless, feckless; the victim's induced self-contempt and tacit acceptance of the all-powerful oppressor's values], and the well-known facts of American racial folklore. This sort of thing has been often noted (see, for instance, the much subtler and more powerful development of these themes in *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*). But the applicability of Memmi's Maghrebi experience to the situation of other disadvantaged groups is probably less than he imagines, especially in North and South America, where assimilation of the underdog into the dominant group—though perhaps not assured—seems still the most viable possibility, if only by reason of numbers. This little book will have scant interest for the political scientist, but, like the better known writings of Frantz Fanon, may provide a certain catharsis for the Hotspurs of the U. S. Negro movement.—James W. Roberts, *University of Maine, Portland.*

Oil and Public Opinion in the Middle East. By David Hirst. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 127. $6.00.)

There is hardly a topic pertaining to the Middle East whose discussion has been characterized by more fear, more anxiety, more dogmatism, and more downright ignorance on the part of the general public as well as some students of international affairs than Middle Eastern oil. Perhaps because of the global and regional political struggles within whose contexts it is ordinarily viewed, with all the emotional and ideological élan that these often entail, and perhaps because of an inadequate appreciation of the intricate workings of the international oil industry, Westerners and Middle Easterners alike have been guilty of the many erroneous generalizations about this highly complex subject. On the one hand many Middle Eastern nationalists tend to regard the oil companies in their midst as nothing more than instruments of western "imperialism" and "neo-colonialism," while, on the other, many Westerners look upon the Middle Eastern nationalists as irresponsible firebrands who, if given half a chance, would nationalize the oil companies and who might in a fit of spiteful frenzy deprive Western Europe of its most vital source of energy. Fortunately, however, a number of worthy books on Middle Eastern oil have appeared in recent years and one can only hope that they will help dispel some of these all too rampant misconceptions. To that end, the work of David Hirst, the Beirut correspondent of the *Guardian*, is a welcome addition.

Oil and Public Opinion in the Middle East is divided into two parts. In the first part, Hirst seeks "to examine not merely Middle East public opinion on oil, in so far as that is regarded as separate and distinct from official government opinion, but all those views, regardless of their origin, which can be considered a significant contribution to Middle East opinion as a whole." In doing so Hirst eschews what might be termed the sociological approach mainly on the grounds that genuine freedom of expression as we know it in the West hardly exists in much of the Middle East, and partly because he feels that there are no sharply distinct opinions on oil beyond what may be broadly classified as informed and ill-informed. Instead, Hirst relies in the main on newspapers, official government positions, and the statements of prominent Middle Eastern personalities who are concerned with the subject of oil. So what emerges from Hirst's efforts is not really a study of public opinion, but a range of views which could be categorized as communist, nationalist and traditionalist.

The second part is devoted to two case studies aimed at demonstrating the behavior of Middle Eastern public opinion in two specific instances. The first deals with the negotiations between the Iraqi Government of General Kassem and the Iraqi Petroleum Company, while the second concentrates on the establishment and development of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Hirst feels that these two cases illustrate two opposing tendencies in the Middle East. On the one hand, the Iraqi-IPC negotiations show how one government attempted to use the "lower level" of public opinion to make political capital for the regime, while, on the other hand, OPEC has attempted to insulate oil from the masses and to appeal instead to

the "higher level" of opinion. Just exactly who constitutes the "lower" and "higher" levels is not exactly clear.

Despite methodological difficulties, Hirst's work is perceptive and insightful. Though students of the Middle East might find little that is new in it, they may well be stimulated by it into doing further research into this exceedingly fascinating subject.—SAMIR N. ANABTAWI, *Vanderbilt University.*

The United States and Japan. ED. BY HERBERT PASSIN for the American Assembly. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. Pp. ix, 174. $3.95.)

During the Fall of 1965 in Tokyo, a number of American observers (including this reviewer) remarked on the changed style of Japanese-American relations. At the same time, Ambassador Edwin Reischauer was successfully closing out five years of dedicated effort to restore the "broken Japanese-American dialogue." Visiting American officials were obsessed with United States' commitments in Vietnam and more than a little impatient with what they called Japanese vacillation in arriving at a clearcut definition of Japan's international identity. Meanwhile, Premier Sato was warning Ambassador Reischauer that America should not take Japan for granted. Obviously Japanese-American relations had reached a turning point.

On October 28, 1965, seventy-one Americans gathered at Arden House, Harriman, New York, for the 28th American Assembly devoted to three days' discussion of the subject, "The United States and Japan." They had before them a set of background papers edited by Herbert Passin, Professor of Sociology, East Asian Institute, Columbia University. In a closing plenary session on October 31, the delegates approved a report of findings and recommendations. The preliminary papers, shaped by discussion and this final report, eventually became the publication reviewed.

The timing of the publication was appropriate: 1965 marked the twentieth anniversary of Japan's defeat and occupation by the United States; the year saw completion of a shift in Japan's status from hated enemy to important ally and also "from dependence to independence," to use a Japanese phrase. Looking to the future (between 1965 and 1970) several pressing problems were apparent: the Security Treaty, which soon comes up for reconsideration, American bases in Japan, and the status of Okinawa. These immediate issues, however, had to be viewed against a background of U. S.-Japanese relations stretching back over a long period.

Extreme fluctuation in images (described by Edward Seidensticker, Chap. 1)—held by Americans and by Japanese—are certainly as important as matters of the moment. Furthermore, all of the immediate issues have arisen out of "The legacy of the Occupation" (dealt with systematically by Robert Ward, Chap. 2), which continued "to set an important part of the agenda of current United States-Japanese relations." The full range of political issues (described by Lawrence Olson, Chap. 3) shows how deeply they are intertwined with domestic political conflicts. For example, several of the observers demonstrate that Americans will have to face up to the Okinawan problem (which the Japanese, Kinhide Mushakoji, call a potential "second Trieste") much sooner than we might like.

These background factors in turn help explain the first major finding of the American Assembly, namely, that there is a sharp difference in Japanese and American attitudes toward world responsibilities. Furthermore there is a genuine disparity of power. Although Japan is America's second trading partner (as William Lockwood, Chap. 4, points out), it accounts for only one-twelfth of American international trade; the U. S. is Japan's most important trade partner and accounts for one-third of Japan's world trade. "The result is that the two countries often look at the same event from opposite ends of the telescope."

The American Assembly also found that the two nations approach many situations from completely different premises. Illustrations include the respective Japanese and American attitudes toward mainland China on the one hand and Taiwan on the other. One author (Kinhide Mushakoji, Chap. 5) presented "The View from Japan" and brought out two important points: (1) the Sino-Soviet split shifts the world's crisis zone from Berlin to Asia; and (2) too much pressure for a commitment on the part of Japan and for an American alignment may seriously weaken Japan's internal stability.

As a matter of fact, it is rather strange that the final publication of *The United States and Japan* included only one description of Japanese attitudes by a Japanese. In addition to the Mushakoji piece, there was available the text of an address delivered to the American Assembly October 29, 1965 by Dr. Shigeharu Matsumoto, Director of the International House of Japan (later published, "The United States and Japan," *Japan Society Forum*, Vol. XIII, No. 4, January 2, 1966). The Matsumoto address underlined the fourth and final finding of the Assembly to the effect that, despite twenty years' close interaction, defective communication between Japan and the United States (often to the point of serious misconception) has led to a failure to develop understanding or easy social relationships.

In what the editor called "a timid, suborbital venture" ("The Future," Chap. 6), the volume closes with a probe into the atmosphere of the period 1965–1975. Many of the predictions by Herbert Passin, as well as recommendations by the Assembly, are being borne out in current developments: Japan should be (and is becoming) a more active participant in the international community; Japan should play (and is playing) an increasing role in aiding development in South and Southeast Asia; the United States and Japan should enter upon (and are indeed entering upon) negotiations looking to reducing the "American presence" in the form of military bases in Japan and, most immediate, to enlargement of the scope and improvement of the quality of Civil Administration in Okinawa. Assembly findings and the background papers in the published volume show clearly that U. S.-Japan cultural relations must extend "beyond polite conventions," although the task will be difficult in light of the disparate societies and language barrier.

Finally, by implication in the volume reviewed and explicitly stated in the Assembly recommendations, American observers would welcome a frank expression of opinions by Japanese in a counterpart of the volume, *The United States and Japan*.—ARDATH W. BURKS, *Rutgers—the State University*.

The Rule of Law in European Integration: The Path of the Schuman Plan. By STUART A. SCHEINGOLD. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965. Pp. xiii, 331. $7.50.)

Unlike any of its international antecedents, the Court of Justice of the European Communities possesses unconditional compulsory jurisdiction, accepts complaints by individuals and common organs along with those of states, leaves no choice to the parties concerning the judges, or the legal principles to be applied in any particular case, and pronounces judgments with direct effect upon municipal legal structures and individuals in the member states. Unlike typical federal courts of general or constitutional jurisdiction, the European Court operates within a strictly circumscribed functional sphere and, in reviewing executive decisions, it is in principle barred from evaluating the underlying substantive policy criteria. Operating in a fluid setting which can at best be located somewhere on the continuum from the international to the federal, the European Court is naturally more vulnerable than traditional courts to conflict between the stabilizing "normative" and the evolutionary "political" judicial roles. The inherent function of the Court of Justice, to protect the system from disruption and to legitimize actions taken by political branches, clashes with the unfinished nature of the European Community and the concomitant requirement to judge present action in terms of unachieved but declared goals.

This is the "essential dilemma" underlying Scheingold's study of eleven major disputes settled by the European Court in the phase of its operation within the framework of the Coal and Steel Community. The Court must seek out the narrow path between the Scylla of "devitalizing the integrative process" by a too strict application of the law and the Charybdis of endangering the accomplishments by assuming excessive political burdens. Inherent in the situation is a threat to the court itself, since straying from the path could make it a "useless appendage," its decision simply disregarded.

Scheingold's cases are grouped by the degree of normative rigidity of the Court's action. From early strict interpretation he sees a movement to a "functional" attitude of allowing much freedom in pursuit of Community goals, finally moderated by a recognition of the unavoidable limitations in a partial integrative process. A uniform chapter outline presents in each case the relevant treaty provisions, the substantive or "political" background of the legal dispute, the arguments of the parties, the Court's reasoning and the consequences of its decision. While this method makes for monotonous reading, the selection of cases—apart from its intended purpose of demonstrating "the role which the court has assumed and the standards by which to judge its success"—reveals the nature of major conflicts of interest during the early years of the Coal and Steel Community, as well as how Community decisions have affected the firms and government policies in the member states.

Scheingold makes clear that he is not writing a legal manual and his discussion of structure and procedures is restricted to the essentials. Yet his evaluative statements in discussing individual cases are rather legalistic, and their significance in establishing criteria for judging the Court's political role is not always clear. His conclusions are political, as the entire book was apparently intended to be, but the chosen framework—the pre-Rome Treaty period—makes them inevitably somewhat less than vital. He seems to be most worried that the unfinished nature of the Coal and Steel Community and its narrow functional scope will divert to the court an excessive share of conflicts of interest, as an increasing number of claimants find the limited political-administrative structure incapable of satisfying them. In the Court's own activity he most fears the danger of too strict application of the Paris Treaty. He nevertheless recognizes that the High Authority, which has been in general excessively cautious, is

unlikely to invite a restrictive censure. The Court's practice reveals in fact a predominantly liberal, "teleological" interpretation of Community law, often prodding the executive to more resolute integrative action rather than stultifying progress. In the end, therefore, the Court is vindicated, making in the author's view an impressive contribution to integration, both actively, by its case law, and passively by its indirect influence upon the Community bargaining process.

As it happens, the Court's liberal attitude has continued in the eight years since it acquired jurisdiction over the general Common Market, and if anything its stature has grown in the process despite recurrent threats to the integrity of the supranational executive. All this has in fact occurred while the twin evils of partial integration and a reluctant executive were relieved, at least in part, by the extension of Community scope to the general Common Market, whose Commission has proved to be more activist than the ECSC's High Authority. Consequently, *The Rule of Law in European Integration* should retain a historical value as an introduction to major politico-legal problems of the early period of European integration, and as a brave attempt, however limited, to include in the domain of political science a subject of study heretofore monopolized by strictly legal scholars. At the same time it draws attention to the need of additional work, expanding the political side of his analysis and amending it in the light of developments since the Rome Treaty.—GEORGE STAMBUK, *The George Washington University.*

The United Nations Administrative Tribunal. BY BYUNG CHUL KOH. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 176. $4.00.)

The United Nations Administrative Tribunal is a strong contender for the title of least known unit of the United Nations system. The United Nations Secretariat is plagued not only by problems of world peace but also by those mundane employer-employee relations problems which afflict every bureaucracy. Two institutions exist to deal with these labor relations disputes, the Joint Appeals Board and the Administrative Tribunal. The latter, a judicial organ, has been submitted to intensive study by Byung Chul Koh.

The author discusses employment security as a problem for the United Nations personnel system, sketches the historical roots of the Administrative Tribunal in the League of Nations and elsewhere, and describes in detail the structure and functions of the Tribunal. The author introduces the book with an explicit statement regarding what he intends to do, which is good, and an equally explicit statement of what he does not purport to do, which is better. An attempt is made to overcome, or at least to compensate for, the basic weakness in a case study approach by relating the specific case to more general questions of employment security in bureaucratic organizations.

This brief book contains more than most people will ever want to know about the Administrative Tribunal and will probably stand as the definitive work on that agency for several years. Most students of international politics and organization can postpone reading this book indefinitely without serious consequence. The value of the book lies in its usefulness to those with specialized interests in international administration and adjudication.—DAVID BALDWIN, *Dartmouth College.*

The History of Treaties and International Politics. BY MARIO TOSCANO. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xv, 685. $13.50.)

This volume is not only a description of the sources of diplomatic history of the principal countries, but also an analysis of the relative value of these sources and of their content for the period of the two World Wars.

The author begins with a description of international relations as an academic discipline in Italy, France, Great Britain and the United States, indicating the tendency to broaden the study from an interpretation of treaties, other diplomatic documents and the memoirs of statesmen, to include economic, geographic, demographic, technological, legal, and cultural conditions and the immediate influence of domestic politics and public opinion upon decisions of governments on foreign policy. This tendency, especially prominent in the United States, is deplored by the author, if pushed too far, because it destroys the "autonomy" of the subject and identifies it with general history and the sociology of international relations (p. 11).

The book discusses the earlier collections of treaties and diplomatic documents going back to the fifteenth century, the reasons for secrecy and for publication, and the increasing abundance of such publication in private collections, and in official publications by states and international organizations. The importance, the character, and the availability of official and unofficial archives in the principal countries is also discussed.

The researcher in the field will profit by the author's careful assessment of the value of the various types of diplomatic documents, both formal and informal, and of memoirs and biographical materials. For the recent period he evaluates the "colored books" published by

governments for propaganda purposes, the privately and officially published collections of documents, and the memoirs, letters and papers of statesmen from eighteen countries including the United States, most European countries and Turkey, China and Japan.

American readers will be especially interested in his discussion, often detailed, of memoirs and biographies of Theodore Roosevelt, John Hay, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, Woodrow Wilson, Edward M. House, Robert Lansing, David Hunter Miller, James T. Shotwell, James W. Gerard, Hugh Gibson, and Henry White with reference to World War I; and of Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles, Admiral Wm. Leahy, Harry Hopkins, Charles G. Dawes, John G. Winant, William C. Bullitt, Joseph E. Davies, William E. Dodd, Hugh Wilson, Claude Bowers, Carlton Hayes, William Phillips, Joseph Grew, Robert Murphy, Henry L. Stimson, Edward Stettinus, Harry Truman, James T. Byrnes, Dwight Eisenhower, and others in reference to World War II.

The author's examination of memoir material from other countries is equally voluminous. He not only appraises the influence of the memoir writer and the value of his writings for understanding the international transactions in which he was engaged, but often narrates particular transactions and comments on the motives for decisions and their wisdom as indicated by subsequent history. Churchill's memoirs are appraised as of major importance for understanding the origin and conduct of both World Wars and of literary quality rivaled only by those of General DeGaulle (pp. 74, 495–497). He emphasizes Churchill's insistence on civilian dominance over the military, even on military decisions, and his efforts to treat Germany with moderation after its defeat and the Soviet Union with caution during the war. He comments on the importance of DeGaulle's memoirs though he finds grounds for criticizing their accuracy in Italian relations. They, however, make clear the often strained relations of "Free France" with the allies and its close relations with the Soviet Union and the communist French resistance after Soviet entry into the war (pp. 478–480). The eighteen pages devoted to the memoirs of Konoye, Shigemetsu, Togo and other Japanese statesmen (pp. 553–570) throw much light on diplomacy before Pearl Harbor and before Hiroshima in a manner not wholly a credit to the perceptions of the United States.

This well indexed volume will be of great value to students of international relations, diplomatic history, and the two World Wars, and the review of numerous memoirs cannot but interest many general readers.—QUINCY WRIGHT, *Rice University.*

The United States and Latin American Wars, 1932–1942. By BRYCE WOOD. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. vii, 519. $11.00.)

Bryce Wood combines a profound grasp of the fundamentals of international politics with firm understanding of the detailed realities of Latin American international relations. In consequence, this authoritative study deserves scrutiny alike by generalists in foreign policy and experts in Latin American affairs. The latter will discover new light on a vital period of conflicts and open warfare (1932–42) in South America marked by the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay, the Leticia dispute between Peru and Colombia and the Marañón conflict between Peru and Ecuador. The careful and painstaking original research underlying the author's study should provide a baseline for future inquiries and clear away much of the underbrush that has obscured the role of the principal Latin American states and those more remote from the conflicts, particularly the United States.

On another level, however, *The United States and Latin Latin American Wars* is a treatise of enduring values. It provides generalists with hard empirical data for analyzing and interpreting the larger issues in international affairs. It invites serious discussion of the relation between the pursuit of peace and of justice, the expression of solicitude or goodwill and the exercise of power, the blending of internationalism and national power in the building of multilateral structures, and the subtle connection between influence abroad and the alternatives of assertiveness or self-denial in the realm of force. Neither cynics nor utopians help us to grapple with such complexities. Policy-makers all too often surround policy formulations with an aura of sanctity that inhibits searching analysis. The virtue of Bryce Wood's latest volume (his earlier companion volume traced the origins and practice of "the Good Neighbor Policy") is its steadfast and fearless analysis of basic issues.

Those who took part in writing the scenario of international relations in Latin America over the past century and a half have much to tell us about the fundamental problems. The nineteenth century was the era of domination by Europe. In successive disputes, Latin American states customarily called on European governments or monarchs to arbitrate. After 1910, not a single European boundary dispute was settled by a European arbitrator. From 1914 to 1932, the prestige of the United States rose as Europe declined, and in the 1920's it is noteworthy that at a time when Washington was criticized for intervention, the states of South and Central America did not hesitate to call on the United

States as an impartial arbitrator. In the period that followed, the United States "was less concerned with stopping the fighting than with the avoidance of charges that Washington was exerting pressure on either belligerent" (p. 14). Wood observes: "In no comparable period following 1830 were there so many conflicts between states in the Americas. . . ." (Ibid.)

Throughout the period of the Good Neighbor, "the United States made no effort to hide its intention to refrain from using force in any way" (p. 359). Three elements dominated U. S. policy: a lasting concern for peace, a determination to avoid the use of force and an overwhelming desire to avoid Latin American resentment. The policy in Dean Acheson's phrase was predicated on "the renunciation of domination" and whereas this was calculated to maximize good will it also had the effect of minimizing our influence. In Bryce Wood's language: ". . . there was no reasonable alternative to a policy aimed at the cultivation of good will when coercion was renounced. The averting of anger against himself is the first objective of an empty-handed pacificator" (p. 365). In its appeals to Latin states, the Department of State stressed "theatricals" or the ceremonial recognition of states who signed armistices or treaties. Material pressures gave way to nonmaterial rewards. Leadership was "exercised by means no stronger than those of example, exhortation and unwearying helpfulness—in a word, solicitude" (p. 379).

Wood is scrupulously fair in crediting our diplomats and policy-makers with the strengths of a policy founded on restraint and good neighborliness. They espoused no selfish interests in the territorial disputes of South America. The disinterestedness of their objectives was matched by great probity in diplomacy and mediation. They profited from the "latent prestige of power, even though held in check. Coercion aside, the weight of the opinion of the government of the United States was greater than that of the other governments" (p. 375). But the point which Wood persists in making in comparing past and present with the era of the Good Neighbor is that the United States' influence on Latin American disputes declined during the years 1932–1942. He summarizes his views by noting the increase in "the ability of the United States to use its prestige as a great power more effectively behind the shield of the Organization of the American States than in the days when it refrained from unilateral coercion . . ." (p. 386).

Generalists will ponder for years to come the basic principles that derive from this superb study.—KENNETH W. THOMPSON, *Rockefeller Foundation.*

American Support for Free Elections Abroad. By THEODORE PAUL WRIGHT, JR. (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1964. Pp. 184. $4.50.)

Professor Wright, in his book, *American Support for Free Elections Abroad,* sets out to investigate nine case studies of American intervention in foreign countries (primarily in Latin America) in support of free democratic elections. The author's central theme and purpose in this exhaustive case presentation is to demonstrate that United States policy in this area has been almost uniformly based on faulty assumptions.

Professor Wright points out that the American policy of supporting free elections typically grew out of a desire to achieve stability in the target country. The State Department decision-makers operated under the assumption that Latin American instability derived primarily from the activities of the losers of elections who had been cheated out of victory by electoral fraud or violence. Thus, American intervention in support of free and fair elections was seen as a way of ensuring the electoral victory of the legitimate majority and, therefore, as a guarantor of stability.

Wright shows this line of reasoning to be faulty in several respects. First, the absence of genuine continuing political parties in Middle America made analogies with North American experience quite spurious. Second, American policy-makers were very slow in recognizing that Latin American politicians saw elections in purely instrumental terms; no value was placed on free elections by any faction unless that faction stood to gain from such elections. Third, political instability did not result exclusively from the frustrations of losers of fraudulent elections, as the losers usually claimed, but rather from the ambitions of any group of "outs" which might revolt, claiming electoral fraud, regardless of the merits of their claims. For these reasons, therefore, U. S. intervention in favor of free and fair elections would not necessarily guarantee political stability at all.

Ironically, as Professor Wright points out, the American goal of government stability in the target countries has been achieved only where the policy of intervention in support of free elections has inadvertently boomeranged and led to the emergence of strong dictatorships, as in Nicaragua, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. As Wright points out, "Clearly there is something irrational about a policy which succeeds in its ultimate purpose, stability, only by failing in its ostensible immediate purpose—free elections." He concludes that the primary reason for the failure of the United States' policy was the total absence of the basic prerequisites of democracy in

Middle America. In such a situation, simple advocation of the mere forms of democracy was, of course, futile.

Doubtless, Professor Wright's book will take its place in the literature of international relations and may provide useful secondary source information and bibliography to students of American foreign policy. Its contributions lie in its narrative and interpretive treatment of the historical data of American policy *vis-à-vis* elections abroad. The narrative portions are presented in detail and the interpretation of the assumptions and results of the policy is persuasive.

The book, however, never quite escapes its very strong historical bias. In the author's choice of the case study approach, he neglects the theoretical dimensions of the problem and the place of the questions he asks in any larger theoretical framework. This shortcoming will prevent the book's attaining anything more than very modest significance.—David W. Abbott, *Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.*

REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

I

At a meeting on April 7, 1967, the Executive Committee of the American Political Science Association considered questions that had been raised as a result of information in the press on February 19, 1967, and later, that Operations and Policy Research, Inc. (OPR) had received some funds from foundations said to have received funds from Central Intelligence Agency sources. Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Executive Director of APSA, and Max M. Kampelman, Treasurer and Counsel of APSA, are President and Vice-President respectively of Operations and Policy Research, Inc. In the discussion that follows it should be kept in mind that the two officers of the Association do not hold parallel positions. As you doubtless know, the post of Executive Director of APSA is a full-time, appointive office. The Treasurer is nominated and elected annually, receives no pay, and must therefore be someone who donates his time to the Association.

On February 22, 1967, the President of APSA invited four past Presidents of APSA to serve as an *ad hoc* committee to inquire into (1) questions arising from the fact that Kirkpatrick and Kampelman hold office both in APSA and OPR, and (2) the broader and extremely complex problem of standards of behavior for all political scientists in their relationships with government agencies. This *ad hoc* committee consisted of:

Gabriel Almond, Chairman, Department of Political Science, Stanford University
R. Taylor Cole, Provost, Duke University
David B. Truman, Dean, Columbia College, Columbia University
C. Herman Pritchett, Department of Political Science, University of California at Santa Barbara (committee chairman)

The *ad hoc* committee reported to the President of APSA on March 30. At our meeting on April 7, we had that report before us, as well as letters and other communications from APSA members to various members of the Executive Committee.

We are announcing the results of our deliberations in this report, which, in letter form, is also being sent to every member of the Association.

As to the first problem, the members of the *ad hoc* committee found that:

1. The American Political Science Association has received no funds directly from any intelligence agency of the government, nor has it carried on any activities for any intelligence agency of government.

2. The Association has received no funds indirectly from any intelligence agency of government, with one possible exception. The Asia Foundation stated on March 21, 1967, that it had been the recipient of money from foundations named as conduits for CIA funds. The APSA has received grants from the Asia Foundation to finance memberships in the Association for a small number of Asian political scientists, subscriptions to the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW for a few Asian libraries, and travel grants to the APSA Annual Meetings for a few Asian political scientists studying in this country. Most other social science associations received comparable grants from the Asia Foundation. In addition, a small number of fellowships have been financed for Asians to participate in the Congressional Fellowship program. All of these programs were approved by the governing bodies of the Association, completely under Association control, reported and advertised in the REVIEW, and widely known by our members.

3. All grants, gifts, donations, and other income of the APSA have been reported in full detail annually in the Treasurer's Report, which is made available to all members of the Association at the annual business meeting. An independent audit of the financial affairs of the Association has been made every year by an established auditing firm of high reputation and the audit report has been made available to all officers and Council members.

4. Operations and Policy Research, Inc. is a small non-profit research organization created in 1955 by a group of social scientists, lawyers, and businessmen. It is completely separate from the American Political Science Association both organizationally and in physical location. OPR is governed by a Board of Trustees and has always had a full-time Executive Director as its principal administrative officer. Since its creation, Evron M. Kirkpatrick has been President and Max M. Kampelman has been Vice-President of OPR. OPR has done work on grants from government, business, and foundations. As stated in press reports, OPR's foundation grants included, among others, grants from foundations reported to have received money from CIA. These grants supported unclassified research completely under OPR control and a large part of the research under these grants has been completed and

included in OPR's substantial list of open publications.

The *ad hoc* committee summed up its findings in these words:

> Nothing that has come to our attention lends the slightest credence to concern that any use might have been made of the APSA for intelligence purposes. There was at no time any connection between OPR and the Association. Kirkpatrick and Kampelman's work with OPR was conducted on their own time, required a minor part of their attention, violated no policy of the Association with respect to outside activities of its staff, and involved no conflict of interest with their responsibilities to the APSA. . . . In conclusion, we think it appropriate to acknowledge, on behalf of the membership of our organization, the great services which both Kirkpatrick and Kampelman have rendered to the American Political Science Association.

In addition to these findings of the *ad hoc* committee, the Executive Committee considered the variety of views expressed by various members of the Association as to the possible damage, if any, to research abroad resulting from the recent series of disclosures about the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The members of the Executive Committee are probably as divided in their assessment of the extent of this damage as the members of the Association from whom they have heard. But they are united in their conviction that it would be inappropriate and unjust to respond to anxieties arising from these disclosures by condemning Kirkpatrick and Kampelman.

Upon full inquiry and reflection, therefore, the Executive Committee accepts and confirms the findings of the *ad hoc* committee and expresses the highest confidence in the conduct and motives of Kirkpatrick and Kampelman. Like the *ad hoc* committee, we wish to record our recognition of the dedication and service of these two men to the Association in the past and our full confidence in the value of their future services.

II

As to the second and more general problem referred to above, members of the Association may recall that at the September 1966 meeting of the Council of the Association, a motion was unanimously adopted that the President appoint an *ad hoc* committee to report to the Executive Committee in time for the Executive Committee to report to the Council in September 1967 on criteria to be applied to the professional activities of political scientists (*APSR*, Dec. 1966, p. 1079). The four members of the *ad hoc* committee appointed in February felt (rightly, in our view) that their most urgent task was to inquire into the matters discussed in Part I, above. Consequently, the *ad hoc* committee was unable, in the time available to it, to pursue the second and more general question. The *ad hoc* committee concluded, however, that:

> The rapid development of political science research in the past decade or two gives the relationship between government and the profession a salience it has not had in the past. We share with you an appreciation of the complexity and difficulty of the many issues which are raised by this development. We therefore welcome the initiative that was taken at the September 1966 meeting of the Council of the Association to explore alternative ways of dealing with the problem, and advise the Association regarding a proper course of action in this area. But we recognize that before any constructive consensus can be achieved, a great deal of work by a specially constituted committee will be essential.

The Executive Committee also took note of the fact that on March 29, 1967, a panel appointed by President Johnson and headed by Undersecretary of State Katzenbach recommended that the future policy of the United States Government should be, among other things, as follows:

> No Federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation's educational or private voluntary organizations. . . . In the judgement of this committee, no programs currently would justify any exception to this policy. At the same time, where the security of the nation may be at stake, it is impossible for this committee to state categorically now that there will never be a contingency in which overriding national security interests may require an exception—nor would it be credible to enunciate a policy which purported to do so.
>
> We therefore recommend that, in the event of such unusual contingencies, the interdepartmental review committee be permitted to make exceptions to the statement of policy, but only when overriding national security interests so require; only on a case-by-case basis; only where open sources of support are shown to be unavailable; and only when such exceptions receive the specific approval of the Secretaries of State and Defense. *In no event should any future exception be approved which involves any educational, philanthropic, or cultural organization.* (Emphasis added.)

In making the report public, President Johnson announced: "I accept this committee's proposed statement of policy and am directing all agencies of the Government to implement it fully." (*New York Times*, March 30, 1967)

Encouraging as it is, this action on the part of the government does not, we think, remove the obligation of the Association to consider the problems of professional standards, responsibilities, and conduct that moved the Council to adopt its resolution last September. The President of the Association has therefore appointed a new and larger committee to examine these questions. The members of this new Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities are:

Marver H. Bernstein (Chairman), Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

Stephen K. Bailey, Dean, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, and President Elect, American Society for Public Administration

Samuel H. Beer, Department of Government, Harvard University

Manning J. Dauer, Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of Florida

David Fellman, Vilas Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin

Harold D. Lasswell, Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law & Political Science, Yale University

Jack W. Peltason, Vice-Chancellor, Academic Affairs, University of California at Irvine, and Chancellor Elect, University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana

Wallace S. Sayre, Chairman, Department of Public Law and Government, Columbia University

Vernon Van Dyke, Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, and President, Midwest Conference of Political Scientists

Aaron B. Wildavsky, Chairman, Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley

The Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities has been asked to examine various proposals contained in the recent correspondence from our members. Hence the Committee will consider such questions as these:

What in fact are the varieties of relationships between government agencies and political scientists? What are the principal viewpoints among our members as to legitimate and proper conduct? Are there standards to which all or most of our members adhere, aspire, or would like to have endorsed in some way?

Should the Association adopt a code of professional ethics? If so, what should the code contain? Should the code apply to all members of the Association or only to officers? Should there be two different codes, one for officers and one for members? Should different professional or personal conduct be demanded from the Executive Director or Managing Editor of the REVIEW (both of whom are appointed and receive salaries from APSA) than from elected officers of the Association, none of whom receive salaries from APSA? Should different standards of professional conduct be required of the President and the President Elect? Is a code of ethics enforceable? If so, how? If not, what weight should be given to non-enforceability?

Are there ways of maintaining high standards that are preferable to a code of ethics? If so, what are these ways? Are they preferable to a code of ethics?

Should the Association adopt or recommend a rule of disclosure, obliging all practicing political scientists to reveal all their sources of support? All ties with government agencies, American or foreign? With business or trade union groups? All ties of any kind? How would such a rule operate? Should the Association keep a public register or file for recording such disclosures?

Would it be useful to prepare a set of case studies, illustrating some of the ethical and factual complexities of these problems, the kinds of personal decisions recommended by various political scientists or others, and the grounds of their recommendations? Would such case studies complement, or displace, a code of professional ethics?

The Committee is free to inquire into any other questions it believes are relevant to the problems of maintaining a high sense of professional standards and responsibilities. The Committee may, at its discretion, appoint subcommittees to study particular problems; it may hold hearings, undertake studies, and consult with other organizations working on similar problems. Any members of the Association may communicate their views and suggestions in writing to the chairman or to any other member of the Committee.

Because of the complexity and novelty of these questions, and the diversity of views among our members, we believe it would be a mistake to impose too brief a life or too short a deadline on the work of the Committee. If the Committee concludes that more time is necessary, it is free to continue its work beyond the next Annual Meeting in September. Nonetheless, it is our hope that the Committee will be able to report some of its recommendations to

us in time for action next September by the Council and by the members at the business meeting of the Association.

At present our members hold a variety of views on these questions and favor a considerable diversity of proposals. Inconvenient as it may seem, this diversity should not be ignored or glossed over. Any action on professional standards that cannot command wide support among our members is, we feel, likely to be worse than futile.

Nonetheless, we believe that the Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities will be able to formulate some recommendations that will command the overwhelming support of members of this Association, and will help to clarify and even to provide guidance in answering the more difficult and troublesome questions on which individual judgments may continue to differ.

For the Executive Committee:
ROBERT A. DAHL, PRESIDENT
MERLE FAINSOD, PRESIDENT ELECT
HARRY ECKSTEIN
HEINZ EULAU
AUSTIN RANNEY
CLINTON ROSSITER

NEWS & NOTES

1967 ANNUAL MEETING AND SLATE OF OFFICERS FOR 1967–68

The 1967 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 5–9 at the Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago. Professor Harry Eckstein, Princeton University, is Chairman of the Program Committee.

At the Annual Business Meeting of the Association, to be held at 4:30 P.M. Wednesday, September 6, in the Great Hall, Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago, the Nominating Committee (comprised of Gwendolen M. Carter, Northwestern University, Chairman; Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester; Samuel P. Huntington, Harvard University; Donald R. Matthews, University of North Carolina; Robert E. Ward, University of Michigan; and Aaron B. Wildavsky, University of California at Berkeley) will propose the following officers for 1967–68:

President Elect:	David Easton, University of Chicago
Vice Presidents:	Stephen K. Bailey, Syracuse University
	Harvey C. Mansfield, Columbia University
	Jack W. Peltason, University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana
Secretary:	Harvey Glickman, Haverford College
Treasurer:	Max M. Kampelman, Washington, D.C.

Members of the Council for two years:

Holbert N. Carroll, University of Pittsburgh
Charles O. Jones, University of Arizona
Merle Kling, Washington University, St. Louis
Roy C. Macridis, Brandeis University
Paul L. Puryear, Fisk University
Robert A. Scalapino, University of California, Berkeley
Glendon Schubert, University of North Carolina
Daniel Wit, Northern Illinois University

PROGRAM COMMITTEE: 1968 ANNUAL MEETING

The 1968 Annual Meeting of the Association will be held in Washington, D.C. at the Washington-Hilton Hotel, September 3–7. Early appointment of the Program Committee for the meeting makes it timely now to invite members of the Association to submit proposals for consideration as soon as convenient, and prior to September 1, 1967, to the Chairman or an appropriate member of the Committee. Members of the Committee are:

Chairman, Joseph La Palombara, Yale University
Public Administration, U. S.—Stephen K. Bailey, Syracuse University
Comparative Administration—Ralph Braibanti, Duke University
International Politics & Organization—Inis L. Claude, Jr., University of Michigan
Political Science & Public Policy—Frederic N. Cleaveland, University of North Carolina
American Government & Politics—Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester
Ideology and Political Science—Andrew Hacker, Cornell University
Historical Dimensions of Political Development—Robert T. Holt, University of Minnesota
Public Opinion and Representation—Duncan MacRae, Jr., University of Chicago
Urban Problems—Daniel P. Moynihan, Joint Center for Urban Studies of M.I.T. and Harvard University
Mathematics & Political Science—William H. Riker, University of Rochester
Comparative Politics—Dankwart A. Rustow, Columbia University
American Foreign Policy—Kenneth W. Thompson, The Rockefeller Foundation
Public Law and Judicial Processes—S. Sidney Ulmer, University of Kentucky
Political Theory—René Williamson, Louisiana State University

NOTICE

RESOLUTIONS AT ANNUAL BUSINESS MEETING

In accordance with Article VIII of the Constitution of the American Political Science Association, the attention of members of the Association is hereby directed to the provision of the Constitution that:

"All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendations before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting."

The Council of the Association will meet all day Tuesday, September 5, 1967, in the Belmont Room, Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago, Illinois.

The *Handbook of Latin American Studies* invites members of the American Political Science Association to submit reprints of their current articles dealing with Latin America for possible review purposes in forthcoming volumes of this annual selected bibliography on the social sciences and humanities. Correspondence should be addressed to: The Editor, *Handbook of Latin American Studies*, Hispanic Foundation, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 20540.

A five-day special program, "Operations Research for Public Systems," will be presented at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology from September 5 through September 9, 1967. General discussions of the methodology will be illustrated by area surveys and case studies from areas such as urban planning and municipal operation, public health, the judicial court system, public transportation, and educational systems. For further information, write to: Director of the Summer Session, Room E19-356, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass. 02139.

The International Studies Association will again sponsor a luncheon meeting at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association. It will be held at 12:30 P.M. on Friday, September 8, and the room will be announced in the Final Program of the convention. At least one nationally prominent speaker will appear at the luncheon. It is requested that those planning to attend notify the ISA office (University of Denver, Denver, Colo. 80210) beforehand.

The sixty-third Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 5–9, 1967 at the Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago.

PROFESSIONAL CONFERENCES

The National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science will hold its regular sessions for contributed papers at the 134th annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, December 26–31, 1967, in New York. Sessions are held with the collaboration of the Section on Social and Economic Sciences of the A.A.A.S.

Political scientists interested in presenting a paper at these sessions are invited to forward titles and abstracts of 300 words to Donald P. Ray, National Institute of Social and Behavioral Science, 863 Benjamin Franklin Station, Washington, D.C. 20044, not later than September 1st.

Papers should concern recently completed or well-advanced ongoing research in any of the fields of political science. Of perhaps especial interest would be studies on, for example, national politics in India, the "alliance gap" in American foreign relations, constitutional government in South Vietnam, political development in the U.S.S.R., and international relations in the Middle East.

Selected materials of the sessions will be published, and papers are eligible, upon nomination, for the $1000 Newcomb Cleveland Prize with bronze medal of the A.A.A.S. The annual meeting invariably receives extensive coverage by science writers from all media.

The Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center, sponsored in collaboration with the comparative administration group of the American

Society for Public Administration and the committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council, will hold an international conference at the Rockefeller Foundation's Villa Serbelloni, at Lake Como, July 17–22. The conference will deal with theoretical problems in administrative reform in developing states. The conference has been organized by Ralph Braibanti, Chairman of the Commonwealth-Studies Studies Center at Duke University and Joseph La Palombara and Fred Riggs, Honorary Chairman and presiding officer will be A. R. Cornelius, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. Among political scientists reading papers or serving as discussants will be Carl J. Friedrich, Joseph La Palombara, W. H. Morris-Jones, Giovanni Sartori, Michel Crozier, Jose Abueva, Harold Lasswell, Brian Chapman, Ralph Braibanti, A. W. Singham, J. J. Spengler, Taylor Cole, W. J. M. Mackenzie, Fred W. Riggs, Samuel E. Finer, John D. Montgomery, Dwight Waldo, G. S. Sharma and Lucian Pye.

The Association for the Study of Negro Life and History will hold its Fifty-second Annual Meeting at the Voyager Inn, Greensboro, North Carolina on October 12–15, 1967. The Agricultural and Technical College of North Carolina is the host institution. Those interested in proposing papers, or sessions, or other participation should contact the program chairman, Walter Fisher, Morgan State College, Coldspring Lane and Hillen Road, Baltimore, Maryland 21212.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

The Escuala Latinoamericana de Ciencia Politica y Administracion Publica, located in Santiago, Chile, and supported by the Inter-Development Bank, UNESCO and the Ford Foundation, is training young faculty members from all over Latin America in modern political analysis, with particular emphasis on problems of methodology for empirical research. The director of the school is Horacio H. Godoy of Argentina. James W. Prothro, University of North Carolina and Robert L. Ayres, of the same institution, are currently visiting professor and assistant professor respectively in the school. Other U. S. professors who have joined the staff for varying periods are Arpad von Lazar, Vanderbilt University and Harold D. Lasswell of Yale.

Political scientists at the six New England state universities are collaborating in a comparative study of legislative behavior in New England. The study is sponsored by the New England Center for Continuing Education under the direction of Robert B. Dishman, assisted by Robert E. Craig, both of the University of New Hampshire. Participating are Karl A. Bosworth, Alvin E. Dozeman, I. Ridgway Davis and Everett Ladd from the University of Connecticut; Eugene Mawhinney, Dana R. Baggett, and Paul Dunham, University of Maine; George Goodwin, Jr., William C. Havard, Glen Gordon and David R. Mayhew, University of Massachusetts; Robert E. Spencer and John O. Stitely, University of Rhode Island; Rolf Haugin, Andrew E. Nuquist and Henry Brubaker, University of Vermont; Shirley Clark, Joseph P. Ford and Lawrence O'Connell, University of New Hampshire.

Applications are now being accepted for Fulbright-Hays appointments for university lecturing and advanced research abroad during 1968–69. It is expected that specialists in political science will receive appointments in about twenty countries. Under the Fulbright program, such specialists have this year been serving as lecturers in Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Peru, and the Philippines, and they have in recent years held awards for research in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, and the Philippines.

The basic application requirements are: U. S. citizenship; a doctoral degree or equivalent status for research; college or university teaching experience for lecturing appointments; in some cases, proficiency in a foreign language.

For lecturing awards under the 1968–69 program, application before May 1, 1967 is strongly recommended. The deadline for research applications is June 1, 1967.

Application forms, a list of openings in political science, and details on the terms of awards for particular countries are available from the Committee on International Exchange of Persons, 2101 Constitution Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20418.

Upon the invitation of the Political Science Department of the University of Illinois, 80 Illinois political scientists met on the Urbana campus of the University of Illinois on October 29, 1966, to discuss matters of current and common interest.

A summer seminar on cross-national urban politics, sponsored by the Comparative Urban Studies Committee of the Comparative Administration Group, The American Society for Public Administration, will be held at the University of North Carolina, July 19 to August 17. Frederic N.

Cleaveland and Robert T. Daland, UNC, will direct the seminar. Other participants will be Robert Alford, University of Wisconsin; Daniel Grant, Vanderbilt; William J. Hanna, American University; James Goyot, UCLA; Francine Rabinovitz, University of Florida; Frank Sherwood, University of Southern California; and Deil Wright, University of Iowa.

The Institute of Urban Research of the University of Connecticut has received a grant from the Municipal League to study the effects of reapportionment in Connecticut. Four political scientists, all from the University, will be associated with the study. They are Karl A. Bosworth, I. Ridgway Davis, Everett C. Ladd, Jr. and Alvin Dozeman.

Political scientists who have been in residence during all or part of 1966–67 at the East-West Center's Senior Specialists program in Hawaii are Remigio E. Agpalo, University of the Philippines; Narayan Deshpande, Nagpur University in India; William C. Johnstone, Jr., Johns Hopkins University; and Norman D. Palmer, University of Pennsylvania.

LUCIUS BARKER, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, has accepted a position as research associate to the Chancellor of the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana.

DAVID A. BINGHAM, University of Arizona, has been appointed to the Board of Directors of the Federation of Rocky Mountain States, Inc.

RALPH BRAIBANTI, Duke University, will spend part of the summer doing research at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London.

LOUISE BRAKEMAN, Denison University, will be director of the Regional Council Center for International Students to be held at Chatham College in Pittsburgh during the summer.

ARCHIE D. CHELSETH, formerly administrative assistant with the Association of Minnesota Counties, has been appointed by Minnesota Governor Harold LeVander to the post of research director in the Office of the Governor.

C. WALTER CLARK JR., Drake University, has been awarded a Danforth Foundation teaching grant and will be on leave, 1967–68.

RICHARD F. CRABBS is on leave from Indiana University and is serving as dean of the Faculties at the American University in Cairo for the academic years 1966–68.

JOHN P. CRECINE, University of Michigan, will be spending the 1967–68 academic year in the Economics Department, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California.

SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD, University of Michigan, spent the month of February in India in connection with a research project.

W. O. FARBER, University of South Dakota, served as secretary to the NATO Parliamentarians Conference Committee on Education, Cultural Affairs and Information at its Paris meeting, November 14–18.

E. FEIT, University of Massachusetts, has been awarded a Mershon post-doctoral fellowship and will do research at the Mershon Center, Ohio State University, during 1967–68.

JOSEPH R. FISZMAN, University of Oregon, has been appointed to a three-year term to the Board of Editors of the *Western Political Science Quarterly*.

ALONA E. EVANS, Wellesley College, has been elected to the Board of Editors of the *American Journal of International Law*.

IVO K. FEIERABEND, visiting associate professor of political science, and ROSALIND L. FEIERABEND, visiting research psychologist, Washington University, St. Louis, have been awarded the 1966 sociopsychological $1000 prize of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. They have also received a research grant from the National Science Foundation.

HERBERT GARFINKEL has returned to Michigan State University from the Institute of Social Sciences at the Hague. He was a NATO visiting professor.

LAWRENCE GRAHAM is on leave from the University of Texas and is serving as a public administration advisor to the program of the Institute of Public Administration in Lima, Peru.

BARBARA B. GREEN, Wellesley College, will be on leave 1967–68. She had been named an associate of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI, University of Georgia, has been chosen to receive the 1967 Best Book award of the American College of Hospital Administrators for his book *Men, Management, and Morality*.

RUFUS G. HALL, University of Oklahoma, is serving as a consultant in the Foreign Service Institute, State Department, January-August, 1967.

ILIYA F. HARIK has spent the 1966–67 year on leave from Indiana University and has conducted research at the American Research Center in Egypt, Inc., located in Cairo.

JOHN J. HOOKER, the Catholic University of America, will be on sabbatical leave during 1967–68.

NEAL D. HOUGHTON, University of Arizona, attended a planning conference in Honolulu in February to work out a program for a forthcoming conference on "Engineering and the Building of Nations" to be held at Estes Park.

GEORGE P. JAN, University of South Dakota, will do research in the Far East during the fall term, under grants from the Social Science Foundation and the Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver.

GEORGE JENKINS, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, is coordinator of the African Studies Commitee at UMW.

CHARLES O. JONES, University of Arizona, has been appointed a member of the Commission on Political Activity of Government Personnel by the United States House of Representatives Speaker, John W. McCormack.

ROGER KANET, the University of Kansas, has been elected president of the Bi-State Conference for the Kansas-Missouri Area.

PAUL KELSO, University of Arizona, was on sabbatical leave during spring quarter, 1967.

EVERETT C. LADD, University of Connecticut, has received research grants from the National Science Foundation and the Social Science Research Council.

RICHARD H. LEACH, Duke University, will be on sabbatical leave during the academic year 1967–68 as a Fulbright professor at the University of Amsterdam.

CHAE JIN LEE, The University of Kansas, has received the Elizabeth M. Watkins faculty fellowship for research.

HERMAN D. LUJAN and HAROLD RIEHM, University of Kansas, have research grants from the Ford Foundation.

CHARLES B. MCLANE, Dartmouth College, read a paper in October at the Institute for the Study of the Soviet Union, Munich.

DOUGLAS MENDEL, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, has been awarded a faculty research grant. He spent the summer of 1966 at Sophia University in Tokyo.

JOHN NORMAN, Pace College, was appointed State Fact Finder and Mediator by the Connecticut Board of Mediation and Arbitration.

FRITZ NOVA, Villanova University, will spend a sabbatical summer teaching at the *Hochschule fuer Politische Wissenschaften*, Munich. Currently he is a visiting research associate at the School of International Relations, Princeton University.

THOMAS PAGE, University of Illinois-Urbana, has been elected chairman of the Advisory Board to the Illinois Department of Personnel, a bipartisan statutory body on which he serves by appointment by the Governor.

ADOLPH REED, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, has been a faculty fellow during 1966–67.

EUGENE ROSSI, Dickinson College, will replace K. R. Nilson as director of the College International Studies program in the fall.

ALAN H. SCHECHTER, Wellesley College, has received a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities for research during the summer of 1967.

EDWARD V. SCHTEN, Institute of Governmental Affairs, University Extension, University of Wisconsin, is on a two-year leave of absence and is serving as an AID higher education advisor in Bogota, Colombia.

MORTON SCHWARTZ, University of California, is spending a sabbatical leave as an associate at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

SHELDON W. SIMON, University of Kentucky, has been awarded a summer research associateship with the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, George Washington University.

CURRIN V. SHIELDS has resumed his duties at the University of Arizona after a six months' sabbatical leave.

FRANK SMALLWOOD, Dartmouth College, read a paper at the annual Conference of the Canadian Federation of Mayors last June.

JOHN E. STONER, Indiana University and PHILLIP C. JOHNSON, Purdue University, have received grants and contracts from the Indiana State Highway Commission and the Bureau of Public Roads to design and implement a system for reporting and analyzing highway traffic accidents by electronic data process.

EDWARD TABORSKY, University of Texas, is on spring and summer leave and is conducting research under grants from the Social Science Foundation of the University of Denver and the University Research Institute of the University of Texas.

RAYMOND TANTER, Northwestern University, has a one-year appointment as assistant director, Behavioral Sciences Division, Advanced Research Projects Agency, Washington, D. C.

JAMES E. UNDERWOOD, Union College, is in Washington, D. C. during 1966–67 as a Congressional Fellow.

GUENTER WEISSBERG, Colby College, has been appointed to the senatorial appointment commission of the state of Maine.

CLAUDE E. WELCH, SUNY at Buffalo, attended a seminar sponsored by the Institute on Man and Science in Tunisia in March. He has also been named chairman of the Committee on Africa Studies of the Council on International Studies and World Affairs.

YORK Y. WILLBERN, Indiana University, has been on leave during 1966–67. During the spring quarter he taught at the American University in Beirut.

ARTHUR M. WILSON, Dartmouth College, will be a speaker at the Second International Congress on the Englightenment at St. Andrews Scotland, August 21–31.

DAVID ZIBLATT, Michigan State University received an award from the Western Political Science Association for the best dissertation completed in 1965 at a western University.

STAFF CHANGES

NEW APPOINTMENTS

JOEL ABERACH, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

THOMAS ANTON, joint appointment as associate professor, Department of Political Science and School of Social Work, University of Michigan; formerly of University of Chicago.

LAWRENCE R. ALSCHULER, assistant professor, University of Hawaii.

JONATHAN S. BARKER, lecturer, University of Arizona.

THOMAS A. BAYLIS, assistant professor, Duke University; formerly of the University of California at Berkeley.

JURIJ BORYS, associate professor, University of Calgary; formerly of University of Stockholm.

KARL R. BRAITHWAITE, assistant professor, Duke University; formerly of University of Wisconsin.

THOMAS W. CASSTEVENS, assistant professor, Oakland University; formerly of the Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley.

TEH-KUANG CHANG, assistant professor, Ball State University.

SAMUEL D. COOK, associate professor, Duke University; formerly of Atlanta University.

RICHARD C. CORTNER, associate professor, University of Arizona; formerly of University of Tennessee.

RALPH E. CRAIG, instructor, University of New Hampshire.

JOHN E. CROW, assistant professor, University of Arizona; formerly of University of Washington.

WILLIAM J. DANIELS, assistant professor, Union College.

ALFRED DIAMANT, professor, Indiana University.

DONALD E. EPSTEIN, instructor, University of Connecticut.

JAMES EISENSTEIN, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

FRANK FEIGERT, instructor, Knox College; formerly of the University of Maryland.

A. R. FIELD, assistant professor, University of Calgary; formerly of San Fernando State College.

ROY E. FELDMAN, assistant professor, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, July 1, 1967.

LEE J. FLYNN, assistant professor, Pomona College.

KARL A. FRIEDMAN, assistant professor, University of Calgary; formerly of St. Anthony's College, Oxford.

FEDERICO GIL, Kennan professor of political science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

HARVEY R. GLASSER, instructor, University of Massachusetts at Boston,

ROBERT D. GREY, instructor, University of Connecticut, Hartford Branch.

KAZIMERZ GRYZBOWSKI, adjunct professor, Duke University, 1967–68.

HAROLD GUETZKOW, Gordon S. Fulcher Professor of Decision Making, Northwestern University.

DONALD R. HALL, assistant professor, University of Arizona.

JOHN V. HILBERG, instructor, University of Connecticut.

PETER KIDMAN, instructor, Westminster College.

SAMUEL S. KIM, assistant professor, Monmouth College (N. J.).

JOHN KITOS, assistant professor, Allegheny College.

PHILIP S. KRONENBERG, lecturer, Indiana University; formerly of University of Pittsburgh.

CARL LIEBERMAN, instructor, University of Akron; formerly of the University of Pittsburgh.

JULIE K. MCGUIRE, assistant lecturer, University of Belfast, Ireland; formerly of University of Alaska.

DONALD E. MILSTEN, instructor, University of Maryland, Baltimore County Campus.

RALPH E. MITCHELL, assistant professor, University of Arizona; formerly of Miami University (Ohio).

STEPHEN R. MITCHELL, associate professor, University of Calgary; formerly of Washington State University.

HAROLD MOLINEAU, instructor, University of Akron; formerly of American University.

DAVID P. MOZINGO, assistant professor, Cornell University; formerly of the Rand Corporation.

RICHARD MULLER, instructor, Colgate University.

CHESTER A. NEWLAND, professor, University Houston.

DAVID A. NICHOLS, instructor, University of Massachusetts at Boston.

LAWRENCE W. O'CONNELL, instructor, University of New Hampshire.

VICTOR OLORUNSOLA, assistant professor, California State College at Long Beach; formerly of University of Indiana.

DANIEL J. O'NEIL, assistant professor, University of Arizona; formerly of University of Tennessee.

ANTHONY PAREL, associate professor, University of Calgary.

EDWARD PLATT, Indiana University of Pennsylvania.

EDWARD A. RAYMOND, assistant professor, University of Connecticut, Stamford Branch.

MAVIS M. REEVES, lecturer, University of Maryland.

FRED W. RIGGS, professor and member of the Social Science Research Institute, University of Hawaii.

FREDERICK ROSEN, assistant professor, Franklin and Marshall College.

JOHN E. RUE, associate professor, Oakland University; formerly of the Hoover Institution, Stanford, California.

STEPHEN M. SACHS, lecturer, South Bend-Mishawaka Regional Campus of Indiana University.

HARRIET SCHIFFER, instructor, Temple University.

ALAN L. SELTZER, instructor, Oakland University; formerly of UCLA.

ROBERT SHARLET, assistant professor, Union College, September, 1967.

JEAN SPENCER, assistant professor, University of Maryland.

EMIL STARR, associate professor, University of Massachusetts at Boston.

JOHN A. STRAAYER, assistant professor, Colorado State Univerity, September, 1967; formerly of University of Arizona.

WILLIAM F. STURNER, assistant professor, Oakland University; formerly of the University of Detroit.

RICHARD SZAWLOWSKI, assistant professor, University of Calgary; formerly of the German Federal Institute of Sovietology, Bonn.

DAVID TABB, assistant professor, University of Hawaii.

KENNETH VINES, professor, SUNY at Buffalo; formerly of Tulane University.

DWIGHT WALDO, Albert Schweitzer Professor of Humanities, Syracuse University; formerly of the Institute of Governmental Research at the University of California at Berkeley.

MEREDITH WATTS, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee.

LEONARD WEINBERG, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee.

EDWARD WEISBAND, instructor, New York, University, February, 1967.

HOWARD R. WHITCOMB, instructor, Colgate University.

WILLIAM D. S. WITTE, dual appointment as associate professor of political science and philosophy, head of Department of Philosophy, Bradley University.

KYUNG WON KIM, assistant professor, New York University.

JOHN H. WOODRUFF, associate professor, University of New Hampshire; formerly of Boston University.

JOHN WOODS, assistant professor, University of Calgary.

ROBERT D. WRINKLE, assistant professor, Southwest Texas State College; formerly of University of Arizona.

VISITING APPOINTMENTS

TOCARY BASTOS, Federal University of Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil: visiting scholar, Indiana University, 1967.

PAUL C. BARTHOLOMEW, University of Notre Dame: professor, Northwestern University, summer 1967.

STEVEN J. BRAMS, Institute for Defense Analyses: assistant professor, University of Rochester, spring 1967.

ALBERTO CIRIA, formerly of the University of Buenos Aires, Argentina: professor, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1966–67.

RICHARD H. COX, SUNY at Buffalo: Chester W. Nimitz Professor of Social and Political Philosophy, U. S. Naval War College, 1967–68.

HARRY J. FRIEDMAN, University of Hawaii: professor, University of the Philippines, 1967–68.

LOUIS L. GERSON, University of Connecticut: Fulbright professor, University of Bombay, India, 1966–67.

WALTER GOLDSTEIN, Brooklyn College, CUNY; professor, New York University, 1966, and lecturer, School of International Affairs, Columbia University, 1966–67.

DONALD R. HALL, assistant professor, University of Arizona.

GEORGE JENKINS, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee: assistant professor, UCLA, summer 1967 and academic 1967–68.

MISHA D. JEZERNIK, University of Ljubljana, Yugoslavia: professor University of Hawaii, 1967–68.

KENT LLOYD, University of Southern California: assistant professor, University of Hawaii, spring term 1967.

GLENN PAIGE, Princeton University: visiting political scientist, Social Science Research Institute, University of Hawaii, 1967–68.

ROY PIERCE, University of Michigan: Stanford University, summer, 1966.

RICHARD M. RICHARDSON, Western Michigan University: assistant professor, University of Hawaii, 1967–68.

CARL-CHRISTOPH SCHWEITZER, University of Bonn: NATO professor of political science, Duke University, fall term 1967.

BARBARA SHOCKLEY, Bloomsburg State College: associate professor, Thiel College.

JOHN VANDEREELL, Franklin and Marshall College: lecturer, Bryn Mawr.

IRVIN L. WHITE, assistant professor: University of Arizona, 1967–68.

VIOLET WURFEL, North Carolina College: professor, University of Montana, summer term 1967.

OTHER APPOINTMENTS

DOUGLAS ASHFORD; assistant director, Center for International Studies, Cornell University.

ALAN ARIAN: chairman, Tel Aviv University.

JAMES B. CHRISTOPH: chairman and professor, Indiana University, September 1967; formerly of the Ohio State University.

DAVID R. DERGE: associate dean of the faculties, Indiana University.

ROBERT B. DISHMAN: chairman, University of New Hampshire.

JAMES R. DONOGHUE: director, Institute of Governmental Affairs, University Extension, University of Wisconsin.

JOHN C. ERIKSEN: director of International Programs and professor-in-residence for 1966–67, University of Oklahoma, Munich Center.

MARSHALL GOLDSTEIN: chairman, University of Hawaii.

MURRAY HAVENS: University of Texas, associate professor and graduate advisor.

FERREL HEADY: academic vice president, University of New Mexico; formerly director of Institute of Public Administration and professor, University of Michigan.

DONALD E. BEBBE: associate dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, University of South Dakota; July 1, 1967.

SAMUEL K. GOVE: director of the Institute of Government and Public Affairs, University of Illinois, Urbana.

E. BURKE INLOW: head, University of Calgary; reappointment for a five-year term.

RICHARD M. JOHNSON: vice chairman, SUNY at Buffalo.

JOHN P. MCCARTHEY: acting chairman, the Catholic University of America.

RICHARD MERRITT: joint appointment as associate professor, Department of Political Science and the Institute of Communications Research, University of Illinois at Urbana, September, 1967.

FRANK JAY MORINO: chairman, Washington Square College, Department of Politics, New York University, September 1967.

BENJAMIN NIMER: acting chairman, George Washington University, spring, 1967.

FRANK B. PESCI: director, Potomac campus, Prince George's Community College, Md.; formerly dean of academic affairs.

JAROSLAW PIEKALKIEWICZ: assistant director, Center for Slavic and Soviet Area Studies, University of Kansas.

WINSTON W. RIDDICK: assistant professor and acting director, Institute of Government Research, Louisiana State University.

WALTER F. SCHEFFER: director, Graduate Program in Public Administration, University of Oklahoma.

KALMAN SILVERT: professor and director, Ibero-American program, New York University.

GLENN SNYDER: acting chairman, Center for International Security and Conflict Studies, SUNY at Buffalo.

VICTOR WEN: professor and chairman, MAFAC Department, Defense Language Institute.

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN: associate director, Center for International Studies, New York University, September 1967.

PROMOTION (with new rank)

ALLEN BALLARD, City College, CUNY: associate professor.

CURT F. BECK, University of Connecticut: professor.

DAVID A. BINGHAM, University of Arizona: professor.

KENNETH A. BODE, Michigan State University: assistant professor.

JOHN C. BUHNER, Indiana University in Gary: associate professor.

FLORENCE CASEY, SUNY at Buffalo: assistant professor.

STEPHEN P. COHEN, University of Illinois at Urbana: assistant professor.

JAMES T. CROWN, New York University: professor.

STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS, University of Illinois at Urbana: assistant professor.

ALVIN DOZEMAN, University of Connecticut: assistant professor.

R. BARRY FARRELL, Northwestern University: professor.

AMIR FERDOWS, Indiana University in Jeffersonville: assistant professor.

JOSEPH R. FISZMAN, University of Oregon: associate professor and associate director, Institute for Comparative Experimental Research on Behavioral Systems.

BARBARA B. GREEN, Wellesley College: associate professor.

ROBERT W. HATTERY, Indiana University: associate professor.

ROBERT S. HIRSCHFIELD, Hunter College, City University of New York: professor.

CHARLES HOLLISTER, Bucknell University: professor.

GARY HOSKIN, SUNY at Buffalo: assistant professor.

CONRAD JOYNER, University of Arizona: professor.

CHARLES O. JONES, University of Arizona: professor.

THOMAS KARIS, City College, CUNY: professor.

ALLAN KORNBERG, Duke University: associate professor.

CHAN LIEN, University of Connecticut: assistant professor.

CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, University of Arizona: associate professor.

FRANK JAY MORENO, New York University: associate professor.

CHARLES R. NAEF, Colgate University: assistant professor.

CHARLES PARRISH, University of Texas: associate professor.

EDWARD T. ROWE, University of Connecticut: assistant professor.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN, University of Pennsylvania: professor.

WALTER SLACK, Westminster College: associate professor.

SEYMOUR SLESSINGER, University of Connecticut, Waterbury Branch: associate professor.

FRANK TACHAU, Rutgers: associate professor.

PETER TOMA, University of Arizona: professor.

PAUL A. WEIDNER, University of Akron: professor.

HERBERT WEISS, New York University: associate professor.

ORION WHITE, University of Texas: associate professor.

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, New York University: professor.

RETIREMENTS

ARTHUR M. WILSON, Dartmouth College, will retire at the end of June, 1967.

CORRECTION

ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR. was incorrectly listed in the March issue as being affiliated with Seton Hall University. He is affiliated with the University of Pennsylvania.

IN MEMORIAM

HENRY PUGET died in Paris on 18 November at the age of 72. He was for many years and at the time of his death chairman of the Scientific Committee of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences and the French member of its Executive Committee. Mr. Puget served in the Council of State for forty-five years. Important details were service in the cabinets of the Ministries of Finance and Air and as chairman of the Appeals Board of UNESCO. His intellectual interests were wide: local government, town planning, copyright, maritime law, atomic energy. Throughout his career he taught at the Institute of Political Studies of the University of Paris. He made important contributions to comparative law and administration through his leadership in IIAS and other international organs and through his publications.

CHARLES S. ASCHER
Brooklyn College, City University of New York

Professional Placement Service at 1967 Annual Meeting

(September 5-9, 1967)

A professional placement service will again be available to members of The American Political Science Association attending the Chicago meeting. The placement service will be provided by the U.S. Employment Service. The primary purpose is to provide an efficient means for employers to meet prospective employees and vice versa.

The Professional Placement Service is entirely separate from the APSA's Personnel Service and requires separate registration. There is no fee for use of the Professional Placement Service by employers or applicants at the Convention.

FOLLOW UP: Orders and applications will be returned to the local Employment Service Office after the Annual Meeting. The office will determine if a satisfactory placement occurred and, if not, will make further recruitment or replacement efforts.

All State Employment Service local offices accept orders and applications in the field of political science on a year-round basis as a regular part of their professional service.

If you plan to attend the Conference and utilize the Placement Service, please mail the form below as soon as possible, *but not later than August 5, 1967*. Application and/or employer order forms will be forwarded to you upon receipt of the following information:

Name: .....

(Organization or Institution) .....

.....

Address: .....

.....
(City) (State)

☐ Employer ☐ No. of Vacancies

(check either)

☐ Prospective Candidate ☐ No. of Area(s) of Specialization

Fill in appropriate blocks and mail to: Mrs. Theresa Scholl, Professional Placement Center, Illinois State Employment Service, 208 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Ill. 60604.

1967 ASIAN TOUR-SEMINAR PROGRAM

9 countries—37 days—August 1-September 6

Because of the success of past Tour-Seminar programs, the Association is offering another in its series of travel study opportunities during the summer of 1967, in Asia.

In addition to direct conversations with governmental leaders of the countries on the itinerary, Tour-Seminar participants will meet with members of the faculties of local universities, U.S. Foreign Service personnel, foreign press representatives, etc. Opportunity will be provided for a limited amount of personal research and sightseeing. The entire trip is being planned with the cooperation and support of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Information Service.

TRANSPORTATION

As was the case with the 1966 African Tour-Seminar, this program will be carried out on regularly scheduled jet flights of reputable international carriers.

The Asian Tour-Seminar is based on the group fare, requiring a minimum of 25 participants.

EXPENSES

The cost to Association members will be about $1645—substantially less than it would be for a similar trip arranged on an individual basis. Included in the fare will be round-trip tourist air transportation, first-class hotel accommodations, numerous meals, baggage handling, and airport transfers. (On the basis of past experience, participants can expect that the cost of this educational activity will be accepted as deductible expense on Federal tax returns.)

For further information concerning this unique educational, research, and travel opportunity, write immediately to: APSA 1967 Asian Tour-Seminar, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. A brochure giving full details and reservation information will be mailed to you.

Notice

Resolutions at Annual Business Meeting

In accordance with ARTICLE VIII of the Constitution, this is to call attention of members of the Association to the provision of the APSA constitution that:

> "All resolutions shall be referred to the Council for its recommendations before submission to the vote of the Association at its Annual Business Meeting."

The Council of the Association will meet all day September 5, 1967, in the Belmont Room, Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago.

COLUMBIA




THE POLITICS OF MILITARY UNIFICATION: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process

Demetrios Caraley

The proposal to unify the Departments of War and Navy and establish the post of Secretary of Defense provoked one of the most intense political conflicts of the entire post-World War II period. For four years it pitted high Army, Navy, Army Air, and Marine officers against each other, civilian officials against military, and the President against Congress. This study analyzes the unification conflict in terms of the actors involved, their goals and perceptions, and their strategies and tactics of influence. It provides fascinating details on the high-powered lobbying, public relations, and propaganda campaigns undertaken by the military services and serves also as an excellent case study of how conflict over policy develops and becomes resolved and what functions conflict serves in executive branch and congressional politics more generally.

"The author has done an outstanding job of research and putting the facts together in a most enjoyable and readable manner . . . [R]equired reading for all persons involved in the U.S. defense establishment."—*U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings.* $8.95



COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
440 West 110th Street
New York, N.Y. 10025

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

JULY 1967

On Approaches to the Study of International Relations, or Back to Machiavelli ..... *David Vital*

New Factors of Stability in Soviet Collective Leadership ..... *Jerome M. Gilison*

Regional Organization and the Regulation of Internal Conflict ..... *Linda B. Miller*

The Political Relation of the Village to the State ..... *Harumi Befu*

Ideology and Politics in Economic Planning: The Problem of Indian Agricultural Development Strategy ..... *Francine R. Frankel*

Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Intergovernmental Organizations ..... *Chadwick F. Alger and Steven J. Brams*

Review Articles by John K. Fairbank, Richard D. Challener, Fred Charles Ikle, and Nathan Leites.

One Year $7.50 • Two Years $12.50 • Single Copies $2.50

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Princeton University, Princeton, N. J. 08540

Our Latest Publications:

1. Agricultural Land use in Punjab: A Spatial Analysis by Gurdev Singh Gosal & B. S. Ojha **Rs.15.00**

2. Proceedings of the Conference on Administrative Reforms (1963) **Rs.10.00**

3. Union Public Service Commission by M. A. Muttalib **Rs.13.00**

Available from:

Administrative Officer

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Indraprastha Estate

RING ROAD, NEW DELHI-1.

THE INSTITUTE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND PARLIAMENTARY STUDIES

18-Vithalbhai Patel House, Rafi Marg. New Delhi-1. (India)

Announces

the publication of a new quarterly

THE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND PARLIAMENTARY STUDIES

The Journal is devoted to studies in comparative constitutional law and problems and prospects of democratic governments in India and abroad. It is intended to serve as an independent forum of discussion in depth on problems of parliamentary procedures and legislative institutions. The basic object of the Journal as of the Institute sponsoring it is to disseminate democratic values and foster popular understanding of free institutions at different levels. The first issue of the Journal (January-March 1967) is already out and the second (April-June 1967) is in press.

Beyond a basic commitment to the philosophy of freedom and a faith in constitutional and representative government, the Journal itself does not hold or support any particular political ideology or party. Honest and critical contributions are welcome from scholars in India and abroad.

Regular features of the Journal include case comments, book-reviews, notes on current developments in the field of constitutional law and parliamentary affairs, a review of the parliamentary scene etc. Besides, articles are contributed by eminent parliamentarians, experienced civil servants, political scientists and constitutional and legal experts.

Annual Subscription:	$5.50 *or* £2.00
Single copy:	$1.50 *or* 11 s.

EDITORIAL BOARD

L. M. Singhvi, (Chairman)
N. C. Chatterjee, M.P.
M. C. Setalvad, M.P.
M. N. Kaul, M.P.
S. L. Shakdher
B. N. Banerjee
R. C. S. Sarkar
V. K. N. Menon

Editor
Subhash C. Kashyap

Joint Editor
D. C. Jain

Trade enquiries, subscriptions, manuscripts for publication, books for review and Journals for exchange may be addressed to the Editor.

COLUMBIA  COLUMBIA

THE FIRST VIETNAM CRISIS

MELVIN GURTOV

"This book analyzes the political crisis of 1953-54, which resulted in the withdrawal of France from Indochina, the establishment of two Vietnams after the Geneva Convention, and the beginning of our multibillion-dollar commitment in the Vietnam war. . . . This is an amply documented book which provides necessary background to the Vietnam conflict and some insight into the complexities of political decision-making. Recommended."—*Library Journal*

$7.00

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST ARMY IN ACTION

The Korean War and Its Aftermath

ALEXANDER L. GEORGE

This remarkable account, based on a series of interviews with selected Chinese Communist prisoners of war, examines the political and military organization of the Chinese Communist People's Liberation Army. The author deals with the organization of the Army in Korea as revealed by the prisoners, details the effect of the encounter with UN Forces on the Chinese Communist military organization, and concludes with an analysis of developments in the PLA since the Korean War. $6.95

CADRES, BUREAUCRACY, AND POLITICAL POWER IN COMMUNIST CHINA

A. DOAK BARNETT, with a contribution by EZRA VOGEL


A comprehensive study of the organization and operation of the political system in Communist China. Based in large part on intensive interviews with Chinese emigrees who formerly worked for the Party or government in mainland China, it presents detailed information on political and governmental structure from the central government in Peking to the local communes. The author analyzes the manner in which the Communists' political apparatus now reaches and affects the mass of ordinary Chinese, and reveals many political trends and problems which will preoccupy Communist China's leaders in the years ahead.

$10.00

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

2960 Broadway

New York, N. Y. 10027



COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

COLUMBIA  COLUMBIA

PATHS TO WORLD ORDER

ANDREW W. CORDIER and KENNETH MAXWELL, Editors

The seven essays in this book are concerned with the need for a common ethic in international affairs. The theological implications in the search for an underlying ethic that will lead to world order, and the chief menace to world order, the difference between the "have" and "have not" nations, are among the subjects covered. Paper, $1.75

NATO AND THE RANGE OF AMERICAN CHOICE

WILLIAM T. R. FOX and ANNETTE BAKER FOX

A study of the works of NATO over the past fifteen years. The authors deal not only with decisions involving national security and Soviet military threats but also with the basic problems of arms control, international cooperation for an expanded economy, and the relation of NATO to the needs of developing countries. $7.95

THE UN SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

LEON GORDENKER

In tracing the techniques employed by the three Secretaries-General of the United Nations in maintaining or restoring peace in the major crises in which the UN has been involved, Professor Gordenker is able to derive conclusions regarding the limitations of the office as it is now constituted, and the possibilities for its expansion of influence in the future. $8.50

COLUMBIA ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Volume II The Dean's Papers, 1966


ANDREW W. CORDIER, Editor

The second annual volume of essays written by students of the Columbia University faculty of International Affairs. Topics treated include: The Gaullist Challenge; French Policy and Supranationality; The Birth of Communism in Southeast Asia; and Local Government and Politics in China: 1955-1958. $7.95

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

2960 Broadway

New York, N. Y. 10027



COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Nazi Germany and the American Hemisphere, 1933-1941

by Alton Frye

Through his examination of Nazi activities in the Americas and of the evidence from captured German archives, Alton Frye concludes that National Socialist Germany posed a distinct threat to the Western hemisphere. Among the book's most disturbing disclosures is the detailed review of Germany's clandestine interference in the American presidential campaign of 1940. **$6.75**

The Indus Rivers

A Study of the Effects of Partition

by Aloys A. Michel

This study analyzes the profound effects which the Partition of the Punjab has had on the regional economy and organization of the subcontinental portion of the Indus Basin. Mr. Michel assesses projects underway in India and West Pakistan since Partition, and also the engineering techniques being employed to restore the efficiency of the old, integrated irrigation system. **$12.50**

Soviet Political Schools

The Communist Party Adult Instruction System

by Ellen Propper Mickiewicz

Virtually unknown to the West, Soviet adult political education has undergone enormous expansion in the last decade. By 1964, thirty-six million people were enrolled in the system. This study is the first, by either a Western or Soviet scholar, to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the system devoted to the "political tempering" of adults. **$6.50**

The Origins of Malay Nationalism

by William R. Roff

The slow growth of communal, ethnic, and national feeling among the peninsular Malays during the first four decades of this century, and the expression of this feeling in voluntary associations of a potentially nationalist nature are the subjects of Mr. Roff's study. He points to three new Malay elite groups as offering an implicit challenge to the traditional status quo in the interests of a distinctly Malay nationalism. **$8.50**

available through your bookstore

Yale University Press
New Haven and London

in Canada: McGill University Press

Tibet: A Political History

by Tsepon W. D. Shakabpa

with a Foreword by His Holiness the Dalai Lama

In 1959 the Dalai Lama of Tibet, disguised as a peasant and accompanied by a small band of supporters, escaped the threatening Chinese Communist regime and took refuge in India. Among those living in exile is W. D. Shakabpa, former Minister of Finance, who has now written the first history of Tibet by a Tibetan to be published in English.

August $10.00

Yale Paperbounds

Children and Politics

by Fred I. Greenstein

"The uniqueness of Greenstein's effort is that it is the first book-length empirical treatment of the political socialization of American elementary school children."—*American Political Science Review.* **$1.75 (cloth $5.00)**

Arms and Influence

by Thomas C. Schelling

"An exemplary text on the interplay of national purpose and military force."—*Book Week.* "A brilliant and hardheaded book."—*New York Times.* **$1.95 (cloth $7.50)**

Village in Vietnam

by Gerald Cannon Hickey

"Mr. Hickey's report has great value for its penetration to realities of the Vietnamese situation."—*New York Times.* "Of major importance."—*Book Week.*

$2.95 (cloth $10.00)

The Lawmakers

Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life


by James David Barber

"Clearly one of the most significant studies of American politics written since the advent of behavioral studies in political science."—*Western Political Quarterly.*

$1.95 (cloth $7.50)

available through your bookstore

Yale University Press
New Haven and London
in Canada: McGill University Press



AS WE SAW THE THIRTIES

Essays on Social and Political Movements of a Decade

by Norman Thomas, Earl Browder, Max Shachtman, Gerald L. K. Smith, A. J. Muste, Granville Hicks, Hal Draper, and Burton K. Wheeler

edited by Rita Simon

Here are first-person, eye-witness accounts of major movements of the thirties, written by the men who led them. From the turbulent chronicle of American radicalism to the impact of the New Deal, the most formative political decade of the century is re-examined in terms of purposes, goals, and actual achievements. 253 pages. $6.50.

NEW FRONTIERS OF THE AMERICAN RECONSTRUCTION

edited by Harold M. Hyman

Traditional views of the Civil War and Reconstruction are challenged and revised in these essays which focus on the period through four differing approaches: constitutional history, political history, Negro Reconstruction, and the effects of the period on Latin America and Canada. Contributors to the volume are Harold M. Hyman, Alfred H. Kelly, John Hope Franklin, August Meier, Harry Bernstein, W. L. Morton, C. Vann Woodward, and Russel B. Nye. 156 pages. $4.95.

IMPROVING THE STATE LEGISLATURE


Report of the Illinois Commission on the Organization of the General Assembly

This pioneering study in an area of increasing national concern details the findings and specific proposals of a state commission created by the Illinois General Assembly in 1965, to examine ways and means of modernizing and improving the legislative process. Evolved from joint research by the commission and consulting specialists in political science and government, these findings explore a wide range of problems critical to modern state government, including constitutional impacts on the legislative process, general legislative procedures and techniques, the potential of committees and commissions, and the appropriation process. 146 pages. Paper, $2.95; cloth, $4.95.

LAW IN THE SOVIET SOCIETY

edited by Wayne R. LaFave

Legal scholars, political scientists, economists, and others will find valuable information and new frames of reference in these seven essays dealing with various aspects of the role of law in Soviet socio-political development and international relations. Contributors are Demitri B. Shimkin, Dennis M. O'Connor, Bernard A. Ramundo, Dietrich A. Loeber, Whitmore Gray, Zigurds L. Zile, and John N. Hazard. "This is a usefully informative book, and its appearance in paperback is welcome." — *The Russian Review*. ". . . a major contribution to American scholarship of Soviet administrative, civil, and criminal law." — *Choice*. 297 pages. Paper, $1.95; cloth, $4.75.



From ST. MARTIN'S

Just published:

Parliament, Parties and Society in France, 1946-1958

Duncan MacRae, Jr., *The Univ. of Chicago*

This important new book is a case study in political sociology. It includes an analysis of voting in the National Assembly in relation to party structure, constituency voting behavior, and social structure. The author has based his analysis on more than 800 legislative roll-call votes processed by computer, survey and aggregate voting data, and the relation of this information to constituencies, party structure, and legislative careers. To provide background he has used newspaper accounts of the Assembly and sociological analysis of the French social structure. The findings reveal two contrasting political subsystems: consensus in the Assembly and dissensus and protest outside. 1967 416 pp. $10.00

The Modern Presidency

Grant McConnell, *The Univ. of Chicago*

This fourth book in *St. Martin's Series in American Politics* is a coherent exposition of the modern presidency as it has emerged through the long term of American history—especially as it has been transformed in the years since the Depression. 1967 128 pp. Paper: $1.50

Influencing Voters

A Study in Campaign Rationality

Richard Rose, *Univ. of Strathclyde*

During an election campaign, dozens of individuals concentrate intensively upon spending millions of dollars to influence voters. Do their efforts corrupt our conventional version of the liberal process? Do party leaders and pressure group heads show themselves ready to use any method possible to sway votes? Are the methods employed effective? The author here sets out to answer these questions by carefully examining campaigning in Britain in 1959 and 1964. He has included material on American experience and the 1966 British campaign as well to demonstrate the many obstacles to rationality in efforts to influence voters. 1967 292 pp. $5.95

Fall publication:

The New Urbanization in New Nations and Old

Editors: Scott Greer and David W. Minar, *Northwestern Univ.;* Dennis C. McElrath, Univ. of California, Santa Cruz; and Peter Orleans, U.C.L.A. Fall 1967 $8.50 *tent.*



College Department

ST. MARTIN'S PRESS

175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010



Cornell University Press

MAJOR THEMES—

Russian Political Thought

An Introduction

By THORNTON ANDERSON. In this lucid and fully documented appraisal of Russian political theory and practice, the author stresses the *continuity* as well as the evolution of ideas. He examines the present Soviet regime, not simply in terms of its Marxist-Leninist concepts, but as a development of traditional Russian political assumptions. He shows how Orthodoxy, Mongol invasions, the fall of Byzantium, and even attempts at Westernization under Peter and Catherine led to the present isolation of Russia from the West. *432 pages.* $9.75

Comparative Political Development

The Precedent of the West

By G. LOWELL FIELD. A bold reclassification of political systems here forms the basis for new comparisons among governmental regimes. Using rigorous scientific and logical methods to classify types of political units, the author constructs a systems model and applies it to explain existing policies and to predict future change. Usual distinctions — such as that between democracy and dictatorship — disappear, and new delineations that are both accurate and objective suggest new approaches to current problems. *8 diagrams, 6 tables.* *288 pages.* $6.75

The Politics of Futility

The General Jewish Workers Bund of Poland, 1917-1943

By BERNARD K. JOHNPOLL. Largely from the Bund's own archives, most of which escaped destruction, Professor Johnpoll has put together this study of a movement that survived until its constituency had been literally wiped out. His moving account, with dramatic sidelights on Zionism, Soviet Communism, and the Polish resistance, adds a revealing chapter in the history of the Jews and of the Socialist movement. *314 pages.* $8.75

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

PROVOCATIVE IDEAS

International Communism in the Era of Lenin

Edited and with commentary by HELMUT GRUBER. This documentary history of international communism provides a concise and stimulating narrative framework into which the most significant doctrinal statements, manifestoes, analyses, and tactical decisions have been interwoven. The documentary material itself highlights the events of the Lenin era and, together with the narrative and a select number of interpretive essays, illuminates the growth of national communist parties against the background of the developing Communist International. *512 pages.* $7.50

Political Parties in Lebanon

The Challenge of a Fragmented Political Culture

By MICHAEL SULEIMAN. The role of political parties in a "confessional democracy" like Lebanon's demonstrates the function and limitations of parties in many emerging nations. In this pioneering study, Professor Suleiman examines the parties on their own terms — as political guides and critics in a highly sectarian society. The nineteen parties, including two Moslem religious groups, are categorized as legal or illegal, national or transnational, pan-Arab or sectarian, and their history, organization, platforms, and ideology are carefully examined in the context of Lebanese political tradition. *336 pages.* $7.50

Religion, Politics, and Diversity

The Church-State Theme in New York History

By JOHN WEBB PRATT. In this first history of church-state relations in a major state, the author details the conflicts and the evolution of a system of compromise in New York from colonial times to the present. He recommends that all concerned with church-state issues view the record to learn how our pluralistic society can continue to adjust its differences in light of today's shifting balance between local and federal power. *336 pages.* $7.50

Cornell University Press
ITHACA, NEW YORK 14850

New Studies from Resources for the Future, Inc.

THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY

The Economics of an International River Basin Development

By JOHN V. KRUTILLA

In September, 1964, the U.S. and Canada ratified the Columbia River Treaty, which provided for a joint financing and development of the Columbia River Basin, with special reference to electrical power and flood control. This study attempts to determine what was the basis for the selection of projects, how closely this basis reflected economic realities, and how the division of benefits affected each party to the treaty. Part I contains a theoretical discussion of international river development; Parts II and III apply these general criteria to the Columbia River experience. $7.50

THE ORSANCO STORY

Water Quality Management in the Ohio Valley under an Interstate Compact

By EDWARD J. CLEARY


One of the most successful efforts to control water pollution was inaugurated in 1948 by eight states—Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia—who signed a compact to coordinate their resources for a regional assault on mutual problems of stream pollution. The principal focus was on the 981-mile Ohio River and its nineteen major tributaries, which flow through the member states. This study is an account of why and how the pioneering ORSANCO compact came into being, what it achieved, and what may be learned from its experience in cleaning up a river basin.

$8.00 cloth, $2.95 paper

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

Baltimore, Maryland 21218

Now your students can learn political science inside out.



From the insider's point of view, that is . . . with the help of the INTER-NATION SIMULATION KIT, a unique game-like classroom program from SRA.

Taking the roles of "leaders" of hypothetical countries, students are required to make important decisions, prepare strategy, and generally act in the best interests of their "nations." Students gain insight into the inner workings of government with this highly-interesting, *involving* addition to world affairs study.

For more information about the INTER-NATION SIMULATION KIT, contact your SRA College Associate or write today.

SRA

Science Research Associates, Inc.
College Department
259 E. Erie St., Chicago, Ill. 60611

A Subsidiary of IBM



New from the University of Chicago Press

Modern Factor Analysis

Revised Edition

Harry H. Harman

Some sections have been condensed and others have been expanded to bring the book into accord with modern usage. Other changes are: A new chapter on Minres Method of factor analysis and a new section on the Direct Oblimin Method of transformation to oblique factors; consistent use of matrix notation in accordance with the usage of mathematical statisticians; computer applications; new problems and exercises; and an updated bibliography. Harry H. Harman is senior research psychologist, Educational Testing Service, Princeton.

1967 LC:67-20572 480 pages, $12.50

Economic Development and American Foreign Policy 1943-62

David A. Baldwin

Tracing the evolution of American foreign policy in an increasingly competitive field, Baldwin stresses the bargaining aspects of the relations between the executive branch and Congress and between the executive and foreign governments. He focuses on soft lending as the government's most important aid technique, and his conclusion sharply challenges several views concerning the constructive roles of the International Bank and Congress in promoting economic development and making foreign policy.

1966 LC:66-20597 291 pages, $7.95

The First Emancipation

The Abolition of Negro Slavery in the North

Arthur Zilversmit

This description of the social and economic role slavery played in the North traces the movement that led to its gradual abolition. Ideology, Zilversmit argues, and not lack of profitability, brought about the first emancipation. Early attacks on slavery by the Quakers combined with the libertarian principles of the Revolution helped the abolitionists persuade state legislators that, in this issue, concern for property rights could be tempered for the sake of individual liberty.

1967 LC:67-15954 353 pages, $6.95

The Death of Slavery

The United States, 1837-65

Elbert B. Smith

This fast-paced account of the crucial pre-Civil War period completes the chronological series of the "Chicago History of American Civilization." Smith's first-hand knowledge of politics gives the work an unusual emphasis which is especially appropriate for the politics of the times. "Chicago History of American Civilization" series, Daniel J. Boorstin, General Editor.

1967 LC:67-16779 232 pages, $5.00

University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*



New from the University of Chicago Press

The Court and the Constitution

A series edited by Philip B. Kurland

This new paperback series brings back into print in modestly priced editions a number of important books on past Supreme Court Justices and on the role of the Court in American life. As well as filling a need for students of law, political science, government, and history, these volumes will provide, collectively, a history of the Supreme Court.

Melville Weston Fuller

Chief Justice of the United States, 1888-1910

Willard L. King

With an Introduction by Phil C. Neal

Melville Weston Fuller presided over the Supreme Court for twenty-two terms—a period in which the Court handed down such important decisions as those on the Income Tax Cases of 1895, the "original-package doctrine," the Insular Cases, and the now discredited "separate but equal" doctrine of *Plessy* v. *Ferguson*. In his new Introduction to this biography Phil C. Neal writes, "Fuller emerges in these pages as, among other things, an attractive human being. . . . Our understanding of a major era of the Supreme Court is the richer for this work."

1967 416 pages Paper $2.95

The Unpublished Opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis

The Supreme Court at Work

Alexander M. Bickel

With an Introduction by Paul A. Freund

From 1916 to 1939 Louis Dembitz Brandeis opposed the tendency of a majority on the Supreme Court to cling to a "laissez-faire" conservatism. Both without and within the Court, he exerted enormous influence in shaping the social and economic thought of the nation. This book gives the reader a rare opportunity to explore the mind of one of America's greatest jurists. Dean Acheson, in commending Professor Bickel's "excellent book," notes: "For the lawyer who wants a full-length view of Justice Brandeis' judicial methodology it is indispensable."

1967 320 pages Paper $2.45

John Marshall

James Bradley Thayer

With a Foreword by Mark De Wolfe Howe

First published in 1901, this concise biography remains an eminently readable introduction to the great Chief Justice. Thayer demonstrates that Marshall's most enduring contribution to the nation's welfare lay in his "strong constitutional doctrine, explained in detail, elaborated, powerfully argued, over and over again, with unsurpassable earnestness and force, placed permanently in our judicial records, holding its own during the long emergence of a feebler political theory, and showing itself in all its majesty when war and civil dissension came."

1967 196 pages Paper $1.95

The Papers of James Madison

Volume V
1 August 1782
—31 December 1782

Edited by
William T. Hutchinson
and William M. E. Rachal

These 200 documents include Madison's notes on Congressional debates beginning in November, 1782, and focus upon the many domestic and foreign problems facing the government during the last five months of that year. The ominous discontent of civilian and military creditors of the Confederation, and the threatening manifestations of sectional rivalries are portrayed in illuminating detail. Reviewers of previous volumes have said: "This edition of the Madison Papers is a massive contribution of scholarship and a fitting monument to one of America's most notable philosopher-statesmen."—Jacob E. Cooke, *Pennsylvania History*. "The editing is magnificent as we are accustomed to expect."—*Times Literary Supplement*.

1967 LC:62-9114 496 pages, $12.50

The Correspondence of Edmund Burke

Volume VI
July 1789-December 1791

Edited by
Alfred Cobban
and Robert A. Smith

Volume VI of Burke's correspondence (July 1789-December 1791) covers the beginning of the French Revolution. Of the 225 letters reproduced here, 164 were written in whole or in part by Burke. Many are of major political importance. The correspondence of these years is an essential supplement to Burke's other writings, for some of his attitudes toward the Revolution, which he saw as a turning-point in Western civilization, he revealed only in private letters.

1967 LC:58-5615 495 pages, $13.50

The Supreme Court Review 1966

Edited by
Philip B. Kurland

Contents: Felix Frankfurter: A Lesson of Faith, *Archibald MacLeish*—The Obscenity Cases: Grapes of Roth, *C. Peter Magrath*—The Voting Rights Cases, *Alexander M. Bickel*—Albertson v. S.A.C.B.: The Conflict between the Privilege against Self-Incrimination and the Government's Need for Information, *John H. Mansfield*—Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, *Monrad G. Paulsen*—Elfbrandt v. Russell: The End of the Era of the Oath?, *Jerold H. Israel*—The Union as Litigant: Personality, Pre-emption, and Propaganda, *Alfred Kamin*—Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents, *Edmund W. Kitch*—The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Court-packing Plan, *William E. Leuchtenburg*.

1966 LC:60-14353 400 pages, $8.95

The Growth of American Constitutional Law

Benjamin F. Wright

With an Introduction by
Robert G. McCloskey

This brilliant survey evaluates the work of the Supreme Court up to the early 1940's, when the two great issues of modern constitutional history—the decline of laissez-faire and the rise of civil rights—were just taking shape. In his new introduction Robert G. McCloskey describes Wright as embodying "a deep knowledge of the institutional and intellectual history of America; a political scientist's concern to understand the Court as an operative instrument of government; and a respect for the judicial ideal of rationality and a sharply critical eye for the Court's shortcomings in its pursuit of that ideal."

1967 296 pages Paper $2.45

University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637

RECOMMENDED BY VAN NOSTRAND . . .

THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE, The Soviet System in Theory and Practice, Third Edition

Edited with introductory notes by *Samuel Hendel*, The City College of the City University of New York. Available Fall 1967, approximately 600 pages, about $4.95 (paper).

The achievements, failures and prospects of Soviet society are examined in this collection of writings. The author has combined original source material by the men who have helped shape the Soviet system. Commentary is by the following distinguished observers of the Soviet scene: *George F. Kennan, Sidney Hook, Harrison Salisbury, Robert W. Campbell, Isaac Deutscher,* and *Bertram D. Wolfe.* The new contributions to this expanded and updated Third Edition include: the nature and prospects of socialist democracy; the Russians as people; the effect of politics on Soviet law; the new economic plan, 1966-1970; the search for economic rationality and economic growth; and the impact of Marxist theory of Soviet practice.

THE VAN NOSTRAND POLITICAL SCIENCE SERIES

Franklin L. Burdette, General Editor

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Second Edition

By *Russell W. Maddox, Jr.* and *Robert F. Fuquay*, both of Oregon State University. 1966, 736 pages, $8.50.

This revised Second Edition sets forth the basic principles, institutions, and functions of American government at the state and local levels. The text is designed for a one-semester undergraduate course in State and Local Government.

ISSUES IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT: Selected Readings

Edited by *Russell W. Maddox, Jr.* 1965, 424 pages, $4.75 (paper).

This collection of readings has been designed specifically for basic college and university courses in State and Local Government and as a supplement for American Government courses. The selections have been divided into ten parts: The States in the Federal System, State Constitutions, State Executives, State Legislatures, Law and the Courts, Political Processes, Finance and Personnel, Local Governments, Metropolitan Areas, Programs and Policies.

EUROPEAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS: A Comparative Government Reader, Second Edition

Edited by *William G. Andrews*, Tufts University. 1966, 608 pages, $4.95 (paper).

This compilation represents a new concept in studies of comparative political institutions: it focuses upon the political institutions of the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union, as viewed by the leaders of each country.

SOVIET INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES: Inside Views

Edited by *William G. Andrews*. 1966, 424 pages, $4.50 (paper)

Each of the fifty-six articles in this book are from original sources and provide new perspective on some facet of the Soviet system. Differing markedly from the descriptive-interpretive viewpoints of conventional books, these selected readings provide more vivid insights into the nature of Russia's conflict with the West.

CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AMERICA

By *Esther C. Sweet*, Tufts University. 1966, 368 pages, $3.95 (paper).

Suitable as a basic casebook for Civil Liberties courses or as a supplement for Constitutional and American Government courses, this book provides the student with a basic knowledge of specific areas in the field of civil liberties and acquaints him with some of the deeply rooted conflicts that have given rise to the various cases.

EUROPEAN POLITICS I: The Restless Search

Edited by *William G. Andrews*. Contributors: *Carl J. Friedrich; Anthony S. King; William G. Andrews; Stanley Hoffman; Elmer Pilschke; and Samuel Hendel*. 1965, 245 pages, $2.50.

Van Nostrand Comparative Government Biennial

Send for your on-approval copies. Write College Department,

Van Nostrand
120 Alexander Street
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

DORSEY PRESS

Outstanding Political Science Texts from the Dorsey Press

THE LANGUAGE OF MODERN POLITICS:
An Introduction to the Study of Government

By H. MARK ROELOFS, *New York University.* This book presents to the beginning student the view that politics should be studied for what it is—a distinctly human activity in which men attempt to converse about and communicate their problems. *About 400 pages. May. Text price: $7.50.*

THE NATURE OF POLITICAL INQUIRY

By FRED M. FROHOCK, *Syracuse University.* This book defines political inquiry through a discussion of the necessary role of theory in investigation. *About 200 pages. July.*

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT: A Critical Study

By EUGENE J. MEEHAN, *Brandeis University.* A critical, analytical study, this book examines discussion now taking place about methodological, conceptual, and evaluative problems in the study of politics. *449 pages. June.*

PATTERNS OF SOVIET POLITICS, Revised Edition

By RICHARD C. GRIPP, *San Diego State College.* Expanded and reorganized, this new edition provides new information on such developments as Khrushchev's downfall and the new five-year plan. *About 650 pages. July.*

THE ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Revised Edition

By GERARD J. MANGONE, *Syracuse University.* Greatly expanded and completely updated, this new Revised Edition presents additional introductory text material for each section of cases and documents. *551 pages. Text price: $8.50.*

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM: Notes and Readings

Edited by BERNARD E. BROWN, *Brooklyn College of the City University of New York,* and JOHN C. WAHLKE, *The University of Iowa.* Systematic, analytic, and dynamic, this book places the study of the American political system in the same perspective as the study of politics in general. *682 pages. Paperbound. Text price: $4.75.*

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY-MAKING:
A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative, Revised Edition

By JAMES A. ROBINSON, *The Ohio State University.* With current information and more extensive analyses, more than one third of this book has been rewritten from new material. *266 pages. May. Paperbound.*

Published in THE DORSEY SERIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Consulting Editor: NORTON E. LONG, Brandeis University

Write Today for Examination Copies

THE DORSEY PRESS • HOMEWOOD, ILLINOIS

DORSEY PRESS

LOOKING FOR A BOOK PUBLISHER?

It is no secret that publication is regarded as the foundation stone of a scholar's career. In order to gain recognition, prestige, and advancement, the scholar must seek publication.


Here at Exposition Press, we offer scholars a complete publishing service, under our special academic imprint, "Exposition-University Books." Though the proportion of scholarly publications in the lists of the trade houses is shrinking, due to economic pressures, many of our recent titles in the academic fields have gained popular reviews, professional recognition and steady sales. These books are the result of a publishing plan that is bringing a steady flow of scholarly writers to Exposition Press. They reflect the high editorial standards and quality of design and production which have won the respect of libraries, schools, booksellers and critics. Ask for free catalogs.

FREE! The behind-the-scenes story of book publishing revealed in two fact-filled, illustrated brochures, containing a detailed description for our subsidy plan including a breakdown of contract terms and typical costs (in print for the first time). Copies are available on request. Your inquiries and manuscripts are invited. An editorial appraisal will be furnished promptly without obligation. References upon request.

Please write to Dept. 93F

EXPOSITION PRESS, *Main Office, 386 Park Ave. So., New York 16, N.Y.*
California office: 9172 Sunset Blvd., Los Angeles 69, Calif.

Be an esotericist



Join the select few who are looking into mathematical social science. *Readings in Mathematical Social Science* contains 18 papers and is the first published volume to apply mathematics to a variety of disciplines in the social sciences.

Edited by Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Quetelet Professor of Social Science, Columbia University and Neil W. Henry, Bureau of Applied Research, Columbia University. Hardbound. Price: $10.50

For your copy, contact your SRA College Associate or write.

SRA

Science Research Associates, Inc.
College Department
259 E. Erie St., Chicago, Ill. 60611

A Subsidiary of IBM

Oxford University Press

Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers

By M. J. C. VILE, *Nuffield College, University of Oxford.* "Freedom ordains rules. Government is lost liberty." This is the paradox which this book explores and which has confronted theorists of constitutional government since earliest times. Mr. Vile traces the history of the doctrine of separation of powers from its birth during the English Civil War through its development in the eighteenth century—including its significance in the American and French Revolutions and in subsequent constitution-making—to its place in political thought in Britain, France, and America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. $8.00

Britain and the Rise of Communist China

A STUDY OF BRITISH ATTITUDES 1945-1954

By BRIAN E. PORTER, *University College, Aberystwyth, Wales.* This study focuses on British attitudes, as they are reflected in government, policy, parliamentary debate, and public opinion, towards the emergence of Communist China as a great power. There is also a record of the issues, wars, and problems which accompanied the rise of Red China. Dr. Porter believes that Western responses helped to produce a series of crises which have convulsed the Far East and heightened world tension. $5.60

Freedom and Unity—Uhuru na Umoja

A SELECTION FROM WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 1952-1965

By JULIUS K. NYERERE, *President of Tanzania.* This selection covers the years of the growth of TANU, the campaign for national freedom and the beginning of Tanganyika, and then Tanzania as an independent nation. The papers reflect President Nyerere's role in and concern for the politics of his country, and the education and welfare of Tanzania's citizens. *15 halftones.* $7.20

The Principles of Politics

By J. R. LUCAS, *Merton College, Oxford.* In his book, Mr. Lucas stresses the importance of thinking out afresh the principles of our own politics. He bases his arguments on the limitations of men: incomplete unselfishness, fallible judgment, and imperfect information, pointing out that institutions should counteract these imperfections. The nature of political argument and political obligation is discussed, and the traditional ideas of natural law and the rules of law, of legality, equality, freedom, and justice are elucidated and reformulated in modern terms. $8.00

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Oxford University Press

The Power Structure
POLITICAL PROCESS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

By ARNOLD M. ROSE, *University of Minnesota.* This revealing survey of the American political process investigates the central question: who holds political power in the United States and how is this power used? The author, who disputes the views of C. Wright Mills, examines the many different groups exerting political pressure and the ways they achieve varying results under varying circumstances.

Cloth, $8.50. *A Galaxy Book,* GB 194, *paper,* $2.95

An Encore for Reform
THE OLD PROGRESSIVES AND THE NEW DEAL

By OTIS L. GRAHAM, JR., *University of California, Santa Barbara.* The author delves into an important source of the reform tradition—the reformers of the Progressive era who survived into the days of the New Deal. Through interviews with over 100 of them, he discovered that more than half opposed the New Deal in whole or in part. "I have read it with interest and admiration. This is a fine monograph."—FRANK FREIDEL, Harvard University.

Cloth $6.00. *A Galaxy Book,* GB 193, *paper,* $1.95

The Puritan Ethic and Woman Suffrage

By ALAN P. GRIMES, *Michigan State University.* The woman suffrage movement in America has usually been seen as a progressive force; this book reveals another, generally ignored, side of the movement. Professor Grimes shows how it actually became a major weapon in the hands of the nativist forces that were organizing against the large blocs of foreign immigrants. "One of the few studies of women and woman suffrage which advance beyond guesswork and anecdote to real historical analysis."—CHRISTOPHER LASCH, Northwestern University. $4.75

Acquaintances

By ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE. Twenty-four people or couples who made an impression on Dr. Toynbee are described by him. The characters include public figures such as Nehru, Smuts, and T. E. Lawrence, whom he merely met, but in interesting circumstances. Close personal friends and relations are portrayed with affection and admiration and in an entertaining manner. This book sheds new light on a number of well-known people, and a very warm light indeed on its author. *12 plates.* $7.50

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Oxford University Press

Elites In Latin America

Edited by SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET, *Harvard University; and* ALDO SOLARI. Essays by fifteen social scientists from the United States and Latin America analyze the groups that control the society, politics and economy of Latin America. The problems of development and modernization, as reflected in the elites, are discussed in detail—with special emphasis on the ways in which the educational systems affect the competence, orientation, and the composition of future elites.

Cloth, $9.50. *A Galaxy Book,* GB 192, *paper,* $2.95

Politics in Brazil 1930–1964

AN EXPERIMENT IN DEMOCRACY

By THOMAS E. SKIDMORE, *University of Wisconsin.* This book examines whether the 1964 breakdown of constitutional processes in Brazil was inevitable. It is a thorough study of Brazilian politics, beginning with Getulio Vargas's fifteen-year rule. The author shows a keen awareness of how the difficulties of economic expansion, an unfavorable trade balance, inequitable land distribution, and shifting political power have hindered Brazil's growth and stability in this classic study of a nation in the throes of industrialization. $8.75

The Politics of the Third World

By J. D. B. MILLER, *Australian National University.* The author's view is that there is no necessary harmony to views within the Third World except on issues of symbolic importance—and even there, the degree of harmony is likely to lessen in the future. In supporting his position he analyzes the consequences of Afro-Asian nationalism; examines such bodies as OAU and the Arab League; looks at the Bandung and Algiers attempts to project an Afro-Asian point of view; and evaluates the efforts of the major powers to increase their influence. (*Royal Institute of International Affairs.*)

Cloth, $3.75, *paper,* $1.50

Stalin

A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY, SECOND EDITION

By ISAAC DEUTSCHER. This masterly work, first published in 1949, is firmly established as the standard life of Stalin and one of the most notable political biographies of our time. The major importance of this edition is the new, extensive closing chapter on Stalin's last years. Besides discussing the forces that shaped Stalin's life, this study is devoted to his foreign policy and its relation to Soviet Russia's internal evolution.

Cloth, $12.50. *A Galaxy Book,* GB 195, *paper,* $2.95

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Institutions in Modern America

Innovation in Structure and Process

Edited by STEPHEN E. AMBROSE

Each of these essays—which were first delivered in the spring of 1966 as the James Schouler Lectures at The Johns Hopkins University under the sponsorship of the Center for the Study of Recent American History—attempts to analyze one aspect of the extraordinary organizational developments that have characterized the first sixty-five years of the present century. Professors Chandler, Ropp, and Brody discuss the corporation, the military establishment, and the labor union, respectively, and find organizational structure to be of prime importance; Professor Leuchtenburg finds process to be more important than structure in his analysis of politics. But all agree that great changes have come, and that they have come in the form of a pragmatic response to daily needs.

$5.95

Modern Yemen, 1918-1966

By MANFRED W. WENNER

This is the story of the power vacuum that followed Yemeni independence in 1918 and the events that led up to the establishment of the Yemeni republic in 1962. Professor Wenner places the policies of the Imams Yahya and Ahmad in the context of Yemeni development and shows how the Yemeni rulers attempted to exploit European conflicts for their own ends. Throughout the study he sets U.S.-Yemeni relations against the background of post-World War II international politics, and concludes with an analysis of the civil war which began in 1962.

$6.95

Canada's Changing Defense Policy, 1957-1963

The Problems of a Middle Power in Alliance

By JON B. McLIN

This is a study of several controversial issues in Canadian defense and Canadian-American relations, including Canada's participation in NORAD, its purchase of several advanced aircraft, and the decision to acquire nuclear weapons. In reconstructing and interpreting these events, Dr. McLin finds that much of the problem stemmed from a lack of clarity about Canada's purposes in alliance participation, which in its case serves ends that are more political than military. The events of this period are examined in the perspective of Canadian defense policy since 1945; the policy changes that were made after the Pearson Government replaced that of John Diefenbaker in 1963 are also described.

$8.50

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS
Baltimore, Maryland 21218

PAPERBACKS for fall classes

ACC

THE SOVIET UNION: An Introduction

GEORGE ALEXANDER LENSEN, *The Florida State University*

Drawing on the intimate knowledge gained through extended residence in the U.S.S.R., Dr. Lensen provides a vivid picture of Russian life and culture, including in his presentation basic political, historical, geographic, and economic information on the Soviet state.

September 1967 128 pages 30 photographs by the author

WORLD TENSIONS: Conflict and Accommodation

ELTON ATWATER, KENT FORSTER, and JAN S. PRYBYLA, all of *The Pennsylvania State University*

A basic introduction to world affairs, this is a lucid treatment of the principal sources of—and various means of resolving—international tension and conflict. It carefully examines the economic, social, political, and ideological determinants of nations' behavior. Instructor's manual now in preparation.

June 1967 400 pages illustrated

A SECOND FEDERALIST: Congress Creates a Government

Edited by CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, *Indiana University;* and GEORGE W. CAREY, *Georgetown University*

A presentation of congressional debates from 1789 to 1824, abridged and excerpted from the *Annals of Congress,* the most complete account of what was said and done by Congress in its first four decades.

January 1967 325 pages $2.95

THE SUPREME COURT AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, 2nd Ed.

GEORGE W. SPICER, *University of Virginia*

The long-awaited revision of Spicer's brief, incisive, critical analysis of the Supreme Court as a guardian of American civil liberties.

February 1967 280 pages $2.45

SOURCES IN MODERN EAST ASIAN HISTORY AND POLITICS

Edited by THEODORE MCNELLY, *University of Maryland*

Source materials and readings on the recent history, politics, ideologies, and international relations of China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, designed to supplement, and correlated with, standard textbooks.

May 1967 416 pages illustrated

CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1964-1966

ROBERT F. CUSHMAN, *New York University*

December 1966 73 pages $.95

(A second supplement, *Cases in Constitutional Law,* 1966-1967, will be available for fall classes.)

Appleton-Century-Crofts

Division of Meredith Publishing Company

440 Park Avenue South, New York 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Important New Books From Macmillan

FORGING WORLD ORDER:

The Politics of International Organization

By Jack C. Plano, Western Michigan University, and Robert E. Riggs, University of Minnesota

An analytical survey of the theory and history of contemporary international institutions is presented in this important new book. Emphasizing the concepts of influence and power, the authors examine the historical development of international cooperation. All types of world organizations are then discussed, with major emphasis placed on political processes and the actual functioning and interacting of the various groups. Many pedagogical aids are included.

1967, 600 pages, $8.95

THE UNITED NATIONS:

International Organization and Administration

Edited by Maurice Waters, Wayne State University

This valuable collection contains readings, sources, speeches, and documents relating to all phases of the United Nations. Giving both the historical development and the theory of international organization, the material is structured to show both the external and internal features of the U.N.

1967, 583 pages, paper, $4.95

THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

By Andrew M. Scott, The University of North Carolina

The first book to apply a general systems approach to the study of international relations, this book consists of a set of interrelated propositions that build on one another as the book progresses. Both facts and assumptions are stated clearly. Making considerable use of communications theory, problems of perception theory, and conflict analysis, the author provides an integrated approach to international relations.

1967, 228 pages, prob. $2.95

POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND POWER: Ideology and Practice Under Capitalism, Socialism, Communism, and Fascism

By Nathaniel Stone Preston, The American University

". . . A real contribution to the teaching literature, for both comparative government and comparative economic systems courses . . ."

—Professor Michael D. Reagan, University of California, Riverside

This well-written book begins by providing a brief history of the development of political and economic forces in Western Civilization. Then each of the four major ideologies is examined in terms of its objectives, operating principles, and actual practice. The relevance of each system to developing nations is also discussed. The final chapter makes some observations on the future of the various systems.

1967, 242 pages, paper, $2.95

Write to the Faculty Service Desk for examination copies.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

866 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022

Scott Foresman College Division

Ready in August

THE CITIZEN AND THE ADMINISTRATOR IN A DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY

An Empirical Study in Delhi State, India

S. J. ELDERSVELD, The University of Michigan
V. JAGANNADHAM, The Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, India
A. P. BARNABAS, The Indian Institute of Public Administration, New Delhi, India


Utilizing survey data to test basic theoretical propositions about the developing Indian democracy, this book deals with various aspects of the Indian bureaucracy, both as it was inherited from the British and as it has been influenced by current social and political attitudes. The authors' pilot study of citizen perception of and contacts with five administrative agencies, together with a study of administrators' role perception and behavior, is based on over 600 interviews with a random sample of citizens in urban and rural areas and over 200 interviews with a random sample of administrators. The results of this study are frequently compared with the results of a similar study in Detroit, Michigan.

The book begins with an introductory theoretical chapter, moves through a presentation of basic data on the public's evaluations of and responses to the agencies and their administrators, and describes the administrators' social and professional backgrounds, job concepts, and performance. It also highlights the importance of the quality and quantity of bureaucratic contacts, focusing especially on public involvement with the Community Development and various agricultural projects. A final chapter summarizes the meaning of this analysis for the problems, prospects, and paradoxes of administration in the Indian democracy.

THE CITIZEN AND THE ADMINISTRATOR IN A DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY can serve as primary reference material for political science courses in comparative politics and administration as well as for those dealing with political development in south Asia. Especially useful to the reader is an appendix which includes the sample design and the questionnaires used. *160 pages prob. $6.00*

SCOTT, FORESMAN AND COMPANY College Division
Glenview, Illinois Atlanta Dallas Palo Alto Oakland, N.J.

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*



STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

A new series from
The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research of The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies

The four studies listed below are the first in a series of booklet publications on international political and economic affairs. Between four and six studies will be published each year. These publications will reflect the Center's major continuing interests: the examination of trends in international politics and the assessment of America's evolving foreign policy. They will analyze and comment on issues of current interest to policy makers, the academic community, and informed persons generally.

Studies in International Affairs

1. INTERVENTION AGAINST COMMUNISM
By Herbert S. Dinerstein

Proposes guidelines for U.S. intervention against communism based on a historical analysis of past experiences, including Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. $1.45

2. IMPERIAL AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF PRIMACY
By George Liska

Examines the exercise of America's pre-eminent power and influence in relation to salient trends in international politics, with special emphasis on the implication of these trends for U.S. foreign policy. $2.25

3. CRISIS OVER RHODESIA: A SKEPTICAL VIEW
By Charles Burton Marshall

Examines the background and development of the Rhodesian question and demonstrates that most of the public debate, in the U.N. and elsewhere, has been ill-informed and unrealistic.

"This work of careful scholarship and lively writing makes easy the duty of every member of Congress, every editor, every citizen who feels obligation to keep track of what his Government is up to."—Dean Acheson $1.45

4. THE CHANGING STATUS OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION IN WESTERN DIPLOMACY, 1955-1966
By Charles R. Planck

Reviews the course of NATO policy on German reunification from the perspective of Bonn's efforts to have its preferences respected in regard to such questions as a final European settlement, disarmament, and priorities in the search for East-West détente. $1.45

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21218

MARX'S ECONOMIC PREDICTIONS

by Fred M. Gotthell

During the course of his creative years (1843–83), Marx produced a large quantity of economic, political, and historical books, essays, pamphlets, addresses, and correspondence. Dispersed among these writings were many prophecies, both abstract and specific. *Marx's Economic Predictions* evaluates over 150 of his predictions as logical derivatives of his theoretical system.

xv + 216 pages $7.50

SOUTH AFRICA'S TRANSKEI

The Politics of Domestic Colonialism

by Gwendolen Carter, Thomas Karis, and Newell M. Stultz

The Transkei, a large tribal reserve situated in the eastern Cape Province, was established by the South African government as its first semiautonomous territory. In this book, the authors describe, analyze, and evaluate the program of "separate development" as demonstrated in the Transkei experiment. *Northwestern University African Studies, Number Nineteen.*

192 pages $5.50

PERSPECTIVES ON THE COURT

by Max Freedman, William M. Beaney, and Eugene V. Rostow

During the past twenty years the Supreme Court has been involved in reformulating our fundamental law as it relates to civil rights, separation of church and state, reapportionment, and criminal procedures. Here, the Court's performance is viewed by three eminent men from the vantage points of journalism, political science, and law.

120 pages $3.50

APPROACHES TO COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

R. Barry Farrell, editor

In this volume, twelve internationally respected political scientists analyze the relationship between national and international politics. These scholars are Karl W. Deutsch, James N. Rosenau, Carl J. Friedrich, George I. Blanksten, Pablo González Casanova, Norton E. Long, R. Barry Farrell, Vernon V. Aspaturian, Roland Young, Chadwick F. Alger, Raoul Naroll, and Oliver Benson.

368 pages cloth, $9.95 paper, $3.95

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS

Evanston, Illinois



Outstanding new paperback texts in political science

THE IDEOLOGIES OF THE DEVELOPING NATIONS

Revised Edition

Edited with an Introduction by PAUL E. SIGMUND. Foreword by Reinhold Niebuhr. Through selections from articles, speeches, and books, Professor Sigmund surveys the political thought and ideologies of the leaders of the developing nations in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. An extensively revised and expanded edition of the now-standard text which *Africa Today* has called "a penetrating analysis of personalities and parties." ca. 440 pp. U-529/$2.95

HOW NATIONS NEGOTIATE

By FRED CHARLES IKLÉ. Now to be made available in a Praeger paperback edition—the groundbreaking study of the science of negotiation written under the auspices of Harvard's Center for International Affairs and first published in 1964. "An attempt to codify negotiating behavior and to construct an operational code. . . . A fresh attack on a neglected field of inquiry."—PROFESSOR WILLIAM T. R. FOX, in *Science*. 286 pp. U-630/$2.50

POLITICAL SYSTEMS Some Sociological Approaches

By H. V. WISEMAN. An ideal text for political sociology, comparative systems, and introductory political science courses: Professor Wiseman summarizes the sociological approaches that have afforded new insights into the study of political systems, relating the theories of Talcott Parsons, Max Weber, and Seymour Lipset to those of Gabriel Almond, David Apter, Edward Shils, and others. 254 pp. bibliog., index. U-629/$2.25

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, Publishers

111 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003



THE COMING OF THE ITALIAN-ETHIOPIAN WAR

By GEORGE W. BAER

In the most comprehensive study in any language of the background to the Italian-Ethiopian War, the author investigates the reactions of the leaders of Great Britain, France, and the lesser powers to Mussolini's open preparations for the invasion of Ethiopia, and analyzes the profound consequences of the crisis for the League of Nations and the world. $9.50

LITERARY DISSENT IN COMMUNIST CHINA

By MERLE GOLDMAN

This examination of the extent of intellectual opposition within Communist China in the 1940's and 1950's analyzes the Party's policies toward the intelligentsia and provides new insights into the nature of totalitarian societies. The author includes accounts of the views, frustrations, and tragic fates of many individual writers. *Harvard East Asian Series, 29.* $7.95

EDMUND BURKE

The Practical Imagination

By GERALD W. CHAPMAN

In spite of innumerable assessments, Edmund Burke has remained, in many ways, an elusive and ambiguous figure. Mr. Chapman indicts the many efforts to claim Burke for a variety of ideological fashions and provides an interpretative summary and analysis of Burke's actual thinking on the great issues of his time. $5.95

PUBLIC POLICY

A Yearbook of the Graduate School of Public Administration, Harvard University

Edited by JOHN D. MONTGOMERY and ARTHUR SMITHIES

Volume XIV (1965) in this distinguished series of books contains eighteen essays organized into four parts, entitled "Politics and Foreign Policies," "Problems of Planning," "Policies and Decisions," and "Applications of Federalism." *Distributed for the Graduate School of Public Administration.* $7.00

HARVARD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*



Charles O. Lerche, Jr.

LAST CHANCE IN EUROPE

Bases for a New American Policy. A clear and cogent analysis of the deterioration of NATO and our relations with our European allies since the end of World War II. Mr. Lerche argues convincingly for a new "partnership." Foreword by Kenneth W. Thompson. *cloth $5.95*
paper $2.25

H. L. Nieburg

IN THE NAME OF SCIENCE

A chilling account of the growth of the scientific-military-industrial complex in America. "This copious, astute, opinionated, illuminating, exasperating work should make the nation wonder whether it really wants, after all, to abdicate the future to the Contract State."—Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Life* *$7.95*

Belden Paulson, with Athos Ricci

THE SEARCHERS

Conflict and Communism in an Italian Town. This excellent casebook in basic, functioning politics is a remarkable study of a village which, because of its past and present, casts a 70 per cent Communist vote. "Sensitive, revealing, important, and thoroughly first-class . . ."—*Annals* *$6.95*

William L. O'Neill, editor

ECHOES OF REVOLT

The Masses, 1911-1917. A bountiful, beautiful anthology from the radical magazine that shocked American manners and morals before it was banned by the U.S. government. "A sumptuous feast . . ."—*New York Times.* "Surprisingly fresh . . . The artwork alone is worth the price of admission."—*Newsweek.* Introduction by Irving Howe. Afterword by Max Eastman. *$12.95*

QUADRANGLE BOOKS, Inc.

180 North Wacker Drive, Chicago 60606

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Challenge and response in American government—

GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

Benjamin Baker / Stanley H. Friedelbaum

Rutgers—The State University

561 pages 1966 $7.95

"The genius of America . . . [is] to be found in the ways in which an essentially undemocratic constitutional structure has been molded into an effective instrument of popular control and [in] the unusual adaptability of the system as a whole toward meeting the changing requirements of each generation."

This excerpt from the Introduction explains concisely the pervading theme of GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, a new introductory text in American government: that our political institutions have changed over the years in response to the needs of American society.

Other features of
GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
have been praised by—

Donald Robinson, Smith College:

"I approve of and, in my own courses, share its emphases. It is well-written, and its footnotes give the student good leads for future study—as does the excellent annotated bibliography."

Paul Dolan, University of Delaware:

"Extremely readable and most up-to-date text at the present time. Well organized."

Robert Wood, Augusta College:

". . . a refreshing approach, an inviting format, a clear process of presentation."

And an Instructor's Manual prepared by Robert S. Getz, Kent State University, is available separately.

For further information, write the regional sales office serving your area.

Houghton Mifflin

Boston / Atlanta / Dallas / Geneva, Ill. / New York / Palo Alto

Politics and the Military in Modern Spain

Stanley G. Payne. The first full-scale study in any language of the relation of the military to Spanish politics, government, and public issues in the 19th and 20th centuries. The key period 1917-39 is given special attention. Includes new data on the military conspiracy of 1936 and the Civil War, 1936-39. $12.50

West German Foreign Policy 1949-1963

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE AND DOMESTIC RESPONSE

Wolfram F. Hanrieder. A detailed examination of the pursuit of the three major goals of West German foreign policy—security, political and economic recovery, and reunification—from the beginning of the Federal Republic to the end of the Adenauer regime. $7.50

Tocqueville and the Problem of Democracy

Marvin Zetterbaum. A fresh study of Tocqueville's well-known "inevitability thesis" that makes possible a new and deeper understanding of his central concern: the problem of reconciling the demands of justice, of equal rights for all men, with the demands of excellence. $5.75

NOW IN PAPERBACK

African Socialism

Edited by William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, Jr. "A handy guide to a very diffuse and elusive subject."—*The Annals.* "An extremely useful study."—*The Journal of Politics.* Cloth, $6.75; paper, $2.95

Marxism in the Modern World

Edited by Milorad M. Drachkovitch. "An excellent, well-written, and wide ranging introduction admirably suited for the layman and the undergraduate."—*The American Political Science Review.* Cloth, $5.95; paper, $2.95

The British Political System

André Mathiot. "Historical materials are deftly woven into a tight analytical framework."—*The Journal of Politics.* "A genuine enrichment of our literature in this field."—*World Affairs.* Cloth, $7.50; paper, $2.95

Order from your bookstore, please

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE

W. W. KULSKI, Duke University

A highly successful text which analyzes the ideological conflicts, discordant national interests and the social and economic factors that underlie today's revolutionary transformations. Close attention is given to the problems of the underdeveloped nations—the "Third World"—and their role in today's power struggle. *"Of the perhaps dozen books on the subject that this reviewer has read in the past year, this is by far the most knowledgeable and useful. It can be recommended for student, intellectual and technician alike."*—America

650 Pages **$7.25**

THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY: EAST AND WEST

KURT LONDON, George Washington University

The author scans the policy machinery of the main protagonists of the East-West conflict—United States, Russia, China, Great Britain and France. Special emphasis is given to the vital roles of intelligence and propaganda in the making and implementation of policy, and the agencies and media are carefully defined.

368 Pages **Paperbound** **$1.95**

THE SOVIET ECONOMY SINCE STALIN

HARRY SCHWARTZ

Russia's current economic difficulties and the reasons for them are analyzed by the *New York Times'* specialist on Russian affairs. The continuing problem of Soviet agriculture and the ouster of Khrushchev are given close attention.

256 Pages **Paperbound** **$1.95**

LA GUARDIA COMES TO POWER: 1933

ARTHUR MANN, University of Chicago

A distinguished historian examines the significant elements of the election that was a turning point in the history of American urban politics. *". . . contains the best account of an urban election we have ever had."*—Atlantic Monthly

192 Pages **Paperbound** **$1.95**

THE INTEGRATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITIES

KARL W. DEUTSCH, Yale University; PHILIP E. JACOB, HENRY TEUNE, JAMES V. TOSCANO, WILLIAM L. C. WHEATON, University of Pennsylvania

Integrated political behavior at the metropolitan and international levels is explored in ten essays based on empirical studies in a wide range of fields, including communications, international tensions, planning and regional science, local government, social structure, social psychology and cultural anthropology.

314 Pages **Paperbound** **$1.95**

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY College Department, East Washington Square, Philadelphia, Pa. 19105



ONE MAN, ONE VOTE:

WMCA and the Struggle for Equal Representation

Calvin B. T. Lee. This volume, an ideal text for any course dealing with reapportionment or with constitutional law, gives a detailed "inside" account of one of the six reaportionment cases of 1964. The case, initiated and carried to the Supreme Court by WMCA, a popular radio station in New York City, is documented by newspaper articles and editorials, radio broadcasts, legal briefs, letters, telegrams, court transcripts, and the personal recollections of those involved. The study provides an unusually concrete and fascinating view of the reapportionment problem and also of the way in which the Supreme Court approaches a case, how lawyers prepare and argue their cases, and how decisions are made.

June, 1967. About 200 pages. Paper. $1.95

REAPPORTIONMENT

Edited by Glendon Schubert. In this Scribner Research Anthology the controversial and problematic question of reapportionment is clearly presented and examined from many points of view. More than forty selections provide a lucid and comprehensive view of all aspects of the question—the present situation, the resistance to change, the ways in which legal action is applied to carry out the requirements of the Constitution, and the results of actual reapportionment in certain states. With thirty-three tables to elucidate the questions under discussion, and suggested topics for controlled and library research.

1964. vi, 288 pages. Paper. $2.95

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

COLLEGE DEPARTMENT • 597 FIFTH AVENUE • NEW YORK

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

RECENT AND FORTHCOMING BOOKS FROM

THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS

UNIVERSITY PARK AND LONDON

LEGIONS OF BABEL: The International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War

Verle B. Johnston

Many foreigners who served with the Loyalists have published personal accounts. But whether writing as non-Communists, Communists, or disenchanted ex-Communists, their judgments were seriously clouded by emotions. Here we have the first dispassionate account based on extensive research as well as correspondence with a number of veterans.

about 180 pages, illustrated, July 56s $7.50

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, 1928–1934: Documents and Materials

Xenia J. Eudin and Robert M. Slusser

A continuation of Mrs. Eudin's *Soviet Russia and the East 1920–1927* (with Robert C. North) and *Soviet Russia and the West 1920–1927* (with Harold H. Fisher). In addition to documents, a narrative summary covers the main developments of the period, e.g., Soviet intervention in Manchuria, the growing threat from Japan and Germany, rapprochement with France and Britain, and finally Soviet entry into the League. Special attention has also been paid to Communist policy in Germany on the eve of Hitler's assumption of power.

each volume about 350 pages: I, March 71s $9.50
II (with bibliography and index), August 71s $9.50

YUGOSLAVIA'S REVOLUTION OF 1941

Dragisa N. Ristic

On March 25, 1941, the Yugoslav Government reluctantly concluded an alliance with the Axis, but two days later air force officers overthrew government and regency, and Hitler immediately ordered Yugoslavia crushed and the attack on Russia postponed. (The author was aide-de-camp to General Simovic, leader of the coup.) It has since been argued that this delay cost Germany the war, but as Ristic demonstrates, the Yugoslav campaign did not delay the attack in the east, and Russian soldiers—not the thermometer—defeated the Wehrmacht. Nevertheless the coup d'etat may indeed have caused Hitler's defeat—but in a much more subtle way than anyone has yet realized. 56s $7.50

THE NEW WORLD: 1939–1946

Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr.

The first complete account of the scientific discoveries, political maneuvers, and military decisions that produced the atomic bomb. "A work of merit and great importance"—*Saturday Review*. "Impressive and richly documented"—*Foreign Affairs*. "*An honorable and worthy accomplishment*"—*Scientific American*. "Exciting . . . impressive . . . quite outstanding"—*The Economist*. "The full history . . . told to the very limit of what today's security regulations permit"—*Christian Science Monitor*. 41s $5.50

RUSSIA AND THE BALKAN ALLIANCE OF 1912

Edward C. Thaden

"Careful work" from a "mass of new source material"—*The Economist*. "Breaks new ground, and will be indispensable" for "the diplomatic history of the years before the First World War"—*Times Literary Supplement* 56s $7.50

PRESIDENT JAMES BUCHANAN: A BIOGRAPHY

Philip Shriver Klein

"Klein has been prodigiously industrious . . . if the general picture is not altered, proportions are"—*Times Literary Supplement*. 71s $9.50

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

THE SOVIET MILITARY AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY

By Roman Kolkowicz

Mr. Kolkowicz examines the areas where the interests of the Communist Party and the Military Establishment coincide and conflict; the manner in which the Party and the military press their claims, defend their interests, and manipulate each other; the historical perspective of their relationship; and the recent changes in the internal and external affairs of the Soviet Union which have substantially altered the traditional pattern of this relationship. *A RAND Corporation Research Study.* *448 pages. $9.00*

THE INTERMEDIARIES

Third Parties in International Crises

By Oran R. Young

The possibilities for third-party intervention aimed at facilitating the nonviolent termination of international crises are explored. The author develops a theory of third-party intervention at a high level of abstraction and then presents a set of applications focusing on the Secretary-General of the United Nations and a variety of potential Soviet-American crises. This book contributes to a new area of study sometimes called the sociology of conflict. *Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.*

440 pages. $10.00

JAPAN'S DEPENDENCE ON THE WORLD ECONOMY

The Approach to Economic Liberalization

By Leon Hollerman

In order to affirm its status as an "advanced industrial nation," Japan has formally adopted a sweeping program of liberalization on its own trade and payments. Mr. Hollerman analyzes the changes in the structure of Japan's industrial production and its foreign trade, and, applying the theory of industrial organization at the international level, evaluates Japan's performance and public policy in external economic affairs. *290 pages. $7.50*

Scholars are invited to write The Editor for a complimentary copy of our style booklet.

Princeton University Press

POLITICAL SCIENCE TEXTS FROM

DICKENSON

Theory and Practice of American Democracy

national, state and local edition

*(national edition available)

by Fred Krinsky and Gerald Rigby

University of Southern California

March 1967, 500 pp. **$7.95**

*May 1967, 450 pp. **$7.50**

THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY is designed as a core text in American Government. The authors assume that these courses should challenge the student with ideas, concepts, and materials from the best available sources. The emphasis is on ideas and concepts, not encyclopedic facts; the student is invited to grapple with dynamics—to understand, not memorize. 7⅝ x 9½ hardcover.

American Government in Action

national, state and local

by Karl M. Schmidt

Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University.

This is a book of readings designed to provide a better understanding of the actual operation of American Government. 502 pp., 6 x 9 paperbound. **$3.95.** Cross reference chart available

American National Government in Action. 460 pp., 6 x 9. **$3.95**

American State and Local Government in Action. 384 pp., 6 x 9. **$3.95**

California Government Series

A basic textbook series of seven coordinated paper volumes

January 1967, 128 pp., 5⅝ x 8⅜. **$1.95**

George S. Blair, and **Houston I. Flournoy,** LEGISLATIVE BODIES IN CALIFORNIA

James R. Bell, and **Thomas J. Ashley,** EXECUTIVES IN CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT

Beverly B. Cook, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN CALIFORNIA

Gerhard N. Rostvold, FINANCING CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT

Forthcoming titles:

Robert L. Morlan, and **Leroy C. Hardy,** POLITICS IN CALIFORNIA

John W. Dyckman, ISSUES IN CALIFORNIA DEVELOPMENT

Frank P. Sherwood, and **Richard W. Gable,** CALIFORNIA SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENTS

For approval copies write, Box D—APSR

DICKENSON
PUBLISHING COMPANY, INC.
BELMONT, CALIFORNIA 94002

McGRAW-HILL TEXTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE, Second Edition

By **CARLTON C. RODEE, TOTTON J. ANDERSON, and CARL Q. CHRISTOL,** *all of the University of Southern California.* 704 pages, $8.50

Provides a broad comprehensive introduction to political science as a whole.

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, Second Edition

By **CHARLES R. ADRIAN,** *University of California, Riverside.* McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science. 608 pages, $8.50

Emphasizes the vital role of state and local government in American political life.

VOICE OF THE PEOPLE, Second Edition

Edited by **REO M. CHRISTENSON,** *Miami University;* **and ROBERT O. McWILLIAMS,** *Eastern Michigan University.* McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science. 640 pages, $7.95 (cloth edition); $5.95 (soft-cover).

A collection of readings on public opinion and propaganda.

FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL SCIENCE SERIES

JOSEPH P. HARRIS, *Consulting Editor.* Each volume: $3.75 (cloth edition); $1.60 (soft-cover).

Volumes in the Series:

Charles R. Adrian: **Governing Our Fifty States and Their Communities,** Second Edition

Hugh A. Bone and Austin Ranney: Politics and Voters, Second Edition

John J. Corson and Joseph P. Harris: Public Administration in Modern Society

Rowland Egger: The President of the United States. Available Fall

Andrew Hacker: **The Study of Politics**

Joseph P. Harris: **CONGRESS and the Legislative Process.** Available Fall

Charles O. Lerche: **America in World Affairs,** Second Edition

C. Herman Pritchett: **The American Constitutional System,** Second Edition

H. Frank Way: **Liberty in the Balance,** Second Edition

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE: TOWARD EMPIRICAL THEORY

ITHIEL POOL, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Editor.* McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science. Available late Summer

Consists of a set of the main Plenary Session papers delivered at the 1966 Convention of the American Political Science Association.

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF CALIFORNIA, Third Edition

By **HENRY A. TURNER,** *University of California, Santa Barbara;* **and JOHN A. VIEG,** *Pomona College and Claremont Graduate School.* 304 pages, $5.95 (cloth); $3.75 (soft-cover).

Provides accurate, comprehensive, and yet concise coverage of all significant aspects of California state and local government.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, Ninth Edition

Available Spring

THE AMERICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, Ninth Edition.

Available Spring

By **JOHN H. FERGUSON,** *The Pennsylvania State University;* **and DEAN E. McHENRY,** *University of California at Santa Cruz.*

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT covers the entire range of government—national, state, and local. **THE AMERICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT** is exactly the same except that it omits the concluding chapters which deal with state and local governments.

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY

330 West 42nd Street
New York, New York 10036

New and recent titles from Ronald

GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

Webb S. Fiser, State University of New York at Albany; **Stuart Gerry Brown,** University of Hawaii; and **John S. Gibson,** Tufts University

Just Published—This textbook surveys concisely but comprehensively the framework of the American governmental system. Intergovernmental relations are developed as cooperative action between levels of government rather than as compartmentalized treatments of federal, state and local systems. Going beyond discussion of politics, parties, and pressure groups, this book shows how the political process unfolds around concrete policy issues in the context of changing historical developments. Particular attention is given to such currently important problems as urban renewal, metropolitan areas, poverty, race relations, law enforcement, agriculture, and education. The chapter on science and government and those on the international scene create a sense of student involvement in America's place in the world order. *1967. 803 pp.* *$8.50*

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Donald C. Blaisdell, The City College of The City University of New York

This textbook acquaints the student with the theory and practice of international organization. It also serves to identify problems in international organization and to open fresh paths for further inquiry. The governmental structures that the world's nation-states have agreed to establish, their procedures, staffs, and finances are examined together with methods for meeting threats or breaches of the peace. Analyzes the success of these organizations in maintaining peace, promoting respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms, and dealing with problems of general welfare. Questions at the end of each chapter. *1966. 531 pp.* *$7.50*

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

John M. Pfiffner, University of Southern California; and **Robert Presthus,** York University, Toronto

Just Published—This famous textbook examines administration at all levels of government. It integrates descriptive-institutional materials of administrative science with behavioral analyses of administration in action. It analyzes such aspects as the historical and institutional framework, separation of powers, role of executives (particularly that of the modern specialist), and the problem of obtaining superior talent. Covers decision-making and the data-processing revolution, and incorporates recent research into group behavior, individual motivation, and leadership dynamics. *5th Ed., 1967. 567 pp.* *$8.00*

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION


Russell M. Ross, University of Iowa; and **Kenneth F. Millsap,** Assistant City Manager, Iowa City, Iowa

This text provides a thorough treatment of the governmental activities of the 50 states and their local governmental units. Although predominant emphasis is on administrative aspects of state and local government, the book also presents material on the structure of governmental units below the national level. The role of counties, the position of the municipalities and special districts, and the peculiar problems of metropolitan areas are examined in detail. The importance of intergovernmental coordination is stressed, as is the growing relationship between the national and local governments. *1966. 705 pp., illus.* *$8.50*

The Ronald Press Company

.....15 East 26th Street / New York, N.Y. 10010

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*



LATIN AMERICA IN WORLD POLITICS

by NORMAN A. BAILEY

Preface by RONALD SCHNEIDER
Latin America Institute of Columbia University

As an area of shifting political alliance in the "backyard" of the United States, Latin America holds a particularly significant place in world politics today. The international repercussions of the 1959 revolution in Cuba served as a violent reminder of this fact, and yet, there is a conspicuous gap in the literature on this aspect of Latin American affairs.


In his comprehensive treatment of the subject, Professor Bailey has set out to fill this gap and provide the student and informed general reader with an understanding of the role of Latin America in the international power structure. Working from an overview of the setting of world politics and the domestic situation of Latin America, he demonstrates the political challenges that arise from their interaction and proceeds to analyze the various ways in which the Latin American Nations have tried to meet these challenges through law, association and union.

Norman Bailey is Associate Professor of Political Science and Chairman of Latin American Studies, Queens College of the City University of New York.

"The frankest treatment of the subject since John Normanno's classic study published in 1930 . . . provocative and refreshing."—*Hobart A Spalding, Jr., History Department, Brooklyn College*

Index, Maps, Charts, Chapter Bibliographies, 320 pages $7.50

THE DILEMMAS OF AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE



by L. GRAY COWAN

In this important book, originally published in 1964 and now reissued in a completely updated edition, Dr. Cowan, director of Columbia University's Program of Studies on Africa, discusses the many problems which confront modern Africa: the emergence of single-party governments; the growing tensions between civilian and military leaders; the scarcity of trained personnel; the numerous obstacles to economic cooperation; and many others.

"If a library could have but one book on Africa, this might well be it."—*Library Journal*

"This is a perceptive and provocative study."—*New York Times*

162 pages *hardcover: $4.50 paperback: $2.25*

For examination copies, sent free for a 60-day period, write to

WALKER AND COMPANY
720 FIFTH AVENUE / NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10019



POLITICAL SCIENCE TEXTS FROM PRENTICE-HALL

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, by Ernest B. Fincher, Montclair State College By using factual information and anecdotal material the author underscores the dynamic character of American government and its relationship to the lives of ordinary citizens. January 1967, 320 pp., $3.95

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, by K. J. Holsti, University of British Columbia. Offers an integrated framework for analyzing the behavior of states, with emphasis on the systemic and domestic sources of external political goals, the bargaining methods used to achieve or defend objectives and interests, restraints on policies, and behavior and procedures conducive to the resolution of international conflicts. May 1967, 512 pp., $8.95

PARTIES AND THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM: A BOOK OF READINGS, by Garold W. Thumm, Bates College and Edward Janosik, University of Pennsylvania. Composed of articles from scholarly journals and excerpts from important political science books, this anthology brings together selected materials dealing with the theory and practice of political parties. May 1967, 320 pp., $3.95

FUNCTION AND POLICIES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 3rd Edition, 1967, by J. W. Peltason, University of California, Irvine, and James M. Burns, Williams College. This text describes comprehensively what American government does and what its specific policies are. It discusses governmental policies, functions, and programs against a background of history and politics. May 1967, 448 pp., $6.95

AMERICA'S ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS, edited by Dankwart A. Rustow, Columbia University. All volumes in this series are approx. 128 pp. each. paper $1.95, cloth $4.50

AFRICA AND UNITED STATES POLICY, by Rupert Emerson, Harvard University. April 1967

FOREIGN AID IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, by John D. Montgomery, Harvard University. January 1967

For Future Publication:

THE BURDEN OF DECISION: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1945, by Charles Burton Marshall, The Johns Hopkins University

LATIN AMERICA AND UNITED STATES POLICY, by Kalman H. Silvert, Dartmouth University

THE MAKING OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, by William C. Olson, Columbia University

THE WEB OF INTERDEPENDENCE: THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, by Ernst B. Haas, University of California, Berkeley

ASIA AND UNITED STATES POLICY, by Wayne A. Wilcox, Columbia University

COLD WAR AND COEXISTENCE: RUSSIA, CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES, by William E. Griffith, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

EUROPE AND UNITED STATES POLICY, by Stanley Hoffman, Harvard University

MILITARY STRATEGY IN WORLD POLITICS, by Walter Goldstein, Brooklyn College

THE NEW SETTING OF WORLD POLITICS, by Dankwart A. Rustow, Columbia University

For approval copies, write: Box 903

PRENTICE-HALL, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 07632

New and Recent

PUBLICATIONS *from* PERGAMON

ASPECTS OF BRITISH POLITICS 1904-1919

D. Collins, University of Leeds

Deals with the changes in foreign policy brought about by the War and Britain's relative loss of power at the beginning of the twentieth century.

1966 372 pages *Flexi-covered,* $5.00

BRITISH POLITICS 1918-1964

L. J. Macfarlane, Oxford University

An account of the main political events in British history from 1918-1964, covering both domestic and foreign policy.

1965 184 pages *Flexi-covered,* $2.95

THE INDIAN UNION AND THE STATE

A. Krishnaswami, Supreme Court of India

The federal system of government that followed British rule in India has, until recently, tended to increase the power of the central government at the expense of the states. Dr. Krishnaswami presents the case for restoring the position of the Provinces to insure the growth of a healthy cooperative federalism and explains some of the measures that have already been taken in this direction.

1965 100 pages *Flexi-covered,* $2.95

ONE FROM SEVEN HUNDRED

A Year in the Life of Parliament

William Norris, Parliamentary Correspondent of *The Times*

Mr. Norris offers a lively and perceptive account of the events, procedures and personalities in Parliament in the first year of Mr. Wilson's Labour government.

1966 131 pages *Flexi-covered,* $1.95

PLANNING IN THE SOVIET UNION

Philippe J. Bernard

The author reviews Soviet economic planning with particular attention to the last decade, describing the characteristics of the Soviet system, the significance of ideology, the coordination of planning, and the problems of management.

1966 336 pages *Flexi-covered,* $9.50

PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

W. M. Clarke, Editor of *The Banker*

A lucid discussion of the need for private enterprise to complement government aid in the developing countries.

1966 69 pages *Flexi-covered,* $1.50

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND COMMUNISM

Some Questions of Development

I. G. Kurakov

The author is concerned with the relation of scientific research to industrial growth and productivity in the Soviet Union.

1967 136 pages $6.00

THE UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD REALITIES

M. J. Lee, University of Southampton

An appraisal of the United Nations, its successes, failures, opportunities, and challenges.

1966 255 pages *Flexi-covered,* $3.95

WESTMINSTER WORKSHOP

A Student's Guide to the British Constitution

R. K. Mosley

An examination of how the British constitution works today. Each chapter contains a section of discussion points, questions for review, examination questions, and a bibliography for further reading.

1965 206 pages *Flexi-covered,* $2.95

To examine copies on approval, write to:

College Division
Box 901
PERGAMON PRESS
44-01 21st Street
Long Island City, New York 11101



You mean I can get $50,000 of TIAA Life insurance for less than $100?

That's what an Assistant Professor asked us when he heard about TIAA's low life insurance costs.

It's true. At his age 30 the annual premium for a 20-Year Home Protection policy providing $50,000 initial amount of insurance is $159.00. The first year dividend, based on our current dividend scale, is $61.00, making a net payment of $98.00. Dividends, of course, are not guaranteed.

The Home Protection plan is level premium Term insurance providing its largest amount of protection initially, reducing by schedule each year to recognize decreasing insurance needs. This is just one example of the many lost-cost TIAA plans available. If you need more protection for your family, ask us to mail you a personal illustration with figures for a policy issued at your age. We'll also send the Life Insurance Guide describing other TIAA policies.

ARE YOU ELIGIBLE FOR TIAA?

Yes, if you are employed by a college, university, private school or other nonprofit educational or scientific institution that qualifies for **TIAA** eligibility.

tiaa

TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ASSOCIATION a G
730 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017

Please mail the new Life Insurance Guide and a personal illustration.


Name_____ Your Date of Birth_____

Address_____ ZIP_____

Dependents' Ages_____

Nonprofit Employer_____
college, university, or other educational or scientific institution

New States of States



ATLAS OF NORTH CAROLINA

Richard E. Lonsdale,
Director and Chief Cartographer

A complete, authoritative and up-to-date general purpose atlas, with 137 maps, 83 pictures, and brief articles by university or state authorities on 69 subjects. Among them are population distribution, voting and registration patterns, industry and employment figures. Three transparent overlays identify the counties on each of the maps. **$7.50**

INTERSTATE COMPACTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS

by Weldon V. Barton

In case studies of fifteen agencies, this book describes the uses and limitations of compacts in coping with regional problems in the American federal system. Emphasis is on evaluation of regulatory, metropolitan area, river basin and state service compacts in political contexts. **$5.00**


BRAZILIAN PLANNING

Development Politics and Administration
by Robert T. Daland

This analysis of the complex Brazilian political system during the period from 1945 to 1965 is an outstanding case study of the nature and effectiveness of national planning in a developing country. **$6.00**

At your bookstore or
THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA PRESS
Chapel Hill, N. C. 27514

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW



The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush
Fred I. Greenstein 629

Bargaining in a Three-Person Game
William H. Riker 642

The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and Religion
William A. Carroll 657

Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives
Robert L. Peabody 675

Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's "Expected" Loss of Seats
Barbara Hinckley 694

Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities
Robert L. Lineberry and *Edmund P. Fowler* 701

Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification
Michael Parenti 717

Class Struggle and Socialist Justice: The Case of Czechoslovakia
Otto Ulč 727

Mass Movement and Democracy: Sokagakkai in Japanese Politics
James W. White 744

Peer Group and School and the Political Socialization Process
Kenneth P. Langton 751

Communications to the Editor 759

Book Reviews and Notes
James W. Prothro (ed.) 762

Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science
Walter E. Beach (comp.) 846

News and Notes
Leo B. Lott (ed.) 875

VOL. LXI SEPTEMBER, 1967 NO. 3

Published Quarterly by

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Princeton Paperbacks

AMERICAN SCIENTISTS AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY, Robert Gilpin	2.95
THE APPEALS OF COMMUNISM, Gabriel A. Almond	2.95
CHANGE, HOPE, AND THE BOMB, David E. Lilienthal	1.95
CHINA AFTER MAO, A. Doak Barnett	1.95
COMMUNISM AND REVOLUTION, Ed. Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton	2.95
THE COMMUNIST SUBVERSION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA, Josef Korbel	2.95
CONFLICT AND DECISION-MAKING IN SOVIET RUSSIA: *A Case Study of Agricultural Policy, 1953-1963*, Sidney I. Ploss	2.95
DANGER IN KASHMIR, Josef Korbel	2.95
THE DYNAMICS OF COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE, R. V. Burks	2.95
INDIA AS A SECULAR STATE, Donald Eugene Smith	3.45
THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: *Theoretical Essays*, Ed. Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba	2.95
MEN AND NATIONS, Louis J. Halle	2.95
NEAR EASTERN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, Ed. T. Cuyler Young	2.95
POLAND BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, *Soviet and German Diplomacy toward Poland, 1919-1933*, Josef Korbel	2.95
THE POLITICAL KINGDOM IN UGANDA, David E. Apter	3.45
POLITICS IN THE CONGO, Crawford Young	3.45
THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA, Manfred Halpern	2.95
THE PRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY, Bernard C. Cohen	2.95
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES, Ed. John J. Johnson	2.95
SECURITY IN DISARMAMENT, Ed. Richard A. Falk and Richard J. Barnet	2.95
STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE FOR AMERICAN WORLD POLICY, Sherman Kent	2.95
STRATEGY IN THE MISSILE AGE, Bernard Brodie	2.95

Available in November

BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, Ed. Joseph LaPalombara	3.45
COMMUNICATIONS AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, Ed. Lucian W. Pye	3.45
THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES, Robert W. Macdonald	2.95
MARXIAN SOCIALISM IN THE UNITED STATES, Daniel Bell	1.95
POLITICAL THEORY, Arnold Brecht	3.95

Princeton University Press

Distinguished Titles from Harper's

Coming in January

BEYOND IDEOLOGY
THE REVIVAL OF POLITICAL THEORY

Dante Germino

The thesis of this volume is that the so-called "decline" of political theory in our time is a myth. The myopia prevalent among numerous social scientists to the current revival of political theory is attributable chiefly to a profound misconception of the nature and function of political theory itself. The author examines the function of political theory from Plato to Meehan.

Harper's Comparative Government Series

MICHAEL CURTIS, EDITOR

Now Available

EASTERN EUROPEAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
Vaclav Benes, Andrew Gyorgy, and George Stambuk

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC
Robert G. Neumann

JAPANESE POLITICAL STYLE
An Introduction to the Government and Politics of Modern Japan
Warren M. Tsuneishi

BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
Douglas V. Verney

LATIN-AMERICAN POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Robert J. Alexander

WESTERN EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
Michael Curtis

GOVERNMENTS OF THE COMMONWEALTH
Josephine F. Milburn

Coming Spring '68

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF CONTEMPORARY ITALY
Dante Germino and Stefano Passigli

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
Michael Curtis

THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF FRANCE
Roy Pierce

THE ISRAELI POLITICAL SYSTEM
Yehezkel Dror

150th ANNIVERSARY

HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS 49 EAST 33D STREET NEW YORK 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

President
ROBERT A. DAHL
Yale University

President-Elect
MERLE FAINSOD
Harvard University

Vice Presidents

ROBERT LANE
Yale University

AVERY LEISERSON
Vanderbilt University

RICHARD SNYDER
University of California

Secretary
KENNETH WALTZ
Brandeis University

Treasurer
MAX M. KAMPELMAN
Washington, D.C.

Executive Director
EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK
1527 New Hampshire Avenue
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

Associate Director
DONALD G. TACHERON

Managing Editor, APSR
AUSTIN RANNEY
University of Wisconsin

COUNCIL

Above-named Officers *ex officiis*

JAMES C. DAVIES
University of Oregon
ALEX M. DRAGNICH
Vanderbilt University
HEINZ EULAU
Stanford University
SAMUEL HENDEL
City College of the City University of New York
WALLACE MENDELSON
University of Texas
LAURENCE I. RADWAY
Dartmouth College
WILLIAM H. RIKER
University of Rochester
VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM
Northwestern University

M. MARGARET BALL
Duke University
WILLIAM BUCHANAN
Washington and Lee University
H. PAUL CASTLEBERRY
Washington State University
HERBERT KAUFMAN
Yale University
CHARLES A. MCCLELLAND
University of Southern California
ALFRED G. MEYER
University of Michigan
CLARA PENNIMAN
University of Wisconsin
CLINTON ROSSITER
Cornell University

FORMER PRESIDENTS

FRANK J. GOODNOW
ALBERT SHAW
FREDERIC N. JUDSON
JAMES BRYCE
A. LAWRENCE LOWELL
WOODROW WILSON
SIMEON E. BALDWIN
ALBERT BUSHNELL HART
W. W. WILLOUGHBY
JOHN BASSETT MOORE
ERNST FREUND
JESSE MACY
MUNROE SMITH
HENRY JONES FORD
PAUL S. REINSCH
LEO S. ROWE
WILLIAM A. DUNNING
HARRY A. GARFIELD
JAMES W. GARNER
CHARLES E. MERRIAM

CHARLES A. BEARD
WILLIAM B. MUNRO
JESSE S. REEVES
JOHN A. FAIRLIE
BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH
EDWARD S. CORWIN
WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY
ISIDOR LOEB
WALTER J. SHEPARD
FRANCIS W. COKER
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE
THOMAS REED POWELL
CLARENCE A. DYKSTRA
CHARLES GROVE HAINES
ROBERT C. BROOKS
FREDERIC A. OGG
WILLIAM ANDERSON
ROBERT E. CUSHMAN
LEONARD D. WHITE
JOHN M. GAUS
WALTER F. DODD

ARTHUR W. MACMAHON
HENRY R. SPENCER
QUINCY WRIGHT
JAMES K. POLLOCK
PETER H. ODEGARD
LUTHER H. GULICK
PENDLETON HERRING
RALPH J. BUNCHE
CHARLES MCKINLEY
HAROLD D. LASSWELL
E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER
V. O. KEY, JR.
R. TAYLOR COLE
CARL B. SWISHER
EMMETTE S. REDFORD
CHARLES S. HYNEMAN
CARL J. FRIEDRICH
C. HERMAN PRITCHETT
DAVID B. TRUMAN
GABRIEL A. ALMOND

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Published quarterly by The American Political Science Association

EDITORIAL BOARD

AUSTIN RANNEY, *Managing Editor, University of Wisconsin*

ROBERT E. LANE, *Yale University*

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Columbia University*

WARREN E. MILLER, *University of Michigan*

WALTER F. MURPHY, *Princeton University*

J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College*

JOHN E. TURNER, *University of Minnesota*

VERNON VAN DYKE, *University of Iowa*

MYRON WEINER, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

EDITORIAL ASSOCIATES

JAMES W. PROTHRO, *Book Review Editor, University of North Carolina*

LEO B. LOTT, *News and Notes Editor, University of Montana*

MARY H. GROSSMAN, *Madison*

EDITORIAL OFFICE

Managing Editor, APSR
North Hall, University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Executive Director, APSA
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Individual and institutional memberships are $15.00 a year ($6.00 for graduate and undergraduate students). Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $3.75 per copy; for *back issues* address Johnson Reprint Corp., 111 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003.

Applications for membership, orders for the REVIEW, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of change of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the month before publication.

Address correspondence about contributions to the REVIEW to Austin Ranney, North Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 53706. All manuscripts should be submitted IN DUPLICATE. They should be double-spaced and may be in typed, mimeographed, hectographed, or other legible form. Footnotes should appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the pages.

Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name and affiliations should appear only on a separate covering page. All footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate page.

Address books intended for review to James W. Prothro, Caldwell Hall, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C. 27514; *News and Notes items* to Leo B. Lott, Department of Political Science, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana 59801; *advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence* to the Executive Director at the Washington office.

Articles and notes appearing in the REVIEW before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature. The International Political Science Abstracts* and the *International Index to Periodicals* index current issues. Microfilm of the REVIEW, beginning with Volume 46, may be obtained from University Microfilms. 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. A *Cumulative Index* of the REVIEW, Volumes 1-57: 1906-1963, may be obtained from Northwestern University Press, 1735 Benson, Evanston, Illinois.

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.

Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.

Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.

Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.

Copyright, 1967, by The American Political Science Association


dagmar super...
MICROFILM READER



...workhorse microfilm reader with the no-nonsense features


There has to be a reason why Dagmar Super—sold direct on a satisfaction-or-your-money-back guarantee—continues its strong sales popularity. The reason is optimum performance through built-in design features—offered at an honest price.

COMPACT
9"x9" base takes up less space than a letterhead, yet outperforms many readers regardless of size or cost.



EASILY PORTABLE
Only 15 lbs. complete with carrying case.





INSTANTLY ADJUSTABLE
Exclusive zoom projection from 12x to 20x with fingertip focusing.

2-SECOND CHANGE—to handle all sizes and types of microfilm forms.

NORMAL READING POSITION—sharp images in moderate light without glare of screens or without peering into darkened hoods.

SILENT OPERATION—no noisy cooling fan. 115 or 230 volt, 60-cycle alternating current.

1-YEAR GUARANTEE—except for lamps or mishandling.

READER, incl. take-up reels, carrying case, extra lamp. **$159.95** f.o.b. Waseca.

5"x8" microfilm HOLDER, with reader **$16.50**

Prices subject to change without notice. Inquire about favorable adjusted prices for Canada.

ORDER ON 10 DAYS' APPROVAL—READY FOR SHIPMENT

AVR

AUDIO-VISUAL RESEARCH
1517 8th St. S.E., Waseca, Minn. 56093

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA GENERAL LIBRARY

The American Political Science Review

VOL. LXI SEPTEMBER, 1967 NO. 3

THE IMPACT OF PERSONALITY ON POLITICS: AN ATTEMPT TO CLEAR AWAY UNDERBRUSH

FRED I. GREENSTEIN
Wesleyan University

There is a great deal of political activity which can be explained adequately only by taking account of the personal characteristics of the actors involved. The more intimate the vantage, the more detailed the perspective, the greater the likelihood that political actors will loom as full-blown individuals influenced by all of the peculiar strengths and weaknesses to which the species *homo sapiens* is subject, in addition to being role-players, creatures of situation, members of a culture, and possessors of social characteristics such as occupation, class, sex, and age.

To a non-social scientist the observation that individuals are important in politics would seem trite. Undergraduates, until they have been trained to think in terms of impersonal categories of explanation, readily make assertions about the psychology of political actors in their explanations of politics. So do journalists. Why is it that most political scientists are reluctant to deal explicitly with psychological matters (apart from using a variety of rather impersonal psychological constructs such as "party identification," "sense of political efficacy," and the like)? Why is political psychology not a systematically developed subdivision of political science, occupying the skill and energy of a substantial number of scholars?

A partial answer can be found in the formidably tangled and controversial status of the existing scholarly literature on the topic. I am referring to the disparate research that is commonly grouped under the heading "personality and politics": e.g., psychological biographies; questionnaire studies of "authoritarianism," "dogmatism," or "misanthropy"; discussions of "national character"; and attempts to explain international "tensions" by reference to individual insecurities. The interpretations made in psychological biographies often have seemed arbitrary and "subjective"; questionnaire studies have encountered formidable methodological difficulties; attempts to explain large-scale social processes in personality terms have been open to criticism on grounds of "reductionism." And beyond the specific shortcomings of the existing "personality and politics" research, a variety of arguments have been mounted suggesting that there are *inherent* shortcomings in research strategies that attempt to analyze the impact of "personality" on politics. It is not surprising that most political scientists choose to ignore this seeming mare's nest.

If progress is to be made toward developing a more systematic and solidly grounded body of knowledge about personality and politics, there will have to be considerable clarification of standards of evidence and inference in this area.[1] My present remarks are merely a pro-

[1] In my own efforts to do this I find that much of the existing research can be considered under three broad headings: psychological studies of single political actors, such as political biographies; studies which classify political actors into types, such as the literature on authoritarianism; and aggregative accounts, in which the collective effects of personality are examined in institutional contexts—ranging from small aggregates such as face-to-face groups all the way through national and international political processes. Needless to say, it is one thing to suggest that clarification of such diverse endeavors is possible and another thing actually to make some progress along these lines.

legomenon to methodological clarification of "personality and politics" research. It will not be worthwhile to invest in explicating this gnarled literature with a view to laying out standards unless there is a basis for believing that the research itself is promising. Therefore I shall attempt to clear away what seem to be the main reasons for arguing that there are inherent objections—objections in principle—to the study of personality and politics.

Clearing away the formal objections to this *genre* can serve to liberate energy and channel debate into inquiry. More important, several of the objections may be rephrased in ways that are substantively interesting—ways that move us from the vague question "Does personality have an important impact on politics?" to conditional questions about the circumstances under which diverse psychological factors have varying political consequences. As will be evident, the several objections are based on a number of different implicit definitions of "personality." This is not surprising, since psychologists have never come close to arriving at a single, agreed-upon meaning of the term.[2]

I. OBJECTIONS TO THE STUDY OF PERSONALITY AND POLITICS

A bewildering variety of criticisms have been leveled at this heterogeneous literature. The criticism has been so profuse that there is considerable accuracy to the sardonic observation of David Riesman and Nathan Glazer that the field of culture-and-personality research (within which many of the past accounts of personality and politics fall) has "more critics than practitioners."[3]

The more intellectually challenging of the various objections asserting that *in principle* personality and politics research is not promising (even if one avoids the methodological pitfalls) seems to fall under five headings. In each case the objection is one that can be generalized to the study of how personality relates to any social phenomenon. Listed rather elliptically the five objections are that:

1. Personality characteristics tend to be randomly distributed in institutional roles. Personality therefore "cancels out" and can be ignored by analysts of political and other social phenomena.

2. Personality characteristics of individuals are less important than their social characteristics in influencing behavior. This makes it unpromising to concentrate research energies on studying the impact of personality.

3. Personality is not of interest to political and other social analysts, because individual actors (personalities) are severely limited in the impact they can have on events.

4. Personality is not an important determinant of behavior because individuals with varying personal characteristics will tend to behave similarly when placed in common situations. And it is not useful to study personal variation, if the ways in which people vary do not affect their behavior.

5. Finally, there is a class of objections deprecating the relevance of personality to political analysis in which "personality" is equated with particular aspects of individual psychological functioning. We shall be concerned with one of the objections falling under this heading—*viz.*, the assertion that so-called "deep" psychological needs (of the sort that sometimes are summarized by the term "ego-defensive") do not have an important impact on behavior, and that therefore "personality" in this sense of the term need not be studied by the student of politics.

The first two objections seem to be based on fundamental misconceptions. Nevertheless they do point to interesting problems for the student of political psychology. The final three objections are partially well taken. These are the objections that need to be rephrased in conditional form as "Under what circumstances?" questions. Let me now expand upon these assertions.

II. TWO ERRONEOUS OBJECTIONS

The thesis that personality "cancels out"

The assumption underlying the first objection seems, as Alex Inkeles points out, to be that "in 'real' groups and situations, the accidents of life history and factors other than personality which are responsible for recruitment [into institutional roles] will 'randomize'

[2] A standard discussion by Allport notes a full fifty *types* of definition of the term (apart from colloquial usages): Gordon Allport, *Personality* (New York: Holt, 1937), 24–54.

[3] David Riesman and Nathan Glazer, "The Lonely Crowd: A Reconsideration in 1960," in Seymour M. Lipset and Leo Lowenthal (eds.), *Culture and Social Character* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1961), p. 437. For examples of discussions that are in varying degrees critical of personality and politics writings see the essays by Shils and Verba cited in note 17, Reinhard Bendix, "Compliant Behavior and Individual Personality," *American Journal of Sociology*, 58 (1952), 292–303, and David Spitz, "Power and Personality: The Appeal to the 'Right Man' in Democratic States," this REVIEW, 52 (1958), 84–97.

personality distribution in the major social statuses sufficiently so that taking systematic account of the influence of personality composition is unnecessary." But, as Inkeles easily shows, this assumption is false on two grounds.

First, "even if the personality composition of any group is randomly determined, random assortment would not in fact guarantee the *same* personality composition in the membership of all institutions of a given type. On the contrary, the very fact of randomness implies that the outcome would approximate a normal distribution. Consequently, some of the groups would by chance have a personality composition profoundly different from others, with possibly marked effects on the functioning of the institutions involved." Secondly,

> there is no convincing evidence that randomness does consistently describe the assignment of personality types to major social statuses. On the contrary, there is a great deal of evidence to indicate that particular statuses often attract, or recruit preponderantly for, one or another personality characteristic and that fact has a substantial effect on individual adjustment to roles and the general quality of institutional functioning.[4]

The objection turns out therefore to be based on unwarranted empirical assumptions. It proves not to be an obstacle to research, but rather—once it is examined—an opening gambit for identifying a crucial topic of investigation for the political psychologist: How are personality types distributed in social roles and with what consequences?

The thesis that social characteristics are more important than personality characteristics

The second objection—asserting that individuals' social characteristics are "more important" than their personality characteristics—seems to result from a conceptual rather than empirical error. It appears to be an objection posing a pseudo-problem that needs to be dissolved conceptually rather than resolved empirically.

Let us consider what the referents are of "social characteristic" and "personality characteristic." By the latter we refer to some inner predisposition of the individual. The term "characteristic" applies to a state of the organism. And, using the familiar paradigm of "stimulus→organism→response," or "environment→predispositions→response," we operate on the assumption that the environmental stimuli (or "situations") that elicit behavior are mediated through the individual's psychological predispositions.[5]

But we also, of course, presume that the individual's psychological predispositions are themselves to a considerable extent environmentally determined, largely by his prior social experiences. And it is these prior environmental states (which may occur at any stage of the life cycle and which may or may not persist into the present) that we commonly refer to when we speak of "social characteristics." Social "characteristics," then, are not states of the organism, but of its environment. (This is made particularly clear by the common usage "*objective* social characteristics.")

It follows that social and psychological characteristics are in no way mutually exclusive. They do not compete as candidates for explanation of social behavior, but rather are complementary. Social "characteristics" can cause psychological "characteristics"; they are not substitutes for psychological characteristics. The erroneous assumption that social characteristics could even in principle be more important than psychological characteristics probably arises in part from the misleading impression of identity fostered by the usage of "characteristics" in the two expressions.[6]

This confusion also very probably is contributed to by the standard techniques used by social scientists to eliminate spurious correlations, namely, controlling for "third factors" and calculating partial correlations.

[4] Alex Inkeles, "Sociology and Psychology," in Sigmund Koch (ed.), *Psychology: A Study of A Science*, VI (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 354.

[5] It is a matter of convenience whether the terms "personality" and "psychological" are treated as synonymous (as in the present passage), or whether the first is defined as some subset of the second (as in my discussion of the fifth objection). Given the diversity of uses to which all of the terms in this area are put, the best one can do is to be clear about one's usage in specific contexts.

[6] My criticism of the second objection would of course not stand in any instance where some acquired inner characteristic (such as a sense of class consciousness) was being defined as a social characteristic, and it was being argued that this "social" characteristic was "more important" than a "personality" characteristic. In terms of my usage this would imply an empirical assertion about the relative influence of two types of psychological, or "personality" variables. My remarks in the text on the meaning of terms are simply short-hand approaches to clarifying the underlying issue. They are not canonical efforts to establish "correct" usage.

Control procedures, when used indiscriminately and without reference to the theoretical standing of the variables that are being analyzed, can lead to the failure to recognize what Herbert Hyman, in the heading of an important section of his *Survey Design and Analysis*, describes as "The Distinction Between Developmental Sequences or Configurations and Problems of Spuriousness."[7]

For an example of how this problem arises, we can consider the very interesting research report by Urie Bronfenbrenner entitled "Personality and Participation: The Case of the Vanishing Variable."[8] Bronfenbrenner reports a study in which it was found that measures of personality were associated with participation in community affairs. However, as he notes, "It is a well-established fact that extent of participation varies with social class, with the lower classes participating the least." Therefore, he proceeds to establish the relationship between personality and participation controlling for social class (and certain other factors). The result: "Most of the earlier . . . significant relationships between personality measures and participation now disappear, leaving only two significant correlations, both of them quite low."

One common interpretation of such a finding would be that Bronfenbrenner had shown the irrelevance of personality to participation. But his finding should not be so interpreted. Hyman's remarks, since they place the problem of relating social background data to psychological data in its more general context, are worth quoting at some length.

> . . . the concept of spuriousness cannot *logically* be intended to apply to antecedent conditions which are associated with the particular independent variable as part of a developmental sequence. Implicitly, the notion of an uncontrolled factor which was operating so as to produce a spurious finding involves the image of something *extrinsic* to the . . . apparent cause. Developmental sequences, by contrast, involve the image of a series of entities which are *intrinsically* united or substituted for one another. All of them constitute a unity and merely involve different ways of stating the same variable as it changes over time. . . . Consequently, to institute procedures of control is to remove so-to-speak some of the very cause one wishes to study. . . . How shall the analyst know what antecedent conditions are intrinsic parts of a developmental sequence? . . . One guide, for example, can be noted: instances where the "control" factor and the apparent explanation involve *levels of description from two different systems* are likely to be developmental sequences. For instance, an explanatory factor that was a personality trait and a control factor that was biological such as physique or glandular functions can be conceived as levels of description from different systems. Similarly, an explanatory factor that is *psychological* and a control factor that is *sociological* can be conceived as two different levels of description, i.e., one might regard an attitude as derivative of objective position or status or an objective position in society as leading to psychological processes such as attitudes. Thus, the concept of spuriousness would not be appropriate.[9]

In the Bronfenbrenner example, then, an individual's "objective" socio-economic background (as opposed to such subjective concomitants as his sense of class consciousness) needs to be analyzed as a possible social determinant of the psychological correlates of participation, taking account of the fact that, as Allport puts it, "background factors never directly cause behavior; they cause attitudes [and other mental sets]" and the latter "in turn determine behavior."[10] A more general

[7] Herbert Hyman, *Survey Design and Analysis* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955), 254–257.

[8] Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Personality and Participation: The Case of the Vanishing Variables," *Journal of Social Issues*, 16 (1960), 54–63.

[9] Herbert Hyman, *Survey Design and Analysis* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955), 254–257. Italics in the original. Also see Hubert Blalock, "Controlling for Background Factors: Spuriousness Versus Developmental Sequences," *Sociological Inquiry*, Vol. 34 (1964), 28–39, for a *logical Inquiry*, Vol. 34 (1964), pp. 28–39, for a discussion of the rather complex implications of this distinction for data analysis.

[10] Gordon Allport, review of *The American Soldier*, *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 45 (1950), p. 173. Nothing in this discussion is intended to gainsay the use of controls. "I am not, of course, arguing against the use of breakdowns or matched groups," Allport adds. "They should, however, be used to show where attitudes come from, and not to imply that social causation acts automatically apart from attitudes." Often a control, by suggesting the source of a psychological state, helps explain its dynamics and functions. A good example can be found in Hyman and Sheatsley's well-known critique of *The Authoritarian Personality*. The critique shows that certain attitudes and ways of viewing the world which the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* explained in terms of a complex process of personal pathology are in fact typical of the thought processes and vocabulary of people of lower socio-economic status. Hyman and Sheatsley are there-

lesson for the student of psychology and politics emerges from our examination of the second objection. We can see that investigators in this realm will often find it necessary to lay out schemes of explanation that are developmental—schemes that place social and psychological factors in the sequence in which they seem to have impinged upon one another.

III. THREE PARTIALLY CORRECT OBJECTIONS

The three remaining objections bear on (a) the question of how much impact individual actors can have on political outcomes, (b) the question of whether the situations political actors find themselves in impose uniform behavior on individuals of varying personal characteristics, making it unprofitable for the political analyst to study variations in the actors' personal characteristics, and (c) the numerous questions that can be raised about the impact on behavior of particular classes of personal characteristics—including the class of characteristics I shall be discussing, the so-called "ego-defensive" personality dispositions. In the remainder of this essay, I shall expand upon each of these three questions, rephrase them in conditional form, and lay out a number of general propositions stating the circumstances under which the objection is or is not likely to hold. As will be evident, the propositions are not hypotheses stated with sufficient precision to be testable. Rather, they are quite general indications of the circumstances under which political analysts are and are not likely to find it desirable to study "personality" in the several senses of the term implicit in the objections.

When do individual actors affect events ("action dispensability")?

The objection to studies of personality and politics that emphasizes the limited capacity of single actors to shape events does not differ in its essentials from the nineteenth and early twentieth century debates over social determinism—that is, over the role of individual actors (Great Men or otherwise) in history. In statements of this objection emphasis is placed on the need for the times to be ripe in order for the historical actor to make his contribution. Questions are asked such as, "What impact could Napoleon have had on history if he had been born in the Middle Ages?" Possibly because of the parlor game aura of the issues that arise in connection with it, the problem of the impact of individuals on events has not had as much disciplined attention in recent decades as the two remaining issues I shall be dealing with. Nevertheless, at one time or another this question has received the attention of Tolstoy, Carlyle, Spencer, William James, Plekhanov, and Trotsky (in his *History of the Russian Revolution*). The main attempt at a balanced general discussion seems to be Sidney Hook's vigorous, but unsystematic, 1943 essay *The Hero in History*.[11]

Since the degree to which actions are likely to have significant impacts is clearly variable, I would propose to begin clarification by asking: *What are the circumstances under which the actions of single individuals are likely to have a greater or lesser effect on the course of events?* For shorthand purposes this might be called the question of *action dispensability*. We can conceive of arranging the actions performed in the political arena along a continuum, ranging from those which are indispensable for outcomes that concern us through those which are utterly dispensable. And we can make certain general observations about the circumstances which are likely to surround dispensable and indispensable action. In so reconstructing this particular objection to personality explanations of politics we make it clear that what is at stake is not a psychological issue, but rather one bearing on social processes on decision-making. The question is about the impact of action, not about its determinants.

It is difficult to be precise in stipulating circumstances under which an individual's actions are likely to be a link in further events, since a great deal depends upon the interests of the investigator and the specific context of investigation (the kinds of actions being studied; the kinds of effects that are of interest). Therefore, the following three propositions are necessarily quite abstract.

The impact of an individual's actions varies with (1) the degree to which the actions take

fore able to suggest that such attitudes may be a learned part of the respondents' *cognitions* rather than a psychodynamic manifestation serving ego-defensive functions. It should be clear from what I have said in the text, however, that Hyman and Sheatsley's thesis cannot legitimately be phrased as an argument that such attitudes are social (or cultural) rather than psychological: Herbert Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley, "The Authoritarian Personality—A Methodological Critique," in Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda (eds.), *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality"* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1954), 50–122.

[11] Sidney Hook, *The Hero in History* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1943).

place in an environment which admits of restructuring, (2) the location of the actor in that environment, and (3) the actor's peculiar strengths or weaknesses.

1. *The likelihood of personal impact increases to the degree that the environment admits of restructuring.* Technically speaking we might describe situations or sequences of events in which modest interventions can produce disproportionately large results as "unstable." They are in a precarious equilibrium. The physical analogies are massive rock formations at the side of a mountain which can be dislodged by the motion of a single keystone, or highly explosive compounds such as nitroglycerine. Instability in this sense is by no means synonymous with what is loosely known as political instability, the phrase we typically employ to refer to a variety of "fluid" phenomena—political systems in which governments rise and fall with some frequency, systems in which violence is common, etc. Many of the situations commonly referred to as unstable do not at all admit of restructuring. In the politics of many of the "unstable" Latin American nations, for example, most conceivable substitutions of actors and actions would lead to little change in outcomes (or at least in "larger" outcomes). Thus, to continue the physical analogy, an avalanche in motion down a mountainside is for the moment in stable equilibrium, since it cannot be influenced by modest interventions.

The situation (or chain of events) which does not admit readily of restructuring usually is one in which a variety of factors conspire to produce the same outcome.[12] Hook, in *The Hero in History*, offers the outbreak of World War I and of the February Revolution as instances of historical sequences which, if not "inevitable," probably could not have been averted by the actions of any single individual. In the first case the vast admixture of multiple conflicting interests and inter-twined alliances and in the second the powerful groundswell of discontent were such as to make us feel that no intervention by any single individual (excluding the more far-fetched hypothetical instances that invariably can be imagined) would have averted the outcome. On the other hand, Hook attempts to show in detail that without the specific actions of Lenin the October Revolution might well not have occurred. By implication he suggests that Lenin was operating in an especially manipulable environment. A similar conclusion might be argued about the manipulability of the political environment of Europe prior to the outbreak of World War II, on the basis of the various accounts at our disposal of the sequence of events that culminated with the invasion of Poland in 1939.[13]

2. *The likelihood of personal impact varies with the actor's location in the environment.* To shape events, an action must be performed not only in an unstable environment, but also by an actor who is strategically placed in that environment. It is, for example, a commonplace that actors in the middle and lower ranks of many bureaucracies are unable to accomplish much singly, since they are restrained or inhibited by other actors. Robert C. Tucker points out what may almost be a limiting case on the other end of the continuum in an essay on the lack of restraint on Russian policymakers, both under the Czars and since the Revolution. He quotes with approval Nikolai Turgenev's mid-nineteenth century statement that "In all countries ruled by an unlimited power there has always been and is some class, estate, some traditional institutions which in certain instances compel the sovereign to act in a certain way and set limits to his caprice; nothing of the sort exists in Russia."[14] Elsewhere, Tucker points to the tendency in totalitarian states for the political machinery to become "a conduit of the dictatoral psychology"[15]—that is for there to be a relatively unimpeded conversion of whims of the dictator into governmental action as a consequence of his authoritarian control of the bureaucratic apparatus.

3. *The likelihood of personal impact varies with the personal strengths or weaknesses of the actor.* My two previous observations can be recapitulated with an analogy from the poolroom. In the game of pocket billiards the aim of the player is to clear as many balls as pos-

[12] Compare Wassily Leontief's interesting essay "When Should History be Written Backwards?" *The Economic History Review*, 16, (1963), 1–8.

[13] For an account of European politics in the 1930's that is consistent with this assertion see Alan Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (New York: Harper, rev. ed., 1962). Needless to say, any attempt to seek operational indicators of environments that "admit of restructuring" in order to restate the present proposition in testable form could not take the circular route of simply showing that the environment *had* been manipulated by a single actor.

[14] Robert C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind* (New York: Praeger, 1963), 145–65; quotation from Turgenev at p. 147.

[15] Robert C. Tucker, "The Dictator and Totalitarianism," *World Politics*, Vol. 17 (1965), p. 583.

sible from the table. The initial distribution of balls parallels my first observation about the manipulability of the environment. With some arrays a good many shots are possible; perhaps the table can even be cleared. With other arrays no successful shots are likely. The analogy to point two—the strategic location of the actor—is, of course, the location of the cue ball. As a final point, we may note the political actor's peculiar strengths or weaknesses. In the poolroom these are paralleled by the player's skill or lack of skill. The greater the actor's skill, the less his initial need for a favorable position or a manipulable environment, and the greater the likelihood that he will himself subsequently contribute to making his position favorable and his environment manipulable.[16]

The variable of skill is emphasized in Hook's detailed examination of Lenin's contribution to the events leading up to the October Revolution. Hook concludes that Lenin's vigorous, persistent, imaginative participation in that sequence was a necessary (though certainly not sufficient) condition for the outcome. Hook's interest, of course, is in lending precision to the notion of the Great Man. Therefore he is concerned with the individual who, because of especially great talents, is able to alter the course of events. But for our purposes, the Great Failure is equally significant: an actor's capabilities may be relevant to an outcome in a negative as well as a positive sense.

When does personal variability affect behavior ("actor dispensability")?

Often it may be acknowledged that a particular action of an individual is a crucial node in a process of decision-making, but it may be argued that this action is one that might have been performed by any actor placed in a comparable situation, or by anyone filling a comparable role. If actors with differing personal characteristics perform identically when exposed to common stimuli, we quite clearly can dispense with study of the actors' personal differences, since a variable cannot explain a uniformity. This objection to personality explanations of political behavior—and here "personality" means personal variability—is illustrated by Easton with the example of political party leaders who differ in their personality characteristics and who are "confronted with the existence of powerful groups making demands upon their parties." Their "decisions and actions," he suggests, will tend "to converge."[17]

The task of rephrasing this objection conditionally and advancing propositions about the circumstances under which it obtains is not overly burdensome, since the objection is rarely stated categorically. Exponents of the view that situational pressures eliminate or sharply reduce the effects of personality usually acknowledge that this is not always the case. Similarly, proponents of the view that personality *is* an important determinant of political behavior also often qualify their position and note circumstances that dampen the effects of personal variability. These qualifications point to an obvious reconstruction of the question. *Under what circumstances*, we may ask, *do different actors (placed in common situations) vary in their behavior and under what circumstances is behavior uniform?* We might call this the question of *actor dispensability*.[18]

The question of under what circumstances the variations in actors' personal characteristics are significant for their behavior has received a good bit of intermittent attention in recent years. The several propositions I shall set forth are assembled, and to some extent reorganized, from a variety of observations made by Herbert Goldhamer, Robert E. Lane, Daniel Levinson, Edward Shils, and Sidney Verba, among others.[19] But before pro-

[16] In other words, the skill of the actor may feed back into the environment, contributing to its instability or stability. To the degree that we take environmental conditions as given (i.e., considering them statically at a single point in time), we underestimate the impact of individuals on politics. For examples of political actors shaping their own roles and environments see Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills, *Character and Social Structure* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953), Chapter 14.

[17] David Easton, *The Political System* (New York: Knopf, 1953), p. 196.

[18] Strictly speaking, it is not the actor who is dispensable in this formulation, but rather his personal characteristics. In an earlier draft I referred to "actor substitutability," but the antonym, "non-substitutability," is less successful than "indispensability" as a way of indicating the circumstances under which an explanation of action demands an account of the actor. On the other hand, "substitutability" is a very handy criterion for rough and ready reasoning about the degree to which the contribution of any historical actor is uniquely personal, since one may easily perform the mental exercise of imagining how other available actors would have performed under comparable circumstances.

[19] Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 99–100; Edward A.

ceeding to lay out these propositions, it will be instructive to consider a possible objection to the notion of actor dispensability.

The circumstances of actor dispensability are those in which, as Shils puts it, "persons of quite different dispositions" are found to "behave in a more or less uniform manner."[20] A personality-oriented social analyst might attempt to deny the premise that behavior *ever* is uniform (and indeed, Shils says "behave in a *more or less* uniform manner.") The objection is, of course, correct in the trivial, definitional sense: every different act is different. The objection is also empirically correct in that, if we inspect actions with sufficient care, we can always detect differences between them—even such heavily "situation-determined" actions as "the way in which a man, when crossing a street, dodges the cars which move on it"[21] vary from individual to individual. Nevertheless, the objection—if it is meant to invalidate Shils' assertion—is not well taken, since it denies the principle (necessary for analytic purposes) that we can classify disparate phenomena, treating them as uniform for certain purposes. Furthermore, a significant sociological proposition follows from Shils' point: "To a large extent, large enough indeed to enable great organizations to operate in a quite predictable manner, . . . [different individuals] will conform [i.e., behave uniformly] despite the conflicting urges of their personalities."[22]

Yet the objection leads to an important observation. What we mean by uniform behavior depends upon our principle of classification, which in turn depends upon the purposes of our investigation. If our interests are sufficiently microscopic, we are likely to find variability where others see uniformity. Nor, it should be added, is there anything intrinsically unworthy about being interested in microscopic phenomena—in nuances and "small" variations.

Even if one *is* interested in the macroscopic (major institutions, "important" events), the irrelevance of microscopic variations introduced by actors' personal characteristics cannot be assumed, since action dispensability and actor dispensability are independent of each other. Small actor variations may lead to actions with large consequences. Thus, for example, there might be relatively little room for personal variation in the ways that American Presidents would be likely to respond to the warning system that signals the advent of a missile attack, but the consequences of the President's action are so great that even the slightest variations between one or another incumbent in a comparable situation would be of profound interest.

In noting the conditions under which actors' personal characteristics tend to be dispensable and those under which they tend to be indispensable, we may examine conditions that arise from the *environmental situations* within which actions occur, from the *predispositions* of the actors themselves, and from the *kinds of acts* (responses) that are performed—that is, from all three elements of the familiar paradigm of E→P→R (or S→O→R). The propositions I shall list under these headings are neither exhaustive nor fully exclusive of each other, but they do serve to pull together and organize crudely most of the diverse observations that have been made on the circumstances that foster the expression of personal variability.

1. *There is greater room for personal variability in the "peripheral" aspects of actions than in their "central" aspects.* Examples of "peripheral" aspects of action include evidences of the personal *style* of an actor (for example, his mannerisms), the *zealousness* of his performance, and the *imagery* that accompanies his behavior at the preparatory and consummatory phases of action (for example, fantasies about alternative courses of action).

By "central" I refer to the gross aspects of the action—for example, the very fact that an individual votes, writes a letter to a Congressman, etc.

Lane suggests that "the idiosyncratic features of personality" are likely to be revealed in the

---

Shils, "Authoritarianism: 'Right' and 'Left'," in Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 24–49; Herbert Goldhamer, "Public Opinion and Personality" *American Journal of Sociology*, 55 (1950), 346–354; Daniel J. Levinson, "The Relevance of Personality for Political Participation," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 22 (1958), 3–10; Sidney Verba, "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System," *World Politics*, 14 (1961), 93–117.

[20] Shils, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[21] This is a quotation from a well-known passage in Karl Popper's *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (New York: Harper Torchbook edition, 1963), II, p. 97, arguing that sociology is an "autonomous" discipline because psychological evidence is so often of limited relevance—compared with situational evidence—to explanations of behavior. For a critique of Popper's analysis see Richard Lichtman, "Karl Popper's Defense of the Autonomy of Sociology," *Social Research*, 32 (1965), 1–25.

[22] Shils, *op. cit.*, p. 44.

"images" political actors hold "of other participants." There also is "scope for the expressions of personal differences," Lane points out, in "the grounds" one selects "for rationalizing a political act," and in one's style "of personal interaction in a political group."[23]

Shils, after arguing that "persons of quite different dispositions" often "will behave in a more or less uniform manner," then adds: "Naturally not all of them will be equally zealous or enthusiastic. . ."[24]

Riesman and Glazer point out that although "different kinds of character" can "be used for the same kind of work within an institution," a "price" is paid by "the character types that [fit] badly, as against the release of energy provided by the congruence of character and task."[25]

2. *The more demanding the political act—the more it is not merely a conventionally expected performance—the greater the likelihood that it will vary with the personal characteristics of the actor.*

Lane suggests that there is little personal variation in "the more conventional items, such as voting, expressing patriotic opinions and accepting election results as final." On the other hand, his list of actions which "reveal . . . personality" includes "selecting types of political behavior over and above voting":[26] writing public officials, volunteering to work for a political party, seeking nomination for public office, etc.

3. *Variations in personal characteristics are more likely to be exhibited to the degree that behavior is spontaneous—that is, to the degree that it proceeds from personal impulse, without effort or premeditation.*

Goldhamer refers to "a person's . . . casual ruminations while walking along the street, sudden but perhaps transient convictions inspired by some immediate experience, speculations while reading the newspaper or listening to a broadcast, remarks struck off in the course of an argument. . . . If we have any theoretical reason for supposing that a person's opinions are influenced by his personality structure, it is surely in these forms of spontaneous behavior that we should expect to find the evidence of this relationship."[27]

We may now consider two propositions about actor dispensability that relate to the environment in which actions take place.

4. *Ambiguous situations leave room for personal variability to manifest itself.* As Sherif puts it, "the contribution of internal factors increases as the external-stimulus situation becomes more unstructured."[28] (A classically unstructured environmental stimulus, leaving almost infinite room for personal variation in response, is the Rorschach ink blot.)

Budner[29] distinguishes three types of ambiguous situations. Each relates to instances which have been given by various writers of actor dispensability or indispensability. Budner's three types of situations include:

(a) *a "completely new situation in which there are no familiar cues."*

Shils comments that in new situations "no framework of action [has been] set for the newcomer by the expectations of those on the scene. A new political party, a newly formed religious sect will thus be more amenable to the expressive behavior of the personalities of those who make them up than an ongoing government or private business office or university department with its traditions of scientific work."[30]

Goldhamer argues that the public opinion process moves from unstructured conditions admitting of great personal variability to more structured conditions that restrain individual differences. Immediate reactions to public events, he argues, reflect personal idiosyncrasies. But gradually the individual is constrained by his awareness that the event has become a matter of public discussion. "There is reason to believe that, as the individual becomes aware of the range and intensity of group preoccupation with the object, his orientation to it becomes less individualized, less intimately bound to an individual perception and judgment of the object . . . [H]e is drawn imperceptibly to view this object anew, no longer now as an individual percipient, but as one who selects (unconsciously, perhaps) an 'appropriate' position in an imagined range of public reactions . . . a limitation is thus placed on the degree to which the full uniqueness of the individual may be expected to influence his perceptions and opinions."[31]

The second type of ambiguity referred to by Budner is (b) *"a complex situation in which*

[23] Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 100.
[24] Shils, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
[25] Riesman and Glazer, *op. cit.*, pp. 438–439.
[26] Lane, *op. cit.* p. 100.
[27] Goldhamer, *op. cit.*, p. 349.
[28] Muzafer Sherif, "The Concept of Reference Groups in Human Relations," in Muzafer Sherif and M. O. Wilson (eds.), *Group Relations at the Crossroads* (New York: Harper, 1953), p. 30.
[29] Stanley Budner, "Intolerance of Ambiguity as a Personality Variable," *Journal of Personality*, 30 (1960), p. 30.
[30] Shils, *op. cit.*, 44–45.
[31] Goldhamer, *op. cit.*, 346–347.

there are a great number of cues to take into account."

Levinson suggests that the availability of "a wide range of . . . socially provided . . . alternatives" increases "the importance of intrapersonal determinants" of political participation. "The greater the number of opportunities for participation, the more the person can choose on the basis of personal congeniality. Or, in more general terms, the greater the richness and complexity of the stimulus field, the more will internal organizing forces determine individual adaptation. This condition obtains in a relatively unstructured social field, and, as well, in a pluralistic society that provides numerous structured alternatives."[32]

Finally, Budner refers to (c) *"a contradictory situation in which different elements suggest different structures."*

Several of Lane's examples fall under this heading: "Situations where reference groups have politically conflicting points of view. . . Situations at the focus of conflicting propaganda. . . . Current situations which for an individual are in conflict with previous experience."[33]

5. *The impact of personal differences on behavior is increased to the degree that sanctions are not attached to certain of the alternative possible courses of behavior.*

"The option of refusing to sign a loyalty oath," Levinson comments, "is in a sense 'available' to any member of an institution that requires such an oath, but the sanctions operating are usually so strong that non-signing is an almost 'unavailable' option to many who would otherwise choose it."[34]

The foregoing environmental determinants of actor dispensability suggest several aspects of actors' predispositions which will affect the likelihood that any of the ways in which they differ from each other will manifest themselves in behavior.

6. *The opportunities for personal variation are increased to the degree that political actors lack mental sets which might lead them to structure their perceptions and resolve ambiguities.* The sets they may use to help reduce ambiguity include cognitive capacities (intelligence, information) that provide a basis of organizing perceptions, and pre-conceptions that foster stereotyping.

Verba, in an essay on "Assumptions of Rationality and Non-Rationality in Models of the International System," comments that "the more information an individual has about international affairs, the less likely it is that his behavior will be based upon non-logical influences. In the absence of information about an event, decisions have to be made on the basis of other criteria. A rich informational content, on the other hand, focuses attention on the international event itself. . ."[35]

Wildavsky, in an account of adversary groups in the Dixon-Yates controversy, points to ways in which the preconceptions of members of factions lead them to respond in predictable fashions that are likely to be quite independent of their personal differences. "The public versus private power issue. . . has been fought out hundreds of times at the city, state, county, and national levels of our politics in the past sixty years. A fifty year old private or public power executive, or a political figure who has become identified with one or another position, may well be able to look back to twenty-five years of personal involvement in this controversy. . . The participants on each side have long since developed a fairly complete set of attitudes on this issue which have crystallized through years of dispute. . . They have in reserve a number of prepared responses ready to be activated in the direction indicated by their set of attitudes whenever the occasion demands. . ."[36]

7. *If the degree to which certain of the alternative courses of action are sanctioned reduces the likelihood that personal characteristics will produce variation in behavior, then any intense dispositions on the part of actors in a contrary direction to the sanctions increase that likelihood.*

"Personality structure. . . will be more determinant of political activity when the impulses and the defenses of the actors are extremely intense"—for example, "when the compulsive elements are powerful and rigid or when the aggressiveness is very strong."[37]

8. *If, however, the disposition that is strong is to take one's cues from others, the effects of personal variation on behavior will be reduced.* Personality may dispose some individuals to adopt uncritically the political views in their environment, but as a result, Goldhamer comments, the view adopted will "have a somewhat fortuitous character in relation to the personality and be dependent largely on attendant situa-

[32] Levinson, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[33] Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

[34] Levinson, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

[35] Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 100. By "non-logical" Verba means influences resulting from ego-defensive personality needs, but his point applies generally to personal variability.

[36] Aaron Wildavsky, "The Analysis of Issue-Contexts in the Study of Decision-Making," *Journal of Politics*, 24 (1962), 717–732.

[37] Shils, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

tional factors."[38] (Dispositions toward conformity are, of course, a key variable for students of political psychology. The point here is merely that these dispositions reduce the impact of the individual's other psychological characteristics on his behavior.)

9. *A situational factor working with individual tendencies to adopt the views of others to reduce personal variation is the degree to which the individual is placed in a group context in which "the individual's decision or attitude is visible to others."*[39]

Another predispositional determinant:

10. *The more emotionally involved a person is in politics, the greater the likelihood that his personal characteristics will affect his political behavior.*

Goldhamer comments that "the bearing of personality on political opinion is conditioned and limited by the fact that for large masses of persons the objects of political life are insulated from the deeper concerns of the personality." [But, he adds in a footnote], "this should not be interpreted to mean that personality characteristics are irrelevant to an understanding of the opinions and acts of political personages. In such cases political roles are so central to the entire life organization that a close connection between personality structure and political action is to be expected."[40]

Levinson argues that "[t]he more politics 'matters,' the more likely it is that political behavior will express enduring inner values and dispositions. Conversely, the less salient the issues involved, the more likely is one to respond on the basis of immediate external pressures. When a personally congenial mode of participation is not readily available, and the person cannot create one for himself, he may nominally accept an uncongenial role but without strong commitment or involvement. In this case, however, the person is likely. . . to have a strong potential for change toward a new and psychologically more functional role."[41]

The final proposition has reference to political roles and does not fit neatly into any of the three elements of the Environment→Predispositions→Response formula.

11. *Personality variations will be more evident to the degree that the individual occupies a position "free from elaborate expectations of fixed content."*[42] Typically these are leadership positions. We have already seen that such positions figure in the conditions of action indispensability; their importance for the student of personality and politics is evident a fortiori when we note that the leader's characteristics also are likely to be reflected in his behavior, thus meeting the requirement of actor indispensability.

The military leader, it has been said, may have an especially great impact. "Even those who view history as fashioned by vast impersonal forces must recognize that in war personality plays a particularly crucial part. Substitute Gates for Washington, and what would have happened to the American cause? Substitute Marlborough or Wellington for Howe or Clinton, and what would have happened? These are perhaps idle questions, but they illustrate the fact that the course of a war can depend as much upon the strengths and failings of a commander-in-chief as upon the interaction of geography and economics and social system."[43]

Under what circumstances are ego-defensive needs likely to manifest themselves in political behavior?

The final objection to explanations of politics in terms of personality is one in which the term "personality" denotes not the impact of individuals on social processes (action dispensability), or the mere fact of individual variability (actor dispensability), but rather the specific ways in which "personalities" vary. Once we have found it necessary to explain political behavior by referring to the ways in which political actors vary, objections can be made to whatever specific personality variables we choose to employ. (Objections falling into this final category might be summarized under the heading "actor characteristics.")

Some choices of variables are particularly controversial, especially the variables based on "depth" psychology that have so commonly been drawn upon in such works as Lasswell's *Psychopathology and Politics*, Fromm's *Escape from Freedom*, and *The Authoritarian Per-*

---

[38] Goldhamer, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

[39] Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 103.

[40] Goldhamer, *op. cit.*, p. 349.

[41] Levinson, *op. cit.*, p.10.

[42] Shils, *op. cit.*, p. 45. The term "role" is commonly used so as to have both an environmental referent (the prevailing expectations about his duties in a role incumbent's environment) and a predispositional referent (the incumbent's own expectations). For a valuable discussion see Daniel Levinson, "Role, Personality, and Social Structure in the Organizational Setting," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 58 (1959), 170–180.

[43] Henry Wilcox, *Portrait of a General* (New York: Knopf, 1964), ix-x.

sonality.[44] It is the deep motivational variables that many commentators have in mind when they argue that "personality" does not have an important impact on politics. It is sometimes said, for example, that such personality factors do not have much bearing on politics, because the psychic forces evident in the pathological behavior of disturbed individuals do not come into play in the daily behavior of normal people. Rephrasing this assertion conditionally, then, we arrive at the question: *Under what circumstances are ego-defensive*[45] *needs likely to manifest themselves in behavior?* It should be emphasized that my selection of this particular question about actor characteristics carries no implication that "personality" should be conceived of in psychodynamic terms, or that it should be equated with the unconscious, the irrational, and the emotional. It simply is convenient to consider this class of personality characteristics, because psychoanalytic notions have guided so much of the personality and politics literature and have antagonized so many of the literature's critics.

Much of what I have said about actor dispensability also applies to the present question. Wherever the circumstances of political behavior leave room for individuality, the possibility exists for ego-defensive aspects of personality to assert themselves. These circumstances include "unstructured" political situations; settings in which sanctions are weak or conflicting, so that individuals of diverse inclinations are not coerced into acting uniformly; and the various other considerations discussed under the previous heading. These circumstances make it *possible* for ego-defensive personality needs to come to the fore. They do not, of course, make it necessary —or even highly likely—that behavior will have a significant basis in ego defense.

Given the foregoing circumstances, which make ego-defensive behavior possible, what, then, makes it likely (or at least adds to the likelihood) that deeper psychodynamic processes will be at work? We may briefly note these three classes of factors, locating them conveniently in terms of environment, predispositions, and response.

1. *Certain types of environmental stimuli undoubtedly have a greater "resonance" with the deeper layers of the personality than do others.* These are the stimuli which evoke "disproportionately" emotional responses—people seem to be "over-sensitive" to them. They are stimuli which politicians learn to be wary of—for example, such issues as capital punishment, cruelty to animals, and, in recent years, fluoridation of drinking water. Often their stimulus value may be to only a rather small segment of the electorate, but their capacity to arouse fervid response may be such that a Congressman would prefer to confront his constituents on such knotty matters as revision of the tariff affecting the district's principal industry than on, in the phrase of the authors of *Voting*, a "style issue"[46] such as humane slaughtering.

One element in these sensitive issues, Lane and Sears suggest, is that they touch upon "topics dealing with material commonly repressed by individuals. . . Obvious examples are war or criminal punishment (both dealing with aggression) and birth control or obscenity legislation (both dealing with sexuality). Socially 'dangerous' topics, such as communism and religion, also draw a host of irrational defensive maneuvers. The social 'dangers' that they represent frequently parallel unconscious intra-psychic 'dangers.' For example, an individual with a strong unconscious hatred for all authority may see in Soviet communism a system which threatens intrusion of authoritarian demands into every area of his life. His anti-communism may thus stem more from a residual hatred for his father than for any rational assessment of its likely effects on his life."

Lane and Sears also suggest that, "Opinions dealing with people (such as political candidates) or social groups (such as 'bureaucrats,' 'blue bloods,' or the various ethnic groups) are more likely to invite irrational thought than opinions

[44] Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics*, originally published in 1930, reprinted in *The Political Writings of Harold D. Lasswell* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951); Erich Fromm, *Escape From Freedom* (New York: Rinehart, 1941); T. W. Adorno, et al., *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950).

[45] For the present purposes a detailed conceptual side-trip into the meaning of "ego-defensive needs" will not be necessary. In general, I am referring to the kind of seemingly inexplicable, "pathological" behavior that classical, pre-ego psychology psychoanalysis was preoccupied with. A rough synonym would be needs resulting from "internally induced anxieties," a phrase that appears in Daniel Katz's remarks on ego-defense. "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 24 (1960), 163–204. Also see Fred I. Greenstein, "Personality and Political Socialization: The Theories of Authoritarian and Democratic Character," *Annals*, 361 (1965), 81–95.

[46] Bernard Berelson, et al., *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 184.

dealing with most domestic economic issues. Few people can give as clear an account of why they like a man as why they like an economic policy; the 'warm'—'cold' dimension seems crucial in many 'person perception' studies, but the grounds for 'warm' or 'cold' feelings are usually obscure. Studies of ethnic prejudice and social distance reveal the inaccessibility of many such opinions to new evidence; they are often compartmentalized, and usually rationalized; that is, covered by plausible explanation which an impartial student of the opinion is inclined to discount."[47]

2. *The likelihood that ego-defensive needs will affect political behavior also is related to the degree to which actors "have" ego-defensive needs.* This assertion is not quite the truism it appears to be. We still have very little satisfactory evidence of various patterns of psychopathology in society[48] and even less evidence about the degree to which emotional disturbance tends to become channelled into political action.

Although it is not a truism, the proposition *is* excessively general. It needs to be expanded upon and elaborated into a series of more specific hypotheses about types of ego-defensive needs and their corresponding adaptations as they relate to political behavior. For example, one of the more convincing findings of the prejudice studies of a decade ago was an observation made not in the well-known *The Authoritarian Personality* but rather in the somewhat neglected *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder* by Ackerman and Jahoda.[49] Personality disorders which manifested themselves in depressive behavior, it was noted, were not accompanied by anti-semitism. But anti-semitism was likely if the individual's typical means of protecting himself from intrapsychic conflict was extra-punitive—that is, if he was disposed to reduce internal tension by such mechanisms as projection. There is no reason to believe that this hypothesis is relevant only to the restricted sphere of anti-semitism.

3. *Finally, certain types of response undoubtedly provide greater occasion for deep personality needs to find outlet than do others*—for example, such responses as affirmations of loyalty in connection with the rallying activities of mass movements led by charismatic leaders and the various other types of response deliberately designed to channel affect into politics. Both in politics and in other spheres of life it should be possible to rank the various classes of typical action in terms of the degree to which the participants take it as a norm that affective expression is appropriate.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

My purpose has been to reconsider a topic that too often has been dealt with in a rather off-hand (and sometimes polemical) fashion: "Is personality important as a determinant of political behavior?" Five of the more intellectually challenging assertions about the lack of relevance of "personality" to the endeavors of the student of politics have been considered. Two of these seem to be based on misconceptions, albeit interesting ones. The three additional objections can be rephrased so that they no longer are objections, but rather provide the occasion for advancing propositions about how and under what circumstances "personality" affects political behavior.

In rephrasing these objections we see three of the many ways in which the term "personality" has been used in statements about politics: to refer to the impact of individual political actions, to designate the fact that individual actors vary in their personal characteristics, and to indicate the specific content of individual variation (and, particularly, "deeper," ego-defensive, psychological processes). It therefore becomes clear that the general question "How important is personality?" is not susceptible to a general answer. It must be broken down into the variety of sub-questions implied in it, and these—when pursued—lead not to simple answers but rather to an extensive examination of the terrain of politics in terms of the diverse ways in which "the human element" comes into play.

[47] The quotations are from Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, *Public Opinion* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 76. Also see Heinz Hartmann, "The Application of Psychoanalytic Concepts to Social Science," in his *Essays on Ego Psychology* (New York: International Universities Press, 1964), p. 90f. Lane and Sears also suggest that "irrational" opinion formation is fostered where the "referents of an opinion" are "vague," where the issue is "remote" and it is "difficult to assess its action consequences," and where the "terms of debate" are "abstract." These are points which, in terms of the present discussion, apply generally to the possibility that personal variability will affect behavior (actor dispensability), as well as more specifically to the possibility that ego-defense will come to the fore.

[48] But see Leo Srole et al., *Mental Health in the Metropolis*, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962).

[49] Nathan W. Ackerman and Marie Jahoda, *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder* (New York: Harper, 1950).

BARGAINING IN A THREE-PERSON GAME*

WILLIAM H. RIKER
University of Rochester

Games are paradigms of many political events, especially those that involve partial or complete conflicts of interest among the participants. As paradigms, they display in relatively simple social interaction the same fundamental forces found in the more complex interactions of the grander political events whose structure they share. This is the feature of games that makes them attractive vehicles for both theorizing and experimentation in the social sciences. The scientific expectation is that, by studying the quasi-political interaction of games—where the variations among institutional, psychological, and ideological components of behavior are minimized—one will be able to understand more profoundly the basic political activities of bargaining, forming coalitions, and choosing strategies. This more profound understanding is a consequence of obtaining answers to the following questions:

(1) What is the mathematical solution, that is, what amount of utility can players be expected to obtain, when it is assumed that players are rational and wish to maximize utility?
(2) What is the strategy (or method of playing) that will ensure players of achieving the solution?

An answer to the first question indicates what may be anticipated as the outcome of political events. If we know it, then, if also we can assume players are rational maximizers of utility, we can predict the political future with some confidence. An answer to the second question (about strategies) permits political engineers to give advice to politicians about how to behave successfully.

The mathematical literature, of course, contains deductively-arrived-at definitions of solutions and strategies;[1] but these are not yet scientifically useful because we do not know whether or not they are also descriptions of what people do in the temporal world. While there has been a considerable amount of experimentation with games, the bulk of it has concerned psychological attributes of subjects and relatively little has been aimed at verifying theory or at extending it to the real world.[2] Given these lacunae, this essay is concerned with verifying a theory about the solution of a three-person non-zero-sum game. The main question is: Does the theory describe what people do? And subsidiarily, does the strategy associated with the solution serve to achieve it in the temporal world? Answers from the laboratory are given to these two questions; it is hoped that these will in turn give sufficient confidence in the theory to pursue direct applications.

I. MATHEMATICAL SOLUTIONS

The game model most relevant to politics is probably the n-person, non-zero-sum game. In this game the main activity is forming coalitions: and, as I have argued elsewhere, a good part of politics is forming coalitions to win wars and elections, to maneuver in legislatures and bureaucracies, to decide cases in courts, etc.[3] And while some of this activity (especially elections) is zero-sum in the sense that each

* The work reported in this essay was done under a grant from the National Science Foundation. It was originally reported at the American Political Science Association meeting, September, 1966. I am indebted to Professors William Gamson and Michael Maschler for advice and to several assistants for much faithful work, Robert Samberg, Robert Weber, and Peter Vivona.

[1] See, especially, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, *The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947, 2nd edition) and the several volumes of *Annals of Mathematics Studies* devoted to the theory of games, Vols. 24, 28, 37, 39, 40, and 52.

[2] Some exceptions that do aim at verifying and extending theory are L. E. Fouraker, "Level of Aspiration and Group Decision Making" in S. Messick and A. H. Brayfield (eds.), *Decisions and Choice* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964); W. A. Gamson, "An Experimental Test of a Theory of Coalition Formation," *American Sociological Review*, 26 (1961), 565–573; Michael Maschler, *Playing an n-Person Game: An Experiment* (Princeton University: Econometric Research Program, Research Memorandum No. 73, 1 February 1965); A. Rapoport and Albert M. Chammah, *Prisoners' Dilemma* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965); Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1960); Michael Leiserson, *Coalitions in Politics* (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Yale University, 1966).

[3] William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), Chapter 1 and *passim*.

minimal winning coalition wins the same amount and that the winner wins exactly what the loser loses, probably the greater portion of political activity in forming coalitions is non-zero sum in the sense that different minimal winning coalitions win different amounts and the loss to the loser may not equal the gain to the winner. In using the game model for politics, therefore, it seems likely that the largest immediate reward will come from the study of n-person, non-zero-sum games.

The particular three-person non-zero-sum game used in these experiments had the following characteristic function (or list of payoffs to coalitions):

$$v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = v(1, 2, 3) = 0;$$
$$v(1, 2) = \$4.00;\ v(1, 3) = \$5.00;\ v(2, 3) = \$6.00;$$

where "v(i, j)" signifies "the value of or payoff to a coalition of i and j." The essential problem in this game is to divide the potential winnings of a two-person coalition in such a way as to satisfy its members that the coalition is viable (i.e., potentially formable) and that the division is stable (i.e., likely to last). Although inexperienced players often initially assume that only (2, 3) can be formed, all three two-person coalitions are in fact formable.[4] But not all divisions in formable coalitions are stable. Consider the division $x = (.05, 0, 4.95)$, which is to be read as a payment of 5¢ to 1, of 0 to 2, and of \$4.95 to 3. Clearly x has very little to recommend it to player 1. One would expect that player 2 could easily attract 1 away from (1, 3) by an offer of, e.g., $y = (1.50, 2.50, 0)$. Probably, therefore, $x = (.05, 0, 4.95)$ is not a stable division. Since all coalitions in this game are formable, the central question is: What division, if any, is stable?

Answers to this question are *solutions*, which consist not of single divisions, but of a family of them, which have the property that, once one of them is arrived at, it is in some sense unreasonable to move away from it. Since solutions are families of divisions, they do not specify particular coalitions as winners but rather, for each formable coalition, specify the division of payoff if the coalition occurs.[5]

[4] An example of a game in which some coalitions are not formable is: $v(1) = v(2) = v(3) = v(1, 2, 3) = 0$; $v(1, 2) = 3.00$; $v(1, 3) = 5.00$; and $v(2, 3) = 20.00$, in which 3 can always offer 2 more than 1 can so that (1, 2) can not be expected to form and in which 3 has no motive to form with 1 so that (1, 3) can not be expected to form either.

[5] There are a number of other theories that offer other kinds of solutions to n-person games. They are not useful in the present context, however, so I will not discuss them here.

The intuitively and mathematically most attractive solutions to the particular game studied here contain the following divisions as the principal possibilities:

$$T = \left\{\begin{matrix}(1.50, 2.50, 0)\\(1.50, 0, 3.50)\\(0, 2.50, 3.50)\end{matrix}\right\}$$

In the von Neumann-Morgenstern theory, these are the main points in the solution although there are an infinite number of additional, somewhat subsidiary, divisions. Their rationale for this selection of points in T can be briefly summarized thus: An *imputation*, x, which is their technical term for something similar to but more precisely defined than what I have called a division, is said to *dominate* an imputation y with respect to a coalition S, if S is not empty, if

$$\sum_{i \in S} x_i \leq v(S)$$

(i.e., if the imputation does not involve payments totalling more than the coalition is worth) and if

$$x_i > y_i, \qquad \text{for all } i \text{ in S.}$$

The intuitive justification for the notion of dominance is that players in S would presumably invariably prefer an imputation, x, in which each gets more, to an imputation, y, in which each gets less. Thus with respect to the coalition (1, 2), $x = (2.00, 2.00, 0)$ dominates $y = (1.00, 0, 4.00)$. The *solution* is then a set of imputations such that

(1) some imputation in the set dominates any imputation not in the set; and
(2) no imputation in the set dominates any other in the set.

If we limit the payments to players in (1, 2) to \$4.00 and the payments to players in (1, 3) to \$5.00, then the imputations in T satisfy the definition of a solution.[6] To illustrate this definition for this game, consider any imputation, $x = (x_1, x_2, x_3)$, such that $x_1 > 1.50$. Then either $x_2 < 2.50$ or $x_3 < 3.50$ inasmuch as $x_1 + x_2 = 4.00$ and $x_1 + x_3 = 5.00$. Suppose $x_1 > 1.50$, $x_2 < 2.50$, and $x_3 = 0$. Then $y = (0, 2.50, 3.50)$ dominates x with respect to (2, 3) because $y_2 > x_2$ and $y_3 > x_3$. Similarly, if $x_1 > 1.50$, $x_2 = 0$,

[6] The points in addition to T in the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution are those which increase the payments of (1, 2) and (1, 3) continuously from \$4.00 and \$5.00 to \$6.00. Since these additional points could not occur under the institutional arrangement of the game reported here, it is reasonable to limit the solution of this particular game to the set T.

and $x_3 < 3.50$, y also dominates x with respect to (2, 3). Hence, for any imputation in which $x_1 > 1.50$, $y = (0, 2.50, 3.50)$ dominates it. Conversely, suppose $0 \leq x_1 < 1.50$. Then $y = (1.50, 0, 3.50)$ dominates x with respect to (1, 3) or $z = (1.50, 2.50, 0)$ dominates x with respect to (1, 2). Hence for any imputation such that $x_1 > 1.50$ or $0 \leq x_1 < 1.50$, some imputation in T dominates it. Similarly some imputation in T dominates any imputation in which $x_2 > 2.50$ or $0 \leq x_2 < 2.50$ or in which $x_3 > 3.50$ or $0 \leq x_3 < 3.50$. Hence some imputation in T dominates any imputation not in T and thus T satisfies the first standard for a solution.

To show that it satisfies the second standard, it is merely necessary to show that the imputations in T do not dominate each other. Consider the imputation $x = (1, 50, 2.50, 0)$. Does $y = (1.50, 0, 3.50)$ dominate it with respect to (1, 3)? While $y_3 > x_3$, still $y_1 = x_1$ so that the definition of domination is not satisfied. Similarly, $z = (0, 2.50, 3.50)$ does not dominate x with respect to (2, 3); and y and z do not dominate each other. Hence, the set T meets the second standard for a solution.

The intuitive justification for this notion of a solution is quite attractive. Defining the *quota* for each player as what he may expect from an imputation in T if he is in a winning coalition, presumably any player is likely to be discontented with an imputation, x, which gives him less than his quota. Hence he should be willing to desert it. Suppose 1 and 2 have tentatively arrived at $x = (2.00, 2.00, 0)$. Then, if 3 offers 2 an imputation $y = (0, 2.50, 3.50)$, the (1, 2) coalition can hardly be expected to last. If they have an infinite amount of time to negotiate, probably rational players would reject any imputation not in T. Hence all such imputations are unstable.

Furthermore, once an imputation in T is reached, rational players would, it is argued, be cautious about leaving it. Since the quota for any individual player, i, is the same for all imputations in T in which i wins, there is no point to moving from one winning coalition and imputation in T to another. As for moving from an imputation in T to one outside of it, this in an invitation to disaster. Suppose that (1, 2) has formed with $x = (1.50, 2.50, 0)$ and that 3, who is about to lose, attempts to seduce 1 into the (1, 3) coalition with an offer of $y = (2.00, 0, 3.00)$. While 1 might be tempted by this offer, a little reflection should reveal that the next step in the negotiation would be for 2 to offer 3 the imputation $z = (0, 2.50, 3.50)$, which is also in T and hence presumably stable and in which 1 is undone by his greed. Hence, once $x = (1.50, 2.50, 0)$ is reached, 1 might reasonably spurn all offers from 3. Indeed, the more that 3 offers 1, the more 3 is likely to accept a counter-offer from 2. Hence 1 should not be the first to desert the (1, 2) coalition and the imputation in T. The same argument holds for 2. Therein lies the stability of an imputation in T: neither member of a winning coalition with an imputation in T has reason to be the first to desert it.

Aumann and Maschler have attempted to place the set T within a mathematical background that is intuitively even more attractive.[7] Describing what I have called a division as a *payoff configuration* and defining it precisely as a set of payoffs in which the sum of the payments to the members of a coalition equals the value of the coalition, they then define an *individually rational payoff configuration* (i.r.p.c.) as one in which

$$x_i \geq v(\{i\}), \qquad \text{for all } i.$$

Finally they define a bargaining set, $M_1^{(i)}$, of stable "i.r.p.c.'s" which turns out to be very similar to the set T. Yet they reach this result by a route which, superficially at least, appears quite different from that of von Neumann and Morgenstern. Given a coalition (i, j) and an i.r.p.c., x, Aumann and Maschler define an *objection* by i against j to x as the proposal of a new i.r.p.c., y, based on a new coalition (i, k), such that i and k do better in y than in x. They define a *counter-objection* to y by j against i as still another i.r.p.c., z, in which j does at least as well as in x and k does at least as well as in y. Then they define an i.r.p.c. as *stable* if, for each objection by an i against j, j has a counter-objection against i. Presumably, if j has no counter-objection, he is receiving more than he can legitimately hope for in the original i.r.p.c. and i is receiving less. Hence one cannot expect the coalition supporting it to last.

[7] Robert J. Aumann and Michael Maschler, "The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games," in M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley, and A. W. Tucker (eds.), *Advances in Game Theory* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, Annals of Mathematical Studies #52, 1964). This paper defines a bargaining set, M; a simpler (and here equivalent) set is $M_1^{(i)}$, which is discussed in M. Davis and M. Maschler, "Existence of Stable Payoff Configurations for Cooperative Games," *Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society*, 69 (1963), 106–108. See also Michael Maschler, *The Inequalities that Determine the Bargaining Set* $M_1^{(i)}$, (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, Research Program in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics, Research Memorandum #17, January, 1966, mimeographed).

But if, for every objection of i, j has a counter-objection, and vice versa, both are receiving their quota which perhaps accurately reflects their bargaining strengths. Hence, presumably, neither has any reason to depart from a stable i.r.p.c. once it is arrived at. Hence the set of stable i.r.p.c.'s or bargaining set, as Aumann and Maschler call it, is similar to a solution and is indeed the set T with the following division added: (0, 0, 0).

To illustrate by reference to the game under consideration here, suppose 1 and 2 have arrived at a division, $x = (2.00, 2.00, 0)$. Player 2, who, as we know from T, is receiving less than he might expect, has an objection against 1 in $y = (0, 2.50, 3.50)$, which satisfies the definition of an objection because 2 and 3 both get more in y than in x. Player 1 cannot, however, make a counter objection. To do so he must keep \$2.00 for himself and offer 3 at least \$3.50, which is impossible since the (1, 3) coalition can make only \$5.00. Thus x is unstable in the sense that if 1 and 2 dispute the division, 2 can obtain more elsewhere, while 1 cannot. On the other hand, suppose 1 and 2 have reached an $x = (1.50, 2.50, 0)$ which is in T and hence presumably stable. Suppose further that 2 offers the objection $y = (0, 2.75, 3.25)$, which also satisfies the definition of an objection because 2 and 3 get more in y than in x. Clearly here 1 has a counter-objection of, for example, $z = (1.50, 0, 3.50)$ which satisfies the definition because 1 receives at least as much in z as in x and 3 receives more in z than in y. Conversely, suppose 1 instead of 2 objected to $x = (1.50, 2.50, 0)$ with a $y' = (1.75, 0, 3.25)$. Then 2 would have the counter-objection $z' = (0, 2.50, 3.50)$. By a similar argument it can be shown that 1 or 2 have counter objections to every departure from $x = (1.50, 2.50, 0)$ for the (1, 2) coalition and also that the i.r.p.c.'s (1.50, 0, 3.50) and (0, 2.50, 3.50) are themselves stable. Hence, T is the bargaining set.[8]

[8] Both the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution and the Aumann-Maschler bargaining set each differ from T by the inclusion of certain formal possibilities. As previously noted, the solution contains an infinity of additional and here institutionally impossible imputations. The bargaining set contains the i.r.p.c., $x = (0, 0, 0)$, which arises when three single member coalitions or one three member coalition occur. It is included in the bargaining set only because the formal requirements of the definition of objections and stability require it. Since the additional imputations in the solution and the additional i.r.p.c. in the bargaining set are there for reasons of formal completeness rather than because they express some concept of stability, T may be regarded as the solution to this game with its particular institutional setting.

II. THE SUBJECTS IN THE EXPERIMENTS

A major methodological criticism of small group experiments is that subjects are often chosen from what may be an atypical set, persons in beginning psychology courses. To minimize this criticism, we chose subjects in several different ways:

I. The first group consisted of 28 businessmen who were chosen at random (with very few refusals) from among those enrolled in night courses at the University of Rochester School of Business Administration. They ranged in age from 25 to 60 with the modal point in the mid-thirties. In occupation they varied widely. The most exalted was a department head in the largest local corporation; the least, a mailman. The occupations most heavily represented were junior executives and engineers who had recently assumed management responsibilities.

None of the subjects recognized the names of any of the other when presented with a list at the beginning of the experiments; but as the experiments progressed over a period of four weeks, subjects frequently recognized each other as classmates and on several occasions subjects employed by the largest local company recognized each other as persons they had seen in the corridors of its buildings. In one case, two subjects recognized each other from a previous business contact. In general, these subjects did not get to know each other well during the course of the experiment. They played either just before or just after the class in which they were enrolled and were generally quite eager to leave the experimental session.

Another major methodological criticism of, especially, studies of games is that the size of the stakes on each trial have often not been large enough to elicit thoughtful and truly competitive play. To minimize this criticism, we set the stakes so that subjects could win a maximum of about \$4.00 and an average of about \$1.80 for three-quarters of an hour of work. This was enough to make the game interesting to people of the financial status of these subjects, without presuming to compensate them at a rate which itself became a motivation for participation. We do not know whether this incentive worked because they needed the money (as a few occasionally but perhaps deceitfully said) or because as businessmen monetary profit had become a kind

of general incentive to them. Only one, a law student-grocery clerk, expressed disdain for the monetary stake; all the rest seemed genuinely interested in winning as much as they could.

None of the members of this group grasped the significance of the set T even after they had played several times. (The maximum number of plays per subject was seven and the mode was three.) At their last play subjects were asked what they thought "should be" the division in each of the possible coalitions. None gave the set T as an answer; most said they just didn't know.

II. The second group of subjects were 25 male sophomores at the University of Rochester chosen at random from the list of students in the sophomore class. About half of those initially invited refused to play or dropped out after one session and were replaced with others also chosen at random from the sophomore class.

These subjects were asked to identify all of the other subjects in the group whom they knew. All groups were constructed so that, for all pairs in each group of three, each member of the pair professed not to know the other by name. (This rule had to be broken with respect to one subject, a prominent football player whose name was known to nearly every other subject. In this case, we matched him with people whom he said he did not know by name and who professed not to know him personally.) As in the case of the businessmen, however, it turned out that some of the subjects were slightly acquainted. In several instances they recognized each other as people who had been in the same classes or lived in the same dormitory.

Since most of these students lived on campus, it was not surprising that they became acquainted socially through the medium of the experiments. We were often informed that subjects discussed the game and the experiment with each other and with non-subjects frequently in the course of the two months that the experiments were going on. Several subjects were close friends; and, while of course they never played with each other, naturally they discussed their individual experiences in experimental sessions.

Most of the members of this group who stayed with the project indicated that the size of the stake was an incentive. Many times in the course of negotiations subjects uttered remarks like. "I need money for this weekend," or "I'm short of cash just now," or in one extreme instance, when a subject in the 2 position was offered \$1.00, he replied "I'd like to walk out of here with a buck and a quarter 'cause I have to take the bus home in a few minutes. I don't have any change," thereby indicating he needed the extra quarter for bus fare.

A few members of this group grasped the significance of the set T from the very beginning. In one case a subject in an interview during his first play answered the question: "What are you going to offer Mr. B [2]?" by remarking, "Well, I guess B is supposed to get \$2.50 and C is supposed to get \$3.50 and A is supposed to get \$1.50." The experimenter replied offhandedly, "That's one theory about how it is supposed to turn out. How did you arrive at these numbers?" The subject answered, "I solved the simultaneous equations." By the end of the experiment, most subjects knew about the set T either by reason of self-discovery or because it had been explained to them in a neogtiation period or in a dormitory bull session.

III. The third group of subjects consisted of 47 male sophomores and juniors at the University of Rochester recruited by means of a story in the student newspaper asking for volunteers. While the people in the second group were distributed in college majors about in accordance with the numerical strengths of the departments in the college, this third group had a disproportionate number of majors in the social sciences, especially political science, and in mathematics. It even contained one who was a major in both.

As in the case of subjects in group II, the subjects in group III were assigned to experimental groups in such a way that no persons who professed to know each other by name were matched together. But also as in group II, the subjects discussed the game with each other privately, probably more frequently and in greater detail than any other set, for these subjects showed by far the greatest interest in the game.

While the size of the stake was an incentive for group III subjects in the same way as for group II, it was not as significant in motivation for group III subjects as were some other factors. As volunteers, they wanted to play partly for the sake of playing and winning. The subjective impression of the experimenter was that, of the three groups, the average level of interest among participants was by far the highest in group III. One objective indication of this fact was that we had far less trouble with absentees in the group III sessions than in the other two. Furthermore, there were only a few subjects in groups I and II who were deeply ego-involved, who regarded this game as a private indication of whether

or not they could succeed in life. In group III, however, by my subjective estimate, perhaps as many as one-fourth of the subjects were deeply ego-involved. As might be expected, this was especially true of the political science majors.

In this group at least six subjects had solved the simultaneous equations before their first experimental session and very soon all the subjects were aware of the significance of the set T. In the negotiation sessions subjects frequently discussed T, although they showed no significantly greater propensity to arrive at divisions in T than had the other two groups.

Despite our care in selecting subjects in different ways, it turned out that the differences in behavior among these groups were not significant for solution theory.

III. THE CONDUCT OF THE EXPERIMENTS

At the beginning of each experiment subjects attended a briefing session at which they were given a description of the experiment consisting of:

1. The characteristic function of the game.

2. The arrangements for negotiation, which were: There are three rounds of conversations, where each round consists of a conversation between 1 and 2, between 1 and 3, between 2 and 3 in that order. The conversations in the first round are five minutes each although they may be terminated by common consent earlier. The conversations of the second and third rounds are three minutes each and may also be terminated earlier. (In the third experiment, there were only two rounds of conversations in which each conversation might last up to five minutes.)

3. The arrangments for voting and payment, which were: At the end of the conversations the experimenter asks each person privately if he has formed a coalition and, if so, how the payoff is to be distributed within the coalition. If two players agree on their answers to these questions and if their answers are compatible with the value of the coalition, the experimenter pays each person in the coalition the appropriate amount.

The conversations were conducted in a seminar room with a microphone and tape recorder in plain view and the experimenter and an assistant present. It did not appear that subjects were inhibited in the slightest by the presence of the recorder. Often in the heat of argument their vocabulary became barracks-like. They were to some degree, however, conscious of the experimenter, making joking remarks like "We want to get as much as we can out of the Political Science department." Whether or not my presence inhibited them, I cannot say.

Subjects not in a particular conversation were asked to remain in an office several doors away until called for another conversation. In groups II and III subjects thus "in storage" were interviewed about what they planned to do in the next conversation.

Considerable care was taken to be sure that all pairs of subjects matched together did not know each other by name. No subjects were ever matched together twice, so that subjects could be assured that they would not again face either of the other two players in this social setting. (It seems to me possible that subjects might behave quite differently if they expected to face each other again; but this is a problem for subsequent investigation.) Hence up to the moment that the play began, most subjects were completely anonymous to each other and could expect to remain so if they chose.

But while considerable effort was expended on keeping the subjects unknown to each other up to the moment play began, no effort was made to restrict the acquaintances formed during the play or to inhibit subsequent discussion of the game. After each play the experimenter and his assistants commented on the course of the play with the subjects, usually discussing what the loser might have done to become a winner and what incidents were crucial to the winners becoming such. Furthermore, the subjects were encouraged to discuss the game with friends who were also subjects and with acquaintances made during the course of the experiment. Subjects were usually eager to do so. I recall one occasion in which subjects who had produced a "round-robin," where 1 voted for 2, 2 voted for 3 and 3 voted for 1 so that no one won anything, were still arguing in the vestibule when I left the building an hour after their match had occurred.

The justification for this stance of insisting on anonymous opponents but encouraging discussion of the game is twofold. In the first place, to eliminate considerations outside the game (i.e., problems of how to live with an opponent in the future), it is necessary that opponents be initially unacquainted or very well acquainted.[9] But, in the second place, this is a very complex game, at least as complex as poker and in my opinion more complex.

[9] William H. Riker and Richard Niemi, "Anonymity and Rationality in the Essential Three-Person Game," *Human Relations*, 17 (1964), 131–141.

TABLE 1. OUTCOMES OF TRIALS

Trial Number	Position Number			Trial Number	Position Number			Trial Number	Position Number		
	1	2	3		1	2	3		1	2	3
GROUP I				32	1.50	0	3.50	29	0	2.50	3.50
1	0	2.00	4.00	33	0	2.40	3.60	30	0	2.75	3.25
2	0	2.75	3.25	GROUP II				31	1.25	0	3.75
3	0	2.25	3.75	1	1.50	2.50	0	32	1.30	0	3.70
4	1.50	0	3.50	2	2.00	0	3.00	33	0	2.75	3.25
5	2.00	2.00	0	3	0	3.00	3.00	34	0	2.50	3.50
6	0	2.20	3.80	4	0	1.00	5.00	35	0	0	0
7	1.00	0	4.00	5	0	3.00	3.00	36	0	2.50	3.50
8	0	2.40	3.60	6	0	2.75	3.25	37	0	2.75	3.25
9	1.75	2.25	0	7	0	2.40	3.60	38	1.50	2.50	0
10	1.50	0	3.50	8	1.00	3.00	0	39	0	2.50	3.50
11	2.00	0	3.00	9	2.50	1.50	0	40	1.75	0	3.25
12	2.00	2.00	0	10	0	2.00	4.00	41	1.60	0	3.40
13	1.25	0	3.75	11	0	3.00	3.00	42	0	2.25	3.75
14	0	3.00	3.00	12	0	2.50	3.50	43	0	2.25	3.75
15	0	2.75	3.25	13	0	2.50	3.50	44	0	2.60	3.40
16	1.00	3.00	0	14	0	2.00	4.00	45	0	2.25	3.75
17	0	3.00	3.00	15	1.25	2.75	0	46	1.40	2.60	0
18	1.00	0	4.00	16	0	2.50	3.50	47	0	2.75	3.25
19	0	3.00	3.00	17	1.60	0	3.40	48	0	2.60	3.40
20	1.50	2.50	0	18	0	3.00	3.00	49	1.75	0	3.25
21	1.25	0	3.75	19	1.25	0	3.75	50	1.50	2.50	0
22	1.75	0	3.25	20	0	0	0	51	1.50	0	3.50
23	1.50	2.50	0	GROUP III				52	1.00	0	4.00
24	0	2.00	4.00	21	1.50	2.50	0	53	0	2.35	3.65
25	2.00	2.00	0	22	0	2.50	3.50	54	1.25	0	3.75
26	0	2.50	3.50	23	1.50	0	3.50	55	0	2.25	3.75
27	0	2.40	3.60	24	1.25	0	3.75	56	1.70	0	3.30
28	2.00	2.00	0	25	1.40	2.60	0	57	1.25	0	3.75
29	1.45	0	3.55	26	0	2.00	4.00	58	0	2.45	3.55
30	0	0	0	27	1.50	0	3.50	59	1.25	0	3.75
31	1.50	2.50	0	28	1.35	0	3.65	60	0	0	0

One can hardly be expected to play it well without intensive thought about its possibilities. To obtain sophisticated play, therefore, it is necessary to encourage discussion. The chief objection that might be raised to outside discussion is that subjects do become sophisticated. If this were a study in learning theory, the objection would be valid. But we are not studying learning. Speaking normatively about the observation of the political world, one is less interested in naive participants' behavior than in sophisticated participants' behavior. And so it is here: we want sophisticated subjects. One expects beginners to make mistakes—the two bizarre results in Table I (II, 4; and II, 9) occurred in matches in which at least a majority of the subjects were playing for the first time. But more experienced subjects can be expected to play their positions for all they are "worth." For this reason, I encouraged extended discussion of the game.

IV. OUTCOMES

The outcome of the experiment is set forth in Table 1. As even the most casual inspection of it indicates, subjects did not usually arrive at a division in T. In fact, they did so only about one-fourth of the time, or 22 instances out of 93. Nevertheless, T acted as a constraint for, as Table 2 indicates, the subjects appear to have selected divisions which vary randomly around divisions in T. The average amount won, when player i was a winner, is almost exactly the quota for i. Furthermore, the averages are about the same in all three experimental groups, both those in which the subjects knew about T and that in which they did not. Hence, T clearly acted as a constraint, re-

gardless of whether or not players were conscious of it and even though divisions in T did not occur significantly more frequently among those who were sophisticated.

These outcomes are quite similar to those obtained by Maschler.[10] In an experiment with 89 games, each played just once, there were 10 games essentially similar to the one studied here, in the sense that each player had a positive quota and $v(i, j, k) \leq \max v(i, j)$. (These were his games numbered 1, 2, 6, 7, 11, 12, 15, 16, 30, 31.) In two of these a division in the bargaining set was arrived at, while in eight there were deviations of about the same degree as in my experiments. The only significant difference between Maschler's results and mine is that in seven of his eight cases of deviation, a concession was made by the stronger player, while in my matches the weaker conceded somewhat more frequently. While I cannot, of course, be experimentally sure of my diagnosis, I attribute this result to a minor institutional difference: Maschler's subjects bargained in triads, mine in dyads. In triadic bargaining there is complete information about each proposal by each player and thus the strongest is always subjected to the social pressure of the two weaker to moderate his demands. In dyadic bargaining information is, however, incomplete and hence the strongest is in a position to exploit his strength.

Just how the set T acted as a constraint in my experiments may be visualized thus. Suppose that players decide to adopt an obvious standard other than T. One such standard was an equal split (which was usually discussed but actually occurred only 11 out of 89 times, or about one-eighth). This results in a set,

$$T' = \begin{Bmatrix} (2.00, 2.00, 0) \\ (2.50, 0, 2.50) \\ (0, 3.00, 3.00) \end{Bmatrix}$$

As is immediately apparent from an inspection of T', only the (2, 3) coalition could be expected to occur if this rule of division were universally adopted. While many subjects did not understand T, most of them understood the disasterous effect on 1 of T'. Hence almost all subjects in the 1 position rejected $x = (2.00, 2.00, 0)$ or $y = (2.50, 0, 2.50)$. x occurred four times and y never; and in negotiations, while x and (less frequently) y were often used as starting points (usually by 2 and 3 to indicate a lack of greed), they were seldom treated seriously by any player. Since 1 usually rejected x and y, 2 and 3 were of course inclined to raise their expectations in the directions of T.

TABLE 2. AVERAGE WINNINGS IN EACH POSITION

		Col 1	Col 2	Col 3
		Total Winnings	Number of Matches Won	Average Col 1 + Col 2
Player 1				
Group	I	29.45	19	1.55
	II	11.10	7	1.59
	III	28.50	20	1.42
Total		69.05	46	1.50
Player 2				
Group	I	53.40	22	2.42
	II	39.40	16	2.46
	III	57.20	23	2.49
Total		150.00	61	2.46
Player 3				
Group	I	81.15	23	3.53
	II	52.50	15	3.50
	III	117.30	33	3.55
Total		250.95	71	3.53

Once one rejects the obvious standard of equal division, it is necessary to find another standard. Subjects frequently debated about what was a "fair" division, almost always meaning by "fair" a division that recognized that 3 was stronger than 2 and 2 stronger than 1. In 75 of the 89 cases in which a coalition was reached, the subjects displayed an agreement that the quota of 3 ought to be greater than the quota of 2 and the quota of 2 greater than the quota of 1. They did not of course always arrive finally at the true quota, although in a very large proportion of the trials some division in T was at least seriously discussed and usually agreed to by the subjects either provisionally or finally, i.e., in 85 out of 93 instances. Sometimes they consciously rejected the quota in order to exploit an advantage in the dyadic situation of bargaining. More frequently subjects who felt themselves weak (either because of the rules or because of the previous course of negotiations) proposed a deviation from a division in T simply in order to win an ally, an event that often occurred

[10] Michael Maschler, *Playing an n-Person Game: An Experiment* (Princeton University, Econometric Research Program, Research Memorandum No. 73, 1 February 1965).

even when all the subjects were conscious of T. But almost always they agreed that 3 should get between $3.00 and $4.00, 2 between $2.00 and $3.00 and 1 between $1.00 and $2.00. Not surprisingly, the quotas of $3.50, $2.50, and $1.50 are the midpoints of these agreed upon ranges. Presumably they were driven toward these midpoints by the kind of considerations involved in the intuitive justification of the solution and the bargaining set.

Despite this rationale which almost all the subjects arrived at, Lieberman has suggested that T′ (or equal division) is a "natural" division and has experimental evidence to substantiate his argument. He used a game with the following characteristic function:

$$v(1) = -6¢;\ v(2) = -8¢;\ v(3) = -10¢;$$
$$v(1, 2) = 10¢;\ v(1, 3) = 8¢;\ v(2, 3) = 6¢;$$
$$v(1, 2, 3) = 0$$

of which the set comparable to T is

$$U = \begin{Bmatrix} (6, 4, -10) \\ (6, -8, 2) \\ (-6, 4, 2) \end{Bmatrix}$$

and the set comparable to T′ is

$$U' = \begin{Bmatrix} (5, 5, -10) \\ (4, -8, 4) \\ (-6, 3, 3) \end{Bmatrix}.$$ [11]

In his experiments, divisions in U occurred only 32 out of 297 times that coalitions formed, i.e., about one-tenth, while divisions in U′ occurred 182 times or about six-tenths. How is one to explain the remarkable difference between his results and Maschler's and mine? I think the answer probably lies in the difference of institutional settings of the game. In the first place, Lieberman's subjects played quickly for pennies so that they had little incentive to think seriously about the game. In the second place, his subjects, while presumably face-to-face, were allowed to communicate only by notes and apparently only briefly. As a consequence, they probably did not have an adequate opportunity to recognize the mathematical complexities of the solution, U. And so, in the absence of the opportunity to explore the remarkably complex game they were playing, they chose the immediately most obvious path of equal division. His subjects were Harvard undergraduates and I think it is not likely that they were less intelligent than my subjects from Rochester (city and University).

Strong evidence that we can disregard Lieberman's results as the artifact of particular and restrictive institutions is provided by an examination of the distribution of outcomes I obtained. If his contention were correct that an equal division is natural, one would then expect in my experiments:

(1) that equal divisions in (1, 2), (1, 3), and (2, 3) coalitions would occur with the same frequency as (1, 2), (1, 3) and (2, 3) coalitions occur; and

(2) that in a frequency distribution of deviations from the quota of the stronger in a pair of winners, there would be a secondary modal point at the point of equal division.

In fact, neither expectation is met. While $x = (2.00, 2.00, 0)$ occurred 4 times and $y = (0, 3.00, 3.00)$ occurred 7 times, $z = (2.50, 0, 2.50)$ never occurred, although (1, 3) occurred 28 out of 89 times.[12] Since x and y involve deviations of $50¢$ from the quota, which often occurred in other connections, while z involves a deviation of $1.00, which seldom occurred, the fact that subjects could tolerate x and y but not z suggests that they regarded the equal divisions that did occur as part of the appropriate bargaining around T rather than as another distinct standard.[13] Nor is the second expectation met for, as Figure 1 indicates, there is no secondary mode at the point of equal division. In this figure, the equal divisions appear as 11 of the 13 instances at the $-50¢$ point.

As such they seem to be no more than the normal deviation around values in T, comparable to the eleven instances in which the stronger player obtained a $+50¢$ advantage. Certainly these eleven equal divisions do not suggest a secondary modal point.

[11] Bernhardt Lieberman, "Experimental Studies of Conflict in Some Two and Three Person Games," in J. H. Criswell, et al. (eds.), *Mathematical Methods in Small Group Processes* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962) and "i-Trust: A Notion of Trust in Three Person Games and International Affairs," Research Memorandum SP-105-R (State University of New York at Stony Brook, October, 1963).

[12] Incidentally, equal divisions never occurred in trials with Group III subjects, who were our most sophisticated players.

[13] In Lieberman's experiments divisions comparable to x and y both occur well over half the time that the coalitions (1, 2) and (2, 3) occurred, while the division comparable to z occurs much less than half the time (1, 3) occurs. Presumably his subjects also sensed the inadequacy of U′ when it arose for them in its most extreme form.




FIG. 1. Frequency of deviations from quota of stronger member in a winning coalition.

If we can therefore disregard Lieberman's result as obvious artifacts of the institutions of his experiments, the results reported here strongly suggest that T is a solution in a behavioral as well as a mathematical sense.

V. STRATEGIES

Although T seems to be a behavioral solution if we regard deviations from T as random variations, we are nevertheless left with the question of why the deviations occurred. We have a solution and we can be certain that the solution, whether recognized or not, constrains experienced players even if they are unsophisticated. But we do not know why the solution fails to be as severe a constraint as the intuitive arguments for it would lead us to expect. In short, why do not divisions in T invariably occur?

The answer is, I believe, that in some positions subjects quite regularly shaved off their expectations from their quota in order to buy the allegiance of a potential ally.[14] Had these negotiations been conducted outside of time (i.e., in the abstract and eternal world of mathematics) so that all the force of the intuitive arguments for the solution could operate, probably such devices as shaving would not work. But necessarily real negotiations, as distinct from mathematical expectations about negotiations, are in time and this fact deeply influences the process.

In order to convey some sense of the effect of this process of shaving (and the concomitant attractiveness of T), I quote at some length from the protocol of a typical match among sophisticated and experienced subjects, number III, 46. In the first round of conversations the following agreements had been arrived at:

		Receipts of 1	2	3
	1	—	2.50	3.00
Offers by	2	1.50	—	3.65
	3	2.00	2.35	—

which is to be read as agreements between 1 and 2 for $x = (1.50, 2.50, 0)$, between 1 and 3 for $y = (2.00, 0, 3.00)$, and between 2 and 3 for $z = (0, 2.35, 3.65)$. In the first conversation of the second round (between 1 and 2), 1 asked what 2 and 3 had agreed on. 2 responded (truthfully) and concluded:

2. "I'm somewhat satisfied with our . . . our coalition the way it stands now" [as well 2 might be, for 3 had offered him less than 1 had]. [Note: three periods indicate a long pause, not the omission of words.]

1. "With one-fifty, two-fifty?"

2. "Yeah"

1. "What did he tell you our coalition was?"

[14] The strategy of shaving the quota should not be confused with what Siegel and Fouraker have called the "level of aspiration." See Fouraker, *op. cit.*; and Sidney Siegel, "Levels of Aspiration and Decision-Making" *Psychological Review*, 64 (1957), 253–262. The level of aspiration is a combination of individual utilities and available rewards. The notion of shaving the quota says nothing about individual utilities for outcomes inasmuch as I assume, correctly in most trials of this game, that subjects have an overriding utility for winning (disregarding particular amounts) as against losing. Rather, the strategy of shaving is a purely instrumental device for winning.

2. "Uh . . . three, two, I think, something like that."

1. "That's what it was. Uh, well, I'll tell you, I think we could come to a better coalition and, ah, ah, I'm willing to take a dollar and a quarter and I'll give you two seventy-five. [1 has grasped the opportunity presented by 3's greediness with 2 in the first round and is now offering a shutout bid.] I think you'll be willing because, ah, I don't think he'll give you more than that . . . more than that."

2. "Now this coalition you're going to make is two seventy-five, one twenty-five?"

1. "Yeah."

2. "What . . . what will you be doing if you're taking a coalition where . . . where you get so little? [Here 2 is expressing the fear which is appropriate in the justification of the solution: How can 2 trust 1 when 1 appears to act against his own interest? Presumably 2 fears that 1 is preparing to set him (2) up so that he will expect a large amount from 3 and perhaps fail to form an agreement with 3, while at the same time 1 and 3 will agree on, e.g., $y=(1.50, 0, 3.50)$]

1. "I want to make a coalition with you."

2. "Uh . . . and what makes you think that you won't get one with him?"

1. "Uh . . . because I don't think he'll go less than . . . ."

2. " . . . the coalition he has with me?"

1. "Yeah."

2. " . . . as I see it now, he expects to get three sixty-five from me. Uh . . . he'll want that three sixty-five, let's say, it still lets you make a coalition with him for one thirty-five which is ten cents more than the coalition with me. . . ." [Thus 2 continues to disbelieve 1's offer.]

1. "Well, I see. Uh. . . . But what I'm trying to do is safeguard myself. I really don't think you'll get any more than that [i.e., 2.75]. . . .

2. " . . . well, you know, now I'm getting . . . if I make this coalition that you just proposed, I'll be getting two seventy-five, you'll be getting a dollar . . . a dollar . . . a dollar and a quarter."

1. "Right."

2. "And that . . . that's a coalition that you want to safeguard and then see what you can do with him, in other words." [This is 2's most direct and forceful statement of his suspicions.]

1. "I will, yes."

2. "Um . . . ."

1. "I doubt if I'll get that [i.e., presumably something in excess of $1.25] from him . . . . See, the point is he may offer you more . . . you have more money to work with between the two of you." [1 is here trying to make his offer believable.]

2. "O.K. . . . oh . . . I came into this game with certain expectations of what I wanted in each position. [2 had solved the simultaneous equations.] Uh . . . and that [i.e., $2.75] is more than I expected. So I'll give you . . . um . . . a dollar forty."

1. "O.K. A dollar forty and that makes . . . oh . . . two sixty for you?"

2. "Yeah."

They then went through further motions of agreement. The outcomes of all the conversations in the second round were:

		Receipts of		
		1	2	3
	1	0	2.60	3.75
Offers by	2	1.40	0	3.90
	3	1.25	2.10	0

In this round 1 tried to buy 3 with $y=(1.25, 0, 3.75)$, and he was successful in the sense that he set the scene for 2 and 3 to agree on the obviously impossible $z=(0, 2.10, 3.90)$, which neither believed. The voting was:

Votes by i for	1	2	3
1	1.40	2.60	0
2	1.40	2.60	0
3	1.25	0	3.75

so that (1, 2) won.

This protocol displays both of the significant forces that appeared in most trials. One player (here 1) tried to shut out the absent player with a high offer. This is what I have called "shaving the quota." The recipient (here 2) expressed some doubt, if the offer was "too high" with respect to other amounts which had been mentioned in the previous negotiation, and forced the agreement back to something close to the quota. This is the force of T in this game.

Of the two forces, i.e., shaving the quota and the quota itself, shaving appears to be the more powerful, as indicated by the fact that far more of the outcomes embodied shaving than the quota, although even when shaving occurred the quota had, as in this match, a significant effect on the actual outcome. Indeed shaving the quota is a general strategy which occurred in all but one trial. (See Table 3, *infra*, where trial III-39 is the only one in which all three subjects refused to shave quotas. Item I-28 appears to be such a case

TABLE 3. t_i IN THE ULTIMATE ROUND OF CONVERSATIONS IN EACH TRIAL

Trial No.	t_1	t_2	t_3	Trial No.	t_1	t_2	t_3	Trial No.	t_1	t_2	t_3
GROUP I				32	.98	1.02	1.00	29	.88	1.06	1.10
1	.58	1.20	.88	33	1.04	1.02	.91	30	1.13	.80	.69
2	.42	.95	.69	GROUP II				31	1.04	1.00	.94
3	.83	1.15	1.06	1	1.00	.95	1.06	32	1.03	.98	.97
4	.92	.40	.38	2	1.03	.81	1.19	33	1.00	.95	1.06
5	.83	.40	.50	3	.68	.99	1.24	34	.50	.70	1.13
6	1.13	.96	.86	4	1.07	1.30	.52	35	no coalition		
7	1.20	.16	.25	5	.88	.95	1.00	36	.96	1.03	1.025
8	1.04	.97	.97	6	.99	.96	1.06	37	1.16	.85	.94
9	.37	.35	0	7	.83	1.12	1.10	38	1.04	.95	1.00
10	.92	.40	.38	8	1.06	.80	1.05	39	1.00	1.00	1.00
11	1.00	.80	1.25	9	.66	1.10	1.40	40	1.04	.20	1.00
12	.33	.40	0	10	1.13	.95	.87	41	.90	1.00	1.15
13	1.13	.92	.91	11	.92	.90	1.25	42	1.03	1.05	.94
14	.74	1.02	1.37	12	1.02	.98	.99	43	1.04	1.05	.88
15	.33	1.05	.69	13	.96	1.00	1.06	44	.99	.98	1.04
16	1.00	.72	1.00	14	1.04	1.15	.75	45	1.06	1.01	.90
17	.75	1.00	1.32	15	1.04	.88	1.09	46	1.06	1.06	.84
18	1.08	.98	.90	16	1.07	.96	.94	47	.92	.95	1.19
19	.33	1.00	1.06	17	1.08	.95	.95	48	.97	.96	1.11
20	1.07	1.03	.89	18	.83	1.00	1.25	49	.96	.90	1.19
21	1.08	.95	.81	19	1.08	1.00	.88	50	.96	.95	1.13
22	1.00	.25	.44	20	no coalition			51	1.09	.89	1.00
23	data unavailable			GROUP III				52	1.06	1.03	.88
24	.96	1.15	.875	21	1.02	1.05	.91	53	1.02	1.01	.96
25	.92	1.00	1.00	22	1.12	.90	.94	54	1.12	.90	.94
26	1.50	1.00	.63	23	1.17	.85	.94	55	.83	1.05	1.19
27	.98	1.00	1.04	24	1.12	.95	.88	56	.96	1.00	1.05
28	1.00	1.00	1.00	25	1.02	.93	1.06	57	1.12	.90	.94
29	1.01	1.00	.99	26	1.00	1.05	.94	58	1.01	1.00	.99
30	no coalition			27	1.04	.90	1.06	59	1.13	.80	1.06
31	1.00	1.05	.94	28	.96	.98	.91	60	no coalition		

also but it is simply an accident of balanced shaving by each person.) And subjects who used the strategy of shaving in forming a winning coalition were significantly more successful than those who did not.

One way to measure whether or not a player is using a strategy of shaving the quota is to compare his offers to his opponents with the quotas for their positions. Signifying the sum of a player's offers by "Σo_i" and the sum of the quotas for the recipients of the offers by "Σq_j", then the ratio, t_i, where

$$t_i = \sum o_i / \sum q_j, \qquad j \neq i$$

is the ratio of the sum of the offers given by i to sum of the recipients' quotas. If $t_i > 1$, player i is certainly following the policy of shaving his quota. If, for no i, does $t_i \geqq 1$, the player for which t_i is highest is probably shaving his quota with at least one other player.

Using t_i it is possible to show that those who shaved their quotas were significantly more successful than those who did not. One hypothesis is that in each match the subject with the highest ratio, t_i, is one of the winners. The relevant data is set forth in Table 3. By comparing Table 1 with Table 3, it is apparent that, in the 88 usable cases, the subject with the highest t_i won 68 times, a difference from expectation that is significant at the .05 level.[15] (The null hypothesis is, of course, that the subject with the highest t_i wins two-thirds of the time.) Since more than one subject may be systematically attempting to follow the quota-shaving strategy, a more informative hypothesis is that the subject with the lowest t_i, that is the one who is presumably manipulated by the other two, is the loser. Again out

[15] $\chi^2 = 4.42$.

of 88 cases, the subject with the lower t_i lost 40 times, a difference from expectation that is somewhat more significant (at the .02 level).[16] (The null hypothesis is that the subject with the lowest t_i loses one-third of the time.)

An even more striking demonstration of the success of the strategy of shaving one's quota is afforded by examination of the results for player 1. As is apparent from Table 2, player 1, while theoretically equal to the other two in his chance of winning, was placed at a disadvantage by the institutional arrangements of this game. In each round of three conversations, 1 was present in the first and second and absent from the third. Very often in the last conversation of the game players 2 and 3 formed a coalition which each trusted simply because each knew that the other would not talk to 1 again. Thus, player 1 was a winner only 46 times, while players 2 and 3 won 61 and 71 times respectively. In general, it is true, therefore, that 1 was a winner only if he played very well or if 2 and 3 were unable to agree. (These are not always independent considerations, for if 1 played well, he often forced 2 and 3 to a contretemps.)[17] Hence it should be the case that, if t_1 is high, 1 should win, and if t_1 is low or medium, 1 should lose. It is expected that t_1 be high one third of the time, that 1 win two thirds of the time, that t_1 be low or medium two thirds and that 1 lose one third. The conditions of the hypothesis are therefore expected to occur thus:

$$\left(\frac{1.2}{3\ 3}\right) + \left(\frac{2.1}{3\ 3}\right) = 4/9,$$

which is about 39 times out of 88. In fact, however, the conditions were met 58 times, a difference that is significant at the .001 level.[18]

Something of the same considerations hold for player 2. The hypothesis that, if t_2 is high or medium, 2 wins, and if t_2 is low, 2 loses is significantly different from a priori expectations at about the .05 level.[19] Or, since the medium t_2 cases are confusing in the sense that the theory set forth here says nothing about them, we can limit consideration to those cases in which t_2 is either high or low. Then for the hypothesis that, if t_2 is high, 2 wins, and if t_2 is low, 2 loses, the difference between observation and expectation is slightly higher.[20]

Clearly, however, if both 1 and 2 follow the strategy of shaving their quotas, they have to shave them in favor of somebody, typically 3. Hence it is not to be expected that 3 follow the same strategy. Indeed, for 3, having a high or medium t_3 seems to be independent of winning and having a low t_3 seems independent of losing.[21] Presumably 3, in his institutionally advantageous position, from which he won 71 times out of 88, had merely to wait for 1 and 2 to come to him with offers. But 3 was neverthe-

[16] $\chi^2 = 5.83$.

[17] The mechanism of producing a contretemps is as follows: If player 1 offers both 2 and 3 amounts greater than their quota or even if he offers just one other player his quota and the third more than his quota, he builds up their expectations so that when 2 and 3 face each other in the final conversation they each demand so much they cannot agree. Such disagreement is well illustrated by the course of negotiations in trial III-23 among sophisticated subjects. Proposed divisions are indicated by entries in each player's column.

Conversation Number and and Players	Proposed Division 1	2	3	Comments
1 (1, 2)	1.50	2.50*		
2 (1, 3)	2.00		3.00*	
	1.75*		3.25	
3 (2, 3)		2.00	4.00*	
		2.25	3.75*	
		3.00*	3.00	
4 (1, 2)	1.50	2.50*		
	.50*	3.50		Subjects agree so to vote
5 (1, 3)	1.50*		3.50	
	1.75		3.25*	
	1.50*		3.50	Subjects agree so to vote
6 (2, 3)		2.25	3.75*	
		3.00*	3.00	
		2.25	3.75*	Final offers, no agreement

* Indicates the initiator of the proposal.

As this sequence displays, player 1's dramatic offer in the fourth conversation (which was accompanied by a fervent protestation that, playing in the institutionally weak position 1, he did not want to be left out altogether) simply confirmed player 2 in his attempt (displayed originally in conversation 3) to exact \$3.00 from player 3 in the last conversation. On the other hand, player 1's firm insistence on the quota for player 3 encouraged 3 in his attempt to exact more than \$3.50 from player 2. So 2 and 3 were unable to agree. They wanted in sum \$6.75, while their coalition was worth only \$6.00. Hence 1 and 3 voted for each other at $x = (1.50, 0, 3.50)$ and 2 rather sulkily voted $y = (0, 3.00, 3.00)$, which he knew 3 had not agreed to.

[18] $\chi^2 = 16.41$.

[19] $\chi = 3.81$.

[20] $\chi^2 = 4.00$.

[21] The difference from expectation is $\chi^2 = 1.00$, which few would regard as significant.

less constrained by the set T. In fact, most of the time he was content with his quota or less. In the first place, most offers from 2 to 3 at the end were reasonably close to the quota. In the second place, the quotas determined a range of reasonableness beyond which few players were willing to go. Surprisingly, in only 25 of the 88 cases, did 3 use his advantageous position to demand an excess above his quota of \$3.50. (Typically the excess demanded was 25¢ or 50¢, but in one memorable and successful case it was \$1.50.) In seven of these, 3 adamantly demanded an increase and got it because, as each of the protocols show, 2 had no coalition with 1 and 3 knew it. In the remaining 18 cases, 3 simply asked for a lot on speculation and then settled for something less than he initially demanded, which indicates he was not entirely certain about the relation of 1 and 2. The outcome of these 18 cases demonstrates the force of T:

when 3 demanded	.01–.25	.26–.50	.51 or more	
from 2, he was successful in forming (2, 3) and	6	1	1	cases in
unsuccessful in	1	3	6	cases,

although in seven of the unsuccessful cases he was a winner because he already had a viable coalition with 1.

This result indicates that 3 usually behaved greedily with 2 only when he was already sure of alliance with 1 and that 2 gave in to 3 only when (a) the amount demanded was within the range of "shaving" or (b) both 2 and 3 knew that 2 did not have a coalition with 1.

In the great majority of cases, therefore, 3 either followed a rather passive strategy of accepting slight excesses above his quota or in the exigencies of bargaining adopted a quota-shaving strategy himself. In some cases he did actively attempt to exploit his position by forcing 2 to shave his quota; but then, typically, he found himself severely constrained by T.

The ideal strategy in a mathematical sense is of course to seek a division in T. But subjects did not typically use the ideal strategy in the temporal circumstances of this experiment. Rather they invented and used strategies based both on the institutional arrangements of the play and the mathematical expectations. Subjects in the 1 and 2 positions invented what turned out to be the significantly successful strategy of shaving the quota. Subjects in the 3 position developed a wider variety of successful strategies in addition to shaving the quota, e.g., demanding amounts in excess of their quota in the last conversation with 2 provided they had some assurance that they could fall back on a (1, 3) coalition if 2 proved hard to manipulate. That some of these were more successful than the ideal strategy indicates that the additional rules—necessary to convert an abstract game into a concrete, temporal game—themselves affect behavior. The solution is the consequence of the abstract rules, mainly the characteristic function. The variations from the solution and the multiplication of successful strategies are the consequences of the local institutions of this particular experiment.

VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the beginning of this essay I pointed out that the value for political scientists in the study of games lies in the discovery and verification of solutions and strategies, which are expectations from and manipulations of rules (i.e., institutions), and which thus are in microcosm the objects that political scientists traditionally study.

Concerning expectations or solutions, it was discovered that the mathematical solution, while actually achieved only about one-fourth of the time, was always a severe constraint on behavior in the sense that outcomes seemed to vary randomly around it. This fact should give political scientists confidence that, when it is possible to specify the solution of a political situation, participants are very likely to behave as if they are trying to achieve it or something close to it.

And it is possible in some kinds of political situations to specify solutions. Let us assume that a legislature consists of parties 1, 2, and 3, no one of which can form a government alone. Assume further that a coalition of 1 and 2 can not do very much in legislative or administrative change because the goals of the parties diverge widely, that a coalition of 1 and 3 can do more, and that a coalition of 2 and 3 can do most. Such a situation might be found in India in the future where 1 is the Left, 2 is the Right and 3 is the Center-Right (i.e., Congress). While the naive might assume (as our subjects did) that only (2, 3) would occur, I would predict that (1, 2) or (1, 3) are equally possible provided that ingenious and artistic politicians can find a way to pay, e.g., 2 the quota in (1, 2) that equals its quota in (2, 3). Further, I would predict that any of (1, 2), (1, 3) or (2, 3) might occur, but that, if any one did occur, something approaching a quota for any pair would also occur. Naturally, the specification of a quota is a difficult task; but in the long run success in this task is likely to be far more rewarding than the discovery of, e.g.,

TABLE 4. CONSISTENCY AND INCONSISTENCY IN CHOOSING t_i HIGH OR LOW IN POSITIONS 1 AND 3

	Number of Players	
	Consistent	Inconsistent
Those who played each position at least twice	0	3
Those who played each position at least once and one position twice	4	16
Those who played each position exactly once	8	22
Total	12	41

patterns of recruitment or methods of socialization in a political system. What I am suggesting, therefore, is that political scientists turn away from their preoccupation with the kind of questions posed by Parsons, Easton, and Almond to the kind of questions posed by the analysis offered here.

Concerning strategies, however, the discovery from these experiments was more complex. Given the solution, the mathematically superior strategy is, of course, to seek a division in the solution. But in these experiments the weaker subjects (weaker institutionally in the sense that they were excluded from the last conversation or weaker mathematically in the sense that they had lower quotas) did not typically seek a division in T. Instead the weaker subjects adopted, when successful, an alternative strategy of shaving their quotas. Conversely the strongest subject (in both senses) adopted (apparently randomly) a strategy of accepting an excess when it was offered and of shaving his own quota when it seemed necessary. The best temporal strategy therefore differed from the best abstract strategy, although the temporal strategy was almost always clearly constrained by the abstract one. This fact should inspire political scientists to the continuation of the most important of their traditional functions, which is the explication of the effect of particular rules in occasioning deviations from abstractly expected strategies and solutions.

In any event, these results should assure political scientists that they have a unique function to fulfill. It is often suggested that outcomes of political events are determined by the psychological or sociological characteristics of the participants. Such considerations seem inconsequential in these experiments where quite different kinds of subjects behaved in substantially identical ways and where the same subjects behaved differently in different positions.

As is indicated in Table 4, subjects did not let their psychological predispositions toward high or low aspirations or high or low feeling of dominance (or whatever else might be said to force them to behave similarly in different positions) affect their judgment on the choice of strategy. For the great majority of those who played often enough to establish a record, subjects chose different strategies in different positions. This is shown most dramatically for positions 1 and 3 because in the former a strategy of having a t_1 higher than t_2 and t_3 is usually appropriate while in 3 a strategy of having a t_3 lower than t_2 and t_1 is (somewhat less) usually appropriate. Subjects with rigid personalities whose psyches unconsciously dictated their behavior would, however, presumably behave the same in positions 1 and 3. Our subjects, who seemed rational, usually did not, inasmuch as only 12 of them chose either t_1 high and t_3 high or t_1 low and t_3 low, while 41 of them chose a different strategy in the 1 and 3 positions. I conclude that the crucial determinants of behavior are the subjects' (conscious or unconscious) recognition of the abstract solution and the strategy dictated by the temporal circumstances. This fact suggests that most participants are rational in the sense that they seek to maximize within the rules and that the analysis of the significance of particular rules can add an important something to the study of social behavior over and above the analysis of participants' psyches and their social circumstances.

THE CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND RELIGION

WILLIAM A. CARROLL
Frostburg State College

I. INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court of the United States, whose decisions not only define constitutional law but vitally affect national policy, has long held both an honored and a controversial place in American life. In no area do its decisions bring it more honor or more controversy than in the field of religion; for, as a member of the First Congress under the Constitution said, "the rights of conscience are, in their nature, of peculiar delicacy, and will little bear the gentlest touch of governmental hand. . . ."[1] Thus, the same decision of the Court may be hailed by some as a great landmark in the struggle for religious liberty, and denounced by others as a serious invasion of liberty of conscience. For although it may be pleasant to dream of religion insulated from governmental touch, the dual membership of citizens in the state and in religious bodies insures that conscience and government will touch at some points with inevitable friction, and, to the conscience so touched, it makes little difference whether the governmental hand is that of a local school board, the Congress, or the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Court has recently been attacked as antireligious, or at least as callous to our religious heritage, because of its decisions invalidating a state-prescribed prayer[2] and state-prescribed Bible reading[3] in public schools. The first of these decisions prompted the more excited outcry,[4] but the two, at first singly and then together, have precipitated a renewed debate about the proper constitutional relationship between the state and religion.[5]

Part of the controversy—and even bewilderment[6]—about the Court's position on the church-state problem undoubtedly arises from a basic conflict in the Court's pronouncements on the meaning of the establishment clause of the Constitution. The Court has repeatedly proclaimed its adherence to the definition of the establishment clause first formulated in *Everson* v. *Board of Education*,[7] which in effect calls for an absolute separation of church and state. It has, however, with one possible exception[8] consistently refused to apply, or even to invoke without qualifications, that definition. The Everson definition has thus had two unhappy effects on the discussion of church-state problems in America. It has aroused unnecessary fears in those who are convinced that the Court has embarked upon a policy which is harmful to religion and has at the same time stirred hopes, destined to be disappointed, in those who regard absolute separation of church and state as essential to religious freedom.

Because the main constitutional battle about the meaning of the establishment clause commenced in 1947 with the clause's incorporation into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,[9] it is appropriate that it be discussed in terms of the remarkable series of cases which accompanied and followed the 1947 incorporation. The first part of this paper shows that, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, the Court only fleetingly adhered to the Everson definition of the establishment clause. The second part proposes an understanding of the establishment clause which will complement the free exercise clause, together with a definition of religion for constitutional purposes, to fill the vacuum left by

[1] Representative Daniel Carroll of Maryland during debate upon the proposed Bill of Rights in the First Congress, August 15, 1789, I Annals of Cong. 730. Quoted by Justice Brennan, concurring opinion, *Abington School Dist.* v. *Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203, 231 (1963).

[2] *Engel* v. *Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

[3] *Abington School Dist.* v. *Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

[4] For a good summary of the opposition to this decision see Leo Pfeffer, "Court, Constitution, and Prayer," *Rutgers Law Review*, 16 (Summer, 1962), 735.

[5] E.g., see Edmond Cahn, "On Government and Prayer," *New York University Law Review*, 37 (December, 1962), 981–1000; Erwin W. Griswold, "Absolute Is In The Dark," *Utah Law Review*, 8 (Summer, 1963), 167–182; Pfeffer, *op. cit.*; Paul Ramsey, "How Shall We Sing the Lord's Song In a Pluralistic Land," *Journal of Public Law*, 13 (1964), 353–400.

[6] See Edmond Cahn, "The 'Establishment of Religion' Puzzle," *New York University Law Review*, 36 (November, 1961), 1275.

[7] 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).

[8] *McCollum* v. *Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

[9] In *Everson* v. *Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

the Everson definition. The third part shows that the proposed understanding of the establishment clause encompasses the main course of the Court's decisions interpreting the religion clauses of the Constitution and provides a basis for the settlement of church-state problems not yet adjudicated by the Court.

II. EVERSON DEFINITION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

The Supreme Court's 1947 decision in *Everson* v. *Board of Education* not only broadened the scope of the church-state battle with the incorporation of the establishment clause into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but centered that battle on its definition of the establishment clause. For, in delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice Black gave what he referred to as a minimum definition of the establishment clause —a definition which was so far-reaching as almost to belie the decision itself,[10] which permitted free bus rides for parochial school children. That definition wants to be quoted if its full impact is to be felt.

> The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religous beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever from they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and *vice versa*. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State." . . .[11]

Had the above definition been literally followed in all its provisions, a rigid separation of church and state would have been established, there would indeed have been a "high and impregnable" wall between the two.[12] But the very opinion in which the definition is found qualified and made exceptions to the definition's sweeping language and thus initiated a process which has continued to this day. For although the definition has been repeatedly reaffirmed, every opinion and decision of the Court involving the establishment clause, with the possible exception of McCollum, has in some manner limited the effect of the Everson definition.

Thus, in the Everson opinion Justice Black placed at least three qualifications on the full sweep of the definition. First, he spoke of "public purpose,"[13] and implied that laws intended to serve a public purpose and which incidentally aided religion met the no-establishment test. Second, he insisted upon governmental neutrality in matters of religion.[14] Third, he asserted that the state could not interfere with the free exercise of religion.[15]

The Everson definition was employed a year after its original formulation when the Court, in *McCollum* v. *Board of Education*, held unconstitutional an Illinois statute providing for released-time religious education.[16] The Court, quoting the Everson definition in its entirety, found that the plan embodied unconstitutional aid to religion and unconstitutional cooperation between church and state in violation of the First Amendment as made to apply to the states by the Fourteenth. Unlike the Everson and subsequent opinions interpreting the establishment clause, there is little in the opinion of the Court in the McCollum case to mitigate the rigor of the definition of establishment. The doctrine of McCollum, however, eventually proved untenable and was in effect abandonded in 1952, in the case of *Zorach* v. *Clauson*.[17]

[10] Indeed, Justice Jackson, dissenting, argued that the opinion was inconsistent with the decision and was reminded of "Julia who, according to Byron's reports, 'whispering "I will ne'er consent," -consented'": *ibid.*, 19.

[11] *Ibid.*, 15–16.

[12] For a discussion of the extraordinary sweep of the definition, see John Norton Moore, "The Supreme Court and the Relationship Between the 'Establishment' and 'Free Exercise' Clauses," *Texas Law Review*, 42 (December, 1963) 164–167.

[13] *Everson* v. *Board of Education*, 330, U.S. 1, 5, 7 (1947).

[14] *Ibid.*, 18.

[15] *Ibid.*, 16.

[16] 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

[17] 343 U.S. 306 (1952). As one commentator has said, by the time the Zorach case reached the Court, "It was clear that, as a practical reality, the sweeping decision of 1948 could no longer be lived with": F. William O'Brien, S.J., *Justice*

The Court has steadfastly refused to apply the Everson definition in any subsequent opinion: it has, however, repeatedly proclaimed its adherence to the definition. This seeming paradox has been accomplished by following the original Everson formula almost to the letter: an assertion of a broad separation of church and state through quotation of or reference to the Everson definition, followed by one or more exceptions to the rule. Two of the Court's earlier exceptions—those based on state neutrality in religion and the free exercise of religion—have been retained, while the "public purpose" exception has been replaced by a "secular purpose" exception.

Thus, in upholding a system of released time religious education in New York,[18] which differed essentially from the Illinois plan held unconstitutional in McCollum only in that religious classes were held off public school property, the Court found an exception to the no-aid-to-religion rule in the need to protect the free exercise of religion.[19] Nearly a decade later, in 1961, the Court continued its discussion of the meaning of the establishment clause in the Sunday closing law cases.[20] Chief Justice Warren, delivering the Court's opinion in the first of these cases, quoted in its entirety the Everson definition of the establishment clause, but qualified it by a secular-purpose test: legislation which incidentally aids religion is constitutional if its primary purpose is secular.[21]

The decision of the Court invalidating Maryland's requirement that state officeholders declare their belief in God was based primarily on the free exercise clause.[22] Nevertheless, in delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Black threw some important light on the Court's understanding of the establishment clause, once again quoting the Everson definition and once again qualifying that definition, albeit more subtly. Black declared that government may not aid "religions as against nonbelievers," nor aid "religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs."[23] Presumably, however, so long as the governmental aid does not work against anyone's belief or lack thereof it is constitutional.

The Court's next decision, holding unconstitutional the prescribed recitation of a state-composed prayer,[24] precipitated a great wave of controversy. It is curious that the school-prayer decision should have aroused such strong dissent.[25] For both sides in the Everson-

Reed and the First Amendment: The Religion Clauses (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1958), p. 170.

The preponderance of opinion holds that the Zorach case does embody a significant departure from the philosophy of the Everson case and especially of the McCollum case; e.g., see David Fellman, "Constitutional Law in 1951–1952," this REVIEW, XLVIII (March, 1953), 160–162; Wilber G. Katz, "Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality," *University of Chicago Law Review*, 20 (Spring, 1953), 426–440; George E. Reed, "Church-State and the Zorach Case," *Notre Dame Lawyer*, 27 (Summer, 1952), 529–551; Justices Black, Frankfurter and Jackson, dissenting in *Zorach* v. *Clauson*, 343 U.S. 306, 315–325 (1952). It has, however, been argued that the Zorach case represents no departure from the Everson-McCollum doctrine; e.g., see Joseph H. Brady, *Confusion Twice Confounded: The First Amendment and the Supreme Court* (South Orange, N.J.: Seton Hall University Press, 1954), 184–189.

[18] *Zorach* v. *Clauson*, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

[19] In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Douglas compared—almost equated—the released time program of New York with excusing children from public schools in order to allow them to attend a religious service or to observe a religious holiday: *ibid.*, 313. See Katz, *op. cit.*, p. 428; and Joseph F. Costanzo, S.J., "Federal Aid to Education and Religious Liberty," *University of Detroit Law Journal*, 36 (October, 1958), 37–38.

[20] In *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), and *Two Guys* v. *McGinley*, 366 U.S. 582 (1961), the Court held that the establishment clause as it is made to apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, was not violated by the Sunday laws attacked; in *Braunfeld* v. *Brown*, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), and *Gallagher* v. *Crown Kosher Market*, 366 U.S. 617 (1961), the Court held that neither the establishment nor the free exercise clause, made applicable to the states in the same way, was violated.

[21] See particularly *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420, 444–5, and 449 (1961).

[22] *Torcaso* v. *Watkins*, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). The Court said: "This Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the appellant's freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against him": *ibid.*, 496.

[23] *Ibid.*, 495.

[24] *Engel* v. *Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

[25] For a discussion of why Engel seemed "so clear" to the Court, and why the Court was al-

McCollum debate agreed that the establishment clause forbade an established church or religion and governmental preference for any one religion;[26] they disagreed about the Court's conclusion that the establishment clause went further, that it had erected a wall to separate religion from the state. As Justice Black, in delivering the opinion of the Court, said, "There can be no doubt that New York's state prayer program officially establishes the religious beliefs embodied in the Regents' prayer."[27] Justice Black must have thought the result obvious, for he did not even mention the controversial Everson definition of the establishment clause, although there was one reference to the "constitutional wall of separation between Church and State."[28]

The decision of the Court holding unconstitutional the prescribed devotional reading of the Bible in public schools[29] was inevitable after the decision in Engel, and like that decision is consistent with a narrow view of the establishment clause, namely that government may not prefer one religion over another. It can no longer be said that the Bible is nonsectarian.[30] The opinion of the Court, however, goes much further. Written by Justice Clark, it is a fairly comprehensive compilation and restatement of what the Court had been saying about the establishment clause for almost a quarter of a century, but particularly since 1947. Although Clark does not quote the Everson definition in its entirety, his short quotation includes one of its most restrictive sentences: "Neither [a state nor the Federal Government] can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another."[31] Moreover, he supports this quotation with quotations from the dissents of Justices Jackson and Rutledge in Everson, who thought that the Court had been too lenient in permitting free bus rides for parochial school students. Thus the effect is to enunciate a policy of rigid separation of church and state.

But in the now-time-honored tradition of the Court, the exceptions followed. First, Clark insists that "In the relationship between man and religion the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality."[32] Second, he insists that "The Free Exercise Clause . . . withdraws from legislative power . . . the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion."[33] Third, the Court implies that a secular objective could save a governmental action from condemnation under the establishment clause: "That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."[34] Thus, the establishment clause stands as defined in the Everson definition, qualified by the neutrality, free exercise, and secular objective tests. On the same day the Court supported exemption from general laws on the basis of religious scruples, reversing a South Carolina court's denial of unemployment compensation to a person unwilling, for religious reasons, to work on Saturday.[35]

The Everson definition, simply stated, held that the establishment clause forbids all governmental aid to religion and all contact between government and religion. But, as we have seen, the Court has riddled the wall of separation with so many exceptions that its character as a wall has been destroyed. The "high and impregnable" wall of separation is not merely a metaphor, it is a myth.[36] Since, however, the Court insists upon retaining its myth, it is necessary to examine the exceptions

---

most unanimous, in contrast to some other establishment cases, see Cahn, "On Government and Prayer," 988–989.

[26] To be sure, some scholars had argued that the establishment clause could not reasonably be incorporated into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.g., Edward S. Corwin, "The Supreme Court as National School Board," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 14 (Winter, 1949), 3–22. Fifteen years after that incorporation, *Everson* v. *Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (some would say twenty-one years, *Cantwell* v. *Connecticut*, 310 U.S. 296 [1940]), however, it was a bit late to argue that the establishment clause had not been incorporated, since the Court had never faltered in its holding that it had been incorporated.

[27] *Engel* v. *Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).

[28] *Ibid.*, 425.

[29] *Abington School Dist.* v. *Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

[30] See concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, *ibid.*, 270–271.

[31] *Ibid.*, 216.

[32] *Ibid.*, 226. The word "neutral" or "neutrality" is used or quoted nine times in the opinion, and can be safely said to be the opinion's dominant concern.

[33] *Ibid.*, 222–223.

[34] *Ibid.*, 222.

[35] *Sherbert* v. *Verner*, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

[36] As Professor Fellman has said, "the wall of separation is bound to be quite porous": *Religion in American Public Law* (Boston: Boston University Press, 1965), p. 107.

which have destroyed the wall.

The first exception arises from the requirement of neutrality. If a denial of aid or cooperation would have the effect of preferring one belief or nonbelief over another, the no-aid rule is suspended. This is reasonable, for the essence of an established religion is that it holds a preferred place in the structure of the state. The second exception, the requirement that the free exercise of religion must not be impeded by the definition, is likewise reasonable. For the establishment clause and free exercise clause, appearing as they do in the same amendment, must be considered complementary rather than destructive of each other.

The most recently established exception,[37] which is based on a secular objective, presents more difficulties, however.[38] To be sure, it does permit government to do many worthwhile and even necessary things which might otherwise be challenged under a strict interpretation of the Everson definition. But the secular objective test raises a number of difficult problems. By the use of the word "secular" the Court in effect assumes that religion is defined as referring to belief in God, or at least in the hereafter, for secular is defined as "of or relating to worldly or temporal as distinguished from the spiritual or eternal."[39] In so doing the Court is inconsistent, for in applying the free exercise clause the Court has in effect assumed a definition of religion which does not rest simply on belief in God or the hereafter;[40] the Court has been aware that a definition of religion which does not include nonbelief as well would work against the freedom of conscience of nonbelievers. It is equally true that in applying the establishment clause a definition of religion which does not include nonbelief as well as belief would discriminate against believers. If the Court is correct in assuming that the religion protected by the free exercise clause includes both belief and nonbelief, then the same definition must apply for the establishment clause. It is inconceivable that the word "religion," which actually appears only once in the First Amendment, could have one meaning for the free exercise clause and a different meaning for the establishment clause.

But the danger of the secular objective test is not merely theoretical, lurking in an implied definition of religion. The secular objective test took its toll of the free exercise of religion on the very day it was first enunciated. In two of the Sunday law cases[41] appellants were Orthodox Jews whose faith kept them from working on Saturday and whose states kept them from working on Sunday. But because the laws they challenged had secular objectives the Court refused to recognize that appellants' constitutional right to the free exercise of religion had been impaired. As Justice Brennan, who concurred in the Court's interpretation of the establishment clause but dissented on its interpretation of the free exercise clause, said, "For in this case the Court seems to say, without so much as a deferential nod towards that high place which we have accorded religious freedom in the past, that any substantial state interest will justify encroachments on religious practice, at least if these encroachments are cloaked in the guise of some nonreligious purpose."[42]

[37] This exception was first specifically mentioned by the Court in *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420, 444 (1961). The Court did employ a "public purpose" test to serve as an exception to the definition of the establishment clause when the definition was first formulated: *Everson* v. *Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1, 6, 7 (1947). But a "public purpose" exception is much broader than a "secular objective" exception.

[38] Pfeffer regards the secular objective test as not merely an exception to the Everson definition, but, together with a "secular means" test, as *the* basis of the Court's interpretation of the establishment clause for many years, except for a lapse in Zorach: "Court, Constitution, and Prayer," 744.

[39] *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged.* (Springfield, Massachusetts: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1961).

[40] See *Torcaso* v. *Watkins*, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).

[41] *Braunfeld* v. *Brown*, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); *Gallagher* v. *Crown Kosher Market*, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).

[42] *Braunfeld* v. *Brown*, 366 U.S. 599, 613 (1961). Pfeffer, who supports the secular objective test, admits that it will sometimes have adverse effects on religion. He writes: "In governmental effectuation of its secular purposes, its action may, as an incidental by-product, affect religion, either benefically or detrimentally—indeed, one would assume that this would be generally so—and that fact, the Court has consistently held, does not restrict government in the manner in which it effects its purposes": *op. cit.*, 744. Admittedly, almost any test in this sensitive area may have such incidental effects, but the secular objective test seems to be particularly callous about its harmful effect on the free exercise of religion. Justices Brennan and Stewart were alert in the Sunday law cases to the danger inherent in the secular ob-

The danger of testing the constitutionality of a governmental act on the basis of its secular objective is apparent in a recent attempt to establish a means for determining whether a governmental action is secular or religious.[43] Professor Van Alstyne proposes that if a piece of legislation which aids religion is found to have been enacted as the result of pressure for aid by a particular religious group, the legislation should be assumed to have a nonsecular objective and therefore to be unconstitutional. He writes:

> If the constitutional requirement is that a law affecting religion cannot stand unless it is supported by a primary and independent secular objective, it would seem imperative in situations such as this for the Court to attempt to discover which among several objectives actually provided the primary incentive for the law. If in fact the ordinance in Everson was merely the result of Catholic pressure for aid, for instance, the law would appear to be a product of the very kind of church-state collaboration which the First Amendment meant to discourage even if such collaboration is disguised as a "safety" law.[44]

But would not such a standard call into question legislation clearly in the public interest, and at the same time curtail the political freedom of members of religious groups, and particularly of the clergy? To take a current example, it can quite plausibly be argued that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 aids those religions which insist upon the equality of all men and that it would not have been enacted without the strong pressure applied by religious organizations. At the civil rights rally held in the national capital in the summer of 1963 to urge passage of the Civil Rights Bill, four of the eleven speakers at the Lincoln Memorial were clergymen.[45] In the spring of 1964 an Interfaith Conference on Civil Rights, sponsored by the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the National Council of Churches, and the Synagogue Council of America, was held at Georgetown University to advocate passage of the Civil Rights Bill.[46]

The New York Times reported:

> The churchmen called for prayer for the passage of the civil rights bill—but that was not all.
>
> There were undisguised political implications in their appeal, and church spokesmen said that "not since Prohibition" had religion in this country roused itself to political action for good or ill.[47]

Moreover, seminarians of the three faiths represented at the conference had been carrying on a "silent vigil" in support of the civil rights bill at the Lincoln Memorial for nine days.[48] If it were determined that religious pressures "actually provided the primary incentive for the law,"[49] in the words of the Van Alstyne test, would it be necessary to hold that the Civil Rights Act is unconstitutional? I hope that this important legislation will never be subjected to that test.

The secular objective test thus can be seen to constitute a threat to governmental neutrality in matters of religion, to the free exercise of religion, and to needed social legislation. Perhaps its chief vice is its ambiguity;[50] for it

---

jective test, and thus in effect called for its modification by a free exercise test. *Braunfeld* v. *Brown*, 366 U.S. 599, 610–616 (1961). Justice Douglas, to be sure, saw the threat to the free exercise of religion in the Court's decision in the Sunday law cases, but he would have solved the problem simply by invalidating all Sunday closing laws. *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420, 561–581 (1961).

[43] William W. Van Alstyne, "Constitutional Separation of Church and State: The Quest for a Coherent Position," this REVIEW, 57 (December, 1963), 865–882.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 876.

[45] *The New York Times*, August 29, 1963, p. 21.

[46] *Ibid.*, April 29, 1964, p. 1. The fact that several different religions were involved does not preclude the application of the standard proposed by Professor Van Alstyne. For the Court has made clear that a prayer is sectarian even when it is as broad in its theology as the Regents' prayer in New York: *Engel* v. *Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). For constitutional purposes, any group of churches or clergymen must be considered to be sectarian to some extent, however minimal the theological or philosophical ground on which they agree.

[47] *The New York Times*, April 29, 1964, p. 1.

[48] *Ibid.*, April 29, 1964, pp. 1, 29.

[49] Van Alstyne, *op. cit.*, p. 876.

[50] The secular objective test has been employed to support governmental aid to religious schools, since the aid would be directed only toward the teaching of secular subjects [Legal Department, National Catholic Welfare Conference, "The Constitutionality of the Inclusion of Church-Related Schools in Federal Aid to Education," *Georgetown Law Journal*, 50 (Winter, 1961), 397–455, particularly pp. 401, 434–437] and to oppose

could be employed to uphold a prescribed reading of the Bible in public schools, if it could be shown that the reading helped to keep the scholars quiet so that they could receive some secular knowledge;[51] it could also be interpreted to invalidate excusing a pupil from a public school to celebrate a religious holiday, since the purpose of the absence was spiritual.[52]

Ultimately, the ambiguities in the Court's opinions in cases touching upon the establishment clause go back to the Everson definition. For that definition is untenable, it is a sham. No amount of reiteration of the definition by the Court can obscure the fact that, with one exception,[53] the Court has been unable to apply the definition, except with elaborate qualifications. Order and coherence will emerge from the Court's interpretation of the establishment clause only after it has discarded the Everson definition and enunciated a more valid interpretation of the constitutional injunction that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."

III. DEFINITION OF RELIGION

If the Everson definition of the establishment clause is to be abandoned it must be replaced, and replaced by an understanding of the establishment clause which is consonant with all the religion clauses of the Constitution and with the commitment to human liberty on which our system of government rests. The religion clauses are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Therefore, both the free exercise and the establishment clauses of the First Amendment must be regarded as directed toward the end of liberty of conscience, just as the Constitution's provision "but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any office or public Trust under the United States" is a means to that end. The establishment clause and the free exercise clause, each with a role to play, must be regarded as complementary rather than in conflict.

If these requirements are to be met, the establishment clause must require that government be neutral in matters of religion—neutral in a far more thorough-going fashion than the Court has thus far envisioned. Government must never prefer one or more forms of religious belief or nonbelief, as belief or nonbelief, over another or others. Thus understood, the establishment clause would complement the free exercise clause, enriching the atmosphere in which a free conscience thrives. The neutrality which is demanded must be exercised not merely in regard to various sects, but across the whole range of belief and disbelief. The failure of the Court to employ the concept of neutrality, instead of its untenable Everson definition, may have arisen from its failure to conceive of neutrality as extending to all forms of religious belief and nonbelief. This failure may, in turn, have arisen from a failure to define religion for constitutional purposes.

In any case, if the concept of governmental neutrality is to be meaningful, it is necessary to define religion for constitutional purposes, particularly in relation to the establishment clause. It is a commonplace to say that the free exercise clause applies to nonbelievers as well as to believers.[54] What has not been so clearly recognized, and what cannot be applied until there is a definition of the constitutional meaning of religion, is the concept that the

---

such aid, since religion, specifically the Roman Catholic religion, is inextricably integrated into the teaching of all subjects in Roman Catholic schools [Konvitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 58–59]. Konvitz is here replying to the argument of Father Parsons that the parochial school serves a public function by providing "secular education," and therefore may receive state aid: Wilfrid Parsons, S.J., *The First Freedom* (New York: The Declan X. McMullen Company, Inc., 1948), 114–127.

[51] In the Bible-reading cases, the Court noted that the states had employed the secular purpose test to support the reading of the Bible. "Included within its secular purposes, it [the State] says, are the promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature": *Abington School Dist.* v. *Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).

[52] The Court has implied that such a practice is constitutional: *Zorach* v. *Clauson*, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).

[53] *McCollum* v. *Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

[54] E.g., see opinion of the Court, written by Justice Frankfurter, in *Minersville School District* v. *Gobitis*, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940). More recently Justice Douglas, dissenting, said, "This freedom plainly includes freedom *from* religion with the right to believe, speak, write, publish and advocate anti-religious programs": *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420, 564 (1961).

establishment clause must also logically apply to nonbelief as well as to belief. Without such a recognition neutrality will be impossible, for either government will give its aid impartially to those organizations meeting the traditional theistic concept of religion, ignoring those outside that concept (as, for example, by providing chaplains for theists but not for nontheists), or it will deny all aid to traditional religion, with consequent advantage to nonbelievers.[56]

The meaning of religion, in the sense of belief in a Supreme Being or superior beings, readily comes to mind; but if religion in a constitutional sense includes nonbelief in the supernatural, some other definition is required. The traditional definition of religion under the free exercise clause is ordinarily sufficient, since in the case of nonbelief it need only be applied negatively. More intricate, however, is the problem of interpreting the establishment clause as it applies to nonbelievers.[56] While the Court's invalidation of prescribed prayers and Bible reading in public schools reinforced the concept of neutrality which the establishment clause requires, a holding that no prayers could be said in public schools would cast a shadow on the Court's concept of neutrality, with its implied advantage to those who regard prayers as useless or worse.

I therefore propose that for constitutional purposes religion be defined as the search for answers to the ultimate questions—such as: Who made man and the universe? What is the end of man?[57] These are questions which historically have frequently been answered on the basis of religion (in the sense of belief in the supernatural) derived from revelation, tradition, reason, other sources, or from a combination of two or more of these sources. These questions have also been answered on the basis of systems of thought which have nothing to do with religion in the sense of belief in God, gods, or the supernatural—revealed, traditional, or natural. Those who deny the existence of God or of any superior beings will answer the first of these questions in the negative—no one made man and the universe, they simply evolved. Nevertheless, it is a question of concern to them, for they have made a negative decision about it and do not wish to have a positive decision forced upon them by government.[58] The second of these ultimate questions may be answered in the negative by nonbelievers, but more frequently some affirmative answer is sought. As one nonbeliever has said:

> They [non-believers] must, therefore, find their objects of loyalty within the human spirit itself. So far as these nontheological minds can see, humanity must supply its own ideal aims—but it must have aims. It must stand on its own feet—but it must have feet and learn to use them.[59]

Obviously, there is no consensus in the United States—or indeed in the world—about

---

[55] Religion has in effect been defined to include both belief and nonbelief in God by the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit (*Washington Ethical Society* v. *District of Columbia*, 249 F. 2d 127 [1957]) and by the District Court of Appeal, First District, Division 1 of California (*Fellowship of Humanity* v. *County of Alameda*, 315P. 2d 394 [1957]) in decisions which held that tax exemptions for religious organizations applied to organizations which were not based on belief in God: see Fellman, *Religion in American Public Law*, pp. 49–50.

[56] It is significant that Leo Pfeffer in his book, *Church, State, and Freedom* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1953), did not mention a definition of religion until Part III (beginning on page 497), which is devoted to the free exercise clause.

[57] Such a definition was long ago implied by Justice Frankfurter in a free exercise case, when, speaking for the Court, he said, "Certainly the affirmative pursuit of one's convictions about the ultimate mystery of the universe and man's relation to it is placed beyond the reach of the laws": *Minersville School District* v. *Gobitis*, 310 U.S. 586, 593 (1940).

The third session of Vatican II adopted a "Declaration on the Church's Relations with Non-Christians," the summary of which contained the following Introduction:

"The community of all peoples is one. One is their origin, for God made the entire human race live on all the face of the earth. One, too, is their ultimate end, God. *Men expect from the various religions answers to the riddles of the human condition: What is man? What is the meaning and purpose of our lives? What is moral good and what is sin? What are death, judgment, and retribution after death?*": *Council Daybook, Vatican II, Session 3*. Edited by Floyd Anderson (Washington, D.C.: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1965), p. 282 (emphasis added).

[58] For a good indication of the insistency of this question see John Courtney Murray, S.J., *The Problem of God, Yesterday and Today* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 4.

[59] Alexander Meiklejohn, "Educational Cooperation Between Church and State," *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 14 (Winter, 1949), 62.

the answers to these ultimate questions. Walter Lippmann has said the First Amendment historically requires state neutrality in matters of religion, "because the neutrality of the State in the fields of religion and opinion are the terms of peace on which the religious wars were brought to an end."[60] But unless religion is defined to include both belief and nonbelief in God in regard to both the free exercise and the establishment clauses, the state cannot be wholly neutral, the liberty inherent in the one or the limitation inherent in the other will be applied differently to believers and nonbelievers.

It is possible to conceive of two ways in which the state could be neutral in regard to religion, defined as concerned with these ultimate questions: first, the state could have nothing whatever to do with any matter related to these questions; or, second, it could simply refuse to support any particular set of answers. The first alternative would reduce the state to an extremely limited role, definitely excluding many activities designed to promote the common good, such as support for or maintenance of schools, colleges, concert halls, museums of art, and theatres.

The second alternative would permit the state to carry on the activities which it has long assumed in this and other countries. The full range of education would be within the competence of the state, provided only that the state adopted no particular theology or philosophy regarding the answers to the ultimate questions. Government could support research in all fields of knowledge and aid such active artistic and cultural endeavors as drama, music, and painting.

Between these two alternatives—complete abstention from contact with the ultimate questions and mere refusal to prefer particular answers—only the latter is consistent with our historic practice and with the requirements of the common good in our own day. From the earliest times in America the state has been concerned with education, a concern which has steadily mounted, so that the great bulk of formal education is now conducted by the state, while even private education is subject to state standards and is the recipient of state favor, particularly in the form of tax exemptions. Moreover, the state has long maintained museums, libraries, and concert halls, and encouraged research. And even in the narrow realm of religion, in the sense of belief in God, the state has maintained an attitude of friendly cooperation, admittedly engaging in some practices which would fail to meet the demands of neutrality, but which nevertheless manifest a recognition on the part of the state of the undoubted contribution which matters of the spirit make to the "general welfare."[61]

Even more impressive than the record of the past are the demands of the present. In the conditions of modern America, given its government responsible to the people and its highly developed and complicated social, cultural, and economic system, it is axiomatic that compulsory education for all children is dictated by the common good, and, practically speaking, if education is to be compulsory, the state must provide it for those who cannot or wish not to pay for private education. Also important for the common good is provision for higher education which, while attendance is not compulsory, is essential if the potentialities of our people are to be realized, as well as provision for promoting the broad intellectual, cultural, and artistic interests of the citizenry.

The understanding of the establishment clause suggested here would allow leeway for the operation of the free exercise clause and should always be interpreted with an awareness of the requirements of the free exercise clause. It thus would avoid the tendency of some legal commentators to emphasize the establishment clause to the virtual exclusion of the free exercise clause.[62] For example, it would permit an exemption from Sunday closing laws for persons who observed some day other than Sunday as the Sabbath,[63] as well as the special arrangement required by the Court for Sabba-

[60] *The Washington Post and Times Herald*, June 20, 1963, p. 20.

[61] For a list of the various ways in which there has been cooperation between church and state and state aid to churches, see Parsons, *op. cit.*, pp. 123–124. All three volumes of Anson Phelps Stokes' *Church and State in the United States* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950) attest to long and continuing association and cooperation between church and state, and repeatedly point to various forms of state aid to religion.

[62] E.g., Philip B. Kurland, *Religion and the Law of Church and State and the Supreme Court* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company, 1962).

[63] Kurland would not allow such an exemption: *ibid.*, p. 106. The Court dismissed an appeal involving a sabbath law, which granted such an exemption "for want of a substantial federal question," in *Arlan's Dept. Store* v. *Kentucky*, 371 U.S. 218 (1952). The effect was to permit the exception to stand.

tarians seeking unemployment compensation.[64] In a land where faiths and nonfaiths are so diverse, some provision ought to be made for the nonconformist if the free exercise of religion is to continue to enjoy its honored place in our scheme of things. The controlling issue in an exemption case is the freedom of the person who needs the exemption to follow his conscience and to stay out of jail. To be sure, not every conscience can be accommodated to all the laws of the land, but when general laws conflict with conscientious scruples, exemptions ought to be granted unless some "compelling state interest"[65] intervenes, to employ a test applied by the Court in a recent exemption case. At best, the way of the nonconformist for conscience's sake is hard, our Constitution requires that he not be unnecessarily burdened by general laws, even when these laws seem wise and good to the vast majority of Americans. We can afford to be generous in these matters, and we ought to be as generous as the good order of the country will admit.

IV. APPLICATION OF THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION

The proposed rule of government neutrality in matters of religion and the definition of religion proposed to help implement that neutrality raise two questions. How do these proposals accord with previous decisions and opinions of the Court in this area? Of what use are these proposals for the determination of other problems regarding the religion clauses of the Constitution? In all cases affecting the establishment clause, the equal claims of the free exercise clause must, of course, be recognized.

While the Court in its opinions has relied upon the Everson definition of the establishment clause, albeit with qualifications, its decisions have been largely in accord with the proposed concept of neutrality and the proposed definition of religion. In Everson the Court upheld legislation which permitted local school boards to reimburse parents for the transportation of students to public schools and to nonprofit private schools.[66] This is a classic instance of neutrality, there was no religious test, there was no preference shown for persons adhering to particular answers to the ultimate questions. The decision in the McCollum case cannot be so readily classified, despite the fact that the opinion of the Court is clearly prejudicial to the concept of neutrality in matters of religion.[67] If the released time religious instruction under the program could have been given only by Jewish, Protestant, and Roman Catholic instructors, then the requirement of neutrality was violated. But if, as suggested by Corwin,[68] instruction could have been given according to *any* set of answers to the ultimate questions, then the requirement of neutrality was met by Illinois, and the program should have been upheld. The Zorach case, with its opinion in the main sensitive to the need for government neutrality in matters of religion and to the First Amendment's other injunction, that the free exercise of religion not be impaired, raises the same problem in reverse.[69] If the New York program of released time religious education was open to instruction regarding *any* answers to the ultimate questions, then the decision of the Court did meet constitutional requirements of neutrality.

The Torcaso decision clearly accorded with the concept of neutrality, even though the decision rested chiefly on the free exercise clause.[70] A government which requires officeholders to swear to their belief in God can hardly be said to be neutral in regard to the first of the ultimate questions. The decisions of the Court in the Sunday law cases raise more difficult problems.[71] A law which requires certain kinds of businesses to close on Sunday does give an advantage to those who, on religious grounds, regard Sunday as a day of rest and worship. But it does seem reasonable to require that one day in the week be set aside as a general day of rest, as all the members of

[64] *Sherbert* v. *Verner*, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

[65] *Ibid.*, 406 (1963).

[66] *Everson* v. *Board of Education*, 330 U.S. 1 (1947)

[67] *McCollum* v. *Board of Education*, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).

[68] In commenting on the case, Corwin wrote, "Besides, so far as anything to the contrary appears, had James Terry and his parent made proper application, the school authorities would have willingly assigned accommodations where the two of them might have foregathered during the released time period to confer with regard to their common faith—or lack of it": *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[69] *Zorach* v. *Clausen*, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

[70] *Torcaso* v. *Watkins*, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).

[71] *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); *Two Guys* v. *McGinley*, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); *Braunfeld* v. *Brown*, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); and *Gallagher* v. *Crown Kosher Market*, 366 U.S. 617 (1961).

the Court except Douglas[72] agreed in the Sunday law cases. It might be difficult to find a day which was sacred to no one. Moreover, if the state were to choose, say, Wednesday as the official day of rest, surely the free exercise clause would protect the right of any religious group to choose Wednesday as its official day of rest and worship. If a church so acted, would the state be required to choose a different day, thus initiating an endless game of move and countermove? In the light of these considerations, the Court's decision that the Sunday closing laws did not violate the establishment clause does seem to be acceptable under the proposed rule of neutrality. The Court's decision in the latter two Sunday law cases, however, that the free exercise clause was not violated in the application of the laws to persons whose faith required them to rest on another day of the week was not in accord with the deference which ought to be paid to liberty of conscience. "For," as Justice Brennan said in his dissent on this issue, "the values of the First Amendment, as embodied in the Fourteenth, look primarily towards the preservation of personal liberty, rather than towards the fulfillment of collective goals."[73] Required exceptions to Sunday closing laws, for those who must conscientiously rest another day of the week, would make such laws acceptable under the free exercise clause, as Justice Brennan implied in his partial dissent.[74] And finally, the Court's decisions in the Regents' prayer[75] and Bible reading[76] cases are fully in accord with the rule of neutrality and the complementary definition of religion which have been proposed here.

There remain, however, a number of problems in regard to the religion clauses of the Constitution which have not yet been settled by the Court, and which can properly be considered in the light of the proposed concept of governmental neutrality and the proposed definition of religion. Among these problems are exemptions from compulsory military service for conscientious objectors and for clergymen and students enrolled in theological seminaries; chaplaincies in the armed forces, prisons, and other public institutions; and federal aid to education.

The problem of the conscientious objector and the religion clauses of the Constitution is made particularly acute by the phraseology of the exemption for conscientious objection found in the Selective Service Act of 1948,[77] which exempts a person "who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." Then the act goes on to define religion as follows: "Religious training and belief in this connection means any individual's belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code."[78] This definition certainly does not embody a governmental position of neutrality between belief and nonbelief in God.[79] The Court recently faced the problem of applying this definition,[80] but because of the facts before it, and by some judicial redrafting of the legislation, the Court was able to dodge the central question which was raised.

In this case the grounds on which the law was challenged were as follows:

> The Constitutional attack is launched under the First Amendment's Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and is twofold: (1) The section does not exempt nonreligious conscientious objectors, and (2) it discriminates between different

[72] And even Douglas admitted that "The State can, of course, require one day of rest a week: one day when every shop or factory is closed." *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420, 576 (1961).

[73] *Braunfeld* v. *Brown*, 366 U.S. 599, 610 (1961).

[74] *Ibid.*, 613–616. Such exemptions are apparently feasible, for Justice Brennan pointed out, "that a majority—21—of the 34 states which have general Sunday regulations have exemptions of this kind": *Ibid.*, 614.

[75] *Engel* v. *Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).

[76] *Abington School Dist.* v. *Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

[77] 62 Stat. 604 (1948), as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. § 453 (Supp. V, 1959–1963).

[78] 62 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (j) (1958). This is not the only way in which religion has been defined in the history of exemptions for conscientious objectors in the United States. See Opinion of the Court, *United States* v. *Seeger*, 380 U.S. 163, 170–173 (1965) and Francis J. Conklin, S.J., "Conscientious Objector Provisions: A View in the Light of *Torcaso* v. *Watkins*," *Georgetown Law Journal*, 51 (Winter, 1963), 252–283.

[79] That such neutrality was required was clearly implied by the Court in *Torcaso* v. *Watkins*, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961). "The sweeping language utilized in *Torcaso* all but explicitly rules the 'belief in a Supreme Being' clause of the 1948 Selective Service Act unconstitutional": Conklin, *op. cit.*, 252–253.

[80] *United States* v. *Seeger*, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).

forms of religious expression in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.[81]

In point of fact, it was not necessary for the Court to have decided the constitutional challenge, for it can be reasonably argued that the conscientious objections of all three litigants were religious as defined by the 1948 act, each having admitted, despite considerable hedging, to a belief in a Supreme Being.[82] But the Court did not seize this means of avoiding the constitutional problem. Neither did the Court go on to invalidate the challenged section of the Selective Service Act on the ground that it preferred one kind of belief over others. Rather, the Court itself hedged. "The question is not, therefore, one between theistic and atheistic beliefs,"[83] the Court proclaimed, arguing that the litigants, Seeger possibly excepted, were theists, rather than necessarily monotheists, but that they were not atheists.[84] The Court then went into a lengthy discussion of the problem of the concepts of religion and a Supreme Being, quoting modern theologians and other sources.[85] Throughout this discussion the Court seems to be saying that many persons who do not believe in God in the traditional sense, actually believe in some kind of a Supreme Being, however vague, even if they do not know it. In the light of these considerations the Court in effect then redrafted the legislative definition of religion for conscientious objection:

> These are but a few of the views that comprise the broad spectrum of religious beliefs found among us. But they demonstrate very clearly the diverse manners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors, may be articulated. They further reveal the difficulties inherent in placing too narrow a construction on the provisions of §6(j) and thereby lend conclusive support to the construction which we today find that Congress intended.
>
> 5. We recognize the difficulties that have always faced the trier of fact in these cases. We hope that the test that we lay down proves less onerous. The examiner is furnished a standard that permits consideration of criteria with which he has had considerable experience. While the applicant's words may differ, the test is simple of application. It is essentially an objective one, namely, does the claimed belief occupy the same place in the life of the objector as an orthodox belief in God holds in the life of one clearly qualified for exemption?[86]

There are two ways of interpreting this redrafted test: first, that it is close to the test found in the Act of Congress, and thus remote from the concept of governmental neutrality in matters of religion; secondly, that it is quite far removed from the act of Congress, and thus closer to the concept of neutrality than the first interpretation would place it, but that it still does not fully meet the standard of neutrality. Taken in the light of the total opinion, the first interpretation appears to be the correct one, though the result cannot be considered constitutionally valid. Conscientious objection can be claimed if somehow, in some remote, confused, or even unknowing way, the objector believes in a Supreme Being. This interpretation is almost compelled by a later paragraph in the opinion of the Court which in effect defines a "merely personal" code (which Congress said could not be the basis of exemption) as one

---

[81] *Ibid.*, 165.

[82] Of Jakobson, the Court said, "He stated on the Selective Service System form that he believed in a 'Supreme Being' who was 'Creator of Man' in the sense of being 'ultimately responsible for the existence of' man and who was 'the Supreme Reality' of which 'the existence of man is the *result.*' R. 44. (emphasis in the original)": *ibid.*, 167. After recalling some of Peter's comments about religion, the Court said: "As to his belief in a Supreme Being, Peter stated that he supposed 'you could call that a belief in the Supreme Being or God. These just do not happen to be the words I use'": *ibid.*, 169.
Seeger is the least explicit. Despite the fact that, according to the Court, "he preferred to leave the question as to his belief in a Supreme Being open, 'rather than answer "yes" or "no"' [*Ibid.*, 166] he did, at least at one point, in effect answer "yes"; for according to the Court, "He cited such personages as Plato, Aristotle and Spinoza for support of his ethical belief in intellectual integrity 'without belief in God, except in the remotest sense'": *ibid.* The exception was certainly enough to meet the standard of the 1948 act, for surely the Congress did not intend that the courts test the proximity of conscientious objectors' beliefs in a Supreme Being.

[83] *Ibid.*, 173.

[84] *Ibid.*, 174.

[85] *Ibid.*, 174–183. Among the sources quoted were Paul Tillich, *Systematic Theology*; John A.T. Robinson, *Honest to God*; and the Schema of Vatican Council II.

[86] *Ibid.*, 183–184. Essentially the same idea had been expressed earlier in the same opinion: *ibid.*, 165–166.

"which is not only personal but which is the sole basis for the registrant's belief and *is in no way related to a Supreme Being.*"[87]

The second possible (but doubtful) interpretation of the Court's redraft of the legislative standard of religious belief is that any belief—even a firm belief that God does not exist—meets the test of religious belief, so long as it is as intense and as firmly held as that of an orthodox believer in God. Although under this interpretation a nonbeliever in God could claim exemption from military service on the basis of conscientious objection, the test could hardly be said to accord to believers and nonbelievers a position of equality or to assign to government a role of neutrality in matters of religion, or—put another way—in regard to the answers to the first of the ultimate questions: Who made man and the universe? It is rather like saying in a segregation case, that a Negro must be admitted to a public, previously all-white institution if he acts like a white man. For in this test of the Court the standard of devotion to the belief is set by the orthodox believer in God, and the nonbeliever in God must meet this standard, though not to the point of belief in a Supreme Being.

Thus the Court's attempt to redraft the religious test for conscientious objectors is unsatisfactory under both possible interpretations of the intention of the Court if governmental neutrality in matters of religion is to be preserved, even though the Court's device may have obtained justice for the litigants before it. The definition of religion for constitutional purposes which has been proposed in this paper does, however, suggest a test which would meet the constitutional requirement of neutrality. An applicant for exemption could be asked: Do you, because of your concept of the origin of man and the universe, or because of your concept of the end of man, conscientiously object to participation in war of any kind? This test would place believers and nonbelievers, orthodox and unorthodox believers in a Supreme Being on a plane of equality and thus preserve for government its proper role of neutrality.

Another provision of the Selective Service Act which may offend governmental neutrality exempts "ministers of religion" and persons studying to become ministers.[88] The definition of religion which applies to conscientious objectors also applies in this section, and thus persons who believe in a Supreme Being are favored. The problems raised by this violation of the rule of neutrality are somewhat more perplexing, since the clergy of the religious groups professing belief in a Supreme Being can be so readily identified in contrast to those who may play a similar role for persons not sharing that belief. A test which might be applied to broaden the ministerial exemption to include nonbelievers is suggested by a decision of the United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, applying Selective Service Regulations which defined a regular minister as one who, though not formally ordained, preaches, teaches, and is recognized as a minister by his religious group.[89] Similar standards could be established to include nonbelievers in God within the ministerial exemption. It is true that the danger of abuse of the exemption might thereby be increased, but this danger could be dealt with by tighter regulations, for example regarding the amount of time devoted to the broadly defined religious activities, without violation of the principle of neutrality.

Another problem of church-state relations which has not been settled by the Court concerns military chaplains.[90] Here surely is an instance of intimate cooperation between church and state and of considerable state aid to religion, but here also is a practice which is vitally important to the free exercise of religion,[91] for members of the armed forces lose, often involuntarily, their freedom to an extraordinary degree and require some kind of governmental action to redress the balance in support of freedom of worship. And yet, under current regulations, the military chaplaincy does not meet the test of neutrality proposed in this paper, for in addition to meeting such qualifications as age, physical condition, and general education, an applicant must "have completed at least . . . 90 graduate hours in the recognized seminary and be actively engaged in the ministry as his principal vocation in life" and "must be regularly ordained, duly accredited by and in good standing with a denomination or organization and must have

[87] *Ibid.*, 186 (emphasis added).

[88] 62 Stat. 611 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. §456(g) (1958).

[89] *Niznik* v. *United States*, 184 F 2d 972, 974 (1950).

[90] See M. Albert Figinski, "Military Chaplains—A Constitutionally Permissible Accommodation Between Church and State," *Maryland Law Review*, 24 (Fall, 1964), 377–416.

[91] Even Leo Pfeffer concedes that "chaplains in the armed forces may be justified under the First Amendment's guaranty of religious freedom": *Church, State, and Freedom*, p. 217.

formal endorsement by a duly established ecclesiastical endorsing agency."[92] Seminaries, ordination, and ecclesiastical bodies are so clearly associated with religion, in the sense of belief in God, that these regulations can hardly be considered other than prejudicial against those who do not believe in God.

Since, however, the military chaplain is so important to the free exercise of religion, as well as to the morale and discipline of the armed forces,[93] his office ought to be retained—with religiously neutral qualifications for appointment. Thus, beyond the age and other routine qualifications, the applicant could be required to have had 90 hours of graduate study in theology or philosophy, or in any other discipline concentrating on the proposed ultimate questions, and to "be actively engaged in the [teaching, preaching, or counseling on the ultimate questions] as his principal vocation in life."[94] Although such qualifications are less definite than those which now obtain, they need not lead to chaos in the Corps of Chaplains. In the unlikely event of a large number of applicants for nontheistic chaplaincies, qualifications for chaplains could be raised across the board, and, of course, quotas based on the numbers of adherents to particular ways of belief would still be permissible. And beyond any inconvenience would be the fact that standards such as those proposed would place believer and nonbeliever in the same general category and thus assure to government a position of neutrality. A full-time leader of an Ethical Culture Society group could be as eligible for a commission in the Corps of Chaplains as a Presbyterian minister.

At last we arrive at the question of governmental aid to religion in the field of education. Although public attention is now directed to federal aid to education, the constitutional question must be framed in the larger context of both federal and state aid, for there can be no doubt that the Supreme Court has incorporated both religion clauses of the First Amendment into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus has made them applicable to the states. Placing federal and state aid to religion in the same category, and speaking only in terms of the Constitution of the United States, it is possible to divide this problem into two questions: Can government aid religion by providing or arranging for courses in religion in public institutions? Can government aid religion by providing financial aid and cooperation to educational institutions operated by religious organizations?

To consider the question of the study of religion in public institutions it is necessary to distinguish between education below the college level and education at or above the college level. Below the college level the rights and duties of parents loom large, the state and the parents in a very real sense share in the task of educating the child. Parents can quite legitimately seek to protect their children from ideas or practices in the religious sphere which they consider unscientific, heretical, or merely absurd.[95] This claim of parents can be met by confining instruction largely to tool subjects and by treating references to the ultimate questions in such subjects as history and literature in a neutral fashion.[96] Such neutrality would become progressively more difficult as the student advanced toward graduation from high school, but perhaps it could be approximated within some tolerable limits. Moreover, this approach would leave wide gaps in the students' education in regard to the ultimate questions, gaps which could be filled only haphazardly and unevenly, by parents, Sunday schools, or other devices. This is not a happy solution to the problem—indeed, it has been

[92] President's Committee on Religion and Welfare in the Armed Forces, *The Military Chaplaincy* (1951), p. 28.

[93] Pfeffer, discussing military chaplains, says, "If, therefore, the expenditure of government funds for religious purposes is militarily necessary, it is constitutionally permissible": *Church, State, and Freedom*, p. 218.

[94] The words in brackets replace the word "ministry" used by the President's Committee, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

[95] Such protection was sought and obtained by the parents involved in *Engel* v. *Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) and *Abington School Dist.* v. *Schempp*, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

[96] This kind of neutrality has already been imposed upon public schools by the Court: "Bearing in mind that the first amendment apparently bars the establishment of nontheistic as well as theistic religions [*Torcaso* v. *Watkins*, 367 U.S. 488 (1961)], it would logically follow from the Engel [*Engel* v. *Vitale*, 370 U.S. 421 (1962)] decision that official prescription of secular humanism's tenet of Human Brotherhood is as much beyond the pale for the classroom as is the Fatherhood of God and Brotherhood of man of the Jewish and Christian traditions": David W. Louisell and John H. Jackson, "Religion, Theology, and Public Higher Education," *California Law Review*, 50 (December, 1962), 752–753.

argued that such neutrality is impossible—[97] but in communities where arrangements for filling the gaps are not feasible, the training offered would enable children to acquire some skills and information, which might justify the risk of incidental indoctrination regarding the ultimate questions. Neutrality and the rights of parents, as well as education itself, could be better served by some system of released or dismissed time religious education or, even better, by a system of shared time under which students could examine in detail the implications of the ultimate questions for history, literature, and other subjects without exposing themselves to systems of thought or belief from which their parents wished to protect them. Alexander Meiklejohn has said in regard to a released time program:

> My own beliefs are definitely on the side of nonreligion. So far as I can see, human purposes have no extra-human backing. Yet, so long as half our people, more or less, are interpreting and conducting their lives, their family relationships, the upbringing of their children upon a basis of some religious belief, the Constitution requires of us that those beliefs shall be given not only equal status but also positive status in the public planning of education. The freedom of religion has the same basic justification as has the freedom of speech or of the press. In both sets of cases, a strong and passionate private desire is involved. But far deeper than this is public necessity. When men are trying to be self-governing, no other single factor of their experience is more important to them than the freedom of their religion or of their nonreligion. The interpreting of our spiritual beliefs is a public enterprise of the highest order.[98]

The point is that while children should not be required to study religious or non-religious beliefs which their parents do not hold, both the private and the public good are served by a system which both permits children to explore the ultimate questions and protects their tender consciences. While the Constitution does not require that special arrangements be made for study (segregated by belief) of the ultimate questions in elementary and secondary education, the Constitution, in conformity with the proposed rule of neutrality, would permit such study, provided of course that believers and nonbelievers were given equal opportunities to provide the instruction contemplated. For by arranging for such a system, government does not prefer one kind of belief or nonbelief over another, rather it merely permits persons to make their beliefs meaningful (which, in the Meiklejohn vein, incidentally aids the public good) and thus promotes the free exercise of religion.

At the college and university level, the principle of neutrality in matters of religion requires that we recognize and accept the practices which the principle of academic freedom and other factors have already established, and that we extend the application of these practices. That is to say, the answers to the ultimate questions are already being explored in philosophy, literature, political science, and many other disciplines, each instructor, and indeed each student, being free to answer these questions according to his own insight. Moreover, state colleges and universities offer courses frankly labeled "religion"[99] (as do many private institutions), which study the tenets of various recognized religions, often based on revelation as understood in the religion studied.[100] If the principle of neutrality is to be fully implemented, so-called courses in religion, narrowly defined, must be given the same place in the curricula of state universities which is now given to other disciplines which explore the ultimate questions. If the state is to be neutral in matters of religion, defined to include both belief and nonbelief, it is forbidden not only to prescribe devotional readings, but also to exclude revelation or other spiritual sources from the curriculum.

Moreover, the same principle of academic freedom which allows a political scientist to espouse the tenets of the Democratic Party or a philosopher to argue against the scholastic proofs of the existence of God, allows a theologian to teach the knowledge of God as understood by John Calvin or anyone else. For although it is possible for the state to be neutral in regard to the ultimate questions, an individual cannot be neutral in the same sense, he can be neutral only in the sense that he is engaged in the unprejudiced pursuit of the truth, but at any single time he is committed

[97] See Francis Canavan, "Implications of the School Prayer and Bible Reading Decisions: The Welfare State," *Journal of Public Law*, 13 (1964), 442.

[98] *Op. cit.*, p. 67.

[99] See Robert Michaelsen, "The Supreme Court and Religion in Public Higher Education," *Journal of Public Law*, 13 (1964), 349.

[100] The constitutionality of optional courses in religion at the university level has been asserted by Louisell and Jackson, *op. cit.*, 751–799, particularly 765–766.

to some concept of the truth, even if it is only that he is not sure what the truth is. And only the most shallow scholarship will fail to reflect the commitment of the scholar and the teacher. "For clearly, once teaching goes beyond technique and aims at imparting wisdom and understanding, it must speak from some standpoint."[101] Thus a large state university would offer general and specialized courses in Christianity, Mohammedanism, Buddhism, and other religions, in departments staffed by persons recruited on the basis of their academic qualifications. Not every state college could be expected to offer courses in every religion, just as not every college offers courses on Mongolian poets. Normal academic standards, such as the availability of competent instructors and student interest, would operate in the establishment of courses in the traditional religions as they do in other disciplines.

Unless the university is to be relegated to the position of a training school for technicians, it must bear the responsibility of provoking the individual to think fundamentally about his role in life and about ultimate questions. Like Socrates, the university should be the inquiring conscience of society, presenting for the thinking student a variety of values so that he may intelligently choose from among the clamor of alternative principles that may shape his life. Although it is not the duty of the university to force a particular choice on a student, or even force him at this stage to choose, it would seem to be the duty of the university to see that the student has the opportunity to learn about all reasonably possible choices. Indeed, unless knowledge of all such choices is available to the student, the university has to some extent *forced* a choice upon him.[102]

The more widely publicized problem is whether government may, under the proposed concept of neutrality in matters of religion, give aid to schools operated by churches. Assuming that government may give aid to private organizations in the pursuit of some public purpose, and assuming that the aid is not confined to church schools, the answer is affirmative. For the state, if it is religiously neutral, may not establish any religious tests—neither those that condition aid on a corporate commitment to God nor those based on no corporate commitment to God. Just as the original Constitution requires that "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States," so the First and Fourteenth Amendments require under the rule of neutrality that "no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification" for the receipt of governmental aid by any person or organization. For purposes of determining eligibility for governmental aid, the creeds, acknowledged or unacknowledged, of those who operate the organizations applying for aid are as irrelevant as their color or race.

The state may, of course, elect not to give aid to private schools, or to any other category of private institutions. To distinguish between a public institution and a private one is reasonable and does not disrupt the neutral role which the establishment clause imposes upon government. To be sure, it has been argued that justice revuries that goverment aid schools operated by religious organizations;[103] but, without examining this claim, it is safe to say that, in view of all the practical difficulties which might arise, the validity of the claim in individual circumstances ought to be left to the political branches rather than be erected as an immutable principle of constitutional law. For if every demand for individual treatment arising from religious convictions had to be honored, government might well be led into a bewildering morass of remedial actions; in our pluralistic society many governmental actions and expenditures will inevitably provide services which some of our citizens cannot conscientiously use, and which will be positively offensive to the scruples of many.[104] Nevertheless, if the political branches of the government decide, for whatever reasons, that subsidies be given to private schools, no religious test may be constitutionally applied to determine eligibility for these subsidies, if government is to be neutral in matters of religion.

[101] Canavan, *op. cit.*, p. 442.

[102] Louisell and Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 752.

[103] William J. Kenealy, S.J., "Equal Justice Under Law—Aid to Education," *Loyola Law Review*, 11 (1962–1963), 183–212.

[104] Although Lew Pfeffer holds that the Constitution positively forbids governmental aid to parochial schools, he can be effectively quoted in support of the more limited concept that the Constitution does not require governmental aid for parochial schools. Discussing the argument that to exclude parochial schools from federal aid to education would interfere with freedom of religion, he writes:

"During the past decade there has been a growing movement to fluoridate the water supply in order to protect the teeth of our children. Many municipalities have engaged in the program. But drinking fluoridated water violates

Other problems, such as tax exemptions for churches and chaplains in prisons, remain. The principles already enunciated can easily be applied. In each instance, legislation touching upon religion must be so phrased that it imposes the limitations or confers the benefits of government indiscriminately upon believers, nonbelievers, and disbelievers, as distinguished by Leo Pfeffer.[105] Governmental neutrality in regard to the ultimate questions must guide the Supreme Court in the complex problems of religion and the state.

V. CONCLUSION

The broad definition of religion for constitutional purposes as referring to the answers to the ultimate questions (Who made man and the universe? What is the end of man?) may create new problems and fail to solve old ones. Identification of religious organizations will undoubtedly be more difficult than under the traditional concept of an ecclesiastical body, no doubt attempts will be made to abuse privileges which can be claimed under the new definition. Moreover, even though armed with the proposed definition of religion, the courts and country will still have to struggle with the sticky problems which persistently arise when the state meets the "sphere of the intellect and the spirit."[106] Nevertheless, the broader liberty of conscience which will flow from a definition of religion which insures governmental neutrality will more than compensate for the difficulties and even for the abuses, and the new tool which the concept of neutrality wedded to the definition of religion offers will better enable the Court to deal with the old problems in a coherent and logical manner.

The concept of neutrality proposed here is suitable only to government as the director of the state; an individual who attempted such neutrality would be dehumanized. A governmental official remains a human being, just as a voter does. Only when a governmental official acts in an official capacity, or when his speech is tantamount to official action, is he bound by the rule of neutrality. His motives, however, are personal and thus beyond the control of the state and outside the rule of neutrality. Indeed, a governmental official must rely upon his concept of man and the universe to make any but the most routine decisions and to make any but the most inane statements. Thus one member of Congress may vote to raise the minimum wage because he thinks that every man needs to have some financial security in order to think about his duties to God; another may vote against the rise, because he believes that God rewards those who fight for survival; while a third may vote for the rise because he believes that the only chance for happiness or pleasure is in this world, since there is no hereafter. Each may speak in or out of Congress according to his conscience, but the minimum wage itself must apply equally to Spencerians, Epicureans, and others. The President in his speeches, and even in his proclamations, may likewise reflect his views of the answers to the ultimate questions, while in enforcing and administering the laws he is bound by the rule of neutrality. Members of the Supreme Court itself will in their opinions frequently reflect some view of man, as Justice Douglas did when, dissenting, he declared, "The institutions of our society are founded on the belief that there is an authority higher than the authority of the State, that there is a moral law which the State is powerless to alter, that the individual possesses rights conferred by the Creator which government must respect."[107] The decisions of the Court, however, must adhere to the rule of neutrality, even though they are derived from a specific theory of the nature of God and man.

Because men are men their expressed views, whether from official positions or in private conversation, will to some extent mirror their convictions, and the men who read or hear those views can accept, reject, or qualify them. It is no accident that the main arena of con-

---

the conscience of Christian Scientists. A number of suits have been brought to stop the program, but all have proved unsuccessful and the Supreme Court has refused to interfere with these decisions. It would undoubtedly be a great expense for Christian Scientists living in communities with a fluoridated water supply to purchase unfluoridated water as required by their conscience and the demands of life. Compulsion of life is at least as potent as compulsion of law, yet I have not come across a single report of a demand by Christian Scientists that the government give them money so that they can buy such water and thus be economically able to exercise their freedom of religion. I doubt very much that, if such a demand were made, serious consideration would be given to it by the courts": "Federal Funds for Parochial Schools? No," *Notre Dame Lawyer*, 37 (March, 1962), 317.

[105] *Church, State, and Freedom*, p. 498.

[106] *Board of Education* v. *Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).

[107] *McGowan* v. *Maryland*, 366 U.S. 420, 562 (1961).

troversy in church-state problems has been in education below the college level, for here the views of the governmental official—the teacher—cannot be so freely expressed because they cannot be so critically received. The teacher, particularly in the lower grades, represents the state—or even more, authority itself—for the young children entrusted to his care are not equipped to subject his views to the critical appraisal which meets the views of legislator, executive, and judge—as well as of instructors in universities and colleges. Thus, out of deference to untrained minds and the rights of parents the public school teacher must be slightly dehumanized—his convictions about the ultimate questions must somehow remain unexpressed before his classes. But this rule must not be extended to governmental officials in general, for to do so would be to attempt to govern adults by rules which are appropriate only for the protection of children.[108] Where adults are concerned it is only necessary that freedom of expression (even by government officials) be maintained, so that men may choose from competing ideas. Prudence will, of course, dictate that elected officials express their views, within the limits of conscience, in terms which are acceptable to a broad section of the electorate. But both as candidates and governmental officials they should be men of conviction—even about the ultimate questions—and they should express their convictions. Similarly, judges should write opinions which will win for their decisions acceptance in the judiciary, in the bar, in the academic community, and among the public at large; but that is not to say that their opinions must be devoid of all commitment to ultimate values.

The proposed definition of religion, applicable to both the establishment and the free exercise clauses, will help both the Court and the country to interpret the religion clauses of the Constitution as complementary parts of our religious settlement. In the light of that definition, the establishment clause can be interpreted to make government neutral in in regard to every religious question—not merely neutral between sects (which favors those who believe in God), and not merely divorced from matters spiritual (which favors those who see no human purpose beyond the secular). Before the state, as state, the answers to the ultimate questions, as answers, will enjoy complete equality. On the other hand, the proposed definition can be employed to make the free exercise of religion meaningful for every degree of believer and nonbeliever. Ideas about the ultimate questions can then be tested in the intellectual market place, where their acceptance or rejection will help to mold the country.

[108] It is well to recall the words of Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, in a case involving a state law which made it a misdemeanor to distribute or prepare or have literature or other matter, "tending to incite minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts, manifestly tending to the corruption of youth. . . ." *Butler* v. *Michigan*, 352 U.S. 380, 381 (1957). He said, "The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult population of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children": *ibid.*, 383–384. The conviction under the act was reversed.

PARTY LEADERSHIP CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES*

ROBERT L. PEABODY
The Johns Hopkins University

Long periods of one-party domination, increased average tenure in office for Representatives, and the institutionalization of patterns of succession to the Speakership, have all contributed to a tendency toward leadership stability in the 20th-century House of Representatives. The election of Sam Rayburn (D., Texas) and John McCormack (D., Mass.) to the offices of Speaker and Majority Leader in 1940, of Joseph Martin (R., Mass.) to the office of Minority Leader in 1939, and of Leslie Arends (R., Ill.) to the position of Republican Whip in 1943, mark the beginnings of the longest tenures in these four positions for any incumbents in the history of Congress.[1] When changes in top leadership occur—as with the overthrow of Minority Leader Charles A. Halleck by Republican Representative Gerald R. Ford, Jr., in 1965, or the succession of Majority Leader McCormack to the office of the Speaker in 1962 following the death of Rayburn—the consequences are considerable. In the case of revolt, individual careers are made and broken. The organization and policy orientations of a congressional party may be extensively altered. While orderly succession has less dramatic impact, it too has a significant effect on "who gets what, when and how." Some members move closer to the seats of power and others fall out of favor. Key committee assignments, and hence the development of entire legislative careers, are likely to ride or fall on the outcomes. A congressional party's philosophical approach, the kinds of legislation it promotes, its strategies of implementation—all hinge to a considerable degree on the individual personalities, political backgrounds, and state and regional outlooks of its principal leaders. Only the contest for the control of the White House and the occasional elections which convert one party from a minority into a majority within Congress are likely to have a more significant consequence for party fortunes.

Despite its acknowledged importance, our overall understanding of the workings of congressional party leadership is rudimentary.[2] The day-to-day observations of newspaper reporters provide some insights, but journalists seldom generalize about their impressions.[3] With increasing frequency political scientists can profit from the writings of more analytically-oriented congressmen.[4] Unfortunately, good biographies on House members are relatively rare compared with presidential, judicial or even senatorial biography.[5]

* This article was stimulated by an opportunity to study the 1965 Ford-Halleck minority leadership contest at first hand. The resulting case study led to speculation on the general problem of leadership change in the House of Representatives. I would like to acknowledge my indebtedness to numerous readers of earlier drafts, especially James D. Barber, Milton C. Cummings, Jr., Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Ralph K. Huitt, Charles O. Jones, Nelson W. Polsby, Randall B. Ripley, and Francis E. Rourke. Financial assistance was provided by grants from the Social Science Research Council Committee on Political Behavior and the Johns Hopkins University Committee on Public Affairs.

[1] George B. Galloway, *History of the House of Representatives* (New York, 1962), pp. 287–292; Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," this REVIEW, 58 (September, 1964), p. 563.

[2] As David B. Truman observed in 1959: "Everyone knows something of leaders and leadership of various sorts, but no one knows very much. Leadership, especially in the political realm, unavoidably or by design often is suffused by an atmosphere of the mystic and the magical, and these mysteries have been little penetrated by systematic observation": *The Congressional Party* (New York, 1959), p. 94.

[3] The most notable exceptions in recent years are William S. White, *Citadel: The Story of the U. S. Senate* (New York, 1956) and Neil MacNeil, *Forge of Democracy: The House of Representatives* (New York, 1963). A masterpiece from the past is Ben Perley Poore, *Perley's Reminiscences of Sixty Years in the National Metropolis*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: 1886).

[4] Two of the best examples are Clem Miller, *Member of the House* (New York, 1962) and Richard Bolling, *House Out of Order* (New York, 1965).

[5] Treatment of Speakers seems to be an exception. See, for example, James A. Barnes, *John G. Carlisle* (New York, 1931); James G. Blaine,

Most full-length studies of party leadership have long been outdated.[6] Only within the past decade have political scientists begun to set forth propositions about congressional leadership developed from intensive field research.[7]

Much less is known about change in leadership. Newspaper accounts of all but the most recent contests are likely to be fragmentary and superficial. Biographies rarely describe leadership contests in any detail and usually these accounts are anecdotal and one-sided. Only two studies exist of contests analyzed in depth by political scientists on the scene.[8] Lack of knowledge about types, the conditions which promote one type rather than another, and the consequences of leadership change are further complicated by the hazards of generalizing from what must inevitably be a limited number of cases. Yet, research on congressional leadership must move in the direction of generalization over a series of Congresses if a theory of party leadership and its consequences for the legislative process is to be developed.

This article begins by outlining a scheme for classifying types of intra-party leadership change in legislatures. This scheme is illustrated with nineteen cases of change or attempted change taking place in the United States House of Representatives in the 84th–89th Congresses (1955–1966). After noting the rather striking differences in the degree to which the Republican minority resorts to contested change as compared with relatively peaceful patterns of leadership succession in the Democratic majority, some of the conditions which seem to facilitate one type of change rather than another are discussed. Finally, some of the consequences of leadership change for individual careers, legislation, party fortunes and the representative process are suggested.

I. TYPES OF INTRA-PARTY LEADERSHIP CHANGE

Change in party leadership in legislatures comes about in three principal ways. *Inter-party turnover*, the replacement of one party's set of leaders by those of another party, occurs when the results of national elections convert a minority into a majority. Such change is relatively rare. For example, in the United States House of Representatives, party control has switched but twenty-four times in the 90 Congresses elected every two years since

Twenty Years of Congress, from Lincoln to Garfield, 2 vols. (Norwich, Conn., 1884); Samuel W. McCall, *The Life of Thomas B. Reed* (Cambridge, 1919); William A. Robinson, *Thomas B. Reed, Parliamentarian* (New York, 1930); L. White Busbey, *Uncle Joe Cannon* (New York, 1927); Champ Clark, *My Quarter Century of American Politics* (New York, 1920); and Bascom N. Timmons, *Garner of Texas* (New York, 1948). A forthcoming political biography of the late Speaker Rayburn by his staff assistant, D. B. Hardeman, should correct the shortcomings of the only full-length existing biography, C. Dwight Dorough, *Mr. Sam* (New York, 1962), which tells us almost nothing about Rayburn, the legislative leader.

[6] Chang-wei Chiu, *The Speaker of the House of Representatives Since 1896* (New York, 1927). This Columbia doctoral dissertation builds on a much better Radcliffe thesis first published in 1896: Mary Parker Follett, *The Speaker of the House of Representatives* (New York, 1909). Among the more useful older studies on party leadership, see DeAlva S. Alexander, *History and Procedure of the House of Representatives* (Boston, 1916); George R. Brown, *The Leadership of Congress* (Indianapolis, 1922); and Paul D. Hasbrouck, *Party Government in the House of Representatives* (New York, 1927).

[7] See, for example, Truman, *op. cit.*, Donald R. Matthews, *U. S. Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill, 1960); Ralph K. Huitt, "Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate," this REVIEW, 55 (June, 1961), 333–344; Nelson W. Polsby, "Two Strategies of Influence: Choosing a Majority Leader, 1962," in Robert L. Peabody and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), *New Perspectives on the House of Representatives* (Chicago, 1963); James A. Robinson, *The House Rules Committee* (Indianapolis, 1963); Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," *op. cit.*, 561–576; Lewis A. Froman and Randall B. Ripley, "Conditions for Party Leadership: The Case of the House Democrats," this REVIEW, 59 (March, 1965), 52–63; and Charles O. Jones, *Party and Policy-Making: The House Republican Policy Committee* (New Brunswick, 1964).

[8] The analysis which follows is dependent upon Nelson W. Polsby's study of the Albert-Bolling contest, "Two Strategies of Influence: Choosing a Majority Leader, 1962," *op cit.;* and Robert L. Peabody, "The Ford-Halleck Minority Leadership Contest, 1965," Eagleton Institute Cases in Practical Politics (New York, 1966), No. 40. The latter study is based on eighty-five interviews with over forty Republican Representatives and staff members during and immediately following the several contests which preoccupied House Republicans from early December, 1964 through February, 1965.

TABLE 1. TYPES OF INTRA-PARTY LEADERSHIP CHANGE

	NO CONTEST	CONTEST
NO VACANCY	Status quo	(5) Revolt or its aftermath
VACANCY		
Established pattern of succession	(1) Routine advancement	(4) Challenge to the heir apparent
No established pattern of succession	(2) Appointment or emergence of a consensus choice	(3) Open competition

1788.[9] This article focuses upon a more common type, *intra-party change*, or the replacement of one or more incumbents within a party hierarchy by other members of the same party. A third type, *institutional reform*, is characterized not by the replacement of leaders, but by alterations in party organization or the rules of a legislature which modify the powers of an existing office or create a new position. In the absence of inter-party turnover and as an alternative to institutional reform, legislators frequently turn to intra-party change, both as a means of fulfilling vacancies and as a device to promote leadership more favorable to their own interests.

Three variables have been selected as a means of classifying types of intra-party leadership change: (1) whether or not a vacancy exists in a leadership position, (2) the presence or absence of an established pattern of succession, and (3) the extent to which the change is contested. When dichotomized these variables lead to a six-fold classification scheme as outlined in Table 1. The first variable is discrete: either a vacancy exists in a given position such as the Speakership, or it does not. The vacancy may come about for a variety of reasons, including death, resignation, retirement, or election defeat. The remaining two variables are not as easily dichotomized. Patterns of succession may be quite firmly established as with elevation from the Minority or Majority Leader to the office of Speaker in the House of Representatives. Other patterns, such as succession to the Majority Leader from the position of party Whip, are only tentative and emerging. The final variable, the extent to which a given change is contested, is even more difficult to define in operational terms. For purposes of this analysis, a "contest" takes place when two or more legislators announce their candidacies and work actively to align support. For simplicity of classification the "contest—no contest" variable has been dichotomized, although as with most variables in the social sciences, it is continuous rather than discrete.[10] That is to say, there are a number of finer gradations along a continuum which a more fully developed scheme would have to take into account. For example, the "no contest" classification may include situations where a contest is considered but abandoned short of announcement because the dissident party faction decides it does not have the necessary votes to make a successful challenge.[11] Contests may range from (a) situations in which two or more candidates announce but all but one withdraw before the final vote, to (b) controversies which force concessions, although the leaders survive, or (c) instances of successful revolt.[12]

These distinctions will become more meaningful after discussion and illustration of the types of intra-party leadership change suggested by this classification scheme: (1) routine advancement, (2) appointment or emergence of a consensus choice, (3) open competition,

[9] U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington, D. C., 1960), pp. 691–692.

[10] For discussion of this problem in the determination of causality, see Hubert M. Blalock, Jr., *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill, 1964), pp. 32–33.

[11] The attention of journalists and political scientists is naturally drawn to instances of organized revolt. For newspapermen, it is conflict, of course, which makes news. But political scientists need to explore situations where the threatened change does not get beyond the discussion stage, as for example, threats to replace Thomas Kuchel, the incumbent Minority Whip in the United States Senate, at the opening of the 89th Congress, and disgruntlement with Speaker McCormack's leadership at the beginning of the 90th Congress.

[12] In the Republican Party (a) is illustrated by the Miller-McCulloch contest of 1960; (b) by the unsuccessful challenge against Minority Whip Arends in 1965 as well as the famed "revolt" against Speaker Cannon in 1910; and (c) by the minority leadership contests of 1959 and 1965.

(4) challenge to the heir apparent, and (5) revolt or its aftermath.

These types are ordered in terms of the amount of credit expenditure (time, energy, number of members involved, and so on) which each is likely to engender.[13] Routine advancement involves little or no expenditure of resources. Dissident members may invest some time conducting an informal poll of the membership to see if a contest has any chance of succeeding. Typically, no commitments are sought, and the campaign is never launched for lack of a single candidate which all opposing factions can rally behind. The second and third types usually involve lower party positions where the stakes are not as high. Leadership appointments may be challenged in a party conference or caucus, but at some cost. If no consensus choice emerges, several candidates may run. Friends, committee associates, and state or regional delegations may be brought in on either side. When the party position is important for the resources it controls, such as the campaign committee chairmanship, or because it is seen as a stepping stone to higher office, then more members are recruited to work actively in behalf of the candidates. If the contest goes to a formal vote, the pressures to align uncommitted members become intense. The greatest credit expenditures are likely to occur in challenges to an heir apparent, or contests which attempt to remove incumbent party leaders. Revolts may end up involving the full time and energy of as many as a third of the party membership over periods of several weeks or longer.

The upper left-hand cell of Table 1 or the *status quo* is, of course, the routine situation. No vacancy in a leadership position exists and no contest takes place. Continuity in office is the general practice in the House of Representatives, as in most organizations. For example, Representative Joseph Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts was first elected to Congress in 1924. He became Republican Minority Leader in 1939. He was re-elected Minority Leader seven times and Speaker twice before the one instance of his defeat in 1959 by his former Majority Leader in the 80th and 83rd Congresses, Charles Halleck of Indiana. Halleck was twice re-elected Minority Leader before his overthrow by Ford in 1965. Republican Whip Leslie Arends, first elected Whip in 1943, has maintained his position under three different Minority Leaders, Martin, Halleck and Ford.

The late Speaker Sam Rayburn of Texas was first elected to Congress in 1912. He became Chairman of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee in 1931. In 1934 he briefly challenged Joseph W. Byrns of Tennessee, the incumbent Majority Leader, for the nomination for Speaker. However, Rayburn withdrew from the race before a vote in the Democratic Caucus. Rayburn went on to defeat Rules Committee Chairman John J. O'Connor of New York in a contest for Majority Leader in 1937. He was elevated to the Speakership in 1940. His occupancy of the top Democratic House position during the next 21 years was never challenged.

The ability of incumbents to retain office is not difficult to explain. Party leaders, particularly Speakers, have multiple opportunities to grant favors, create obligations, and build credit, all of which they can use to maintain a network of continuing support. A Speaker or floor leader has available, in addition, a number of sanctions, including the withholding of patronage and the vetoing of committee assignments, the threat of which can act as strong deterrents on contested change. In addition, there are a number of benefits to be gained from continuity of party leadership, not the least of which is experienced floor management. Contests, and particularly revolts against incumbent leadership, are likely to generate high costs in terms of subsequent party harmony. For all these reasons, the predominant pattern in congressional parties is the retention of incumbents rather than frequent leadership turnover.

II. FREQUENCY OF CHANGE

Evidence of the frequency of change in five major party-wide positions in both the Democratic and Republican parties for a twelve-year

[13] For general discussion of a theory of social exchange, see Talcott Parsons, "On the Concept of Influence," James S. Coleman, "Comment on 'On the Concept of Influence,'" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 27 (Spring, 1963), 37–62, 63–82; George C. Homans, "Social Behavior as Exchange," *American Journal of Sociology*, 65 (May, 1960), 545–556; and Peter M. Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York, 1964). For more specific applications of exchange theory to legislatures, see Robert L. Peabody, "Organization Theory and Legislative Behavior: Bargaining, Hierarchy and Change in the U. S. House of Representatives" (paper delivered before the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 7, 1963); James S. Coleman, "Collective Decisions," *Sociological Inquiry* (Spring, 1964), 166–181; and James D. Barber, "Leadership Strategies for Legislative Party Cohesion," *Journal of Politics*, 28 (May, 1966), 347–367.

TABLE 2. DEMOCRATIC (MAJORITY) PARTY LEADERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1955–1966

Congress	Speaker	Majority Leader	Majority Whip	Caucus Chairman	Congressional (Campaign) Comm. Chairman
84th: 1955 1956	Sam Rayburn,[a] Texas	John McCormack,[b] Mass.	Carl Albert, Okla.	John Rooney, N.Y.	Michael Kirwan,[c] Ohio
85th: 1957 1958	Rayburn	McCormack	Albert	Melvin Price, Ill.	Kirwan
86th: 1959 1960	Rayburn	McCormack	Albert	Price	Kirwan
87th: 1961 1962	Rayburn McCormack	McCormack Albert	Albert Hale Boggs, La.	Francis Walter, Pa.	Kirwan
88th: 1963 1964	McCormack	Albert	Boggs	Walter Albert Thomas, Texas	Kirwan
89th: 1965 1966	McCormack	Albert	Boggs	Eugene Keogh, N.Y.	Kirwan

[a] Rayburn was first elected Speaker in the 76th Congress on September 16, 1940.

[b] McCormack was first elected Majority Leader in the 76th Congress on September 25, 1940.

[c] Kirwan was first elected Chairman of the Democratic National Congressional (Campaign) Committee midway in the 80th Congress (1948).

Sources: George Galloway, *History of the House of Representatives* (New York: Crowell, 1961); Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," this REVIEW, LVIII (September, 1964), 561–576; *Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774–1961*; *Congressional Record; Congressional Quarterly Almanacs;* Michael J. Kirwan, *How to Succeed in Politics* (New York, 1964), p. 9.

period, 1955–1966, is presented in Tables 2 and 3. This period was selected because it encompasses the six complete Congresses since the last election bringing about inter-party change in the organization of the House, the midterm election of 1954.[14]

For the Democratic Party, the majority party in the House of Representatives throughout this period, the five major party-wide leadership positions are the Speaker, the Majority Leader, the Majority Whip, the Chairman of the Democratic Caucus, and the Chairman of the Democratic National Congressional (Campaign) Committee.[15] With the exception of the Whip, all of these positions are elective. The Democratic Whip is appointed by the Majority Leader in consultation with the Speaker. Nominations to lesser party positions are largely controlled by the Speaker and Majority Leader, but their choice must be ratified by the Democratic Caucus, composed of all Democratic House members. Table 2

[14] Only one instance of leadership change took place at the opening of the 90th Congress in January, 1967. Representative Dan Rostenkowski of Chicago was elected Chairman of the Democratic Caucus, replacing Eugene Keogh of New York, who had retired at the end of the 89th Congress. All other incumbent leaders, Democrats and Republicans, were re-elected to the positions they held in the previous Congress. In addition, House Republicans converted the Chairmanship of their Committee on Planning and Research from an appointive to an elective position.

[15] A sixth leadership position, Chairman of the Democratic Steering Committee, has been omitted from consideration. This committee, the counterpart to the Republican Policy Committee, was largely dormant throughout this period. Reactivated briefly in 1962 and again in 1965, its chairman is thirteen-term Representative Ray Madden of Indiana, senior administration supporter on the Committee on Rules.

TABLE 3. REPUBLICAN (MINORITY) PARTY LEADERS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1955–1966

Congress	Minority Leader	Whip	Policy Comm. Chairman	Conference Chairman	Congressional (Campaign) Comm. Chairman
84th: 1955 1956	Joseph Martin,[a] Mass.	Leslie Arends,[b] Ill.	Joseph Martin,[c] Mass.	Clifford Hope,[d] Kan.	Richard Simpson[e], Pa.
85th: 1957 1958	Martin	Arends	Martin	Charles Hoeven, Iowa	Simpson
86th: 1959 1960	Charles Halleck, Indiana	Arends	John Byrnes, Wisc.	Hoeven	Simpson William Miller, N.Y.
87th: 1961 1962	Halleck	Arends	Byrnes	Hoeven	Bob Wilson,[f] Calif.
88th: 1963 1964	Halleck	Arends	Byrnes	Gerald Ford, Mich.	Wilson
89th: 1965 1966	Gerald Ford, Mich.	Arends	John Rhodes, Ariz.	Melvin Laird, Wisc.	Wilson

[a] Martin was first elected Minority Leader at the opening of the 76th Congress, January 3, 1939.

[b] Arends was first elected Minority Whip midway in the 78th Congress (1943).

[c] Martin served as both Minority Leader and Policy Committee Chairman from 1949 until 1959.

[d] Hope served as Conference Chairman from the 82nd Congress until his retirement at the end of the 84th Congress (1951–1956).

[e] Simpson served as Chairman of the Republican Congressional (Campaign) Committee from 1953 until his death on January 7, 1960. He was succeeded by Miller in late January, 1960.

[f] Wilson was elected Chairman of the Republican Congressional (Campaign) Committee on June 29, 1961 following Miller's selection as National Chairman of the Republican Party.

Sources: George Galloway, *History of the House of Representatives* (New York: Crowell, 1961); Randall B. Ripley, "The Party Whip Organizations in the United States House of Representatives," this REVIEW, LVIII (September, 1964), 561–576; *Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774–1961; Congressional Record; Congressional Quarterly Almanacs*; Charles O. Jones, *The Republican Party in American Politics* (New York, 1965.)

lists the incumbents for these five positions since 1955.

For the Republican Party, the minority party throughout this period, the five major party positions are Minority Leader, Minority Whip, Chairman of the Republican Conference, Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee and Chairman of the Republican Congressional (Campaign) Committee. All of these positions are elective in the sense that the nominees must ultimately be approved by the Republican Conference, counterpart to the Democratic Caucus. For two offices during most of this period the selection process has been made by separate committees. From 1919 until 1963 the choice of the Republican Whip was formally made by the Republican Committee on Committees, acting on the recommendation of the Speaker or Minority Leader. In 1965 the Republican Whip was directly elected by the Republican Conference. The Chairman of the Republican Congressional Committee, the counterpart to the Democratic National Congressional Committee, is elected by that committee. As with the Republican Committee on Committees, each state with Republican members is entitled to one Representative with as many votes as there are Republican House members in his state delegation. Table 3 lists the incumbents for these five Republican leadership positions for the 84th–89th Congresses.

As Tables 2 and 3 suggest, the prevailing practice is continuity in office rather than leadership change. At first glance, Republicans are no more susceptible to change than Democrats. Of the thirty changes in each party which could be hypothetically expected (a change in

TABLE 4. TYPES OF INTRA-PARTY LEADERSHIP CHANGE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 84TH–89TH CONGRESSES (1955–1966)

	NO CONTEST		CONTEST[a]	
	Democratic Majority	Republican Minority	Democratic Majority	Republican Minority
NO VACANCY	*Status quo*		(5) *Revolt or its aftermath*	Minority Leader Halleck vs. Martin, 1959 Ford vs. Halleck, 1965 Conference Chairman Ford vs. Hoeven, 1963 Minority Whip Arends vs. Frelinghuysen, 1965[b]
VACANCY	(1) *Routine advancement*		(4) *Challenge to heir apparent*	
Established pattern of succession	Floor leader to Speaker McCormack, 1962			
No established pattern of succession	(2) *Appointment or emergence of a consensus choice*		(3) *Open competition*	
	Majority Whip Albert, 1955 Boggs, 1962		Majority Leader Albert vs. Bolling, 1962	Conference Chairman Laird vs. Frelinghuysen, 1965
	Caucus Chairman Rooney, 1955 Price, 1957 Walter, 1961 Thomas, 1964 Keogh, 1965	Conference Chairman Hoeven, 1957 Policy Comm. Chairman Byrnes, 1959 Rhodes, 1965		Congressional (Campaign) Comm. Chairman Miller vs. McCulloch, 1960 Wilson vs. McCulloch, 1961
Total number of changes	8	3	1	7

[a] In cases of contest, the winning candidate is listed first.

[b] Strictly speaking, the Arends-Frelinghuysen contest is not an illustration of a change in leadership since the incumbent Whip Arends withstood the challenge.

each position with each Congress) each party has made but nine.[16] It should be noted, however, that five of the nine Democratic cases are accounted for by the practice of rotating the largely honorary position of Caucus Chairman among senior Democrats who have not yet become chairman of standing committees.

[16] For the Democrats these nine changes consist of the choice of McCormack for Speaker in 1962; Albert for Majority Leader in 1962; Albert and Boggs for Whip in 1955 and 1962; and the five choices for Chairman of the Democratic Caucus (see Table 2). The nine Republican changes in leadership would include the selections of Halleck and Ford for Minority Leader in 1959 and 1965; Byrnes and Rhodes for Policy Committee Chairman in 1959 and 1965; Hoeven, Ford and Laird for Chairman of the Republican Conference in 1957, 1963, and 1965; and Miller and Wilson for Chairman of the Campaign Committee in 1960 and 1961 (see Table 3). In the following section one further case is added, the unsuccessful attempt to remove Arends as Minority Whip in 1965.

As will become more apparent, the way in which change comes about has far more important consequences than the number of changes *per se*.

III. LEADERSHIP CHANGE, 84TH–89TH CONGRESSES

The utility of a classification scheme is demonstrated both by its ability to order phenomena as well as the fruitfulness of the hypotheses it generates. Before suggesting why one party resorts to conflict as a means of change more frequently than the other party, each of the five types of intra-party leadership change needs further elaboration. Four of the five types are illustrated by nineteen cases of change or attempted change which took place during the 84th–89th Congresses (Table 4). Two earlier contests for the nomination for Speaker within the Republican Party in 1919 and 1931 provide more clear-cut cases of the remaining type, challenge to an heir apparent.

(1) *Routine advancement.* This first type of intra-party leadership change takes place when

a vacancy occurs in a top leadership position, a clear pattern of succession exists, and the next-ranking member in the party hierarchy is elevated without challenge. One index of the increasing institutionalization of the House has been the development of patterns of succession to top leadership. Eleven of the twelve Speakers in the twentieth century have been elevated from either the majority leadership or from the minority leadership following congressional election victories. The one exception to this established pattern was Gillett's defeat of Minority Leader Mann for the Republican nomination for Speaker after Republicans regained control of the House in 1919.

McCormack's succession to the Speakership in January, 1962, following the death of Rayburn, illustrates the prevailing practice of routine advancement. Rayburn and McCormack had served together in the principal Democratic leadership positions in the House since September, 1940. When Speaker Bankhead of Alabama died in 1940, Majority Leader Rayburn was elevated without contest. McCormack, with White House backing, defeated Clifton Woodrum of Virginia for the office of Majority Leader by a vote of 141 to 67. Prior to his selection, McCormack was Chairman of the Democratic Caucus and fourth-ranking member on the Ways and Means Committee. His northern background, which complemented Rayburn's, was a strong factor in his election. The two men served in tandem throughout the 1940's and 1950's, dropping down to Minority Leader and Minority Whip, respectively, during the two Republican-controlled Congresses, the 80th and 83rd.

Rayburn's health began to fail in the summer of 1961. Before he left for his home in Bonham, Texas in late August he designated Majority Leader McCormack as Speaker pro tempore. McCormack served out the remaining month of the session in that capacity. Rayburn died on November 16, 1961.

None of McCormack's possible liabilities—his age, religion, or lack of popularity with some elements of the House, particularly Democratic Study Group members—proved serious enough to bring on a challenge. Some members feared that McCormack, at 71, was slowing down and would not provide the strong leadership necessary to get the Kennedy legislative program enacted. Others were hostile to the elevation of another Roman Catholic to a position of national leadership along with President Kennedy and Senate Majority Leader Mansfield. Although not particularly popular with Northern liberals and some Southern members, McCormack had the support and respect of a number of the senior oligarchs of the House, especially Carl Vinson of Georgia and Howard W. Smith of Virginia. The inability of his opponents to rally around one of the several possible candidates and the hands-off policy adopted by President Kennedy and his White House assistants made McCormack's election inevitable. On January 10, 1962, he became the 45th Speaker of the House.

(2) *Appointment or emergence of a consensus choice.* This second type of change is illustrated by a number of appointments or unchallenged elections at the lower levels of the party hierarchy where patterns of succession are not yet established. The appointments of Majority Whips Carl Albert in 1955 and Hale Boggs in 1962 are illustrative. When the Democrats regained control of the House in the 84th Congress (1955–56), a vacancy had been created in the Whip position by Tennessee Representative Percy Priest's elevation to the Chairmanship of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Albert, who was beginning his fifth term, had come to Rayburn's attention as the Representative of the Oklahoma district adjacent to Rayburn's own Texas district and through parliamentary skills displayed in floor debate. At the same time that Rayburn and McCormack were appointing Albert as Majority Whip, they created a new position of Deputy Whip for another talented young Representative, Hale Boggs of Louisiana. In January, 1962, after Albert was elected Majority Leader, he appointed Boggs as Majority Whip. John Moss of California advanced from a regional whip position to Deputy Whip at the same time.

The selection of the Chairmen of the Democratic Caucus for these six Congresses also illustrates this second type. Since the principal responsibility of this party official is to preside over the party caucus at the opening of each session of Congress, a caucus which seldom meets again, the position is primarily honorary. By tradition, incumbents serve for one, or at the most, two terms. They are nominated by the leadership and selected from a pool of loyal, senior members who are not yet chairmen of standing committees.

Until 1963, the Chairman of the Republican Conference was also an honorary title with few duties beyond presiding over infrequent meetings of House Republicans. Unlike the Democrats, the Republicans have not rotated the position. Thus, Clifford Hope of Kansas served in this capacity from 1951 until his retirement in 1956. Charles Hoeven of Iowa, first selected in 1957, served until his defeat by Gerald Ford at the opening of the 88th Con-

gress. Since Ford's election in 1963, and particularly since Melvin Laird's election in 1965, the responsibility of the Republican Conference Chairman has undergone considerable reorganization and up-grading.

Two uncontested choices for Chairman of the Republican Policy Committee also illustrate emergence of a consensus choice. In response to the disastrous 1948 election, Republicans seeking to improve their organizational structure converted a defunct steering committee into a policy committee. Little was made of it, however. Republican Minority Leader Martin served as Chairman of a largely inoperative committee for the next ten years. In 1959, following Charles Halleck's overthrow of Martin, the Chairmanship was given independent status. John W. Byrnes of Wisconsin, the most senior available member save for Halleck among several members considered as possible challengers to Martin, was elected without opposition.

The selection of John Rhodes of Arizona as Byrnes' successor in 1965 is a less clear-cut case of a consensus choice. Byrnes resigned from the Chairmanship of the Republican Policy Committee in late January, 1965 in order to devote his full time to serving as ranking minority member of the Ways and Means Committee. With Byrnes' endorsement, the Republican Conference adopted a resolution on January 14, 1965 which prohibits its five principal party leaders from serving as chairman or ranking minority member on standing committees. Byrnes' intention to resign had cleared the way for another Wisconsin Republican, Melvin Laird, to be elected Chairman of the Republican Conference. The selection of Rhodes was not challenged, even though he was not the new Minority Leader Ford's first choice. Rhodes, first elected to Congress in 1952, had served as Chairman of the Policy Committee's subcommittee on special projects since 1961. A friend of Ford's, he had nevertheless backed Halleck in the 1965 contest against Ford. After Rhodes announced his candidacy, Ford considered putting up a candidate of his own choice, but because of the potential costs to his own prestige and to party harmony, he decided to avoid a direct confrontation. With the support of Laird and Arends, he created a separate Committee on Planning and Research to coordinate the task forces. Ford's first choice to head the Republican Policy Committee had been four-term Representative Charles Goodell of New York. Goodell, co-manager of Ford's successful challenge to Halleck, was appointed Chairman of the newly created Committee on Planning and Research. His appointment was confirmed on February 23, 1965, the same day that Rhodes was unanimously elected Chairman of a restructured Republican Policy Committee.

(3) *Open competition.* When a vacancy occurs in a party leadership position which is not appointive and where no pattern of succession has been established, open competition between two or more candidates may take place. The two contests for Chairmanship of the Republican Congressional (Campaign) Committee in 1960 and 1961 illustrate this type. Richard Simpson of Pennsylvania, Chairman from 1953 to 1960, died on January 7, 1960. Many of the Republican members who had backed Martin against Halleck in 1959, aligned themselves behind William McCulloch of Ohio. On January 20, 1960 the Halleck forces won a further victory when their candidate, William E. Miller of New York, was elected Chairman. Miller had behind-the-scenes support from Vice President Richard M. Nixon, and was also acceptable to another prospective presidential candidate, Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York. When Miller was elevated to Chairman of the Republican National Committee in June, 1961, another non-mid-westerner, Bob Wilson of California, emerged from a field of potential candidates which included Laird of Wisconsin, Rhodes of Arizona, and Ford of Michigan, in addition to McCulloch. While the selection of Miller and Wilson cannot be divorced from prior House contests and political maneuvering on the national scene, they also reflected successful efforts to widen geographical and expand suburban representation within the House Republican leadership.

Both regional and ideological differences were at issue in another example of open competition, the contest between Laird of Wisconsin and Peter Frelinghuysen of New Jersey for Chairman of the Republican Conference in 1965. Ford, the Chairman in the previous Congress, had announced his intention to resign regardless of the outcome of his open challenge to Minority Leader Halleck. Laird, sympathetic to Ford's candidacy, announced his own independent bid for the Conference Chairmanship on December 29, 1964, the week before the 89th Congress convened. First elected to Congress in 1952, Laird had risen to fourth-ranking Republican on Appropriations and served as Chairman of the Republican Platform Committee at San Francisco in 1964. His firm management of the drafting of the platform, which Goldwater and Miller later campaigned on, led to intensified criticism of Laird from eastern seaboard liberals such as

John Lindsay of New York and Bradford Morse and Silvio Conte of Massachusetts. Together with some twenty House colleagues organized as the Wednesday Club, they decided to field a last-minute candidate of their own. Meeting on Sunday night before the January 4, 1965 vote, the Wednesday Club selected Frelinghuysen as their choice. He had only recently joined their group but he was one of the few members with a seniority equivalent to Laird's. Despite Frelinghuysen's late announcement he received 62 votes to 77 cast for Laird.

Richard Bolling's abortive effort to prevent Carl Albert's advancement from Democratic Whip to Majority Leader at the opening of the second session of the 87th Congress in 1962 represents still another example of open competition. Following Rayburn's death in 1961, Bolling at first considered a challenge to McCormack. He finally concluded he would have a better chance to defeat Albert, although he realized that in both cases the odds were severely stacked against him. Strong support for Bolling's candidacy failed to materialize. Just before Congress reconvened his hard count was estimated at sixty-five to seventy votes, far short of the 130 votes needed to win in the Democratic Caucus. Bolling announced his withdrawal on January 3rd, 1962. One week later at the opening caucus Carl Albert was unanimously elected Majority Leader.[17]

(4) *Challenge to an heir apparent.* This fourth type of contest takes place when a vacancy occurs through death, defeat or retirement, but the apparent successor's claim is contested. No clear-cut case took place in the House during the 84th–89th Congresses. Several earlier contests in this century, the Gillett-Mann struggle over the nomination for Speakership in 1919, and the upset of former Majority Leader Tilson by Republican Rules Committee Chairman Snell in 1931 just prior to the organization of the 72nd Congress, are illustrative examples. The Republican Party had endured minority status and the rather arbitrary rule of Minority Leader James R. Mann of Illinois, successor to Speaker Cannon, for eight years before they regained control of the House in the election of 1918. Favorable election results did not inhibit national party leaders and House opponents of Mann from putting together enough support within the Republican Conference to win the nomination, and ultimately, the Speakership, for Frederick H. Gillett of Massachusetts. Gillett, first elected in 1892, was one of two Republicans in the House who had served longer than any other member, save for ex-Speaker Cannon. Gillett, the ranking Republican member on the Committee on Appropriations, had few personal enemies. Mann, in contrast, had antagonized many members in both parties with his relentless and caustic criticisms of legislation. In addition to his strong identification with the Cannon regime, his opponents accused him of conflict of interest in his relations with the Chicago meat packing industry. On February 27, 1919, Gillett defeated Mann by 138 votes to 69 with three other candidates receiving 18 votes.[18] Gillett served as a rather ineffective Speaker from 1919 to 1924, when he resigned to run for the Senate.

In 1931, Halleck's predecessor, Joseph Martin of Massachusetts, backed Bertrand H. Snell of New York in a bitter Conference struggle resulting in the overthrow of Republican Speaker Nicholas Longworth's apparent successor, 73-year old John Q. Tilson of Connecticut.[19] Longworth had died on April 9, 1931, before the 72nd Congress convened. Tilson had served as Republican Majority

[17] This contest comes close to qualifying as the fourth type, *challenge to the heir apparent.* Excerpts from the interviews reported in Polsby's detailed study of this contest clearly reveal the extent to which members perceived Albert as "'entitled' to the job by virtue of his six years' service in the leadership hierarchy of the House." *op. cit.*, p. 247. But while the pattern of succession from Floor Leader to Speaker has been firmly established, there is only limited precedent for elevating the party Whip to Floor Leader. Oscar Underwood of Alabama served briefly as Minority Whip in 1900–1901, but ten years intervened before he became Majority Floor Leader in 1911. With the possible exception of John Garner of Texas, no other Floor Leader save for Albert had previously served as Whip *prior* to his first selection as Floor Leader: Ripley, *op. cit.*, p. 563, p. 564, n. 19. Albert, however, was able to capitalize on McCormack's two related experiences of serving as Minority Whip and then moving back up to Majority Leader following the 80th and 83rd Congresses. Boggs' elevation from Deputy Whip to Whip in 1962 was further evidence of a developing pattern.

[18] *New York Times*, February 28, 1919, p. 1; Chiu, *op. cit.*, pp. 25–27.

[19] Snell moved from 55 votes on the first ballot to a 96 to 64 lead over Tilson on the seventh ballot but still one short of a majority. Before the eighth ballot began, Tilson moved to make the nomination unanimous. *New York Times*, December 1, 1931, pp. 1, 4; December 8, 1931, pp. 1, 16.

Leader under Longworth since 1925, the year in which Martin was first elected to the House. This contest followed a 49-seat election setback for the Republicans in 1930. The deaths of several Republican incumbents before December, 1931 allowed the Democrats to gain control of the House and frustrated Snell's ambitions to be Speaker. Snell voluntarily retired from the House in 1938. Martin, the eastern Assistant Whip and the Republican Campaign Chairman in a year in which the Republicans won back 80 seats, was elected Minority Leader in 1939, without any serious challenge.[20]

(5) *Revolt or its aftermath.* This last type, usually the most costly in terms of the investment of resources required, takes place when: (1) no vacancy in a leadership position exists, (2) the incumbent cannot be persuaded to step aside, and (3) an intra-party contest ensues. The Halleck-Martin struggle for the Minority Leadership in 1959, the Ford-Hoeven fight over the Chairmanship of the Republican Conference in 1963, and the Ford-Halleck contest for the Minority Leadership in 1965, all illustrate this type of intra-party change. Ford's unsuccessful attempt to remove incumbent Minority Whip Arends represents a quite different form of revolt.

In the late 1950's, when Martin's health began to fail, a number of younger Republicans sought more vigorous party leadership. The election disaster of 1958 provided a further impetus for change. In mid-December, more than a dozen Republicans met in the office of Representative Bob Wilson of California to discuss what could be done to improve party fortunes. While they were agreed that new leadership was needed, they were divided in their choice among Halleck of Indiana, Byrnes of Wisconsin, Ford of Michigan, and Simpson of Pennsylvania. In an informal poll of members, they found widespread sentiment for change, but only one active candidate, former Majority Leader Halleck. After determining that the White House would remain neutral, Halleck announced his candidacy. On the eve of the vote, his backers estimated they had more than eighty votes of the 154 Republican Representatives-elect. Martin, like Halleck six years later, did not take the challenge seriously until it was too late.

At the afternoon conference on Tuesday, January 6, 1959, the Martin forces led by Richard Simpson of Pennsylvania, Leo Allen and Leslie Arends of Illinois, and Clarence Brown of Ohio, lost a move to avoid a secret ballot by a vote of 96 to 50. Halleck edged Martin on the first ballot by a vote of 73 to 72 with one ballot rejected as illegible. Since neither candidate received a majority another ballot was necessary. Halleck won on the second ballot by a vote of 74 to 70.[21]

The Ford-Hoeven contest of 1963 was an important precursor of the 1965 minority leadership struggle. It was initiated at the opening of the 88th Congress by two junior members on the House Education and Labor Committee, Robert P. Griffin of Michigan (first elected in 1956) and Charles E. Goodell of New York (first elected in a special election on May 26, 1959). After considering and rejecting challenges to either Halleck or Arends, Griffin and Goodell decided to go after the Republican Conference Chairmanship as a further step toward revitalizing party machinery. With the active support of most of the House members elected in 1958, 1960 and 1962, and the tacit approval of many of the same activists who had promoted the Halleck upset of Martin, they launched an over-the-weekend campaign against Hoeven, the incumbent Conference Chairman since 1957. On January 8, 1963, their candidate, the 49-year-old Ford,

[20] Joe Martin, *My First Fifty Years in Politics* (as told to Robert J. Donovan) (New York, 1960), pp. 81–82.

[21] The best single review of this contest is Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 29–38. His summary contains one questionable statement: "A poll of members showed that John W. Byrnes of Wisconsin had the most support, Gerald R. Ford, Jr., of Michigan was second, and Halleck was third." (p. 35). A more plausible interpretation is that the informal polls taken in late December and early January were too indefinite to do much more than suggest that there were several possible candidates with Halleck and Byrnes the front-runners. The insurgents discussed going with Byrnes, but found him reluctant to step out in front of Halleck, an experienced floor leader. When one of their group, former Representative Jack Westland of Washington, discussed the possibilities of a revolt with Halleck in Florida, Halleck insisted on his right as the former Majority Leader to make the challenge. Other contemporary accounts seem to support this interpretation. See, for example, Richard Fryklund, "Story of G.O.P. Revolt Has Varied Chapters," *Washington Star*, January 11, 1959, p. A-1; John L. Steele, "G.O.P. Tactics That Toppled A Veteran Leader," *Life*, January 19, 1959; and Martin's own version, *op. cit.*, pp. 3–19. I am indebted to Representative Bob Wilson for making available a 69-page scrapbook of clippings and other materials which he kept on this contest.

defeated the 67-year-old Hoeven, by a secret ballot vote of 86 to 78.[22]

A necessary, but not sufficient, cause of the 1965 revolt was the Republican election disaster of November, 1964. The Goldwater defeat and the net loss of thirty-eight Republican House seats created a psychological climate within which revolt flourished. But the seeds of dissatisfaction with Halleck's leadership extended back to bitterness engendered by Halleck's defeat of Martin in 1959. This irritation and unrest was compounded by the continuing frustrations of minority status. Agitation for change, only temporarily dampened by Ford's defeat of Hoeven in 1963, intensified throughout the long and trying sessions of the 88th Congress.

A post-election House Republican Conference held on December 16, 1964 put Halleck to test. Although called to evaluate Republican party organization and policy positions, its principal consequence was to bring back to Washington a diversified group of younger activists who were convinced that the first step toward achieving majority status was new leadership. Two likely challengers emerged, Gerald R. Ford, Jr. of Michigan and Melvin R. Laird of Wisconsin. Ford, with four more years of seniority, was selected as the candidate with the best chance of defeating Halleck.

Ford announced his candidacy on December 19, 1964. By dint of superior organization and hard campaigning the young activists, led by Griffin of Michigan, Goodell of New York, Quie of Minnesota, Ellsworth of Kansas, and Rumsfeld of Illinois, got off to an early lead which they never relinquished. Halleck's counter-attack was a classic illustration of "too little and too late." Only a few members worked actively in his behalf. Most of his contacts were made in the final week of the campaign. Only in the closing days did he begin to cash in on his credits outstanding. On January 4, 1965, at the opening of the 89th Congress, Ford defeated Halleck by a secret ballot vote of 73 to 67. In the final analysis, it was the two-thirds of the House Republican Party in the five most junior classes which made victory possible for Ford. The bulk of his support, and certainly the organizational nucleus of his campaign, came from members elected in 1956 and subsequent elections.[23]

A fourth contest, New Jersey Representative Frelinghuysen's unsuccessful challenge to the incumbent Minority Whip, Leslie Arends of Illinois, ten days after Ford's defeat of Halleck in 1965, came about as an aftermath of revolt. In this instance, the challenger ran with the new Minority Leader's endorsement in a losing effort to consolidate the revolt and provide wider geographical and ideological representation within the minority leadership. Arend's early start in the defense of his incumbency, his more than twenty years of service as party Whip, and his wide-spread personal popularity proved to be too strong. He won by 70 votes to 59. Frelinghuysen's personal reserve and rather aristocratic background cost him some support. So did his identification with the Wednesday Club. Conservatives, already smarting under National Chairman Burch's resignation, found Frelinghuysen's stand on the nuclear policy plank at San Francisco and his general liberal voting record on foreign affairs further reasons for opposing Ford's choice. In any event, Ford, like Martin and Halleck before him, came to understand more fully that members are more hesitant to reveal their true preferences to an incumbent Minority Leader.

IV. CONDITIONS WHICH FACILITATE OR INHIBIT CHANGE

The differences between the dominant types of intra-party change adopted by the two parties are quite striking. As Table 4 illustrates, all but one of the nine instances of leadership selection in the Democratic majority were uncontested. Even in this one instance—the Albert-Bolling fight for Majority Leader in 1961–62—the challenger withdrew before the contest reached the voting stage in the Democratic Caucus. In contrast, seven of the ten Republican leadership changes were decided by intra-party combat. Four of the seven contests involved challenges to incumbents.

Why has the Democratic majority developed patterns of succession and utilized relatively peaceful means of leadership change? What causes the Republican minority to seldom resort to change short of contests? Among the most important factors which combine to facilitate or inhibit one type of change rather than another are (1) the skill of the incumbent, (2) majority-minority status, (3) election results, and (4) differences in hierarchy and structure in the two congressional parties.

Skill of the incumbent. The age, personality and skill of the incumbent in contrast to his potential or actual challengers, are clearly among the most crucial factors affecting patterns of leadership change. In contrast to their

[22] "Ford's Election Sparks Shifts in GOP House Strategy," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 21 (February 8, 1963), 149–156.

[23] Peabody, "The Ford-Halleck Minority Leadership Contest, 1965," *op. cit.*, pp. 32–35.

Democratic counterparts, first, Martin and later, Halleck seemed to have lost touch with their colleagues, particularly junior Republicans. Halleck and his supporters used this criticism to telling advantage in the 1959 minority leadership contest. The same charge was leveled against Halleck in 1965. As one of his supporters admitted: "I don't know anyone who was really close to him. That was one of Charlie's problems—communication. I presume he ate by himself. He didn't show up at the Republican luncheon in the Capitol. He shielded himself from other members. He was out of touch with the team to an unnecessary degree." Truman's analysis of voting patterns in an earlier Congress, the 81st, provides some corroborating evidence. Neither Martin nor Halleck appeared to be very influential with the more junior members of the Republican minority; Democratic junior members were much more likely to vote in accordance with their party floor leader, McCormack.[24]

One characteristic of successful leadership is an ability to recruit and develop younger talent for positions of future leadership. Rayburn had this reputation. One of Ford's principal campaign themes was his promise to be accessible to all and to make 60-minute ball players out of all 140 House Republicans. Assessments of personality played a prominent role in the outcomes of other contests, for example, Albert's popularity and Bolling's relative estrangement in 1962.

Leadership contests are won by the side which can mobilize the greatest number of members who are willing to work long and intensively in an effort to convert their fellow congressmen. Here, more than in typical battles over legislative issues, personal loyalities and animosities developed over a series of Congresses are crucial. Respect, trust and affection are usually more crucial than explicit bargaining based on such tangible objects of exchange as committee assignments or the promise of additional patronage. Over the long run, however, the majority leadership enjoys greater stability, in part, because of its superior resources, both tangible and intangible.

Majority-minority status. Congressional leaders have many opportunities to help their colleagues achieve their personal and legislative objectives. A leader's endorsement frequently decides which one of several candidates will receive a preferred committee assignment. A floor leader may interrupt a freshman member's speech to argue in favor of his public works project and in the process, convert enough wavering members to make the difference. Party leaders appear at fund-raising dinners. They provide the kind of personal endorsement which will enhance a member's chances for re-election. Both majority and minority party leaders are constantly involved in such credit-building endeavors. But majority party leaders enjoy superior resources. They work within a climate of expanding rather than contracting credit.

Credit expands because of the multiple benefits which accrue with majority status. There are more committee assignments and appointments to prestige boards and commissions to be distributed. It is the majority which receives most of the credit when legislation is passed. Their projects receive higher priority. Majority members chair the committees and subcommittees. With position comes staff, superior access to executive officialdom, and greater influence on legislative outcomes. Since there are more benefits to go around, majority members are more satisfied and less critical of their leadership. Majority status promotes a search for compromise, accommodation and the acceptance of the established patterns of succession.

In contrast, the minority party operates in an environment of continuing frustration and increasing discord. There are fewer choice committee assignments to go around. The majority controls most of the prestige appointments. Political patronage and staff assistance are not as abundant. Opportunities for constructive participation in the drafting and implementing of major legislation are more limited. Limited resources, contracting credit, an inability to adequately reward the party faithful, the prospects of continuing defeat in floor struggles—all foster internal dissension and further undermine the leadership. If election results continue to run against the minority party, as they have with House Republicans during this period with the single exception of 1960, then party juniors are motivated to take their frustrations out through change in leadership.

Election results. Party structure and leadership change in the House of Representatives are intimately related to congressional election results. In the first place, the party which wins a majority of the 435 seats earns the right to organize the House, choose the Speaker and select the committee chairmen. What has not been so clearly understood is the relationship between the aggregate size of the net gain or loss and its implications for intra-party leadership change. Strong victories promote good will and generally reflect to the benefit of party

[24] Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 212–227.

TABLE 5. PARTY LINE-UP, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND PRESIDENT, 1954–1964

Election Year	Congress	House of Representatives				President
		Members Elected		Gains/Losses*		
		Dem.	Rep.	Dem.	Rep.	
1954	84th	232	203	+19	−18	Eisenhower (R)
1956	85th	234	201	+ 2	− 2	
1958	86th	283	154	+49	−47	
1960	87th	263	174	−20	+20	Kennedy (D)
1962	88th	259	176	− 4	+ 2	
1964	89th	295	140	+38	−38	Johnson (D)

* Gains and losses do not always balance because of independent candidates or increases and decreases in the size of the House as a result of the admission of Hawaii and Alaska and reapportionment.

Source: *Congress and the Nation* (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Service, 1965), p. 63.

leaders. Conversely, defeat results in pessimism hostility and a search for scapegoats. If the net losses are particularly severe, as many as thirty to fifty seats, then the possibilities of minority leadership change through revolt are greatly enhanced.

Table 5 summarizes the congressional election results and party line-ups from 1954 to 1964. This period was a particularly trying one for House Republicans. Eisenhower was in the White House from 1952 to 1960, but Republicans lost control of Congress after 1954. They continued as a minority party through the mid-sixties. Halleck apparently considered the possibility of a contest against Martin after the elections of 1954 and 1956, but did not make a bid because White House neutrality was not forthcoming. At least three, and perhaps, all four cases of revolt were preceded by election disappointments. In the 1958 election, House Republicans suffered a further net loss of 47 seats. Halleck's defeat of Martin followed. Under Halleck's leadership and with Nixon at the head of the ticket, House Republicans made moderate gains in 1960.

When traditional midterm gains were not forthcoming in 1962, junior Republicans led by Goodell and Griffin took out their frustrations on Republican Conference Chairman Hoeven. In 1964, with Goldwater at the head of the Republican ticket, House Republicans lost 48 House seats and picked up only 10 seats previously held by Democrats. Ford's defeat of Halleck and the attempt to remove Arends followed. A senior Republican, who played a prominent role in both the 1959 and 1965 minority leadership contests, summed up the climate created by election defeats:

> Such elections normally make minorities anxious. A climate is created. Members are seeking some way to make a change. It is in the nature of things. If the results are downhill, you make the change. If you hold your own or win, you don't. The election defeat creates an environment which makes members look for some change. It's a sense of unrest, a subconscious searching for something to ease individual consciences. The result is often "let's change our leadership."

The Democratic majority fared far better throughout this period, a factor which contributed to stable leadership. After regaining control of the House in 1954, Speaker Rayburn and Majority Leader McCormack picked Albert as Whip and created the new position of Deputy Whip for Boggs. In the face of Eisenhower's overwhelming victory in 1956, the Democratic leadership was content to hold its own. Inability to capitalize on large Democratic majorities achieved in 1958 led to the formation of the Democratic Study Group.[25] Composed of mostly Northern moderates and liberals, the DSG played a crucial role in the 1961 flight to enlarge the principal scheduling body of the House, the Committee on Rules. But Rayburn also needed 22 Republican votes to offset 1960 election losses in his narrow 217–212 win.[26] After Rayburn's death, McCor-

[25] Kenneth Kofmehl, "The Institutionalization of a Voting Bloc," *Western Political Quarterly*, 17 (June, 1964), 256–272.

[26] Milton C. Cummings, Jr. and Robert L. Peabody, "The Decision to Enlarge the Committee on Rules: An Analysis of the 1961 Vote," in Peabody and Polsby, *op. cit.*, pp. 167–194.

mack, Albert and Boggs each advanced one step in the party hierarchy. Following decisive election gains in 1964, the DSG promoted caucus action which stripped two Southern Democrats of their committee seniority and brought about further liberalization of the House rules.

Election defeat tends to produce party leadership conflict within the Republican minority. Conversely, election successes have enhanced leadership stability in the House Democratic majority.[27] But it is not just the climate created by the election, but its impact on hierarchy and party structure within the two House parties which promotes or deters change.

Hierarchy and party structure. The Republican minority has been more prone to leadership change through contested means for two further reasons. First, unlike the Democratic majority, Republicans in recent Congresses have suffered from a disproportionate number of junior members to senior members. This problem becomes particularly acute after major election defeats, such as 1958 and 1964. For example, following the Goldwater disaster, 93 of the 140 House Republicans (66.4 percent) were members of the five most junior classes (1956, 1958, 1960, 1962 and 1964). Even with the large class of entering freshmen, the comparable figure for Democrats was 169 members out of 295 (57.3 percent). What was more striking, however, was not relatively greater average seniority among Democrats, but much more depth among its senior members. Of 72 members in the 89th Congress who had served 10 terms or more, only 11 (15.6 percent) were Republicans. Just as Martin before him, it was Halleck who suffered most from the loss of loyal senior supporters in 1964.

Conversely, it was the very existence of this pool of senior Democrats, many of them committee chairmen and heads of state delegations, which helps to explain the development of hierarchical patterns of leadership succession and the reluctance to challenge incumbents characteristic of the Democratic majority. A Representative must have substantial service, a minimum of five terms, before he can be considered a candidate for leadership. Seniority is not the only factor. The dissident factions must settle on a candidate capable of winning. When a vacancy occurs there are likely to be two or three equally plausible prospects, no one of which is preferable to all of the factions within the party. Hierarchical balance is bolstered by traditions of the majority party which foster moderation and acceptance of the existing leadership. "Above all, in the House, one must *last*. If one does last, influence will accrue, but this power is diluted with any defeat. So a congressman, however strong or senior, does not commit himself carelessly. He waits."[28]

Differences in party structure also contribute to the pronounced variations in types of leadership change characteristic of the two House parties. At the risk of oversimplification and ignoring variations from Congress to Congress, the Democratic majority is composed of more than two Northern moderates and liberals for every Southern conservative. Urban machine Democrats and border state congressmen, epitomized by Speaker McCormack and Majority Leader Albert, have traditionally formed a moderating nucleus between the ideological extremes of the party. Neither wing can organize the House nor reap the benefits of majority status without the other. Although this dominant cleavage makes House Democrats less cohesive than Republicans in their voting patterns, majority status and the need to promote a presidential program lead to greater accommodation among elective leaders and seniority leaders than is the case among minority Republicans.[29]

In contrast, the Republican minority, although characterized by greater voting cohesiveness, is less susceptible to compromise and accommodation. Its rather monolithic voting structure is skewed heavily in the conservative direction. There appears to be little attempt by conservatives, who outnumber liberals by six or seven to one, to tolerate dissent or accord liberals positions in the party leadership. If the activities of the Wednesday Club in a series of contests taking place at the opening of the 89th Congress are at all charac-

[27] The impact of the midterm election of 1966 on prospective leadership change at the beginning of the 90th Congress adds further support to these generalizations. Republicans made a net gain of 47 House seats, but fell 31 seats short of winning control. The party breakdown for the 90th Congress was 248 Democrats and 187 Republicans. A principal effect of the election was to consolidate Ford's position as Minority Leader. Although the House Democratic majority leadership came in for some criticism and floor setbacks in the opening months, their leadership positions were not directly contested.

[28] Excerpt from an unpublished newsletter of the late Representative Clem Miller, January-February, 1962, p. 3.

[29] For evidence of such effects in an earlier Congress, the 81st, see Truman, *op. cit.*, pp. 231–246.

teristic, liberals have seldom been cohesive enough to form a balance of power between personal or sectional interests within the predominantly conservative Republican ranks.

Lacking a better historical perspective the full import of party structure for leadership change must remain speculative. But it would appear that the basic bimodal distribution within the Democratic majority is a strength as well as a weakness, since it promotes compromise and a trading off of major leadership positions between North and South. The relatively monolithic structure of the House Republican party may lend itself to party harmony and centralization of leadership when the G.O.P. controls Congress, but this same structure seems to discourage accommodation and the selection of its leaders short of contests in times of minority status.

V. CONSEQUENCES

What difference does it make when a Halleck upsets a Martin or a McCormack succeeds a Rayburn? More broadly, what are the consequences when one party, the Democratic majority, develops patterns of succession to top leadership, while the other, the Republican minority, seldom stops short of contests in the selection of its party leaders? As Truman, Huitt and others have pointed out, the discretionary aspects of congressional leadership are considerable.[30] Their personalities and backgrounds not only shape the positions they occupy, but also have important implications for the careers of their supporters and the success or failure of legislation. The predominant mode of change adopted by the two House parties has additional consequences for national elections, the two-party system, and representative government.

Within the confines of this article it is impossible to assess fully the impact of even the most important leadership choices made by the two House parties during this twelve year period. It is possible, however, to use two examples—Halleck's defeat of Martin in 1959 and McCormack's elevation to the Speakership in 1962—to briefly illustrate some of the most important kinds of consequences of replacing one incumbent leader by another.[31]

Revolt, by its very nature, results in more wholesale change than orderly succession. Following his defeat of Martin, Halleck brought new vigor to the Republican party leadership. A canny, aggressive "gut-fighter," he was at his best in the give-and-take of floor debate and behind-the-scenes maneuvering. In contrast to Martin, he seldom cooperated with Rayburn, McCormack and the more liberal wing of the Democratic majority, but instead actively cultivated ties with conservative Southern Democrats. Moderate Republicans on the Committee on Rules who had retired or advanced to the Senate were replaced with solid conservatives. The dormant Republican Policy Committee was reinstituted, John Byrnes of Wisconsin was elected Chairman, and arrangements were made to provide professional staff. Under Byrnes and John Rhodes of Arizona, task forces were created to investigate problems which cut across committee lines or which might serve as the basis of campaign issues. Freshman members were given representation on the executive subcommittee of the Republican Committee on Committees.

When Halleck took over as Minority Leader in 1959 Republicans had 154 House members. At one time during the 88th Congress, the number increased to 178. For a majority of 140 Republicans-elect at the beginning of the 89th Congress, however, Halleck's ability to promote party solidarity and to administer defeat to Democratic proposals was not enough. Ford's promise to "promote and communicate the image of a fighting, forward-looking party seeking responsible and constructive solutions to national problems" struck a receptive chord. The intensive efforts of some 30 members working in Ford's behalf led to Halleck's defeat only six years after his own coup.

Peaceful succession brings on more incremental change, but the impact of such different personalities as Rayburn and McCormack on the office of the Speaker is considerable. McCormack's style is both more institutional and partisan than Rayburn's. He calls more meetings to discuss legislative strategy and involves the Majority Leader and Whip to a much greater extent than Rayburn did. Under his leadership, the Democratic Steering Committee has been revived and the Caucus has come into greater use. The telephone is one of McCormack's most effective weapons—"I'd call the devil if I thought would do any good." In contrast, Rayburn operated on a more

[30] Truman, *op. cit.*, p. 245; Huitt, *op. cit.*, pp. 336–337.

[31] For an attempt to more fully analyze the consequences of Ford's defeat of Halleck in 1965, see Robert L. Peabody, "House Republican Leadership: Change and Consolidation in a Minority Party" (paper delivered before the American Political Science Association, New York City, September 9, 1966).

independent and personal basis. He preferred the intimacy and informality of after-the-session gatherings of the "Board of Education."[32] The Whip organization was used less frequently and Rayburn almost never called a party Caucus beyond the opening meeting.

McCormack's shift from partisan Majority Leader to impartial presiding officer was not an easy transition. His strong partisan identifications reflect his South Boston organizational ties. Rayburn's rural Texas background and more conservative political outlook made him more acceptable to most Southern Democrats. He was more inclined to cooperate with Republicans, a relationship facilitated by his close friendship with former Minority Leader Martin.

With the selection of a new Speaker or Minority Leader, some congressmen exercise more influence and others fall out of favor. The relationship of members of the Committee on Rules to the new Speaker provides an illustration. The influence of Bolling of Missouri and Thornberry of Texas declined; O'Neill of Massachusetts and, to a lesser extent, Madden of Indiana, gained influence. Committee assignments in 1963 also reflected the composition of the new leadership. For example, McCormack was instrumental in packing the Committee on Appropriations with five Northern liberals over the objections of its conservative Chairman, Cannon of Missouri.

Leadership change also has a direct impact on legislation. Certainly, a bill to enlarge the House of Representatives to 438 members by adding one additional member from Massachusetts, Missouri, and Pennsylvania would not have advanced as far as it did without the new Speaker's support.[33] McCormack's Catholicism made it even more mandatory that any federal-aid-to-education bill be accompanied by some resolution of the church-state issue. The possibilities of strong civil rights, medicare, and mass transit legislation improved as a more sympathetic leader advanced to the Speakership. Since ideological differences between Martin, Halleck and Ford were less pronounced and the minority has far less control over scheduling, the impact of leadership change on Republican legislative goals is more difficult to trace.

The relatively peaceful modes of leadership change practiced by House Democrats in recent years have promoted party harmony, facilitated the passage of legislation, and thus aided the re-election of Democrats. But the development of patterns of succession is by no means universally endorsed by House Democrats. A junior member, a potential candidate for leadership, summed up some of the disenchantment:

> A man shouldn't become a leader just because sometime fifteen or twenty years ago somebody made an obscure decision to put someone in as whip or deputy whip, and then, he advances up the hierarchy. There's a real problem in the House. It's a kind of hardening of the arteries, too much bureaucracy. We're beginning to be more like the people we criticize downtown. Leadership should come from a man's proven ability, not just because he got started on the ladder. . . .
>
> I think what the Republicans have done is a healthy development. If Joe Martin were a Democrat, we'd still have him as our leader.

Change through contested means has a number of opposite consequences. Few House Republicans are complaining about bureaucratized patterns of succession since none exist. In any future change, the incumbent Whip would be bypassed as he has been in the past. Should Ford falter, the closest approximation to an heir apparent is Conference Chairman Laird. But other potential candidates—among them, Wilson, Rhodes, and Goodell—wait in the wings. House Republicans can take some consolation from one by-product of overwhelming election defeats—it moves able younger members into positions of high rank far quicker than any other means. The overall costs to internal party harmony from frequent contests are difficult to estimate. More latent than manifest, they seldom reveal themselves in legislative voting patterns. But the animosities and bitterness flowing from leadership contests remain an underlying source of tension and distrust. One contest tends to promote another. Continuing frustrations at the polls will quite likely lead to further contests.

To an extent not adequately stressed, congressional leadership change has important consequences for national politics and the strength of the two-party system. The House provides a pool of talent for nominations to the Senate or state-wide offices. The Senate has produced more presidential candidates in recent years, but the House is frequently a mid-career stage for aspiring national leaders.

[32] For a discussion of Rayburn's use of this informal institution, see MacNeil, *op. cit.*, pp. 82–84.

[33] McCormack disavowed his support of H.R. 10264 after an uneasy bipartisan coalition came apart on the floor of the House during the amendment stage: *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, 20 (March 16, 1962), p. 429.

House members continue to participate intensively in the selection of candidates, the writing of party platforms and the management of national conventions. The party which does not control the White House turns to its congressional leaders for the nucleus of opposition party leadership. As leaders of the congressional majority, Rayburn and Johnson had more resources at their command, including better press coverage, than Republican minority leaders like Dirksen, Halleck and Ford. Currently the Joint Senate-House Republican Leadership and the Republican Coordinating Committee play dominant roles in the selection of domestic campaign issues and the structuring of debate on foreign policy. Thus, a change in House leadership has implications far beyond the internal activities of Congress.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

Collective decisions made by the electorates of 435 House districts have a number of important consequences for representative government in the United States. First, the election results advance or limit the careers of some 800 promising politicians, not a few of whom are destined for national leadership as party spokesmen, committee chairmen, and presidential aspirants. Second, the aggregate outcome of seats won and lost determines which congressional party shall be the majority with the right to organize the House of Representatives. Third, the size of the majority sets the limits for success or failure of the President's legislative program. If Congress is controlled by the opposition party, or if his own party does not have a working majority, then a President's expectations as to what is politically feasible must be lowered. He may even have to shift from a policy largely oriented toward passing legislation to one primarily designed to promote campaign issues, two or four years, hence. Finally, as the findings of this article suggest, the size of the net gain or loss sets the climate for continuity or change in House party leadership. These aggregate election results provide the clearest instruction offered by the electorate in what is at best a generalized and largely uninformed evaluation of administration and congressional performance.[34] Congressmen translate these instructions into mandates for continuing support or opportunities for change in congressional party leadership.

This analysis began by distinguishing three basic kinds of leadership change in legislatures, inter-party turnover, intra-party change, and institutional reform. After noting that continuity rather than change is the predominant pattern of congressional leadership five types of intra-party leadership change were set forth: (1) routine succession, (2) appointment, or the emergence of a consensus choice, (3) open competition, (4) challenge to an heir apparent, and (5) revolt, or its aftermath. All but one of these types were illustrated by nineteen instances of leadership change or attempted change which took place in the five top party-wide leadership positions in both House parties during the 84th to 89th Congresses (1955–1966). The remaining type, challenge to an heir apparent, was illustrated by two earlier contests in 1919 and 1931.

Some rather striking differences were revealed in the predominant mode of change practiced by the two House parties during this twelve-year period. The Democratic majority was able to resolve its problems of leadership change through relatively peaceful means in eight out of nine cases. In contrast, the Republican minority resorted to contested means in seven out of ten cases. In four instances, most notably the minority leadership contests of 1959 and 1965, change in

[34] "In Detroit in January, 1957 only 18 percent of the people could correctly name the Congressman from their own district, and only 13 percent knew the names of both United States Senators from Michigan. . . . The world of the political activists and the newspapers which report political events is much more remote from the world of the average citizen than is generally realized": Daniel Katz and Samuel J. Eldersveld, "The Impact of Local Party Activity Upon the Electorate," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (Spring, 1961), 1–24, 20. "The electorate sees very little altogether of what goes on in the national legislature. Few judgments of legislative performance are associated with the parties, and much of the public is unaware even of which party has control of Congress. As a result, the absence of party discipline or legislative results is unlikely to bring down electoral sanctions on the ineffective party or the errant Congressman": Donald E. Stokes and Warren E. Miller, "Party Government and the Saliency of Congress," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 26 (Winter, 1962), 531–546, 545. It seems clear that the electorate does not bring down electoral sanctions upon the ineffective party in the sense of the responsible party doctrine. However, members of Congress, particularly Representatives in the minority party, seem to interpret large-scale shifts in seats won or lost as a judgment on their party image and the calibre of its leadership.

Republican party leadership was sought through organized revolt. Two sets of findings emerge from analysis of these cases:

1. Democratic majority:

a. The Democratic majority is much more likely than the Republican minority to resolve questions of leadership change through non-contested elections or appointments.

b. The longer the period of majority status, the more likely the majority party is to develop established patterns of succession.

c. When contests take place in the Democratic majority, they will most likely occur at the middle or lower levels of the party hierarchy.

2. Republican minority:

a. The Republican minority is more prone to intra-party leadership change through contested means.

b. The longer the period of minority status, the more prone the minority party is to leadership change through revolt.

c. Revolts are most likely to occur following congressional election disasters (the net loss of thirty or more seats).

Further historical research is needed to determine the extent to which these findings are limited to this twelve-year period or have broader applicability. In order to prove or disprove hypotheses relating party differences and majority-minority status to types of leadership change, it will be necessary to examine in detail the periods 1894 to 1930 and 1931 to 1954. During the earlier period the Republican party was in the majority save for a Democratic interlude from 1910 until 1918. To what extent were the Cannon revolt and the Gillett-Mann and Snell-Tilson contests the exceptions rather than the rule? How was the Democratic party, as the minority party, able to avoid leadership contests during the 1920's? Were the series of leadership contests which preoccupied the Democratic majority in the 1930's a spilling over of the frustrations of minority status in the 1920's and a reflection of its new and unwieldy party structure? What other factors were at work in the selection of party leaders throughout these periods?

The outcome of future leadership change in both parties will provide a further test and opportunity for modification of these findings. Given the high component of chance, prediction in politics is always hazardous. Yet, in the long run, a science of politics is as dependent upon its ability to predict as on its capacity for explanation.[35] When change comes about in the Democratic party, it is most likely to occur through the death or retirement of the 75-year old Speaker, John W. McCormack of Massachusetts. The incumbent Majority Leader, Carl Albert of Oklahoma, should routinely advance to the Speakership, contingent upon his full recovery from a September, 1966 heart attack. If a contest develops in the majority party, it is most likely to occur when and if the incumbent Whip, Hale Boggs of Louisiana, attempts to move up to Majority Leader. The problem for his opponents, just as it was in the 1959 and 1965 minority leadership contests, will be to agree upon a candidate with sufficient seniority, demonstrated leadership skills, and popularity around whom a majority might coalesce. Should Boggs succeed, and should the incumbent Deputy Whip, John Moss of California, be appointed Whip, then leadership succession in the House of Representatives, at least as it reflects majority practices, will have undergone further institutionalization. The return in 1968 of a sizeable number of the Democratic freshman members who lost in 1966 could sufficiently strengthen the Democratic Study Group so as to give it a decisive voice in subsequent leadership contests.

Leadership change in the Republican minority party will depend heavily upon the results of the presidential election of 1968 and the congressional election of 1970. Minority Leader Ford needed a substantial victory in 1966 to consolidate his leadership. He got it—a net gain of 47 House seats. But should his party stumble in the next two campaigns, then he, like Martin and Halleck before him, is likely to be asked to step down or face the consequences of further revolt.

Studies in depth of past and future leadership change in the House of Representatives, as well as the modification of these hypotheses as they apply to other legislatures such as the United States Senate or the British House of Commons, should improve our understanding of the workings of legislative parties. They would also provide an opportunity for further examination of such important explanatory variables as the personality and skill of party leaders, majority and minority status, and the impact of election results on party structure and hierarchy.

[35] Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco, 1964), pp. 346–351.

INTERPRETING HOUSE MIDTERM ELECTIONS: TOWARD A MEASUREMENT OF THE IN-PARTY'S "EXPECTED" LOSS OF SEATS*

BARBARA HINCKLEY
Cornell University

I. ANALYSIS OF MIDTERM OUTCOMES PROBLEM AND METHOD

Midterm congressional elections have been subjected to relatively little analysis.[1] This is surprising because these elections exhibit three quite striking features which, when taken together, call for further explanation. First, every midterm House election since the Civil War, with the exception of 1934, has brought a net loss of seats to the President's party. Second, in the large majority of elections the net loss has approximated the gross loss. The in-party (i.e., the President's party) seldom has captured seats from the other party to offset its own loss. And third, although the in-party's loss has been persistent, the number of seats lost has varied widely.

Attempts to incorporate midterm elections into a broader interpretive framework of American election studies usually stress one of the first two features outlined above. The fact that only the in-party loses—and that its losses are mainly in marginal districts—has led commentators such as V. O. Key Jr.[2] and the authors of *The American Voter*[3] to interpret these midterm elections as part of the stable, long-term trends in voters' party allegiance. That interpretation provides a useful corrective to the traditional emphasis on midterm House elections as merely the sum of local events which cannot be read as any national electoral verdict.

To explain the persistent pattern of midterm loss by the in-party, some sort of coattail explanation is usually offered.[4] Such an explanation implicitly supports the thesis of the constancy of party-loyal voters, even in off-year House races. Angus Campbell, for example, argues that differences in turnout between the two kinds of elections, used in conjunction with coattails, can explain the persistent loss. His distinction between "marginal" and "habitual" voters allows the coattail explanation to be reconciled with the thesis of the electorate's durable partisan loyalties. He argues that the higher turnout in presidential elections means that marginal voters have joined the body of habitual voters. In any particular election, one or the other presidential candidate has an advantage of personality, party, or current issues which attracts these less politically interested voters, as well as some habitual voters, who then support him and his party ticket. In the off-year, those habitual voters who temporarily defected in the presidential election return to the fold of party loyalty and, more importantly, the less interested part of the electorate, deprived of the stimulus of a presidential campaign, does not vote. Both movements hurt the party whose presidential and House candidate had benefited at the preceding presidential election.[5]

This newer interpretive frame, offered by Key, Campbell, and others, helps establish the broad national-party meaning of House midterm outcomes, based on the electorate's durable attachment to the two major parties.

* I wish to thank Professor Allan P. Sindler for his criticism of earlier drafts of the paper and for his advice throughout the manuscript's preparation.

[1] For comment and footnote citations, see V. O. Key, Jr., *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups*, 5th ed. (New York, 1964), p. 574. Key's chapter on congressional elections, pp. 545–574, includes an analysis of midterm Senate and House elections. Milton C. Cummings, Jr., *Congressmen and the Electorate* (New York, 1966), limits his extensive analysis of congressional elections to those held in presidential election years. Cummings is concerned mainly with relating presidential-year House elections to the vote for President in the same or preceding elections. Where midterm elections are mentioned, they are treated as one of a number of factors influencing subsequent presidential-year outcomes.

[2] *Op. cit.*, pp. 553–571.

[3] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), especially pp. 124, 127.

[4] Louis H. Bean, *The Mid-Term Battle* (Washington, D.C., 1950); Malcolm Moos, *Politics, Presidents and Coattails* (Baltimore, 1952); Ruth Silva, "A Look into a Crystal Election Ball," *New York Times Magazine*, Oct. 10, 1954.

[5] Angus Campbell, "Voters and Elections: Past and Present," *Journal of Politics*, 26 (November, 1964), 745–757. See also Key, *op. cit.*, pp. 568, 569.

Yet it tends to leave unexamined, and thus unexplained, the large fluctuation in the number of seats lost by the in-party from one midterm election to another. If we grant that the midterm election gives a party verdict, then the kind of verdict given obviously depends on our interpretation of the number of seats lost, which in turn requires that we know what "normal" loss of seats can be expected.[6] Without knowledge of the latter we cannot really determine whether, to use 1966 as an example, the 47-seat net loss for the Democrats should be hailed as "resurgent Republicanism," or normal Democratic voting, or neither.

The pronounced variation in the number of seats lost at midterm complicates any determination of this "expected loss" of seats. The figures on net seats lost from 1922–62 (omitting 1934) are 75, 10, 49, 71, 45, 55, 29, 18, 47, and 4.[7] The imposition of an averaged figure on such disparate data, such as the method used by Louis H. Bean in deriving a "normal midterm loss,"[8] is clearly misleading. Yet until we can distinguish a "normal loss" from a "deviation," the party verdict rendered by the voters at midterm remains unreadable.

This paper analyzes midterm loss in relation to the voting in the preceding presidential election. This approach, it is believed, helps to explain midterm fluctuations and offers some preliminary steps toward measuring the "expected loss" of seats. Two hypotheses are useful for preliminary consideration. (1) From the stability of voters' party affiliation, we infer that a large proportion of the in-party's midterm loss occurs in districts which at the preceding presidential election were marginal in congressional vote and gave relatively weak support to the party's presidential candidate. (2) From the coattail thesis, we infer that midterm loss should be heaviest in districts where the President ran ahead of his affiliated congressional candidate.

Support for the first hypothesis lies in Key's demonstration that the higher the party's percentage of congressional vote in a district in a presidential year election, the better the chances for the party to retain the seat at midterm.[9] Further support comes from evidence of the high continuity between the district vote for President and the House midterm outcome, an inquiry conducted as part of the preliminary analysis for this paper. When in-party districts in 1952, 1956, and 1960 respectively were divided into quartiles based on the President's percentage of the total vote, it was found that districts in successively "lower" quartiles of presidential voting strength registered increasingly heavy loss rates for the in-party in the subsequent midterm House race.[10]

This first hypothesis, however, cannot by itself explain midterm outcomes. By stressing the correspondence in party voting between elections, this hypothesis tends to suggest a correspondence in party success at the two elections. If party voting is stable and if this stability is the one main factor influencing the election results, then presidential years of overwhelming support for one party should be followed by midterm elections of relatively large support (i.e., small number of seats lost) for the same party. Yet, as will be shown later, the reverse has in fact occurred.

This paper offers evidence in support of the second hypothesis and argues that it provides an important modification to the first in explaining midterm outcomes. If a link can be established between midterm loss and districts

[6] The *New York Times* heading, "November May Tell What's Ahead in Vietnam," July 17, 1966, IV, 3, is illustrative of a widespread view of the midterm election as a referendum on the conduct of government by the President and his party. See Key, p. 565. Key, p. 569, also remarks that "some [midterm] loss is to be expected. . . . A sufficiently large loss may indicate a genuine withdrawal of popular favor from the President's party." The problem lies in interpreting what a "sufficiently large loss" is.

[7] The figures are taken from *CQ, Congress and the Nation, 1945–1964* (Washington, D.C., 1965), p. 63.

[8] Bean, *op. cit.*, pp. 18–20, averages the difference between the number of House seats won in a presidential election and the number won at midterm in each election sequence from 1928 to 1946. He arrives at the figure of "26 or 30."

[9] Key, *op. cit.*, pp. 554, 569–571. Key's evidence supports the larger point made throughout that chapter that congressional elections should be viewed as part of national party voting trends. Cummings, *op. cit.*, pp. 6–27, offers a longer span of similar evidence to support Key's point of the similarity in party voting for presidential and House candidates within presidential-year elections.

[10] Of the 1952 Republican districts in the first quartile (lowest percentage vote for Eisenhower), 18 were lost in 1954; in the second quartile, 3; in the third and fourth, 0. 1956–58 showed the same general tendency with 15 lost in the first quartile; in the second, 17; third, 11; and fourth, 5. Democratic districts for 1960–62 repeated the pattern: first quartile, 5; second, 4; third, 1; fourth, 0.

where the President ran ahead of the successful House candidate at the preceding election, then one explanation for the fluctuation in midterm loss becomes apparent. It is known that the number of districts where the President ran ahead is subject to wide fluctuation from election to election. Even small overall percentage changes in the total vote for President, known to be more volatile than the congressional vote, can produce this wide fluctuation. Since the number of districts where the President ran ahead varies so widely, the number of possible "coattail" districts vulnerable to loss at midterm may vary similarly. A large loss of seats at midterm may therefore be due mostly to a previously large presidential plurality. Similarly, a small loss might mean that the party gained less of those seats in the preceding election which it might be expected to lose at midterm. According to this explanation, the "expected loss"—i.e., that portion of midterm loss "built-in" from the preceding election—could be determined and the party meaning of midterm outcomes could be assessed.

The congressional district is the basic unit of analysis for the paper. *Congressional Quarterly*'s reporting of the vote by congressional district for all national offices makes possible the analysis of all districts for 1952–54 and 1956–58 and of that half of the districts not affected by reapportionment for 1960–62.[11] This body of data is supplemented by preliminary analysis of the 1964–66 results.[12]

[11] *CQ* seems to be the only data source available that gives the presidential vote for all congressional districts. Data used for this paper have been taken from "What Happened in the 1956 Elections," *CQ Weekly Report*, May 10, 1957, Special Supplement, the first presentation of this material; from "Complete Returns of the 1960 Elections by Congressional District," *CQ Special Report*, March 10, 1961; and from "Complete Returns of the 1964 Elections by Congressional District," *CQ Special Report*, March 26, 1965. Absolute vote figures are available from 1956 on and percentages from 1952 on.

[12] See *CQ Weekly Report*, November 11, 1966. The first three sequences, presented in the tables, form the basis for the paper's analysis and conclusions. The 1964–66 data are based on unofficial voting returns without benefit of *CQ*'s expected 1967 identificiation of those districts whose lines have been redrawn since 1964. Nevertheless, because the 1964–66 sequence so clearly supported the paper's original conclusions, it has been included in the text. The support it offers may also serve to demonstrate the predictive possibilities of the analysis.

The inquiry is therefore limited, unavoidably, to these four election sequences. Reliance on aggregate data builds in another limit, for such data do not permit the precise identification of a "coattail influence."[13] Since aggregate data can identify districts where the President led his party's successful House candidate, this larger category is used to represent those districts where a coattail effect is possible.

II. THE PRESIDENT'S RELATIVE VOTE STRENGTH AND MIDTERM LOSS

According to the "coattail" hypothesis, the in-party's loss of seats at midterm is most likely to occur in districts where the President ran ahead of his party's successful House candidate.

Support for this hypothesis is suggested by the data in Table 1. Comparing the percent of districts lost, it is evident that in each of the three sequences, districts where the President ran ahead[14] fare worse at midterm than districts where he ran behind. Preliminary analysis of the 1966 election gives the same results: 23 percent (41 out of 176) of Democratic districts where Johnson ran ahead were lost as compared to 9 percent (11 out of 119) of districts where he ran behind.

This general relationship can be refined by focusing attention on a category of especially vulnerable districts, those that switched party of the House seat at the preceding presidential election.[15] In 1952, 25 seats shifted from Demo-

[13] See Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting," this REVIEW, 51 (June, 1957), 309. Charles Press, "Voting Statistics and Presidential Coattails," this REVIEW, 52 (Dec., 1958), 1041–1050, on the other hand, assumes that aggregate data can get to an identification of coattails. See also Press, "Presidential Coattails and Party Cohesion," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 7 (Nov., 1963), 320–325, and *CQ*'s analysis of Eisenhower's coattails, *CQ Weekly Report*, February 3, 1956.

[14] For 1956, 1960, and 1964, a comparison of absolute vote figures has been used to determine whether the President ran ahead or behind. Since the number of votes cast for President is almost invariably larger than the congressional vote, the presidential percentage may be lower than the congressional percentage even though the absolute vote is greater. Since absolute vote figures are not available for 1952, the 1952 data are derived from a comparison of the percentages of the vote that President and House candidates received in a district.

[15] It may be of interest to note that switched districts are more vulnerable to midterm loss than

TABLE 1. MIDTERM LOSS RELATED TO THE PRESIDENT'S RELATIVE VOTE STRENGTH (*vis à vis* THE HOUSE CANDIDATE) AT THE PRECEDING PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: REPUBLICAN DISTRICTS 1952–54, 1956–58; DEMOCRATIC DISTRICTS 1960–62

	1952–54			1956–58			1960–62		
	# of CD's '52	# Lost '54	% Lost '54	# of CD's '56	# Lost '58	% Lost '58	# of CD's '60	# Lost '62	% Lost '62
Districts where the President ran ahead	135	15	11%	174	45	26%	12	3	25%
Districts where the President ran behind	85	6	7%	27	3	11%	101	7	7%
Total	220	21	10%	201	48	24%	113	10	10%

cratic to Republican control, and their party fate in 1954 was related to the President's relative vote strength in the district in 1952. Seventy-three percent of the switched districts where the President ran ahead were lost in 1954; the comparable figure for the districts where the President ran behind was 40 percent[16].

By holding the congressional vote constant, Table 2 eliminates the possibility that the above

those marginal districts where candidates received under 55% of the vote. In 1954, 60% of switched districts were lost as compared with 39% of marginal districts: in 1958, 67% of switched districts were lost and 55% of marginal districts. As would be expected, those marginal districts which were also switched districts seem even more vulnerable. In 1952, all marginal, switched districts were districts where the President ran ahead. Of the 12, 11 (or 92%) were lost in 1954. In 1958, 100% of the 6 marginal, switched districts were lost.

[16] In 1956 a similarly high percentage of switched districts where the President ran ahead were lost—67%, but no comparison can be made since there were no switched districts where the President ran behind. Insufficient data prohibited analysis of 1960's switched districts.

TABLE 2. MIDTERM LOSS RELATED TO THE PRESIDENT'S RELATIVE VOTE STRENGTH, HOLDING CONGRESSIONAL VOTE CONSTANT: REPUBLICAN DISTRICTS 1952–54, 1956–58; DEMOCRATIC DISTRICTS 1960–62

Congressional % of Vote	1952–54				1956–58				1960–62			
	# of CD's '52	# Lost '54	% Lost '54	% of Total Loss	# of CD's '56	# Lost '58	% Lost '58	% of Total Loss	# of CD's '60	# Lost '62	% Lost '62	% of Total Loss
50.1–59.9%												
President ahead	77	15	19%	71%	86	36	42%	75%	6	3	50%	30%
President behind	19	3*	16%	14%	12	1	8%	2%	26	6	23%	60%
Total 50.1–59.9%	96	18	19%	86%	98	37	38%	77%	32	9	28%	90%
60–69.9%												
President ahead	54	0	0%	0%	76	9	12%	19%	4	0	0%	0%
President behind	44	2	5%	10%	11	1	9%	2%	21	0	0%	0%
Total 60–69.9%	98	2	2%	10%	87	10	11%	21%	25	0	0%	0%
70–100%												
President ahead	4	0	0%	0%	12	0	0%	0%	2	0	0%	0%
President behind	22	1	5%	5%	4	1	25%	2%	54	1	2%	10%
Total 70–100%	26	1	4%	5%	16	1	6%	2%	56	1	2%	10%
Total 50.1–100%	220	21	10%	(101%)	201	48	24%	(100%)	113	10	9%	(100%)

* In 1952–54, 2 of the 3 districts lost in the 50.1–59.9% category where the President seemed to run behind in percentage of vote—Delaware AL & Illinois 25—actually were districts where he ran ahead, in absolute vote count. So the 1952–54 districts may present even clearer evidence than they seem to do for the effect of the President's relative vote strength.

evidence merely reflects the influence of a marginal congressional vote, a factor whose relationship to midterm loss has already been discussed. The most striking finding from Table 2, allowing for the somewhat blurred picture as a whole, shows the impact of the President's relative vote strength on marginal districts. Within the 50.1–59.9 percent category for all three election sequences (in addition to the 60–69.9 percent category in 1956–58), districts where the President ran ahead suffered proportionately more loss than districts where he ran behind. A further refinement for the 50.1–54.9 percent districts showed the same relationship for the three sequences.

The 1966 results seem to confirm this analysis. Many commentators heralded the 52-seat gross loss for the Democrats as a sign of voter dissatisfaction with the Democratic Administration. Yet 37 of those lost seats were in marginal districts where the President ran ahead and so may have been "built-in losses" from the Johnson 1964 landslide, according to this paper's argument. The Democrats lost 52 percent (37 of 71) of the marginal districts where Johnson ran ahead in 1964, but only 27 percent (4 of 15) of the marginal districts where he ran behind. The 1966 data again suggest that only in the marginal districts does the President's relative vote strength seem to make a critical difference to midterm outcomes.[17]

The foregoing evidence, linking midterm loss to districts where the President ran ahead, raises a subsidiary question: Does the rate of midterm loss increase with an increase in the President's vote lead over the House candidate? A brief check of the most marginal Republican districts (those between 50.1 and 54.9 percent in GOP congressional vote) where the President ran ahead indicated no evidence of such a relationship. In fact, what pattern there was suggested a higher loss rate for districts with a relatively small gap between presidential and congressional candidates. The districts under analysis were subdivided into categories of relatively small vote gap (with a presidential vote lead of 5 percentage points or less) and relatively large vote gap (with a presidential vote lead of more than 5 percentage points). Of the 1952–54 districts with a relatively small vote gap, 48 percent were lost; of districts with a relatively large vote gap, 27 percent were lost. Of 1956–58 districts with smaller vote differences, 62 percent were lost; with larger differences, 55 percent were lost. A more refined breakdown, however, revealed no clear tendency in either direction. On this evidence, the formulation must remain fairly imprecise: Districts where the President ran ahead—but not necessarily those districts where he ran farthest ahead—are especially vulnerable to midterm loss. This formulation is logically defensible since the peculiar vulnerability to midterm loss is assumed to result from the removal of an earlier coattail influence. And within the category of districts where the President ran ahead, such a "coattail influence" may be reflected as much by a relatively small vote gap, as Angus Campbell and Warren E. Miller point out, as by a relatively large vote gap.[18]

It seems clear on the basis of the evidence in section II[19] that midterm elections are not merely continuations of the preceding presidential-year election as an emphasis on stable party voting, taken alone, might indicate. They also reverse some effects of that election. Those districts which we assume are most

[17] The breakdown for the other 11 seats lost is as follows. In districts between 60% and 69.9% Democratic congressional vote: where the President ran ahead, 4 were lost out of 57; where the President ran behind, 3 were lost out of 33. In districts between 70% and 100% Democratic congressional vote, 0 were lost where the President ran ahead, 4 were lost where the President ran behind. Three of these last four were involved in Florida redistricting.

[18] See Warren E. Miller, "Presidential Coattails: A Study in Political Myth and Methodology," *Public Opinion Quarterly* (Fall, 1955), 353–368, for an argument against a large vote gap as a sign of a coattail effect. Campbell and Miller, "The Motivational Basis of Straight and Split Ticket Voting," *op. cit.*, argue that neither a large nor small vote gap may be taken as a certain sign of a coattail influence.

[19] The question may be raised whether the Republican midterm losses under analysis are merely products of a decreasing GOP trend in those districts, extending beyond the two sets of elections examined. Midterm loss could thus be explained as much by a long-run trend factor as by the short-run coattail factor. However, 52% of 1954's lost districts and 65% of 1958's lost districts increased their congressional GOP percentages in the subsequent presidential election, thus following what Press, "Presidential Coattails and Party Cohesion," *op. cit.*, p. 325, calls the "expected national trend."

Some data from other elections can be cited in corroboration of this section's evidence. Silva, *op. cit.*, p. 76, reports that in the 5 midterm elections from 1934–50, of 281 seats lost, only 32 were lost in districts where the congressional candidate ran at least 5 percentage points ahead of the presidential candidate two years before.

helped to victory by the presidential vote—marginal districts where the President ran ahead—suffer the highest loss rate at midterm. We can assume that a presidential election brings many of these districts into the in-party column or helps to keep them there. The midterm election, according to the evidence in this paper, takes them out again. On this basis, we can also explain fluctuations in the number of seats lost. Midterm outcomes may vary with the variations in presidential vote-getting power two years before. For example, as 1956 increased over 1952 the number of districts where the President ran ahead, it increased also the number of districts vulnerable to loss at midterm.[20]

III. CONCLUSIONS

1. The House midterm election, on the basis of the foregoing evidence, may be understood as an integral part of two quite distinct processes. First, it continues the main lines of party voting from the preceding election. But second, it forms, together with the preceding presidential-year election, a process which is superimposed on the first. We found that midterm loss was concentrated in districts where the President ran ahead at the preceding election and we clarified this relationship by linking midterm loss to those marginal districts where the President ran ahead. This relationship suggests a midterm counter-tendency built into the sequence by the alternating presence and absence of the presidential candidate on the ticket. This view of midterm elections as an integral part of two distinct processes accords with the interpretation set forth by Key, Campbell, and others.

2. Fluctuations in midterm loss may be explained in terms of the scale set by the preceding presidential-year election. As the victorious presidential candidate wins by larger pluralities, the number of districts where the President runs ahead markedly increases. In this process, submarginal districts may become marginal, and some marginal districts may be raised to percentage levels that obscure their essential vulnerability to loss. Some evidence for this latter possibility is provided by the high loss rate of the 60–69.9 percent districts where the President ran ahead in 1956, that is shown in Table 2.[21] Thus as the number of districts where the President runs ahead increases, the loss built in for the subsequent midterm election also increases. Eisenhower led the Republican House candidates in 174 districts in 1956; Kennedy led the Democratic House candidates in 46 districts in 1960; and Johnson led in 176 districts in 1964. The scale of loss for 1966 (as set by 1964) thus equals the scale set for 1958 and far surpasses that set for 1962. By this argument, 1958 and 1966 contained the same "built-in loss." Some striking support is provided by the election results. The gross loss for both midterm elections was almost the same. The Republicans lost 48 seats in 1958; the Democrats, 52 in 1966. Both elections registered a 47-seat net loss for the presidential party.

Even such gross data as presented in Table 3 support the notion that the scale of loss is set by the preceding presidential-year election. Table 3 shows that the largest net midterm loss was preceded by election years of the largest presidential pluralities, the smallest loss by years of the smallest pluralities, suggesting

TABLE 3. NET LOSS OF SEATS IN THE PRESIDENT'S PARTY RELATED TO THE PRESIDENT'S PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE AT THE PRECEDING ELECTION, 1920–62*

Net Loss of House Seats for President's Party	Midterm Year	% Presidential Vote in Preceding Election
75	1922	60.4%
71	1938	60.8
55	1946	53.5
49	1930	58.2
47	1958	57.4
45	1942	54.8
29	1950	49.5
18	1954	55.1
10	1926	54.0
4	1962	50.08

* The figures for the table have been taken from *CQ, Congress and the Nation*, pp. 62, 63. The 1934 gain of 9 seats is omitted.

[20] This explanation seems to contradict the widely held opinion that the results of the 1956 election showed the absence of effective presidential coattails. But the point should be made that we cannot tell how many seats which *were* carried in the Republican column in 1956 might well have been lost without Eisenhower's presence on the ticket, given the lack of enthusiasm for the GOP as a party in 1956.

[21] Of those 9 "safe" districts where Eisenhower ran ahead in 1956, which were destined to be lost in 1958, 4 had registered quite "competitive" congressional vote percentages in 1954—50.9%, 52.7%, 52.8%, and 57.6%.

a counter-tendency at work in the midterm election. It can be noticed that the figure most out of place in the table is the 53.5 percent figure for 1944. This relatively low percentage was the FDR "fourth term" figure; the corresponding relatively high loss figure of 55 seats was a Truman Administration figure. The relationship shown in Table 3 is, of course, not breathtakingly clear.[22] The number of districts where the President ran ahead would be a more precise indicator of scale for the third column, since any one level of presidential vote may be joined by relatively high or low levels of the in-party's congressional vote, producing quite different effects on midterm results. With this modification in mind, the relationship that appears between high presidential popularity and high midterm loss merits attention.

In his analysis of presidential-year elections, Milton Cummings cites evidence for the greater volatility of the vote for President compared to the congressional vote and remarks that the "survival of . . . opposition Congressmen in the House represents a check on the incoming President that is built into the functioning of the nation's electoral system."[23] The counter-tendency inherent in the midterm election provides yet another check on the President. In effect, he loses in congressional party support at the midterm election what he had gained in the year of his own election.

3. The absolute number of seats lost at midterm is not in itself a sufficient datum to permit judgments as to the party verdict. Nor can such a number be used to provide a comparative assessment of party fortunes across a range of midterm elections. Rather, that datum must be interpreted in conjunction with a measure determining the number of seats whose loss was built into the midterm by the contours of the preceding presidential election. This built-in loss would be the "expected loss" for the midterm election.

On the basis of the evidence presented in this paper, it should be possible to use presidential election data—specifically, the total number of districts where the President ran ahead of his party's successful House candidate—as the basis for determining the built-in loss for a midterm election. We choose the total number of districts, and not the number of marginal districts, where the President ran ahead because the former number permits us to identify those elections exhibiting such presidential popularity that the President led the congressional candidate even in districts above the marginal level. We do not necessarily assume the in-party would lose seats in some specified fraction of this total number of districts. Rather, the figure is an indicator of the level of presidential popularity which in turn would be expected to affect the amount of midterm loss. For example, the numbers 46 and 176, from 1960 and 1964, respectively, would be used to derive the figures of built-in loss for 1962 and 1966. With data from only four election sequences, however, this derivation is not as yet possible. We do not know whether there is some fairly constant rate of loss registered by districts where the President ran ahead, in which case an average of the percentage of those districts which were lost might be used as a basis. Instead, it is possible that changes in the number of districts where the President ran ahead produce changes in the rate of loss, in which case the built-in loss figure might be derived through regression analysis. The actual construction of this measure must await a larger range of data.[24]

4. On the basis of this analysis, the midterm "referendum" appears quite derivative. It is, in part, a continuation of the verdict expressed in the preceding presidential election and, in part, an adjustment of that verdict, an adjustment built into the midterm by the preceding presidential election. If these conclusions are valid, construction of a measure for "expected loss" may bring clearer understanding of what the decisions are—and whether there are decisions—that are made by the electorate at midterm.

[22] Calculation of the correlation coefficient yields $r = .55$, which is not a very strong relationship.

[23] Cummings, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

[24] It should be noticed that the three elections where absolute vote figures are available to derive the number of districts where the President ran ahead suggest a similar rate of loss. In 1956–58, 26% of districts where the President ran ahead were lost. In 1960–62, 25%. And in 1964–66, according to preliminary analysis, 23%.

REFORMISM AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN AMERICAN CITIES*

ROBERT L. LINEBERRY
University of Texas

AND

EDMUND P. FOWLER
York University

A decade ago, political scientists were deploring the "lost world of municipal government" and calling for systematic studies of municipal life which emphasized the political, rather than the administrative, side of urban political life.[1] In recent years, this demand has been generously answered and urban politics is becoming one of the most richly plowed fields of political research. In terms originally introduced by David Easton,[2] political scientists have long been concerned with inputs, but more recently they have focused their attention on other system variables, particularly the political culture[3] and policy outputs of municipal governments.[4]

The present paper will treat two policy outputs, taxation and expenditure levels of cities, as dependent variables. We will relate these policy choices to socio-economic characteristics of cities and to structural characteristics of their governments. Our central research concern is to examine the impact of political structures, reformed and unreformed, on policy-making in American cities.

I. POLITICAL CULTURE, REFORMISM AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

The leaders of the Progressive movement in the United States left an enduring mark on the American political system, particularly at the state and municipal level. In the states, the primary election, the referendum, initiative and recall survive today. The residues of this *Age of Reform*,[5] as Richard Hofstadter called it, persist in municipal politics principally in the form of manager government and at-large and nonpartisan elections. The reformers were, to borrow Banfield and Wilson's phrase, the original embodiment of the "middle class ethos" in American politics. They were, by and large, White Anglo-Saxon Protestants reacting to the politics of the party machine, which operated by exchanging favors for votes.[6]

It is important that we understand the ideology of these reformers if we hope to be able to analyze the institutions which they created and their impact on political decisions. The reformers' goal was to "rationalize" and "democratize" city government by the substitution of "community oriented" leadership. To the reformers, the most pernicious characteristic of the machine was that it capitalized on socio-economic cleavages in the population, playing on class antagonisms and on racial and religious differences. Ernest S. Bradford, an early advocate of commission government

* The authors are indebted to Professors Robert T. Daland, James W. Prothro, William R. Keech and James Q. Wilson for comments on an earlier draft of this paper. For assistance in statistical and methodological questions, the advice of Professor Hubert Blalock and Mr. Peter B. Harkins has been invaluable. The authors, of course, assume responsibility for all interpretation and misinterpretation.

[1] Lawrence J. R. Herson, "The Lost World of Municipal Government," this REVIEW, 51 (June, 1957), 330–345; Robert T. Daland, "Political Science and the Study of Urbanism," *ibid.*, 491–509.

[2] David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics*, 9 (April, 1957), 383–400.

[3] Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press and the MIT Press, 1963); see also James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public-Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 58 (December, 1964), 876–887.

[4] See, for example, Thomas R. Dye, "City-Suburban Social Distance and Public Policy," *Social Forces*, 4 (1965), 100–106; Raymond Wolfinger and John Osgood Field, "Political Ethos and the Structure of City Government," this REVIEW, 60 (June, 1966), 306–326; Edgar L. Sherbenou, "Class, Participation, and the Council-Manager Plan," *Public Administration Review*, 21 (Summer, 1961), 131–135; Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "An Analysis of Public Policies in Cities," *Journal of Politics*, 29 (February, 1967), 94–108.

[5] (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1955.)

[6] John Porter East, *Council Manager Government: The Political Thought of Its Founder, Richard S. Childs* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), p. 18.

with at-large elections, defended his plans for at-large representation on grounds that

> . . . under the ward system of governmental representation, the ward receives the attention, not in proportion to its needs but to the ability of its representatives to 'trade' and arrange 'deals' with fellow members. . . . Nearly every city under the aldermanic system offers flagrant examples of this vicious method of 'part representation.' The commission form changes this to representation of the city as a whole.[7]

The principal tools which the reformers picked to maximize this "representation of the city as a whole" were the commission, and later the manager, form of government, the nonpartisan election and the election at-large. City manager government, it was argued, produced a no-nonsense, efficient and business-like regime, where decisions could be implemented by professional administrators rather than by victors in the battle over spoils. Nonpartisan elections meant to the reformer that state and national parties, whose issues were irrelevant to local politics anyway, would keep their divisive influences out of municipal decision-making. Nonpartisan elections, especially when combined with elections at-large, would also serve to reduce the impact of socio-economic cleavages and minority voting blocs in local politics. Once established, these institutions would serve as bastions against particularistic interests.

Banfield and Wilson have argued that the "middle class ethos" of the reformers has become a prevalent attitude in much of political life. The middle class stands for "public regarding" virtues rather than for "private regarding" values of the ethnic politics of machines and bosses. The middle class searches for the good of the "community as a whole" rather than for the benefit of particularistic interests.[8] Agger, Goldrich and Swanson, in their study of two western and two southern communities have documented the rise of a group they call the "community conservationists," who "see the values of community life maximized when political leadership is exercised by men representing the public at large, rather than 'special interests.'"[9] Robert Wood has taken up a similar theme in his penetrating analysis of American suburbia. The "no-party politics of suburbia" is characterized by "an outright reaction against partisan activity, a refusal to recognize that there may be persistent cleavages in the electorate and an ethical disapproval of permanent group collaboration as an appropriate means of settling disputes."[10] This ideological opposition to partisanship is a product of a tightly-knit and homogeneous community, for "nonpartisanship reflects a highly integrated community life with a powerful capacity to induce conformity."[11]

Considerable debate has ensued over both the existence and the consequences of these two political ethics in urban communities. Some evidence has supported the view that reformed governments[12] are indeed found in cities with higher incomes, higher levels of education, greater proportions of Protestants and more white-collar job-holders. Schnore and Alford, for example, found that "the popular image of the manager city was verified; it does tend to be the natural habitat of the upper middle class." In addition, manager cities were "inhabited by a younger, more mobile population that is growing rapidly."[13]

More recently, Wolfinger and Field correlated socio-economic variables—particularly ethnicity and region—to political structures. They concluded that "the ethos theory is irrelevant to the South . . . inapplicable to the West . . . fares badly in the Northeast . . ." and that support for the theory in the Midwest was "small and uneven."[14] Region proved to be a more important predictor of both government forms and of policy outputs like urban renewal expenditures than did the socio-economic composition of the population.

In our view, it is premature to carve a head-

[7] Ernest S. Bradford, *Commission Government in American Cities* (New York: Macmillan, 1911), p. 165.

[8] Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

[9] Robert Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert E. Swanson, *The Rulers and the Ruled* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. 21.

[10] Robert C. Wood, *Suburbia: Its People and Their Politics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1959), p. 155.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 154.

[12] We refer to cities characterized by commission or manager government, nonpartisan elections, and at-large constituencies as "reformed." Our use of the term is historical and no value position on reformism's merits is intended. To refer to reformed cities as "public regarding" or "middle class" is, it seems, to assume what needs to be proved.

[13] Leo Schnore and Robert Alford, "Forms of Government and Socio-Economic Characteristics of Suburbs," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 8 (June, 1963), 1–17. See also the literature cited in Froman, *op. cit.*

[14] Wolfinger and Field, *op. cit.*, pp. 325–326.

TABLE 1. INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

1. Population, 1960
2. Per cent population increase or decrease, 1950–60
3. Per cent non-white
4. Per cent of native population with foreign born or mixed parentage
5. Median income
6. Per cent of population with incomes below $3000
7. Per cent of population with incomes above $10,000
8. Median school years completed by adult population
9. Per cent high school graduates among adult population
10. Per cent of population in white collar occupations
11. Per cent of elementary school children in private schools
12. Per cent of population in owner-occupied dwelling units

stone for the ethos theory. It is our thesis that governments which are products of the reform movement behave differently from those which have unreformed institutions, even if the socio-economic composition of their population may be similar. Our central purpose is to determine the impact of both socio-economic variables and political institutions (structural variables) on outputs of city governments. By doing this, we hope to shed some additional illumination on the ethos theory.

II. RESEARCH DESIGN

Variables. The independent variables used in this analysis, listed in Table 1, consist of relatively "hard" data, mostly drawn from the U. S. census.[15] These variables were selected because they represent a variety of possible social cleavages which divide urban populations—rich vs. poor, Negro vs. White, ethnic vs. native, newcomers vs. old-timers, etc. We assume that such social and economic characteristics are important determinants of individual and group variations in political preferences. Data on each of these independent variables were gathered for each of the two hundred cities in the sample.[16]

Our principal theoretical concern is with the consequences of variations in the structural characteristics of form of government, type of constituency and partisanship of elections. The variable of government form is unambiguous. Except for a few small New England towns, all American cities have council-manager, mayor-council or commission government. There is, however, somewhat more ambiguity in the classification of election type. By definition, a "nonpartisan election is one in which no candidate is identified on the ballot by party affiliation."[17] The legal definition of nonpartisanship conceals the wide variation between Chicago's and Boston's nominal nonpartisanship and the more genuine variety in Minneapolis, Winnetka and Los Angeles.[18] We will quickly see, though, that formal nonpartisanship is not merely an empty legal nicety, but that there are very real differences in the political behavior of partisan and nonpartisan cities, even though we are defining them in legal terms only.[19]

Our classification of constituency types into only two groups also conceals some variation in the general pattern. While most cities use either the at-large or the ward pattern of constituencies exclusively, a handful use a combination of the two electoral methods.

[15] The source for the first nine variables is *The City and County Data Book* (Washington: United States Bureau of the Census, 1962). For the last three variables, the source is Orin F. Nolting and David S. Arnold (eds.), *The Municipal Yearbook 1965* (Chicago: International City Managers' Association, 1965), pp. 98 ff.

[16] We used a random sample of 200 of the 309 American cities with populations of 50,000 or more in 1960. All information on the forms of government and forms of election are drawn from *The Municipal Yearbook, 1965, op. cit.*

[17] Banfield and Wilson, *op cit.*, p. 151.

[18] For Minneapolis, see Robert Morlan, "City Politics: Free Style," *National Municipal Review*, 48 (November, 1949), pp. 485–490; Winnetka, Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 140; Los Angeles, Charles G. Mayo, "The 1961 Mayoralty Election in Los Angeles: The Political Party in a Nonpartisan Election," *Western Political Quarterly*, 17 (1964), 325–339.

[19] At least one other variable may produce a given institutional form in a city—the legal requirements of a state government, which vary from state to state and may even vary for different kinds of cities within the same state. We have not taken account of this variable because systematic information on comparative state requirements in this area was unavailable to us. However, Wolfinger and Field consulted several experts and eliminated cities which are not given free choice over their institutions. Nevertheless, a comparison of our figures with theirs revealed no important differences.

For our purposes, we classified these with district cities.

The dependent variables in this study are two measures of public policy outputs. A growing body of research on local politics has utilized policy measures as dependent variables.[20] The present research is intended to further this study of political outputs by relating socio-economic variables to expenditure and taxation patterns in cities with varying political structures.

The dependent variables are computed by a simple formula. The measure for taxation was computed by dividing the total personal income of the city into the total tax of the city, giving us a tax/income ratio. Similarly, dividing expenditures by the city's aggregate personal income gave us an expenditure/income ratio as the measure for our second dependent variable. These measures, while admittedly imperfect,[21] permit us to ask how much of a city's income it is willing to commit for public taxation and expenditures.

Hypothesis. Much of the research on city politics has treated reformed institutions as dependent variables. Although we shall briefly examine the social and economic differences between reformed and unreformed cities, our principal concern will be to explore the *consequences* for public policy of political institutions. From our earlier discussion of the political culture of cities we hypothesized that:

1. The relationship between socio-economic cleavages and policy outputs is stronger in unreformed than in reformed cities.

This hypothesis focuses on the intention of the reformers to minimize the role of particularistic interests in policy making.

III. REFORMED AND UNREFORMED CITIES: A COMPARISON

The economic and social contrasts between reformed and unreformed cities have been the subject of much research,[22] and for our purposes we may be brief in our treatment. We divided the independent variables into three groups, one measuring population size and growth, a second containing social class indicators and a third including three measures of social homogeneity. The means and standard deviations for each variable by institutional category are found in Table 2.

It should initially be noted that population size and growth rate fairly clearly separate the reformed from the unreformed cities. As Alford and Scoble have amply documented,[23] the larger the city, the greater the likelihood of its being unreformed; the faster its growth rate, the more likely a city is to possess manager government, nonpartisan and at-large elections. These differences are largely accounted for by the fact that very large cities are most likely to (1) have unreformed institutions and (2) be stable or declining in population. Since neither of these variables emerged as particularly important predictors of our output variables, we relegated them to secondary importance in the rest of the analysis.

The data in Table 2 indicate that reformed cities (at least those over 50,000) do not appear to be "the natural habitat of the upper middle class." While reformed cities have slightly more educated populations and slightly high proportions of white collar workers and home ownership, unreformed cities have generally high incomes. In any case, whatever their direction, the differences are not large. What is striking is not the differences between the cities but the similarities of their class composition.

[20] See footnote 4, *supra*.

[21] We recognize that these are only rough indicators of city finance policies. Definitions of taxation vary from city to city and what may be financed from taxes in one city may be financed from fees in another. Expenditures present a more complex problem because the types and amounts of state transfer payments vary from state to state according to state laws, the division of governmental labor in a state, the incomes and sizes of cities, not to mention political factors at the state level. We think it important, however, that our independent variables explain a large proportion of the variation in municipal outputs as we measured them. No doubt one could explain an even larger proportion of the variation in measures which specify different functional responsibilities of cities. At least these measures constitute a starting point, and we hope others will improve on them.

The source of our output measures was the *County and City Data Book, op. cit.*

[22] See, for example, Robert Alford and Harry Scoble, "Political and Socio-Economic Characteristics of American Cities," *The Municipal Yearbook 1965, op. cit.*, pp. 82–97; Sherbenou, *op. cit.*; John H. Kessel, "Governmental Structure and Political Environment," this REVIEW, 56 (September, 1962), 615–620.

[23] Alford and Scoble, *op. cit.* The particularly large differences found between the populations of reformed and unreformed cities reflect the fact that New York City and several other urban giants are included in the sample.

TABLE 2. COMPARISON OF THE MEANS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS) OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF REFORMED AND UNREFORMED CITIES

Independent Variable	Government Type					
	Mayor-Council		Manager		Commission	
Population:						
Population (10^3)	282.5	(858.6)	115.7	(108.0)	128.6	(115.2)
% Change, 1950–60	36.4%	(118.8)	64.1%	(130.4)	18.5%	(36.7)
Class:						
Median Income	$6199.	(1005.0)	$6131.	(999.6)	$5425.	(804.4)
% under $3000	15.3%	(7.0)	17.3%	(6.9)	21.5%	(7.9)
% over $10,000	16.9%	(7.2)	17.5%	(6.7)	12.5%	(3.7)
% high school graduates	40.7%	(10.8)	48.1%	(8.9)	41.6%	(10.4)
Median Education (yrs.)	10.7	(1.1)	11.4	(.89)	11.0	(2.1)
% Owner-Occupied Dwelling Units	54.9%	(15.1)	57.3%	(13.6)	54.6%	(13.7)
% White collar	44.1%	(9.0)	48.1%	(7.1)	44.2%	(7.6)
Homogeneity:						
% Nonwhite	10.6%	(11.5)	11.6%	(10.8)	16.5%	(14.9)
% Native with Foreign Born or Mixed Parentage	19.7%	(9.9)	12.4%	(8.3)	11.7%	(10.7)
% Private School Attendance	23.5%	(11.9)	15.3%	(11.8)	16.6%	(11.8)
	N = 85		N = 90		N = 25	

Independent Variable	Election Type			
	Partisan		Nonpartisan	
Population:				
Population (10^3)	270.8	(1022.1)	155.8	(198.7)
% Population Increase 1950–1960	17.1	(40.1)	58.3%	(136.1)
Class:				
Median Income	$5996	(904.5)	$6074	(1045.5)
% under $3000	16.8%	(7.1)	17.2%	(7.2)
% over $10,000	16.1%	(6.1)	16.7%	(7.0)
% High School Graduates	40.5%	(9.2)	45.3%	(10.6)
Median Education (yrs.)	10.6	(1.1)	11.2	(1.2)
% Owner-Occupied Dwelling Units	51.5%	(14.4)	57.7%	(13.8)
% White Collar	43.5%	(7.5)	46.7%	(8.3)
Homogeneity:				
% Nonwhite	13.0%	(11.9)	11.5%	(11.8)
% Native with Foreign Born or Mixed Parentage	17.5%	(10.7)	14.7%	(9.6)
% Private School Attendance	24.1%	(13.6)	16.9%	(11.3)
	N = 57		N = 143	

Independent Variable	Constituency Type			
	District		At-Large	
Population:				
Population (10^3)	246.9	(909.8)	153.6	(191.2)
% Population Increase 1950–1960	23.1%	(36.4)	59.1%	(143.7)

TABLE 2—(*Continued*)

Independent Variables	Constituency Type: District		At-Large	
Class:				
Median Income	$6297	(965.2)	$5942	(1031.9)
% under $3000	14.7%	(6.5)	18.2%	(7.6)
% over $10,000	17.7%	(7.1)	16.0%	(6.6)
% High School Graduates	43.6%	(10.9)	44.4%	(10.4)
Median Education (yrs.)	10.9	(1.1)	11.2	(1.2)
% Owner-Occupied Dwelling Units	55.1%	(14.4)	56.9%	(14.5)
% White Collar	45.2%	(9.4)	46.3%	(7.5)
Homogeneity:				
% Non white	9.8%	(10.6)	13.0%	(12.3)
% Native with Foreign Born or Mixed Parentage	18.9%	(9.4)	13.4%	(9.7)
% Private School Attendance	23.2%	(12.5)	16.6%	(11.7)
	N=73		N=127	

Homogeneity is easily one of the most ambiguous terms in the ambiguous language of the social sciences. We have followed Alford and Scoble who used three measures of homogeneity: for ethnicity, the per cent of population native born of foreign born or mixed parentage; for race, the per cent nonwhite; and for religious homogeneity, the per cent of elementary school children in private schools. The last measure, while indirect, was the only one available, since data on religious affiliation are not collected by the Census Bureau.

With the exception of race, reformed cities appear somewhat more homogeneous than unreformed cities. While the differences in homogeneity are more clear-cut than class differences, this hardly indicates that reformed cities are the havens of a socially homogeneous population. Although the average nonpartisan city has 16.9 per cent of its children in private schools, this mean conceals a wide range—from 2 to 47 per cent.

Our findings about the insignificance of class differences between reformed and unreformed cities are at some variance with Alford and Scoble's conclusions. There is, however, some support for the argument that reformed cities are more homogeneous. While we used cities with populations of over 50,000, their sample included all cities over 25,000; and varying samples may produce varying conclusions. The only other study to analyze cities over 50,000 was Wolfinger and Field's and our conclusions are generally consistent with theirs. We differ with them, however, on two important questions.

First, Wolfinger and Field argued that what differences there are between unreformed and reformed cities disappear when controls for region are introduced: "The salient conclusion to be drawn from these data is that one can do a much better job of predicting a city's political form by knowing what part of the country it is in than by knowing anything about the composition of its population."[24] Since regions have had different historical experiences, controls for region are essentially controls for history, and more specifically, historical variation in settlement patterns. The problem with this reasoning, however, is that to "control" for "region" is to control not only for history, but for demography as well: to know what region a city is in *is* to know something about the composition of its population. Geographical subdivisions are relevant subjects of political inquiry only because they are differentiated on the basis of attitudinal or socio-economic variables. The South is not a distinctive political region because two surveyors named Mason and Dixon drew a famous line, but because the "composition of its population" differs from the rest of the country.

It is therefore difficult to unravel the meaning of "controlling" for "region" since regions are differentiated on precisely the kinds of demographic variables which we (and Wolfinger and Field) related to reformism. Cities in the Midwest, for example, have a much higher proportion of home ownership (64%) than cities in the Northeast (44%), while northeastern cities have more foreign stock in their

[24] *Op. cit.*, p. 320.

population (27%) than the Midwest (16%). Hence, to relate ethnicity to political reformism and then to "control" for "region" is in part to relate ethnicity to reformism and then to control for ethnicity. Consequently, we have grave reservations that the substitution of the gross and unrefined variable of "region" for more refined demographic data adds much to our knowledge of American cities. "Controlling" for "region" is much more than controlling for historical experiences, because region as a variable is an undifferentiated *potpourri* of socio-economic, attitudinal, historical and cultural variations.[25]

We also differ with Wolfinger and Field in their assertion that their analysis constitutes a test of the ethos theory. As we understand it, Banfield and Wilson's theory posits that particular attitudes are held by persons with varying sociological characteristics (ethnic groups and middle class persons, in particular) and that these attitudes include preferences for one or another kind of political institution. But relating the proportion of middle class persons in a city's population to its form of government says nothing one way or another about middle class preferences. An important part of understanding, of course, is describing and it is certainly useful to know how reformed cities differ from unreformed cities.

In our view, however, such tests as Wolfinger and Field used cannot logically be called explanations, in any causal sense. The most obvious reason is that they violate some important assumptions about time-order: independent variables are measured with contemporary census data, while the dependent variables are results of decisions made ten to fifty years ago. Moreover, this problem is multiplied by the difficulty of inferring configurations of political power from demographic data. Presumably, their assumption is that there is a simple linear relationship between sheer numbers (or proportions) of, say, middle class persons and their political power: the larger the size of a group in the city's population, the easier it can enforce its choice of political forms. At least one prominent urban sociologist, however, has found empirical support for precisely the opposite proposition. Hawley concluded that the smaller the proportion of middle class persons in a city, the greater their power over urban renewal policies.[26] Similarly, it may also be dubious to assume that the size of an ethnic population is an accurate indicator of influence of ethnic groups. Although we recognize the importance of describing the socio-economic correlates of political forms, the logical problems involved suggest the need for a good deal of caution in interpreting these differences as explanations.[27]

In any case, the question of why the city adopts particular structures is of less interest to us than their consequences for public policy. It is to this analysis that we now turn.

IV. POLICY OUTPUTS AND THE RESPONSIVENESS OF CITIES

We are now in a position to take three additional steps. First, we can compare the differences in policy outputs between reformed and unreformed cities. Second, we can assess the cumulative impact of socio-economic variables on these policy choices. Finally, we can specify what variables are related in what ways to these output variables. In essence, we can now treat political institutions, not as dependent variables, but as factors which influence the *level* of expenditures and taxation and the *relationship* between cleavage variables and these outputs.

Differences between reformed and unreformed cities' outputs. Contrary to Sherbenou's conclusions about Chicago suburbs,[28] our data indicate that reformed cities both spend and tax less than unreformed cities, with the exception of expenditures in partisan and nonpartisan cities. It appears that partisan, mayor-council and ward cities are less willing to commit their resources to public purposes than their reformed counterparts. What is of more importance than the difference in outputs, however, is the relative responsiveness of the two kinds of cities to social cleavages in their population.

[25] In statistical parlance, the problem with "region" as an independent variable might be described as treating a complicated background variable as the first variable in a specific developmental sequence. But, as Blalock argues, ". . . *one should avoid complex indicators that are related in unknown ways to a given underlying variable.* Geographical region and certain background variables appear to have such undesirable properties": Hubert M. Blalock, *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964), p. 164 (italics in original).

[26] Amos Hawley, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (January, 1963), 422–431.

[27] See also the exchange between Banfield and Wilson and Wolfinger and Field in "Communications," this REVIEW, 60 (December, 1966), 998–1000.

[28] Sherbenou, *op. cit.*, pp. 133–134.

TABLE 3. MEAN VALUES OF TAX/INCOME AND EXPENDITURE/INCOME RATIOS, BY STRUCTURAL CHARACTERISTICS

Structural Variables	Taxes /Income	Expenditures /Income
Election type:		
Partisan	.032	.050
Nonpartisan	.030	.053
Government type:		
Mayor-Council	.037	.058
Manager	.024	.045
Commission	.031	.057
Constituency type:		
Ward	.036	.057
At-large	.027	.049

The responsiveness of cities. We have argued that one principal goal of the reform movement was to reduce the impact of partisan, socio-economic cleavages on governmental decision making, to immunize city governments from "artificial" social cleavages—race, religion, ethnicity, and so on. As Banfield and Wilson put their argument, the reformers "assumed that there existed an interest ('the public interest') that pertained to the city 'as a whole' and that should always prevail over competing, partial (and usually private) interests."[29] The structural reforms of manager government, at-large, and nonpartisan elections would so insulate the business of governing from social cleavages that "private regarding" interests would count for little in making up the mind of the body politic. But amid the calls of the reformers for structural reforms to muffle the impact of socio-economic cleavages, a few hardy souls predicted precisely the opposite consequence of reform: instead of eliminating cleavages from political decision-making, the reforms, particularly the elimination of parties, would enhance the conflict. Nathan Matthews, Jr., a turn-of-the-century mayor of Boston, issued just such a warning:

> As a city is a political institution, the people in the end will divide into parties, and it would seem extremely doubtful whether the present system, however illogical its foundation be, does not in fact produce better results, at least in large cities, than if the voters divided into groups, separated by property, social or religious grounds.[30]

[29] *Op. cit.*, p. 139.

[30] Quoted in Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

Matthews recognized implicitly what political scientists would now call the "interest aggregation" function of political parties.[31] Parties in a democracy manage conflict, structure it, and encapsulate social cleavages under the rubric of two or more broad social cleavages, the parties themselves. "Parties tend to crystallize opinion, they give skeletal articulation to a shapeless and jelly-like mass . . . they cause similar opinions to coagulate . . ."[32] The parties "reduce effectively the number of political opinions to manageable numbers, bring order and focus to the political struggle, simplify issues and frame alternatives, and compromise conflicting interests."[33] Since parties are the agencies of interest aggregation, so the argument goes, their elimination makes for greater, not lesser, impact of social cleavages on political decisions.

Political scientists have recently confirmed Matthews' fears, at least with regard to electoral behavior in partisan and nonpartisan elections. Evidence points to the increased impact of socio-economic cleavages on voting when a nonpartisan ballot is used than when the election is formally partisan. Gerald Pomper studied nonpartisan municipal elections and compared them with partisan elections for the New Jersey State Assembly in Newark. He concluded that the "goal of nonpartisanship is fulfilled, as party identification does not determine the outcome. In place of party, ethnic affiliation is emphasized and the result is 'to enhance the effect of basic social cleavages.' "[34] If (1) this is typical of other American cities and if (2) electoral cleavages can be translated effectively into demands on the government in the absence of aggregative parties, then we might assume that the reformed institutions would reflect cleavages

[31] For a discussion of the concept of interest aggregation, see Gabriel Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Gabriel Almond and James S. Coleman (eds.), *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 38–45.

[32] Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties* (New York: Science Editions, 1963), p. 378.

[33] Frank J. Sorauf, *Political Parties in the American System* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964), pp. 165–166.

[34] Gerald Pomper, "Ethnic and Group Voting in Nonpartisan Municipal Elections," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 30 (Spring, 1966), p. 90; see also, J. Leiper Freeman, "Local Party Systems: Theoretical Considerations and a Case Analysis," *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (1958), 282–289.

DIAGRAM 1. Proportion of variation explained (R^2) in taxation policy with twelve socio-economic variables, by institutional characteristics.[a]

Independent Variables	Structural Variables	Dependent Variable
	Reformed Institution:	
	Government: Commission	62%
	Government: Council-Manager	42%
	Election: Nonpartisan	49%
	Constituency: At-Large	49%
Twelve Socio-Economic Variables		Tax/Income Ratio
	Unreformed Institution:	
	Government: Mayor-Council	52%
	Election: Partisan	71%
	Constituency: Ward/Mixed	59%

[a] In the total sample, the twelve independent variables explained 52% of the variation in taxes.

DIAGRAM 2. Proportion of variation explained (R^2) in expenditure policy with twelve socio-economic variables, by institutional characteristics.[b]

Independent Variables	Structural Variables	Dependent Variable
	Reformed Institution:	
	Government: Commission	59%
	Government: Council-Manager	30%
	Constituency: At-Large	36%
	Elections: Nonpartisan	41%
Twelve Socio-Economic Variables		Expenditure/Income Ratio
	Unreformed Institution:	
	Government: Mayor-Council	42%
	Constituency: Ward/Mixed	49%
	Elections: Partisan	59%

[b] In the total sample, the twelve independent variables explained 36% of the variation in expenditures.

more, rather than less, closely than unreformed ones.

Essentially, then, there are two contrasting views about the consequences of municipal reform. One, the reformers' ideal, holds that institutional reforms will mitigate the impact of social cleavages on public policy. The other argues that the elimination of political parties and the introduction of other reforms will make social cleavages more, rather than less, important in political decision-making.

The measurement of responsiveness. We have hypothesized that socio-economic cleavages will have less impact on the policy choices of reformed than unreformed governments. Thus, one could do a better job of predicting a city's taxation and expenditure policy using socio-economic variables in partisan, mayor and ward cities than in nonpartisan, manager and at-large cities. Operationally, we will test this hypothesis by using multiple correlation coefficients. Squaring these coefficients, called "multiple R's," will give us a summary measure of the total amount of variation in our dependent variables explained by our twelve independent variables.[35] The results of the correla-

[35] It is possible that the difference between any two correlations may be a function of very different standard deviations of the independent variables. A quick look at Table 2, however, suggests that this is not likely to affect the relationships we find.

tion analysis are summarized in Diagrams 1 and 2.

On the whole, the results of the correlation analysis strikingly support the hypothesis, with the exception of commission cities. Thus, we can say, for example, that our twelve socio-economic variables explain 71 per cent of the variations in taxation policy in partisan cities, and 49 per cent of the variation in nonpartisan cities. In commission cities, however, socio-economic variables predict substantially more variation in both taxes and expenditures than in the unreformed mayor-council cities.[36] The anomaly of commission governments is interesting, for they present, as we will see, marked exceptions to virtually every pattern of relationships we found. The substantial explanatory power of these socio-economic variables is not altered, but confirmed, by examining the variables independently. The rest of the correlations show a consistent pattern: reformed cities are less responsive to cleavages in their population than unreformed cities.

If one of the premises of the "political ethos" argument is that reformed institutions give less weight to the "private regarding" and "artificial" cleavages in the population, that premise receives striking support from our analysis. Our data suggest that when a city adopts reformed structures, it comes to be governed less on the basis of conflict and more on the basis of the rationalistic theory of administration. The making of public policy takes less count of the enduring differences between White and Negro, business and labor, Pole and WASP. The logic of the bureaucratic ethic demands an impersonal, apolitical settlement of issues, rather than the settlement of conflict in the arena of political battle.

V. TO SPEND OR NOT TO SPEND

If efforts to expand or contract the scope of government stand at the core of municipal political life,[37] they are nowhere better reflected than in the taxation and expenditure patterns of cities. A generation ago, Charles Beard wrote, "In the purposes for which appropriations are made the policies of the city government are given concrete form—the culture of the city is reflected. Indeed, the history of urban civilization could be written in terms of appropriations, for they show what the citizens think is worth doing and worth paying for."[38] Pressures to expand and contract government regulations and services are almost always reflected one way or another in the municipal budget. Labor, ethnic groups, the poor and the liberal community may press for additional services and these must be paid for; the business community may demand municipal efforts to obtain new industry by paring city costs to create a "favorable business climate"; or businessmen may themselves demand municipal services for new or old business. In any case, few political conflicts arise which do not involve some conflict over the budget structure.

Class variables and public policies. Part of the political rhetoric associated with the demand for a decrease in the scope of the national government is the argument that the initiative for policy-making should rest more with the state and local governments. Opposition to high federal spending levels, as V. O. Key has demonstrated, is found more often among persons with middle class occupations than among blue-collar workers.[39] It is not inconceivable that the middle class argument about state and local responsibility might be more than political rhetoric, and that at the local level, middle class voters are willing to undertake major programs of municipal services, requiring large outlays of public capital. Wilson and Banfield have argued that the "public regarding" upper-middle class voters in metropolitan areas are often found voting for public policies at variance with their "self-interest narrowly conceived," and that "the higher the income of a ward or town, the more taste it has for public expenditures of various kinds."[40] Similarly a longitudinal study of voting patterns in metropolitan Cleveland found that an index of social rank was positively correlated

[36] Wolfinger and Field, *op. cit.*, p. 312, " . . . omit the commission cities from consideration since this form does not figure in the ethos theory." Historically, however, commission government was the earliest of the structures advocated by the Progressives and is quite clearly a product of the reform era. While history tells us that commission cities can not legitimately be excluded from the fold of reformism, they appear to be its black sheep, characterized by low incomes, low population growth and large proportions of nonwhites. In fact, they present a marked contrast to both mayor-council and manager cities.

[37] Agger *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–14.

[38] Charles A. Beard, *American Government and Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1924, 4th edition), p. 727.

[39] V. O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 124.

[40] Wilson and Banfield, *op. cit.*, p. 876. Footnote 5 in the same article conveniently summarized research supporting this proposition.

TABLE 4. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MIDDLE CLASS CHARACTERISTICS AND OUTPUTS IN REFORMED AND UNREFORMED CITIES

Correlations of	Government Type			Election Type		Constituency Type	
	Mayor-Council	Manager	Commission	Partisan	Non-Partisan	Ward	At-large
Taxes with:							
Median income	−.13	−.24	−.19	.03	−.19	−.17	−.22
White collar	−.23	−.12	−.62	−.21	−.33	−.30	−.32
Median education	−.36	−.22	−.08	−.45	−.24	−.48	−.18
Expenditures with:							
Median income	−.19	−.32	−.43	−.04	−.32	−.23	−.34
White collar	−.24	−.23	−.58	−.18	−.39	−.32	−.35
Median education	−.32	−.36	−.26	−.36	−.38	−.44	−.32

with favorable votes on welfare referenda.[41] If these data reflect middle class willingness to spend on a local level, they might indicate that the "states' rights" argument was more than ideological camouflage: middle class voters stand foursquare behind public expenditures at the local level even when they oppose those expenditures from the national government. Therefore, we hypothesized that:

2a. The more middle class the city, measured by income, education and occupation, the higher the municipal taxes and expenditures.

In line with our general concern of testing the impact of political structures on municipal policies, we also hypothesized that:

2b. Unreformed cities reflect this relationship more strongly than reformed cities.

With respect to hypothesis 2a, the data in Table 4 on three middle class indicators are unambiguous and indicate a strong rejection of the hypothesis. However we measure social class, whether by income, education or occupation, class measures are negatively related to public taxes and expenditures.

It is possible, however, that income does not have a linear, but rather a curvilinear relationship with municipal outputs. Banfield and Wilson argue that "In the city, it is useful to think in terms of three income groups—low, middle, and high. Surprising as it may seem to Marxists, the conflict is generally between an alliance of low-income and high-income groups on one side and the middle-income groups on the other."[42] If the relationships between income and expenditure is curvilinear, then we should expect to find that proportions of both low and high income groups were positively correlated with outputs. Our data, however, lend no support to this notion of a "pro-expenditure" alliance. Rather, the proportion of the population with incomes below $3000 is positively correlated with expenditures in all city types (although the relationships are small) and the proportion of the population in the above $10,000 bracket is negatively correlated with expenditures. Summing the two measures and correlating the combined measure with outputs produced no correlation greater than .15 and the relationships were as likely to be negative as positive. Tests for nonlinearity also suggested that no such coalition exists in the cities in our analysis.

To be sure, aggregate data analysis using whole cities as units of analysis is no substitute for systematic survey data on middle class attitudes, but it is apparent that cities with larger middle class population have lower, not higher expenditures. As we emphasized earlier, the "ethos theory" deals with attitudes and the behavior of individuals, while our data deal with cities and their behavior. The coalition suggested by Banfield and Wilson, however, is not discernible at this level of aggregation in these cities.

Hypothesis 2b is not consistently borne out by the data. In fact, the relationships between middle class variables and outputs are, if anything, stronger in the reformed cities than in in their unreformed counterparts. One would not want to make too much of the data, but a large body of literature on city politics, which

[41] Eugene S. Uyeki, "Patterns of Voting in a Metropolitan Area: 1938–1962," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 1 (June, 1966), 65–77.

[42] Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

TABLE 5. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN OWNER OCCUPANCY AND GOVERNMENT OUTPUTS IN REFORMED AND UNREFORMED CITIES

Correlations of Owner Occupancy with:	Government Type			Election Type		Constituency Type	
	Mayor-Council	Manager	Commission	Partisan	Non-Partisan	Ward	At-large
Taxes	−.57	−.31	−.73	−.64	−.45	−.56	−.48
Expenditures	−.51	−.23	−.62	−.62	−.40	−.50	−.40

we discuss below, suggests that reformed institutions maximize the power of the middle class.

We originally assumed that the proportion of owner-occupied dwelling units constituted another measure of middle class composition, but it soon became apparent that it was only weakly related to income, occupation and education measures. Nevertheless, it emerged as the strongest single predictor of both expenditure and taxation policy in our cities. We hypothesized that:

3a. Owner-occupancy and outputs are negatively correlated, and
3b. Unreformed cities reflect this relationship more strongly than reformed cities.

Hypothesis 3a is consistently borne out in the data presented in Table 5. These relationships were only slightly attenuated when we controlled for income, education and occupation. No doubt self-interest (perhaps "private regardingness") on the part of the home owner, whose property is intimately related to the tax structure of most local governments, may account for part of this relationship. Moreover, home ownership is correlated (almost by definition) with lower urban population density. High density, bringing together all manner of men into the classic urban mosaic, may be itself correlated with factors which produce demands for higher expenditures—slums, increased needs for fire and police protection, and so on.

In confirmation of hypothesis 3a, the unmistakable pattern is for unreformed cities to reflect these negative relationships more strongly than the manager, nonpartisan and at-large cities, although commission cities show their usual remarkably high correlations.

Homogeneity variables and public policies. Dawson and Robinson, in their analysis of state welfare expenditures, found strong positive relationships between the ethnicity of a state's population and the level of its welfare expenditures.[43] If this is symptomatic of a generalized association of ethnic and religious minorities with higher expenditures, we might find support for the hypothesis that:

4a. The larger the proportion of religious and ethnic minorities in the population, the higher the city's taxes and expenditures.

And, if our general hypothesis about the impact of political institutions is correct, then:

4b. Unreformed cities reflect this relationship more strongly than reformed cities.

The correlations between ethnicity, religious heterogeneity and outputs (see Table 6) are, with one exception, positive, as predicted by hypothesis 4a. These associations may reflect the substantial participation by ethnic groups in municipal politics long after the tide of immigration has been reduced to a trickle.[44] The relatively intense politicization of ethnic groups at the local level,[45] the appeals to nationality groups through "ticket balancing" and other means, and the resultant higher turnout of ethnic groups than other lower status groups,[46] may produce an influence on city government far out of proportion to their number.

We found when we related all twelve of our independent variables to outputs in various city types that the associations were much weaker in cities we have labeled reformed. The correlations for ethnicity and religious homo-

[43] Richard E. Dawson and James A. Robinson, "The Politics of Welfare," in Herbert Jacob and Kenneth Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965), pp. 398–401.

[44] Raymond Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," this REVIEW, 59 (December, 1965), 896–908.

[45] Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 236–243.

[46] *Ibid.*

TABLE 6. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN ETHNICITY AND RELIGIOUS HETEROGENEITY AND OUTPUTS IN REFORMED AND UNREFORMED CITIES

Correlations of	Government Type			Election Type		Constituency Type	
	Mayor-Council	Manager	Commission	Partisan	Non-Partisan	Ward	At-large
Taxes with:							
Ethnicity	.49	.26	.57	.61	.43	.56	.40
Private School Attendance	.38	.15	.37	.33	.37	.41	.25
Expenditures with:							
Ethnicity	.36	.02	.21	.48	.21	.44	.13
Private School Attendance	.34	−.01	.07	.25	.24	.40	.05

geneity show a generally similar pattern, with commission cities exhibiting their usual erratic behavior. The data, then, show fairly clear support for hypothesis 4b.

The third variable of our homogeneity indicators—per cent of population non-white—had almost no relationship to variation in outputs, regardless of city type. We found the same weak correlations for the poverty income variable, which was, of course, strongly related to the racial variable. An easy explanation suggests that this is a consequence of the political impotence of Negroes and the poor, but one should be cautious in inferring a lack of power from the lack of a statistical association.

We have dealt in this section with factors which are positively and negatively related to spending patterns in American cities. While social class variables are associated negatively with outputs, two measures of homogeneity, private school attendance and ethnicity are related to higher taxes and spending. Examining the strengths of these correlations in cities with differing forms, we found some support for our general hypothesis about the political consequences of institutions, especially for the homogeneity variables and the home ownership variable. Interestingly, however, this was not the case with class variables.

VI. REFORMISM AS A CONTINUOUS VARIABLE

The central thrust of our argument has been that reformed governments differ from their unreformed counterparts in their responsiveness to socio-economic cleavages in the population. Logically, if the presence of one feature of the "good government" syndrome had the impact of reducing responsiveness, the introduction of additional reformed institutions should have an additive effect and further reduce the impact of cleavages on decision-making. We therefore decided to treat "reformism" as a continuous variable for analytic purposes and hypothesized that:

5. The higher the level of reformism in a city, the lower its responsiveness to socio-economic cleavages in the population.

We utilized a simple four-point index to test this hypothesis, ranging from the "least reformed" to the "most reformed." The sample cities were categorized as follows:

1. Cities with none of the reformed institutions (i.e., the government is mayor-council, elections are partisan and constituencies are wards).
2. Cities with any one of the reformed institutions.
3. Cities with two of the reformed institutions.
4. Cities with three reformed institutions (i.e., the government is either manager or commission, elections are nonpartisan and constituencies are at-large).

We can not overemphasize the crudity of this index as an operationalization of the complex and abstract concept of "reformism." Nonetheless, we think some of the relationships we found are strongly suggestive that reformism may in reality be a continuous variable.

To test this hypothesis, we took four variables which had moderate-to-strong correlations with our dependent variables and computed simple correlations in each reform category. If our hypothesis is correct, the strength of the correlations in Table 7 should decrease regularly with an increase in reform scores. While there are some clear exceptions to the pre-

TABLE 7. CORRELATIONS BETWEEN SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND OUTPUT VARIABLES BY FOUR CATEGORIES OF REFORMISM

Correlations of	Reform Scores			
	1 (least reformed)	2	3	4 (most reformed)
Taxes with:				
Ethnicity	.62	.41	.50	.34
Private School Attendance	.40	.32	.28	.25
Owner-Occupancy	−.70	−.39	−.54	−.44
Median Education	−.55	−.27	−.32	−.13
Expenditures with:				
Ethnicity	.51	.27	.41	.05
Private School Attendance	.46	.23	.16	.08
Owner-Occupancy	−.67	−.30	−.54	−.38
Median Education	−.49	−.19	−.38	−.37

dicted pattern of relationships, there is some fairly consistent support for the hypothesis. Even when the decreases in the strengths of the correlations is irregular, there is a clear difference between cities which we have labeled "most reformed" and "least reformed."


Again, we would not want to attach too much importance to the results of this rough-and-ready index. But, the patterns support our previous argument about the impact of reformism: the more reformed the city, the less responsive it is to socio-economic cleavages in its political decision-making.

VII. A CAUSAL MODEL AND AN INTERPRETATION

A causal model. The implicit, or at times explicit, causal model in much of the research on municipal reformism has been a simple one: socio-economic cleavages cause the adoption of particular political forms. A more sophisticated model would include political institutions as one of the factors which produce a given output structure in city politics. We hypothesize that a causal model would include four classes of variables: socio-economic cleavages, political variables (including party registration, structure of party systems, patterns of aggregation, strength of interest groups, voter turnout, etc.), political institutions (form of government, type of elections and types of constituencies), and political outputs. Diagram 3 depicts one possible causal model.

This study has of necessity been limited to exploring the linkages between socio-economic cleavages, political institutions and political

DIAGRAM 3. A hypothesized causal model.



outputs. We found that political institutions "filter" the process of converting inputs into outputs. Some structures, particularly partisan elections, ward constituencies, mayor-council governments and commission governments, operate to maximize the impact of cleavage indicators on public policies. We conclude by discussing some of the reasons why different structures have varying impacts on the conversion process.

An interpretation. Three principal conclusions may be derived from this analysis.

1. Cities with reformed and unreformed institutions are not markedly different in terms of demographic variables. Indeed, some variables, like income, ran counter to the popular hypothesis that reformed cities are havens of the middle class. Our data lent some support to the notion that reformed cities are more homogeneous in their ethnic and religious populations. Still, it is apparent that reformed cities are by no means free from the impact of these cleavages.

2. The more important difference between the two kinds of cities is in their behavior, rather than their demography. Using multiple correlation coefficients, we were able to predict municipal outputs more exactly in unreformed than in reformed cities. The translation of social conflicts into public policy and the responsiveness of political systems to class, racial, and religious cleavages differs markedly with the kind of political structure. Thus, political institutions seem to play an important role in the political process —a role substantially independent of a city's demography.

3. Our analysis has also demonstrated that reformism may be viewed as a continuous variable and that the political structures of the reform syndrome have an additive effect: the greater the reformism, the lower the responsiveness.

Through these political institutions, the goal of the reformers has been substantially fulfilled, for nonpartisan elections, at-large constituencies and manager governments are associated with a lessened responsiveness of cities to the enduring conflicts of political life. Or, as Stone, Price and Stone argued in their study of changes produced by the adoption of manager governments, the council after the reform "tended to think more of the community as a whole and less of factional interests in making their decisions."[47]

The responsiveness of a political institution to political conflicts should not be confused with the "responsibility" of a political system as the latter term is used in the great debate over the relative "responsibility" of party systems.[48] In fact, the responsiveness of political forms to social cleavages may stand in sharp contrast to "responsible government" on the British model. Presumably, in American cities, partisan elections, ward constituencies, and mayor-council governments maximize minority rather than majority representation, assuring greater access to decision-makers than the reformed, bureaucratized and "de-politicized" administrations.

Partisan electoral systems, when combined with ward representation, increase the access of two kinds of minority groups: those which are residentially segregated, and which may as a consequence of the electoral system demand and obtain preferential consideration from their councilmen; and groups which constitute identifiable voting blocs to which parties and politicians may be beholden in the next election. The introduction of at-large, nonpartisan elections has at least five consequences for these groups. First, they remove an important cue-giving agency—the party—from the electoral scene, leaving the voter to make decisions less on the policy commitments (however vague) of the party, and more on irrelevancies such as ethnic identification and name familiarity.[49] Second, by removing the party from the ballot, the reforms eliminate the principal agency of interest aggregation from the political system. Hence, interests are articulated less clearly and are aggregated either by some other agency or not at all. Moreover, nonpartisanship has the effect of reducing the turnout in local elections by working class groups,[50] leaving officeholders freer from retaliation by these groups at the polls. Fourth, nonpartisanship may also serve to decrease the salience of "private regarding" demands by increasing the relative political power of "public regarding" agencies like the local press.[51] And when nonpartisanship is com-

[47] Harold Stone, Don K. Price and Kathryn Stone, *City Manager Government in the United States* (Chicago: Public Administration Service, 1940), p. 238.

[48] The standard argument for party responsibility is found in the works of E. E. Schattschneider, esp., *Party Government* (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1942) and in the report of the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System* (New York: Rinehart, 1950).

[49] See Pomper, *op. cit.*; and Freeman, *op. cit.*

[50] Robert Salisbury and Gordon Black, "Class and Party in Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines," this REVIEW, 57 (September, 1963), 584–592.

[51] One newspaperman said of nonpartisan politics that "You can't tell the players without a

bined with election at-large, the impact of residentially segregated groups or groups which obtain their strength from voting as blocs in municipal elections is further reduced.[52] For these reasons, it is clear that political reforms may have a significant impact in minimizing the role which social conflicts play in decision-making. By muting the demands of private-regarding groups, the electoral institutions of reformed governments make public policy less responsive to the demands arising out of social conflicts in the population.

The structure of the government may serve further to modify the strength of minority groups over public policy. It is significant in this respect to note that commission governments, where social cleavages have the greatest impact on policy choices, are the most decentralized of the three governmental types and that manager governments are relatively the most centralized.[53] From the point of view of the reformer, commission government is a failure and their number has declined markedly in recent years.[54] This greater decentralization of commission and of mayor-council governments permits a multiplicity of access points for groups wishing to influence decision-makers.[55] It may also increase the possibilities for collaboration between groups and a bureaucratic agency, a relationship which has characterized administrative patterns in the federal government. As a result of this decentralization, group strength in local governments may be maximized.

It is important in any analysis of reformism to distinguish between the factors which produce the *adoption* of reformed institutions and the *impact* of the new political forms once they have been established. We can offer from our data no conclusions about the origins of reformed structures, for it is obviously impossible to impute causation, using contemporary census data, to events which occurred decades ago. Once a city has institutionalized the reformers' ideals, however, a diffused attitude structure may be less helpful in explaining the city's public policy than the characteristics of the institutions themselves. With the introduction of these reforms, a new political pattern may emerge in which disputes are settled outside the political system, or in which they may be settled by the crowd at the civic club at the periphery of the system.[56] If they do enter the political process, an impersonal, "non-political" bureaucracy may take less account of the conflicting interests and pay more attention to the "correct" decision from the point of view of the municipal planner.

These conclusions are generally consistent with the ethos theory developed by Banfield and Wilson. If one of the components of the middle class reformer's ideal was "to seek the good of the community as a whole" and to minimize the impact of social cleavages on political decision-making, then their institutional reforms have served, by and large, to advance that goal.

---

scorecard, and we sell the scorecards": Banfield and Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

[52] Oliver P. Williams and Charles Adrian, *Four Cities* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), pp. 56–57.

[53] Alford and Scoble, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

[54] In our view, the failure of the commission government to achieve the intended reforms is more plausible as an explanation of its demise than its administrative unwieldiness—the conventional explanation.

[55] Williams and Adrian, *op. cit.*, pp. 30–31.

[56] Carol E. Thometz discusses the role of the "Civic Committee" in decision-making in Dallas: see *The Decision-Makers* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1963).

ETHNIC POLITICS AND THE PERSISTENCE OF ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION

MICHAEL PARENTI
Sarah Lawrence College

A question that has puzzled students of ethnic politics can be stated as follows: in the face of increasing assimilation why do ethnics continue to vote as ethnics with about the same frequency as in earlier decades? On the basis of his New Haven study, Robert Dahl observes that " . . . in spite of growing assimilation, ethnic factors continued to make themselves felt with astonishing tenacity."[1] Nevertheless, he asserts, "the strength of ethnic ties as a factor in local politics surely must recede."[2] Dahl sets up a "three-stage" model to describe how political assimilation will follow a more general social assimilation. However, one of his co-researchers, Raymond Wolfinger, demonstrates in a recent article in this REVIEW[3] that ethnic voting patterns persist into the second and third generations, and that "at least in New Haven, all the social changes of the 1940's and 1950's do not seem to have reduced the political importance of national origins."[4] The same observation can be made of religious-ethnic identities, for as Wolfinger notes, citing data from the Elmira study, social mobility in no way diminishes the religious factor as a determinant of voting behavior; in fact, in the case of upper and middle class Catholics and Protestants, religion seems to assume a heightened importance as a voting determinant.[5] Wolfinger marshals evidence to support the arresting proposition that, melting pot or not, ethnic voting may be with us for a long time to come, a finding which craves explanation.

Part of the reason for the persistence of ethnic voting may rest in the political system itself. Rather than being a purely dependent variable, the political system, i.e., party, precinct workers, candidates, elections, patronage, etc., continues to rely upon ethnic strategies such as those extended to accommodate the claims of newly-arrived ethnic middle-class leadership; as a mediator and mobilizer of minority symbols and interests, the political system must be taken into account.[6]

Wolfinger suggests several further explanations, which may be briefly summarized as follows: (a) "Family-political identification." Voting studies show that as many as four-fifths of all voters maintain the same party identification as did their parents, a continuity which is not merely a reflection of similar life conditions but is in part ascribable to the independent influence of primary group relations.[7] (b) "Critical elections theory." The emergence of highly salient ethnic candidates and issues may cause a dramatic realignment so that a particular party becomes the repository of ethnic loyalty even after the ethnically salient candidate and issues have passed.[8] (c) "Historical after-effects." Partisan affiliations, as Key and Munger have demonstrated for Indiana, persist generations after the reasons for their emergence have ceased to be politically relevant. Thus "even when ethnic salience has faded, . . . its political effects will remain."[9] (d) "Militant core-city residue." The ethnic community may retain a group awareness despite a growing class heterogeneity because the assimilationist-minded will advance to the suburbs while those among the upwardly mobile who choose to stay in the ethnic city settlements are more likely to be the most strongly in-group oriented.[10]

[1] Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 59.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 62. See also pp. 32–62 inclusive.

[3] Raymond E. Wolfinger, "The Development and Persistence of Ethnic Voting," this REVIEW, 59 (December, 1965), 896–908.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 907.

[5] *Ibid.*, see also Bernard R. Berelson *et al.*, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 65.

[6] Besides the studies cited in Wolfinger, *op. cit.*, and his own data on New Haven, almost all the literature on the relationship between the political machine and the ethnic lends support to this proposition.

[7] Cf. Wolfinger *op. cit.*, p. 907 and the studies cited therein. Also Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1959), and much of the work done by Fred I. Greenstein.

[8] Here Wolfinger is applying Key's hypothesis. See V. O. Key, Jr. "A Theory of Critical Elections," *Journal of Politics*, 17 (February, 1955), 3–18.

[9] The quotation is from Wolfinger, *op. cit.*, p. 908. See also V. O. Key and Frank Munger, "Social Determinism and Electoral Decision: the Case of Indiana," in Eugene Burdick and Arthur J. Brodbeck (eds.), *American Voting Behavior* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1959), pp. 281–299.

[10] Wolfinger, *loc. cit.*

Several comments are in order before we proceed further: of the above explanations, there seems to be some question as to whether (a), (b) and (c) are concerned with independent variables. It does seem that the Key-Munger historical after-effect idea in (c) is an extension of the "fixation" of the "crucial elections" notion in (b) and that both must rest in large part on the strong inheritance and continuity of family partisan identifications in (a). Explanation (d), while suggestive, is wanting in substantiating data. What evidence we have does not necessarily support the "militant core-city residue" idea, and certainly does not lend substance to the image of a homogenized, assimilated suburbia, as we shall see below. Nevertheless, the above hypotheses submitted by Wolfinger may serve as useful explanations for the political continuity of all social groups, ethnics included.[11]

Yet, after all is said and done, I cannot free myself from the suspicion that perhaps a false problem has been created which can best be resolved by applying certain analytic and theoretical distinctions, supported by data that extend beyond the usual voting studies. If, in fact, it can be demonstrated that assimilation is not taking place, then the assimilation theory as propounded by Dahl, along with Wolfinger's alternate explanations are somewhat beside the point. And the question, why do ethnics continue to vote as ethnics despite increasing assimilation, becomes the wrong one to ask—because the answer may simply be that minorities are not assimilating. At first glance, such an assertion seems to violate the evidence of our senses. Have not old-world immigrant cultures all but disappeared? Are not the ethnics scattering into homogeneously Americanized suburbs? Is not the educational level of the national minorities continually increasing? Are not ethnic occupational distributions changing? etc.

The confusion rests, I submit, in the failure —common to many of us political scientists, and even to some sociologists and anthropologists— to make a conceptual distinction between "acculturation" and "assimilation." The distinction is crucial in reading correct meaning into our data and in guiding us to fruitful theoretical conclusions. For while it is established that ethnics have accommodated themselves to American styles and customs (acculturation) by the second generation, and while perhaps they may enjoy increased occupational and geographic mobility, it is not at all clear that they are incorporating themselves into the structural-identificational-group relations of the dominant society (assimilation). On close examination we find that the term "assimilation," as commonly used, refers to a multiplicity of cultural, social and identificational processes which need closer scrutiny.[12]

I. ACCULTURATION AND ASSIMILATION

At the outset, it is necessary, as Talcott Parsons and others have urged, to distinguish between *cultural* and *social* systems: the cultural is the system of beliefs, values, norms, practices, symbols and ideas (science, art, artifacts, language, law and learning included); the social is the system of interrelations and associations among individuals and groups. Thus a church, family, club, informal friendship group, or formal organization, etc., composed of individuals interracting in some kind of context involving roles and statuses are part of the *social* system, or one might say, represent particular subsocietal systems within the society; while the beliefs, symbols, and practices mediated and adhered to by members of the church, family, club, etc., are part of the *cultural* system or sub-cultural systems within the total culture. By abstracting two analytically distinct sets of components from the same concrete phenomena we are able to observe that, although there may often be an important interraction, the order of relationships and the actions and conditions within one are independent of those in the other. Attention to this independence increases analytical precision.[13]

What was considered as one general process becomes a multifaceted configuration of processes. And if it can be said that there is no inevitable one-to-one relationship between the various processes, and that imperatives operative in one system are not wholly dependent upon the other, then ethnic political behavior becomes something less of a mystery. *For ethnic social sub-systems may persist or evolve new structures independent of the host society and despite*

[11] For a more extended and systematic treatment of the question of political continuities and discontinuities see Seymour M. Lipset *et al.*, "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior," in Gardner Lindzey (ed.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, Vol. II (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954), pp. 1124–1170.

[12] For instance, Wolfinger uses the term "assimilation" synonymously with "general acculturation and occupational differentiation," in the same body of propositions, *op. cit.*, p. 906.

[13] A. L. Kroeber and Talcott Parsons, "The Concepts of Culture and of Social System," *American Sociological Review*, 23 (October, 1958), 582–583; also Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951).

dramatic cultural transitions in the direction of the mainstream culture.

Since early colonial times, nearly every group arriving in America has attempted to reconstruct communities that were replications of the old world societies from which they had emerged. With the exception of a few isolated sectarian enclaves such as the Hutterites, the Amish and the Hasidic, they failed to do so. If culture is to be represented as the accumulated beliefs, styles, solutions and practices which represent a society's total and continuing adjustment to its environment, then it would seem to follow that no specific cultural system can be transplanted from one environment to another without some measure of change. Unable to draw upon a complete cultural base of their own in the new world, and with no larger constellation of societal and institutional forces beyond the ghetto boundaries to back them, the immigrants eventually lost the battle to maintain their indigenous ways. By the second generation, attention was directed almost exlusively toward American events and standards, American language, dress, recreation, work, and mass media, while interest in old world culture became minimal or, more usually, non-existent. To one extent or another, all major historical and sociological studies of immigration and ethnicity document this cultural transition of the American-born generation.[14]

However, such acculturation was most often *not* followed by social assimilation; the group became "Americanized" in much of its *cultural* practices, but this says little about its *social* relations with the host society. In the face of widespread acculturation, the minority still maintained a social sub-structure encompassing primary and secondary group relations composed essentially of fellow ethnics. A study of a Polish-American industrial town illustrates this cultural-social distinction. The Polish children treat their immigrant parents with either patronization or contempt, speak American slang, are addicted to American popular music, and popular culture, accept fully the American way of piling up money and material goods when possible. Yet they keep almost all their social contacts within the confines of the Polish-American community and have no direct exposure to, and little interest in, middle-class American society.[15] Similar findings were made by Whyte and Gans in their respective studies—done twenty years apart—of Italian-American communities in Boston. American styles, language, sports and consumption patterns predominated, but interpersonal relations and social group structures were almost exclusively Italian-American in both the North End of the 1940's and the West End of the 1960's.[16]

From birth in the sectarian hospital to childhood play-groups to cliques and fraternities in high school and college to the selection of a spouse, a church affiliation, social and service clubs, a vacation resort, and, as life nears completion, an old-age home and sectarian cemetary—the ethnic, if he so desires, may live within the confines of his sub-societal matrix—and many do.[17] Even if he should find himself in the oppressively integrated confines of prison, the ethnic discovers that Italian, Irish, Jewish, Negro and Puerto Rican inmates coalesce into distinct groups in "a complex web of prejudices and hostilities, friendships and alliances."[18]

[14] See for instance: Oscar Handlin, *Boston's Immigrants, A Study in Acculturation* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, rev. ed. 1959); Oscar Handlin, *The Uprooted* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1951); R. E. Park and H. A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted* (New York: Harper, 1921); W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 5 vols. (Boston: Badger, 1918–20); E. V. Stonequist, *The Marginal Man, A Study in Personality and Culture Conflict* (New York: Scribner, 1937); W. L. Warner and Leo Srole, *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1945); William Foote Whyte, *Street Corner Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943); Herbert J. Gans, *The Urban Villagers* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe), 1962.

[15] Arnold W. Green, "A Re-examination of the Marginal Man Concept," *Social Forces*, 26 (1947), 167–171.

[16] Whyte, *op. cit.*, and Gans, *op. cit.* A socially unassimilated pluralism is readily visible in many areas of American life. Thus, in a single weekend in New York separate dances for persons of Hungarian, Irish, Italian, German, Greek and Polish extractions are advertised in neighborhood newspapers and the foreign language press.

[17] See Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 34; also Erich Rosenthal, "Acculturation without Assimilation?" *American Journal of Sociology*, 66 (November, 1960), 275–288; Amitai Etzioni, "The Ghetto—a Re-evaluation," *Social Forces* (March, 1959), 255–262; J. Milton Yinger, "Social Forces Involved in Group Identification or Withdrawal," *Daedalus*, 90 (Spring, 1961), 247–262; Y. J. Chyz and R. Lewis, "Agencies Organized by Nationality Groups in the United States," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 262 (1949).

[18] M. Arc, "The Prison 'Culture' From the In-

Hollingshead, in a study of New Haven, discerned vertical social divisions based on race, religion and national origin along with the expected horizontal cleavages due to income and residence. Cutting across the class strata were the parallel dissections of the black and white worlds, with the latter further fissured into Catholic, Jewish and Protestant components which, in turn, sub-divided into Irish, Italian, Polish, etc. Within this highly compartmentalized world were to be found the ethnic associational patterns.[19]

II. HETEROGENEITY WITHIN THE HOMOGENEOUS SOCIETY

Could not such unassimilated sub-structures be more representative of a time when urban areas were segmented into ghettos untouched by post-war affluence, upward occupational mobility and treks to the suburbs? This is the question which seems to anticipate both Dahl and Wolfinger. In actuality, while individual ethnics have entered professional and occupational roles previously beyond their reach, minority group mobility has not been as dramatic as is often supposed. A comparison of first and second generation occupational statuses as reported in the 1950 national census shows no evidence of any substantial convergence of intergroup status levels. The occupational differences among ethnic groups, with the Irish as a possible exception, remain virtually the same for both generations, leading C. B. Nam to observe that even with the absence of large-scale immigration, "the importance of nationality distinctions for the American stratification system will remain for some time to come."[20] If today's ethnics enjoy a better living standard than did their parents, it is because there has been an across-the-board rise throughout America. Fewer pick-and-shovel jobs and more white collar positions for minority members are less the result of ethnic mobility than of an over-all structural transition in our national economy and the composition of our labor force.[21]

Furthermore, despite the popular literature on the hopeless homogeneity of suburbia,[22] suburbs are not great *social* melting pots. Scott Greer, after noting the breakup of some of the central city ethnic communities, cautions: "The staying force of the ethnic community (in suburbia) must not be underestimated." The good Catholic, for instance, "can live most of his life, aside from work, within a Catholic environment,"[23] in a sub-societal network of schools, religious endogamy, family, church, social, athletic and youth organizations, and Catholic residential areas. Similarly, Robert Wood observes that suburbs tend toward ethnic clusters. In the more "mixed areas," ethnic political blocs are not unknown. As in the city, the tension between the older resident and the newcomer sometimes reinforces ethnic political alignments and ethnic social identifications.[24] Minority concentrations are less visible in suburban than in urban areas because less immigrant and second-generation persons reside there. Lieberson's study of ten major metropolitan areas shows that the groups most highly segregated from native whites in the central city are also most residentially concentrated in the

side," *New York Times Magazine*, February 28, 1965, p. 63.

[19] August B. Hollingshead, "Trends in Social Stratification: A Case Study," *American Sociological Review*, 17 (1952), 685 f; see also Gans, *op. cit.*; Warner and Srole, *op. cit.*, for further evidence of ethnic sub-societal systems.

[20] C. B. Nam, "Nationality Groups and Social Stratification in America," *Social Forces*, 37 (1959), p. 333. The assumption that Negroes have been enjoying a slow but steady economic advance is laid to rest by Dale Hiestand, *Economic Growth and Employment Opportunities for Minorities* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964).

[21] See Lewis Corey, "Problems of the Peace: IV. The Middle Class," *Antioch Review*, 5, 68–87.

[22] For instance William H. Whyte, *The Organization Man* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1957); A. C. Spectorsky, *The Ex-Urbanites* (New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1955).

[23] Scott Greer, "Catholic Voters and the Democratic Party," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (1961), p. 624.

[24] Robert C. Wood, *Suburbia, Its People and Their Politics* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1958), p. 178. As impressive as is the trek to the suburbs, more recent developments should not go unrecorded. Of great significance, and hitherto unobserved because it is of such recent occurrence, is the effect of the revised and liberalized national origins quota system of our immigration laws. Direct observation of immigration into several of the Italian and Greek communities in New York during 1965–66 leaves me with the conviction that the ethnic core-city community is far from declining. In certain urban centers, such as the Brownsville section of New York, the gradual depletion of old ethnic neighborhoods is being amply and visibly counterbalanced by new injections of Polish refugees, along with Italian, Greek and Latin American immigrants who not only reinforce the core-city neighborhoods but frequently lend them certain first-generation touches reminiscent of an earlier day.

suburbs, so that suburban patterns bear a strong similarity to those found in the city.[25]

Finally, residential segregation is not a necessary prerequisite for the maintenance of an ethnic sub-societal structure; *a group can maintain ethnic social cohesion and identity, while lacking an ecological basis.*[26] The Jews of Park Forest live scattered over a wide area and "participate with other Park Foresters in American middle-class culture," that is, they clearly are acculturated. Yet in one year a Jewish sub-community consisting of informal friendship groups, a women's club, a B'nai B'rith lodge and a Sunday School had emerged. Similarly distinct Lutheran and Catholic social groupings also had developed in which national origin played a large part. (Religion, according to Herbert Gans, was not the exclusive concern of any of the three groups.)[27]

The neighborhood stores, bars, coffee-shops, barber shops, and fraternal clubrooms which serve as social nerve centers in the ecologically contiguous first-settlement urban areas are difficult to reconstruct in the new topography of shopping centers and one-family homes, but they are frequently replaced by suburban-styled church, charity and social organizations, informal evening home-centered gatherings and extended family ties kept intact over a wide area with the technical assistance of the omnipresent automobile. The move to second and third settlement areas and the emergence of American-born generations, rather than presaging an inevitable process of disintegration has led to new adjustments in minority organization and communication. *Even when most of the life-styles assume an American middle-class stamp, these in-group social patterns reinforce ethnic identifications and seem to give them an enduring nature.* Today identifiable groups remain not as survivals from the age of immigration but with new attributes many of which were unknown to the immigrants.[28] In short, changes are taking place in ethnic social patterns, but the direction does not seem to be toward greater assimilation into the dominant Anglo-American social structure.

In addition to the movement of ethnics from first settlement areas to the surrounding suburbs there is a smaller "secondary migration" to the Far West. What little evidence we have of this phenomenon suggests that highly visible acculturation styles do not lead to the loss of ethnic consciousness. The numerous Italian, Aremenian, Greek, Finnish and Jewish sub-societal organizations, to cite the West Coast groups that have come to my attention, suggest that structural assimilation into the Anglo-Protestant mainstream is far from inevitable in the "newer America." Friedman, observing how the Jews in Alberquerque are so well integrated as to be "almost indistinguishable from the community at large," then goes on to describe a Jewish network of social organizations such as Hadassah, B'nai B'rith, Shul, Temple, etc.[29] The strenuous efforts made by West Coast Greek-Americans on behalf of Mayor Christopher of San Francisco, including appeals that reached segments of the Greek community in New York, indicate that old-style political ethnic appeals are not unknown in California. The recent gubernatorial contest in Nevada, with its appeals to Mormons, Catholics and Italians, moved one observer to comment that "the Nevada campaign made it clear once again that American elections more often than not are heavily dependent on a maze of ethnic, religious and minority group voting factors that few candidates discuss in public."[30] At the same time, the emerging political articulation of Mexican-Americans throughout the Far West should remind us that growing acculturation often leads to *more* rather than less ethnic political awareness.[31]

In general terms, the new "affluence," often cited as a conductor of greater assimilation, may actually provide minorities with the financial and psychological wherewithal for building even more elaborate parallel sub-societal structures, including those needed for political action. In prosperous suburban locales, while the oldest and most exclusive country clubs belong to old-stock Protestant families, the newer clubs are of Jewish or varying Catholic-ethnic antecedents. Among Chicago's

[25] Stanley Lieberson, "Suburbs and Ethnic Residential Patterns," *American Journal of Sociology*, 67 (1962), 673–681.

[26] See Etzioni, *op. cit.*, for a discussion of this point.

[27] Herbert J. Gans, "Park Forest: Birth of a Jewish Community," *Commentary*, 7 (1951), 330–339.

[28] *Cf.* Etzioni, *op. cit.*, p. 258; also Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge: M.I.T. and Harvard University Press, 1963), pp. 13–16.

[29] Morris Friedman, "The Jews of Alberquerque," *Commentary*, 28 (1959), 55–62.

[30] Tom Wicker, "Hidden Issues in Nevada," *The New York Times*, July 23, 1966.

[31] See Joan W. Moore and Ralph Guzman, "The Mexican-Americans: New Wind from the Southwest," *The Nation*, May 30, 1966, pp. 645–648.

debutantes, established "society," primarily Anglo-Protestant, holds a coming-out at the Passavant hospital ball. Debutantes of other origins make do with a Presentation Ball (Jewish), a Links Ball (Negro) and the White and Red Ball (Polish). Similar developments can be observed in numerous other urban and suburban regions.[32] Rather than the expected structural assimilation, parallel social structures flourish among the more affluent ethnics. Increasing prosperity among Catholics has been accompanied by an increase in Catholic institutional and social organizations including a vast parochial education system,[33] and the proliferation in sectarian higher education often means a heightened ethnic consciousness. Thus Lenski finds, after controlling for income and party affiliation, that parochially educated Catholics tend to be more doctrinally orthodox and politically conservative than publically educated Catholics.[34]

If ethnic social relations show this notable viability, it might also be remembered that ethnic sub-cultures have not been totally absorbed into mainstream America. Numerous writers have observed the influence of ethnic cultural valuations on political life, causing one to conclude that not only is there slim evidence to show that assimilation is taking place, but there is even some question as to whether acculturation is anywhere complete.[35] Acculturation itself is a multifaceted process, and even as American styles, practices, language, and values are adopted, certain ethnic values and attitudes may persist as a vital influence; for instance, the attitude that fellow-ethnics are preferable companions in primary group relations.

That ethnic sub-cultures may still operate as independent variables in political life can be seen in the recent Wilson and Banfield study. In twenty referenda elections held in seven major cities between 1956 and 1963 for expenditures to pay for public services such as hospitals, schools and parks, it was found that the groups which, because of their income level, would pay little or nothing while benefitting most, were least likely to support such services namely Poles, Czechs, Italians, Irish and other ethnics.[36] Conversely, upper-income White Protestants and Jews, the very groups that would be paying the costs while benefitting least, were the strongest supporters of these proposed expenditures. The correlations are too compelling for one to assume that the voters of all groups were acting out of ignorance of their actual material interests. More likely, the authors conclude, there is something in the White Protestant and Jewish subcultural belief systems which tends "to be more public-regarding and less private—(self or family) regarding" than in the other ethnic subcultures.[37] In sum, *cultural belief systems or residual components of such systems may persist as cultural and political forces independently of objective and material factors.*[38]

III. IDENTIFICATIONAL DURABILITY

From the time he is born, the individual responds to cultural cues mediated by representatives that help shape his personal character structure. As Parsons suggests, beside the distinction made between the cultural and social systems, one must take into account the personality system.[39] Insofar as the individual in-

[32] *Cf.*, E. Digby Baltzell, *The Protestant Establishment, Aristocracy and Caste in America* (New York: Random House, 1964), p. 357; and "Life and Leisure," *Newsweek*, December 21, 1964.

[33] John Tracy Ellis, *American Catholicism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), *passim*; also James P. Shannon, "The Irish Catholic Immigration," in Thomas T. McAvoy (ed.), *Roman Catholicism and The American Way of Life* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1960), pp. 204–210.

[34] Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963, rev. ed.), pp. 268–270.

[35] Cf. Wesley and Beverly Allinsmith, "Religious Affiliation and Politico-Economic Attitude," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 12 (1948), 377–389; Lawrence Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of the American Jews*, (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956).

[36] James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public Regardingness As a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 58, (December, 1964), 876–887.

[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 882–885. Wilson and Banfield offer no delineation of these sub-cultural ingredients. For an attempted analysis of the components of religious belief systems which are politically salient see Michael Parenti, "Political Values and Religious Culture: Jews, Catholics and Protestants," *The Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, (forthcoming).

[38] For the classic statement of this proposition see Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (New York: Scribner's Sons, 1958). For application of this proposition to the American scene see Seymour Martin Lipset, *The Fist New Nation* (New York: Basic Books, 1963), pp. 110–129.

[39] Parsons actually constructs a four-systems model which includes the social, cultural, person-

ternalizes experiences from earlier social positions and sub-cultural matrices, his personality may act as a determinant—or character interpreter—of his present socio-cultural world. To apply that model to our present analysis: ethnic identifications are no matter of indifference even for the person who is both culturally and socially assimilated to the extent that his professional, recreational, and neighborhood relations and perhaps also his wife are of the wider White Protestant world. A holiday dinner at his parents' home may be his only active ethnic link, or it may be—as Stanley Edgar Hyman said when asked what being Jewish meant to him—nothing more than "a midnight longing for a hot pastrami sandwich"; yet it is a rare person who reaches adulthood without some internalized feeling about his ethnic identification. Just as social assimilation moves along a different and slower path than that of acculturation, so does identity assimilation, or rather non-assimilation enjoy a pertinacity not wholly responsive to the other two processes.

There are several explanations for the persistence of individual ethnic identity in such cases. First, even if the available range of social exposure brings a man into more frequent contact with out-group members, early in-group experiences, family name and filial attachments may implant in him a natural awareness of, and perhaps a pride in, his ethnic origins. An individual who speaks and behaves like something close to the Anglo-American prototype may still prefer to identify with those of his own racial, religious or national background because it helps tell him who he is. For fear of "losing my identity" some individuals have no desire to pass completely into a "nondescript" "non-ethnic" American status. In an age of "mass society" when the "search for identity" concerns many, an identification which is larger than the self yet smaller than the nation is not without its compensations.[40]

Furthermore, the acculturated ethnic may be no more acceptable to the nativist than the unacculturated. Since the beginning of our nation, the native population has wanted minority groups to acculturate or "Americanize," a process entailing the destruction of alien customs and appearances offensive to American sensibilities. But this was not to be taken as an invitation into Anglo-American primary group relations. (It seems that nativists well understood the distinction between acculturation and assimilation.) To be sure, there is little to suggest that the host society has been a gracious host.[41] Even if full social acceptance is won without serious encounters with bigotry, it is unlikely that from childhood to adulthood one will have escaped a realization that some kind of stigma is attached to one's minority identity, that one is in some way "marginal."[42] Ethnic identifications are, after all, rarely neutral. Few things so effectively assure the persistence of in-group awareness as out-group rejection, and much of the ethnic cradle-to-grave social structure, often considered "clannish," is really defensive.[43] The greater the animosity, exclusion and disadvantage, generally the more will ethnic self-awareness permeate the individual's feelings and evaluations. For groups enjoying some measure of acceptance ethnicity plays an intermittent rather than constant role in self-identity, whereas for those groups which have experienced maximum hostility and oppression —for instance, the Negro American—the question of ethnic identification takes on a ubiquitous quality, there being few instances when, for real or imagined reasons, race does not define, shape or intrude upon both the ordinary business of living and the extraordinary business of politics.[44]

ality and physiological systems; the fourth system is not immediately pertinent to our discussion. See Talcott Parsons, "Malinowski and the Theory of the Social System" in R. Firth (ed.), *Man and Culture* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960).

[40] See Gordon, *op. cit.*; also Gans, "Park Forest," *op. cit.*

[41] See Baltzell, *op. cit.*, for a study of White Protestant exclusiveness; also Gordon, *op. cit.*, pp. 111–2.

[42] For supporting data see Michael Parenti, *Ethnic and Political Attitudes: Three Generations of Italian Americans*, (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1962); also Gordon W. Allport, *The Nature of Prejudice* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1958).

[43] Hansen observes: "When the natives combined to crush what they considered the undue influence of alien groups they committed a tactical error, for the newcomers, far from being crushed were prompted to consolidate their hitherto scattered forces": Marcus Lee Hansen, *The Immigrant in American History* (New York: Harper and Row, 1960 ed.), p. 136.

[44] Race consciousness is, James Q. Wilson notes, "an ever-present factor in the thought and action of Negroes of all strata of society," and is "the single most consistent theme in Negro discussion of civic issues." *Negro Politics: The Search for Leadership* (Glencoe: Free Pree Press, 1960), p. 170. It is true, however, that members of any one

As long as distinctions obtain in the dominant society, and the foreseeable future seems to promise no revolutionary flowering of brotherly love, and as long as the family and early group attachments hold some carry-over meaning for the individual, ethnic identifications and ethnic-oriented responses will still be found even among those who have made a "secure" professional and social position for themselves in the dominant Anglo-Protestant world.

IV. CONCLUSION

By way of concluding I may summarize my major propositions and discuss their broader political and theoretical applications.

1. If the wrong question is asked, then the answers are irrelevant. If our conceptual and analytic tools are insufficient, then we fail to do justice to our data. The question of why ethnics continue to vote as ethnics despite increasing assimilation focuses on a false problem because minority groups are not assimilating. Using an admittedly simplified application of Parson's model, we arrive at the hypothesis that the cultural, social and personality systems may operate with complex independent imperatives to maintain ethnic consciousness. *Assimilation involves much more than occupational, educational and geographic mobility.* From the evidence and analysis proffered in the foregoing pages, there is reason to believe that despite a wide degree of second and third generation acculturation: (1) residual ethnic cultural valuations and attitudes persist; acculturation is far from complete; (2) the vast pluralistic parallel systems of ethnic social and institutional life show impressive viability; structural assimilation seems neither inevitable nor imminent; (3) psychological feelings of minority group identity, both of the positive-enjoyment and negative-defensive varieties, are still deeply internalized. In sum, ethnic distinctiveness, can still be treated as a factor in social and political pluralism.

Dahl's assertion that the Germans, Irish, Jews and Italians of New Haven are entering into the "third stage of assimilation" in which middle-class jobs, neighborhoods, ideas, associates and styles of life make ethnicity a negligible factor, and Wolfinger's assertions that "ethnic consciousness is fading; it is already faint in some parts of the country and for some ethnic groups," and that "continuing increases in education, geographic dispersion, intermarriage and inter-group contacts are all likely to reduce ethnic consciousness,"[45] should be scrutinized carefully. We can see that (a) increases in education have not necessarily led to a diminished ethnic consciousness; indeed, the increase in sectarian education often brings a heightened ethnic consciousness.[46] (b) Increases in income and adaptation to middle-class styles have not noticeably diminished the viability and frequency of ethnic formal and informal structural associations. Such stylistic changes as have occurred may just as easily evolve *within* the confines of the ethnically stratified social systems, thereby leading to a proliferation of parallel structures rather than absorption into Anglo-Protestant social systems. (c) Geographical dispersion, like occupational and class mobility has been greatly overestimated. Movement from the first settlement area actually may represent a transplanting of the ethnic community to suburbia. Furthermore, as we have seen, even without the usual *geographic* contiguity, *socially* and *psychologically* contiguous ethnic communities persist. (d) Inter-group contacts, such as may occur, do not necessarily lead to a lessened ethnic awareness; they may serve to activate a new and positive appreciation of personal ethnic identity. Or intergroup contacts may often be abrasive and therefore conducive to ethnic defensiveness and compensatory in-group militancy. Perhaps intermarriage, as a genetic integration (for the offspring) will hasten assimilation; where hate has failed, love may succeed in obliterating the ethnic. But intermarriage remains the exception to the rule,

---

group, because of individual experiences and personalities, may vary as to the amount of emphasis they place upon their ethnic status: see Aaron Antonovsky, "Toward a Refinement of the 'Marginal Man' Concept," *Social Forces*, 35 (1956), 57–62, for a study of in-group attitudes among Jewish males; also Irwin Child, *Italian or American? The Second Generation in Conflict* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1943). To my knowledge there exists no quantifiable cross-group comparative study of in-group awareness. The impression one draws from non-comparative studies as implied above is that the groups most disliked by the wider society harbor the greatest number of individuals of militant ethnic self-awareness.

[45] Dahl, *op. cit.*, pp. 35–6; Wolfinger *op. cit.*, p. 908.

[46] Lenski, *loc. cit.* Lenski's entire study points to the persistence of sub-cultural religio-ethnic variables in political and economic life. The transition away from the Democratic Party by Catholics is not, as Wolfinger seems to suggest, a symptom of assimilation; in fact, by Lenski's data, it is a manifestation of a growing commitment to religious conservatism.

and in the foreseeable future does not promise a large-scale structural group assimilation. Furthermore, in the absence of pertinent data, we need not assume that the offspring of mixed marriages are devoid of ethnic identifications of one kind or another.

2. While not denying what was granted earlier, namely that the political system itself may be an instigator and fabricator of ethnic appeals, we would do well to avoid common overstatements along these lines. It is quite true that politicians are capable of amazing alertness to ethnic sensibilities even in instances where such sensibilities fail to materialize.[47] Yet in the light of the above discussion it would be unduly hasty to conclude that politicians betray a "cultural lag" or perceptual laziness by their continued attention to ethnic groups. The political organization attempting to mobilize support faces the problem of having to construct definitions of its constituency which will reduce the undifferentiated whole into more accessible, manageable, and hopefully more responsive components. The politician, then, is not completely unlike the scientific investigator—if we may allow ourselves an extended analogy—who in dealing with a mass of data must find some means of ordering it into meaningful and more manipulatable categories. More specifically, he must find means of making his constituency accessible to him in the most economical way. Given the limited availability of campaign resources and the potentially limitless demands for expenditure, the candidate is in need of a ready-made formal and informal network of relational sub-structures within his constituency. He discovers that "reaching the people" is often a matter of reaching particular people who themselves can reach, or help him reach, still other people.

A growing acculturation may have diminished the salience of the more blatant ethnic appeals, and the candidate knows that a nostalgic reference to the old country no longer strikes the resonant note it did thirty years ago; indeed, it may elicit a self-consciously negative response from the American-born generations. But he also should know that social assimilation (whether he calls it that or not) is far from an accomplished reality, as he finds himself confronted with leaders and members from a wide melange of ethnic associations, be they professional, business, labor, veteran, neighborhood, educational, church, charitable, recreational or fraternal. Unhampered by any premature anticipations of assimilation, the politician can work with what is at hand. Even if "ethnic issues," as such, do not emerge in a campaign, ethnic social life provides him with ready-made avenues to constituent audiences, audiences which—no matter how well acculturated—are not noted for their indifference to being courted by public figures.

That many urban and suburban politicians persist in giving attentive consideration to minority social groupings in American-born constituencies, then, may be due less to their inveterate stupidity than to the fact that ethnic sub-structures and identifications are still extant, highly visible and, if handled carefully, highly accessible and responsive. The political practitioner who chooses to ignore the web of formal and informal ethnic sub-structures on the presumption that such groupings are a thing of the past does so at his own risk.

3. Historically, the theoretical choice posed for the ethnic has been either isolated existence in autonomous cultural enclaves or total identificational immersion into the American society. We have seen that neither of these "either-or" conditions have evolved. In 1915, Woodrow Wilson observed: "America does not consist of groups. A man who thinks of himself as belonging to a particular national group in America has not yet become an American."[48] As was so often the case when he addressed himself to the problem of national minorities, Wilson took the simple view. His was the commonly accepted assumption that a person's identity or position in the social system were indivisible qualities; therefore, identity choices were mutually exclusive. But in reality a person experiences cumulative and usually complementary identifications, and his life experiences may expose him to some of the social relations and cultural cues of the dominant society while yet placing him predominantly within the confines of a particular minority sub-structure. For the ethnic, a minority group identity is no more incompatible with life in America and with loyalty to the nation than is any regional, class, or other particular group attachment. A pluralistic society, after all, could not really exist without pluralistic sub-structures and identities. Ethnics can thus sometimes behave politically as ethnics while remaining

[47] See, for instance, the study of balanced ticket calculations in a New York state-wide campaign in the concluding chapter of Glazer and Moynihan, *op. cit.*

[48] Quoted in Oscar Handlin, *The American People in the Twentieth Century* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963, rev. ed.), p. 121.

firmly American. It may be said that minorities have injected a new meaning into a national motto originally addressed to the fusion of thirteen separate states: *e pluribus unum*, a supreme allegiance to, and political participation in, the commonality of the Union, with the reserved right to remain distinct unassimilated entities in certain limited cultural, social and identificational respects.

The disappearance of ethnicity as a factor in political behavior waits in large part upon total ethnic structural-identificational assimilation into the host society. Perhaps even in that far-off future "when national origins are forgotten, the political allegiances formed in the old days of ethnic salience will be reflected in the partisan choices of totally assimilated descendants of the old immigrants."[49] If so, then the forces of political continuity will once more have proven themselves, and ethnicity will join long-past regional ties, wars, depressions, defunct political machines, deceased charismatic leaders and a host of other half-forgotten forces whose effects are transmitted down through the generations to shape the political continuities and allegiances of all social groups. But before relegating them to the history of tomorrow, the unassimilated ethnics should be seen as very much alive and with us today.

[49] Wolfinger, *loc. cit.*

CLASS STRUGGLE AND SOCIALIST JUSTICE: THE CASE OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA*

OTTO ULČ
State University of New York, Harpur College

This article represents an attempt to assess the degree of legal certainty in post-February 1948 Czechoslovakia and, more specifically, the intervention of political bias in the work of the courts. This conflict will be viewed and evaluated through an analysis of the class struggle, a process most appropriate for testing the interaction between political pressures and judicial integrity. The study of basic laws, published court decisions, and legal literature support the contention that the Communist Party has not given up the discriminatory concept of class justice which subordinates law to politics, and that the absence of legal "definiteness" is a *conditio sine qua non* of a totalitarian mode of government. It should be added that my first hand experience with the Czechoslovak judicial system is limited to the period 1953–1959.[1] As far as the sixties are concerned (Part VI), it has been necessary to rely exclusively on the published and available sources. Without benefit of "hard evidence," the conclusions in that section must be regarded as merely interpretative and inferential.

I. CONCEPT OF SOCIALIST JUSTICE: LAW VERSUS POLITICS

Marxists, who reject the objectivity of laws as impossible and hypocritical, maintain that the state, as an organ of violence of the ruling class, employs for the promotion of its selfish interests both the laws and the judicial machinery. The law is a political directive and, to quote N. V. Krylenko, the People's Commissar of Justice in the early years of the Soviet state, "our judge is above all a worker in the political field." In the words of the same jurist, "a club is a primitive weapon, a rifle is a more efficient one, and the most efficient is the court."[2] The nadir of the rule of law was reached with Stalin's coining of the doctrine of the intensification of the class struggle. Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, his proconsul over the realm of law and the judiciary, projected this Magna Carta of mass blood baths and forced labor camps into the official theory of law, that of "socialist legality." This theory, never satisfactorily defined, sanctioned the dichotomy of legal and extralegal measures regarding law not as equal but as ancillary to political interests, and exempting the state, though not its citizens, from the binding force of the law.

It was a misfortune, to say the least, that when the countries of Eastern Europe were initiated into the ways of "people's democracy," the Vyshinsky theory—and the practices of this Prosecutor General of the U.S.S.R. —flourished as the one and only formula required for adoption by the disciples of sovietization. Acceptance of the Soviet guidance, however, was less than a perfect solution owing to the fact that Moscow was unable to offer any model codes for emulation. The basic laws (e.g., the Civil Code enacted in the N.E.P. era) were outdated, neglected and moribund through prolonged disuse. Hence, the people's democracies had to be satisfied solely with the imitation of Soviet legal institutions such as *Prokuratura* or *Arbitrazh*, with certain judicial practices (notably, the "people's assessors," and the authority of the Supreme Court to annul the final verdicts of lower benches) and, above all, the doctrine of law as a set of "class-oriented" rules, implanted in the essentially "bourgeois" codes of the respective countries.

This Soviet import was probably most damaging, or to put it differently, its impact necessitated the implementation of the most drastic changes in the case of Czechoslovakia—a white crow among the candidates for sovietization by virtue of its democratic tradition and its record of considerable social harmony. The country's unsuitability for this "operation re-shape" was in inverse proportion to the enthusiasm with which the lawyers of the Establishment welcomed the incisions of Vyshinsky's surgical knife. Academician Viktor Knapp, for example, the most prominent authority in the field of civil law, hailed the class content of law as "a brilliant discovery of legal science." "Until then," he confessed, "we

* I should like to thank my colleagues Walter Filley and Paul A. Smith for their helpful criticism of an earlier draft of this paper.

[1] In 1953, after graduating from the law school of Charles University in Prague, I was appointed Assistant District Judge in Plzen, and in 1956, District Judge in Plzen and Stribro respectively. Three years later, at the age of twenty-nine, I left Czechoslovakia.

[2] N. V. Krylenko quoted in Harold J. Berman, *Justice in Russia*, (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 36.

staggered through an impasse of sterile, idealistic speculations."[3]

The "class concept" also facilitated the filling of hiatus in the Soviet model, that of codified works suitable for adoption. The element of *tridnost* ("classness," a term difficult to translate, close in meaning to "class essence" or "class orientation") was infused into the indigeneous fundamental laws, notably the Criminal, Civil and Family Relations Codes, promulgated by the Prague Parliament between 1949 and 1950. Scores of exceptions to the rule, of escape clauses and intentionally vague formulations emasculated the provisions of law, still reminiscent of the continental Roman tradition, of its definiteness and of force binding equally on all subjects.

Before we proceed further with the matter of class justice, a theoretical framework explanatory of the interaction of politics and law, of the degree of judicial integrity and impartiality may be of some assistance. These phenomena and their development during the almost two decades of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia may be viewed through a model incorporating three levels of bias impeding the rule of law,—those of bias in law, of bias in interpretation, and of outside pressures. The first level concerns the bias which is implicit (through doctrine itself) and also explicit (ranging from escape clauses to outright discriminatory provisions) in the law, including both substantive and procedural codes. The second level is provided by the "legitimate" (i.e., officially required) bias of the judge as the interpreter of the law and the decision-maker. Finally, the third level concerns the "illegitimate" (i.e., on occasion tolerated but never publicly sanctioned) distortion of law by outside pressures and by intervention in adjudication.

To illustrate how far removed is the concept of class justice from the "ideal law," understood as a set of written rules equally binding on all members of the society, and sustained by an independent and impartial authority: In Czechoslovakia the "law protects socialism" (Criminal Code, Section 1; Bias I), the law orders a judge to punish with particular severity those offenders "who manifested hostility toward the people's democratic order" (Criminal Code, Section 20; Bias II) and the general climate of "legal nihilism" has enabled the political elites to force a judge to pass a manifestly illegal decision (Bias III).

This triad represents a concept of varying scope of applicability and unequal acceptance by the regime. On the one hand, the government has always readily admitted the practice, desirability and, in fact, inevitability of the first level bias (on the assumption that "law without inherent class bias is bourgeois nonsense") and the entire crop of post-1948 legal writings provides abundant evidence in support of this assertion. On the other hand, the third level bias (outside pressures) has not enjoyed official sponsorship, though from time to time its "spontaneous occurrences" have been admitted and criticized.[4] The most controversial, and the most important for the understanding of the susceptibility and compliance of Czechoslovak legal practices to these political desiderata, remains the second level impediment, namely the bias required of the judicial decision-maker. The legitimacy of its applicability was not challenged—with the exception of a short interlude in 1957—until 1963; the causes and consequences of this change will be evaluated later in this analysis.

II. CLASS ENEMIES

Before dealing with the implementation of "class justice," let us first see how the system identifies its victims. The designation, "class enemy," is elastic and extensive enough to be a threat to any individual. The original Marxist criterion of class—i.e., the relation to the means of production ("ownership and exploitation")—does not suffice, so additional labels of "state of mind" and "heritage" have had to be introduced for consideration.

The government, preferring vagueness to specificity, has never produced a definite "black list" of the strata designated for liquidation. However, a study of the codes, judicial processes, and juridical writings, supplemented by first hand knowledge, permit us to classify the world that does not classify itself, to construct

[3] Viktor Knapp, *Predmet a system ceskoslovenskeho socialistickeho prava obcanskeho* (The Object and System of the Czechoslovak Socialist Civil Law), (Prague: NCSAV, 1959), p. 29.

[4] Cf., the campaign of criticism in 1963, below. The extent to which the Party tolerates (or demands) the outright intervention of the *apparatchiki* in adjudication is impossible to assess without the benefit of inside experience. I had to participate between 1958 and 1959 in weekly meetings at the District Party Secretariat to discuss the "state of socialist legality in the area." The "consultations" invariably turned into the pressures (third level bias) upon the judges with respect to their specific adjudication. This policy, promulgated in 1958, was uniform for the entire country.

certain categories in order to provide some guidance through the verbal morass of class warfare. What may at first appear to be an overly pretentious typology concocted by the writer is, in fact, the explicit articulation of the pattern of class justice, implicitly understood and implemented by the lawyers. It is a direct outgrowth of the way the mind of a Czechoslovak judge is trained, his adjudication demanded, and uniformity of practice in the country secured through internal ordinances of the Ministry of Justice, the decisions and directives of the Supreme Court, and monthly conferences on the provincial level. Last, but not least, it reflects the judge's awareness that compliance with such norms conditioned his political survival. Without trying to reduce a complex set of phenomena to an oversimplified formula, the following scheme of essentially empirical categories of "class enemies" comes close to reflecting the operational codes used in the judicial process.

I. *Classic enemies.*
   A. The owners of the means of economic exploitation in
      1. non-agricultural production.
      2. agricultural production.
   B. That part of the bourgeoisie not directly engaged in exploitation.
      1. Those who held positions of prominence in the pre-1948 state.
      2. Those who were simply wealthy (e.g., "widows with fat bank accounts").
   C. Anyone who actively opposed the regime (engagement in anti-state activities).

II. *Ideological enemies*, (or, in Lenin's words, "All who are not with us are against us").
   A. Anyone who did not identify himself with the regime and its philosophy (e.g., members of the clergy).
   B. Anyone who did not identify himself with the official interpretation of Marxism-Leninism (deviationists).

III. *Hereditary (derivative) enemies.*
   A. Those members of the bourgeoisie whose property was expropriated or who were otherwise demoted. These strata, despite their lost economic and social status, are considered not to have changed their class affiliation.
   B. Families and descendants of any of the above.

The criteria of "ownership," "state of mind" and "heritage" implied in the above categories are neither defined nor mutually exclusive. For example, a student with a socially and politically harmless family background who is sentenced as an American spy becomes a "classic enemy" (I-C), even though he has never been associated with exploitation. Or, a former police commissioner (I-B-1), who might personally be very fond of Communists, is not rich, never exploited anybody and will never revolt against anything, remains a classic enemy, as well.

Ideological enemies (Group II) have the fewest prerogatives for classification purposes. They come into the picture only if they cannot be stigmatized under I or III. A non-Party manual worker who is a religious believer, and his former employer who has as much devotion to the church, will not be found in the same category: the worker is apt to be labelled II-A, while his former employer ends up as III-A or might even be classified as III-A *plus* II-A.

This kind of classification is not entirely academic; it has some practical value in the implementation of the class struggle. An accumulation of "enemy" designations intensifies the harshness with which the court will deal with a particular individual. To take a hypothetical example, a former foreign service officer (I-B-1) who participated in an anti-state conspiracy would be punished more severely than his fellow conspirator who happened to be an inconspicuous accountant. Their anti-state crime might be the same, but the punishment would be measured in accordance with the pattern I-C *plus* I-B-1, as against a mere I-C.[5]

The degree of assumed enmity toward the political status quo, as far as the specific categories in this scheme are concerned, is not identical. Maximum hostility is manifested by group I-C. In fact, a traitor might be called an "enemy of the people" in any state, although under communist practice the I-C stigma has been applied to less reprehensible derelictions, such as verbal offenses or economic crimes. At the opposite pole, it is not deviant behavior but sins of the past (e.g., exploitation by a former I-A) or sins through accidental association (stained pedigree) which characterize the hereditary enemies (group III-B).

It is not unreasonable to assume that the more non-active (or non-existent) enemies the state persecutes, the more oppressive the state is. In Czechoslovakia, unlike other people's democracies, the emphasis on class warfare

[5] Cf., "Volime soudce a soudce z lidu lidovych a krajskych soudu" (We Elect the Judges and the Lay Assessors for District and Regional Courts), *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 8 (1957), p. 478.

against the III-B category has been particularly strong and enduring.

III. NON-JUDICIAL METHOD OF CLASS STRUGGLE

After the seizure of power in 1948, the Party utilized a twofold weapon in the class warfare—judicial and non-judicial ("administrative") methods. The jurisdiction with the former was vested with regular courts (district, regional courts and the Supreme Court) while the latter was left with organs completely independent of the judiciary, the so-called "People's Committees" (local, district and regional committees) which may be regarded as the Soviets, Czechoslovak style.

Both forms were subject to the three-level bias (those of law, of the decision-maker, and the outside pressures) with, however, varying degrees of intensity. The most significant difference related to the first level, the bias within the "class law." The legislative acts on which the judicial processes were based were of general applicability, drafted to obfuscate rather than emphasize its discriminatory features, as opposed to laws enforced by People's Committees. The administrative acts were often directed towards limited, specified groups of subjects with little or no effort to conceal their discriminatory purposes.

The first targets under the administrative, non-judicial method were the urban capitalists (I-A-1). Although the 1948 Constitution protected the individual's business if his employees numbered fifty or fewer, the same Parliament which created this law passed almost simultaneously the Five-Year Plan Act which had as one of its goals the elimination of such "protected" private property.[6] The I-A-1 category of "exploitation" was stretched wherever convenient to include those non-exploiting artisans who worked independently but failed to maintain a "positive attitude toward higher forms of enterprise."[7] Their liquidation was achieved by chicanery on the part of authorities in control, imposition of heavy fines for insignificant offenses, revocation of trade licenses, denial of raw materials and machinery and, finally, by confiscatory taxation.[8]

The rationing system was another weapon wielded against class enemies: ration cards were denied to the urban bourgeoisie (I-A-1, I-B-2), to wealthy farmers (I-A-2), and to individuals in positions of prominence in the pre-1948 era (I-B-1).[9] In 1953, the rationing system was abolished; simultaneously a monetary reform was introduced which wiped out virtually all savings. This "reform" was a kiss of death, particularly for those of the bourgeoisie who lived on their savings (I-B-2).

By 1953, which marked the end of the first Five-Year Plan, urban capitalists (I-A-1) ceased to exist.[10] The "capitalists of the country-side" (I-A-2), the "village rich" who were later to be called *kulaks*, were next in line for liquidation. They were subjected to a most venomous hate campaign. Characteristically, a governmental ordinance demanded: "The cabinet calls on all groups forming the National Front . . . to mobilize their members in struggle against the sworn enemy of the toiling masses, the village rich."[11]

The government never offered a definition of a kulak preferring to let the ominous dictum hang over the head of every farmer reluctant to sign an application for membership in the agricultural cooperative, otherwise known as the kolkhoz. Liquidation of I-A-2 enemies was accomplished by confiscating their agricultural machinery, forcible exchange of fertile land for land of lower productivity, increase in compulsory quotas of agricultural products to be delivered to the state, and discriminatory taxation.[12] Unlike the urban bourgeoisie the

---

[6] Act No. 150 of 1948 *Sbirka zakonu a narizeni* (Collection of Laws and Ordinances, hereafter *Coll.*), Sections 158, par. 1; 159, par. 1, 2. Act No. 241 of 1948 *Coll.*

[7] Klement Gottwald in *Rude pravo*, May 26, 1949.

[8] Vlastimil Chalupa, *Rise and Development of a Totalitarian State* (Leiden: Kroese, 1959), pp. 185–186; Dana A. Schmidt, *Anatomy of a Satellite* (Boston; Little, Brown, 1950), p. 157; Eduard Vyskovsky (ed.), *Deset let lidove demokratickeho Ceskoslovenska* (Ten Years of the People's Democratic Czechoslovakia), (Prague: Orbis, 1955), p. 52. Acts Nos. 78 and 79 of 1952 *Coll.*; J. Kabes in *Prace*, December 12, 1952.

[9] Decree of the Ministry of Domestic Trade of January 14, 1953, No. 6, *Uredni list* (Official Gazette).

[10] Monetary Reform Act of May 30, 1953, No. 43 of *Coll.* J. Pucik in *Rude pravo*, January 23, 1954. *Zivot strany*, No. 9 (May, 1958), p. 487.

[11] *Uredni list*, February 14, 1952, p. 89. Until 1954 instead of "kulak" the term "village rich" (*venkovsky bohac*) was used.

[12] Instead of "confiscation" the state called it an "obligatory purchase of agricultural machinery." The term "purchase" is probably not the correct one for the description of a peculiar contractual relationship in which the farmer was ordered to sell his machinery to the state and the state never paid for what it purchased. Chalupa, *op. cit.*, p. 191, states that five percent of purchase

kulaks proved to be more stubborn, since by 1958 they were still in possession of 1.6 percent of Czechoslovakia's arable land.[13]

In 1953, the then Prime Minister, Viliam Siroky, remarked that socialization of the economy must be followed by socialization of minds.[14] The urban bourgeoisie and especially the kulaks were difficult but not impossible to identify as enemies of the working class. But the elimination of ideological enemies was not to be achieved through confiscation or through escalated delivery quotas. To discover what a citizen really had on his mind the main resort was to inference and guess, both highly unreliable methods. The only sure exceptions were, of course, the churches and their followers.[15] The state has been searching for ideological enemies of other than religious affiliation, mostly among the intelligentsia. Universities have been cleared of unreliable teachers and students, and thousands of white collar employees were shifted to manual work.[16]

A Party member faces the peril of being declared an ideological enemy (II-B) whenever there is suspicion of his deviating from the official interpretation of Marxist ideology. The doctrinal heresies are known under various labels, ranging from dogmatism to revisionism, from "vulgar materialism" to obscurantism, from local patriotism to cosmopolitanism.[17] The expulsion from the rank of the initiated carries—to borrow the phrase of Alfred G. Meyer—"a stigma comparable to that of the unfrocked priest."[18] It is a matter of experience that a former Party member is most likely to be classified an ideological enemy (II-B), with more speed and consistency than will be the case of individuals with no record of Party affiliation whose deviant thinking poses the threat of the type II-A condemnation.[19]

The class struggle against hereditary enemies has been most evident in cases involving children with parents of the wrong social origin or political background (III-B). While the children of proletarians have been encouraged to enroll in universities, sometimes without regard to previous education, "bourgeois" youth (the designation is interpreted very freely) have been barred from higher education.[20] In addition, those classed in both group III-B and III-A (in particular, expropriated capitalists and former civil servants) have been adversely affected through the discriminatory system of social security.[21]

Class enemies in general, regardless of further classification, have also been targets of the so-called "administrative adjudication." Unlike their Soviet counterparts, the police in Czechoslovakia have not played an altogether independent role in the class struggle but have

costs were paid by the state. This writer, however, never heard of one case in the period from 1948 to 1959 of any compensation whatsoever. Act No. 27 of 1949 *Coll.*, Sect. 6; Ordinance of the Ministry of Agriculture, No. 612 of 1949 *Official Gazette*. Valer Fabry, "The Development of Agricultural Legislation," *Bulletin de droit Tchecoslovaque*, Nos. 3–4 (1952), p. 446. On forcible exchange of land, cf., Jaromir Blazke in *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 3 (1956), pp. 133–146, and No. 4 (1956), pp. 197–206. *Rude pravo*, January 15, and February 11, 1949. Governmental Ordinance No. 57 of 1952 *Coll.* Act No. 77 of 1952 *Coll*; A. Slovinsky, "Nova uprava polnohospodarske dane" (New Reform of the Agricultural Tax) *Pravny obzor*, No. 10 (1959), p. 599.

[13] *Rude pravo*, June 19, 1958 and May 14, 1961. F. Karnik, "Boj proti kulactvu—neoddelitelna soucast za vybudovani socialismu na nasi vesnici" (The Struggle against the Kulaks—the Indivisible Part of the Struggle for Building up Socialism in Our Villages), *Nova mysl*, No. 10 (1955), p. 970.

[14] *Rude pravo*, December 6, 1953.

[15] Acts and Decrees Nos. 46, 95 of 1948 *Coll.*, 217–222 of 1949 *Coll.* The struggle was predominantly directed against the Roman Catholic Church which was the strongest, most influential and most courageous, compared with other churches which offered a mere token resistance. Cf. Jan Haida (ed.), *A Study of Contemporary Czechoslovakia* (Chicago: University of Chicago, prepared for the Human Relations Area Files, Inc., 1955), p. 196.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 94. On the first massive transfer to manual work involving 77,500 individuals, cf., *Uredni list*, July 19, 1951. Another impressive purge took place in 1958. Antonin Novotny in *Rude pravo*, June 19, 1958.

[17] Cf., Eduard Taborsky, *Communism in Czechoslovakia, 1948–1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 119–143. *Pravda* (Bratislava), February 9, 1960.

[18] Alfred G. Meyer, *Communism* (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 130.

[19] Rudolf Slansky in *Lidove noviny*, May 27, 1949, on the social composition of the Party. Concerning purges, cf., Pavel Korbel, *Purges in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia* (New York: FEC, 1952), p. 6; *Rude pravo*, July 2, 1950.

[20] *Rude pravo*, December 5, 1951 and May 27, 1952. *Lidove noviny*, April 27, 1951. *Vestnik Ministerstva skolstvi* (Circular of the Ministry of Education), November 25, 1954, No. 126.

[21] Act No. 54 of 1956 *Coll.*, Sects., 14, 30; Governmental Ordinance No. 22 of 1953 *Coll.*; Act No. 40 of 1958 *Coll.*

instead been employed as the punitive arm of the People's Committees. The Committees, consisting of laymen rather than lawyers, decided who was to be evicted from his apartment, assigned to Army penal battalions, or sent to forced labor camps.[22] The rulings were completely dominated by political considerations, in defiance of the limits set up by the law.[23]

IV. ROLE OF CRIMINAL LAW

The laws and their application by the courts have become a very potent instrument in the policy of liquidating class enemies. Ordinarily, one might feel embarrassed at having to equate democracy and dictatorship, independence and subservience on the part of the courts, or observance and violation of the law. Marxist jurisprudence, however, manages to navigate through such seemingly hopeless contradictions. Jan Bartuska, the former Minister of Justice, and at the time of this writing, the Prosecutor General, offered the following reasoning:

> Socialist legality is an important factor and method in protecting and strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat. Dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist legality create one dialectic unity. To ignore this fact means to fail to understand the class nature of socialist legality.[24]

This authoritative statement on the fusion of politics and law sanctioned the application of bias in law and its interpretation (our first and second level impediments), which was also evidenced in the provisions of substantive and procedural codes, as well as in the directives of the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice.[25]

An analysis of the class-biased practices of the Czechoslovak judiciary shows little distinction between the criminal courts and the courts handling calendars of a non-punitive nature. However, since the discriminatory features of the penal law are more apparent, let us look first at this facet of socialist legality, based on the Codes of 1950.[26]

Because "the new Criminal Codes must be sharp weapons of the working class against the class enemy,"[27] it was no surprise to read that among the aggravating circumstances listed was "the offense by which the offender manifested his hostility toward the people's democratic order." By the same token, "an extenuating circumstance to be given particular consideration is the fact that the offender, before the commission of the crime, led the orderly life of a working person."[28]

The wrongdoer's class profile was considered the key to the motive of his criminal action, and the same offense committed by two persons of different class background was to be judged differently by the court. In most cases, however, the courts implemented the double standard, not in the determination of the offense, but in the severity of the punishment. The difference between the minimum and maximum penalty for a specific crime was usually great enough to allow the court to pass a properly biased verdict.[29] At times, a certain kind of judgment (i.e., leniency) was not permitted in cases involving class enemies.[30]

[22] Acts No. 247 of 1948, No. 92 of 1949, Nos. 88, 89 of 1950, No. 67 of 1952 *Coll.* Ferdinand Bilek, "Nove trestni pravo spravni" (The New Administrative Criminal Law), *Vestnik ministerstva vnitra* (The Bulletin of the Ministry of Interior) Nos. 2–3 (June, 1950), p. 136. United Nations, *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labour*, (Geneva: ILO, 1953), pp. 217, 219. Richard K. Carlton (ed.), *Forced Labor in the People's Democracies*, (New York: Praeger, 1955), pp. 35, 123–124.

[23] I recall a story mentioned in 1951 in the class room of the law school in Prague by my teacher who simultaneously held an important post with the Ministry of Interior. He referred to a decision of a District People's Committee in the Prague province that sentenced the widow of former Prime Minister Beran to four years of deprivation of liberty despite the legal maximum of two years. The Committee reasoned that in case of such an important enemy (III-B) restrictions set by the law should be disregarded.

[24] Jan Bartuska, "Denne upevnovat socialisticky stat a zakonnost" (The Daily Strengthening of the Socialist State and Legality), *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 9 (1957), p. 532.

[25] Cf., "Diskuse: O zakonnosti v trestnim pravu a rizeni" (Discussion: Legality in Criminal Law and Proceedings), *Pravnik*, No. 7 (1963), comment by Boguszak, p. 589.

[26] Acts Nos. 86, 87 of 1950 *Coll.*

[27] *Trestni zakon a trestni rad* (Penal Code and Code of Penal Procedure), (Prague: Orbis, 1951) p. 48; cf., Ivan Gadourek, *The Political Control of Czechoslovakia* (Leiden: Kroese, 1953), p. 66.

[28] *Criminal Code* (Act No. 86), Section 19, par. 1, Section 21, lit. f.

[29] "Volime soudce," *op. cit.*, p. 477.

[30] For example, the penalty called "corrective measures at liberty," during which time the person sentenced suffers deduction from his pay in favor of the state: cf. Vladimir Kabes, *Socialist Legality in Czechoslovakia*, (The Hague: International Commission of Jurists, 1953), p. 17.

The degree of militancy or moderation has been communicated to the lower courts mainly through the "Collection of Decisions of Czechoslovak Courts" (*Sbirka rozhodnuti ceskoslovenskych soudu*), published by the Supreme Court in Prague. Though officially the Supreme Court's decisions lack the force of binding precedent, *Sbirka* has been of considerable importance in the practice of the judiciary[31] and constitutes a fairly representative document concerning the characteristics and development of the class struggle. The years 1949 and 1950 were dominated by class warfare directed against the classic enemies (especially group (I-C) and the Roman Catholic Church (II-A)). From 1951 on, the kulaks (I-A-2) and urban bourgeoisie (I-A-1) received particular attention. While the political importance of the liquidation of kulaks dropped by 1957,[32] a year later the accent on class militancy increased sharply, as it focused on the expropriated bourgeois strata (III-A).

The class enemy has been defined neither in laws nor in court decisions; the door was thus left wide open for the broadest interpretations (Bias II). A "wrong" class origin counted heavily under all circumstances; at the same time, however, the offender with a faultless social background could be regarded as a class enemy "provided he, in the course of his violation of law, joined the ranks of the class enemies."[33]

In view of the Supreme Court—the most zealous protagonist of the second level bias—, the act of the accused had to be evaluated in relation to the entire state of political affairs in the Republic.[34] This approach pertained not only to matters of domestic policy but also to the international situation.[35] The Korean war or the Hungarian revolution for example, had to be taken into account by the deliberating judges at those periods. The court also evaluated evidence from the class viewpoint. The credibility of a witness was not entirely separate from his social profile.[36]

It would be tempting to try to determine the extent to which politically prominent individuals have enjoyed preferential treatment at the hands of the criminal courts. Personal experience and the means of documenting it are, of course, two different matters. Furthermore, the government for its own good reasons has been rather silent on this point.[37] In 1949, however, an extraordinary decision was published. This was the case of a functionary of the Communist Party whose political position the Regional Court in Prague found, in view of the offense committed, to be an aggravating circumstance. The court held that:

> These Party members should be an example of dedicated and honest functionaries .... The broad public follows their activities carefully. The class enemy might exploit their mistakes and generalize them into an attack against the Party.[38]

This decision can be said to be an exception to the rule by which individuals close to the Communist Party were favored and protected when they appeared at the courts as culprits or as objects of attack by an outsider. The Supreme Court in 1956 stated that:

> Our laws and the entire people's democratic state protect in an increasing measure every citizen and especially the functionaries who fulfill conscientiously their duties connected with building socialism in our fatherland.[39]

Penal policy in Czechoslovakia was also di-

[31] Karol Plank, "Viac presnosti pri uverejnovani sudnych rozhodnuti ceskoslovenskych sudu" (More Accuracy in Publishing Decisions of Czechoslovak Courts), *Pravny obzor*, No. 1 (1959), p. 51.

[32] Out of ninety-three cases not even one dealt with kulaks.

[33] Reg. C. Prague, December 22, 1949, To I 397/49; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 123 (1950) pp. 178–180 concerning a couple (the husband was a white collar employee with university education) who attempted to send abroad a letter to their friends.

[34] Supr. C., March 2, 1950, (when the case is considered secret, no number of its file is given); *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 113 (1950) pp. 161–163.

[35] Supr. C., August 15, 1957, 1 Tz 122/57; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 82 (1957), pp. 195–197.

[36] Reg. C. Bratislava, January 16, 1952, 4 Tk 751/51; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 117 (1952), pp. 237–239.

[37] For recent criticism of these practices see, the editorial "Ucinne pomahat upevnovani zakonnosti" (The effective Help in Strengthening the Legality), *Pravnik*, No. 7 (1963), p. 522.

[38] Reg. C. Prague, December 16, 1949, To II 225/49; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 18 (1950), pp. 25–26.

[39] Supr. C., March 4, 1956, (no number); *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 34 (1956), pp. 80–83. This was a murder case with strong political overtones. The crime occurred in an unidentified village in Slovakia. The accused M. I. was not a kulak but "before the war he spent six years in Canada, where he got acquainted with the capitalist style of life, with making undeserved profit . . . ." (It should be mentioned that this reasoning was not very imaginative. Before the war Czechoslovakia had exactly the same evil capitalism as

rected "against the vestiges of capitalist ideas in people's minds,"[40] i.e., against ideological and hereditary enemies. Listening to foreign broadcasts constituted the criminal offense of "incitement." The citizen who privately expressed his dislike of the government committed the crime of "endangering the public interest through action hostile to the people's democracy."[41] Judges in dealing with this kind of hostility were obliged, first of all, to determine the class and political background of the accused. The Supreme Court decreed this to be the only correct approach, even in those cases where the defendant committed his verbal delict while totally drunk and hence presumed not to be legally responsible for his act.[42]

In cases involving the clergy, the courts did not question their political loyalty because none was expected.[43] The Vatican Decree concerning the excommunication of Communists furnished the Party with the welcome opportunity to cross swords with the Catholic clergy. Reading the Decree to believers from the pulpit was considered by the courts to be a crime of high treason, as was obedience to the bishop's order to distribute copies of the Decree to other priests.[44] The priest who denied the last sacrament to an excommunicated Communist committed high treason, and the priest who expressed his concern about the uncertain future of the Church in Czechoslovakia committed, in the view of the Regional Court at Nitra, a serious political crime.[45]

By 1958 the classic enemies (group I-A, I-B) were extinguished, and the classic enemies of group I-C no longer consisted of self-made amateurish conspirators, but more elusive professionals. The ideological enemies (group II) were either liquidated or had learned to be careful about disclosing their identity. Of necessity, the class struggle, which was becoming more and more artificial, was diverted toward the hereditary enemies (group III).

At this stage the Communist Party enunciated this dogma: Criminality is on the decline, and the majority of the offenders were now individuals with a bourgeois background (III-A).[46] New offenses, notably speculation (Sect. 134-a) and parasitism (Sect. 188-a) were formulated and employed by the courts, especially against the urban III-A group, with rather specious reasoning as, for instance, charging parasitism against someone for work done without state authorization.[47] The hereditary enemies were also made responsible for that most popular of Czechoslovak crimes, pilferage of socialist property.[48] This policy has to some extent survived to this day.

Canada so that the accused did not have to cross the ocean in order to acquire reprehensible habits.) Although the crime was committed under heavy influence of alcohol, the Supreme Court concluded that "the hatred of the accused M. I. toward J. T. originated from the fact that the victim was a man of splendid character and progressive attitudes who gave himself entirely to the service of the people and worked tirelessly for the socialization of the village." Hence, the court concluded that the defendant "murdered J. T. because of his activity in the Local People's Committee and in the socialization of the village." Under normal circumstances the defendant would have been sentenced to loss of liberty for 15–25 years, acc. to Sect. 216, par. 1, P. C. In this case however the crime was adjudged to be a so-called "qualified murder" under especially aggravating circumstances, under Sect. 216, par. 1, 2, lit. c, P. C. The death penalty resulted.

[40] Explanatory memorandum to the Penal Code of 1950.

[41] Supr. C., December 17, 1954, 1 Tz 260/54; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 13 (1955). Supr. C., October 17, 1952; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 67 (1953), pp. 112–4.

[42] Supr. C., April 20, 1950, Tz I 73/49; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 234 (1950), pp. 350–2. V. Vydra and O. Vymetal "Nepricetnost pri alkoholickych otravach" (Irresponsibility Caused by Alcoholic Intoxication), *Socialisticka zakonnost* No. 10 (1956), p. 614.

[43] Minister of Information Vaclav Kopecky in *Rude pravo*, June 12, 1952.

[44] State Court, January 10, 1950; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No 67 (1950), pp. 97–98. State Court, January 19, 1950; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 116 (1950), pp. 168–169. Supr. C., November 19, 1949, To 201/49; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 1 (1950), pp. 1–2.

[45] Supr. C., September 30, 1949, To 144/49; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 51 (1949), pp. 66–75. Reg. C. Nitra, March 29, 1949, To 52/49; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 15 (1949), pp. 20–21.

[46] Vaclav Skoda in *Rude pravo*, July 21, 1958. Jan Bartuska in *Rude pravo*, September 20, 1961. *Zemedelske noviny*, April 26, 1961.

[47] Supr. C., July 11, 1958, 1 Tz 152/58; *Coll. Dec.*, Crim., No. 88 (1958), pp. 224–225. Cf., *ibid.*, pp. 69–53, 81–83.

[48] *Ochrana socialistickeho vlastnictvi. Sbornik pravnich predpisu* (Protection of Socialist Ownership: Collection of Legal Provisions), (Prague: Orbis, 1960), pp. 49, 53. "The Pilfered Treasury: Crimes against 'Socialist' Property," *East Europe*, No. 1 (1959), pp. 14–25.

V. ROLE OF CIVIL LAW

A body of non-punitive law[49] has also been used as a weapon of class warfare, though its discriminatory features are less obvious than in criminal law.[50] Moreover, the civil judiciary had not had much impact upon certain groups of class enemies. Instead the urban exploiters (I-A-1) were victimized by other means, e.g., by confiscatory decrees, administrative decisions and criminal law courts. The very nature of civil law precluded its use in suppressing classic enemies of the I-C category. The non-punitive law and the judges acting in this sphere of jurisdiction did, however contribute to the collectivization of agriculture and to the liquidation of kulaks (I-A-2). This part of the judiciary also played an important role in discriminating against ideological (group II) and hereditary (group III) enemies, mainly in the domestic relations and inheritance agenda.

The Civil Code of 1950[51] introduced a range of vague, ambiguous and even contradictory provisions, well suited to extensive interpretation and biased application in class warfare. On the one hand, "Civil rights shall be protected by law" (Section 2); on the other hand, however, "No one shall be permitted to misuse civil rights to the detriment of the society" (Section 3). The individual's rights were thus annulled whenever the court found them incompatible with such clauses as "law," "rules of socialist community life," "fulfillment of the economic plan," "common interest" or "important common interest." The Code abounded in such clauses which it failed to define.[52]

The Code of Civil Procedure, which "enables the courts to fulfill its political-education function,"[53] employed the same practices of limitation. A litigant had no right to free disposition of his claim (withdrawal, conciliatory settlement, etc.). The court, before granting a motion, was obliged to ascertain that the "public interest would be served" (Section 76 C.C.P.). The judges were encouraged to reduce the award if the common interest intervened and if "the precise procedure according to the law was inconflict with the legal feeling [*pravni citeni*] of our people."[54]

The successful litigant was entitled to have his court costs, including attorneys' fees, wholly compensated by the losing opponent (Section 129 C.C.P.). However, for "reasons worthy of special consideration" (Section 130), this right could be denied. The rationale of this provision is well demonstrated in a decision of the Supreme Court on an alleged violation of socialist justice by a lower court:

> If the Regional Court had considered correctly the social profile of the litigants, in which light the plaintiff was the widow of a merchant and the defendant a worker and her husband, a *normovac*, while the defendants are of proletarian origin and were honored several times as exemplary workers . . . it [Regional Court] would have had to arrive at the conclusion that the circumstances of this case were worthy of special consideration, thus fulfilling the requirements for the application of Sect. 130, C.C.P. Because the Regional Court failed to do so, it violated the law in its provisions Sects. 1, 130, 88.2 C.C.P. and Sects. 3, 4 of the Act No. 66 of 1952 Coll.[55]

Class enemies through the same application of the second level bias were also denied exemption from paying court fees and/or deposits.[56]

The number of litigations in which an individual would challenge the contractual obli-

[49] The term "non-punitive" seems to be more suitable because the Civil Code no longer regulates matters of family, labor, etc.

[50] Cf. Chalupa, *op. cit.*, p. 243: "The civil judiciary and that part of criminal judiciary which has no political aspect, stand in the background of the interest of the communist state."

[51] Act No. 141 of 1950 *Coll.*, effective as of January 1, 1951.

[52] For the theoretical difficulty in this respect cf. Frantisek Stajgr and Ferdinand Boura, *Prokurator v obcanskem soudnim rizeni* (The Prosecutor in the Civil Law Procedure), (Prague: Orbis, 1955), p. 65; Vitezslav Provaznik, "K pravidlum socialistickeho souziti a zasadam slusnosti ve vztahu k obecnemu zajmu "(The Rules of Socialist Community Life and Principles of Equity in Relationship to Common Interest), *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 7 (1957), pp. 796–806.

[53] *Komentar k obcanskemu soudnimu radu* (The Commentary of the Code of Civil Procedure), (Prague: Orbis, 1957), p. 29. Act No.142 of 1950 *Coll.*, effective as of January 1, 1951.

[54] Viktor Knapp, *Splneni zavazku a jine zpusoby jejich zaniku*, (Fulfillment of the Obligations and Other Forms of Their Termination), (Prague: NCSAV, 1955), p. 173.

[55] Supr. C., June 13, 1958, Cz 222/58; *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., No. 94 (1958), pp. 206–8; cf., *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., No. 90 (1951), No. 7 (1953), Nos. 44, 113 (1956). *Normovac* denotes a white collar employee who sets up the output norms for the workers.

[56] Reg. C. Plzen, April 18, 1958, 5 Co 188/58; *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., No. 95 (1958), pp. 208–209. *Komentar, op. cit.*, p. 561. Cf., *Coll Dec.*, Civ., No. 86 (1953).

gation of the State dropped considerably, due also to the common knowledge that a citizen, and a class enemy in particular, could hardly expect to be successful in a contest with the Establishment. One such class enemy (I-B-1), seeking an exception to the rule had the following experience:

In 1950, a former bank director living on a 5,000 Kcs pension, submitted to the court a claim against a bank, a national enterprise, for payment of 950,000 Kcs. He based his claim on a contract concluded under capitalism with the bank in which he held a prominent position. According to this contract the bank allededly obligated itself to pay him a bonus of 10,000 Kcs monthly to his pension. This director was so impertinent that in the people's democratic state and at the people's democratic court he dared to present his claim for a colossal amount of money and speculated that the court would decide in favor of this groundless and illegal [*sic*] claim. It is self-evident that the court rejected the claim . . . .[57]

In tort suits, Section 358 C.C. furnished the courts with the opportunity to reduce the amount of indemnification on the basis of the "personal characteristics of the wrongdoer." This term in practice called for an evaluation of the defendant's social class status. If the defendant were a worker, he might have been granted the benefit of Section 358, provided that the plaintiff was a class enemy. Where both parties belonged to the working class, the application of this provision was out of question.[58]

Following the Soviet example, in Czechoslovakia family relations were excluded from the Civil Code and constituted as an independent legal discipline. Its class bias was applied mainly in parent-child relationships.

The Code on Domestic Relations was designed "in accordance with the ideas and with the interests of the working people's political and economic power."[59] The political motivation of this Act can be clearly observed in the courts' practice with regard to divorce. As Professor Frantisek Stajgr pointed out, "In divorce cases, it is frequently possible to detect, under the surface disorder of a marriage, the reflection of class conflicts in society."[60] Political considerations dominated the decision whether the marriage was to be dissolved and also the question of guilt. For example, in the opinion of the Regional Court at Usti n.L.:

The fact that the wife informed the police with good reason about her husband, who had embezzled some property from a national enterprise, could by no means be held against her and could not constitute a grave reason for a rift in the marriage.[61]

On the other hand, the conditions for granting a divorce were met if the wife resisted political re-education by her husband.[62] In the light of these examples, it is not surprising that a classic enemy (I-C), became the losing party in a divorce proceeding. In the reasoning of the Regional Court at Ostrava:

There is no doubt that the anti-state activity itself, proving the defendant to be an enemy of the people's democracy who joined the rank of the enemies of the working class, must have caused disdain and disgust on the part of his wife, who is loyal to the people's democracy and destroyed all her emotions for the defendant, even if such emotions still existed.[63]

In the parent-child relationship, both the social and political background of parents have been the paramount factors in custody cases. The courts "first of all, have to examine the parents' attitude toward the people's democratic regime,"[64] their ability to "develop in the children the qualities of character necessary for every member of the socialist community and, in particular, to nourish in them love for the people's democratic fatherland.[65] Thus, in a case where the father was "reactionary-minded, disagreeing with the principles of the people's democratic system," the two daughters were entrusted to the "mother who re-

[57] "Volime soudce," *op cit.*, p. 469.

[58] Reg. C. Karlovy Vary, July 3, 1951, Co Ok 56/51; *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., No. 144 (1951), pp. 204–205.

[59] Alexej Cepicka, *New Family Legislation in Czechoslovakia* (Prague: Ministry of Information, 1950), p. 7. Act No. 265 of 1949 *Coll.*

[60] Frantisek Stajgr in *Pravnik* (June 1959) quoted in "Discrimination," *East Europe*, (December, 1959), p. 6.

[61] Reg. C. Usti n. L., 7 OK 93/52, quoted in J. Andrlik *et al.*, *Komentar k zakonu o pravu rodinnem* (Commentary of the Code of Domestic Relations), (Prague: Orbis, 1954), p. 117.

[62] Reg. C. Pardubice, 5 OK 32/52; *ibid.*

[63] Reg. C. Ostrava, May 8, 1951 11 OK 34/51; *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., No. 7 (1952), pp. 11–12.

[64] Reg. C. Ceske Budejovice, 6 OK 140/51; cf. Reg. C. Banska Bystrica, OK 50/51; Andrlik, *op. cit.*, pp. 154–155.

[65] Reg. C. Prague 17 OK 23/52; Reg. C. Ceske Budejovice, 6 OK 136/51; *ibid*, p. 152.

married, although this fact was entirely irrelevant."[66] The emphasis on ideology also reduced the importance of other factors such as the finding that the mother was living unmarried in the household with another man.[67] In view of these findings, one might question the sincerity of the Code's claim that its ultimate interest was the welfare of the children.

VI. DESTALINIZATION

The passing of Stalin in March, 1953, and of his disciple and Czechoslovak leader Klement Gottwald, who obediently followed the master ten days later, produced no immediate changes in the policy of class warfare described above. Stalinist practices in the judiciary also survived Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin and the terror of his era at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February, 1956, and, even more surprisingly, managed to survive the allegedly monumental historical change of 1960, when Czechoslovakia progressed from a people's democracy, the transient period of development, into genuine socialism, that is from the state of class warfare to the state of class harmony.

Destalinization, understood as at least a partial restoration of the rule of law against uninhibited political arbitrariness, did not reach Czechoslovakia before 1963. The two most significant factors that retarded this development were, first, the resistance to a change on part of the country's intolerant, unimaginative and narrow-minded stalinist leadership, and, second, the impact of the Hungarian revolution of 1956. The Hungarian events supplied the Party with ample arguments for not experimenting with magnanimity. Liberalization could easily get out of hand: if you showed leniency to the class enemy, he in turn would cut your throat as he was busy in doing in Budapest (A rather unlikely assumption in view of the essentially Schweikian and compliant *esprit* of the Czechs.). The Hungarian revolution did not accelerate but delayed the advent of destalinization and the zenith of power of political caprice over law was reached as a reaction to this challenge to the totalitarian rule, almost four years after the death of Stalin.

There was only one significant attempt to challenge the excessive class discrimination, that raised by a group of authors of the *Commentary to the Code of Civil Procedure*, published in 1957.[68] Their reasoning went as follows:

> Once we speak about the class character of socialist legality, we have to keep in mind, first of all, that *tridnost* ["class essence"] is not something existing outside the law which might be conditioned—as it is thought sometimes—by a free deliberation of courts. Class character emanates from the sense and purpose of the law and cannot be 'added' to it. This 'adding' *tridnost* leads to illegality and in many cases to open arbitrariness. . . . We consider therefore that view incorrect which makes the class profile (or even the mere class origin) a matter of specific evidence. The class profile (origin) is an objective socio-political fact which exists outside the court proceedings. The court, therefore, must not make it an object of the suit and an object of special evidence.[69]

In a nutshell, this was the premise: Law, being a product of the ruling class, is always a class law. Objective interpretation of these class laws is the only correct one, whereas any *extra-legem* class approach goes beyond the confines of class justice. Or, to put it in terms of the model of three levels of bias, the authors, while acknowledging the legitimacy of the first level (bias of law), rejected the others (bias in interpretation and the outside pressures).

This challenge was strongly condemned by Minister of Justice Vaclav Skoda, who, while silent on the intervention of party authorities in adjudication by the courts (Bias III), defended most emphatically the second level bias as implemented by the interpreters of the law, the judges:

> There are views heard that class character is merely inherent in the law and, therefore, class application of the law is not justified. Some legal theoreticians and also judges . . . even call the class approach in civil law social discrimination, because the class profile, they say, is an objective socio-political reality which remains outside the court proceedings.

The Minister, without confirming or denying the existence of discrimination by the judges,

[66] Distr. C. Policka, February 24, 1950, P 138/46; *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., No. 9 (1951), pp. 16–18.

[67] Distr. C. Decin, 3 P 23/52; cf., Reg. C. Zilina, 5 OK 92/51; Andrlik, *op. cit.*, pp. 152–4.

[68] *Komentar, op. cit.*; Among the sixteen authors the most prominent was Ferdinand Boura. Boura, at the age of 32, became Dean of the Law School of Charles University in Prague. Incurably ill, he died in 1957. His obituary is found in *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 3 (1957), pp. 145–147.

[69] *Komentar. op. cit.*, pp. 14, 24.

went on to extol unlimited class struggle, stating that

. . . the judge, in order to discover the substantive truth and to decide justly, must discover and clarify the class substance of every case he is dealing with. Otherwise, he will have violated socialist justice.

Skoda rejected the views of the authors of the *Commentary* without further ado and concluded that if their

. . . formalistic approach excludes class character from the application of the law, it must lead to violation of socialistic justice, to the detriment of the working class and to the benefit of the bourgeoisie. For these reasons, such views must be characterized openly as revisionism.[70]

Nobody since Skoda has formulated the official policy on class justice more candidly.

The high tide of class militancy in the post-1956 period affected mainly the sphere of non-punitive law. In the old days of stalinism, a class enemy was discriminated against if his opponent in litigation belonged to the working class. In a suit not involving class enemies, the courts generally functioned free of bias. By 1958, however, this latitude was overridden by the requirement to pursue a rigorous class approach in *all* the trials regardless of the litigants' background. Instead of discrimination solely against class enemies of the I, II, III groups, the victims now might include politically loyal individuals with harmless social backgrounds if their opponents in the suit were *more* loyal and *more* proletarian. The following two custody rulings by the Supreme Court in 1958 illustrate this new policy.

The first case involved a dispute between a father and the sister of his deceased wife over the custody of his child. Despite the fact that the "father as well as his *parents* are loyal citizens who would guarantee a good upbringing of the child," and, despite the provision of the Code (Section 55, par. 2) vesting parental authority with the surviving parent, in the opinion of the Supreme Court the lower court violated the principles of socialist justice because it failed to pay adequate attention to the fact that the aunt demanding custody of the child, "was a functionary of Czechoslovak Youth Organization who had been sent by her plant in 1957 to the Soviet Union to participate in the Sixth World Youth Festival."[71]

The second case is of a similar nature: A divorced couple, both members of the working class, were disputing the custody of their only child. Because of the mother's incurable illness and apparent lack of competence to raise the child, the father won the case. The Supreme Court annulled the decision, emphasizing:

The child's grandfather from the mother's side is the chairman of the Uniform Agricultural Cooperative and of the local organization of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. This educational environment guarantees the right way to bring up a child to become a politically loyal member of our society.[72]

It is ironic that, in this atmosphere of intensive emphasis on class warfare, the Party decided in 1960 to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of the country's liberation by the Red Army by declaring that Czechoslovakia had just passed the temporary phase of a people's democracy and achieved socialism.[73] The achievement of socialism, by definition, signified the extinction of the last hostile class. Enemies were annihilated, class antagonism ceased to exist, but against all logic—except that of a totalitarian state—class discrimination against non-existent enemies had to continue. Doctrinal considerations were overridden by the political imperative not to give up the concept of the class enemy, that useful scapegoat justifying the indispensability of arbitrary power. As noted earlier, in the late fifties the categories of available enemies had shrunk to the group of hereditary enemies (III-A, III-B), and the term "exploiting class" was replaced by "remnants of exploiting classes."[74] In 1960, the "remnants" being too microscopic, the formula was no longer satisfactory, prompting the Party to search for a further semantic improvement. The term, "remnants of bourgeois mentality," was therefore coined and since their survival was partly conditioned by the "existence of the capitalist part of the world,"[75] the enemies became candidates for

[70] Vaclav Skoda in *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 7 (1958), pp. 404–411.

[71] Supr. C., May 22, 1958, Cz 198/57; *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., No. 85 (1958), pp. 187–189. Italics mine.

[72] Supr. C., April 29, 1958, Cz 71/58; *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., No. 97 (1958), pp. 211–212.

[73] Cf., Zdenek Jicinsky and Pavel Levit, "Strana-organizatorka vystavby socialistickeho statu" (The Party, Organizer of the Construction of a Socialist State), *Pravnik*, No. 9 (1961), p. 744.

[74] Jan Bartuska, "Upevnenim socialisticke zakonnosti k zvysene ochrane naseho zrizeni a vymozenosti lidu" (Through Strengthening Socialist Justice to the Increased Protection of Our Regime and Of Achievements of the People), *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 1 (1958), p. 9.

[75] Frantisek Stajgr, "The Courts and the Office of the Prosecutor Under the New Constitution," *Bulletin of Czechoslovak Law*, XVIII (1960), p. 105.

longevity, if not immortality. The then First Deputy Minister of Justice, Josef Litera, presently President of the Supreme Court, wrote in 1961:

> The members of the exploiting classes are still living among us. Because of their former parasitic mode of life and because progress has not taught them anything, they commit crimes under the influence of the enemies from abroad, in particular of the agents of American imperialism.[76]

Similarly, nothing of substance has changed with respect to the pattern of threefold biases (law-interpretation-pressure). The new Constitution and the new fundamental codes contain the first level bias, similar to or identical with its predecessors. The Acts repeat the old, ambiguous, vague provisions, the rules that tolerate exceptions to the rule and are abundantly conditioned by phrases such as "compliance with the mode of socialist community life."[77]

The second-level bias, that of the interpreter of the law, had also been retained as an inherent characteristic of socialist legality. Though the number of published discriminatory decisions and articles extolling the virtue of class militancy has decreased compared to the "people's democratic era," one still encountered authoritative statements commanding judges to analyze very carefully the offender's class background in criminal proceedings,[78] and to apply class bias in all fields of non-punitive law, ranging from matters of family relations to the exemptions from court fees.[79]

Continuation of the outside pressures into adjudication (Bias III) at that time was publicly neither confirmed nor refuted.

Despite some indications of liberalization, such as the admission at the Twelfth Party Congress in December 1962 that the majority of verdicts in political trials were not just,[80] this destalinization, at best nominal, lasted until 1963, a year of substantial challenge to this peculiar form of "thaw," and of some change in the political climate. An attempt to single out the prime cause of the change must end in the futility of mere speculation. The prolonged stalinist practices came under attack due to the cumulative impact of several influences. Notable among them were the difficulties with the over-centralized economy—accompanied by a drop in living standard, by growing restiveness among some of the writers, young intellectuals, and the Slovak "nationalists," and by general frustration with destalinization more in words than in deeds. "The multiplying quantity of impatience was about to assume a new quality," dialectically speaking.

The issue of the rehabilitation of the Slansky group became the testing ground between the advocates of liberalization and the "dogmatists," resisting the change. If the leadership were to admit the innocence of Rudolf Slansky and his companions, hanged in December of 1952, such a confession would have been read as an implicit indictment of exercises in arbitrariness and illegality in general, a move the Party was reluctant to undertake. Least anxious to take such action was the head of the Party, Antonin Novotny, once publicly credited with having unmasked Slansky's heinous crimes.[81]

Parallel to the snail-like pace of destalinization there proceeded the tactics of a gradual whitewashing of the Slansky group. One by one, the charges were reduced until on August 22, 1963 the Party declared the sins of the ill-fated late Secretary General to be non-existent.[82]

Almost simultaneously, the legal periodicals started a soul-searching campaign demanding the restoration of the rule of law. I have contended in an article published elsewhere[83] that, first, the leadership commissioned the jurists to start the campaign in order to shift the blame and responsibility for "stalinist distortions of legality" from the Party to the judiciary, to the judges who, after all, signed the verdicts sending innocent men to the gallows. Second, this engineered exercise in criticism went at least partially out of control: in the pages of *Pravnik*, *Pravny zivot* and *Socialisticka zakonnost* it transcended the cliches of mere attacks on the anonymous cult of personality, according to which everybody and therefore

[76] Josef Litera, "Za dalsi upevnovani socialisticke zakonnosti a zlidoveni soudnictvi" (Towards Further Strengthening of Socialist Justice and Popularization of the Judiciary), *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 1 (1961), p. 4.

[77] Civil Code, Section 35, par. 2; cf., Section 39 and Article VI. New legislation: Constitution, Act. No. 100 or 1960 *Coll*; Criminal Code, Act No. 140 of 1961 *Coll*; Civil Code, Act No. 40 of 1964 *Coll.*

[78] *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 6 (1961), p. 335.

[79] "Typicke zavady v obcansko pravnim rizeni" (Typical Shortcomings in the Civil Law Procedure), *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 8 (1961), pp. 478–492. On page 484 there is a reference to a typically stalinist decision No. 95, *Coll. Dec.*, Civ., (1958), still a binding guide.

[80] *Rude pravo*, December 5, 1962.

[81] Karol Bacilek, the then Minister of Security, in *Rude pravo*, December 18, 1952.

[82] *Rude pravo*, August 22, 1963.

[83] Otto Ulč, "Czechoslovakia's Restive Jurists," *East Europe* (December, 1965), pp. 19–25.

nobody in particular was responsible for injustices committed. Thus we read in *Pravnik* this confession, characteristic of the mood of the day:

> The liquidation of the cult of personality in the discipline of law and legality (and, naturally, not only in these two fields) brought about an unprecedented ideological commotion and enthusiasm, followed by a moral catharsis.[84]

"The cult of personality reserved for itself the monopoly to think," the writers assert. It degraded legal science to something on a level with primitive propaganda, and "it represented a power hard to control. Because power carries within itself a potential evil, the threat is greater when power is unlimited."[85]

The writers have not left many stones unturned in the now discredited judicial edifice. Their criticism and demands may be viewed within the theoretical framework of the typology of the class enemies and of the three levels of bias. As for the former, the class enemy as a social category was rejected. The practices of class warfare symptomatic of the period of people's democracy were invalidated by the achievement of socialism, by "the transformation of the dictatorship of the proletariat into a [*vselidova*] socialist democracy of all the people."[86] Class discrimination was no longer tenable; it imperilled social tranquility,[87] it contradicted socialist humanism,[88] and, as the novelist, Ivan Klima, who occasionally writes about law and legality put it,

> The hypertrophic application of the principle of 'class' not only cause immediate damage by disqualifying able men and granting preferment to incompetent ones but, first of all, instead of real values it promoted fictitious values, independent of man, of his work, of his thinking. Awareness that in society there exist fictitious values and privileges, determining a man's destiny at birth (whether these are proprietary, racial or class values), always denigrates the category of freedom and stifles the energy of every man.[89]

Strange as it may seem, the critics, save for minor objections, did not question the validity of the first-level bias as it was incorporated in the laws. A doctrinaire presumption of the inner class character of the legislative acts sanctioned the vagueness, the escape clauses and the host of discriminatory formulae, such as the distinction between the citizen's "personal" (*osobni*) and "private" (*soukrome*) ownership, between "good" and "bad" property, with the latter left unprotected by the law.[90]

The third-level bias (outside pressures) became a frequent target of criticism in the campaign. The political functionaries were charged with obstructing the pursuit of socialist justice and with substituting themselves for the judicial authority.[91] It is significant, however, that most of the blame was laid, not at the door of "individuals with dictatorial taste," "careerists," and "those who usurped 'confidence' and jurisdiction to decide in the name of the Party and of the working class"[92] but with the judges who permitted (i.e., were forced to permit) these practices.[93]

The acceptance of the first-level bias and the rejection of the third level injected no novelty into the discourses about the meaning of socialist legality. The latter bias used to be criticized even in the era of people's democracy, though with far less vehemence. The most substantial difference between the past attempts to restore the rule of law and the campaign that lasted from 1963 to 1965, revolved around the second-level bias, namely that of the interpreter and administrator of the law. While in 1957 the Party, through Minister Vaclav Skoda, rebuffed the attempt of the authors of the Commentary to dispose of the second-level bias, this time no one from the Establishment stood up to repeat Skoda's reasoning. The Party, by acquiesence, dropped the legitimacy of the second-level bias and disclaimed any responsibility for its eventual recurrences. To sum up: officially the realm of class justice was left only

[84] Editorial "K aktualnim otazkam ideologicke prace" (Urgent Problems of Ideological Activities), *Pravnik*, No. 4 (1964), p. 301.

[85] Vojtech Hatala, "Kult osobnosti a niektore noeticke a eticke problemy nasho trestneho prava" (Cult of Personality and Some Noetical and Ethical Problems of Our Criminal Law), *Pravny obzor*, No. 2 (1964), pp. 66, 67, 69.

[86] Editorial "K vysledkum XII. sjezdu KSC" (On the Results of the Twelfth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 1 (1963), pp. 2–3.

[87] "K aktualnim," *op. cit.*, p. 319.

[88] "Kainovo znameni" (Cain's Stigma), *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 2 (1964), p. 45.

[89] *Literarni noviny*, January 25, 1964.

[90] *Civil Code*, Sections 125–135.

[91] Ivan Klima in "Anketa," *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 5 (1964), p. 6.

[92] Ladislav Schubert, "K principu dodrzovania socialistickej zakonnosti" (About the Principle of Maintaining Socialist Legality), *Pravny obzor*, No. 6 (1963), pp. 323–325.

[93] Michal Lakatos, "K otazce nezavislosti soudcovskeho rozhodovani" (Problem of the Independence of Judicial Decision-Making), *Pravny obzor*, No. 2 (1964), p. 89.

with the first-level bias and with no class enemies around.

Some disturbing evidence, however, calls for caution against accepting at face value the sudden restoration of the rule of law over politics. First, the prevailing note of the criticism is that of lack of concreteness. Indignation with sins, manifold and specific, is not accompanied by any identification of the sinners. Not one single prosecutor or judge has been called a stalinist guilty of the "cult of personality practices." Even a bold critic like Brestansky will not go further than to refer to "a *certain* investigator on a *recent* interdepartmental consultation in a *certain* district."[94] Second, while this restraint may be an evidence of prudent caution in some, misgivings and suspicion of insincerity are hard to suppress with other advocates of destalinization including jurists such as Jicinsky or Boguszak. Until recently they were the most outspoken stalinists and their sudden conversions seems to be too good to be true.[95] Third, denunciation of illegality was not accompanied by any purge of the persons responsible, save for four minor officials of the Ministry of Interior.[96] The quartet most responsible for the damage, namely Jan Bartuska, Josef Litera, Vaclav Skoda and Josef Urvalek have not been held accountable for their excesses in interpreting class justice. Bartuska remains Prosecutor General and Litera has even been promoted.[97] The Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court and the lower courts remain in the hands of the same individuals—former proletarians turned jurists and graduates of ten-months course, the so-called PSP (the "Workers' Law School"). These, in my opinion, are political upstarts and beneficiaries of stalinism, hardly willing or capable of changing their outlook.[98] As one of the critics put it, "Since for so many years a certain style in thinking was required and even forced upon the personnel, one cannot be surprised that they have learned to behave that way."[99]

Old habits die hard, especially if their elimination depends on the willingness of the proteges to abdicate their privileges through a restoration of law. A strange coexistence of contradictory values and processes came into being, occasionally reminiscent of a dialogue between the deaf. On the one hand, class discrimination is rejected as obsolete, irrational and immoral,[100] while, on the other hand, a government ordinance of June 24, 1964 further reduces the pensions of hereditary enemies (III-A) and members of their families (III-B).[101] A similar class bias may be found in the provisions of the ordinance on the indemnification of confiscated real property, of

[94] Jozef Brestansky, "Porusovanie procesnopravnych predpisov a jeho hmotnopravne dosledky" (Violation of Procedural Rules and Its Substantive Law Consequence), *Pravny obzor*, No. 2 (1964), p. 79. Italics mine.

[95] This is based on the writer's personal experience, as well as on their pre-1963 publications in *Stat a pravo*, *Pravnik* and *Socialisticka zakonnost* respectively.

[96] *Rude pravo*, August 22, 1963.

[97] Bartuska maintained that Stalin was the founding father of Czechoslovakia in 1918. (Jan Bartuska, *Obrana nasi vlasti a boj za zachovani miru* (The Defense of Our Fatherland and the Struggle for the Maintenance of the Peace), (Prague: Orbis, 1953), p. 18. For Bartuska's stalinism, cf., *Rude pravo*, June 20, 1957 and December 14, 1960; *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 1 (1958), p. 7. For promotion of Litera, cf. *Socialisticke soudnictvi*, No. 4 (1963), p. 97. Josef Urvalek, who sent many innocent men to the gallows, was eulogized by the present Minister of Justice Alois Neumann as follows: "In the name of the Ministry of Justice and certainly in the name of all of us, I express the most sincere thanks for the work he [Urvalek] performed for building up our socialist judiciary and wish him much success in his new activities in the field of scientific legal research." (*Socialisticke soudnictvi*, No. 4 (1963), p. 97.). Urvalek's shift to "scientific activities" is aptly ridiculed by Ladislav Mnacko in his book *Opozdene reportaze* (Belated Reports), (Prague: Ceskoslovensky spisovatel, 1964), p. 51. For Skoda's stalinism, cf. his articles in *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 8 (1956), pp. 449–468, and No. 7 (1958), pp. 401–416.

[98] According to the personal knowledge of this writer, in 1959 all deputies of the Minister of Justice were graduates of the "Workers' Law School." The PSP men held nineteen posts as chairmen of regional courts out of nineteen available, and eighteen out of nineteen regional prosecutor's offices, and almost all important positions at the Supreme Court, mainly in the division of criminal law. The same individuals retained their offices as of 1965. Cf., Intelligence Research Aid, *Directory of Czechoslovak Officials*, A 65–8 (March, 1965), pp. 20, 40.

[99] Zdenek Krizek in "Diskuse," *Pravnik*, No. 7 (1963), p. 591; cf., Brestansky, *op. cit.*, pp. 77–78, and "K aktualnim otazkam," *op. cit.*, p. 302.

[100] Hatala, *op. cit.*; Brestansky, *op cit.*, p. 81.

[101] "Adjustment of Benefits of Some Persons," Ordinance No. 120 of 1964 *Coll.*; cf. "Kadrovani neboztiku" (Political Screening of the Deceased), *Zemedelske noviny*, January 23, 1965.

the same year.[102] Among the assurances about the renaissance of law, one still reads about judges who continue to violate the law.[103] Unlike the fifties, there are far fewer class-biased decisions published. This finding, however, confirms a change in editorial policy but not necessarily a change in adjudication. Equally, without inside information, no judgment can be passed on the question of the continuation or the decline of third-level bias. For example, nothing is known about the Party having officially rescinded the weekly "consultations" of the judges with the *apparatchiki* from the District Secretaries.

Among the legal theorists a considerable uneasiness prevails. The rejection of Vyshinsky's theories left a gaping hole that no Soviet or domestic authority has filled. Without such guidance, the theorists seem to steer a middle course of cautious, piecemeal heresies. For example, while one writer defends the continued correlation between criminality and hostile bourgeois idology,[104] two others, instead of regarding deviant behavior as a reflection of class antagonism, emphasize the need for analyzing contradictions *inherent* in socialism.[105] Representative of the wavering search for firm doctrinal grounds is the essay by Michal Lakatos, who has attempted to draw the line dividing the realm of judicial integrity from the Party's supervisory powers. Lakatos, who goes to some pain of lengthy reasoning about this very ticklish affair, rejects both extremes, that of the absolute independence of the judges and that of "permanent consultation" (implying an utter abdication of judicial responsibility) with the Party Officials. Instead he recommends a compromise that would leave the judges not independent of the regime but free from interference on the day-to-day administration of law.[106]

[102] Ordinances Nos. 25 and 73 of 1964 *Coll.*

[103] "Diskuse," *op. cit.*, p. 585, comment by Schubert; Stepan Flajzar in *Socialisticke soudnictvi*, No. 2 (1963), p. 34; Ludek Mach, "Skoncovat s dogmatismem ve vychovne praci" (End to Dogmatism in the Educational Activities), *Socialisticke soudnictvi*, No. 11 (1963), pp. 335–7; *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 2 (1964), pp. 63–64.

[104] Miroslav Mamula, "Za dalsi prohloubeni boje proti kriminalite" (For Further Deepening of the Struggle Against Criminality), *Socialisticka zakonnost*, No. 6 (1965), p. 7.

[105] Jiri Boguszak and Zdenek Jicinsky, "K problemum socialisticke zakonnosti" (Problematics of Socialist Legality), *Pravnik*, No. 3 (1965).

[106] Lakatos, *op. cit.*, cf.; *Rude pravo*, August 18, 1965.

Despite the unmistakable signs of an honest desire on part of many jurists to terminate the subordination of law to politics, the present situation has to be read as a change in form, or degree, rather than in substance. As noted at the beginning of this article, no one can reasonably expect the Communist Party to vote itself out of power, or to abandon completely and for good the discriminatory concept of class justice and to make law superior to politics. The process of destalinization has modified but not entirely changed the picture of limited legal certainty and equality, for these limitations continue to be expressed both in the laws (first-level bias) and, occasionally at least, in the administration of those laws (the surviving occurrences of the officially rejected second-level bias). Similarly, the class enemy (notably as exemplified in the III-A and III-B categories), this whipping boy for all seasons and ultimate justification of arbitrariness, has not been definitely extirpated from the Czechoslovak reality. The logic of totalitarianism commanded it to go so far but no further.

In conclusion, to undertake the risky venture of some prediction, one may perhaps expect a continued decrease of political intervention into judicial processes and gradual abandonment of the first-level bias. The most important vehicle of this anticipated trend is the time factor. First, almost two decades of decreed revolutionary militancy converted zeal into fatigue, spontaneity into routine, and, to some extent, transformed intolerance from passion into lip-service.[107] Second, the aging generation of the rulers, from the top ranks to the district level, the engineers and beneficiaries of stalinism, people of narrow outlook and inadequate education, will have to vacate the premises for the younger ones. This university-trained intelligentsia is probably devoted to socialism but certainly not to the doctrinal discipline. The young are uninhibited by the Scriptures (e.g., "Marx and Engels would probably fail to recognize contemporary capitalism")[108] and very much disrespectful of the elders tarred with the misdeeds of the stalinist era.[109] The issue is not

[107] Milan Prucha, "O toleranci" (On Tolerance), *Literarni noviny*, July 17, 1965, pp. 1–2. His views rejected by Miroslav Stanec and Jaromir Vojnar, "Tolerantni nesouhlas" (Tolerant Disagreement), *Rude pravo*, August 25, 1965.

[108] Jan Prochazka, "Pohyb sveta" (Motion of the World), *Literarni noviny*, May 1, 1965, p. 1.

[109] "Neverime sobe ani slibum" (We Trust Neither Ourselves Nor Any Promises), *ibid.*, March 27, 1965, p. 7; Milos Hoznauer, "Nadseni kontra kriticnost" (Enthusiasm Versus Scepti-

that of a conflict between the "communists" and the "democrats," not even the classical struggle for power in the Party Politburo, but one between the lower echelon elites, who remain in charge of politics, the state administration, the economy and cultural life and the young generation anxious to replace them. The present mini-Stalins in charge of everything, of whom 61.1 percent have not gone beyond grade school,[110] resist giving in to the pressure of the young aspiring intelligentsia that has more to offer than thoughtless loyalty. The struggle between the "dogmatists" and the "revisionists" revolves around the issue of the reassertion of brains and competence. Its outcome promises the comfort of cautious optimism, of expectation that "class justice," once a key to arbitrariness will be relegated to the emptiness of a cliche, and "justice" (*spravedlnost*), still vaguely obscene, will make no one blush.

cism), *ibid.*, January 16, 1965, pp. 1–3; Dusan Rovensky, "Problem mlade generace nebo nas vsech?" (Problem of the Young Generation Only or of Us All?), *Nova mysl*, No. 3 (1965).

[110] Karel Kotrbaty in *Kulturni tvorba*, September 9, 1965.

MASS MOVEMENT AND DEMOCRACY: SOKAGAKKAI IN JAPANESE POLITICS

JAMES W. WHITE
Stanford University

With a claimed membership of over 12 million members, possession of over 1000 seats in local and national legislative assemblies, a widespread domestic reputation, and a sensationalistic treatment in the foreign press, the Sokagakkai has come in recent years to be a subject of some academic, and much religious and political interest in both Japan and the United States. An organization of lay believers of the Sho sect of Nichiren Buddhism (noted for its intolerance and vigorous propagation methods), the Sokagakkai has gone into Japanese politics with a striking degree of success; the extent to which it has brought its religious characteristics into the political sphere and the question of whether such religious groups should be in that sphere at all are at present the focus of considerable debate in Japan.

Most criticisms of the Sokagakkai have to date concentrated upon its religious activities, its doctrinal truth or falsehood, its alleged militaristic tendencies, and the proper place of religion in the political system of a secular state. I would like to touch on some of the social (or antisocial) functions performed by the Sokagakkai in Japanese society, as proclaimed by the Gakkai itself and as evidenced in the Gakkai's performance, and on the implications of these social functions for the Japanese political process.

As its name, the "Value-Creation Society," suggests, the Sokagakkai postulates pursuit of absolute happiness by means of the creation of certain values in one's life as the proper direction of human life. So that all men may be able to achieve this happiness, the Gakkai emphasizes equality of all men; so that they may be fully able to enjoy their values, the Gakkai stresses freedom.[1] Absolute freedom, equality, and happiness may be sought by the individual through religious faith; the agency for the realization of these ideals for society and the world is the political system.[2]

The means by which politics achieves these collective ideals is power; however, only that power which is directed toward realization of these goals for the collectivity *in toto* is legitimate, and in no case does government have unlimited power over the individual, regardless of its ends.[3] The individual functions of faith and the collective functions of politics, combined in a fusion of religion and politics, are to bring harmony of individual happiness and collective (both national and, one step further removed, international) prosperity. The form of government appropriate to such a condition, and to its realization, is democracy. The Gakkai perceives democracy as a set of attitudes, not structures: respect for the individual and for the dignity of human life, compassion, freedom, and equality. The purpose of political parties, postulated as indispensable in this system, is to represent and respond to the will of the people, aggregating and harmonizing the widely varying interests of the public and avoiding factionalism and identification with certain segments of the public.[4]

I. SOCIETY AS IT IS AND AS IT SHOULD BE: THE GAKKAI'S PERCEPTION

The Sokagakkai takes a view of contemporary society close to that propounded by "mass society" theorists. The atomized, alienated, anomic little man overwhelmed by the onrush of technological progress, urbanization, and bureaucratic proliferation and depersonalization in all spheres of life is the Gakkai's image of the common man today. Government in particular has deserted its proper role; man, freed from feudalism, is now oppressed by the cutthroat competition of capitalism, with its sanction of blatant inequalities, or by the collective oppression of socialism, with its elimination of freedom.

In democratic mass societies, however, man has a possible escape from this stultifying situation. Though government has tended to dominate man, it has granted him certain rights which, if exercised, will enable him to dominate government and turn it again to its proper pursuit: absolute happiness for all the people. The Sokagakkai emphasizes the importance of organized mass power built upon a base of politically aware and active citizens,

[1] Ikeda Daisaku, *Seiji to Shukyo* (Tokyo: Hoshoin, 1965), pp. 160–161.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 211–212.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 90–91, 104–105.

[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 99, 130, 139; Sokagakkai, Overseas Bureau, *Sokagakkai and Komeito*, "This is the Sokagakkai" series 6 (Tokyo: Seikyo Press, 1965(?), p. 17.

articulating their views as a group to overcome the insignificance of the individual in the contemporary political process.[5] It attributes the corruption of the political world to the apathy of the citizenry and exhorts people first to fill the political vacuums in their own lives by familiarizing themselves with the political process, especially through direct participation in matters of immediate concern in their daily lives, and then to join with others in articulating views and demanding responsiveness from their representatives.[6]

To these general problems of politics and society today the Gakkai adds certain features of the Japanese situation which necessitate its participation in the political process. Foremost is popular apathy: freed from the restraints imposed by the political participation of an aware mass, freedom becomes licence and evil men are free to take over the government for their own ends. Second, and stemming from this apathy, is the corruption, factionalism, and self-seeking of the major Japanese political parties. This in turn further alienates the people, because such parties neither will nor can, due to their representation of particularistic interest groups, satisfy the needs of the people.[7] In its 1964 declaration of intent to form a political party the Sokagakkai offered the following additional reasons for its move:

1. The confusion and diversity of thought [in Japan].
2. The ideological bankruptcy of youth, stemming from egoism and an appetite-oriented view of values.
3. The collapse of the bicameral system and stagnation of government brought on by the opposition of the two major parties.
4. Competitive co-existence and the deadlock of the capitalist and socialist systems.
5. The danger of war, based on the pursuit of national profit and the oppositions of national interest.
6. National restrictions on resolution of problems by local government.[8]

II. THE GAKKAI'S FUNCTION: ITS OWN PERCEPTION

In this national and international environment the Sokagakkai perceives its own function to be crucial: man, in this new age, needs a new world view, a supreme philosophy which can both restructure and guide government toward its proper ends and provide the individual with a frame of reference inclusive and yet flexible enough to be applicable to any situation, enabling him to cope with the otherwise overpowering world.[9] The only appropriate philosophical basis for modern society and politics is, as determined by the Gakkai through a theoretical and pragmatic proof, the True Buddhism of Nichiren, with its unique efficacy in everyday life and its lofty goals of freedom, equality, and absolute happiness.

The political functions of the Gakkai in the realization of *Obutsu Myogo*, or the fusion of religion and politics under which earthly paradise will be achieved, are several. First is a harmonizing function. Through the guiding power of faith the Gakkai will be able to effect an economic synthesis of capitalism and socialism into a (substantively vague) "neosocialism," a philosophical synthesis of materialist and idealist thought into "The Third Civilization," an international synthesis of national diversity and sovereignty and international community into "One-Worldism," and a political synthesis of Western liberal democracy and Communist people's democracy into "Buddhist Democracy."[10]

Second, the Gakkai will help realize true freedom and equality. Basing its position upon the idea of the ultimate unity of all life, and therefore the equality of all manifestations of life, the Gakkai claims that only belief in Nichiren Shōshū instills the respect for life and for the individual necessary for smooth human intercourse and, as embraced by those in government, for the restoration of compassionate politics.[11] Third, the Gakkai works constantly for the humanization of the political system, attending to the grievances and views of individual citizens and demanding similar attendance on the part of all public officials, both elective and appointive. Fourth, and most immediately, the Gakkai vociferously advocates, while a minority political force, the cleanup of the political world.

To perform these functions the Sokagakkai created, in November 1964, the Komeito, or Clean Government Party. By virtue of its supreme philosophy the Gakkai feels obligated to help society: in a democratic society, where popular political participation is the ideal, the Gakkai is duty-bound to express its efforts

[5] Ikeda, *op. cit.*, pp. 137–138, 95.

[6] Takase Hiroi, *Komeito*, Tokyo, Gakushu Kenkyusha, 1964, p. 137; Ikeda, *op. cit.*, pp. 146–147.

[7] Ikeda, *op. cit.*, pp. 1 (Introduction by Hojo Hiroshi), 140, 266.

[8] Takase, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

[9] "This is the Sokagakkai" series 6, pp. 11–12.

[10] Takase, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

[11] Ikeda, *op. cit.*, pp. 235, 246; Takase, *op. cit.*, pp. 183–186.

in the political system. The Koseiren, the forerunner of the Komeito, was designed for the cleanup of politics; the creation of the Komeito signified a new, more positive and active political role for the Gakkai.

The new party claims superiority on several grounds: it alone has the ideology enabling realization of true democracy, prosperity, and happiness. It alone is the true party of the whole people, being a microcosm of Japanese society. It alone has the ideological integrity and ability to resist the corruption of power. Finally, in contrast to the other major parties, all controlled by foreign elements, the Komeito alone is a Japanese political party controlled by Japanese.[13]

III. MEANS TO THE END: KOMEITO POLITICS

The policies presented by the Komeito as a blueprint for the achievement of the new society are what one might expect of a party which tries to appeal to the broadest possible segment of any, and especially of the Japanese, populace. Domestic issues are far more prominent than international, though a comprehensive, if somewhat vague, program has been designed. Internationally, in accord with the ideal of One-Worldism, the Gakkai espouses world federation, a sense of universal community transcending national frontiers (which remain). To this end Japan's foreign policy should at present emphasize the UN and disarmament and oppose regional alliances and all international violence.[13]

Domestically, focus is upon economic and immediate issues. Preparations for neosocialism include income tax cuts on lower income levels, price stabilization, more public housing, full employment, comprehensive social security, drastic redistribution of income, increased autonomy of local government, and shorter working hours. Among the immediate issues (to the voters, that is) are sewage, air and water pollution, narcotics, urban renewal, water shortages, and noise.[14] Emphasis within the former area is upon rectification of the "double economic structure" so that consumers may enjoy lower prices and medium and small industries may share in the general economic development. Tax concessions, easy loans, and managerial advice should be extended to small business and big and small business coordinated to eliminate overlapping of effort. Similarly price supports and streamlined distributive structures should enhance the relative position of small agriculture and lower consumer prices, while establishment of industry-wide, instead of company, labor unions would improve the position of the labor force in small enterprises.[15]

Komeito policies read very much like those of the socialists, but the party claims vital differences. First, the Komeito presents its program as the articulated desires of the people, not as the logical result of a hidebound ideology. Second, though the party talks nationalization, such moves would be made with the interests of *all* the people in mind in such a way as to benefit both owners and workers.[16] In rebuttal to criticism that the Komeito in fact usually votes with the conservatives, the party emphasizes the ultimate importance of ideas: individual policies are simply manifestations of the ills of society, and effort is better spent in trying to democratize the government itself than in squabbling over every single bill.[17]

IV. CONFLICTS IN FUNCTION: RELIGION VS. POLITICS

Critics of the Gakkai have pointed out a number of difficulties attendant upon the entry of a religious group into politics, focussing upon the inherent incompatibility of religion and politics and upon the incompatibility of the Sokagakkai's religion with democracy. The Gakkai claims that church and state can be separated while religion provides a philosophical and ethical base for politics; while religion would continue to be viewed in absolute terms, politics would be recognized as an area of relativity, change, and compromise.[18] The value of cross-cutting social cleavages and discussion across these cleavages is asserted, though many observers doubt whether such tolerance could be reconciled with doctrine.[19] The Gakkai has in fact moderated certain of its positions, at times explicitly. The idea of a

[13] Ikeda, *op. cit.*, pp. 259ff.

[13] Sokagakkai, Overseas Bureau, *The Buddhist Democracy*, "This is the Sokagakkai" series 7 (Tokyo: Seikyo Press, 1965(?), pp. 8ff; Tsuji Takehisa, "Komeito no Kihon Seisaku," *Ekonomisuto*, 43 (September 7, 1965), p. 53; Takase, *op. cit.*, pp. 227–229.

[14] Saki Akio, "Komeito no Seisaku o Hihan suru," *Zenei*, no. 238 (July, 1965), p. 206; Takase, *op. cit.*, pp. 214, 256–257.

[15] Takase, *op. cit.*, pp. 244, 248–249, 253; Tsuji, *op. cit.*, pp. 53–54.

[16] Takase, *op. cit.*, pp. 258, 216.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 62.

[18] Ikeda, *op. cit.*, p. 1 (Preface); Sokagakkai, Overseas Bureau, *What is Shakubuku?*, "This is the Sokagakkai" series 8 (Tokyo: Seikyo Press, 1965(?), p. 9.

[19] Takase, *op. cit.*, p. 211; *Christian Science Monitor*, April 25, 1966, p. 11.

National High Sanctuary, prominent in the 1950's, has undergone a denationalizing name change and a process of abstraction.[20] Former Komeito Secretary-General Hojo Hiroshi stated recently that certain party policies were designed specifically with mass appeal in mind, in opposition to high-level party opinion and, though this was not stated, to strict doctrinal purity. He also deemphasized the importance of assumption of power, asserting that the Komeito could effect many of its goals as an opposition party.[21]

On the issue of religious freedom under Komeito government the Gakkai is vociferously affirmative, but there is fear, reinforced by occasional outbursts against "heretical" thought and expression, that this is no more than a pose.[22] In the same way, fears of institutional imposition of Gakkai doctrines regardless of present stress on individual freedom recur; the Gakkai presupposes harmony of the collectivity and the individual, but in the basic writings of founder Makiguchi Tsunesaburo society is clearly the ultimate source of value.[23] Accusations of ultra-nationalism pose another problem. The Komeito rails against nationalism as the cause of countless wars and stresses the universal validity of Nichiren Shoshu; at the same time the traditional Nichirenite idea of the civilizing mission of the Japanese people and the more modern idea of Japan, the synthesizer of the best of East and West, are still in disturbing evidence in Gakkai materials.[24]

V. ACTUAL FUNCTIONS PERFORMED FOR GAKKAI MEMBERS

1. *Psychological.* The functions performed for its members by the Sokagakkai are of both a social-psychological, and, more specifically, political nature. It fulfills selfish personal needs: health, money, and family problems can be solved through faith. At the same time psychic needs to belong, to feel secure, to be related to other people and to society are satisfied. In a way, Gakkai membership constitutes an "escape from freedom," from the deafening barrage of contradictory information delivered by the mass media, from the new situations and new insecurities to be encountered in any modernizing society and especially in the postwar normlessness and upheaval of Japan.[25] The composition of the Gakkai membership supports this proposition: it consists largely of workers in small enterprises, unorganized labor, new immigrants from the country, and in general those who have not shared in or are being left behind in Japan's development.[26] Politically, the favorably inclined are those whose children have been killed in traffic accidents, who suffer from air pollution, who are repeatedly inconvenienced by water failures, or who remember harsh treatment at the hands of arrogant bureaucrats.

The Sokagakkai has solved the problems of these people by creating a community of faith reinforced by bonds of interest, political position, and diffuse we-feelings. The Gakkai is in fact a value-creating structure in that it creates in its members a new set of norms, attitudes, and values not previously there and offers opportunities to realize these values through group action.[27] The groups themselves are ingeniously designed to fulfill multiple functions. They are fourfold in type. There is the vertical converter-convert organization which grows and multiples amoeba-like whenever a group becomes too large to maintain close face-to-face contact among the members. There is the horizontal, geographical block system, utilizing local community relationships. There are numerous interest groups involved in music, drama, and various academic and cultural pursuits. Finally, there are peer groups convering all elements of the membership: students, young men, young women, and so forth.[28] All human relationships are utilized in some way: kin, local,

[20] Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 55; Takase, *op. cit.*, p. 220.

[21] *Christian Science Monitor*, May 2, May 3, 1966. N.B.: these interviews were given to a foreign publication and thus differ from what is provided for domestic consumption. Whether it is more or less truthful than domestically-expressed views is unknown.

[22] Tsuji, *op. cit.*, p. 55; Miyata Mitsuo, "Shukyo Seito to Minshushugi," in *Sekai*, no. 233, May, 1965, p. 158.

[23] Robert L. Ramseyer, "The Soka Gakkai," in *Studies in Japanese Culture: 1*, Center for Japanese Studies, Occasional Papers 9 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965), pp. 158–159; Shiobara Tsutomu, "Sokagakkai Ideorogii," in *Tembo*, no. 78, June, 1965, p. 37.

[24] "This is the Sokagakkai" series 7, pp. 9ff.; Ikeda, *op. cit.*, p. 208; compare with Takase, *op. cit.*, pp. 205–206, 267.

[25] Especially relevant regarding this phenomenon: James Dator's excellent article, "The Soka Gakkai: A Socio-Political Interpretation," in *Contemporary Religions in Japan*, 6 (September, 1965), pp. 207–208; Erich Fromm, *Escape From Freedom* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961), *passim*.

[26] *Christian Science Monitor*, April 29, 1966.

[27] Dator, *op. cit.*, p. 217.

[28] *Ibid.*, pp. 213–214.

friendship, occupational, all overlap so as to bind the individual into a firm collectivity.

The Gakkai and Komeito provide important communication functions for their members also. They serve to transmit, albeit very selectively, news to a broad segment of society which, one may surmise from its socio-economic position, would otherwise be relatively uninformed; and they offer channels for response wholly lacking in direct contact with the mass media.

A further function which it is increasingly assumed the Gakkai fulfills is in the provision of a symbol upon which reviving Japanese nationalism can focus. The general success of the Nichiren-derivative new religions, with their indigenous founder and sense of national purpose, is compared with the autochthony and national orientations of prewar Shinto and the Sokagakkai, among others, is viewed as a modern functional counterpart.[29]

2. *Political.* In the expressly political realm the success with which the Gakkai has been fulfilling its proclaimed functions is open to some doubt. In its extraparliamentary methods the Komeito has taken a microscopic view of politics, emphasizing face-to-face contact with the electorate, personal surveys and investigations on matters of apparently trivial import, and identification with the masses and their most immediate grievances, and most of their non-Gakkai support is due to these tactics. A striking structural innovation is the system of Livelihood Discussion Centers, established in every Komeito branch, where voters can come with problems of every type and receive legal advice or have their problems referred to the relevant public office.

In the assemblies the Komeito has not been noted for its ability successfully to initiate legislation or to fight on issues apparently inimical to its interest. It approves the vast majority of bills proposed by the conservatives in the Upper House of the Diet and in local assemblies.[30] The frequency with which Komeito representatives speak has on occasion been recorded and has not been startlingly great.[31] Overall one must conclude that the Komeito's function as agent for concrete realization of the masses' desires as policy has not been successfully fulfilled; this is very much due to its status as a minority party, and may be offset by the marked extraparliamentary efforts made.

VI. FUNCTIONS PERFORMED FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

1. *As an Abstract Organization.* The functions performed by the Sokagakkai/Komeito in the Japanese political system can be viewed from two directions: from that of the Gakkai as an organ of political articulation and politicization, and from that of the Gakkai as a religious-political organization of lower-middle and lower class people. Neither of these aspects has as yet been the subject of extensive study; the image of the Sokagakkai has been determined by its tactics and by the political implications of certain of its dogmas.

When viewed as an abstract organ, the nature of the Gakkai implies a function conducive to democracy; as one adds the peculiarities of the organization its role becomes much more ambiguous. Various studies have suggested the importance of popular political awareness and participation in increasing the sense of political competence of the citizenry and thereby creating generalized commitment and emotional attachment to the political system.[32] In addition, the development of an extensive system of voluntary organizations is widely assumed to be important to the development of stable democratic processes. There is a high correlation between membership in such organizations, even formally apolitical ones, and an increased individual sense of political competence. The ability to cooperate with others toward the achievement of political goals gives one a quite different perspective from that of the isolated, inactive citizen.[33]

Japanese observers, however, to the degree that they have concentrated upon this aspect of the Gakkai, have in general denied its functionalism or have given greater weight to the Gakkai's organizational idiosyncrasies. The largely negative nature of its platform and of its politicization process is cited, along with

[29] Muramatsu Takeshi, "Nihon no Kindaika to Nichirenshu," in *Chuo Koron*, 80 (March, 1965), pp. 53–54; Alfred Bloom, "Observations in the Study of Contemporary Nichiren Buddhism," in *Contemporary Religions in Japan*, 6 (March, 1965), p. 70; Saki Akio, "Komeito no Seisaku to Honshitsu," *Ekonomisuto*, 43 (July 27, 1965), p. 38.

[30] Murakami Shigeo, "Komeito no Seiji Kodo," in *Sekai*, no. 233, May 1965, pp. 167–168.

[31] *Loc. cit.*

[32] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 253.

[33] *Ibid.*, pp. 307, 318, 320; William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), p. 138; Emil Lederer, *State of the Masses* (New York: Norton, 1940), pp. 147–150.

the authoritarian appearance of its structure and the narrow, biased awareness created by the Gakkai's communication and participatory functions.[34] On the other hand, the Gakkai has moderated its tactics markedly in the last several years and has issued strictures against both excessive zeal and all types of mass defiance of authority. The constant reiteration of democratic symbols in Komeito and Gakkai publications may to some extent balance the sectarian narrowness.

2. *As a Collectivity.* Though an abstract appraisal of the politicization and articulation functions performed by the Sokagakkai for the Japanese political system may lead one to consider it beneficial to a democratic system, superficial examination of the social nature of the Gakkai's lower-middle and lower class membership, when compared with similar social elements in other countries in regard to basic political beliefs, presents a less favorable picture. Numerous studies in the United States and elsewhere have found a consistent correlation between lower-middle and lower class socio-economic position and extreme, simplistic, rigid, authoritarian, political views; relatively low commitment to democratic structures, processes, and values; and predilections for intolerant, millennial religious beliefs.[35] It must be emphasized that no thorough study of the social composition of the Sokagakkai nor of members' political attitudes has yet been made. But, while no assumptions concerning these attitudes should be made, one would not be surprised to find attitudes cross-nationally common to lower class life among the membership.

Although in many democratic societies a large stratum of the population is neither very aware of, enthusiastic about, nor committed to democratic ideals and procedures, in most of them political inactivity seems to correlate highly with low commitment. In other words, a large degree of apathy may be beneficial for democracy since those most apathetic are those whose values are most incompatible with democracy.[36] What the Gakkai has done is mobilize those sectors of society most associated with undemocratic beliefs. Thus certain questions arise: do official organizational positions determine the true political nature of the Sokagakkai, or is it determined by the possible latent, deeply-held personality characteristics of the members as a particular social element? Second, what is the nature of the politicization process performed for its members by the Gakkai? Does it imbue them with commitment to democratic structures and processes, train them in moderate action, and alleviate or reform whatever frustrations and aggressive impulses might have led them to the Gakkai as an organ of protest? Or does the Gakkai simply mobilize intact and unleash upon the political system all the desperation, pent-up anger, and intolerance of those otherwise ignored by society?

The Sokagakkai itself stresses the ability of ideas, especially religious ideas, to change personality. In effect, this change is group-imposed, and much research has suggested the powerful role which groups—especially such small, face-to-face groups as characterize the Gakkai—play in the formation of individual political attitudes. Though personal and official positions need not be congruent, individuals of certain types are originally drawn to organizations of certain types and, once in, a process of natural selection (impeded in this case by Gakkai pressure against withdrawal) results in congruence of organizational and individual values.[37] If the role of group influences is in fact crucial, one might expect the constant Gakkai emphasis on freedom, equality, respect for the individual, compassion, and the dignity of human life to create eventually, both by attraction and by post-entry indoctrination, a membership so democratically inclined as to make mobilization for undemocratic ends by the leadership impossible.

However, and here the inconsistencies of the social sciences become apparent, research has also shown that in many cases not only entry, but lasting commitment to parties, communities, organizations, and nations may be the result of attachments having nothing to do with the formal aims and values of the collectivity.[38] Individuals receiving primarily psychological gratification from membership and orienting their actions toward very basic

[34] Murakami, *op. cit.*, pp. 158–159, 166–167.

[35] Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960), ch. 4 *passim*; Glen Tinder, *The Crisis of Political Imagination* (New York: Scribner's, 1964), pp. 109ff.

[36] Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," this REVIEW, 58 (June, 1964), pp. 364–365.

[37] T. W. Adorno, et al., *The Authoritarian Personality* (New York: Harper, 1950), pp. 206–207; Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 91–92; David Riesman et al., *The Lonely Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. xxii–iii; Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 50–51.

[38] McClosky, *op. cit.*, p. 378.

human relationships within the small group may preserve, unreconstructed, attitudes incompatible with those expressed at higher levels of the collectivity concerning, for instance, the desirability of a democratic political system.

Much further study of the Sokagakkai, especially in the areas mentioned above, is necessary if its true relevance for the Japanese political system is to be ascertained. It is clear that, on a very general level, organizations such as the Gakkai, which provide a means for political education, articulation, and participation for those otherwise ignored in the political process can perform valuable functions in a democratic society. What requires further attention is the peculiar nature of the Gakkai's politicization process and the congruence or incongruence of and relative weights of the organization's views and those of the membership. Such study of a political force of the magnitude of the Sokagakkai in the democratic political process of contemporary Japan is imperative.

PEER GROUP AND SCHOOL AND THE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS*

KENNETH P. LANGTON
The University of Michigan

The role of education as a significant political socialization process is widely accepted among social scientists and educators. Numerous studies point to positive correlations between education level and political cognition and participation. But beyond this point agreement ends. While many studies have demonstrated with varying degrees of certitude the formal role of curriculum and the teacher in the socialization process, the inconclusive and contradictory nature of the findings has led many students of socialization to a closer examination of the less formal environment of the school.[1] Yet only a few studies have examined the influence of the informal school environment upon political socialization.[2]

The purpose of this paper is to examine empirically the impact of the class climate in peer groups and schools upon the reinforcement or resocialization of political attitudes and behavior patterns.

The major questions are as follows:

1. What is the relationship between the class homogeneity-heterogeneity of peer groups and schools and the isolation of lower class students from the political and economic norms of higher class students? For example, do homogeneous class peer groups and schools reinforce the political culture of the working class while heterogeneous class environments tend to resocialize lower class students in the direction of norms held by students of higher classes?
2. Does the heterogeneous class climate of both the peer group and school have a cumulative effect upon the resocialization of working class political attitudes and behavior patterns?
3. What are the cross-cultural implications of these findings for the conscious manipulation of the school environment?

While these questions are of sufficiently broad scope to be amenable to empirical testing in any political culture in which class cleavages exist, the primary source of data for this study is a national sample of 1287 students in government aided secondary schools in Jamaica, W. I. In addition, tangential comparative data on the influence of the class climate of the school is available from a survey

* I wish to express my appreciation to Philip E. Converse for his helpful suggestions and to acknowledge the financial support of the Cooperative Research Program of the Office of Education, U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

[1] For a concise summary of this problem and related bibliography, see James S. Coleman (ed.), *Education and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 18–25.

The reader should note that in societies where elites are interested in rapid modernization and political change, they may depend heavily upon the conscious manipulation of the formal as well as the informal environment of the school. See, e.g.: Stephen Dunn and Ethel Dunn, "Directed Cultural Change in the Soviet Union: Some Soviet Studies," *American Anthropologist*, 64 (April, 1962), 328–339; Urie Bronfenbrenner, "Soviet Methods of Character Education," *American Psychologist*, 17 (August, 1962), 550–564; and Franklin Houn, *To Change a Nation* (New York: Free Press, 1961).

Yet within school systems where self-conscious indoctrination does not take a massive form there is evidence that curriculum and formal instruction do not have great effect upon student values. As a transmitter of social values, the classroom teacher may be in a relatively weak position. It is likely that those adults who are most significant in the high school socialization system are those who control role assignments which are important *within the adolescent culture*, for example, the athletic coach or driving teacher. Albert D. Ullman, "Sociology and Character Education" in Franklin Patterson, *et al*, (eds.), *The Adolescent Citizen* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960), 206–223. For experimental evidence on the dubious role of the college teacher as an agency of change see: Everett K. Wilson, "The Entering Student: Attributes and Agents of Change," in Theodore M. Newcomb and Everett K. Wilson (eds.), *College Peer Groups* (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), pp. 84–87.

[2] See: Martin L. Levin, "Social Climates and Political Socialization," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (Winter, 1961), 596–606; David Riesman, *Faces in the Crowd* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1952), p. 559; Theodore M. Newcomb, *Personality and Social Change* (New York: Dryden Press, 1943); and David Ziblatt, "High School Extra Curricular Activities and Political Socialization," *The Annals*, 361 (September, 1965), 21–31.

of 1349 primary and secondary school students in Detroit, Michigan.[3]

I. THE PEER GROUP

The influence of the group upon the perceptions and expressed opinions of an individual is one of the better documented generalizations in the small group literature.[4] James S. Coleman has shown in a striking manner the power of a particular group—the student peer group—in setting the values of its members. When we turn to more manifestly political orientations, Theodore Newcomb has demonstrated that college peer or prestige groups may play an important role in the political resocialization process.[5]

Yet perhaps one of the foremost functions of the peer group is to transmit the culture of the wider society of which it is a part. While student peer groups may have a subculture of their own, they also teach the adult subculture of which they are a part and reinforce the norms and social patterns held by adult society.[6] Social class, religious and ethnic subcultures may be transmitted through the peer group. A child who grows up in a working class family learns the working class way of life. If he enters a school peer group composed of students from the same social class, this may act to reinforce as well as elaborate the class attitudes and expectations learned in the family. Certainly one of the first points to emerge in Hyman's summary of the literature is the relative lack of discontinuity in the socialization process in the United States.[7] While there are some discontinuities, more impressive is the general acceptance of the political orientations of one's parents.

In addition to its function of transmitting or reinforcing the political culture of the society, the peer group may provide a social system in which the individual learns new attitudes and behavior. For example, while the peer group with a homogeneous class composition may operate to reinforce the class way of life and associated political orientations of its members, a lower class boy or girl entering a heterogeneous class peer group where he interacts with individuals of higher social status may learn from them new ways of behaving and believing. The literature suggests that these higher status peers become especially significant as models for identification. For they are in a position to reward peer group members of lesser status by bestowing approval, attention, leadership, or by giving permission to participate in peer activities or to employ certain symbols. Harvey and Rutherford found that American students in heterogeneous class peer groups tended to change their opinions in the direction of those held by high status peers. However, this shift was greater in higher (6th–11th grades) than in lower grades. The development of status consciousness may be in corollary of the maturation process.[8] Remmers and Radler found in their national sample of high school students that respondents from low income homes were more likely to defer to the opinions of their peers on racial questions than were students from medium and high income homes. Low income students were also much more likely than respondents from higher income families to follow the dictates of their peers, rather than to suggest new group activity.[9]

Interestingly enough, C. Stendler found that

[3] I wish to thank Drs. Roberta S. Sigel and Irving S. Sigel for the use of their data, which was gathered from selected Detroit secondary and primary schools in 1964 during their study of school children's reactions to the assassination of President Kennedy. See: Roberta S. Sigel, "An Exploration Into Some Aspects of Political Socialization: School Children's Reaction to the Death of a President," in Martha Wolfenstein and Gilbert Kliman (eds.), *Children And The Death Of A President* (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1965), pp. 30–61.

The multi-staged Jamaican sample was based upon a stratified cluster sample of unequal clusters collected in 1964.

[4] James C. Davies, *Human Nature in Politics* (New York: Wiley 1963), pp. 170–172; Sidney Verba, *Small Groups and Political Behavior* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 22–23, 90–109; Robert Lane and David Sears, *Public Opinion* (Prentice-Hall, 1964), pp. 33–42.

[5] James S. Coleman, *The Adolescent Society* (Glencoe: Free Press 1961); Theodore M. Newcomb, *op. cit.* Unfortunately, peer group is a term frequently used without definition. It does not always refer to a primary or face-to-face group, but is often applied to age, grade, and social class cohorts. In this study peer group refers to a face-to-face group of "best friends."

[6] Robert J. Havighurst and Bernice L. Neugarten, *Society and Education*, 2nd Ed. (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1962), chapter 5.

[7] Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959).

[8] J. Harvey and J. M. Rutherford, "Status in the Informal Group: Influence and Influencibility at Different Age Levels," *Child Development*, 31 (June, 1960), 377–385.

[9] H. H. Remmers and D. H. Radler, *The American Teenager* (New York: Charter, 1957), pp. 234–237.

in Brasstown out-of-school peer groups were generally more class-homogeneous, while there was a greater tendency for peer groups within the school to cross class lines.[10] This suggests that the environment of the school peer group may be more conductive to resocialization than informal cohort groups outside the school.

From the preceding discussion we might hypothesize that the primary function of homogeneous class peer groups in the political socialization process is to reinforce the way of life and associated political orientations of the lower classes, and thus, to maintain the political and cultural cleavages which may exist between the classes. On the other hand, we hypothesize that heterogeneous class peer groups function in an important way to resocialize the attitudes of working class members in the direction of those held by higher class peers.

Class Differences:

A consistent pattern of political cleavages exists among the different social stata in Jamaican society.[11] In light of the research findings in the United States on the relationship between objective class and political attitudes, we are not surprised to find that working class students in Jamaica are less committed to the values of a "democratic" order, less supportive of the civil liberties of Jamaican minority groups, less positively oriented toward voting, and less politicized than the middle and upper classes.[12] The relationships are linear in all cases with the working and upper classes occupying opposite ends of the various dependent indices.[13]

We also attempted to ascertain the respondents' general orientation toward the political system as a whole. This diffuse system affect is likely to vary between political cultures and, more important for the purposes of this study, negative and positive affect may vary between social classes. Almond and Verba found, for example, that in the United States, Great Britain, and Mexico, the better educated respondents and those with higher status occupations were more likely to express general pride in their respective political systems than those from lesser statuses.[14]

In contrast, we find in Jamaica a linear increase in positive affect or "support" and a decrease in ambivalence as social class decreases.[15] There appears to be no relationship between

---

[10] Celia B. Stendler, *Children of Brasstown* (Urbana: Bureau of Research and Service of the College of Education, University of Illinois, 1949).

[11] The respondent's social class is determined by his position on an index composed of two items: the occupation of his father and the education of his mother or father—whichever is higher.

[12] It has generally been found that working class Americans have a lesser sense of citizenship duty and disposition to vote than those of higher social class: Robert E. Lane, *Political Life* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), pp. 157–160.

H. H. Remmers found that American high school students from the lower classes were less tolerant of civil liberties and less disposed toward the norms of a "democratic" order than were higher class students. See: *Purdue Opinion Poll*, Number 30, November, 1951; and Remmers and Radler, *op. cit.*, chapter 8.

Both Remmers and Radler, *op. cit.*, and Herbert Hyman, *op. cit.*, pp. 34–35, found that students from low income and less educated families were less politicized than their counterparts from higher classes. The reader should note that the degree of class polarization on comparable political attitudes and issues can be expected to vary between countries. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the degree of class polarization within a country is likely to vary over time: Philip E. Converse, "The Shifting Role of Class" in E. Hartley, *Readings in Social Psychology*, 3rd Ed. (New York: Holt, 1958), pp. 388–399.

[13] Respondents were asked to express their opinions on the following:

General "democratic" orientation: "Economic security is more important than political freedom."

Attitude toward voting: "It won't matter much to me if I vote or not when I become an adult."

Civil Liberties: "Rastafarians (Jamaican minority group) should not be allowed to hold public meetings even if they gather peacefully and only make speeches."

Politicization: Respondents' placement on this index was determined by the frequency in which they discussed politics with members of the family, school friends, teacher or politicians; and the frequency in which political articles were read in the national newspaper.

The differences between the position of the working class and the upper class on each of these four variables was 15, 12, 13, and 13 percent, respectively.

[14] Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 105.

[15] Respondents were asked: "Do you feel politics and the government have been honest, dishonest, neither honest nor dishonest?" This question might also be considered a measure of general political cynicism.

class and negative affect or "opposition" to the political system (Table 1).

The relatively stronger support and less political cynicism found among the working class may be explained in terms of the class appeals and charismatic nature of Jamaican politics. Both political parties in Jamaica have attempted to project the charisma of their respective leaders before the working class Jamaican. Most successful political campaigns combined charisma with "bread and butter" trade union issues and directed these appeals primarily at the working class. While the lower classes may have found these appeals and the tone of Jamaican politics particularly appealing it has only tended to make the more educated classes increasingly suspicious of "mob appeal" and intolerant of alleged corruption and waste.

TABLE 1. RELATION OF SOCIAL CLASS TO SYSTEM LEGITIMACY

Social Class	System Legitimacy			
	Support	Ambivalent	Oppose	N
	%	%	%	
Working Class	40	46	14	462
Middle Class	33	53	14	272
Upper Class	28	55	17	338

Students were also asked to give their opinions on certain economic issues. Some of these issues impinge directly upon class prerogatives.[16] Generally the findings conform to the well documented proposition that the lower class is less economically "conservative" than the higher classes.

Although class polarization on the preceding political and economic issues is not as dramatic in Jamaica as it might be in other societies, given the consistent pattern of political cleavages that exist among the different social strata, we hypothesized that peer groups and schools play an important role in reinforcing or resocializing the political and economic attitudes of the working class.

Peer Class Environment and Political Socialization:

The class homogeneity-heterogeneity of the respondent's peer group was based on his perception of the peer environment. We asked respondents if their best friends in school were in the same social class as they or a different social class. House and money criteria were given as class indices. Students who responded "the same social class" were categorized as being members of homogeneous class peer groups. Those who responded that their best school friends were from "higher, lower as well as the same social class" as theirs were categorized as being members of heterogeneous class peer groups. If, for example, a respondent had an objective working class status and he said that his best friends in school were members of the same social class as he, then for the purposes of this study, that school peer group will be considered to be of a generally homogeneous working class nature.

It is possible that there may be some systematic distortion in the respondent's perception of group homogeneity. However, research finding reported later in this paper appear to minimize the problem. We found, for example, that when we used a more objective indicator of class homogeneity in the school, the effects of the class atmosphere were similar to those reported for the peer group.

When we examine the relationship between class homogeneity-heterogeneity of peer groups and the attitude of working class respondents on the political variables discussed above, we find that homogeneous peer groups function to reinforce working class political norms and the existent political cleavage between the working class and other social classes.[17] On the other hand, working class students in heterogeneous class peer groups (hetpeers) appear to be resocialized in the direction of higher class political norms.[18] For hetpeers are less com-

[16] The questions were as follows:

"Do you think the rich should give up their privileges?"

"Should there be some upper limit, such as 10,000 pounds a year, on how much any one person can earn?"

[17] In each case working class students in homogeneous class peer groups assume an attitudinal position which is farther from that of the middle and upper classes than is the attitudinal position of the working class in general.

[18] The political differences found between working class students in homogeneous and heterogeneous peer groups is explained primarily as a function of the resocialization process in heterogeneous class peer groups. This difference might also be explained by a process of selection. Heterogeneous class peer groups may only select working class members who have the same values as they do or high I.Q. students may select or be co-opted into heterogeneous groups. However, this alternative explanation appears doubtful when the analogous influence of *school* class atmosphere is examined later in this paper. When using controlled selection, objective criteria of class atmo-

mitted to economic aggrandizement at the expense of political liberty (Gamma: +.37), more disposed towards fulfilling their voting obligation (+.40), and less intolerant of minority groups (+.44) than their classmates in homogeneous class peer groups (hompeers).[19]

Peer heterogeneity appears to have no effect upon the development of highly politicized students (Table 2). They are found in equal percentages both in homogeneous and heterogeneous peer groups. While the class environment of such intermediary socialization agencies as the peer group adds explanatory power to the movement from low to medium politicization among working class students, other variables must be sought—such as family and peer group politicization—to explain the development of high politicization.

Apparently interaction with higher class peers, who tend to be more suspicious of the charismatic tone of Jamaican politics and of alleged political corruption, has a "rationalizing" influence upon working class students. Working class hetpeers are less supportive and more ambivalent toward the political system than are hompeers (Table 2). This influence of the heterogeneous class peer group upon the legitimacy attitudes of the working class is effective despite the fact that it is contrary to the message in Jamaican "civics" textbooks which emphasize support. It suggests that the political information the respondent hears informally which represents "real" political attitudes is more significant in the socialization process than the formal education he receives. Wylie makes the same observation regarding informal vs. formal political socialization of French school children.[20]

Peer group class environment also has an effect on the economic attitudes of working class students. Students in heterogeneous class peer groups appear to move away from the more liberal attitudinal positions held by their classmates in homogeneous groups toward the more conservative economic orientations of the middle and upper classes. They are less inclined to respond that the rich should give up their privileges (+.48) or that earning limits should be established (+.37) than are hompeers.

TABLE 2. RELATION OF PEER CLASS ENVIRONMENT TO POLITICAL ATTITUDES AMONG WORKING CLASS STUDENTS

Peer Class Environment	Dependent Variable			
	Student Politicization*			
	% Low	% Medium	% High	N
Homogeneous	44	26	30	215
Heterogeneous	34	36	30	205
	System Legitimacy*			
	Support	Ambivalence	Opposition	N
	%	%	%	
Homogeneous	45	42	13	206
Heterogeneous	33	51	16	193

* See footnotes 13 and 15 for the items included in these tables.

Thus, we see throughout that heterogeneous class peer groups consistently function to resocialize the working class toward the level of politicization and political outlook of the higher social classes. On the other hand, the net effect of homogeneous class peer groups is to reinforce the political and economic culture of the working class.

II. THE SCHOOL

The school (like the peer group) may reinforce social and political class differences by the virtue of the fact that it is composed of students of the same social class. On the other hand, if students from various classes are assigned to a school, the resulting environment may promote the resocialization of working class students by grouping them with adolescents of higher social status.

In her study of selected midwestern schools in the United States, B. Neugarten found that lower class children and adolescents generally deferred to the higher status students in heterogeneous class schools by ascribing more favorable personality traits to them than to students of their own class.[21] Other research

sphere, and the same dependent variables, effects similar to those reported for the peer group are also found in the school.

[19] All references to hompeers and hetpeers are for working class students only. Middle-class hompeers and hetpeers are not discussed in this paper but will be subjects for later analysis.

[20] Lawrence Wylie, *Village in the Vaucluse*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper, 1964), pp. 207–209.

[21] Bernice L. Neugarten, "Social Class and Friendship Among School Children," *The American Sociological Review*, 51 (January, 1946), 305–313. In her study in Jonesville, Neugarten found students in heterogeneous class environments continued to defer to the perceived "favorable characteristics" of upper class students from elementary school through high school. While in the

indicates that students from the lower socio-economic classes who attend heterogeneous class schools have higher educational aspirations than those in more homogeneous school climates. The authors attribute the difference in aspirations at least in part to the dominant class character of the high school or grade cohort.[22] . . . .

In order to test our hypothesis, we ordered the schools in the Jamaican sample by their class environment. Schools categorized as "homogeneous" have a dominant working class environment and, for working class students, are the closest analog to homogeneous class peer groups. The school with the most balanced distribution of classes can be considered the closest analog to the environment of the heterogeneous class peer group.

In the determination of the class environment of the school the individual student is treated as a respondent whose class attributes (objective class of his parents) constitute a part of the total school class climate. This differs from the method used to determine peer class environment. In the latter case the respondent was used as an informant about the class homogeneity of the peer group.

When we examine the relationship between school class climate and the same political variables, a familiar pattern develops. Homogeneous class schools reinforce working class political norms and maintain the political cleavage between the working class and the other social classes. On the other hand, working class students in heterogeneous class schools appear to be resocialized in the direction of higher class political norms.[23] They are less inclined to forsake political liberty for personal gain (+.51); more disposed toward fulfilling their voting obligation (+.38); more tolerant of minority groups (+.40); more politicized (+.32); and less supportive and more ambivalent toward the political system than their counterparts in homogeneous schools (+.30).

School class environment appears to have little effect upon economic attitudes. It is possible that among the working class economic attitudes may be more "hard core" and resistant to change than the more esoteric political attitudes. This may be particularly true within the wider school environment where the pressures to conform and defer to higher class norms may not be as great as in the small face-to-face heterogeneous peer group. The rigidity with which these attitudes are held may vary between cultures. We might find adherence to economic aggrandizement less a part of the working class culture in more affluent societies. This will also depend, of course, on the visibility of class differences in the society.

The Peer Group and School Environment:


The interaction between the wider school environment and the socializing process within the peer group pose intriguing questions and manifest the need for further research. To what degree, for example, has the school class

higher grades in secondary school there was no tendency to defer to lower class students and deference to higher status students was still clearly operative, adolescents were increasingly disposed to defer horizontally in more complex ways. In other words, being the student council president or the captain of the football team might make one equally if not more subject to deference as being from an upper class family. However, as Mary C. Jones has so cogently observed, higher social status is strongly associated with access to prestigeous student offices in the high school: Bernice L. Neugarten, "Democracy of Childhood," in William Lloyd Warner, *et al.* (eds.), *Democracy in Jonesville* (New York: Harper, 1949), chapter 5; and Mary C. Jones, "A Study of Socialization Patterns at the High School Level," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, 93 (September, 1958), 87–111.

[22] Alan B. Wilson, "Residential Segregation of Social Classes and Aspirations of High School Boys," *American Sociological Review*, 24 (December, 1959), 836–845; and John Michael, "High School Climates and Plans for Entering College," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 25 (Winter, 1961), 583–595.

[23] It is possible, of course, that differences found between working class students in homogeneous and heterogeneous class schools could be due to selection rather than the operation of different school environments. In other words, working class students with the attitudinal syndrome found among working class students in heterogeneous class schools may actually seek out the more heterogeneous class schools to matriculate. Fortunately, the Jamaican Ministry of Education was able to provide information on this matter. Due to its local school policy, there is no evidence that differences in political attitudes between working class students in homogeneous-heterogeneous class schools is due to any significant degree to selection rather than the socializing influences of the school class environment. For an expanded discussion of this point see: Kenneth P. Langton, *Civic Attitudes of Jamaican High School Students*, Cooperative Research Project, United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1965, p. 198.

FIG. 1. The cumulative effect of heterogeneous class environment in peer groups and schools among working class students*



* This figure represents the mean difference between the positions taken by hompeers in homogeneous class schools and hetpeers in homogeneous and heterogeneous class schools on the seven previously discussed variables. The position of hompeers in homogeneous class schools provides the base line.

environment outside the peer group contributed to the reported differential influence of peer class environment upon political socialization? Do we still find the reported effect of different peer class environments within schools with relatively homogeneous class environments?

Does the heterogeneous class environment of both the peer group and school have a cumulative effect upon the resocialization of the working class? Based on previous findings, we might predict that working class hetpeers in heterogeneous class schools will be the farthest removed from the political culture of their class.

In Figure 1 we see evidence that the heterogeneous class climate of the peer group and school is indeed cumulative. There is a mean linear change in the predicted direction between the positions taken by hompeers in homogeneous class schools and hetpeers in homogeneous and heterogeneous class schools on all seven of the previously discussed variables. The cumulative direction of change is consistently toward the political culture of the higher classes. The mean difference between the position of hompeers in homogeneous class schools and hetpeers in heterogeneous class schools is 21 percent.

It is also evident that the impact of the peer group appears to be independent of the broader class environment within the school. When school class homogeneity is controlled, heterogeneous class peer groups still appear to play a significant role in resocializing working class students in the direction of higher class political norms.

Finally, it seems obvious that to compare the political culture of an undifferentiated working class with that of higher classes tends to underestimate the political cleavages in the society. For the cleavage between the political culture of hompeers in homogeneous class schools and the higher classes is much greater.[24] It is also very likely that this differentiation will increase as the respondents pass into the early years of adulthood.

III. SCHOOL CLASS CLIMATE AND THE POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION PROCESS IN THE UNITED STATES

Other than the suggestive literature discussed above, there appear to be no empirical studies of the effect of peer group or school class climate upon the political socialization process in the United States. However, in 1964 a study was conducted in Detroit, Michigan, of school children's reaction to the assassination of President Kennedy. Secondary analysis of the data from this sample of 1349 students may illuminate the potential influence of school class environment upon politically relevant

[24] The mean difference between the positions taken by the undifferentiated working class and working class hompeers in homogeneous class schools on the seven variables is 9.7 percent, with the latter group consistently taking a position farthest removed from that of the higher classes.

variables. Two questions in the survey dealt with the denial of Oswald's civil rights, another attempted to ascertain children's idealization of the President. An analysis of the data reveals an inverse correlation between social class and propensity to deny Oswald his civil rights (Gamma: −.40), (−.44).[25] Working class students are more likely than middle or upper class students to be "glad" that Oswald was killed by Ruby and to want to see President Kennedy's murderer "shot or beat up." Working class students are also more likely to idealize the role of the President and to feel that all American Presidents have "done their job well" than are middle or upper class students (+.38).

In order to examine the impact of school class environment upon these attitudes among working class students, the schools in the Detroit study were ordered by their objective class environment as were the schools in the Jamaican study.[26]

When we examine the relationship between school class climate and these three variables in Detroit we see what is becoming a consistent pattern. Heterogeneous class schools appear to be resocializing working class students in the direction of higher class political norms: working class students in heterogeneous class schools are less inclined to deny Oswald his civil rights (+.44, +.37) than are those in more homogeneous environments. Interestingly enough, they also take a less benevolent view of the Presidency (+.36)—a finding not incompatible with the greater political cynicism found among working class Jamaicans in heterogeneous class schools.

IV. CONCLUSION

Throughout this paper we have seen that working class students in heterogeneous class schools and peer groups consistently differ in the same direction from their counterparts in homogeneous class environments. If, as seems to be the case, peer groups and schools are important agencies of change, then the question many educators and students of politics may ask is as follows: How can we take advantage of students' potentialities for change—and of the power of peer and school environment to induce change—in such ways that change will most probably occur in the direction of our educational, social, and political objectives?

The social scientist would suggest on the basis of the preceding discussion and findings that there is a potential for introducing "modernizing" norms to the lower classes via heterogeneous class environments. He might also point out that the organization of vocational and technical schools for the working class, as is being done in many less industrialized countries, may reinforce existent political-culture cleavages within the society. However, the results of this study indicate that any manipulation of peer grouping or class environment within schools should be preceded by a careful survey of one's objectives and an analysis of the political culture of the different social classes. For we found that working class students in a heterogeneous class environment not only are more politicized, have more "democratic" attitudes, give greater support to civil liberties, and have more positive orientations toward voting; they are also more economically conservative. Equally, if not more important, in a culture where the higher classes tend to be more politically alienated (Jamaica), working class students in heterogeneous class environments are more ambivalent and less supportive of the political system than those in more homogeneous class climates.

This means that the existence of potential system "pathologies" in the form of political class cleavages may be less threatening to long run stability than the resocializing effect of heterogeneous class school and peer environments. For while this process may reduce class cleavages, it creates an enlarged category of students who are not only more politicized but also less supportive of the political system—certainly a potentially dangerous output in national political systems in their early stages of development.

However, the problems which the socializing function of different peer group and school environments may create for the political system does not mean that the planner must seek to enable the lower classes to live comfortably with their "inferior" social and cultural status à la Huxley. What it does mean is that the creation of heterogeneous class socializing environments to promote the stability of democratic political systems will be maximized when the higher classes are generally supportive of the political system.

[25] Respondents' social class is based upon their father's occupation.

[26] Because of the reduced N resulting from the class control, it was necessary to include both primary and secondary schools in the index (i.e., grades 4, 6, 8, 10, 12). This may diminish the reported effect of school class climate to the extent that status consciousness is a corollary of the maturation process. See Harvey and Rutherford, *op. cit.*

COMMUNICATIONS

TO THE EDITOR:

"The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," which appeared in the March 1967 issue, is the sixth article on childhood political socialization I have seen by David Easton and his colleagues. Apparently more articles will come. The concluding page argues the need for comparative research, clearing the way for studies on childhood political socialization in Europe, South America, Asia, Africa, and a practically inexhaustible list of combinations. It would seem to be a good time to evaluate the promise of this research.

The initial finding—the culmination of some seven years of work—states that "an attitude structure has begun to take shape among the children in their early years." Would an adult sensitive to his own development conclude differently? Were he unable to recall his early years, it should be sufficient to watch his own children, nieces, nephews, etc., grow in political awareness. An amnesic hermit listening to Art Linkletter would know as much. The early formation of an attitude structure toward government was covered long ago in the commonplace notion of citizenship training.

The other "findings," despite their grounding in data and quantification, do not seem to be contributions to political science. It was found that the trend from grade 3 to grade 8 is in the "direction of a development of a higher sense of political efficacy in these years." The unsophisticated Man from Missouri might say "the older the child, the more he picks up about politics." The third finding is also circumlocutory: "the resources in political communication that the child has are especially likely to affect such acquisitions as political efficacy" (Man from Missouri: "the child picks up more about politics the more there is to pick up"). Quantification of common sense notions can have value, but it does no good to marshal data for tautologies. This is evident for the fourth finding: "the child who has greater intellectual abilities—as measured by I.Q. tests—is more likely to acquire the norm early and maintain thereafter a greater positive feeling towards it" (in less elliptical language: "the smarter the child, the more he picks up"; and conversely: "the more he picks up, the smarter he is.")

Studies along this line remind me of Arnold Brecht's description of social scientists who delve into biology, psychology, and psychoanalysis. "Instead of asking which evaluations are valid they examine how people came to their evaluations, beginning from inheritance and childhood impressions and repressions, and leading up to the influences exercised by advertising, propaganda, and other mass manipulations"—the eighth of ten professional escapes from the crisis of twentieth-century political science.

LOUIS FISHER, JR.

Queens College

TO THE EDITOR:

Mr. Fisher seems to be taking the occasion of our article to join a long line of predecessors in accusing contemporary political science of two mortal sins: that it produces nothing that was not already known (or readily knowable, although the distinction is not clear); and that as a profession we seem to be incapable of searching out "valid evaluations" (about what, is not clear) rather than descriptive explanations.

We do not know Mr. Fisher but we do wish him well in any long-range efforts to assess the adequacy and direction of contemporary political research. But in place of these two well-worn issues, we would have thought it might have been more helpful for him to address himself to some of the fundamental assumptions which have helped to keep these issues alive. He could have raised questions as to whether human behavior can ever be subject to rigorous investigation, whether measurement automatically squeezes out the most important facets of political life, whether there is a mystique of numbers and rigor that cripples insight, whether excessive concern for precision destroys the capacity to deal with the ambiguities of human relationships, or whether evaluations can be validated rather than only warranted. But since Mr. Fisher has chosen to pass over basic issues such as these and to direct our attention to effects rather than causes, we have no alternative, in so brief an exchange, but to follow his lead.

On the matter of novelty, it may well be true that what we have discovered in this one small area of our research—about political efficacy in childhood—might easily have been derived from common sense (introspection, radio commentators, hermits, or Men from Missouri, in Mr. Fisher's terms). But even in discussions with the few hermits we were successful in flushing out from among our friends—and enemies—they apparently were reluctant to share their run-of-the-mill insights

with us. Not once did they or their writings reveal to us the possibility that the norm of political efficacy takes root during childhood and that this may have an important bearing on the linkage between members of a system and their regime. Lacking any clue from those who presumably knew it so easily all along, we were forced to do it the hard way and to think the matter out for ourselves using the kind of theoretical framework and related research described in our article.

If our introspective colleagues would only lend us their wisdom and tell us what they know before we publish rather than come along afterwards and protest that they knew it all along, they would surely be hailed by one and all for saving the country some money and their colleagues an enormous amount of time. Since we will have lots more to say about a variety of matters on political socialization in a forthcoming book, it would be most helpful and a sign of true scholarly comradeship to let us have the readily available, self-evident information now, not after we have finished our labors.

As for the Man from Missouri, Mr. Fisher describes him as "unsophisticated." Regretfully, we agree. In no instance are his generalizations really equivalent to those of ours that he intends to paraphrase in some way. His generalizations are far more general and unrestricted as to subject matter and in some instances they are so vague as to be practically useless for understanding what really happens. They demonstrate remarkably well most of the shortcomings of unadorned and untested insights.

In our article the explanations are restricted to a defined attitude structure, which we call political efficacy, and to certain specific variables such as age, I.Q., and sex. Universal generalizations of the kind Mr. Fisher makes in the third paragraph of his letter are extremely vulnerable; they are seldom true under any and all circumstances or for all areas of behavior, as his formulation implies. The useful and rewarding thing for the student is to be able to specify the conditions and subject matters about which such generalizations do hold. In suggesting that age, intelligence, and sex are related not to anything and everything political in childhood, but to a specified norm, in a particular way, and for plausible reasons, we hope that we have made a not-insignificant contribution to the understanding of political socialization.

On the matter of moral evaluations, it is not clear at what or whom his Parthian shaft is directed and we would encourage him to clarify his thinking here. If he intends to scold political science for substituting description for evaluation, he may indeed have been cohabiting too long with those "amnesic hermits" with whom he contrasts us so unfavorably. In all humility we invite our colleague to join us in the modern world and to familiarize himself with political science in the sixties. He will discover that large numbers from our profession have been involved with one or another of the most critical social issues of our day: civil rights, poverty, Vietnam, China policy, the computer revolution, reform of education at all levels, and government support of research, to mention only a very few. Historically and currently political scientists have seldom been too bashful to pass judgment on policy concerns and to publicize their views. On our scale of values, we feel this is as it should be. Repeated accusations to the contrary, large numbers of political scientists are indeed engaged in moral evaluations.

But if Mr. Fisher is suggesting that *all* political scientists devote *all* their energies and time to seeking the moral bases of solutions to the obviously critical issues of our day, we have a more debatable problem. Rational strategy might well dictate otherwise. It is worth considering, surely, whether some proportion of our resources, varying with the historical period, should not be spent on the long run just in the event that we are not all dead. Indeed, there is reason to believe from the experience of all science that unless some minimal level of pure research is maintained, the social sciences may well reach a point at which they exhaust the fund of knowledge borrowed from the past and are able to pass on little to the future. At that point society might face a far greater danger than that occasioned even today by the withdrawal of some resources—human, financial and organizational—from admittedly urgent policy matters and related moral concerns.

In time, we feel secure, Mr. Fisher will come to appreciate more fully the significance of the debates of the last decades about the appropriate balance among pure, applied and policy research, and between empirical and ethical inquiry. As he does, we cannot help but hope that he will share with us the conviction that there is little basis for anyone seeking to commit as broad and varied a discipline as political science to any one pattern of concerns. He may join us in hoping that such an intention, and the unedifying asperity that often accompanies it, belong with the snows of yesteryear.

In any event, in the meanwhile we wish to reassure him that the effort in our research to understand something about the origins of support for the structure of authority ought not

to mislead him into believing that we are likely to leave to others, who at times may be less well informed about socialization than we, the sole responsibility for offering "valid" evaluations in relevant areas.

DAVID EASTON
University of Chicago
JACK DENNIS
University of Wisconsin

TO THE EDITOR:

In "The Paradox of Voting—A Possible Method of Calculation,"[1] Campbell and Tullock call attention to Georges Th. Guilbaud's work[2] on the probability of cyclical majorities. M. Guilbaud presented, without proof, the probabilities of the voting paradox with three alternatives and three, five, and nine individuals, as well as the limiting value of the series as the number of voters approaches infinity. On the basis of their own simulation work, Campbell and Tullock suggest that "Guilbaud may have opened an important new channel of investigation, or he may have made a mistake."[3]

Although it is impossible to determine how Guilbaud obtained his results, we have independently confirmed them. The exact probabilities for three, five, seven, and nine were easily obtained in a total of less than one full second with a short computer program testing all possible combinations of individuals among the six possible rank orders. These results are compared in Table 1 with Guilbaud's results as well as the simulation results of Klahr[4] and Campbell and Tullock.[5] Clearly Guilbaud's values are correct (except for one minor discrepancy which is probably due to rounding error) and Klahr's simulation yielded approximations which are highly accurate. Campbell and Tullock's own values consistently overstate the likelihood of the paradox.

In the limit the probability of an intransitivity with three alternatives is .0877, as Guilbaud states.[6] Furthermore this limiting value is approached rapidly, the exact probability being .0832 with 19 individuals, .0848 with 29, .0860 with 49, and .0863 with 59. Indeed the number of individuals is basically irrelevant, except when it is very small.

TABLE 1. PROBABILITY OF THE PARADOX OF VOTING WITH THREE ALTERNATIVES.*

Number of Voters	Exact Values	Guilbaud	Klahr	Campbell & Tullock
3	.0556**	.056	.0556	.057
5	.0694	.070	.07	.078
7	.0750	—	.08	.084
9	.0780	.078	—	.089

* These calculations are based on the assumption that all possible rank orders are equally likely.

** The exact values have been rounded to four decimal places. Except for one of Klahr's figures (which was an exact calculation), the other values are rounded by their authors to two or three decimal places.

We have also generalized these results to permit unequal probabilities to be assigned to the rank orders. For example, if the initial probabilities for the six possible rank orders are $ABC = ACB = BCA = CBA = \frac{1}{8}$, $CAB = BAC = \frac{1}{4}$, the probability of a voting cycle is .0833. In this example the probability is very close to that for equally likely rank orders. However, this is not always true, and the probability of an intransitivity can range from zero to unity as the initial probability assumptions are varied.

Our general solution extends to the case of more than three alternatives, and we have calculated values for the probability of the paradox for up to 49 alternatives assuming equally likely rank orders. A cycle is virtually certain with more than ten individuals and with as few as five alternatives the probability that no alternative commands a majority over all of the others is one-fourth.

Although these mathematical results still require empirical interpretation, important new channels of investigation are indeed being opened.

RICHARD G. NIEMI
University of Rochester
HERBERT F. WEISBERG
University of Michigan

[1] This REVIEW, 60 (1966), 684–685.

[2] "Les Théories de l'Intérêt Général et le Problème Logique de l'Agrégation," *Economie Appliquée*, 5 (1952), 501–584.

[3] *Op. cit.*, p. 685.

[4] David Klahr, "A Computer Simulation of the Paradox of Voting," this REVIEW, 60 (1966), 384–390.

[5] Colin D. Campbell and Gordon Tullock, "A Measure of the Importance of Cyclical Majorities," *The Economic Journal*, 75 (1965), 853–857.

[6] Guilbaud's formula for this limit—$1-[3/\pi][\text{Arc cos}(1/\sqrt{3})]$—can be derived from our general solution, which is given in our "A Mathematical Solution for the Probability of the Paradox of Voting," unpublished paper, October, 1966.

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

Schubert, The Judicial Mind: Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946–1963. *Schubert*, Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research. ALAN F. WESTIN 763
Fenno, The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress. JAMES A. ROBINSON 764
Schelling, Arms and Influence. LAURENCE W. MARTIN 766
Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States. KENNETH PREWITT 767
Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. GABRIEL A. ALMOND 768
Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury. *LaFave*, Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody. *Newman*, Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial. WILLIAM BEANEY 770
Loewenberg, Parliament in the German Political System. CHARLES R. FOSTER 771
Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam. JOHN T. MCALISTER, JR. 773
de Grazia et al., Congress: The First Branch of Government. *Cleveland*, We Propose: A Modern Congress. *Davidson*, Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform. NICHOLAS A. MASTERS 775
Matthews and Prothro, Negros and the New Southern Politics. HUGH DOUGLAS PRICE 779

BOOK NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY 780
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 793
COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 810
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION 833

BOOK REVIEWS

The Judicial Mind: Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946–1963. GLENDON R. SCHUBERT. (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1965. Pp. 288, index. $10.00.)

Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research. GLENDON R. SCHUBERT. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1964. Pp. 587, index.)

Can political scientists interested in the American judicial system find profitable insights in Glendon Schubert's work even though most readers will never have rotated factorial reference axes and will not comprehend such telling arguments as

$$\pi_b = \frac{S}{[\frac{1}{2}n(n-1) - T]^{1/2}[\frac{1}{2}n(n-1) - U]^{1/2}}?$$

Since I find the answer to be "yes," this review provides an opportunity to rise in the fraternal meeting hall and testify to why (and in what context) I hold this belief.

It is generally accepted in the profession that political scientists interested in courts and law have divided into three main competing schools in the past two or three decades. The public law school, the oldest and most traditional, continues to concentrate on the formal decisions of courts, analyzing the logic and legal consistency of opinions, discussing their wisdom as public policy, probing the implications of various decisions for the court's institutional power position, and assessing the "proper place" of courts in the American political system. The second approach, legal or judicial process, treats trials, courts, and law as an extension of politics by other means. Using group theory, case studies, and other "process" techniques, this approach attempts to identify the significant actors in the legal process, chart their influences, and identify the key variables, largely external, that lie behind formal logic and opinion-justifications.

Finally, there is the "behavioral" approach, which has often been divided into two camps. One wing is primarily interested in applying insights from anthropology, social psychology, sociology, and psychiatry to develop more scientific theories of personal motivation among individual judges and of small-group interaction during the collegial decision-making process. A second wing of behaviorists is attracted to mathematical analysis of judicial rulings, utilizing such techniques as multiple factor analysis and cumulative scaling to identify certain significant patterns in the flow of a tribunal's decisions that do not appear to general or even specialist observers of the raw data. A few behaviorists, notably Schubert, combine the psychological-sociological and mathematical approaches, in an effort to construct a comprehensive and reproducible model of how and why judges make their decisions.

Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research is a beautifully wrought collection of 36 pieces displaying samples of both behavioral approaches. The selections include historical as well as contemporary commentators, which make available to readers such early challengers of the public-law tradition as Charles Groves Haines, Benjamin N. Cardozo, Jerome Frank, and Harold D. Lasswell. The five general sections of the volume are divided into "Jurisprudence and Judicial Behavior," "Cultural Anthropology and Judicial Systems," "Political Sociology and Judicial Attributes," "Social Psychology and Judicial Attitudes," and "Mathematical Prediction of Judicial Behavior."

Since it is difficult to react effectively to 36 different pieces of work, some of which are relatively modest additions to the legal process approach and others are radically innovative interpretations of courts and law, I have several general observations to make about the volume as a whole. First, the excellent essays of the editor and the breadth of the selections make this not only a fine history of behavioral approaches to law but also an enlightening opportunity to the reader to see just where along the behavioral continuum he may want to get off—at the sociological stop, the psychological, the mathematical, etc. Second, the publication of this book may well symbolize the end of an era within the political science profession, the period of harsh denunciation of behavioral analysis as without value for the understanding of the legal process. Philip Selznick remarked recently that a similar battle is now over among sociologists. The "young turk" sociologists of the 1940's have reached their 40's, and approaches that seemed "outrageously wild" to their seniors have now been solidly institutionalized in books to be cited as "part of the discipline," a sub-group to meet together at professional meetings, and youthful disciples to place in good jobs and carry on the true work. This seems to me to be what has happened with behavioral analysis

of the legal process. If Schubert still has a tendency to froth at his traditionalist critics more than necessary (he can be quite lucid when his controls are on), there will be less apologetics and more straight-forward presentation in the new generation.

One other point about *Judicial Behavior* may be worth noting. Most of the political analysis represented in the book (and many of the selections I found most useful) were written by scholars such as Schubert, Murphy, Krislov, Schmidhauser, Tannenhaus, etc., who had displayed a firm command of the public law and process approaches in their writing before they experimented with behavioral theories. Some of the worst of the early mathematical analysis of Supreme Court opinions suffered from just the lack of basic sophistication about courts and law that failed to save the authors from glaring errors of judgment in their adaptation of mathematical techniques. There is a notion in science that too much traditional knowledge can hinder great theoretical breakthroughs, by imprisoning the mind in conventional categories. Whatever the value of this observation in other cases, I doubt whether ignorance of what courts do will ever be an asset to behavioral analysts. Thus the movement of first-rate public law and process specialists from the normative "what" and descriptive "how" to the behavioral "why" can only be a great strength to the new inquiries.

The Judicial Mind is Schubert's own work, a study of 18 Supreme Court Justices who served between 1946 and 1963. Schubert first identifies a set of attitudes and ideologies for Supreme Court Justices, based on value-analysis work by social-psychologists. He then postulates a relation between these attitudes and ideologies and the stimuli presented to the Supreme Court by policy-laden cases, this portion of Schubert's theory resting on the stimulus-response work of psychologists such as Eysenck. To measure the effects of the stimuli on attitudes and ideologies, Schubert adapts factorial and scaling techniques to the specific conditions of the Supreme Court milieu, developing a series of scales as to liberalism-conservatism, pragmatism-dogmatism, political and economic issues, etc., and a special technique for applying these to a data pool consisting of all cases in which the Supreme Court divided on the merits between 1946 and 1963.

Schubert's substantive findings and his judgments about the theoretical implications of his work are spelled out in a final chapter and cannot be summarized easily here. His findings about the reasons for the Supreme Court's relative consistency as an institution and the patterns of liberalism and conservatism among the Justices as individuals made great sense, which is, I suppose, the irritating but genuine tribute a non-behaviorist pays to his science-oriented colleagues. What I found most useful, however, was a point that Schubert did not make explicitly in his book but seemed to me one of the major contributions of his volume. Among both public law and process analysts, one of the most bruising and important struggles of interpretation is over which Supreme Court cases "really matter" in the 150–200 that the Justices decide each year on their merits. The debates here are over the relative weight of leading cases to lesser rulings, and the relations of earlier to later cases in the development of a line of case precedents in a particular substantive area. Much of the contest about the Court's direction and individual relationships turns on which cases are emphasized and which points within the cases are taken to be important, with no neutral umpires to set down general rules of weighting.

I am sure that such content analysis will go on in the future, and ought to do so. But the value of Schubert's work, I submit, is that his analysis of all the decisions on the merits over almost two decades, with both politically and psychologically shrewd categories for manipulation, provides the best control I know for the artistic analyses of the public law and process practitioners. Thus, while I do not expect to shift my own writing about courts and law to the social-psychological vocabulary and the formidable mathematical operations that Schubert applies, I believe that any work on courts and law by political scientists in the future should be aware of Schubert's findings, and any departures from his findings ought to be justified with analysis rather than brandished with glee.

ALAN F. WESTIN
Columbia University

The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress. By RICHARD F. FENNO, JR. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966. Pp. xxix, 704. $8.75.)

At the 1961 APSA meeting in St. Louis, Richard Fenno unveiled, for the first time I believe, his perspectives on Congressional appropriations processes. That paper, "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System," almost immediately attained the status of a classic. Its adaptation of Parsons' "structural-functional" analysis together with its emphasis on factors that "integrate" a committee continuously operating in conflict

captured the attention of editors of anthologies on American government, legislative processes, and political behavior. Moreover, other research workers in the congressional vineyards began to cast or recast their committee studies in the light of Fenno's concepts and hypotheses. While the original paper was winning notice and sparking new research, Fenno painstakingly continued a large, comprehensive inquiry into appropriations politics in Congress. This massive book is the admirable product.

Fenno explicitly uses the concepts of a *political system* with identifiable *internal* mechanisms, operating in an *external environment*, tending to *stabilize* both its internal and external relations. The Appropriations Committees constitute systems; their internal problems are *making decisions* and *integrating* themselves; their external problems revolve principally around *adapting* to their political environment. The materials that flesh out this conceptual skeleton are the *normative expectations* (perceptions and attitudes) of the participants in the system and their *behavior*. Norms imply expectations about how an occupant of a position should perform, and clusters of norms define *roles*. These constitute the basic elements of a system's internal relationships. *Role behavior* designates how in fact roles are performed. External relations are described according to *goal expectations* (*what* others think the system should do) and maintenance expectations (*how* others think the system should execute its goals). This conceptual apparatus, as the footnotes acknowledge, amalgamates ideas from Homans, Parsons, Easton, Wahlke-Eulau, and the other political sociologists who have introduced *systems*, *structures*, and *functions* to social analysis.

How shall we appraise this use of a systems orientation? I venture to say that this is one of the most data-rich applications of systems analysis in print, perhaps even in progress. The scheme is not merely illustrated. It is used to arrange, order, and organize extensive and intensive material from many sources. Fenno has marshalled volumes of *Congressional Records*, hearings, reports, and assorted documents. He has collected and analyzed budgetary information from 36 agencies representing 7 cabinet departments. Appropriations requests were compared with 5 decision stage outcomes in Congress for 16 years, from 1947–1962. These 576 appropriation case histories were supplemented with 175 interviews taken during the six years from 1959–1965. Thanks to Fenno's concern for both process and outcome he selected and analyzed data that reveal how process affects the content of decisions. Consequently, Fenno has avoided one of the criticisms he rightly makes of many studies: "Too often in legislative research, we describe the process of decision-making in great detail yet cannot relate process to outcome—because we simply cannot describe the decisions that result" (p. xxviii).

This conception together with the author's prodigious research confirms some of the lore about Congressional politics and revises our images about other bits of lore. First an example of the former: we have thought for some time that the integration of the House Committee on Appropriations depended heavily on its specialization, and that its specialized subcommittees respected each other's independence to the extent that the effective locus of decision is in subcommittees, not the full committee. That is fully documented, and the effect is also well elaborated: the price of *Committee integration* is the *absence of an integrated comprehensive legislative appropriations* process. Now an example of the "obvious" image that has been found unsupported by data: ". . . the data fail to confirm Gilbert Steiner's conclusion (based on his study of five appropriation bills—one in 1928, two in 1929, one in 1933 and one in 1943) that 'House influence was predominant' and 'outweighed' that of the Senate in the area of appropriations . . . the data establish presumptive evidence that Senate, not House conferees are the more influential in appropriations conferences" (p. 664).

The system orientation has, thus, been used to organize materials, even to suggest questions for Fenno. But as a "theory" I still find it barren of hypotheses. It is primarily inductive; it provides "boxes" of variables to be filled with data, but it doesn't specify or predict the relations one expects to find among the variables. This is an honored way of proceeding with research, especially for research on institutions. But as our concerns broaden for the study of systems and processes, I think more than personal style will justify increasing efforts at formal, deductive theories and models. I doubt that systems theory and structural-functional analysis will have the predictive, as distinguished from postdictive or historical, values of such models as Downs' and Riker's. While Fenno has told us a great deal about the power of the purse, he has not enlarged our understanding of theories of social systems and decision processes in general. That this was not his objective absolves him from criticism but it does not save the systems orientation from the criticism.

I conclude with one note of regret. This book may be too big, too much, more than most

of us want or need to know. Its bulk consists in extensive quotations from interviews with Congressmen and from hearings and debates. These materials, especially the interview notes, lend verve and give one a "feel" for the politics of money, but they have limited probative value. The length they add will, I fear, put the book beyond the reach of the mass market of undergraduates and the interested laymen in Washington and elsewhere. Scholars and graduate students will, of course, use it, and the multiplier effect for research will no doubt operate. But dissemination of the results of hard work and imagination will, nevertheless, be reduced. It would be unfortunate if this case of academic overkill should be consigned to the status of an unread classic, often cited, rarely read. Maybe that fate can be partially forestalled if this work receives The Woodrow Wilson Prize for the best book on American politics in 1966. If it is in order, I nominate *The Power of the Purse* for that award.

JAMES A. ROBINSON
The Ohio State University

Arms and Influence. By THOMAS C. SCHELLING. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 293. $7.50.)

Upon first looking into this book those who have read a good deal of Professor Schelling's earlier work may feel it is all very familiar stuff. To some extent this is true, for Professor Schelling's greatest contribution to strategic studies has been the evolution of a personal and now well-known style of inquiry characterized by the capacity to cut through complex policies or doctrines to the essential relationships below so as to describe them in common sense, down to earth, but none the less subtle terms.

Because mere exposure to Professor Schelling's style makes such a lasting impression, it is easy to overlook the changing content to which he applies it. His penchant for reducing things to simple elements frequently brings down on his head the charge of attributing to states and men a clarity of mind, rationality of purpose and consistency of conduct which they rarely attain in reality. This criticism would frequently be justified if we were to read his work as history or as prescription for policy. But while he is ready to comment on particular policies in an illustrative way, Professor Schelling does nothing to suggest he intends us to take his rules and patterns and apply them directly to life. Rather, he teaches us a set of analytical questions with which to cut through our own vagueness and stereotypes so as to arrive at better solutions to our own problems. His great contribution is not so much what he has to say, as his way of saying it; not so much his answers as his questions.

That is not to say that his answers are never interesting or valuable. The present book applies his method to a variety of important problems. Thus he deals with "coercive diplomacy": the art, which he suggests is an lod one, of using the threat and application of force for bargaining purposes; with the ways a state may advertise its commitment to objectives so as to impress, dismay and deter opponents; with limited war, strategic war, and how to stabilize the military balance and control the arms race, though on the latter question he has written more fully elsewhere. Insofar as the book has a common theme it seems to be that the nature of modern military force has made it increasingly difficult to employ it to secure political objectives forcibly and hence has made it all the more important to know how to use it persuasively, to influence opponents to concede the issue out of fear of the consequences of continued resistance, rather than out of sheer exhaustion. Such a use of military power can obviously occur without, as well as by way of, actual hostilities. Thus the traditionally cited purpose of military strategy, that of "imposing one's will on the enemy," which in the past frequently meant completely destroying his capacity to resist, has to be replaced by much more subtle analysis and management in a new kind of military diplomacy.

Perhaps the most interesting of his chapters is on "the manipulation of risk," in which the author tries to show in some detail how one may use the danger that things may get out of hand to make effective threats which would be incredible in cold blood because their implementation would be disastrous for the instigator of them. "There is," writes Professor Schelling, "just no foreseeable route by which the United States and the Soviet Union could become engaged in a major nuclear war. This does not mean that a major nuclear war cannot occur. It only means that if it occurs it will result from a process that is not entirely foreseen." This is an important contribution to understanding how our present paradoxical strategic balance works; it is also a very disturbing illustration of the dangers of our strategic environment and it would be very wrong, though by no means impossible, for a reader to deceive himself into believing that Professor Schelling's analysis of the way in which risk can be rationally used as an instrument of policy somehow takes the dangers out of such brinkmanship.

This is one of the points at which Professor

Schelling's cool analysis and sometimes eccentric imagination incur the danger of being taken, either to the detriment of his reputation or to the confusion of the unwary reader, as an endorsement of the present strategic world as a pleasant and enjoyable state of affairs. This would be unfair, for he sets out to illuminate problems rather than prescribe solutions. Nevertheless one suspects Professor Schelling entertains little hope of our moving to a very different kind of world. He is, however, willing to suggest ways in which the present one can be made a little safer and makes a practical contribution by attacking some of the probable strategic problems of the future, as in the consideration of what will be involved in deterring or even fighting China. Whether or not we like the practical trend of Professor Schelling's thought on such topics, the clarity with which he advances his arguments sets our minds to work anticipating just a little more clearly what the future holds.

There is plenty in this book that is arguable, some that seems familiar, and a little that almost seems to embrace the unconventional twist for its own sake. But it is well worth reading and there will be few who do so that do not find an idea or line of inquiry emerging in their own later thinking that owes its inspiration to Professor Schelling's lively analysis.

LAURENCE W. MARTIN
University College of Wales

Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States. By JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966. Pp. xv, 226. $6.00.)

In introducing an "ambition theory of politics" Professor Schlesinger argues that incumbent office-holders guide their behavior more by where they want to get than by how they got where they are. Ambition theory asserts that the politician's "behavior is a response to his office goals." Although not an original theme in career analysis—more than three decades ago Lasswell informed us that the sense of where one is going, or wants to be going, affects current behavior—in Schlesinger's hands this idea takes on new meaning. He suggests that the ambitions of the politician are linked to the opportunities he faces. Incumbency in one post will foster ambitions while incumbency in another will dampen them. Put differently, political ambitions are not free floating. The sense of advantage, or being treated as if one is advantaged, will generate political aspirations. Incumbents of certain offices or from particular regions or who have followed appropriate career paths have a disproportionate advantage in seeking more advanced offices.

The logic of his argument leads Schlesinger to a second theme. If there are differential career oportunities assigned to different political positions, might not there be a general "opportunity structure" of some kind? The author collects and ingeniously presents a wealth of career data bearing on this question. He begins by taking the term *structure* seriously and is immediately led to ask about its shape and size. The *size* of the opportunity structure consists of the "number of offices available and the frequency with which new men attain them"—aggregate tenure and turnover data are used as indicators. The *shape* of the opportunity structure derives from the career paths along which men typically advance in politics—aggregating individual career patterns provides the indicator. Any political unit, from a village to a multi-national body, will have an opportunity structure.

With considerable imagination and ingenuity, Schlesinger draws on data about statewide and national office holders (usually aggregating data from 1914 to 1958) to depict the U. S. political opportunity structure. His findings fall into two categories, those pertinent to the internalities of the recruitment structure and those which show how the structure is articulated with the party system. Examples of the former include his analysis of differences and similarities in the lines of promotion characterizing appointive and elective office; his identification of transitory offices and offices characterized by long tenure; his report of state and regional variations. Although some of his empirical generalizations are well-known, others are much less so, and never have any of them been buttressed with such conclusive evidence.

In examining the nexus between the opportunity structure and the party system, Schlesinger first reports that political chances are not solely determined by party competition. This permits him to analyze the independent effects of competition and opportunity structure on other variables. In this connection his most significant argument is that the party system and the opportunity structure operate on each other in such a way as to create a distinctly national party organization. The flow of political careers is upward, from the state to the national system. He links this to ambition theory by suggesting that the visions incumbents hold of their future, their office goals, give to political life a national perspective.

This argument is presented as a counter to the "localists" bias of much party theory.

Schlesinger's effort will be of major interest to students of political recruitment, of the American party system, and of comparative state politics. The book is not, however, free of faults. Some of the problems were beyond the control of the author. For instance, aggregating career patterns across four decades of American political life smothers important historical variations. However, such aggregation was necessary to solve the "n" problem. Other weaknesses, it seems to me, are rooted more in faulty theorizing than data difficulties.

Schlesinger's "ambition theory" and his evidence on the opportunity structure meet only in the *assumptions* he makes. Data and theory do not conjoin in the analysis itself. His theory is psycho-political; it makes assertions about the effect of aspirations on behavior. But the data permit no direct inferences about such assertions. Attitudinal attributes of individuals cannot be deduced from aggregate properties of the political system. Schlesinger recognizes this difficulty (see p. 198). But his disclaimers notwithstanding, the reader will wonder why he belabored a theory only tenuously linked to his data when other theoretical lines could have been pursued more fruitfully. It is important and fascinating to learn about turnover, tenure, career chances and career lines; it is a major contribution to conceptualize empirical generalizations about such phenomena into middle range theory concerning opportunity structures. But this exercise does not tell us about the image incumbent politicians have of themselves, their duties or their aspirations.

The book in general, more than the ambition theory in particular, does help us break free of the straight-jacket imposed on recruitment theory by its early marriage to the "sociology of occupations" approach. Heretofore, data about individual political careers have been very inadequately linked to theories of recruitment. Schlesinger reminds us that political units have a recruitment *structure*, a structure with identifiable properties. He further reminds us, though not forceable enough for my tastes, that the recruitment structure will be related to other systemic variables, e.g., tensions and stresses in the body politic, patterns of public policy, party organization and competition, and even the cultural stereotypes citizens have of political leaders. Recruitment studies need not be locked into the narrow "individual career" focus impressed upon them by theories of personality or socialization or occupations. Although influenced by other factors, the recruitment structure is a distinctly political variable. The concept "opportunity structure" takes us a major step toward empirical political theory incorporating recruitment as a variable.

KENNETH PREWITT
University of Chicago

Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. By BARRINGTON MOORE, JR. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966. Pp. xix, 559. $10.00.)

This is a profoundly individual and courageous work of scholarship. In a day of empirical field work, team research, quantification, and formal theory, Barrington Moore works alone, primarily with library materials, and with little explicit formal systematization. He handles quantitative data with suspicion and systematic social theory with scorn, viewing both as conservative traps. He is no man's disciple, and, so far as I know, has none.

His methodological forays are sometimes pointless, and sometimes wrong, and yet he offers a useful corrective to the quantitative theory of knowledge so influential today. His search for an unequivocal ideological and political neutrality (even though he doubts its possibility) leads him into some serious distortions, and yet he compels us to look hard at some things we would greatly prefer to avoid.

Moore's work stands at the other end of the continuum from much of contenporary social and political science. He takes the reader along with him from the formulation of the problem, through the appraisal of the evidence, the construction of generalizations, and their arrangement in an orderly set of propositions about the origins of democracy and totalitarianism in the modern world. He works like an archaeologist, sifting the sand of historiography, picking out the fragmentary bits, marking them carefully, noting the missing pieces, and presenting us with a monumental structure of evidence and inference. He avoids the mannerisms of modern behavioral science, but often his polemics with the statisticians, social theorists, and historians have a mannered quality of their own, unessential and diverting. We are fortunate and enriched by this book, both by its striking successes and its failures.

The study of modernization and democratization has focused on modern economic and democratic institutions and roles—on the city, the factory, the entrepreneur, the workman, the modern economy, the bureaucracy, the political party, the interest group, the communication media, and the like. Moore illuminates the agricultural sector, showing how the differing fates of "lord and peasant" n British, French, German, Russian, Japanese,

Chinese, and Indian historical development contributed, or are contributing, to their industrial and political development.

He treats in detail the British, American, French, Japanese, Chinese, and Indian cases; but enough is said about the German and Russian cases to include them in his analysis. He argues that these cases reflect three principal routes from the pre-industrial to the industrial, modern world: (1) the successful bourgeois revolution which commercializes and modernizes the countryside and assimilates aristocracy and peasantry into the modern economy and democratic polity (Britain, France, and the U. S.); (2) the conservative revolution (the German and Japanese cases) in which the bourgeois revolution is either aborted or never takes place and where industrialization is carried out from "above" by a coalition of aristocratic-bourgeois elements in which the bourgeois component is the junior partner; and (3) the Communist revolution in those areas in which the middle and ". . . urban classes were too weak to constitute even a junior partner . . ." in the processes of modernization (Russia and China) and in which a huge and alienated peasantry ". . . provided the main destructive revolutionary force that overthrew the old order . . ." and made the peasants its primary victims.

The Indian case is included in an effort to apply what has been learned in the historical cases to the contemporary problem of modernization and democratization. And Moore concludes on the basis of this confrontation that "Either masked coercion on a massive scale, as in the capitalist model including even Japan, or more direct coercion approaching the socialist model will remain necessary."

In a brief review it is difficult to come to grips with the accomplishments and failures of this book. Surely, one of Moore's principal contributions is his treatment of the comparative costs of the different political routes to modernization. According to Moore our conception of British modernization and democratization as incremental and low-cost is erroneous. Britain paid its price of violence in the Puritan Revolution, and the heavy costs of commercialization and industrialization were taken from the peasantry in the sixteenth–nineteenth centuries and from the working classes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. His contribution here and in the analysis of the American Civil War and the French Revolution serves to correct ideological distortions in comparing the costs of the democratic and Communist routes to modernization. This note of pessimism about the role of violence, coercion, and the unequal distribution of burdens in the process of industrialization and democratization both historically and in the contemporary world is one of the principal themes of the book. It is a most useful corrective for those of us who sometimes permit hope to carry us away.

But in his zeal to compare these costs objectively, Moore occasionally leans over backward, as when he tells us "Communist repression has been and remains so far mainly directed against its own population. The repression by liberal society, both under earlier imperialism and again now in the armed struggle against revolutionary movements in the backward areas, has been directed very heavily outward, against others." For one so circumspect and cautious in the handling of evidence it is an extraordinary oversight not to refer to the activities of the Third International, the Stalinist subjection of Eastern Europe, and the stimulation of guerrilla warfare outside their borders by the Russian, Chinese, and Cuban Communists.

There are theoretical weaknesses in the book. Moore's approach to causation tends to be an economic determinist one. He moves from peasantry, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie to industrialization and democratization. This relation takes him far in accounting for the different patterns. But particularly as he deals with the theme of democratization he fails to treat adequately the international environment as it affected the timing of and the patterns of bureaucratic centralization in such countries as Britain, France, and Germany. Surely British, French and German democratization were effected by the different pressures of their international environments and the responses of their elites as they became nation-states in the course of the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. The balance between crown and aristocracy in England, the transformation of the French nobility into a class of courtiers and the Prussian Junkers into stern monklike servants of the state cannot be explained without reference to the location and experience of these nations in their international environments.

Moore cuts into a complex pattern of causation by highlighting the relations between social structure, commercialization and industrialization, and politics. The treatment would have more balance had he varied his approach taking the political decisions of elites and international pressures as the independent variables when appropriate. While it is doubtful that such a treatment would greatly relieve

the pessimism of his conclusions, it might at least have led to a more thorough exploration of policy alternatives in dealing with contemporary problems of modernization and democratization.

GABRIEL A. ALMOND
Stanford University

The American Jury. By HARRY KALVEN, JR. AND HANS ZEISEL. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966. Pp. viii, 559. $15.00.)

Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody. By WAYNE R. LAFAVE. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1965. Pp. xxxiv, 540. $10.00.)

Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial. By DONALD J. NEWMAN. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966. Pp. xxvii, 259. $8.50.)

The study of law and legal institutions has suffered from a dearth of well-conceived empirical studies showing how the legal system operates in the real world. The concentration of legal writers on the appellate process has tended to over-emphasize the role of formal rules and procedures and other aspects of "the law or the book." Those writing books for practitioners, on the other hand, have revealed from their own experience various insights and artful practices to help the less sophisticated members of the profession win lawsuits or successfully defend accused persons. The three books under review fit neither of the traditional models and, although all three are concerned with vital aspects of criminal justice, they are not reformist in spirit or conception, as were the various crime surveys or the Wickersham Commission reports of the 20's and 30's.

In *The American Jury*, Harry Kalven, Jr., a professor of law, and a sociologist, Hans Zeisel, report their findings on one phase of a major study of the role of the jury in American law: the extent to which juries in criminal cases reach verdicts which the trial judges regard as legally incorrect. Since approximately one-seventh of all felony prosecutions end in jury trials, and since the decision to plead guilty or to waive trial by jury is greatly influenced by real or supposed knowledge about the way juries decide cases, the subject is of central importance to the process of criminal justice. As the authors show, the higher the chances for acquittal, the less likely the guilty plea, and vice versa (pp. 20–21). Regional custom apparently determines whether a defendant will waive jury trial, with the percentage of jury waivers varying from a high of 79 per cent in Wisconsin to 3 per cent in the District of Columbia and 0 per cent in Montana (p. 25). The category of crime also is a significant factor. Jury waiver occurs in 70 per cent of the drug violation cases, where judges may be expected to be less emotionally involved than lay jurors, while the jury is waived in only 13 per cent of murder trials (p. 26).

To determine the magnitude and direction of disagreement between judge and jury, as well as the source and explanation of such disagreements, 3576 trial judges throughout the nation were sent a questionnaire which asked certain details about each case, asked the judge to write down his verdict when the jury retired, and where the jury verdict differed from his own to explain why this happened. As to convictions, the data show that the defendant experienced a net leniency of 16 per cent at the hands of juries. When differences between judge and jury respecting charge and penalty were also taken into account the net leniency of the jury was 22.8 per cent.

The authors raise, and dispose of, several questions concerning the reliability of the questionnaire, and conclude that the judges played the game squarely. What one must inevitably conclude, however, is that we are privileged to listen to a series of fascinating accounts of how a large number of judges think that juries reached decisions. Judges may be correct in most instances in ascribing jury verdicts to this or that characteristic of the defendant, or the case, but, in the absence of any interrogation of jurors as to what took place in their discussions, or, how they, as jurors, viewed the case, we are forced to see the jurors' work through judicial eyes. The richness and suggestiveness of the judges' comments cannot be summarized here; a reader may conclude that the "equitable" function of the jury does not seem undesirable, and some of the judges' comments acknowledge that jury verdicts with which they disagreed represented in many instances a wise and tolerable justice, whether or not according to law. *The American Jury* is clearly and engagingly written, the numerous charts and tables seem as clear as the nature of the material allows, and it demonstrates how much can be learned from a well-conceived study based on the use of questionnaires about the differences between a judge and a jury in judging the guilt of criminal defendants.

The two other works, *Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody*, by Wayne R. LaFave, a professor of law, and *Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial*, by Donald J. Newman, a sociologist, are the first two volumes of a five-volume series

on the Administration of Criminal Justice in the United States, prepared under the auspices of the American Bar Foundation, a project commenced in 1953. The editor of the series, Professor Frank J. Remington of the University of Wisconsin Law School, explains that it was originally intended to undertake a pilot study in Michigan, Kansas, and Wisconsin in 1956 and 1957, to be followed subsequently by a national study of criminal law administration. The data gathered in the pilot study phase proved so substantial and illuminating, however, that the decision was made to make the results available in published form, a judgment that surely was correct.

The method of research was to send teams to observe the police, judges and other functionaries responsible for the administration of justice, and to ascertain, if possible, how and why they reached certain decisions crucial to the functioning of the system. The stress is on the real world, and, since the identities of specific participants were concealed, and confidences maintained as promised, the results are highly revealing and of great importance. Much of the lore of criminal justice that has been known only to insiders, or recounted in more or less personal memoirs, is revealed in these studies as part of the everyday world, with the formal law furnishing only one of the elements that combine to make an operative system of criminal justice. *Arrest* explains the range of police discretion, notes that nonenforcement may be the result of a conclusion that the legislature does not desire enforcement, because of limited police resources, or for various other reasons that make sense to law enforcement officials, and, it may be suggested, may make sense to most readers. The unthinking demand to enforce law in every possible situation would create an intolerable society. The problem, as the author shows, is to work out effective administrative controls of police discretion and to upgrade the quality and training of personnel who must exercise discretion. Two major sections then deal with the decision to arrest for purpose of prosecution, and the decision to arrest for purposes other than prosecution. While the material in the latter topic may seem most alarming to those who fear law enforcement tactics that threaten individual freedom, the various ways in which future prosecution is advanced by means of arrest and custody on grounds inconsistent with the spirit and letter of law is probably more significant in terms of the number affected and the threat of improper convictions.

Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial is an extremely perceptive study of the bargaining process that eventuates in a plea of guilty. It is a process in which the discretion of the prosecutor and the bargaining skill of defense counsel and defendant are exercised largely outside the formal rules and proceedings of the legal system and commonly without any record of the agreements made.

In many instances the defendant who decides to plead guilty is without the aid of counsel and, as Newman explains, those with counsel may receive less than effective representation even from men whose competence in court is unquestioned. The conclusions of this fascinating and disturbing book suggest the need for greater attention by the trial judge to the bargaining process, and more effective institutionalized provision of adequate defense counsel and a record of the negotiations. Some lovers of games may be satisfied with the existing catch-as-catch-can system, but a just society should insist on fairness to the defendant and should scorn the triumphs of its officials who play with a stacked deck. On the other hand, as Newman shows, prosecutors may be tempted to take the easy path of accepting pleas to excessively reduced charges to avoid the threat of a difficult trial. A more vigorous intervention by the trial judge would seem essential to hold the balance between the rights of the accused and the rights of the people. Just as the judges have increasingly brought the events preceding trial under judicial scrutiny, they must accept the duty of ensuring reasoned justice in the process by which 90 per cent of criminal prosecutions are terminated.

WILLIAM BEANEY
Princeton University

Parliament in the German Political System. By GERHARD LOEWENBERG. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966. Pp. xviii, 463. $10.00.)

The Parliament has occupied a particularly critical place in German history. Its beginnings provided the chief access to government for large sections of the population, whose entry into politics transformed the old autocracy into a modern state. Later, in the first third of this century, the Parliament failed to perform adequately and helped to create the vacuum in which Nazism thrived and on which it built its own characteristic combination of mass participation and authority. (In a nation which never knew a golden age of Parliament we cannot speak of a decline of the institution.) Since 1949, the fate of Parliament and the fate

of German democracy are again closely allied.

An assessment of the post war German Bundestag has been long overdue and every scholar of parliamentary affairs as well as German politics will be indebted to Professor Loewenberg for a superb and balanced account. That the first comprehensive work on the Bundestag has been written by an American is a symptom of the historical reluctance of German scholars to deal with political institutions, a lack of concern which reflects popular disinterest.

After summarizing the parliamentary tradition in Germany, Loewenberg inspects the social background and political behavior of the deputies using confidential documentary sources as well as interviews with members of the Bundestag and their staff.

It becomes clear in this chapter that the professional politician, who is least acceptable in the German political culture, dominates the work of the Bundestag. His freedom from narrow commitments to interest-groups or ideological positions, his fulltime-commitment to the work of the House, and his constant reelection give him the advantage of experience and seniority over most of his colleagues and a special role as negotiator among different leaders. By comparison, the other great bloc of members, namely the interest group representatives, is confined to the specialized committees and party working groups where the detailed legislative work is done.

The work of the Bundestag is very unevenly distributed among its members, depending on their skills and their available time. This makes for the dominance of a small group of professional parliamentarians whose style, which has become in large measure the style of the House, incorporates a typical professional esprit de corps, and which is exemplified by caution in policy innovation and a penchant for compromise. There is also a penchant for organization, leading to a proliferation of committees and informal groups which, in turn, produces a bureaucratization of the parliamentary process, with the characteristics of division of labor, hierarchy and secrecy of policy-making.

In his third chapter, Loewenberg discusses the success of the Bundestag in adapting the structure which it has inherited to the requirements of the new party system, the new relationship between government and parliament and new types of political issues. Central to this success has been a great reliance on informal arrangements to supplement and alter the effect of the overt rules. This has left the effectiveness of the norms of parliamentary behavior extraordinarily dependent on arrangements among a few leaders and on the political relationships which exist at the moment. The new pattern of power has not been institutionalized, and the public lacks an accurate conception of the norms of behavior in parliament. But such performance of communications functions still leaves some of the need for representation unfulfilled. There is little evidence that the interest groups or parties or the mass media have imparted to the individual German a sense of participation in government, or a commitment to the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany, which goes beyond satisfaction with the day to day results it produces.

The following three chapters illustrate the legislative process, and include five major case studies. Loewenberg examines the structure of Parliament in relation to the functions it performs within the German political system. The author concludes that the Bundestag has developed rapidly since 1949, that it is far more effective than any of its predecessors, but he warns that changes in parliamentary organization and performance have outdistanced public understanding of the institution and that the relationship between Parliament and the public, and, to a lesser extent, Parliament and the Government poses serious problems for the entire political system.

Of all the weaknesses of the Bundestag, none is so critical as its weaknesses as an agency of representation and political leadership. Today the functions of political communication in Germany are performed by a variety of interest-groups, the parties and the mass media. In his final chapter, Loewenberg brilliantly traces some of the symptoms and causes of this crisis of representation. The deputies feel a far stronger incentive to develop their legislative specialities than to engage in political discourse with the general public. They have permitted the decision making process of the committee room or the party caucus to displace the public deliberations of the House. Loewenberg sums up: "In short, the deputies regard their Party leaders, or their interest group patron as their chief constituents and they treat the general public with a reserve and discretion more typical of the bureaucrat than the politician."

More importantly, the system of proportional representation and candidate selection ties the individual member more closely to party and interest groups than to the general electorate. Post-war political tranquility has the effect of creating political apathy and encourages residues of traditional German political values which allow Parliament to keep

the general public at arm's length. Loewenberg concludes, the constant growth of executive power and the prospect of the establishment of supernational political units in Europe steadily increase the urgency and the difficulty of representing Government and public to each other.

Many of the tendencies of the German parliament—in particular, the tendencies toward professionalization and specialization—which are so perceptively noted in this admirable volume are undoubtedly observable in other parliaments. Perhaps the only weakness of the study—aside from the lack of bibliography—is the lack of comparison with European parliaments other than the British House of Commons. This is due to the fact that the book reflects the frame of reference of a parliamentary insider and thus also tends to overestimate the importance of the Bundestag in the contemporary German system, notably its executive control function.

The reform of the Bundestag is a question which is increasingly under discussion in Germany today. Political scientists, notably, Professor Hennis, and parliamentary leaders, such as Gerstenmeier, Mommer, and Schaefer, are writing on this topic, and already the formation of the large coalition has resulted in some improvements, such as the appointment of six parliamentary secretaries. It is easier to reform parliamentary procedure than to strengthen the political decision-making of each deputy or to anchor the institution in public support. To every German politician, journalist and political scientist who wishes to undertake the task of improving the public support and authority of parliament, the Loewenberg volume (soon, it is to be hoped, translated into German) will be required reading.

CHARLES R. FOSTER

Washington, D. C.

Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam. By SIR ROBERT THOMPSON. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 171. $4.95.)

Sir Robert Thompson has written the most devastating critique of American ineptness in Viet Nam yet to emerge from the cacophony of shrill and indignant books that have decried our intervention in Southeast Asia. *Defeating Communist Insurgency* is devastating precisely because it is neither shrill nor indignant. It stands apart from recent books on Viet Nam in being a clear and carefully understated memoir of an English gentleman who never once levels a barbed criticism at the United States. Sir Robert does not have to rely on snippy remarks to tell of the shortcomings in the Vietnamese and United States response to the Communist-led insurgency in Viet Nam. His knowledge is so vast, so detailed, and so incisive that he is able to weigh each facet of the situation with the care and precision of the professional he is. Not only is he a twenty-three-year veteran of the Malayan Civil Service in which he played a major role in the defeat of the Malayan Communist's terrorist campaign but he is also the former chief of the British Advisory Mission to the Republic of Viet Nam (1961–1965). Consequently, his is the first book attempting a codification of the techniques of counterinsurgency that has been written from the perspective of extensive first-hand experience in the two major campaigns against Communist guerrillas in Southeast Asia. As a soldier-administrator's memoir it is a classic.

The essence of insurgency, Sir Robert asserts, is political, not military; it is an attempt to destroy "the links between the government and the people (p. 24)." In his view a primarily military response will automatically turn insurgency into a military problem creating, in the process, more problems than are solved (p. 110). No matter what level of military force is used, military action alone cannot achieve the basic goal of counterinsurgency which, according to Sir Robert, is to establish and maintain a politically and economically stable and viable country. Yet military action can make it more difficult to attain this objective by alienating the population through exposing them to the dangers of battle and by preventing close "contact between the government and the people . . ." Instead of relying on napalm and search and clear missions the underlying goal of counterinsurgency can best be achieved by establishing a sound administrative structure which must, "keep pace with the aspirations of the people while at the same time creating an atmosphere of order and stability . . ." (p. 70).

Sir Robert is at his best in analyzing why an insurgency gets started (chapters 1–3). Every insurgency, he says, requires a popular cause which is often to be found in opposing the presence of a foreign power in a country. Resistance to Japanese occupation, anti-colonialism, and anti-imperialism, in the sense of being anti-American, are major examples of the causes adopted by insurgents. But these causes do not provide an insurgency with its strength; they are merely the convenient symbols against which popular frustration can be mobilized. The real source of insurgent

strength comes from exploiting those conflicts and cleavages within a society which cannot be resolved by existing institutions. These societal shortcomings are reflected most clearly by the types of people who are attracted to an insurgency. According to Sir Robert they are of three sorts: the naturals, the converted and the deceived.

The naturals are attracted to an insurgency because they do not "see any future prospects for themselves in existing society" (p. 35). Communism "with its strength of purpose and discipline, with the chances of promotion in its monolithic structure . . . its belief in inevitable victory and its sense of political power, offers them their opportunity" (*ibid.*). On the other hand the converted are "those who join because of government excesses or abuses of power," while the deceived are primarily youths who are scornful of authority and are attracted by "the prospect of excitement and action . . ." as well as the strong bonds of group commitment and identity. Here in Sir Robert's analysis is fresh evidence of a phenomenon much documented in the developing areas: the failure of government and societal performance to keep pace with popular expectations. In Southeast Asia as in other areas political instability and violence have been the consequences of this frustration.

Popular frustrations are not by themselves sufficient to launch an insurgency. Sir Robert notes that one other practical factor is required, "and that is a breakdown, or a near breakdown, of the government's rural administration" (p. 24). However, this critical threshold in lauching an insurgency "is not something that can be left to chance" (*ibid.*). An incipient insurgent movement will set about trying to destroy the administrative ties between the government and the rural populace by a campaign of terror. Sir Robert makes clear that terror is not used indiscriminately; it "is more effective when selective" (p. 25). Those singled out for assassination are the key decision-makers and office holders in the administrative heirarchy as well as prominent individuals "to whom the local population might look for leadership" (p. 24). Through a systematic program of murder in which popular and influential leaders are discredited in the eyes of the people before being killed, an administrative structure can be decimated.

In discussing the type of response governments can make when an insurgency intensifies beyond terrorism into a guerrilla war Sir Robert is especially severe in his criticism of the actions taken by the Republic of Viet Nam on United States advice. He regards the creation of a large conventional army in Viet Nam as a breach of all the basic principles upon which counterinsurgency should be based. Without pointing an accusing finger Sir Robert makes clear that the American military backed the creation of a burgeoning armed force because their assessment of the situation in Viet Nam was viewed from the perspective of Korea. The principal threat to the country in their judgment was from direct aggression by Communist northern Viet Nam (p. 58). The 17th parallel was considered just another version of the 38th. As a result of this myopic assessment the defense of Viet Nam was thought best assured by an army prepared to blunt a massive conventional invasion from the north until friendly relief forces could arrive from abroad.

Such an emphasis on the lessons of Korea caused a virtually complete neglect of the experiences with insurgency in the Philippines, Malaya, and even the first Indochina War! Consequently, when an army, "organized on conventional lines to defeat a foreign invader and to occupy and administer a foreign country" (p. 60) had to respond to a guerrilla challenge within its territory it seemed to be treating its own people as if they were living in an occupied country. Naturally the "conventional organization of the army led . . . to operations of a conventional type" (*ibid.*). Sadly, these operations have taken form in, "search-and-clear" or "search-and-destroy" missions which usually have been no more than sweeps through insurgent controlled areas. As soon as "any opposition is met, artillery and planes are called on, villages are shelled and bombed, and such casualties as the insurgents incur are multiplied in government statistics . . . by the bodies of innocent peasants killed . . ." (pp. 34–35). The result is that "most search-and-clear operations, by creating more communists than they kill, become in effect communist recruiting drives" (*ibid.*).

In Sir Robert's analysis these effects on the population are only part of the sad consequences of the creation of a conventional army. Of greater seriousness in the long run is the fact that political power in the country came to lie with those who controlled the army. Because of the neglect of public administration and the judiciary and the meaninglessness of legislative politics the army became virtually the only political institution in Viet Nam. Out of necessity President Ngo Dinh Diem had, "to devote much of his time and energy to manipulating the army commands in order to retain control and maintain his position" (p. 58). Sir Robert suggests that all efforts to

persuade Diem "to broaden the base of his government and attract more popular support were meaningless in a situation in which the reality of power lay not with the people but with the army" (pp. 58–59).

In this line of reasoning Sir Robert has overstated his case. He implies fatalistically that once a conventional army had become such a political force it could not be brought under control but simply had to be manipulated in the hope that it would not bite off the head of its creators. Clearly, there were political actions that could have been taken to develop other institutions of political power—Sir Robert even discusses them himself in great detail in other parts of the book. The essence of the problem is that Diem would not permit the creation of such political institutions because he knew there was little hope in controlling them even by manipulation. If Diem could not control new sources of political power he did not want them to develop; he was not ready for pluralistic politics. Instead, he preferred to take his chances with the army. Undoubtedly, he realized after the abortive *coup d'état* of November 11, 1960, that his army was not only ineffective against the insurgents because of the incessant rotation of troop commanders but also that this rotation was a sort of Russian roulette on a tragicomedy scale. On November 1, 1963, the chamber with the live cartridge came up flush with the barrel; in effect Diem blew his own brains out. Since then the topsy-turvy governments in Saigon have struggled to achieve some kind of political stability by trying to establish institutions which were out of the question in the Diem era.

For all of his awareness and sensitivity toward the political character of insurgency Sir Robert's political solutions all lie within the spectrum of public and judicial administration. There is no mention anywhere in his book of a role to be played by political parties, political ideology, or legislative politics in articulating popular aspirations or winning support for government programs. Neither is there any discussion of the army as a force for political integration nor an exploration of the most politically advantageous means of recruiting for the civil service and the judiciary. On the contrary, Sir Robert is suspect of 'politicians' in newly independent countries. Certainly, there is only sparse evidence from the developing countries to contradict Sir Robert's impression. But his views in addition to reflecting bitter experiences with 'politicians' in new states also indicate a lack of awareness of the social science literature on political development and modernization. Consequently, his suggestions for achieving the principles of counterinsurgency are unnecessarily limited to administrative politics and rule out other political processes that can contribute significantly to the goals of stability and viability which he has so rightly enunciated.

This limited spectrum in Sir Robert's concern for political action is the principal shortcoming in his profoundly important book. But it is a welcome shortcoming because it opens up for the first time an opportunity for a meaningful dialogue between social scientists and the practitioners of the craft of counterinsurgency. Prior to the appearance of *Defeating Communist Insurgency* only two books stood out from the other undistinguished mass of literature on the subject. Both of them (*Counterinsurgency Warfare* by David Galula and *Modern Warfare* by Roger Trinquier) were written by former French Army officers who were primarily concerned with using military force to get control over a population. Sir Robert's book easily surpasses these works because his is the first study with a political sophistication approaching that of the major Communist theories: Mao Tse-tung and the two brilliant Vietnamese, Vo Nguyen Giap and Truong Chinh. Sir Robert is the first to propose credible and comprehensive political responses to the political initiatives on which the Communist doctrine of insurgency (revolutionary war) is founded. Moreover, he has viewed the problem from a more useful perspective by relating counter-insurgency to the broader considerations of political stability and the development of resilient governmental institutions in the new states. Never again can a book on counterinsurgency gain credibility unless it confronts the political issues raised by Sir Robert. Let us hope that *Defeating Communist Insurgency* will be as pervasive as it is profound and that its influence will soon be manifested in policies in Viet Nam.

JOHN T. MC ALISTER, JR.
Princeton University

Congress: The First Branch of Government. BY ALFRED DE GRAZIA et al. (Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1966. Pp. 515. $6.50.)

We Propose: A Modern Congress. BY JAMES C. CLEVELAND. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1966. Pp. xiv, 338. $5.50, cloth; $1.45, paper.)

Congress in Crisis: Politics & Congressional Reform. BY ROGER H. DAVIDSON, DAVID M. KOVENOCK, AND MICHAEL K. O'LEARY.

(Belmont, Cal.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1966. Pp. xv, 208. $2.60, trade; $1.95, text.)

At a recent conference on the role of the Federal Government in vocational education, a distinguished faculty member of a midwestern university remarked, "Adam Clayton Powell is no exception in the Congress of the United States. If the truth were only known, the public would see that every Congressman has some non-productive relative on the payroll, or has a mistress or is in some way misusing public funds. I know this to be true. I lived in Washington for 10 years." His remarks provoked both laughter and applause, and I suspect beneath that approval was a little bit of envy among those who would probably behave even more frivolously if given half the chance. Menbers of Congress wince at this sort of thing, but they are used to it. And, whether they like it or not, the stream of negative criticism about Congress rolls on forcefully and resolutely. In our society I doubt that this type of criticism will ever stop. It is an American tradition.

Therefore, it is refreshing to read and evaluate three separate works which do not view Congress contemptuously, which do not condemn the entire institution on the basis of a few deviant cases, which avoid putting together a tedious string of revelations about wrong-doing and which avoid sanctimonious comparisons with private organizations or with parliamentary institutions abroad.

Congress: The First Branch of Government consists of twelve studies on the organization of Congress written by a distinguished group of political scientists and students of Congress: Cornelius P. Cotter, Roger H. Davidson, Charles R. Dechert, Edward de Grazia, Lewis Anthony Dexter, Heinz Eulau, Kenneth Janda, Kenneth G. Olson, James A. Robinson and Aaron Wildavsky. The study was coordinated by Alfred de Grazia, Professor of Political Science at New York University. It was conducted under the auspices of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research with, of course, the usual disclaimer that the Institute neither supports nor disapproves of the published findings.

Unfortunately, while it was refreshing to examine any volume that avoids the usual negativism about Congress, particularly in this Adam Clayton Powell era, my enthusiasm for this series of studies diminished rapidly upon closer examination. As early as page 10 of the introduction, I was becoming somewhat confused by the purported basic themes. Under the heading "Operating Principles for Congress," for example, the following statements are made:

"Explicit principles to work with are required, principles of thought and action that can guide both the reorganization of Congress and the nature of the legislation designed to correct social ills. At least eleven guiding principles can be named. A Congress needs to be sought that will, despite opposition and obstacles, perform regularly in accord with them."

I have selected, at random, a few of the operating principles:

"1. Espouse a central view of American political society by sympathizing and identifying with all people to a significant degree.
"2. Enhance individual and group senses of social responsibility and altruism.
"3. Foster many independent publics and voluntarism in social relations generally.
"4. Seek new modes of autonomous territorial and functional decentralization, i.e., a new federalism taking into account the urbanization of the American people.
"5. Arrive at decisions in as rational a manner as is possible granted the political obstacles that make even ordinary care and foresight difficult.
"6. Control and supervise the executive agencies more thoroughly and in more respects."

If I have read these correctly, the author of this section is *not talking* about possible changes in the internal structure of the Congress. Rather, he is talking about changing all of the political and social requisites of our system. In my opinion, before Congress could begin to operate in accordance with these principles, approximately 12,000 years would have to pass. This may be a very short time geologically, but is somewhat lengthy for human beings.

This is not to say, however, that Congress would reject as an operating principle the enhancement of individual and group sense of political responsibility and altruism. But, most Congressmen would not know what they said after they endorsed this exhortation or be able to tell you how it would affect anything that they are currently doing. In fact, one 16-year veteran of the House of Representatives, after reading this statement, commented that it was one of the "silliest g— d— pieces of academic nonsense" he had ever read. I suspect that underlying these so-called operating principles is the notion that the Executive Branch, including the entire bureaucracy, is a monolithic force dominated by a central figure, and

that the time has come for a reversal of the tendency of the President to absorb all of the authority and power available in our society. Yet, the wisdom of this notion is barely explored.

Turning to the specific propositions on the organization of Congress that starts a few pages later, I am again struck by the ambiguity of it all. I can find a few things that seem to merit favorable mention—the idea that "first-term Congressmen should be tendered greater orientation, apprenticing and responsibilities in the operations of Congress makes sense. Improvements in expansion of committee staff and greater planning of committee staff work are recommendations that I think most serious students of Congress would enthusiastically support. More frequent use of expert consultants and the increasing of research capabilities of the Congress are thoroughly defensible recommendations. But these do not reflect the main burden of the recommendations.

Most of the recommendations, again, are totally unrealistic in that they would require drastic changes in our society. One or two of them, I think, merit *abrupt* dissent. For example, the idea that "qualifying tests for all staff should be used to insure compatability with congressional principles" is both ludicrous in terms of its practicability and dangerous in terms of its basic assumption. Proposition 38 again confuses this reviewer. It says, "A more formal designation of general representatives on all committees to prevent excessive special-interest representation on the committee rosters is desirable." What is a general representative as opposed to a special-interest representative? Can you imagine a committee on committees saying to one representative, "You cannot serve on this committee because you represent specific interests," and at the same moment designating another representative as a general representative?

Turning away from what I consider to be a list of almost totally irrelevant propositions about the reorganization of Congress, one finds a number of essays on congressional organization that vary considerably, both in quality and insight. It is not possible in the short space allotted to this reviewer to evaluate critically each one, and they are not sufficiently interrelated to make a general statement or series of statements applicable to them all. Some are well written; some are not. Some contain interesting and defensible propositions; others border on the ridiculous. For example, Dexter's article "'Check and Balance' Today: What does It Mean for Congress and Congressmen?" is worthy of reading. But it is marred somewhat when it comes to means to enable Congress to improve its capacity to check the Executive Branch. He says that it is necessary to develop a program of "indoctrination" of congressional specialists; he says that it is necessary for the congressional specialists to unlearn their assumptions about the superiority of professional judgment of executives. This is pure nonsense.

Mr. Dexter recommends personality tests for congressional employees. I am fearful of people who make statements such as this: "With due planning and care, personality tests could be developed (or adapted from existing tests) which would help to exclude those specialists who are most hostile to the principle of Congress checking the executive. For instance, people whose personality profile shows great faith in respectable views are unlikely to challenge the leaders of their profession."

Finally, on page 103 is what I consider the most ridiculous paragraph in the entire book. I can only leave it to the readers to this review to draw their own conclusions. I quote it in its entirety.

> Finally, it might be a wise precaution to prohibit employees of Congress from sharing living quarters with employees of the executive department. *This is a very common Washington practice and my impression is that in general such living arrangements again benefit the executive-oriented experts, since the pressure of their numbers and professional tradition makes it difficult for congressional employees to preserve congressional attitudes in these circumstances. Accordingly, regulations to make such living arrangement difficult—perhaps by reducing the stipend of congressional employees who continue with them after some specified date—should be discussed (the mere discussion of the issue, indeed, might serve to eliminate most of the cases).* Individual Congressmen who are in a strong enough bargaining position should now make it a condition of employment that their staff not room with executive employees. [Emphasis mine.]

Kenneth Janda's article on information system for Congressmen is excellent and deserves special mention. It brings to the student of American government one of the really intelligent discussions of the problems of and the new uses of information systems. Kenneth Olson's discussion on "The Service Function of the United States Congress," although I disagree with his conclusions, is a first-rate essay illuminating the nature of a growing problem.

I do not think it is necessary to go through each of the essays and recommend each separately. None is that long. I think the book should be on the shelf of students of Congress even though it is a mixed bag, varying from an exceptionally good and insightful commentary to an incredibly naive and silly batch of general statements and recommendations.

We Propose: A Modern Congress, a collection of essays by leading members of the House Republican Task Force on Congressional Reform, does not deserve the current undergraduate term of highest praise. That is, in brief, "it ain't a cool book." It is a useful volume nonetheless, because it does bring to light what a number of the current and recent members of Congress think is wrong with the institution. This is the chief value of the book.

The proposals to remedy the problems have not been, however, thought out and developed. Moreover, the essays, and this is to be expected, are somewhat biased in favor of the minority. Beyond Representative Thomas Curtis' introductory statement that the Task Force views the Congress as a deliberative body, one searches in vain for a coherent theme—a thread or a unifying theory of reform. For example, is Congress to be a strong, consensus-oriented group capable of challenging the Executive Branch? Some of the essays say "yes." On the other hand, is Congress to be a place where division and conflicts over public policy are exposed for public evaluation? Again, a number of the essays say "yes," without any mention of the possible inconsistency of the two positions. Most Congressmen want it both ways, but there is a real choice involved when congressional reform is under consideration. Is Congress in need of competent, professional, non-partisan staff? Again, the answer is "yes." But, does Congress need minority staffing, not simply as a matter of right or insurance, but as a functioning part of the system? Again, the answer is "yes." One could enumerate endless inconsistencies in this volume.

A few essays should be mentioned just to give the prospective reader a glimpse of the flesh and spirit of this work; and I do recommend that it be read by all serious students of Congress. Mayor John Lindsay's essay on the seniority system and Senator Robert Griffin's discussion of rules and procedures of standing committees would, in my opinion, at best be only acceptable undergraduate seminar papers. On the other hand, John Anderson's discussion of science policy and Robert McClory's discussion of budgetary and fiscal machinery are informative and break some new ground. Unfortunately, McClory's essay had to drag out the old chestnut about a Joint Committee on the Budget—a proposal thoroughly demolished, both on practical and constitutional grounds, by no less a figure than Representative George Mahon, Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. James C. Cleveland in his essay says that the case for minority staffing is "overwhelming," that the political life of this country is best served by an adversary system. There are powerful arguments, however, against this view, because if Congress is divided, particularly along party lines, it can scarcely compete with an omnicompetent Executive Branch. In the eyes of this reviewer, a typical minority staffer, a la Cleveland, would resemble a little mouse who desperately hoped to become a majority rat.

Other essays point to some of the problems with which Congress is currently dealing. The whole area of contested elections, I think, needs thorough study, and Robert McEwen is to be congratulated for bringing some of the issues to light. Robert F. Ellsworth has an intelligent discussion of the case for television and radio coverage, as does Durward G. Hall on electric voting in the House. In essence, there is much to recommend this book for the reasons I set forth earlier; and I think the editor, Mary McGinnis, is to be congratulated on managing to corral these busy members of Congress into a place where they would sit down and expose their thoughts about a subject which, generally, has little political currency back home.

The last of the three books, *Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform*, is an important contribution to the literature on Congress. The first section of the book carefully sets out some of the various theories about congressional reform and notes the various reform proposals under each general approach. I know of no other place where this is set forth so clearly and lucidly, as in the Davidson et al. volume. Chapter Two, dealing with "The Public Looks at Congress," and Chapter Three on congressional views of Congress and congressional reform are both excellent. The book's discussion of the internal politics of the Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress, although brief, is accurate as far as it goes.

I suppose the major criticism of the book is that the various chapters do not tie together very well. The introductory chapter, which, as I previously indicated, is very useful, and the chapters which contain most of the new data, as well as the concluding chapters, all seem to stand as independent studies which just happen to be under one cover. However,

I consider this a minor defect, in view of the contribution this book makes to a fresh understanding of Congress.

NICHOLAS A. MASTERS
Pennsylvania State University

Negroes and the New Southern Politics. By DONALD R. MATTHEWS AND JAMES W. PROTHRO. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966. Pp. xvi, 551. $12.50.)

The political modernization of the South is one of the most exciting aspects of the post-war American scene. Negroes who have previously been, to borrow some Almond and Verba terms, "parochials" or at best "subjects" have burst into the "participant" category. This is the background of Matthews and Prothro's long-awaited study of Negroes and "the new Southern politics." How do they handle it?

First it should be noted what they do *not* do. They do not interview political leaders or candidates, whether Negro or white. They do not concern themselves much with individual states. They do not round up much local data on how counties or predominantly Negro precincts actually vote in primaries or general elections. They make little use of political data other than that collected for their own study, which is largely cross-sectional. Bayesian statistics may be "in" these days, but they make little use of prior or outside sources of information. Hence their own research design is of particular importance.

The authors focus their attention on the collection and analysis of several related sets of data. First is the aggregate data on Negro registration, as of 1958, for the approximately one thousand Southern counties which have some Negro population. Second is their own survey material, obtained early in 1961 (pre-Birmingham crisis) by Survey Research Center interviewers, for South-wide samples of adult Negro and adult white population. Additional interviews were taken in four particular communities, to round out local sub-samples. Later a special survey was taken of Negro college students in the South, and in 1964 the SRC ran an extra quota of interviews on Negro respondents. This is a fascinating collection of data, obtained at substantial cost, which eventually will be available through the Consortium for further analysis.

In Part One of the book the authors describe their general approach, and spell out the "political participation scale" which serves as the main dependent variable. It is a simple Guttman-type cumulative scale based on whether the respondent has (1) talked politics, (2) voted, (3) campaigned, and (4) held office or belonged to a political group. This is a routine 1950's scale, developed for national samples, which hardly seems ideal for tapping the special circumstances of the Negro in the South. Indeed, for Southern Negroes the widespread denial of the vote, and related need for belonging to a political group if one is to register means that a great many Negroes are non-scale types (as the authors duly note at pp 524–525). It should be kept in mind that in later chapters the "high" participants generally include many Negroes from Deep South areas who have never seen a ballot, but who may have given a dollar to the NAACP or participated in a voter registration school. More seriously, the heavy reliance on the participation "scale" tends to substitute a methodological gimmick for the broad substantive question of how Negro interests are awakened, articulated, or aggregated.

The heart of the study is Part Two, which seeks to explain variations in Negro registration among counties, as well as in level of participation (subject to above *caveat*) among individual Negroes. The analysis of registration is only slightly modified from what appeared in the REVIEW.[1] A large number of variables are dumped rather unceremoniously into a single multiple regression equation. There are some nice touches in the analysis of the residuals, but few political scientists yet seem as skillful at regression as is the average economist. Analysis of variance would not accomodate the full range of variables, but would permit explicit tests for "interaction" among the more important ones.

In predicting registration levels the county per cent of Negro population is, as expected, the most important single variable. But "urbanism"—which would seem important to many of us—has a feeble effect. And white educational level, the universal solvent of survey analysis, turns out to be strongly *negatively* associated with per cent Negro registration. Actually much of the latter is spurious due to an obvious positive relationship between white educational level and per cent Negro population. And the seeming weakness of "urbanism" may well be due to a procedure which treats each of the counties as equally important. If large numbers of Negroes move to a few cities, like Atlanta, where conditions are different then that may indeed have important effects

[1] See Matthews and Prothro, "Social and Economic Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," REVIEW (1963), 24–44, and "Political Factors and Negro Voter Registration in the South," REVIEW (1963), 355–367.

on statewide politics though perhaps not on the regression analysis. Routine complaints are the use of 1950 census data (rather than 1960), failure to exploit time series of registration data (available for a number of the states), no presentation of the basic matrix of correlations among the variables (despite 123 tables and 54 figures), and the absolute ban on maps (Eisenhower's religiousity has been said to be the most over-sold item of the 1950's, but among political scientists an excessive fear of the so-called "ecological fallacy" is a strong contender).

The analysis of individual participation is pursued in somewhat greater detail, since the authors have more information on the local sampling areas and quite extended studies of four contrasting communities. The "local color" from the latter may help sustain the general reader, but sometimes gets in the way. The two rural case studies may have required pseudonyms, but they hardly seem necessary for the two urban areas, which appear to be Tallahassee (which Prothro knows very well) and Durham (which is a highly atypical case—very large Negro business community and a tradition of Negro voting as far back as the mid-1930's).

Chapter 11 presents a ten-page "summary view and a causal analysis" of Negro participation. Here the authors make a stalwart effort to pull together the categories of variables with which they seek to explain rankings on the "political participation scale." On a sort of filing cabinet basis all Negro socioeconomic attributes go into one box, Negro attitudes and cognitions into a second, community structure items into a third, and features of the political system into a fourth. This is done without benefit of index construction, factor analysis, or even clergy. The italicized conclusion is that "all effects on political participation are interpreted by Negro attitudes and cognitions, "presumably including cognitions developed on the opening page (p. 3) by beating would-be Negro registrants over the head with a pistol.

Part Three has rather less to say on the impact of Negro political participation on Southern (or national) politics. Most of the material turns on either "party image," or data on Negro college students. The latter are fascinating, though some other minority groups have relied heavily on non-college trained leaders. This reader ended with the feeling of having learned a little bit about a lot of things, but not a great deal about what's happening to the Negro or the South. The "paradigm" of survey research established in the late 1950's by the Survey Research Center is undergoing substantial expansion or revision: the emphasis now is increasingly on comparative studies, on use of time series to gain historical perspective, and even aggregate data are regarded as respectable. But in the final analysis Matthews and Prothro's book seems to me to share the strengths and limitations of the earlier paradigm, rather than to exploit the potentials of the newer emphasis.

The authors have undertaken one of the most difficult tasks of social analysis, and in an area where there is room for many books using many approaches. But with a little better luck they might have accomplished so much more. One regrets, for example, that they did not happen across Almond and Verba while designing their study (don't old Princetonians get together?), and one wonders how they could have avoided contact with Hubert Blalock (Chapel Hill's contribution to "causal modeling," and a student of the Negro for over a decade). But perhaps it is a healthy sign for political science that our aspirations are rising so rapidly as to be only partly satisfied by such substantial studies as *Negroes and the New Southern Politics.*

HUGH DOUGLAS PRICE
Harvard University

[The foregoing review, of a book written by the Book Review Editor and the former Acting Book Review Editor of this journal, was commissioned by the Managing Editor.]

NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Political Power and Social Change. By PETER H. ODEGARD. (New Brunswick, N. J.: Rutgers University Press, 1966. Pp. 111. $3.50.)

The Process of Government. By ARTHUR F. BENTLEY, with an Introduction by Peter H. Odegard and a selected bibliography. (Cambridge; Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. xxxviii, 501. $6.95.)

It will be a long time before the influence of direct contact with Peter Odegard's buoyant discernment fades with the passing of the host of

persons in public and business as well as academic life who as students or associates caught something of his zest for understanding in company with purpose and action. One cannot say when the indirect influence will stop. Meanwhile it is useful to have two small pieces, almost posthumous, that add to what he has left in print. The three lectures that are the book on *Political Power and Social Change* were delivered in spring of 1965 and were published in the following year, before Odegard's death. The other piece came out in 1967 as a long introduction to a new edition of Bentley's *The Process of Government*. It is fitting, indeed, to have this comment by the scholar whose book in the twenties on the Anti-Saloon League was not only the pioneer among a congeries of monographs on "pressure politics" but also gave a generic name to the phenomena.

The mood that binds the chapters in the book on *Political Power and Social Change* is reflected in their titles: "No Single Thing Abides" (Lucretius), "Political Science: Knowledge for What?" and "The Use and Abuse of Political Power." In the first chapter the author accepts Lynn White's view that "the Canon of a hierarchy of values" is more properly a spectrum, recognizing that "in a pluralistic world men have different value systems which are not either right or wrong but merely different" (p. 30). Not unexpectedly, Odegard's brief survey of divisions and schools in political science has a harsh word for certain "developing methods and vocabularies" that seem to frustrate communication instead of helping it. But his complaint is deeper than the question of intelligibility. His concern lay in the "area where conscience and power meet" for it is there that "political science must make its greatest contribution" (p. 71). Too easily nowadays, he feared, concern with the techniques of study can become a disguised failure of will and an escape from risky political issues. For Odegard, the political scientist's proper center of attention is the uniquely integrative process without which there can be neither order nor freedom. "When political scientists *abandon* politics as the major focus of their research," he wrote, "they become poor political scientists without becoming much of anything else" (p. 59). This spirited sentence may well stand as the code and the coda of a lifetime's outlook and practice.

In the circumstances, it is fitting to quite a bit more in showing the trend of Odegard's thinking on broad questions of policy. The reader can assume the unspoken refinements that belong with a general statement in a public lecture. "If American conservatives," declared Odegard, "continue to resist the powerful—some would say irresistible—thrust toward increasing intervention of public authority in the social and economic life of the nation, and increasing centralization of the decision-making process including some form of world organization, they will continue to lose touch with the real world and, I believe, cannot hope for an early return to power" (p. 108).

As to Arthur Bentley's "attempt to fashion a tool" in 1908, Odegard's introduction tells of his own sympathetic acquaintance with the book through his teacher at the University of Washington, J. Allen Smith. Odegard served with a lobbying organization before doing graduate work at Columbia. The relative neglect of Bentley among political scientists in those days was not complete; perhaps there were more exceptions than Odegard implies. I recall a comment of Charles Beard with whom I was serving as an instructor before the first world war. He was more emphatic in conversation than in his review of the book at the time of its publication when he wrote that "Mr. Bentley's attempt to get below formalism into the governing process as a manifestation of social pressures deserves serious consideration." At the time I mention he declared that *The Process of Government* was the best thing in American political science since *The Federalist*. It was not Beard's fault that many oversimplified the book's message, perhaps without reading it. I recall that I had a member of Beard's graduate seminar as a visitor in my college class. He asked, what *is* the New York State legislature? Answering his own question, he drew on the blackboard a number of converging arrows, naming each after one of the leading interest-groups in the state. That, he said, is the legislature. Bentley (as Odegard reminds us) included the legislative body as a group and with it the national government and, indeed, almost every institution. Odegard's introduction stresses the need for careful reading or rereading—the need that justifies this fresh printing with the aid of the prefatory essay and a selected list of Bentley's writings.

The validity of Odegard's appeal is not weakened by saying that the inclusiveness of Bentley's concept of groups, along with his suspicion about ideas as causes, led him to slight the starting points and slow confluences of policy, on the one hand, and the uniquely integrative role of party politics, on the other hand. Odegard, intent upon reintroducing Bentley, needed only to hint that tasks of clarification, correction, and projection remained and remain for later generations. Bentley's own search for reality lay in another direction. He had taken his doctor's degree at Johns Hopkins after study abroad, had taught sociology briefly at Chicago, and then was a journalist for fifteen years. The book in question was written at that time. Bentley happened to draw on government, he said, to illustrate something that was elusive and more universal. The search for the

meaning of meanings that he subsequently carried on as an independent scholar led to the study of linguistics and of mathematics as a more dependable language; it included a fruitful collaboration with John Dewey to whom Bentley was drawn by a shared interest in Dewey's "transactional" view of behavior. Political science profited because, in the course of this pilgrimage, Bentley wrote the book that Odegard among others helped to put in a still more revealing perspective.—ARTHUR W. MACMAHON, *Columbia University.*

Oakeshott's Philosophical Politics. BY W. H. GREENLEAF. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966. Pp. viii, 110. $2.75.)

"To know only the gist," Oakeshott says, "is to know nothing" (pp. 3–4). Yet here is a book that seeks to present the gist of Oakeshott. Dr. Greenleaf is well aware of the difficulties, especially those arising from Oakeshott's declared enmity to digests and abridgements, on the ground that they formalize, over-simplify, and misrepresent reality. In addition, both in his style of writing and in the kind of understanding he seeks Oakeshott makes it difficult for those who attempt to summarize his views. He uses few phrases or slogans that can fairly represent his outlook, which perhaps explains some of the misrepresentations of his point of view. Instead, the author is obliged to deal with an ethos of ideas—"not a complete system of knowledge but rather a way of thinking" (p. 40). Oakeshott's political reflections are to be found in thirty-some essays and a much larger number of book reviews, there being no major treatise on politics. Despite these difficulties, Dr. Greenleaf succeeds admirably in his purpose of explaining and interpreting Oakeshott's ideas.

Since it will hardly do to summarize a summary, especially in this case, this review will comment on Oakeshott's views on rationalism, as it is one facet of his thinking that is perhaps of greatest interest to American political science. Oakeshott sees politics as eminently a practical activity, thus raising the problem of its relation to theoretical knowledge. Oakeshott rejects the kind of knowledge that is the by-product of what he calls rationalism (which, of course, has nothing to do with rationality). This is technical knowledge, knowledge how; it may be precisely formulated in rules and written down; and it is in appearance, at least, complete and certain. Examples of it are how-to-do-it manuals, grammars, primers (as of scientific method), and, in the realm of politics, ideologies, whether found in The Declaration of Independence or in doctrines and slogans of either Right or Left. This mode of thinking has been "the most remarkable intellectual fashion of post-Renaissance Europe" (p. 46), and evidence of it is to be found in Bacon, Locke, Bentham, Godwin, and St. Simon. It is a mentality that is to be found mainly on the Left, but it should be noted that Oakeshott is not sparing of rationalism on the Right.

Quite different is practical or traditional knowledge, which "appears imprecise because it comprises everything which cannot be systematically formulated in directions" (p. 47). It cannot be learned or taught independent of activity, "but only imported and acquired by practice in the activity" (p. 97). It may be illustrated by activity that involves artistry, taste, and, in politics, good judgment. It can only be acquired through apprenticeship or experience.

Oakeshott relates the fashionableness of rationalism to the rapidity of social change—one might even say, though Oakeshott does not, to the rapid circulation of elites. Rationalism produces the kind of knowledge that appeals to the inexperienced. Insensitive to or too impatient to acquire details and subtleties, the inexperienced are attracted to doctrines that seem to summarize all that is required to understand and to deal with a situation. There have been new rulers, for whom Machiavelli provided a manual of ruling in *The Prince*; and there have been new classes that have quickly acquired guidance from the ideologies derived from Locke, Bentham, and Marx. The technical knowledge contained in manuals and ideologies, in addition to providing a short-cut to knowledge, also appeals because it offers precision and "the simple certainties" (p. 48) required by the inexperienced practitioner.

What is wrong with Rationalism and the technical knowledge it produces? First of all, it should be noted that Oakeshott acknowledges the necessity of technical knowledge, but he argues that it is insufficient. Thus he primarily contends against those who assume the "sovereignty of technique" (p. 47). They have a special affinity for an engineering approach to politics, which assumes that politics consists of problems to be solved and that only technical knowledge is required to solve them. A superficial understanding results. "Rationalist politics converts political realities into generalized abstractions" (p. 51). Since it misconceives the relation of knowledge and practice, it has a harmful, sometimes dangerous, effect on practice. It disposes men to believe that all problems can be solved; it creates the illusion of certainty; and it inclines one toward utopianism.

These views have implications for such matters as political education and the role of scientific method in the study of politics, and these are among the topics that Oakeshott considers and Greenleaf elucidates. The author also traces the connections between Oakeshott's political reflections and his conception of philosophy (on which there is a major treatise, *Experience and its*

Modes). Dr. Greenleaf also illuminates the intellectual background of Oakeshott's work by considering its relationship to Hegel, the idealist school in Britain, and Collingwood. He does this not by the tracing of influences but by consideration of an intellectual tradition that dealt with the problems that Oakeshott inherited.

Dr. Greenleaf is successful in elucidating without misrepresenting; and he answers Oakeshott's critics without himself being uncritical. This book is an excellent introduction to Oakeshott's writings, though, as the author would readily admit, it is no substitute for them.—JOSEPH HAMBURGER, *Yale University.*

Ancients and Moderns: Essays on the Tradition of Political Philosophy. EDITED BY JOSEPH CROPSEY. (New York: Basic Books, 1964. Pp. xi, 330. $10.00.)

Into the vocabulary of professionals in the field of political theory there has entered, in recent years, a new noun: "Straussian." It does service, one notices, also as an adjective (as in the sentence, "Professor So-and-so is a 'Straussian'"). One notices too, however, that the adjective and the noun are not, as currently used, symmetrical: A "Straussian" is simply somebody who in the course of taking his Ph.D. at the New School or the University of Chicago came to think of himself as, first and foremost, a pupil of Professor Leo Strauss; while the meaning of the adjective is to say the least "problematic," and is certainly used by different people to denote different things. Some use it, by analysis with *e.g.* "Platonic" or *e.g.* "Hegelian," with the clear implication that there is a Straussian "teaching" about political things—a Straussian "position" in political philosophy around which (as some seem to hope, some to fear) there has grown up, or is about to grow up a "school," all complete with an orthodoxy that the school's adepts propose to teach to all nations. Some use it to denote the kind of political philosophy criticism that devotes itself to the deciphering of "secret writing"—or, as those would put it for whom the adjective is something less than a term of praise, that finds secret writing to decipher even when it isn't "there." Some use the adjective to denote the kind of political philosophy criticism that takes a dim view of what political philosophy has become in the period stretching from Machiavelli and Hobbes to Mill and Nietzsche, and calls upon us, or seems to, to return to the ancient verities. Yet others, finally, use it to denote the kind of political philosophy criticism that pins to its banners the slogan "To understand a political philosopher is to understand him as he understood himself," which is certainly a major theme in the now-vast corpus of Professor Strauss' own writings.

Ancients and Moderns is a collection of essays presented to Professor Strauss on his sixty-fifth birthday by "friends, former students, contemporaries, [and] colleagues;" and is, from beginning to end, an intellectual feast fully appropriate (as books of this *genre* seldom are) to so happy an occasion. Some of the "courses" that make up the feast may, to be sure, tickle this or that gourmet's palate more than others, but he would be an exigent guest indeed who would wish, over his after-dinner coffee, that any course had been omitted. At most, therefore, a reviewer can say (though at the risk of merely revealing his own limitations) that upon laying down the book some of the essays have made a deeper impression on him than others. This reviewer, for example, thinks at once of the touching essay on Plato's *Apology* by George Anastaplo (himself the author of perhaps the only "apology" of our time that demands a place in any anthology of American oratory); it is hardly too much to say that Anastaplo gives us a wholly new *Apology* (as Professor Strauss has given us a wholly new *Prince*). This reviewer thinks, too, of Seth Bernadett's "political" reading of *Oedipus Tyrannus*; of Howard White's study of the idea of "legitimacy" in Shakespeare's *King John* (which few of us, surely, have hitherto thought of as a place to go in search of political wisdom); of Alan Bloom's breath-taking close-reading of *Gulliver's Travels* which will also put a new book on your shelves even if a copy of *Gulliver's* has sat there, as mine has, for forty years; and of Hilail Gildin's brilliant study of Mill's *Essay on Liberty*, which, by casting doubt on what Mill was up to in the *Essay*, may well cost many readers of this journal one or two sleepless nights; and of Joseph Cropsey's trail-blazing "Hobbes and the Transition to Modernity," which takes Hobbes sternly to task for his reading of Aristotle's *Politics*.

The writers I have mentioned all happen to be "Straussians." Are they also "Straussian"? Here one may confidently venture several answers: First, that few readers will fail to sense in their essays (as, also, in the essays included in the earlier Strauss-Cropsey *History of Political Philosophy*, which unhappily ran afoul of the profession's *tabu* against reviewing "text books") a mysterious *something* that all have in common. Second, that that something, or quality, is also present in the essays presented by scholars of Professor Strauss' own generation (for example, the essay on Aristotle by Professor Jacob Klein, and that on the Emperor Julian by Alexandre Kojeve, which is a good place to look if you are still curious about "secret writing"); the "something", it would seem, is not necessarily picked up exclusively in Strauss seminars. Third, that that which the essays have in common is not a political tendency,

and not even a "position" on the great issues of political philosophy. Fourth, that Professor Cropsey's all-too-brief "Preface" is, to date, the *locus classicus* as regards the nature of the debts one incurs in the course of becoming "Straussian." It is, in part, a matter of coming to understand that the "issue between antiquity and modernity" is in fact an issue between "alternative views of man and his setting." It is, in part again, a matter of coming not so much to "discountenance" the present in favor of the past; but of learning (a) not to take it for granted that the classics have been "overrun by the automatic progress of mankind," and (b) to seek, as one studies the ancients and moderns, "what is imperishable" in the thought of both. It is, in part, a matter of learning that to be "open" to the thoughts of any political philosopher is "to be utterly attentive to his writing"—to be, simultaneously, "perfectly receptive and passive and perfectly alert or active," and to cultivate the virtue of "modesty." *Ancients and Moderns* is a reverent acknowledgement of that debt by sixteen eminently-qualified spokesmen for the widening circle of scholars who owe it.—WILMOORE KENDALL, *University of Dallas.*

The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought. BY CYNTHIA EAGLE RUSSETT. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. vii, 203. $5.00.)

From time to time, little books appear which present in brief compass important new insights regarding the relationship of major intellectual concepts to the phenomena of history. Such books, though historical in approach, are truly theoretical in their effect. For they give their readers central and unifying concepts which give reason, understanding and harmony to the widest possible range of occurrence and fact.

Carl Becker's *The Declaration of Independence* was one such book. Its clear exposition of the manner in which Newtonian concepts were adopted by social theorists—by Locke and Jefferson above all—made it a classic study in the history of political doctrine. Again, Richard Hofstadter's *Social Darwinism in American Thought* gave broad perspective to the multi-fold social and political developments which followed popularization of the evolutionary doctrine in the late nineteenth century. Mrs. Cynthia Eagle Russett's *The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought* is best appraised, and most meaningfully complimented, by setting it next to the Becker and Hofstadter books.

Mrs. Russett's work is not so readable as Becker's or Hofstadter's—though it's far from being an unreadable book. Nor is her theme quite so grand as that of "natural law" or "survival of the fittest." Nevertheless, the concept of equilibrium is provocatively explored, and in Mrs. Russett's felicitous treatment, is made to reveal certain threads of understanding which in fact unify many seemingly diverse and even contradictory developments in American social thought. Not the least significant contribution of this book lies in the clarity with which it demonstrates the central role of equilibrium concepts in both the organic and the mechanistic approaches to sociological theory.

The chief defect of the volume is both so small as perhaps to make unworthy its mention, and exceedingly large. The fact is, Mrs. Russett has written the rightest of books, but has given it the wrongest of names. Her parade of characters—from Comte and Spencer; down through Ward, Cumplowicz, Small, and Pareto; though Henderson and Parson—strongly suggests that the text should have been confined in its advertisement, as in its analysis, to American *sociological* thought, rather than to American social thought. A few equilibrium theorists among political scientists—Catlin and Easton, most prominently—are included. But the economists, who of course have turned the equilibrium concept to its best known and most analytically potent uses, are explicitly excluded from this volume's cognizance, and for reasons which this reviewer finds not altogether persuasive.

"At base," Mrs. Russett writes (p. 177), "the case equilibrium resolves into the perennial question of how felicitously science can ever encapsulate human experience." Similarly, the value of a work of this sort lies in the lucidity with which it articulates the underlying premises of an important and constantly developing intellectual discipline—modern sociology. Mrs. Russett's book takes high marks as a book to be read by political scientists, and as one very sure to be referenced in the future literature of American social and political inquiry.—GERALD GARVEY, *Federal Power Commission.*

Varieties of Political Theory. EDITED BY DAVID EASTON. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. Pp. iv, 154. $4.95.)

This brief volume is part of a new Prentice-Hall series devoted to empirical political theory. The intention of the book's editor is to enrich the approaches of political scientists engaged in theory-building with a selection of strategies for theorizing about politics which have been developed by scholars in the related fields of economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, and economics. All the contributors are eminent in their several disciplines—James Buchanan, James March, Talcott Parsons, Anatol Rapoport, Herbert Simon and M. A. Smith. The essays were originally presented as panel papers at the 1963 meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Readers who are familiar with the work of the authors of this volume will find relatively little in it which is entirely new. The essays by Buchanan, Simon, Parsons and Easton are largely capsulizations of theories they have expounded at great length elsewhere. Easton explicitly notes that his contribution is a slightly revised version of the second chapter of *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (1965). And Buchanan indicates that his chapter is a brief statement of the approach which he and Gordon Tullock enployed in *The Calculus of Consent* (1962). The book does, of course, have utility as a compilation. It is handy to have these important theories between two covers. And two of them do appear to be entirely new work—Smith's explication of a structural approach to comparative political analysis and March's discussion of the utility of the concept of "power" in predictive theories of social choice. March's essay received an award as the best paper presented at the APSA meetings in 1963.

As an economic strategy for theorizing James Buchanan offers an individualistic model of political process, adapted from the classical conceptualization of the economy, which dispenses with such difficult-to-operationalize concepts as "social welfare function" and "public interest." Actually, advocacy of this model might better be described as restoring to political science a mode of analysis originally developed there, though later exploited as an academic tool more fully by economists than by political scientists. The basic premises of the model, as well as the substantive problem in which Buchanan is interested—a rational rule for the creation and amendment of constitutions—are the same as those of classical contractarians like Hobbes and Locke.

Viewing the Buchanan approach as a revival of contractarianism (which the author himself explicitly acknowledges in *Calculus of Consent*) raises a question as to whether this can be described as a purely empirical theory of politics, one which is value-free. For individualist norms attach to the contractarian model, and it is usually viewed as a normative theory. A welfare-state liberal might well see Buchanan's paper as a conservative polemic. It is not entirely clear, however, that the editor understands empirical theory, at least at the high level of generality of the theories in this book, as a value-free enterprise. In the introductory chapter, Mr. Easton says that "modern theory seeks to follow in the grand tradition of moral theory. It poses fundamental questions about the nature and direction of political enquiry." Unfortunately this thought is not developed. This book would have been more complete if it had included as essay by a philosopher on the fact-value dichotomy and on the large question of the relation of value theory to causal theory in the scientific study of politics.

March's essay on the "Power of Power" is an important study of the analytical utility of a concept which has always been part of the political scientist's equipment and which in the last several years has been subjected to a variety of attempts at clarification and operationalization by such scholars as Cartwright, Dahl, Karlsson, Riker, Shapley, Shubik, and Simon. The paper is confined to an examination of theories that center on mechanisms of social choice and it focuses on the question of the circumstances under which the use of the concept "power" contributes to the predictive value of a theory. After describing the typical concepts, procedures, and results of three basic approaches to the study of power (experimental, community, and institutional studies) and six classes of models of social choice which cut across these approaches, March concludes that the "power" concept has a rather restricted utility as a predictive tool at present. It is most useful in "short-run situations involving the direct confrontations of committed and activated participants," situations found more frequently in the laboratory than in nature, though he believes that methodological advances may extend the utility of the concept in the future to more complicated and long-run natural situations.

Anthropologist M. G. Smith presents a challenge to the vogue of functional approaches in the empirical study of political systems like those of Easton and Almond, and exemplified in this book by Talcott Parsons' essay. Despite their claims to universality Smith finds these approaches culture-bound, appropriate only to the study of nation-states, and he proposes in detail a structural frame of reference which he believes has broader applicability.

Herbert Simon, in an essay called "The Decision-Framework," remarks that he might have used the labels "action theory," "economic theory," "influence theory," and "game theory" as alternative titles for his paper. The first three of these are appropriate names for the approaches of Parsons, Buchanan and March, respectively. This suggests that while this book is designed to present *varieties* of political theorizing, there is also an implicit or underlying unity in the essays. They all bear in some way or other on decision-making, and for all of them the concept of decision-making, with which Simon's paper is concerned, seems to be a core concept. Whether their authors would all agree to Simon's peculiar way of conceptualizing the salient aspects of the decision-making process, however, is not clear. And Simon's essay was not intended to state the common ground shared by the contributors. Some effort at review and synthesis by the editor in his concluding chapter would have been an invaluable addition to a useful book.—WILLIAM T. BLUHM, *The University of Rochester.*

Chinese Political Thought: Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi. By Yung Ping Chen. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. Pp. ix, 118. 16.50 guilders.)

As the title suggests, Professor Chen's aim is to analyze the ideas of Mao and Liu, considered as the two most authoritative political thinkers in China today. His method consists in presenting very succinctly the views of Marx, Lenin and Stalin on a given aspect of the theory and practice of Communism, and then comparing the ideas of Mao and Liu with those of their predecessors and of one another. The eight chapters (apart from a brief and not very accurate biographical introduction) deal with most of the essential points: philosophical viewpoint, Chinese conditions, democratic revolution, socialist revolution, state and government, the Communist Party, nationalism and internationalism, and the Sino-Soviet ideological conflict. This approach has the advantage of clearly singling out the important theoretical issues. It also presents the danger, from which the author does not entirely escape, of detaching from their historical context theoretical statements which are often understandable only in terms of the practical political aims which they were intended to serve at a given moment. Thus he juxtaposes a Mao text of 1926 (as rewritten in 1950) and a Liu text of 1945 in order to demonstrate that Liu had more doubts about the "national bourgeoisie" than did Mao (p. 50).

An even graver distortion of historical perspective grows precisely out of the fact that Professor Chen has fallen victim to the falsification of the record of the past undertaken by Mao in the years immediately after he came to power. Thus he cites Stalin's observation, "In China, armed revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution," adding that Mao has frequently used this statement to justify the necessity of establishing a Red Army (p. 51). He neglects to tell us that when Stalin made the above remark in 1926, the "armed revolution" he was talking about was the Northern Expedition led by Chiang Kai-shek. (Mao's own statement, in early 1926, "The present world situation is one in which the two big forces, revolution and counter-revolution are engaged in the final struggle," (p. 94) should be understood in a similar light; for Mao too, at this time, the leader of China's revolutionary forces was Chiang Kai-shek.) Similarly, the author discusses (pp. 52–54) Mao's advocacy, in 1937 and 1938, of a long-term united front with the Nationalists even after victory over Japan, without mentioning that in the original contemporary texts of these writings Mao specifically said that leadership belonged and would continue to belong to the Kuomintang.

Professor Chen's conclusions regarding the extent and limits of Mao Tse-tung's originality are on the whole prudent and reasonable, though he errs in claiming that Lenin, unlike Mao, never imagined that a country such as China could avoid the capitalist stage in its development, and move directly from a "semi-feudal and semi-colonial" status into socialism. (Lenin expounded this idea at some length at the Second Comintern Congress in 1920). As for the author's comparison of Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-ch'i, one could hardly have expected him, in a book revised for the press in the summer of 1964, to predict the present dramatic conflict between the two men—though he could have discovered somewhat more about the history of the tensions and rivalry between them had he delved into the sources of the Yenan period. On the whole, his presentation of the nuances between the views and attitudes of Mao and Liu is perceptive and accurate. He correctly emphasizes Liu's tendency to attach greater political weight to the working class, and to be more critical of the peasantry, which has indeed marked off his position from that of Mao for over forty years.

Certain other statements in the book, which appear singularly at variance with the facts today, are less excusable even in a work written several years ago. Thus, Professor Chen writes: "Another aspect of democratic centralism is found in Mao and Liu's adherence to the principle of collective leadership" (p. 83). Long before 1964, the Mao cult had attained monumental proportions, and by 1964 it had unquestionably left that of Stalin in the shade. And it is hard to see how anyone could write in 1964 that, while differing from the Russians "on substantial points," the Chinese had "skillfully avoided open disagreements on basic principles," though of course there are those who still believe this today.—Stuart R. Schram, *Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris.*

L'Idée de Philosophie Politique: Annales de Philosophie Politique-6. By P. Arnaud, P. Bastid, H. Batiffol, J. W. Chapman, S. Cotta, B. de Jouvenel, R. Polin, R. Treves and D. Sternberger. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965. Pp. 195. F. 10.)

Issued under the auspices of the Institut International de Philosophie Politique, this book consists of eight individual contributions and a summarized colloquium. Four of the papers are by Frenchmen, two by Italians, one by a German, and one by an American. Two are published in English, the rest in French.

To review any work of this sort is difficult. The difficulty in this case is compounded by the fact that the underlying theme of the volume is by no means obvious. Although the title suggests that

the over-all purpose is to define political philosophy, this is true only of the first five articles, which constitute Part I. The remaining three articles, and the colloquium, which appear as Part II under the general title "Problèmes de Philosophie Politique" are actually devoted to an exploration of "l'Idée de Constitution." At first glance this would seem to be a rather different subject.

In Part I the longest and most substantial contribution is J. W. Chapman's "Political Theory: Logical Structure and Enduring Types," an original and interesting attempt to outline a typology of modern political thought, using Hume as a starting-point and as a recurring point of reference. It is well worth reading, but is clearly out of place in the present context.

The remaining contributors to Part I are concerned, in a more direct and basic way, with problems of scope and method. An Italian, R. Treves, takes the familiar logico-positivist line that all philosophy is essentially non-normative, and that political philosophers should limit themselves to problems of methodology. This proposition is rejected by the three French scholars whose articles lead off and set the general tone of the volume. To them political philosophy (or as B. de Jouvenel prefers to call it, "la politique pure") may or may not be normative, but in either case is to be defined as a search for truths of the widest possible degree of generality. The political philosopher is one who "spécule sur les principes fondamentaux de l'organisation sociale" (P. Bastid, p. 20), one who tries to "saisir l'actualité politique sous ses aspects les plus simples" (B. de Jouvenel, p. 27) or who helps us to "comprendre les grandes attitudes politiques humaines" (R. Polin, p. 41). But specific historic events (this point is particularly emphasized by the first two authors) are intrinsically contingent, and therefore incapable of being subsumed under broad generalizations. It is only in so far as they are regulated by social institutions, above all by law-making institutions, that human actions are capable of becoming in any way orderly and predictable. The study of such institutions is, therefore, the only possible subject of political philosophy.

As compared with the current traditions of Anglo-American scholarship, this is a distinctly legalistic view of the nature of politics. Once this fact is recognized, it is easy to see the rationale of concluding a book on the idea of political philosophy with a section devoted to constitutional problems. A constitution is the most highly generalized and least contingent of social institutions. It channels the chaotic political energies of a society into forms of action that are relatively fixed and predictable. For a political philosophy conceived in terms of high-level generalizations, a study of the nature and limitations of constitutions is bound to be a matter of central concern.—FREDERICK M. WATKINS, *Yale University.*

Elites and Society. T. B. BOTTOMORE. (New York: Basic Books, 1964. $4.50.)

The theory of elites as elaborated by Pareto, Mosca, Schumpeter, Lasswell and others is not a scientific theory so much as an ideological critique of Marxist Socialism and Democracy. Because it is an ideological critique, it is limited as scientific theory. This is the thesis of T. B. Bottomore in this volume. It is somewhat late in the day to say that a sociology of knowledge analysis of theory in no way bears upon the scientific validation of a theory. The validity of a theory is independent of the motives of its authors or the effects of the theory on the beliefs of those who either accept or reject it.

If the basic premise of elite theory is true, that minority rule occurs in all political systems, then Marxist socialism in its emphasis upon the class basis of power and democracy, cannot be true. Further, then Democratic beliefs in popular rule are also a myth and an illusion. It is Bottomore's task to refute elite theory, so as to buttress both Socialism and Democracy as he defines them.

Only some highlights of the author's analysis can be presented here. The contention that elite circulation is a check on elite power is answered by a criticism of circulation theories for their failure to be empirically supported. Bottomore rightfully points out that the theories of Pareto, Kolabinska, Pirenne, and Schumpeter have led to no systematic studies of turnover and circulation, and those that do exist are too fragmentary to support the theory.

To the argument that the growing differentiation of elites of managers, intellectuals and bureaucrats pluralizes political influence, the author contends (without evidence) that industrial managers and public officials are closely associated with the upper classes of society, and insofar as they directly influence public policy, it is more likely to be along the lines of class interests than along the lines of their own particular aims (p. 81). Inferences about what public officials do, based upon their class origins, would not find much substantiation in the research on the recruitment of decision makers.

The author regards as at best an overstatement, the theory of democracy as the competition among elites, as elaborated originally by Schumpeter and then others. For Bottomore, such a theory means the abandonment of "government by the people," the dynamic conception of democracy, because it promises progressive extensions of political opportunity. The elite competition conception is static and insufficient, since it neg-

lects or gives insufficient attention to the social substrata or preconditions necessary to democracy. To the typical pluralist argument that voluntary groups and associations are sources of elite competition, the author prefers to emphasise the role of groups in extending the opportunity for popular political participation. Again, a good deal of empirical evidence would make this dubious.

The author sees democracy as an extension of self-government not only in government but in economic life as well. The author tries to answer criticism that socialism and collective ownership lead to bureaucratization and atrophy of citizen participation. Several times Yugoslavia is cited as an example of emerging reconciliation of democracy and socialism, but here the forms of decentralization are cited, not the effective distribution of power.

This is a curious work, a mixture of good reasoning and bad; cogent evidence mixed with superficiality. This mixture is so viscous that it sacrifices some coherence. In his criticism of pluralism, Bottomore can insightfully find contradiction. In his analysis of the deficiencies in the research on elite circulation, the author's remarks are cogent. We would add that the complexity of the measurement of political mobility lies in the difficulties in the measurement of power. Moreover, measurement confronts difficult problems in that not only individuals move, but groups, organizations and roles undergo mobility as well. We are just at the beginning of comparative study of political roles. In his espousal of a kind of democracy by popular participation, the author's realism and critical acuity recede. Direct democracy is a durable myth, despite evidence that wherever it is espoused or practiced it has been but another justification for a political elite.

Despite these reservations, the book is to be recommended for being very stimulating and provocative. It is a most useful and welcome discussion in the current discussion about democracy and pluralism.—LESTER SELIGMAN, *University of Oregon.*

Independence and Involvement: A Christian Reorientation in Political Science. By RENE DE VISME WILLIAMSON. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964. Pp. ix, 269. $7.50.)

This is not an apologetic work but an expository one. After describing what the author calls the promises of the Christian faith and evaluating both the shortcomings and achievements of the Christian community he proceeds to analyse such concepts as liberty, law, civil rights, citizenship and representation in the light of the Christian faith and in the context of contemporary problems. As a work of exposition the argument of the book is addressed primarily to those who share the author's fundamental convictions. To those who do not share his convictions the book will undoubtedly appear to be irrelevant if not eccentric.

As one who shares the author's fundamental convictions, if not his theology, this reviewer has found the book to be a stimulating attempt genuinely to re-think some old problems. His discussion of the shortcomings of both liberalism and conservatism and of the need to transcend both is particularly perceptive. In his criticism of liberalism the author is careful to point out that he is not "attempting to justify those critics of modern liberalism who misuse the Christian doctrine of man to block and discredit all social reform. The important point to establish is that moral integrity and welfare programs are interdependent and that social reform cannot succeed beyond the moral capacity of both government and people to sustain it" (p. 97). The author affirms the Christian basis of the modern welfare state but with a more realistic understanding of the difficulties of achieving the common good than characterized the more sentimental and optimistic Social Gospelers of the nineteenth century. "Men do not naturally turn the other cheek, walk the second mile, love their enemies, lend and give generously, enjoy freedom from worry, avoid censoriousness and ostentation. It is Christ, not the natural man, who calls qualities like meekness and purity of heart blessed. In the eyes of the world, the meek are insignificant and mousy, and the pure in heart are naive and inexperienced. Only one man ever lived the Christian ethic to the full . . . . Even deeply committed and mature Christians, still being sinners, cannot live it to the full. There is always a gap between profession and practice, reach and grasp, aspiration and achievement. And this gap makes hypocrites of us all" (p. 184).

Professor Williamson writes from within the Calvinist theological tradition and if his book has a weakness it is the denominational narrowness of his theological perspective. He would undoubtedly describe his own perspective as Biblical but that in itself reveals a particular theological bias. Discussing John Courtney Murray's *We Hold These Truths* Professor Williamson finds it strange apparently that Father Murray should attempt "the formidable task of proving that Roman Catholicism and the American tradition are compatible" (p. 154). Related to this weakness is the author's lack of interest in other contemporary efforts to relate the Christian faith to politics. One would expect a book of this kind to devote considerable attention to an analysis of the thought of Reinhold Niebuhr but Niebuhr is mentioned

only in passing and there is little or no appreciation given to his important and influential work. There is no mention of Nicholas Berdyaev, Jacques Maritain, John C. Bennett, Eric Voegelin, V. A. Demant, the social encyclicals or the studies sponsored by the World Council of Churches. Professor Williamson's book is not an analysis of the significant work that has already been done on the same subject but is more in the nature of a personal testimonial. Contemporary readers would expect some confrontation with the thought exemplified by Harvey Cox if only to show what the author thinks is defective in that kind of thinking. But I expect it is a common complaint of reviewers that the author did not write the kind of book they should like him to have written. And perhaps the complaint is unjustified. The author has written in a field in which it is difficult to be original and yet, in a sense, has succeeded. It is not a survey of other people's ideas so much as it is one man's attempt to face up to some difficult problems. His argument is not likely to persuade those who do not share his basic commitment but to those who do it may prove a stimulus to further thought. And at a time when "competing faiths . . . fight for the possession of the world" it is surely important to bring those faiths and their consequences to the level of intellectual self-consciousness.—JOHN H. HALLOWELL, *Duke University.*

The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. EDITED BY OSCAR AND MARY HANDLIN. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 962. $17.50.)

The revolutionary era was one of the most creative periods of American political history, and eleven states formulated new constitutions between 1776 and 1780. The War undermined the legitimacy of the colonial charters, and the process of establishing the new constitutions illustrated the difficulties involved in translating abstract social contract theories into practice. The act of erecting constitutions and declaring systems of rights in the midst of a war constitute what Sir Ernest Barker calls the "honour" of the American Revolution.

The Popular Sources of Political Authority is a collection of documents relevant to both the rejected Massachusetts Constitution of 1778 and the adopted Constitution of 1780. The editorial purpose is to "examine, in one state, the interactions among the ideas of the Enlightenment, the existing institutions of government, and the unspoken assumptions of the people about their relationship to political power." The proposal, examination, and rejection of the Constitution of 1778 were the first steps in an interchange between leaders and led that culminated in the ratification of the Constitution of 1780. The process of establishing a new constitution, the editors argue, familiarized the people of the state with a "body of political theories which did not remain abstract, but was reduced to meaningful categories that described their own experience," and illustrates the close connection between leaders and followers that was unique to the American Revolution. The Introduction traces the major themes of the constitutional debates and supplies some of the background material necessary for an adequate understanding of them. Its approach is configurative rather than comparative and the editors deal with their material as "an incident in the life of a particular society."

The documents present the results of the debates rather than the debates themselves, and rarely give more than a bare summary of the reasoning used in arriving at decisions. The Constitution of 1778 was formulated in an attempt to provide a legitimate government for Massachusetts. Many citizens argued that the existing government was as illegitimate as that of England, and though some indeed preferred that there should be no state government, and others thought the process of constitution building should be delayed until after the war, most thought a government legitimized by popular consent was an immediate necessity. Prior to the formulation of the Constitution of 1778 debate centered around questions of whether towns or individuals were to be represented, whether the existing legislative body or an especially elected Convention was to formulate the Constitution, and methods of popular ratification.

The government proposed by the 1778 Constitution closely resembled the colonial government. Property qualifications for electors and elected were detailed, and the Governor was given the responsibility for defending the limitations of the Constitution. The towns examined the proposed Constitution and attacked almost all sections of it. Some argued that the property qualifications were too small, while others said they were too large. Many objected to the provision debarring Indians, Negroes and mulattoes from the vote and to the provision requiring towns to pay the salaries of their representatives, and most of the towns objected to the lack of a Bill of Rights. The Essex Result also presents the spectre of the declining morality of the American people which was to be echoed and re-echoed by the Founding Fathers. Stoughton, in Eastern Massachusetts, presented a fascinating plan for a Board of Censors, elected by all freemen, which should meet every three years "to enquire whether the Constitution has been preserved inviolate, and whether the legislative juditical and executive

branches of the Government have performed their duty as guardians of the people or rasumed to themselves or exercised other or greater powers than they are entitled to by the Constitution . . . ." This Board was to have the authority to "negative laws enacted contrary to the principles of the Constitution" for one year from the day of their election. Most of the towns, however, did not concern themselves with this problem.

After the rejection of the Constitution of 1778 a new Constitution incorporating a Bill of Rights, and erecting a Senate designed to protect property and a House designed to protect persons, was proposed. The Constitution retained property qualifications for voting and office holding, and provided for the payment of Representatives by the State. In many ways it acknowledged the objections raised against the previous Constitution. Debate in the towns centered on the provisions concerning religious liberty, and the property qualifications. Multiple objections were raised to many provisions of the Constitution, but the sense of the state seemed inclined towards ratification.

It is tempting to relate the State Constitutional debates to the later debates on the Federal Constitution, since many of the same issues were raised. But the Founding Fathers were wiser, more experienced and better read than most of those involved in the state debates, and moved on a different level of discourse. Though the states provide a useful training ground for the framers it would be fallacious to relate the debates on the Federal Constitution too closely to the debates on the state constitutions.

Much of the potential usefulness of this book is vitiated by the poor editorial apparatus. The book could use more extensive notes aiding those not steeped in Massachusetts history. The index is probably useless to a political scientist, since it includes only proper names for the documents, although it lists some subject names for the introduction.—HARRIS MIRKIN, *University of Missouri at Kansas City.*

Poor Richard's Politicks: Benjamin Franklin and His New American Order. By PAUL W. CONNOR. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. xi, 285, $6.50.)

For those of us who were introduced to Dr. Franklin by a presentation copy of Carl Van Doren's biography, only to have our understanding enriched or confused by the "Franklin and" studies (e.g., Franklin and the Stamp Act, Franklin and France, Franklin and the Post Office, and so on), Paul Connor's book would rate at the very least as a welcome relief. Happily, his study is a good deal more than that.

One's first impression, and it wears well, is that this is an exceptionally well-written book. Connor has a graceful prose style, and one admirably suited to his Eighteenth Century man of letters and affairs. Substantively, Professor Connor has made two major contributions to our knowledge and appreciation of Benjamin Franklin. The first and more modest is the successful attempt to integrate Franklin's thought with the larger patterns of Enlightenment social and political philosophy. This feature is even more impressive because it is continued throughout the book rather than being confined to a single chapter.

The second and more important contribution lies in the extent to which Professor Connor has described the order and consistency of Franklin's social and political concepts. He takes issue, explicitly and implicitly, with writers who have found little but contradiction in Franklin's exposition of his basic views. Connor has demonstrated, to my satisfaction at least, that there is a remarkable consistency and system in the old gentleman's ideas, at least where his vision of America's possibilities were concerned.

The theme to which Connor relates Franklin's ideas is that of "a tripartite socio-political goal which the author has chosen to call the New American Order—virtuous, evolving, and harmonious" (p. x). Under these three heads Connor draws together otherwise seemingly disparate and unrelated elements of Franklin's thought, as well as pertinent references to Franklin's practices and experiences in business, government, and diplomacy. It is well done.

Professor Connor's book will be a useful one in the courses on American political theory and American intellectual history, and it may cause those of us who have relegated Kindly Old Ben to the discard heap in those fields to think the problem through again.—STEPHEN R. MITCHELL, *University of Calgary.*

Symbols of American Community, 1735–1775. By RICHARD L. MERRITT. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. Pp. xxii, 279, $6.00.)

Content analysis, as a research method in the behavioral sciences and the humanities, has been undergoing something of a renaissance in recent years. Professor Merritt's book, largely based on a content analysis of colonial newspapers performed as part of his doctoral dissertation at Yale, contains some examples of the reasons why.

First, the tracks of modern computational techniques are everywhere in this work. In contrast to many earlier content analysts, the author is obviously at home with a wide range of statistical techniques; he is in command of his data. When he asserts that his tables show a difference, he is prepared to defend his statement with an

appropriate statistical test. Although I can find no immediate mention of the fact, I feel sure that he enjoyed the use of a modern computer.

Theoretical sophistication in advance of older content analytical works is also present. Although not everyone agrees with the emphasis Harold Lasswell and his students place on the importance of symbols in political affairs, it is difficult for anyone to argue that the system is theoretically barren. Indeed, at the end of the book, one is quite likely to join the author in his near reification of such ideas as "symbol revolution," "levels of attention," and "curves of American community awareness."

Occasionally—and perhaps this, too, is part of the new emphasis in content analysis—the author seems to be trying too hard to make a case for special or unique knowledge produced by content analysis in contrast to older, purely historical approaches. A point he emphasizes, for example, is that the colonial newspapers studied showed a shift toward the use of "American" symbols of self-reference (as opposed to "British" or "continental" symbols) about 1763. This was two years before the Stamp Act Crisis which historians often take as the beginning of the rapid movement toward independence in the colonies.

Whether this "symbolic change" was a real one or just a minor hop in the curves at that point seems to me to be of less significance than the truly rapid and dramatic rise in the use of American symbols that *did* accompany the Stamp Act Crisis. If *this* change had not occurred, then the validity of the analysis could well have been questioned.

What this book seems to illustrate quite well is not that content analysis can make *unique* contributions to the study of history and politics, but that, as a method, it can make *additional* contributions of interest and value.

The book includes two useful appendices for the scholar—one on the methods employed by the author and one on the data collected—and an index.—WAYNE A. DANIELSON, *University of North Carolina.*

Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement. BY A. N. OPPENHEIM. (New York: Basic Books, 1966. Pp. viii, 298, $5.95.)

This "how-to" book is addressed generally to students in sociology and social-psychology and to commercial practitioners who may need to design a questionnaire in research.

Oppenheim first analyzes—in logical and chronological fashion, yet briefly and generally—the problems of survey research (i.e., descriptive versus analytical) and the type of design appropriate to each. He next treats problems of questionnaire design, primarily concerning himself with the utility of a pilot study, the comparative advantages of personal interviewing versus mailed questionnaires, open versus closed types of questions, and filtering questions. The general problems of question-wording (with relation to leading questions, prestige bias, embarrassing items, maintaining rapport, and instructions) are examined in the third chapter. The next five chapters explain and evaluate alternative techniques for eliciting social data: (1) checklists, rating scales, rankings, and inventories; (2) measuring attitude statements (including problems of "acquiescence" and of "social desirability"); (3) the construction of attitude scales (in which Bogardus' social-distance, Thurstone, Likert, factorial, and Guttman scales are described and evaluated with regard to the desired criteria of unidimensionality, equal intervals, reliability, validity, and reproducibility); (4) various projective techniques involving association, fantasy, ambiguous stimuli, and/or conceptualizing and making use primarily of sentence completions, cartoons, and thematic apperception tests); and (5) finally a miscellaneous chapter (on sociometric analysis, the semantic-differential technique, and the use of diaries for data collection). Oppenheim concludes his book with a simple chapter on data analysis: quantification, coding, punching, card layout, and the plan of analysis (for marginals, cross-tabulations, and simple multivariate distributions), concluding with a few comments on statistics, mainly involving chi-square tests.

A general methods book must still be judged in terms of its utility (which I would define as both the adequacy of its coverage of subject-matter and the level of its treatment of those topics) to a specific discipline such as political science. In these terms, then, for the beginning researcher who is concerned solely with anticipating and automatically resolving the more common problems of questionnaire design and who is utterly alone (i.e., no one on his own faculty of use and no access to the ICPR at Ann Arbor), this book *might* prove useful.

But it is a cook-book and its limitations ought to be recognized. First, the author has addressed himself to primary measuring instruments in the social sciences, yet his treatment of levels of measurement is so simplified as to reduce to a series of canons of good research to be dogmatically memorized—rather than understood. Second, the book is also regrettable evidence of cultural lag, for much of the discussion is based upon the assumption that no computer will be available to the researcher. A third limitation—highly relevant in view of the fact that uninitiated students are often uncritically enthusiastic about application of "scientific technology" in social inquiry—relates to the disturbing fall-off

in research on the methodology of survey research since World War II, including research on the topics to which Oppenheim addresses himself. Many questions remain open—as indicated by the recent replication and extension of the Parry-Crossley findings on the high amount of unreliability and invalidity on fact questions concerning registration or having voted by Bell and Buchanan; but the author gives the novice totally inadequate warning about these disturbing problems. Fourth, the discussion of analysis might better have been left unsaid, for it is a severe retrograde from Hyman's treatment and yet is is precisely within the area of analysis that political scientists, who have become increasingly sophisticated about what data they need and how to get them, require more sophisticated instruction and practice.

In short, Oppenheim's book confirms the wisdom of the now-emerging political science series of methodology manuals (e.g., Backstrum and Hursh, and Janda): political scientists have enough unique and important problems, and have now accumulated enough research, that it is time for research texts uniformly addressed to the subject-matters and using the examples of this discipline.—HARRY M. SCOBLE, *University of California at Los Angeles.*

Approaches to Organizational Design. EDITED BY JAMES D. THOMPSON. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1966. Pp. vi, 223. $3.95.)

Approaches to Organizational Design impressed this reader with the reach and competence of its parts, but the volume left him wondering about the sureness of the grasp of the total effort. The book is one of the products of the Second Seminar on the Social Science of Organizations held during June, 1963, and attended by representatives of various disciplines, including psychology, sociology, industrial administration, and political science. Participants met in small groups for ten days of discussion branching out from brief working papers. Five participants later developed the papers which constitute the volume being reviewed.

The wide reach of the volume in its parts may be suggested briefly. Thus the five individual chapters deal with: an approach to organization as a system of constraints; a framework for analyzing interorganization relations; a set of hypotheses concerning innovation in large enterprises; a catalog of proposed dimensions for a theory of organization; and even a set of impressive notes on the design of organisations. Other diversities may be sampled. Thus Triandis reflects a deep concern with concepts and operations for gathering data as primary in the development of any comprehensive empirical theory. Other contributors, particularly Buck, in effect look the other way. They emphasize the value of the uses of such techniques as linear programming in manipulating data, almost (but not quite) independently of how the data are gathered or whether they can be gathered. Relatedly, the several contributions were variously grounded in available empirical research. Triandis' piece was most cautious about moving beyond relatively-firm research. The balance of the volume decidedly was not determined by Triandis, however. Thus Wilson and Evan attempted to extrapolate global insights from admittedly inadequate descriptive research; and Stogdill gave almost-prescriptive attention to "the scope and dimensions of organization theory." Indeed, more generally, the volume may be characterized as generating steams of high-level hypotheses.

All this implies that many tastes are likely to be whetted by *Approaches to Organizational Design*, and differentially so by different pieces. This reviewer found Triandis' piece most useful and satisfying, for example. To put the matter in another way, I abreacted from the high-level hypothecation (and the play on words *is* intentional) characteristic of the volume. In many cases, to illustrate the reasons for my reaction, the ways in which hypotheses were generated in the volume often to me complicated the processes of verification and replication, if those processes were not subtly rejected. I cannot otherwise regard a "hypothesis" that begins and goes little beyond noting that: "The greater the diversity of the organization . . ."

Even given the volume's general tone of "systemic sociology," however, I can argue with certainty only that Triandis' piece was pleasingly different to me from (for example) such pieces as Wilson's treatment of innovation. I cannot predict the relative usefulness of the pieces in guiding and inspiring future research, the only real criterion. What I see as research titanium, in short, may be verbal dross. Moreover, I certainly do not count it a waste to have coped with the full diversity of the five papers, despite my own more parochial interests. Far from it, in fact. Only a very wise (or very foolish) student of man's collective efforts could come away from the volume without feeling a greater appreciation of the manifold challenges facing organizational analysis.

It also seems fair to note that *Approaches to Organizational Design* will not sate any research or applied appetites, however. Directly—and this leaves me wondering about the grasp of the total effort, about the usefulness of the *gestalt* it implies for organization analysis—the volume leaves me without the feeling of it as somehow tending to become integral. An argument is in-

tegral if its parts reflect an internal coherence *and* a relational consistency, primitively. At another level, integrality may be defined in terms of those blind men and that elephant. Here integrality reflects confidence that the observers have enough handholds on the reality they cope with so as to permit reasonable confidence on two points: that they can meaningfully begin to describe some theoretical totality-in-the-state-of-becoming; and that they are describing the same related phenomena, more or less.

The volume being reviewed fails tests of integrality, as dually defined. The several contributions are unevenly related to the public theme of organization design, for example, only one or two giving extended and direct consideration to that theme. Moreover, any broader commonalities are not clearly articulated. Indeed, Thompson apparently chose to let the papers stand pretty much as reflections of the diversity and in-process character of the area of study. Most revealingly, the papers are nestled between a two-page Preface and four pages of interpretive Afterword. Editor Thompson concludes by noting that its movement "closer to identifying some basic issuess speaks for the Seminar's success," a very tentative movement indeed toward internal integrality.

My basic concerns about *Approaches to Organizational Design*, however, derive from doubts about the volume's integrality defined as having a good enough grasp on the vitals of its target-phenomena. To be sure, the volume's title does not promise integrality in this second sense. And I do not merely argue that a more appropriate title would have been *Mostly Rational Approaches to Organizational Design*. That is, my concern is that some readers will feel the volume does have a firm grasp on "organization design." Admittedly, my own ox is involved. For I am often a "change agent" concerned with organization design, and most of the volume's papers (Triandis' excepted) only tangentially touch vast areas of concern to me in that role. My concern goes deeper, however, I feel. That is, one can at least suggest that the Seminar was a prime victim of its own myopia of scope.

Let me try economically to illustrate my concerns about the volume's integrality in this second sense. To simplify, the Second Seminar had at least two major purposes: to present cognitive material relevant to organization design, and thus material dealing in substantial degree with behavioral change by others in organizations; and to help Seminar participants themselves to "build relations" and perhaps to change parts of themselves, specifically to reinforce or to develop attitudes or feelings about commonalities across the social sciences based on mutual concern for collective phenomena. It is twice ironic, therefore, that the Seminar papers and (as far as I have been able to learn) the design of its format neglected the massive contemporary research and applied efforts being devoted to "laboratory programs" of organizational change and development which initially stress unfreezing old attitudes and feelings, developing more appropriate attitudes, and reinforcing them. The social scientists at the Second Seminar, in short, thus denied the aid of today's most vigorous brand of "applied social science" to their own pieces of organization analysis as well as to their own interactions.

A complex summary may help bring some of the pieces above closer together. On the cognitive level of material relevant to organization design and to behavioral change—the first proposed purpose of the Seminar—I feel a dual concern about the integrality of *Approaches to Organizational Design*, at once so rich in its parts and still somehow so unsatisfying in its totality. That is, the volume's component pieces unclearly reflect relational consistencies. Moreover, such important areas are neglected as to raise doubts about the integrality of the volume in even roughly encompassing relevant phenomena.

I have no such concerns about the second proposed purpose of the Seminar, that of reinforcing or developing feelings in participants and relations between them that emphasize a common concern with organizational phenomena as a strong link between the several social sciences. Based upon the "before" and "after" work of a number of Seminar participants I know well, I count the Second Seminar a success in these terms. It seems to have induced a more vital sense in participants of the real connectedness of the social sciences derivative from their common concern with organized effort.—ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI, *University of Georgia.*

AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Congressmen and the Electorate: Elections for the U. S. House and the President, 1920–1964. BY MILTON C. CUMMINGS, JR. (New York: The Free Press, 1967. Pp. xvii, 233, $5.95.)

Professor Cummings' book is the result of his considerable effort over a long period of time to unravel the relationships between congressional elections and presidential elections. Obviously, these relationships are multi-faceted and one must make some decisions about the specific questions to be answered, the data to be collected, and the methods to be employed. Professor Cummings has limited himself to questions about electoral relationships between presidential and

congressional candidates during the presidential elections, 1920–1964, as these relationships are evident in the analysis of aggregate election statistics presented in the standard sources. Specifically, he examines the overall national results for the party ticket, several dimensions of split ticket voting, the importance of incumbency for congressional candidates, the effect of policy and personality differences between presidential and congressional candidates, minor parties and their effect, and the impact of certain formal characteristics of the election system (e.g., ballot form) on presidential and congressional elections.

Cummings handles each of these major problems with care and precision—as one would expect from a student of V. O. Key, Jr. In typical "Key" fashion, Cummings proceeds by setting forth the precise questions to be analyzed, presenting data in numerous tables and figures, analyzing the data, noting refinements, and developing conclusions which are thoroughly grounded in the data. The result of this process is that each point is firmly "nailed down" as Cummings continually probes, backs off, probes in a slightly different way, summarizes, reviews, and probes again. One unfortunate characteristic of this procedure is that it sometimes results in tables or figures with titles of over 50 words—somewhat of a challenge to the reader.

There are no major surprises in this volume. In general, Cummings finds what one would expect. His contribution is rather in the detail which he provides, the qualifications and refinements which he offers to accepted generalizations, the descriptions of specific electoral situations. Thus, for example, while providing supporting evidence for the time-honored generalization that the incumbent candidate enjoys a marked advantage, he also notes conditions under which the generalization does not hold up. And, in a sense, the entire book is an attempt to explain the exceptions to the generalization that "American voters support a President and a Congressman of the same party."

It is very difficult to criticize Professor Cummings' work. He clearly outlined the scope of his work and set about to complete his task. What he did do, he did well. The book is even readable—a major accomplishment when dealing almost entirely with aggregate elections data. My only major criticism is that the book "stops" rather than "drawing to a conclusion." Cummings does not provide a final chapter and, frankly, I wanted one, and thought I deserved one. The reader has to work his way through complicated analysis. A brief, concluding chapter would have been most helpful.

My remaining comments must be limited to what still needs to be done on this general subject. Cummings limits himself to presidential elections. Obviously, those intriguing, and peculiarly American, mid-term elections need to be examined too. Several times in his analysis, Cummings is led to comment on the extent to which congressional elections maintain the separation of power. The mid-term election is undoubtedly a major contributor to this maintenance but these elections are worth studying for other reasons too. A second major topic which has never received the attention it deserves is that of the significance of congressional elections, whenever they occur, on policy-making in Congress. Precisely what goes on in a campaign and election which helps to shape policy, if anything? Presumably the effect would be different from constituency to constituency. But how? Why? And what are these effects?

Other topics which bear investigation are the primaries, recruitment, campaigning, patterns of organization, organizational relationships (candidate organization to party organization, to other candidate organizations, etc.), and, of course, voter motivations and attitudes in congressional elections. There are countless researchable questions which could be developed for each of these general topics.

All of this should not detract from Professor Cummings' contribution in *Congressmen and the Electorate*. He has provided an important addition to a slim literature. It is my hope that Cummings, as the principal student of House elections, will continue to provide us with the benefits of his scholarship on these important events in American democracy.—CHARLES O. JONES, *University of Arizona.*

The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession. By CABELL PHILLIPS. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966. Pp. 463. $7.95.)

Cabell Phillips states in the preface to this book that we have lacked a sufficiently "proportioned" and "coherent" narrative on the Truman Presidency, and he wrote this book partially to fill the gap in the literature. Phillips' credentials for this undertaking are impressive. He has been with the *New York Times'* Washington Bureau for more than twenty years, including the entirety of Truman's tenure as President. The author acknowledges that his book is done in "journalistic perspective," but he has researched his subject thoroughly and has utilized published materials, interviews, and extensive files of personal correspondence to write a rather well-rounded volume on the Truman Presidency.

Chapters of this book examine Harry Truman's pre-presidential life; President Truman's staff and cabinet; the 1948 presidential campaign; the de-

cisions to drop atomic bombs on Japan, to intervene militarily in Korea, and to dismiss MacArthur; foreign policy developments including the Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, and NATO; and several other topics. The author's writing is spiced throughout with anecdotes and snippets of "inside" information that should hold the attention of most readers. Reporter Phillips seems at his best when he relates situations that require little independent ordering and interpretation, such as the Truman-Dewey presidential campaign. Where interpretations are made about Truman or his administration, Phillips is reasonably perceptive, and he commonly balances his own judgments and explanations against relevant writings of other scholars where differences exist. At the same time, Phillips is an unabashed propagandist for the ideology of human dignity; his treatment of "McCarthyism," especially, reverberates with concern for the worth and dignity of man. Consequently, one would hope that this book is widely read by the general public and that the book eventually is published in paperback and perhaps abridged form to facilitate its availability.

Political scientists who conduct systematic research on the American Presidency might glean some useful information from *The Truman Presidency*. Analysts who emphasize institutionalized behavior may find suggestive the author's discussion (pp. 159–165) that in late 1946 a small group of Truman's administrators, including bureaucrats as well as personal presidential staff, "imparted a much-needed element of liberal consistency to the Truman program" after President Truman during his first year and a half in office had "wavered frequently between a strong and a moderate liberal course." This runs counter to Richard Neustadt's hypothesis that presidential leadership must remain largely personal and non-institutionalized; Phillips' discussion suggests that the Presidency manifests significant potential for filling a power vacuum occasioned by a President who is unable or indisposed to provide consistent and effective policy leadership. Students of decision-making in the Presidency should find interesting the argument (pp. 305–308) that the 1950 Korean intervention decision was made within the framework of Policy Paper Number 68 of the National Security Council, which, according to Phillips, afforded guidelines substantially to facilitate the decisional process. This is inconsistent with Richard Snyder's contention that the Korean decision was essentially "unprogrammed," and Phillip's finding tends to support the feasibility of comprehensive planning to rationalize national security policy-making.

Beyond scattered pieces of information of the above sort, political scientists probably will not find this book very useful. Some may expect the book—written by a journalist who enjoyed access to presidential politics during Truman's time—to yield hard-to-come-by empirical data to be worked into their analytical schemes to explain behavior related to, and to guide reform of, the Presidency. Generally speaking, the book will not satisfy such expectations. The serious student of presidential politics will discover in this volume much that is commonplace and little that is relevant and useful to systematic analysis. But it is unrealistic to expect a single volume to serve directly all potential readers. Perhaps political scientists should be satisfied with the probability that Cabell Phillips' volume will increase understanding of the Presidency within the American political community.—WELDON V. BARTON, *Southwest Texas State College.*

With Kennedy. By PIERRE SALINGER. (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1966. Pp. xvi, 391. $5.95.)

The name of the game is politics—and politics involves the public image of both individual and institution. Communication between the press and government is the most critical process in creating and conveying an image to the public. But the image often comes less from what is done than how it is done, or from what is said than how is is said. Style then overcomes substance.

Salinger sees both the press and government as powerful adversaries with a basic tension in their relationship. "It is inevitable and it will be continuing since both have almost inexhaustible resources." Indeed, the theme of this book is the conflict between them, and the high points of the Kennedy Administration, as reported by Salinger, involve not just international crises but internal crises between the government and the press.

The interplay between these two protagonists involves a deep seated mutual distrust—of motives and veracity—as each pushes his line of reasonableness a bit further than the other views as reasonable. But, "Who shall draw the line?" This problem lies in the very nature of their roles and objectives. Constitutionally, the government guarantees freedom of the press, and for "a successful press policy (must) allow access to information and policy makers." At the same time it must involve itself in every major crisis of the day, while putting forth its best possible image. The press is equally involved in these crises as reporter, interpreter and critic of the government's activity. For Salinger, " . . . no single issue took more of my time and energies than freedom of information . . . . The press insists on its right to know and print what is happening in government. The President insists on his right to conceal or withhold information whose

publication might threaten the national security."

And it was national security crises which brought the Kennedy Administration and the press into conflict. The Bay of Pigs episode occurred at the same time Salinger and the White House were attempting to coordinate "all the important news from the executive branch of government." But one man's coordination is another's news management. Further, President Kennedy took this occasion to suggest to the American Newspaper Publisher's Association that the publishers ask themselves on each story, "Is it in the interests of national security?" in addition to "Is it news?" This question, the timing, the audience, and the new White House press policies all led to a bitter quarrel as the press saw censorship and even an accusation with this additional question.

The Cuban missile crisis raised the question: is news a weapon to be used by government in moments of crisis? When diplomatic channels faltered, the press eagerly assumed the role of diplomatic communicator. But when the government in effect "lied" to the press to achieve certain goals (and felt it justified), the press rebelled. Similarly, the Viet Nam war in the early 1960's placed the American mission there in direct conflict with several American correspondents. Each charged the other with deliberate falsehood and misleading reports, and took steps to undermine the position of the other. While Salinger repeatedly indicates that a successful press policy must rely on total candor, he recognizes that in this and similar situations, it is politically impossible.

In each of these cases, it was less what the content of the "news" was than the style of the relationship between the government and the press: one trying to enhance its image, the other mistrusting it. But success or failure by these adversaries is not the question here, as each needs the other. The question was the conflict itself—inevitable and unending.—THAD L. BEYLE, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

Men Near the Top: Filling Key Posts in the Federal Service. By JOHN J. CORSON AND R. SHALE PAUL. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xvii, 189. $6.00.)

This volume, a Supplementary Paper of the Committee for Economic Development, joins a growing literature on the federal service and political executives. Political scientists found voter-citizens, interest groups, political parties, legislatures, and the like more vulnerable than the bureaucracy to the discipline's innovations and theoretical concerns over the past two decades. As recently as five years ago empirical studies of the federal service going beyond the case study approach were scarce, indeed. This is no longer true, and our comprehension of both the upper and lower echelons of the federal bureaucracy has been considerably enhanced.

Having said this, I would add that I believe a corrective is needed to the general drift of research on the federal service if it is to be of greatest value to students of American politics. Aside from work in specific policy areas, the major studies have dealt with what are essentially personnel problems. Overriding policy concerns have been the recruitment, training, and retention of competent personnel. The research has tended to take the viewpoint of a personnel manager or industrail psychologist rather than that of the political scientist. There are many salutary consequences to this approach, all of which are not simply programmatic. But by themselves the results do not help much in interpreting—and perhaps in guiding as well—the behavior of men and institutions in the political system unless they are at some point tied to broader systemic questions.

Men Near the Top falls into the dominant mold. The authors and sponsors are quite unabashed in stating the purposes of the study, as indicated in the subtitle. Two main data sources are used: 1) questionnaires filled out by a sample of 424 civil servants (of 817 solicited) at the GS 16–18 range; and 2) extended interviews with a subsample of 80. The questionnaire data are used primarily to describe a "typical" work week, the activities considered most and least significant by the respondents, their educational backgrounds, and their federal careers. The interviews flesh out the questionnaire data and treat in a more expansive fashion decision-making roles, job satisfactions, interpersonal interactions; with other status-occupants, and desiderata for successful job performance. Although some methodological problems exist, such as the possible bias in the 52% completion rate and the possible atypicality of the "typical" work week, the data are satisfactory for the purposes at hand.

The bulk of the reporting deals with three categories of men near the top: program managers, supporting staff managers, and professionals. A not unconvincing picture emerges of the similarities and differences in the occupational roles of these three types. A key device for the comparisons lies in depicting the respondents' responsibilities to superiors, to and for subordinates, to their peers, to the Congress, and to their constituencies. Important differences hinge on the ultimacy of responsibility, the source of authority and the focus on responsibility, the extent to which authority is subject to challenge, and the nature and breadth of the span of control (pp. 104–105). In an effort to give a like-life quality to the descriptions, the authors resort

quite frequently to thumbnail descriptions of and quotations from the interviewees. It is not always clear whether the anecdotes illustrate the generalization or whether the generalization is derived from the anecdotes.

Personnel policy implications and recommendations coming from the study round out the book. Most of these have been the stock in trade of students of the higher civil service for some years. A central recommendation is for planned career development. This would include mobility both in and out of the federal service. But the authors wisely reject the idea of mobility as good, per se, and they also reject the value of the oft-advanced notion of an interchangeable cadre of career administrators.

One of the virtues of this well-written book is that it will perhaps prove as useful to the people about whom it was written as to the scholarly community. Hopefully, the kind of knowledge represented by works of this type will also, in time, be integrated into some more central questions of the discipline.—M. KENT JENNINGS, *University of Michigan.*

In the Name of Science. BY H. L. NIEBURG. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1966. Pp. ix, 431. $7.95.)

H. L. Nieburg has written a bitter attack on the "Contract State," that complex structure of agreements that ties private interests to public programs (and public programs to private interests). His particular targets are the Air Force and NASA hierarchies, the industrial groups that produce and supply their "hardware" needs, and those scientists and engineers who advise them all. His "unflinching hero" is Robert A. McNamara, the Secretary of Defense who set out "to reform and control the Contract State." His book is analytical, searching, and polemical.

Nieburg's analysis is more complex than the presence of heroes and villians might suggest—though heroes and villains there are and there is little question who they are and what they are. But Nieburg takes care to explain that "the so-called military-industrial complex is not a conspiracy but rather a culmination of historical trends" (p. 381). This is after he has already stated that "the institutions that embody the national response to the science-technology race are no longer improvisations. The classical period of institutional experiment is coming to an end, and the innovations have acquired a stability of law, custom and usage . . . " (p. 244).

The greater part of Nieburg's book is devoted to explaining how the Contract State (upper case is his) emerged out of the experience of the Second World War and in response to the heavy demands of the cold war. The contract system itself was primarily developed by the scientist-statesmen under the leadership of Vannevar Bush who headed the war-time Office of Scientific Research and Development. It became the chief instrument through which the new Department of the Air Force could buy the technical capability it needed to develop advanced weapons systems and the newer National Aeronautics and Space Administration the capability it needed to compete in the space race. In the process, Nieburg contends, the government did not (at least until the McNamara era in Defense and presumably not yet in NASA) develop an internal capacity to evaluate, criticize, and keep its contractors responsible to the public interest (or, at least, to legally constituted political authority). It depended instead on a high sense of purpose and ethics on the part of American industry (which Nieburg frequently finds wanting) and on synthetically-created, technically-staffed "non-profit" entities (some of which Nieburg often finds developed complicated conflicts-of-interest, interlocking connections, and substantial profits).

Part of Nieburg's explanation for the way the Contract State developed—with almost no restraint before McNamara—is that "the nation over-reacted to the evidence of the early fifties that the Soviet Union could and would successfully challenge us, stealing a march in missilery and then in space. The American response was a crash program to re-establish a strategic superiority that was becoming increasingly meaningless, self-vitiating, and diplomatically useless. In the pursuit of this chimera, all the institutions and standards painfully constructed in two great wars to safeguard the integrity of the state and the public interest were thrown to the winds" (p. 351).

If this is an explanation for the Contract State, it leaves some questions unanswered. Is Nieburg saying that there was no need for the development of inter-continental ballistic missiles? Is he saying that the decision to go to the moon was (and is) folly? If he is, then he is second-guessing political judgments made by Presidents and Congresses and he may be right—but he may be wrong. But is he also saying that these—and other—decisions went in the direction they did—more weapons, more hardware, more contracts—because of the pressures and special platform that the Contract State gives to those interests (public, as well as private) that have a stake in more rather than less (weapons, hardware and contracts)?

A major difficulty with his book is that Nieburg tries to deal with two separate sets of problems and assumes but never really analyzes the nature of their inter-relationship. He deals, first, with the kinds of decisions taken to exploit advanced

technology and, second, with the process through which these decisions are made. One could persuasively contend that if the Contract State did not exist—if the military departments had developed a vast internal "arsenal" system, if the Defense Department had had a strong and politically-supported civilian staff, and if planning-programming-budget systems had been instituted as early as 1947—the decisions to build a multi-purpose missile-based deterrent and to aim for the moon, would still have been made matters of national policy (without making any judgments about whether these decisions *should* have been made).

In the end, Nieburg calls for a system of national planning—of "positive democratic planning"—to replace the "inchoate," "disguised" system of allocating national resources that, he sees, has grown out of the contracting system. He acknowledges that "positive" planning would not eliminate the battle over priorities, but suggests that it would serve to counter-balance the forces that now dominate the Contract State. And so it might. But the choice between space and education or defense and slums for a share of public budget, could go either way whatever the choice-making system—if, indeed, there could, or need, be a choice. Moreover, beyond the question of choice, it is increasingly evident that science and technology generate pressures for political action that are not wholly susceptible to analysis by reference to competing political and economic interest groups. To understand them fully, we may also need a set of handles that has yet to come out of the increasing, if belated, interest in issues of science and public policy. GENE M. LYONS, *Dartmouth College*.

The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945–1963. By EDWARD A. KOLODZIEJ. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 630. $7.50.)

What the role of Congress should be in the making of United States foreign policy has recently become a lively issue again. The focus of this dispute has been the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which, after a long period of quiescence wherein its major efforts were devoted to the increasingly tedious controversies surrounding the annual foreign aid bill, has begun a public reexamination of some of the basic assumptions behind this nation's foreign policy. The Committee has acted upon a belief, long regarded as a dangerous heresy by many of its current supporters, that Congress has the right—even the responsibility—to participate meaningfully in the formulation of basic foreign policy. Chairman J. William Fulbright is himself a recent convert to this view of the committee's prerogatives and he still describes his committee's many and well-publicized hearings as merely "educational." Clearly, however, he has more ambitious purposes in mind, notwithstanding the fact that going beyond educational and investigatory functions will, as he well knows, be a formidable and perhaps ultimately frustrating objective.

For rather different reasons—because he is quite confortable with what he calls our "world-wide containment posture"—Professor Kolodziej also believes that the congressional role in foreign policy be strengthened. He wants a Congress "with the broad vision of public men bearing equal responsibility with the executive branch for the future security of the nation and the success of its foreign policy" rather than one "with the narrowly circumscribed mentality of a bookkeeper" (p. 252). His lengthy book, divided into three parts, seeks to demonstrate how and why this transformation should take place.

Part I is a brief introductory statement about the American system of government, stressing the legitimacy of a significant congressional role in "strategic policy." Part II is 400 pages long and consists of an excellent history and analysis of how Congress—and, most particularly, the Defense Approriations Subcommittees—has dealt with the executive's defense budgets from 1945 to 1963. This encyclopedic effort is a testimony to the author's patience, as well as his thorough familiarity with the relevant professional literature and congressional publications; and its extensive footnoting constitutes what must be nearly an exhaustive listing of significant contemporary publications on defense policy.

This part also displays the author's clear, if somewhat repetitive, writing style and his impressive analytical capacities. It is all there, from the precipitate postwar demobilization to the RS-70 controversy. While congressional influence oscillated during this period, Kolodziej demonstrates that only during the later Eisenhower years did Congress ever exert anything approaching what he regards as its proper influence over the defense budget. The post-Sputnik conditions are given credit for this, however, and this experience is treated as an aberration.

In Part III, the author turns to prescription and, naturally enough, moves onto more slippery and controversial terrain. He first recapitulates what he regards as the long catalogue of responsibilities that the Congress failed to assume. And then the Congress is assigned a herculean task. It has, the author contends, the responsibility "(1) to define the political objectives underlying the defense budget; (2) to test the military feasibility of these objectives, including the contingency plans to effect them; (3) to relate these plans to the nation's military forces and weapons

system; (4) to assess the economic and fisca feasibility and operational efficiency of defense policy; (5) to generate alternatives to the President's defense proposals when they prove defective; and (6) to oppose the President in order to effect its legislative determinations" (p. 446).

It is not surprising, if these are the objectives, that Kolodziej's prescriptions for achieving them are so ambitious as to be almost certainly unattainable. His two basic proposals are the creation in each chamber of "National Policy Committees," and another effort to establish an "omnibus appropriations bill." The policy committees would be composed of the majority and minority leaders and the ranking committee members of each party from all of the standing committees of each chamber, with the majority caucas then adding other members to insure a majority for its party. Kolodziej's description of what these policy committees would be responsible for is little short of breath-taking, placing him alongside the more audacious advocates of congressional reform: They would review security policy to insure its compatibility with foreign policy objectives and its feasibility; they would specify what the government's fiscal and economic policies should be; they would sponsor all public bills on the floor of Congress; and they would establish the rules and set the agenda for each chamber!

The unanticipated consequences of reform have been as important as those anticipated. Such would likely be the case in the unlikely event that these proposals should ever be adopted. The imagination boggles at what these policy committees and their necessarily sizable staffs would do to traditional executive-congressional relations, congressional politics, even the party system itself. We might have something like a partial parliamentary system growing up inside, but not displacing, our present system of government, with its separate institutions sharing power and its powerful presidency. The possibility of protracted stalemate seems at least as likely to this observer as does the formulation of a more rational set of national policies.

For those who, like the author and, incidentally, this reviewer, are sympathetic to Congress and respect the political (policy) judgment of many of its members, a substantially enhanced congressional role in the making of defense policy is an attractive goal. There are powerful historical and theoretical reasons for believing that the executive branch is capable of egregiously bad policy judgment. Yet, spectacular reform proposals for Congress have been notoriously unsuccessful. What would seem to be called for, then, are less ambitious, more incremental, proposals for change. Even their prospects might not be bright, but at least they would be framed in the light of intractable realities.

For better or for worse, however, any changes that do occur are not likely to alter very much the structures and procedures of Congress, rooted as they are in tradition and political convenience and advantage. So, if any changes at all occur in the way Congress handles the defense budget, they are likely to be in the directions now being scouted by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: an existing committee or subcommittee would take upon itself the responsibility of instituting inquiries into the fundamentals of defense policy, and it would use whatever influence it could muster to effect whatever policy changes it deemed desirable. Whether the results would be salutary or unfortunate would depend upon who did it, with what skill and intelligence, and for what purposes. And whether the author or this reviewer or anyone else would approve or disapprove of the results of these initiatives would depend primarily on policy preferences, not on whether we approve in the abstract of this or that institutional arrangement.—WILLIAM P. GERBERDING, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

Postwar Defense Policy and the U.S. Navy, 1943–1946. By VINCENT DAVIS. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966. Pp. xv, 371. $7.50.)

At the end of World War II, the civilian and military leaders of the United States Navy found themselves in a strange paradox: On the one hand, they could glory in having successfully fought the greatest naval war in history and amassed a fleet larger and stronger by far than the navies of all other countries in the world combined. On the other hand, they were being confronted by a set of new challenges that threatened more seriously than ever before their organization's very survival.

First of all, the rationale for the modern American navy had always been the need to fight and defeat possible enemy navies. But in 1945, as a result in large part of the Navy's own successes, there were no enemy navies left to fight and defeat. As Army Air Force General Carl Spaatz, one of the Navy's leading antagonists, at the time bluntly put it:

> Why should we have a Navy at all? The Russians have little or no navy, the Japanese Navy has been sunk, the navies of the rest of the world are negligible, the Germans never did have much of a navy. The point I am getting at is, who is the . . . Navy . . . to fight? There are no enemies for it to fight except apparently the Army Air Force . . . we certainly do not need to waste money on that.

Furthermore, the belief was quickly developing among the public and in Congress that with the invention of nuclear weapons, navies had been

rendered permanently obsolete and superfluous—obsolete because of their supposed great vulnerability to atomic attack, and superfluous because in the large, A-bomb carrying, bombers of the Army Air Force, the nation was supposed already to have an invincible military force to cope with any kind of military exigency. Finally, as a more immediate threat, the War Department was actively promoting a plan for the unification of the military services that appeared calculated to bring about organizational changes that could turn the Navy into a minor auxiliary component of an overall military establishment dominated by ground Army and Air Force generals.

Vincent Davis is an associate professor at the University of Denver's Graduate School of International Studies. His book is a solid, carefully and exhaustively researched, and clearly written descriptive analysis of how the Navy hierarchy responded to these challenges, which was primarily by articulating a new strategic justification for the Navy based on the concept of "sea air power." By "sea air power" the Navy leaders meant to indicate that the Navy not only had the capacity to fight other navies, but that through the use of naval aircraft launched from ships it could also project naval power against land forces and targets and could thus, more specifically, engage effectively even in strategic bombing with atomic weapons. Davis shows how uncertain and halting were the Navy's early efforts to fashion such a new strategic formula and documents the important role in the process of Navy Secretary James Forrestal and of the younger naval aviator admirals and captains.

Davis certainly succeeds in his own stated aim of providing "fresh descriptive material" about the activities of the Navy's senior officer corps—a group relatively neglected in the political science literature—in preparing the Navy for the postwar era. He presents new data drawn from extensive interviewing of naval officers and others, from access to previously classified official Navy files, as well as from the usual documentary and bibliographical sources. Davis also throws some light on the general process of military policymaking, and his data excellently illustrate how it was not any particular prescience on the part of the Navy leaders in analyzing what the strategic needs of the country would be in the postwar international order, but simply the anticipation of the kinds of military forces Congress was most likely to support with appropriations that led to concentration on a "sea air" capability that, as it turned out, has served the country well in numerous post-World War II military operations.

Unfortunately, Davis does not relate either this or other of his interesting findings to the existing literature on the politics of national security policymaking (such as the works by Huntington, Schilling, Hammond, etc.), thus passing up the opportunity to make the maximum possible use of his case approach. Furthermore, I strongly disagree with Davis' interpretation of the unification conflict as being "at heart—as far as the Navy was concerned— . . . a battle between it and the Air Force" (p. 226): the Navy in 1945 perceived the greatest of threats in two features of unification that were being promoted most vigorously not by the Air Force, but by the ground Army—a single military budget essentially under the control of an overall chief of staff (with the Navy expecting the chief of staff who would be determining its budgetary share to be wearing, at least initially, the uniform of a ground Army general) and the permanent, severe restriction of the size and functions of the Marine Corps (leading to an emasculation of the Navy's capabilities in amphibious warfare). Davis' interpretation may be due, incidentally, to his general tendency to view events from the perspectives of the naval aviators, a tendency which also leads him to be overly hard, I think, on the "old [non-flying?] guard" naval officers. It was, after all, these "old guard" officers who had presided over the development of the carrier-based task forces that had won the Pacific war, and thus they might very well have been equally effective in dealing with the Navy's new challenges if they had not been retired or otherwise displaced. Davis himself quotes from the official reports of the foremost "old guarder," Admiral Ernest J. King, the World War II Commander-in-Chief U. S. Fleet—Chief of Naval Operations, for the earliest statement of the notion that the Navy even in that war had successfully fought not only against other ships, but also against land targets and land-based aircraft.

The flaws just mentioned are only minor. They do not seriously detract from Davis' significant contribution in furthering our understanding of the behavior of the postwar Navy elites and of the variety of forces that shape strategic thinking.—DEMETRIOS CARALEY, *Barnard College, Columbia University.*

The Making of United States Foreign Policy. By BURTON M. SAPIN. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966. Pp. xi, 415. $7.50.)

Very few books of this scope have been attempted, although foreign policy commands by far the largest share of the nation's public resources and the consequences of policy are potentially earth-shattering. Over the past twenty years the United States has undertaken commitments on a global scale that have severely taxed material and organizational resources. America's contemporary version of a "new manifest destiny" has bred a foreign policy organizational rev-

olution, still ongoing. Today we hear not only searching debate over the purpose and limits of policy, but serious scholars as well as semi-popular magazines, dissatisfied with results, are asking "what's wrong at Foggy Bottom."

The central problem is an enduring one: the proper relationship between policy and power, between purpose and organization. The plethora of operational agencies created to fight cold war—diplomatic, military, economic, propagandistic, intelligence, para-military and secret interventionist—have for two decades threatened to reverse the proper sequence of policy and power. The danger constantly exists that the "instruments" or "operations" become in themselves ends of policy rather than means. Anyone observing the subject with care knows of the organizational entanglements that have plagued the programmatic side of American foreign policy.

The title of Professor Sapin's book suggests decision making process but its content emphasizes organizational structure and administrative relationships. The author's principal contribution in this substantial book is the fulfillment of his major purpose of providing "a reasonably up-to-date description of present organizational arrangements. . . . The emphasis is on structure and function, though processes are not ignored" (p. 3). He has managed to include, by last-minute footnoting, organizational developments to March, 1966. His focus is on the executive branch. This book grew out of a 1959 Brookings Institution study and report, *The Formulation and Administration of United States Foreign Policy*, prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Since 1959, Sapin has spent four years on the Politico-Military Staff of the Department of State and has conducted numerous formal and informal interviews with officials. These have afforded him a perspective both from inside government and from the academy.

Although the primary focus is the Department of State the book also covers the other major governmental institutions directly concerned with foreign policy making. He deals, in chapter length analyses, with Congress; the Presidency; the Pentagon; economic, information, science and cultural agencies; and personnel problems.

What are Sapin's principal findings and observations? Regarding the State Department, some will be surprised to read that "In recent years the quality and prestige of the Department have been moving steadily upward" (p. 106). But this, he notes, compares it with a rather low ebb of the past thirty years. With functions enormously broadened, State now finds itself in ferment. The outcome, in Sapin's cheerful view, "may yet surprise and delight those of its critics who simultaneously deplore its inadequacies and yet concede the logic of its role as foreign policy leader" (p. 134). As for Congress, the author calls it the "most important part of the political setting within which the foreign policy machinery of the executive branch must operate" (p. 34). The role Congress plays best, he observes, is not as policy maker but "discussant, critic, sharp-eyed investigator and watchdog" (p. 54). In evaluating performance Sapin is as sanguine about Congress as he was about State. He concludes that Congress has not been a "major handicap in the pursuit of United States national security and foreign policies since the beginning of World War II" (p. 55). Regarding the Presidency, the author is skeptical about various proposals, "super-staffs" for example, to alter the nature of that office. Sapin has no enthusiasm for a "little State Department" in the White House. He prefers a vigorous President working closely with his department chiefs.

Sapin also makes a comforting judgment about the military establishment: "The maintenance of civilian control is assumed to be secure" (p. 141). While he assumes that State, under Presidential direction, will lead in decision making, he expects substantial military participation. He acknowledges the "key role" played in recent years by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. He finds relationships between State and Defense dramatically improved and points to the crucial importance in the future of the Office of International Security Affairs under the Secretary of Defense. If the White House does not need its little State Department, the Pentagon does, he seems to argue. After surveying economic, information, intelligence and planning agencies, Sapin concludes his descriptive analysis by focusing on personnel. Here he finds separate Civil Service, special career services, and political appointees to constitute a "patchwork quilt" system, inadequate for the "new diplomacy."

Sapin explicitly is not of the school of "worrisome observers and eager reformers." Although he is critical of some organizational detail he does not think the limitations on efficiency are likely to be "overcome by drastic organizational surgery" (p. 370). And, unlike most other writers on the subject, Sapin is "prepared to give the United States high marks for its overall international performance during the last twenty years and I am inclined to think that history will share this view" (p. 380). The criteria and arguments behind this evaluation are inadequately set forth and many political scientists, including this reviewer, would not agree without major reservations.

The chief value of this book is as an organizational road map. It is the best and only up-to-date "text" of this scope on the subject. It catalogues the organizational arrangements and re-

views thoroughly the relevant literature, although for bibliography one must unfortunately be content with footnotes. While Sapin defends the organizational status quo, he does not ignore some serious, persistent problems. He recognizes the precariousness of any Secretary of State's control over policy making; the enormity of the problem of keeping functional lines untangled; the rapid obsolescence of personnel systems in today's world; and the never-ending problem of communication, that of bringing new and timely knowledge to decision makers when they need it. Conceding that Washington is an "organizational jungle" (p. 377) he in essence recommends better trained jungle fighters rather than defoliation.

The best seat in Washington to view foreign policy making was held for several years by McGeorge Bundy, who once said: "Organization is an interesting, important, and difficult problem, but it is not a problem which touches the heart of the process of politics." The main disappointment with this otherwise valuable book is that it is long on organization and short on process. It is admittedly impressionistic and descriptive rather than theoretical; it represents synthesis rather than extensive new research; it is characterized by empathy for those who toil in the bureaucracies rather than pointed criticism.

How, ultimately, does one evaluate the adequacy of organization? It finally must be judged with reference to purpose, and to relationships between ends and means. Sapin evaluates organization by criteria of functional performance and of adaptability to the setting. This, perhaps, is too limited a basis for overall evaluation. We would be fortunate if Professor Sapin were next to write a book, of quality equal to this one, on the purpose of American foreign policy. This would provide a more adequate basis than we have here for evaluating the adequacy of organization.—HARRY HOWE RANSOM, *Vanderbilt University.*

Expanding Liberties, Freedom's Gains in Postwar America. By MILTON R. KONVITZ. (New York: The Viking Press, 1966. Pp. xvii, 429. $6.50.)

The social changes that have occurred in America in the three decades since the Jones and Laughlin decision give reason to many for anxiety about the security of civil liberty. Industrial, technological, and military developments have produced a culture which threatens human beings with the suffocations of size, depersonalization by public and private bureaucracies, invasions of privacy by bizarre devices like electronic olives, and simulations of the electorate in which manipulation of the variables in the model is intended to lead to telergic responses, a little like voodoo. The Supreme Court of the United States, of course, is not going to save us all from machines that compose bad music and write letters about lapsed magazine subscriptions. But in the generation since Jones and Laughlin, it has seemed to sense—at first uncertainly and in limited ways, and then more assertively after 1954—the importance of rescuing the human personality from the embrace of Behemoth, and decisions have been shaped to this end.

Professor Konvitz is not concerned with the sociology of the new birth of freedom fathered by the Court but he is with some of its products. He describes and analyzes the increasingly abundant law of civil liberty under three broad titles, stressing developments since the end of the Second World War. The first and most extensive treatment (242 pages) is accorded to "First Amendment Freedoms"—religious liberty, freedom of association, academic freedom, questions of free speech and association involving the Communist Party, and censorship and literature. The second title is "Civil Rights" (107 pages) and the third, although generously called "Human Rights," is a limited reference (33 pages) to American policy with respect to international conventions on the subject. The principal parts of the book are somewhat uneven in length and substantiality but the shape of the discourse is of much less moment than the quality of the material it encloses, which is very high. The important theme of the ten chapters of the book, which is pressed with ardor and eloquence, is that there has been a massive enlargement of freedoms in the United States since the end of the Second World War, and that the Supreme Court is responsible for much of it.

Professor Konvitz's book has great merits both for what he does say and for what he does not say. His writing is infused with a strong humanistic regard for the liberal values of an open society. No doubt is possible about the author's commitment to ethical principle or his belief in its importance in public affairs, although some may not agree that religious freedom is the central star in the constellation of constitutional liberties. He writes movingly about great topics of liberal concern without trivializing them, and without clamping them within stereotypes of analysis that have become conventional. Thus, his writing is full of the creative insights that lift political inquiry out of the lower levels of mere quantification. And he avoids dwelling upon the judicial alternatives of activism and restraint, presumed polarities of ambiguous location and uncertain pull.

His discussion of expanding liberties, extensive as it is, does, however, omit two areas that might reasonably have been included. The first is the development of procedural rights in the administration of criminal justice and the second is the new judicial policy on legislative apportionment.

As to the first of these, there is only a sketchy reference in the last five pages of the book (in some remarks about the problems of the poor) to the Griffin (1956), Betts (1942), and Gideon (1963) cases. This is all there is on criminal justice. Since the rights of defendants in criminal cases are uniquely within the control and protection of the judges, the new procedures they require in these cases may actually affect the circumstances of more real people more directly (including every police department in the country) than the protection the judges have extended to such ladies as Fanny Hill, Molly Bloom, Lolita, and Lady Chatterley. Consideration of the Court's work in legislative apportionment might have been appropriate since the malapportionment the Court has been attacking involves the freedom of a considerable portion of the electorate from the archaism of rural domination.

But who should cavil about the book that Professor Konvitz did not write? The book that he did write is a literate witness to new policies of the Court that have as their end the protection of the rights of the individual in a free society. As such it is a substantial contribution to a body of literature on civil liberty in which his name has, for some time, figured prominently and with distinction.—EARL LATHAM, *Amherst College.*

Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A Study in Constitutional Interpretation. By JACOB W. LANDYNSKI (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. 286. $8.50.)

In this carefully researched and well-written volume, Professor Landynski has made a substantial contribution to the scholarly literature of law, history, and political science. The book—a balanced historical and analytical account of the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment—will provide the serious scholar with a much needed perspective for interpreting future decisions of the Court in this uncertain and complex area of constitutional adjudication.

While the opening chapter sketches the early English and American background of the Fourth Amendment, the bulk of the book is structured around "four tolerably distinct periods" in the Supreme Court's interpretation of this Amendment. Professor Landynski sees the first period, which extends into the 1920's, as dominated by the Boyd Case (1886), which expressed in sweeping terms the curbs implied by the Fourth. The second period continues through the World War II years and reflects substantial and restrictive modifications of the liberal decisions of the earlier period. The third period commences with the post war years and ends in the late 1950's. Search and seizure opinions for these years "were marked by notable inconsistency and, for the first time, invariable judicial disagreement." It is a tribute to Landynski's skill that he was able to follow the labyrinthine path that the doctrine travelled at this time. He designates 1960 as the beginning of the fourth and present period, which he says has given "some indication of a return to the broad libertarian principles which animated Fourth Amendment interpretation up to 1925."

In Chapter Eight he gives a vivid description of current "bugging" practices. He describes the flagrant abuse of eavesdropping by officials at all levels of government, and is obviously alarmed by the "menace to privacy posed by electronic devices . . . ." Further, he apparently sees little difference between an indiscriminate electronic dragnet and the unconstitutional general search, a reprehensible practice which the Fourth Amendment was specifically designed to proscribe; therefore, he implies that the Fourth Amendment can and should be construed to provide protection against electronic eavesdropping.

This book is not without its controversial aspects. In one place, for example, the author asserts that much of the stimulus for Justice Hugo Black's efforts to get the Bill of Rights absorbed into Fourteenth Amendment due process is that he would "like to limit the scope of due process to the protection of the *specific* provisions of the Bill of Rights" (p. 122). Many will balk at this hint of an ulterior motive in the Justice's present efforts to expand Fourteenth Amendment due process. And in another place, the author states that much criticism of search and seizure doctrine by police officials "amounts to nothing short of an attack on the Fourth Amendment itself" (p. 175).

Several other inferences in the volume appear to be rather strained. For example, Landynski interprets the opposition of some state law enforcement officials to proposed federal legalising of wiretapping to mean their opposition to permissive wiretapping. Could it not be argued that these officials, already enjoying extensive freedom in this area, simply view any new federal legislation as a possible threat to such freedom?

Finally, this reviewer feels that the value of this book to the political scientist would have been enhanced by the inclusion of additional non-legal data, such as more information about the impact that recent landmark decisions (e.g., *Mapp* v. *Ohio*) have had on the actual behavior of state and local law enforcement officials. Nevertheless, this timely and perceptive volume, reflecting imagination and industrious research, is a most welcome addition to our literature and should find a wide audience among serious students of American constitutional law.—E. W. MILES, *San Diego State College.*

Labor Politics in a Democratic Republic: Moderation, Division, and Disruption in the Presidential Election of 1928. By Vaughn Davis Bornet. (Washington, D.C.: Spartan Books, 1964. Pp. xiii, 376. $6.95.)

For more than three decades, we have been brainwashed by antagonistic and partisan accounts of Hoover written from hindsight. After plowing through a formidable mass of manuscripts, minor-party publications, trade-union proceedings, journals, and pamphlets—collections scattered from coast to coast—Professor Bornet shows conclusively that Hoover was no enemy of labor and that contemporary Democrats and union leaders viewed him as a great humanitarian, a liberal, and a brilliant man with fifteen years of distinguished public service, and certainly a candidate not approved by old-line GOP politicians. Norman Thomas, the Socialist candidate, said that both Hoover and Smith were more able and better qualified than any major-party candidates since 1916.

The fact is that both Smith and Hoover were considered personally friendly to organized labor with a decided edge for Smith. The differences between the two were not sufficient to make either labor's enemy so that the A. F. of L.'s traditional non-partisan policy of rewarding "friends" and punishing "enemies" could not operate. The A. F. of L.'s Council and Internationals endorsed neither candidate, and the labor press maintained strict neutrality. Various individual unions and leaders, however, did endorse one candidate or the other. An analysis of these endorsements indicates that Smith won the favor of more national labor leaders, city centrals, state federations, and major unions than did Hoover, whose union support came largely from individual officers in the Railway Brotherhoods, John L. Lewis' United Mine Workers, and local unions. Moreover, Hoover's labor support was localized largely in the Middle West—particularly in the East Central states. Bornet concludes that "substantial elements in the American trade union movement" supported Smith. In a footnote on p. 229, he says that this discovery required a great deal of effort but leaves the reader curious about this laborious methodology.

Bornet believes that, in contrast to union leaders, a majority of union members probably voted for Hoover. Smith's labor appeals were pitched to unions—e.g., his commitment to curbing the use of injunctions in labor disputes—but such issues seem to have been of only secondary interest to workers who were not inclined to strike and lose pay checks so necessary to meet installments on their new bungalows, model-Ts, and radios. Wage-earners were more interested in their rising standard of living and, to them, this meant the protective tariff and immigration restrictions. Although Smith promised not to lower tariff or immigration walls, these two GOP gifts to labor simply seemed safer in Republican than in Democratic hands.

Although Hoover mentioned his support for collective bargaining and his opposition to "excessive use of the injunction in labor disputes," he concentrated on "equality of opportunity" and more efficient production to raise real wages. Smith's more specific commitment to anti-injunction legislation and his painfully truthful talk about the irregular distribution of prosperity simply did not appeal to a majority of working men when real wages were rising and the work week was declining so that the worker had statistical grounds for optimism.

The most interesting chapters (3 & 6) are based on previously unused records and deal with AFL President William Green's efforts to commit one or both parties to anti-injunction legislation. Such a bill had been sponsored in the 70th Congress by Senator Shipstead, a Farmer-Laborite from Minnesota. During the spring and summer, the A. F. of L. got Edwin Witte, Donald Richberg, Herman Oliphant, and Felix Frankfurter to polish up the Shipstead bill. Green then secured written comments on the Witte bill from Morris Hillquit, George Wharton Pepper, Fiorello LaGuardia, Roscoe Pound, *et al.*, all of whom seem to have favored the Witte proposal. Meanwhile, the A. F. of L. was busy with its pre-convention activities designed to elect labor's friends in primaries and to commit presidential hopefuls to pro-labor positions.

Armed with the comments of Hillquit, Pepper, *et al.*, AFL leaders went to both conventions in an attempt to get both parties to write anti-injunction planks into their platforms. Although both platforms were unsatisfactory to labor leaders, the Democrats' labor planks were less unsatisfactory, and Smith subsequently took a stand supporting anti-injunction legislation. Hoover's pro-labor statements never included a clear-cut stand in favor of organized labor, but it was Hoover who signed the Norris-LaGuardia Act in 1932. Bornet reminds us that the real push for strong anti-injunction planks in 1928 came from the Progressive minority in the GOP Convention and that there is no factual basis for the allegations that Hoover longed to veto the Norris-LaGuardia Act. Bornet tells us these and other important facts too long unknown, forgotten, or distorted.—Ruth C. Silva, *Pennsylvania State University.*

Dirty Politics. By Bruce L. Felknor. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1966. Pp. 295. $5.95.)

On December 11, 1966, *New York Times* Hollywood writer Peter Bart had a bylined story about

William Roberts, the self-styled "political mercenary" who guided Ronald Reagan to the top office of the top state. Spencer-Roberts, Inc., Bart reported, was paid $150,000 for the Reagan campaign.

Bruce Felknor, who is no one to knock PR for cornflakes and aspirin, nevertheless saves some of his hardest raps for the Spencers and Roberts who are emerging wherever big tough campaigns are being fought. Felknor calls them "professional winners of elections who come to politics in the role of hired killers." Political PR, and even more, the activity of the anonymous staff assistants to congressmen, governors, and mayors, are seen by Felknor as being the main carriers of contemporary political immorality.

For the 11 years 1955 to 1966 Felknor was the Executive Director of the Fair Campaign Practices Committee. He has the honor, for whatever it's worth, of knowing more about dirty politics than any other man in America. Fortunately nearly half of the book is about Felknor's life and times as leader of the goo-goo's vigilantees—a tough job for a man who likes a good hard fight and knows that men are considerably less than angels.

The first half of *Dirty Politics* is historical stuff, mainly, that gives the book general and more time-lasting appeal no doubt (as well as enhance its usefulness as collateral reading in courses in American parties and elections). That part is, frankly, less interesting, though Felknor's happy writing style is well suited to the comic-opera quality of much political smear. It's only, I guess, that most of us don't need to hear, for the eighty-seventh time, the jingle about Cleveland's bastard.

The importance of the book lies mainly in the several chapters in which Felknor, from a decade of intense involvement, with a keen and well-balanced appreciation for "political reality" as well as moral considerations, assays the present temper and health of American campaigning.

He finds the public body reasonably well and free from disease. However, he believes, on the whole, that our election laws ought to be amended and brought up to date. Fiscal restrictions on candidates are, as we all know, "absurdly unrealistic"; Felknor would abolish them. He would, however, keep, and tighten, and enforce vigorously, the reporting and disclosure laws for contributions over $100. He suggests a government subsidy for TV time.

Smear and alleged smear present the most difficult set of problems. The libel laws offer at best slow and uncertain remedy. Court injunctions perhaps should be used more widely in the U.S., Felknor thinks, as they are in England. The laws on anonymous literature ought to be uniform, clear, and provide for an open record of who printed what when and where (Felknor cites approvingly the New Jersey law that requires the *printer* to keep all the facts for two years).

In the end, laws will not maintain political hygiene. Only a vigorous and engaged citizenry will do so. To expect legal remedies to prevail against political evils is to invite the mercenaries and amoral manipulators who are at least as dangerous as the smear that springs from amateur passion in the campaign. Felknor would not sterilize our politics. We need, he says, "responsible citizens, not political eunuchs."—BERNARD C. HENNESSY, *Pennsylvania State University.*

American Federalism: A View from the States. By DANIEL J. ELAZAR. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1966. Pp. xii, 228. $2.50.)

Mr. Elazar has written a general text, an essay, and a report of his own research. The combination makes appraisal difficult.

It is not clear that the author intended to write a general text on American federalism. He says, "This book is not meant to be comprehensive, but neither is it incomplete." I am not sure what that means, but the volume does deal with most standard topics of federalism. The treatments are generally well-informed and remarkably compact. Their quality ranges from the insightful to the wholly conventional.

The book has its greatest success as an essay. That is to say, it is a personal interpretation that many will find fresh, suggestive, and provocative. One thesis denies that cooperative federalism so intermixes national, state, and local activities that the states have lost their identities "as separate civil societies in their own right with their own political systems." A civil society, Elazar writes, is "one which, in common-sense terms, could stand alone as a sovereign nation" (though he later lists eight metropolitan areas as "civil societies"). Given this thesis, Elazar understandably prefers architectonic to culinary imagery. Ignoring layer cakes, marble cakes, and whorled ice cream, he speaks of the states as "the keystones of the American governmental arch," "political keystones, serving their local subdivisions and supporting the overall structure of national government," "smaller polities within an overarching federal system."

The second principal thesis is that "three overarching factors"—political culture, sectionalism, and the continuing frontier—"are especially important in shaping the individual states' political structures, electoral behavior, and modes of organization for political action."

Both theses are developed with imagination and historical learning. Readers will find many factual and interpretive statements to disagree

with or puzzle over. Consider the following: "Where there are popular majorities in a majority of the states [advocating or accepting the necessity of particular programs] and the state governments do not act, it usually means they cannot, willing as they might be to support the programs in question:" these are the circumstances in which "federal assumption of new formal responsibilities is most likely to occur" (pp. 34f). Is he asserting that state governments have usually been responsive to majorities within their states, except for the "whole host of programs [that] cannot be undertaken alone, even by those states that can afford to support them"? If so, he denies a widely accepted proposition about state governments' behavior. And the denial is too expediently aided by Elazar's converting the many poor and urban people into the "minorities" composed of "public welfare reformers" and "urban reformers" "who sometimes turn to the federal government for assistance" (pp. 36, 38). Alternatively, does his double-majority condition, "popular majorities in a majority of the states," narrow the focus to a small number of cases—despite his "whole host of programs"?

Elazar's original research efforts, though essential to the essay's development, require separate appraisal. The three principal operations classify the 48 mainland states as follows: (1) a "national order of state cohesiveness," placing the states in eight groups according to four criteria of internal unity since 1945 (e.g., deviation from national patterns or norms); (2) a classification of states' political cultures as predominantly Moralistic, Individualistic, or Traditionalistic; or as different-order mixtures of any two (e.g., MI, IM); this results in 8 principal and 14 more refined categories; (3) two classifications of states in terms of state-local relations—one by presence or absence of seven "important variables in state-local political conflict" (e.g., 40 states have sectionalism, but only 16 have localism), and the other a mapping of states' traditions as predominantly localistic or centralistic, or localistic with centralizing tendencies or vice versa.

These operations required a lot of work. They point in a direction highly relevant for progress in the comparative study of state political systems. I am not clear as to whether Elazar's pioneering effort has advanced us far or not, nor can I discover how he regards it himself. He says that the volume as a whole "is based on the best of the recent research into the problem, including the author's own work over the past decade." But he footnotes a major table, "The placing of the individual states should be viewed cautiously, considering the limits of the data."

Two things are clear, though. First, we cannot discover or test his processes of induction. The major classificatory operations are based on the author's "judicious consideration of the available evidence" and express his "own conclusions to date, based on his research over the past several years." Second, Elazar uses his results far more confidently than his warning signals lead one to expect.

To prove "the direct influence of political culture" and of centralistic/localistic traditions he attempts to correlate his classifications of states with the actual behavior of the states. The correlation procedures are seriously defective. Some are circular in logic, as behaviors used to test the categories' predictive power were already incorporated in definitions of the categories themselves. Other correlation efforts are statistically naive. One illustration is his use of a grouping of states by high, medium, and low state ratios of local school expenditures in 1961. This single year's grouping is not a sound test of his long-run culture and central/local classifications (in fact, by 1965–66 the medium-ratio group of six states had lost three states and gained three). Further, the point that "all but one" of the six medium-ratio states "are influenced by the moralistic political culture and also have strong traditions of activism at the local level" distorts the facts: only one "predominantly moralistic" and no "predominantly localistic" state is among the five; and 17 other moralistic-influence states and 29 predominantly or partly localistic states appear in the "high" and "low" expenditure-ratio columns.

This is a book that combines conventional and unconventional wisdom (and some unwisdom), exhibits an attractive literary style that is flawed by a gift for ambiguity, and attempts ambitious classificatory and correlation exercises without sufficient attentiveness to accepted procedures for the conduct of such exercises.—JAMES W. FESLER, *Yale University.*

Annexation in Virginia: The Use of the Judicial Process for Readjusting City-County Boundaries. By CHESTER W. BAIN. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966. Pp. xiv, 258. $6.00.)

In this first study in a series on Virginia government projected by the University of Virginia, Chester Bain describes and analyzes the general law on annexation, the initiation of proceedings, the statutory standards, the hearing and the issues concerning the area to be annexed, the compensation to be paid the county, and the consequences of annexation under Virginia's unique system of annexation through judicial process. He concludes with a favorable appraisal and recommends a strengthening of the existing plan. Mr. Bain says that Virginia's special type of city-county separation requires that annexation decisions should rest with an independent and impartial agency and that the use of the courts is

"much more desirable than any procedure that would permit self-interest to determine or to influence the decision" (p. 233).

Though this careful and detailed study gives much support to such a conclusion and some six decades of experience testify to the many merits of the system, this reviewer finds it necessary to dissent.

Procedures taking into account the self-interest of the parties are dismissed as less desirable though they were not examined in the study. In Virginia city-county mergers, provoked by shared fears of big city annexations and by deficiencies in the annexation procedures, have been successfully accomplished in the Hampton Roads area. These mergers have been negotiated between the interested parties and are as political as the annexation procedure is judicial.

One finds in this book little evidence of political forces and interests but it is hard to believe that they were not a part of the situation in each annexation despite the use of court procedure. Annexations have been proposed out of fear that city governments would soon come under the control of Negro majorities and they have been opposed by suburbanites seeking to escape urban problems. Yet, in the setting of Virginia politics for half a century the insulation of annexation from politics is credible. The power and stability of the political leadership has made it possible to remove from the political arena many issues, including those of annexation, and the domination of local government by the judiciary has been designed to eliminate "politics."

This situation cannot last. The decline of the old leadership, de-segregation, re-apportionment, extension of the suffrage, and the adoption of a general sales tax have changed the situation at the same time that the state has become predominantly urban and urban problems have become acute. Courts serving as temporary ad hoc commissions to give equitable relief in particular problems will hardly serve when Virginia must not only respond to the demands of urban voters but must also develop urban policies appropriate to the national policy framework.

In the light of these new circumstances the more realistic conclusion would be a proposal for a permanent quasi-judicial commission in a state Department of Urban Affairs. Professor Bain may reasonably hope that such a commission will find guides to wise and effective procedures in the sixty-year old system which he has described.—WARNER MOSS, *College of William and Mary.*

The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois. By THOMAS J. ANTON. (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 286. $6.75.)

The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois is a well-written case study about the roles played by major participants in the state budgetary process during the period of Professor Anton's observations (October, 1962–June, 1963). To call Anton's book a case study is not to condemn but to identify at the outset its most severe limitation. He deals with an aspect of politics (decisions about money) that many authors consider central to the determination of "Who Gets What. . .?" It illustrates with stories about live creatures a number of phenomena that other research suggests may be widely present in state budgeting:

1) Participants in budgeting decisions lack relevant training for decisions that affect the substance of public policies.
2) Participants make their budgeting decisions on the basis of simplistic rules that focus on changes in dollars to be spent rather than on the nature of services to be provided.
3) Changes in agency budgets are incremental modifications to an existing base and reflect no clear pattern of response to economic, political or ideological stimuli.
4) The weight of the "budget organization" with well-developed criteria for awarding funds is likely to prevail over the desires for change held by individual members of the state government—even if those desiring change are members of the Legislature or the Governor himself.

> ". . . The budget document may be compared to a huge mountain, which is constantly being pushed higher and higher by underground geologic convulsions. On top of the mountain is a single man, blindfolded, dislodging pebbles with a teaspoon. That man is the Governor."

Anton maximizes the utility of his case study by organizing it around theoretically relevant questions. He goes far beyond the description of formal procedures and argues that he has searched out and found the goals and rules that structure decision-making in Illinois budgeting.

The book's major fault is its lack of comparative data. Anton does not compare his subjects with counterparts in other states and he does not compare systematically Illinois 1962–63 with Illinois at any other time or the budgeting of different agencies at his one point of time. A related fault is an avoidance of statistical techniques that might increase the author's credibility. More than other substantive areas in political science the residue of financial decision-making lends itself to sophisticated statistical analysis. Agency requests, the decisions of budget reviewers in the Administration and Legislature, appropriations and the ultimate expenditures are already quantified and begging for scholars to make theoretical sense out of them. Anton presents many tables throughout his book, including an Appendix that gives the dollar record of each agency's budget history for one biennium. Yet Anton neglects the possibilities of his own numbers. The tables are generally illustrative and rarely show anything more than gross budget figures. The reader must test generalizations with the persuasiveness of the author's prose and illustrative cases.

Despite these problems Anton's book is a valuable addition to the budgeting literature. Its

lively writing style should commend it to instructors who want an extensive description of a vital political process. For the growing number of scholars who specialize in the budgetary process, Anton's book (like Aaron Wildavsky's description of Federal budgeting) deals explicitly with questions of wide relevance and should make a useful standard for comparison. Along with Wildavsky and Charles Lindblom, Anton finds budgeteers relying on something other than rational-comprehensive decision rules. The most important thing in the budget-maker's world is last year's appropriation and the degree of deviation posed by the request for next year. The Illinois process fits the incremental model but it illustrates a type of incrementalism that may differ from others. Illinois budget-makers at the Executive and Legislative levels argue almost entirely about the increment between last year's expenditure and the dollar figure requested for the next year. There is an apparent lack of contention between protagonists about the increments in program activity that additional dollars will buy. Agency officials avoid or evade the formal budget process in their efforts to expand programs. If it is generally true that state budgeteers ignore programmatic considerations, then political scientists may have to look beyond the budget process for sources of control and innovation *vis à vis* state public services.
—IRA SHARKANSKY, *University of Georgia.*

Nevada: The Great Rotten Borough, 1859–1964. By GILMAN OSTRANDER. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966. Pp. v, 247, $4.95.)

Nevada is an extreme example of a rotten borough both because it has constitutional representation of two senators to the United States Senate (as designated by the Connecticut Compromise of 1787) and because the policy perspectives and commitments of its senators throughout most of its political history have tended to advance state interests over national interests with one exception. This appears to be the thesis of Professor Gilman Ostrander's book, *Nevada: The Great Rotten Borough, 1859–1964.* Furthermore, Ostrander implies that the existence of a rotten borough is one of the unanticipated consequences of the Connecticut Compromise and few scholars have analyzed the results of this compromise. He intends to correct this information gap in the present book.

Documentation of this thesis is undertaken by analyzing the major contours of Nevada's economic and political history from 1895 to present day. Prior to the 1930s Nevada was dominated by absentee-owned mining, cattle, and railroad interests and its senators, most of whom were originally non-Nevadans, were ardent spokesmen for these interests and rarely concerned themselves with national interests. The rise of "Nevadaism," a term which he uses to describe the election of native born Nevadans to the Senate, began in 1932 with the election of Senator Pat McCarran. It was at this time that Nevada was considered a rotten borough because its economy was depleted and its population had declined to the lowest point in its history so that its senatorial representation in the United States was even more exaggerated.

In evaluating Nevada's senatorial representation in the Senate, Ostrander emphasizes repeatedly that the Nevada senators either absolutely ignored national problems or, when they did get into positions of national influence, they projected their small state views far beyond the representation and interests that Senators from Nevada might be expected to exert. Admittedly, a senator who is chairman of a committee exercises considerable influence on legislation but they are not solely responsible for the passage of legislation as implied in Ostrander's book. For example, Senator McCarran did not singlehandedly pass the McCarran-Walter Act for there was considerable senate and congressional support for this legislation. Senator Newlands is the only Nevada senator who is saluted in the book and this is because he represented national interests in the field of conservation.

A number of problems and difficulties exist in this book. First, concrete evidence that the Founding Fathers were distraught over the terms and results of the compromise is spare, although Ostrander makes a great claim that there was considerable dissension about the compromise. Nor is there sufficient evidence to support Ostrander's claim that the Founding Fathers had reverence for "the holy principle of proportional representation." Second, the establishment and perpetuation of a federal union requires considerable balance and harmony between national and state interests and the political history of the United States is replete with national-state conflicts. Is there, for example, a senatorial ideology or norm that commands a senator from a sparsely populated state continuously to represent a national viewpoint as opposed to statewide interests? Is there, for example, an inherent vice in satisfying local political and economic interests? It should be argued, instead, that the reality of political life indicates that senators who do not mollify local economic and political interests will be retired from office. This is as true in other states as it is in Nevada.

Third, there is no inclusion of how statesmanship is judged by Ostrander, except the assumption that those senators who pursue "national" policies are good and those who do not are bad. At the same time, Professor Ostrander severely criticizes Senator Key Pittman because of his

active support of the national policies of the Wilson Administration. To evaluate the nature of statesmanship there has to be some consistent criteria for evaluation.

Fourth, if Nevada is a rotten borough as Professor Ostrander suggests that it is, then one must include forty-nine other states in this category because the Connecticut Compromise clearly allocated senate seats to each state regardless of the magnitude or sparseness of their population. These objections surely question the validity of the rotten borough thesis. Finally, Senator McCarran could not have graduated from the University of Nevada Law School for there never has been a law school at that University.—STANLEY A. PEARL, *University of Nevada.*

Skid Row as a Way of Life. By SAMUEL E. WALLACE. (Totowa. N. J.: The Bedminster Press, 1965. Pp. vi, 219. $5.50.)

Long ago a noble fort stood in a howling wilderness, far beyond the frontier of a milk-and-cookies civilization. That citadel of courage and romance was surrounded by impenetrable forest on one side and trackless desert on the other. The incredible feats of courage which marked the daily routine of its garrison made it impregnable to the assaults of barbarian hordes. Then one day, at a single stroke, that fortress was betrayed, delivered to its enemies, and reduced to a heap of rubble. An old woman said, "You kids stay out of that filthy old shed!" What has become of the survivors?

It seems that the definitive study of many high cultures, cultures of vision and imagination, sounds the death knell of the institutions thus described. Mr. Wallace has attempted a definitive study of the culture of skid row. He reports that this culture, long beleaguered by the forces of temperance, social security, and reform, is vanishing from the American scene like other vestiges of our age of innocence. If that report is correct, his study of the failing struggle of this sub-culture to maintain its integrity would be of only passing interest to contemporary social science.

Mr. Wallace provides a graphic portrait of human derelicts and the urine scented hovels in which they exist. His use of participant observations of his own and others to document the conditions of life on skid row is excellent almost to a fault. The most accurate description of the objective conditions of existence may miss major features of the world in which men live. Although the observations of this work are skillfully placed in an historical perspective and a theoretical context, the events seem strangely isolated from the human, social context in which they occur. Too many of the quotations used in support of the analysis emerge from times and places far removed from the phenomena described, but the best of those may be Orwell's line (p. 108), "A bread and margarine diet does, to some extent, provide its own anodyne."

The idea that people in exceptional conditions struggle to maintain the integrity of their own value system against the onslaught of Philistines will not be new to anyone familiar with life in the "old army" barracks, the prison community, a railroad track-gang, or a present-day college dormitory. It should not be new to anyone who has ever been a small boy. The question of why men will sacrifice all the amenities of middle-class life in that struggle for integrity is a more significant issue and one not sufficiently illuminated by the present study. That question of "why" might be fruitfully approached by considering various modes for the expression of alienation and the society that generates that mood. It can hardly be answered by a focus on the culture of skid row and its "feeder" institutions alone.

Mr. Wallace notes that the class of "vagabonds, rogues, and sturdy beggars," as defined by legislation in the 15th Century, included a substantial increment of university students, but he explores the implications of that only by saying that the population of skid row is not being replenished in the present. Where have the young men gone?

The author considers briefly but seems to reject (pp. 126 ff.) the hypotheses of arrested development to account for his subjects' style of life. Yet, the evidence presented strongly suggests that some men never grow up to accept the conventions of middle-class society. They huddle like small boys in dark and filthy places. They transform those ugly places into some enchanted land by the magic of corn silk cigarettes, cheap wine, or a sheer act of imagination, and they conceal their magic from the eyes of all intruders. Some men seem never to grow up. Others seem never to have been small boys. I wonder if one will ever learn to understand the other the way small boys understand tramps.—RICHARD MCCLEERY, *Antioch College.*

The Urban Transportation Problem. By J. R. MEYER, J. F. KAIN AND M. WOHL. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. xix, 427. $11.95.)

Automobile, bus, rail—which shall it be? The argument over which of these provides the most economical, socially useful, and politically relevant mode of travel is the concern of this book. "The emphasis has been upon the study of basic issues rather than an attempt to solve the particular problems of specific urban areas." Economic change such as trends in urban location, supply of urban transport, highway financing, and trip patterns are viewed in relation to possible demand

for different modes of urban transportation. Heavy reliance is put upon comparative cost analysis. Purportedly, the objective of the book is to test some of the standard propositions such as: transit is probably cheaper than highways; or, the type of urban transport is very important in shaping the character of the city. Meyer, Kain, and Wohl conclude that these notions are either wrong or grossly oversimplified. Transportation —particularly meaning private automobiles— really isn't in a mess!

The authors point out that the critics of Los Angeles' freeways and essentially private automobile urban transportation system are unfair in blaming the cause of congestion and delay on the freeways. Meyer and his associates argue that such critics do not understand the dynamics of freeways and automobiles in Los Angeles. Yet their proof of the system's performance is their (1) sketchy statistics on traffic flow for only several arterials, (2) the mention of monumental demands for urban services in Los Angeles, and (3) the lack of a rail transit system. What might have been the system's performance if a subsidized high speed inexpensive fare rail and mass bus transit had been built? What might have been the system's performance in terms of such costs as commuting time, air pollution (it seems to have something to do with private automobiles), and tension in Watts (where one of the major complaints was lack of adequate public transportation)? In other words, if Meyer *et al.* are going to argue for system performance—then they should bring in the *full* range of costs *and* performance.

The authors mention the possibility that private automobile transportation creates an urban wasteland. The wasteland then is promptly blamed on dispersed employment location and FHA policy. Obviously these factors are causal, too, but that doesn't absolve the responsibility of the private automobile. Perhaps most important the authors, as market-oriented economists, don't fully visualize the possibility for structuring of policy alternatives by governmental action. With the exception of San Francisco, no new metropolitan mass transit system has been or is being built from scratch since World War II. As a consequence there are no performance data on such a system. Nor has governmental policy encouraged high density, easily-financed home or apartment construction to the extent it has single family detached dwellings which create a demand for new mass transit.

The Chicago and Northwestern Railroad is mentioned as losing money on its commuter services while it has been and is making a small profit. The tables are frequently difficult to follow. This book could have been edited to one half its size and lost none of its content.—B. W. ONSTINE, *Portland State College.*

COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Ombudsmen and Others. By WALTER GELLHORN. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1966. Pp. xvi, 448. $6.95.)

When Americans Complain. By WALTER GELLHORN. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 239. $3.95.)

"There are no new ideas," goes the old adage, "just adaptations of the old ones."

Professor Walter Gellhorn, Betts Professor of Law at Columbia University, would probably agree with this—at least as far as the Ombudsman idea is concerned. For Professor Gellhorn has recently completed a detailed and interesting study of Ombudsman systems all over the world. In his book, *Ombudsmen and Others: Citizens' Protectors in Nine Countries,* Gellhorn tells us that although much of the Swedish Constitution of 1809 has been forgotten, "the office it created, that of the Justitieombudsman, has lived and grown. It has inspired similar establishments in Finland, Denmark, Norway, and New Zealand, and has added the word 'ombudsman' to the international vocabulary."

What is an Ombudsman? The word itself, translated from Swedish, simply means "one who represents someone." But the concept means much more. In every country which today has an Ombudsman, the office has become a combination external critic, grievance-handler, and general complaint bureau. The powers and jurisdiction of these Ombudsmen vary. Professor Gellhorn points out that some "have the capacity to initiate prosecutions; others can, at most, exclaim in horror. Some are expected to roam the land, dropping into public offices with little or no warning in order, presumably, to take idlers by surprise or to prevent sweeping dirt under the rug; others remain steadily at their own desks. Some can look into the affairs of Cabinet Ministers; others stop at the departmental level." And whereas most Ombudsmen can receive complaints directly from the public at large, recent proposals (notably in Great Britain and by certain representatives in the U. S. Congress) would limit the Ombudsman to investigating only those complaints referred by elected legislators.

There are, of course, attributes common to all the Ombudsmen, and Gellhorn lists them for our consideration: all are created by the legislature but function independently of it; all have almost unlimited access to official papers bearing upon

matters under investigation; all can express "an ex officio expert's opinion about almost anything that governors do and that the governed do not like," and all explain their conclusions "so that both administrators and complaining citizens well understand the results reached."

Ombudsmen and Others thus gives us a comprehensive understanding of existing grievance procedures in other countries. All of the Scandinavian countries have an Ombudsman (Sweden has two, one for civilian and one for military affairs). Poland has "The Prokuratura"; the Soviet Union a Procurator General; Japan the Administrative Management Agency (AMA); and Israel a State Comptroller. And all represent partial answers to the "search for cheap and easy means of inquiring into asserted deficiencies," a search that Professor Gellhorn points out has intensified in recent decades.

This same search exists in the United States—and at all levels of government. Professor Gellhorn's second book, *When Americans Complain*, provides us with a most timely study of existing governmental grievance procedures, federal, state, and local. Ranging from judicial control over administration to internal inspection and audit systems, the Professor examines what happens now when Americans complain about their public servants.

Students of the legislative branch of government will find the chapter entitled "Watchmen in Washington" worthy of serious analysis. Currently, the Congress is considering proposals designed, in part, to alleviate the pressure of what is commonly referred to as "casework." The Joint Committee on the Reorganization of the Congress, in its final report of 1966, decided against recommending creation of an Ombudsman-like office, pointing out that "casework is a proper function of the individual Member of Congress and should not be delegated to an administrative body." But Professor Gellhorn argues that too much reliance is being placed on "an unperfected critical device, congressional performance of constituents' casework." Casework does not work, he says, for three intertwined reasons: normal administrative processes are too often shortcircuited; Congressmen often use the process to gain unearned credit; and casework is an ad hoc process which "too infrequently includes thought about the future."

Yet another critique of Congressional casework was presented by Swedish Ombudsman Alfred Bexelius when he appeared before Senator Edward V. Long's Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure. "If the Congressman should find that the agency concerned has not acted in a wrong way," Bexelius asked the Committee, "can you be sure that the complainant will believe the Congressman? Can he not say that the Congressman tries to defend the agency owing to political reasons?"

If statistical parallels are accurate, the experiences of other Ombudsmen show that 80–90 per cent of the complaints are unfounded, although submitted in good faith. Professor Gellhorn points out that "though the Ombudsman has sometimes been called 'the citizens' defender,' he is very much 'the bureaucrats' defender' too." And although the Professor makes a very persuasive case for trying Ombudsmen here in the United States, especially at the state and local level, at this early stage there appears to be considerable apathy—if not opposition—from the legislators who must pass on any Ombudsman-creating legislation. No doubt there is also opposition from the executive, over which any Ombudsman will have jurisdiction. In fact, Professor Gellhorn informs us that when New Zealand was considering creating their Ombudsman in 1962, the official organ of the Public Service Association carried the following headline: "Ombudsman Bill Sheer Humbug." Three years later, after the Ombudsman's annual report had exonerated the Public Service from any charge of malpractice, the same periodical praised the Ombudsman, saying: "It is becoming increasingly clear that the office of Ombudsman is not necessarily the trap for public servants which many of us feared when it was first established."

There are, no doubt, many serious questions to ask when considering Ombudsman for any level in the United States. Can we import into our political system an office which has thus far been successful only under parliamentary systems? Would the creation of an Ombudsman imply that we have failed in establishing a government of, by, and for the people? Would an Ombudsman merely be a stop-gap or half-way measure toward solving our problems, without really getting to the core of our trouble? How would the Ombudsman be appointed, and what jurisdiction would he have? Would his office become just another bureaucracy?

These issues, plus many more, must be fully explored. The debate which is so healthy has started in city halls and state legislatures across the country, and indeed, in the U. S. Congress as well. Professor Gellhorn's two books, *Ombudsmen and Others*, and *When Americans Complain* should be considered basic pre-requisites to any informed discussion of this fascinating subject.—BENNY L. KASS, *Asst. Counsel, Committee on Judiciary, U. S. Senate.*

Canadian Ombudsman Proposals. By STANLEY V. ANDERSON. (Berkeley: Institute of Govern-

mental Studies, University of California, 1966. Pp. xi, 168. $2.50.)

Many Americans will be surprised to learn that in Canada a vigorous discussion of the Ombudsman ideas has been going on since 1960, when an opposition member's resolution on the subject was filed in the House of Commons. Since then, proposals have been made at all levels of government for the appointment of an independent Ombudsman to receive and investigate complaints by citizens against administrative action (or inaction!). Professor Anderson's monograph is a thorough and painstaking account and analysis of these proposals. It reveals that by 1966 the federal parliament and eight of the ten provincial legislatures had considered Ombudsman proposals, but no government had yet adopted the scheme. Since then, the governments of three provinces—Alberta, Manitoba, and Quebec—have announced that they intend to introduce bills to create the plan at the current sessions of the provincial legislatures. Government support practically ensures adoption. It is therefore almost certain that the first adoptions in North America will be by Canadian provincial governments rather than American state governments. The Canadian experiment will no doubt be watched with interest by Americans.

Since the Canadian provinces have a parliamentary system of government, with the executive responsible to the legislature, Americans may argue that Canadian experience is not strictly relevant. As Professor Anderson points out, however, one of the main arguments in Canada against the adoption of the Ombudsman system is that it might interfere with ministerial responsibility. This argument does not apply to the American separation of powers. The other main opposition arguments, however, *are* relevant to the American system: that the office is superfluous because the legislator already fulfills this function and because legal aid already exists; that administrative procedure should be reformed instead; and that the problems of federalism and population size would be insurmountable. In his final chapter, Professor Anderson gives effective answers to these objections, and wisely concludes (p. 74): "In appraising the adaptability of the Ombudsman institution, experience should predominate over abstract logic. An Ombudsman office does not alter the basic structure of government."

The main part of Professor Anderson's text is only 84 pages long. The remainder is reproductions of proposed bills and other appendices. Although this information will be of great interest of the specialist in "Ombudsmanship," it is doubtful whether others would find the monograph worth the cost. Americans will be more interested in his writings on the application of the idea to the United States. Next to Professor Gellhorn, he is probably the foremost American academic exponent of the idea. He is now editing the background papers on this subject for this year's meeting of the American Assembly, and is also preparing a volume on American Ombudsman proposals. In view of the incisiveness of his analysis of the Canadian proposals, Americans should find his new volume of great interest.—DONALD C. ROWAT, *Carleton University, Ottawa.*

Atomic Energy in France Under the Fourth Republic. By LAWRENCE SCHEINMAN. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. xxiv, 259. $6.50.)

An academic, prosaic title on an artless jacket masks one of the most significant politico-nuclear studies of the past two decades. A pity.

Some of those whose attention is drawn to this book may expect a rendition of the familiar strategic philosophies of Gallois Beaufre, *et al.*, but nowhere do these names appear. They are the apostles of the Fifth Republic and this is a salient point of Scheinman's analysis, for the development of strategic doctrine in France did not proceed, but followed possession of the bomb. This was the case for the earlier members of the nuclear club; such examinations are more symptomatic of the dilemma of what to do with the bomb after the exultation of first achievement rather than whether to make it in the first place.

Since the liberation of Paris, de Gaulle was exposed to briefings and memoranda on the progress and potential of atomic energy research. It was he, as head of the Provisional Government, who on October 18, 1945 established the Commissariet à l'Energie Atomique under his direct control. And it was he, returning as first President of the Fifth Republic who was able to use to his own enormous political advantage the considerable technological momentum sustained in the political kaleidoscope of the intervening years.

From the beginning and through the period of Joliot-Curie's scientific leadership the French atomic program was never entirely disassociated from possible military intent. But it was not until Joliot-Curie's removal in April 1950 that the "technocratic" leadership of the administrative sector of the C.E.A. began to dominate. They were the persevering force which eventually gave France the bomb. Schienman's fascinating description of this struggle and its consequences constitutes an important sociological examination of the ascendency of a well-defined administrative class of leadership, not confined to the C.E.A. to a level just below that of the General.

Perhaps the most instructive point of the study is the way in which essentially pure technological

pressures devoid of strategic consideration had built up to such a point that after a critical interministerial meeting at the end of 1954 when the question of whether France should formally embark on a weapons program, a permissive if not directive, stance emerged. Thus the bomb began to be developed, albeit without formal official warrant, for a period of over three years. In the last spring of the Fourth Republic Prime Minister Felix Gaillard gave official sanction to the manufacture of the bomb. "The Gaullist policy of *grandeur* and prestige was in play—and it preceded its mentor."

Thus the story carries an aura of inevitability with the outcome unaffected by the circumstance of whether or not de Gaulle had resumed power again. This image characterizes not only the question of bomb production but the future industrial power complex. Although Scheinman's main thrust is towards the weapons decision, another major contribution is his analysis of the forces which came into play regarding the development of civilian atomic power, particularly with regard to the Euratom question. Here was a confrontation with the future surrender of some measure of industrial and military sovereignty for the benefits European integration was presumed to bring. De Gaulle was in retirement at Colombey-les-deux-Eglises, yet similar political behavior in more recent years is often ascribed to a caprice, uniquely the General's. In the C.E.A., the scientific and administrative services, still split by the bomb question, were united in feeling against international pooling of atomic resources. They did, in the end, surrender to the political motivation of M. Mollet, but the latter also had to accept the reservations of more cautious proponents, including Independents, Gaullists and Radicals. The French preserved their option for independent development and possession of nuclear weapons, and this was the price accepted by Euratom so that membership among the Six could be complete. Thus the precedence was set for a chain of accommodation aimed at keeping France in the European atomic energy community.

There is a rather consistent pattern to this story, and in few other studies of the manner in which each of the five nuclear powers have attained their status have the political, sociological and technological threads been so effectively interwoven.

This book should be required text for university studies involving not only nuclear proliferation but the interaction of technology with society. Its reading hopefully would tempt someone to continue the analysis into the Fifth Republic, when the preparations of earlier years came to fruition in the tests at Reganne and in the Pacific, and in the extensive complex for production of nuclear and thermonuclear materials for military and benign purposes. There are still many aspects of the French nuclear program which will force decisions of painful import for many nations, France included.—ARNOLD KRAMISH, *The Institute for Strategic Studies, London.*

Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officers Corps under Marshal Pétain. By ROBERT O. PAXTON. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 472. $9.00.)

The student of French civil-military relations soon discovers that historians have been fascinated far more by the battlefield exploits of France's army than by its social and political history. Professor Paxton's admirable study of the Vichy Army helps to redress that imbalance in the historical literature. In a book which is impressively well researched and lucidly written, he examines the passions and internal tensions of an army freed by defeat from its perennial domestic critics, yet constantly threatened with extinction at the hands of foreign powers.

With the fall of the Republic, Marshal Pétain restored military values and military men to a place of honor long denied them. One officer confided to Paxton that "This was the most fervent period of my life." Impassioned with the thought that only the army could rebuild French unity and restore the moral fiber of the nation, officers turned their efforts in 1940 and 1941 away from the war, which seemed all but over, toward the task of instilling respect for discipline, industry, sacrifice, and patriotism in the minds both of conscripts and of members of the compulsory youth league, the Chantiers de Jeunesse. De Gaulle's appeals fell mostly on deaf or hostile ears, with only an occasional renegade officer—usually assigned outside a normal military unit—daring to disobey the Marshal. As Paxton demonstrates, the usual restraint of discipline was complemented by a widespread fear, even among those few Anglophile officers, that a breach of French neutrality would mean the "Polandization" of France, the loss of the French Empire, and quite possibly the breakdown of domestic social order.

Paxton describes how the officer corps failed to accomplish its goals even within the "Free Zone." "Curiously enough," he writes, "It was the power given to high-ranking officers and the executive feebleness of the Marshal's so-called authoritarian government which gave free rein to the growth of cliques." Far from attaining that "natural" unity which, as military figures had argued, would result from a termination of civilian interference, officers were at least as quarrelsome and promotions at least as often politically motivated as under the Third Re-

public. Nor did the military parades, the morality lectures, and the expanded prerogatives of defeated officers succeed in endearing the army to civilian society. Finally, the orthodoxy of neutrality ultimately failed to protect the Vichy zone from German occupation or even to prevent the dissolution of the Armistice Army itself in November, 1942.

Paxton wisely refrains from explaining too much of subsequent French military indiscipline in terms of the Vichy experience. Yet, though frustration in later colonial wars clearly was a necessary condition to the military revolts of 1958 and 1962, Paxton rightly stresses that wartime experiences deepened the isolation of the army from civilian society, heightened the army's attachment to the colonies (and her jealousy of foreign designs on them), weakened officers' faith in unquestioning discipline, and aroused their interest in re-educating French youth.

As an historian, Professor Paxton is not concerned with the theoretical literature on civil-military relations. His careful exposition and analysis of French military values and behavior in a time of stress, however, provide valuable materials for students of civil-military relations and of military sociology, as well as for those interested in one of the most controversial episodes in contemporary French history.—JOHN S. AMBLER, *Rice University.*

Dimensions du Nationalisme: Enquête Par Questionnaire. BY GUY MICHELAT AND JEAN-PIERRE H. THOMAS. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966. Pp. xiii, 184.)

This volume grew out of a paper presented to the conference on contemporary nationalism sponsored by the French Political Science Association in 1962. The authors, both researchers at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, had the happy idea of testing out various hypotheses concerning nationalism by investigating the attitudes actually held among French students. This group was highly accessible and cooperative, but hardly representative. It consisted of 223 students at the Institutes of Political Studies of Paris, Grenoble and Strasbourg. As the authors point out, the time period during which the survey was carried out was most extraordinary—the weeks immediately preceding the opening of Franco-Algerian negotiations at Evian. Not only were students, and everyone else, highly politicized at this time, but "nationalism" as an ideology had a particular political meaning. If a similar inquiry were conducted today, we should probably find a more favorable attitude towards nationalist values on the part of the Left.

The most interesting finding of this modest but well planned piece of research was almost incidental to the original stated purpose. In seeking to correlate attitudes towards nationalism with other psychological and political attitudes, the authors decided to use the classic distinction between the Left and the Right as one of the variables. The importance of this ideological polarity, and even the exact meaning of these terms, is a matter of some controversy among French political scientists. François Goguel and René Rémond have underlined the significance of the Left-Right conflict for an understanding of electoral behavior and recent history. But other political scientists have questioned this interpretation, suggesting that there is really a pluralism of Lefts and Rights, that this kind of division exists within major political blocs at any given time as well as between them, and that a trend towards depoliticization is weakening these hoary ideologies in any case. Michelat and Thomas report that they expected a large number of respondents to say that they could not classify themselves in terms of this ideological division, and that the Right would be disowned during this period of OAS terrorism. The question posed was: "Do you consider yourself on the Right, on the Left, in the Center, or can your position not be defined in these terms?" Of the 97 per cent who responded, only 20 per cent did not define their political position in these terms, while 16 per cent said they were on the Right, 37 per cent on the Left and 24 per cent in the Center. The classic Left-Right ideological polarity still had plenty of life, at least among university students in the peculiar circumstances of 1962.

The authors found that nationalism among these students was one element, among others, in a system of political attitudes readily identifiable as the conservative Right. Nationalist students tended to be conservative, anti-communist, favorable to colonialism and respectful of the army, while those scoring lower on the nationalism scale were sympathetic to socialism, disdainful of anti-communism, hostile to colonialism and distrustful of the army. The only surprise was that anti-German and anti-American attitudes were of little significance. The limited data in this study thus seem to support the thesis that traditional ideological orientations continue to be of fundamental importance, subject to all the qualifications noted above regarding the nature of the group studied and timing of the inquiry. In his perceptive introduction, Professor Raoul Girardet expresses the laudable hope that more French political scientists will engage in this kind of empirical research.—BERNARD E. BROWN, *Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.*

Auschwitz. A Report on the Proceedings Against Robert Karl Mulka and Others Before the Court at Frankfurt. BY BERND NAUMANN. (New

York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. xxx, 433. $7.95.)

The Frankfurt trial of twenty-two former SS men, who ranged from adjutant to camp guard at Auschwitz concentration camp, began on December 20, 1963, and ended on August 20, 1965. During those 20 months, court was in session 182 days; a record for a criminal case in Germany. The 22 were accused of murder and complicity in murders; they were charged individually and separately, not as members of the SS.

Bernd Naumann, who covered the trial for the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, published a shortened collection of his reports in Germany in 1965. The English translation is changed only to delete references to the German penal code and other material that might puzzle the non-German reader. A comparison of the two editions reveals that the book lost none of its force in translation.

Mr. Naumann's purpose was to observe and report. There is neither commentary nor analysis. After presenting a short biographical survey of each of the 22, Naumann follows the trial from the testimony of the defendants and the witnesses, to the court's Auschwitz visit, to the summations of the prosecution and the defense, and finally, to the verdict and the opinion of the court. He quotes questions and answers as he recorded them; sometimes he paraphrases; sometimes he summarizes. He introduces the witnesses, who came from various parts of the world, and reports their testimony, some of which has been blurred by lapse of time and memory (why not?), and much of which the court discounted even though it had to rely almost exclusively upon witnesses' testimony. What emerges is a not unfamiliar catalog of violence, murder, sadism, and degradation that would be unbelievable were the evidence collected since 1945 not so incontrovertible.

There is, however, an apparent larger unity to the book: It is the stark contrast between the recollections of the accused and those of the witnesses. Mr. Naumann points up—not by editorial, but by superb reporting—the apparent inner defense the accused had built up, and ends with the only editorial I found in the book: They "consider themselves innocent, almost as innocent as the victims of Auschwitz . . . . the pawns of a relentless fate" (p. 404).

Hannah Arendt, whose introduction provides the commentary for the English edition, sees it otherwise. Not fate, but German indifference to Nazi crimes and public opposition to further trials conditioned the attitude of the accused. "It was just this kind of public opinion, which can be all-pervasive and still only rarely come into the open, that the trial in Frankfurt revealed in its true strength and significance" (p. xii).

For the reader familiar with the major, and especially the lesser, war crimes trials conducted at Nuremberg after World War II, with the Eichmann trial, with Rudolf Höss's *Commandant of Auschwitz*, Gerald Reitlinger's *The Final Solution*, and Raul Hilberg's *The Destruction of the European Jews*, there is really not much that is new in this book. It adds the names of 22 people who murdered and cooperated in murder and it tells how they were tried.—JOHN GIMBEL, *Humboldt State College.*

The Relations of the Profumo Rebels with Their Local Parties. By JORGEN S. RASMUSSEN. (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1966. Pp. 54. $1.50.)

This short study is an investigation of one of the often suggested causes of cohesive, disciplined major political parties in Great Britain: the controls exercised by the formal party organizational apparatus over the nominating process for parliamentary candidates. Conclusions reached earlier in Leon Epstein's investigation of the Suez crisis are retested through an investigation of the experiences of Conservative party members who rebelled against the party leadership on the Profumo affair. The basic hypothesis, drawn from Epstein, is that deviations toward the opposition, but not extremist deviations, result in sanctions against errant MP's by local party organizations in the form of refusing renomination for candidature to the parliamentary seat.

Identifying six other issues on which significant deviations from government policy occurred within the Conservative party between 1959–64, the author finds considerable evidence supporting the hypothesis that British Tory backbench opposition is "ad hoc" in nature. No cohesive group of MP's is found who consistently opposed the leadership in a given direction.

Some confusion in terminology is present, however, in the use of the terms right wing, non-right wing, and center, as the types of deviations in which Tories indulge. The characterization of the Profumo case as a center deviation implies that the last two may be synonymous, but if so, why use two different terms? The precise implications of the major conclusion, that party tolerance for center deviations is indicated by the results of this research, are slightly obscured by this problem.

It can be readily agreed that the Profumo case, though involving no significant policy issue, represented perhaps an even more serious crisis for the Conservative party than did the Suez controversy. It cannot so easily be accepted that deviation in that case would be so likely viewed by the local constituency associations as open support for Labour. Perhaps a distinction based on this point would prove useful. In any case, the fact that several of the more serious deviants faced local challenges, and that those most vulner-

able in terms of seniority and party balance in their districts were in most cases careful to limit strictly the frequency of their deviations, seems to imply at least the perception of a limit to tolerance of individual deviations, which seems to have been crossed for Suez, but only approached for Profumo. The results do indicate, however, that the response to Suez may have been a response to a somewhat unique situation.

Other conclusions, concerning the grounds for discipline and non-discipline of particular MP's are suggestive, and are based on the author's substantial knowledge in this area. On the whole, the study makes a useful contribution in the direction of clarifying our knowledge of this particular area, and reflects an approach to problem selection which is of value for the development of the discipline.—LARRY N. STERN, *Florida State University.*

The Communist Party Apparatus. By ABDURAKHMAN AVTORKHANOV. (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1966. Pp. viii, 422. $10.00.)

On any list of most troublesome questions about the Soviet system and its party, we would expect to find questions such as the following: What is the process by which individuals are drawn into or make their way into party leadership posts and what kinds of individuals with what types of outlooks are they likely to be? How does the party define its decision-making function and how is that function distributed within the party? In what ways is the party responsive to communications and expressed interests from without? Given the party's directing role in Soviet society, how are boundary lines maintained between the party and other structures, and how does the party extend its influence and develop support? To each of these questions we would want to add, given the internal changes of the last dozen years or so: What evidence can be found to suggest any significant modification in party functioning, perhaps in the direction of broader representation, more flexible approaches, less exclusive control, etc,?

Avtorkhanov takes us only a very short way toward answering these questions. He has drawn together an impressive compendium on the structure and composition of the party. He begins by identifying the party apparatus as the covert, controlling element in the Soviet system. He explores the party's origins and ideological underpinnings, its relationship with the governmental apparatus and other sectors of Soviet society, the party's role in policy-making. From time to time he raises but does not pursue broad and complex questions such as the relationship between collective leadership and intra-party democracy, the impact of an emerging party "rationalism" on the system, the significance of the Chinese-Russian split, etc. Through it all, despite the useful information he has assembled, he adds little to our understanding of the working of the party and of general political processes in the Soviet Union.

The first difficulty, it seems to me, is the "bare bones" quality of the study. Avtorkhanov produces this quality in part through the considerable attention he pays to party statutes, Central Committee resolutions, organization structures, and formal chains of command. He gives the impression, though it is not quite an accurate one, that he approaches the party in the same spirit as those he castigates who look only at formal rules and constitutions and hence see no more than the facade of the party and governmental apparatus. A student, we might suggest, is likely to come away from a reading of Ehrenburg's *The Thaw* with a more vivid impression of the party's role in Soviet life.

Further, where Avtorkhanov speaks of the informal functioning of the party apparatus, he does so in bits and pieces and in a formally descriptive way. He tells us, for example, that decisions of district (*raion*) and city (*gorod*) party bureaus are drawn up by the party apparatus in advance of bureau meetings but after consultation with whatever organizations or institutions may be affected by the decision. The consultation aspect of the procedure, he notes, represents a change—accomplished perhaps in the late nineteen-fifties—from the earlier practice of concealing draft decisions until after formal approval by the bureau. The change is certainly suggestive, and it may be significant. Yet Avtorkhanov does not explore the matter, and we are left dangling—intrigued but not much better informed.

In the same way, Avtorkhanov experiences difficulty interpreting the party and system changes of recent years. The system, he argues, is a "partocracy," and he documents effectively the dominant, guiding role the party plays in Soviet life. The party on its part, he argues, is hierarchical, and he emphasizes central authority and the manipulative role and skills of the secretariat. He does not provide, however, the fine measure that is needed to draw subtle, discriminating conclusions. We are told, for example, that candidates for positions as delegates to party congresses are subjected to stringent screening by the party apparatus and the central security police. The screening is meant to ensure delegate reliability to the Central Committee and its leaders. The observation is a useful reference to reinforcing centralist techniques for maintaining broad institutional support. It is an adequate observation, however, only when applied to a monolithic party with an accepted, absolute leader at its head. How is screening accomplished where there is rivalry

within the party? If there are party factions, no matter how ill-organized, what relation do they bear to the process? Does the apparatus work to define some form of factional balance, or does it work simply to ensure that congress delegates will not challenge the modest role congresses now are given, a role which renders the question of delegate selection a minor one perhaps even to party leaders?

Answers to these questions are not easy to come by in a system which protects its party core so scrupulously from outside observation. The disappointing aspect of Avtorkhanov's study is its failure to approach the apparatus in a way which would help define the relative importance of the wide variety of questions about the party we might want to raise.—ROBERT S. SULLIVANT, *University of Missouri at St. Louis.*

The New Eastern Europe: The Khrushchev Era and After. By J. F. BROWN. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. vii, 306. $6.50, cloth; $2.25, paper.)

Man progresses in ordering his world when he remains open to experience and free from dogma. J. F. Brown demonstrates in *The New Eastern Europe* that the leaders of the countries from East Germany to Bulgaria have increasingly come to such a realization.

Brown traces the events in Eastern Europe between 1956 and the present under the headings of Political Development, Industry and the National Economy, Cultural Development, and Relations with the Soviet Union. Additional chapters treat the special cases of Albania and Romania and relations with the West. The treatment is chiefly chronological and generally introductory in nature. While not eloquently written, the book is clear, direct and untainted by ideological bias. The topics are treated in a country by country fashion with a summing up included as a part of each chapter. Over half the book is devoted to an analysis of political events and to industrial reform programs. There are five appendices including a list of State and Party officials in each of the countries and biographical sketches of party leaders and premiers. A chief source for Brown's analysis is the Eastern European press.

Brown concludes that Khrushchev "inherited an empire" and "bequeathed a commonwealth," that the countries, having abandoned terror and coercion, "had to identify more closely with the peoples they were governing and had to reflect their traditional nationalism, even if only in a limited way."

In terms of political development, Brown finds that generalizations are difficult to make. Nonetheless, varying degrees of political relaxation and liberalization have taken place after 1953 and the Eastern European countries have become better places to live. Economic reforms also have taken place, sometimes these were only piecemeal but in some cases completely new schemes of economic management were adopted. In many cases the objective was the search for a better quality product and for the kinds of commodities that the market requires. Some revitalization of small-scale, private enterprise also has taken place. While Brown cautions that economic reform is "long" and "drawn out" and that opposition to change does exist within these countries, nevertheless a definite new approach to the economy characterizes every country of the region. Particularly significant are the political implications. "Party supremacy, as it has been traditionally understood, may gradually wither away . . . and the potency of the traditionally understood ideology" may disappear.

The efforts of Khrushchev to impose a common economic plan on Eastern Europe failed and the failure illustrates the national assertion of the leadership of Eastern Europe. Direction from Moscow is no longer a significant part of the relations between these countries and the Soviet Union.

The themes that emerge from the book are ones of evolution away from a rigid pattern of rule and of an assertion of national independence. Brown's book demonstrates that the international system is being transformed away from a two bloc world.—LOUIS F. BRAKEMAN, *Denison University.*

Workers' Councils: The Yugoslav Experience. By JIRI KOLAJA. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. xii, 84. $4.50.)

Look East Look West, the Socialist Adventure in Yugoslavia. By DAVID TORNQUIST. (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966. Pp. 310. $6.95.)

For a country so preoccupied with Communism as the United States, it is surprising that not more advantage has been taken of the unique opportunity afforded by Yugoslavia. Here is a country run by a Communist Party where it is possible for non-Communist foreigners to live, move about freely, observe the various political and social institutions at first hand and carry on detailed scholarly research. For some years Yugoslavia was the only Communist country where any of this was possible, and even today it is the only one where such an investigator is really given a more or less free hand. It is a country so rich in ethnic, nationalist, social and economic complexities as to be a gold mine for scholars in a half a dozen disciplines. In addition, the Yugoslavs have a fascinating and original type of socialism which has in important degree influenced the theory and practice of Communism in other countries. Despite

some outstanding works, American scholarship has not yet discovered Yugoslavia in any depth. One reason, probably, why the gold mine has not been tapped to a greater extent is the language barrier, which can be formidable.

There now seems to be an increasing number of books based on firsthand observations in Yugoslavia by linguistically competent writers. Here are two of them which complement each other. In *Look East Look West*, Mr. Tornquist, a professional writer and translator, reports in a chatty but often searching fashion about his life as a more or less ordinary citizen in Yugoslavia during a two-year period. Mr. Kolaja's little book, *Workers' Councils: The Yugoslav Experience*, is somewhat more systematic in approach but much more limited in scope. It is a report of the operations of worker management in two Yugoslav factories, based on the author's personal observations over a two month period and on a questionnaire submitted to employees of one enterprise. Although the material is interesting and useful, it is not clear why it was printed in the form of a book that sells for $4.50. It has only 81 pages of text, and for some reason does not include the list of questions on which much of the results are based.

The development of worker management was the first step in the institutional development of Titoism, to which it is central. And much of the political conflict in Yugoslavia since 1950—up to and including the recent economic reform and the more recent "purge" of Aleksandar Ranković and his secret police—has, directly or indirectly, concerned how much real freedom and independence the workers' councils were to be allowed. It is proper, therefore, that Mr. Tornquist's book, although it discusses many other facets of Yugoslav life, also deals in some detail with worker management. He treats it somewhat more philosophically than Mr. Kolaja, but they both come up with the same general conclusions: worker management in Yugoslavia is an important and original contribution of much promise; contrary to some critics, it works and gives employees a real opportunity to have a say in affairs of their factories; contrary to some of its supporters, it is far from a panacea; it doesn't work as well as is claimed, and meaningful independence of workers' councils still suffers from interference by the Communist party.

Yugoslavia is a complex country to report on, and the constant and rapid changes of the last 15 years make the task hazardous. *Look East Look West* is more or less a narrative. It is well written, objective and gives a fairly thorough and up to date picture. *Workers' Councils* has many useful observations and statistical data on the two factories studied. It is, however, too brief to be a study in depth, and it is sometimes marred by the effort—perhaps the necessity—to generalize on the basis of inadequate data. If there is anything true about Yugoslav worker management, it is the unevenness of its development. As Mr. Tornquist states, "in one place it may be well established; next door it may be a mere form." Both authors illustrate the factors making some workers' councils stronger and more efficient than others. Among these are the strength of the trade union organization, the attitudes of Communists and non-Communists among employees, the efficiency and profitability of particular enterprises.

The questionnaire Mr. Kolaja was able to submit to workers in one factory reveals conditions and attitudes by no means untypical. Mr. Kolaja also correctly emphasizes the role of the trade union organization in influencing workers' councils—by no means always in ways the workers desire. In fact, the union *sindikat* is probably more important in this connection than is indicated. At the same time, Mr. Kolaja's book may overstress the role of the Party, as distinguished from that of individual Communists. This is one of the factors that varies most from enterprise to enterprise and, since 1959, when the author made his investigations, it has declined considerably. Two additional factors of importance, inadequately treated here, are the relations of enterprises with communal authorities and the over-all strength of the industrial association to which a particular enterprise may belong.

Over all, Mr. Kolaja concludes that worker management in Yugoslavia gives more freedom for management than for workers; that more information is provided workers about factory operations than in any other country; but that "most people in the enterprise" were apathetic about it. He suggests that this stems from "the absence of a genuine workers' organization" or is an inescapable result of "large modern organizations," regardless of political complexion.

Mr. Tornquist is at his best in reporting and explaining attitudes of various types of Yugoslav citizens. He heralds the great progress made in personal freedom in Yugoslavia, but points out that "no one seems to know exactly where the limits of freedom lie." He cites the plight of Mihajlov as an example. At the same time, he seems to agree with one Party member who told him: "It's getting so the only citizens unable to enjoy freedom of speech are the Communists." There is, he thinks, a "contradiction between the Yugoslav version of democracy and the power, organization and methods of the League of Communists." Mr. Tornquist hazards the guess that the continuing "soul searching" of the Yugoslav Communists may result in two formally organized

wings within the Party or may produce a two-party system within the confines of Titoist Socialism.

Both books would have benefited, perhaps, if they had treated the Yugoslav development more dialectically and had referred to its place in the general spectrum of Marxism. *Workers' Councils* has a short and uneven bibliography. *Look East Look West* would be stronger if the reportage had been bulwarked with more facts and figures and if some citations were given.—FRED WARNER NEAL, *Claremont Graduate School and University Center.*

Communism in Finland: A History and Interpretation. By JOHN H. HODGSON. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. xii, 261. $6.00.)

Since the Russian Revolution Communism has probably been relatively more important in Finland than in any other democratic political system. In view of the perilous position of an independent Finland on the Soviet frontier, this fact is noteworthy. Most of the theories attempting to explain the appeals of Communism have nevertheless ignored Finnish Communism. In the rare cases where an attempt has been made to integrate Finland into comparative studies of Communism, the factual basis has been pitifully weak. Linguistic barriers have, no doubt, been at least partly responsible for this ignorance. The latter will no longer be defensible. Hodgson has written a study of the development of Finnish Communism which is not only pioneering but comes dangerously close to being definitive. The scholarly study of Finnish politics will never be the same because of Hodgson's contribution. The scholarly study of European Communism can afford to ignore this book only at its own risk.

The author has drawn upon an enormous body of published and archival material in several languages. Especially impressive is his mastery of both Finnish-language and Russian-language sources. The extensive bibliography is itself a major contribution to those who labor in the vineyard of Finnish politics. Furthermore, the author has used effectively a previously-untapped source: interviews with present and former Finnish Communists and non-Communists. Perhaps only a non-Finn could have gotten Finns to talk so honestly about themselves. The picture that emerges is that of real human beings living real lives—the stuff of politics. This picture is fortified by the author's matter-of-fact, undramatic style. The truth about Finnish Communism is itself dramatic enough without theatrical embellishments. The author does not appear to have any policy axes to grind, and his scholarship is impeccably honest and fair. It seems reasonable to assume that no Finn could have written this book. That it should have been written by a younger American scholar suggests that the study of European politics is not yet dead on these shores, in spite of the prominence of students of non-Western politics.

Hodgson gives a persuasive explanation of the causes of the Finnish Civil War of 1918, when the parliamentary leaders of Social Democracy lacked the courage to prevent the Red Guards from taking over the party. Seldom has any party leadership been so weak, listening with both ears to the ground. These leaders responded to military defeat in 1918 with a flight into Soviet Russia, where they became the emigrant leaders of a newly created Finnish Communist Party. Like other emigrants elsewhere, they always dreamed of return; in 1939, at the beginning of the Winter War, which they had urged upon Soviet leaders, this return seemed imminent. It did not take place until 1944, however, and even after the Second World War, Otto Kuusinen, the *alpha* and *omega* of Finnish Communism, and quite probably the most powerful Finn who ever lived, was denied permission to return to his homeland by the Finnish government. Hodgson's biographical insights into these emigrant leaders' thought and actions are enormously helpful in understanding the strengths and weaknesses of Finnish Communism.

Even more important, however, Hodgson gives a clear picture of the impact of the defeat of 1918 upon those far more numerous and more ordinary Red Guards who remained in Finland, where the victorious Whites, unable to lay their hands on the Red leaders, put the masses of followers into concentration camps, which did not prove to be seedbeds of Finnish democracy. Those who survived the political justice and physical starvation of the concentration camps became the chief source of militant support of Finnish Communism long after 1918. Whether the party was legal or (as between 1930 and 1944) illegal, whether it had any chance of electoral success or not, whether its leaders were Leninists or Trotskyites or Stalinists or Khrushchevians, whether Soviet leaders attacked or befriended Finland, the essential appeal of Finnish Communism was—and is—the heritage of 1918. Finnish Communism cannot be understood without grasping the full impact of a civil war in which Finns on both sides treated each other with a ferocious brutality. If the Red Guards had won, it is doubtful that very many defeated Whites would have survived. The Whites happened to win, and the probably inevitable consequence was the creation of a radical party supported by much of the Finnish working class.

That so many Finnish workers became Communists rather than Social Democrats after 1918 was, however, as Hodgson clearly demonstrates, a function, at least in part, of the weakness of the leadership of Finnish Social Democracy. This distinguished study therefore illuminates brilliantly the long crisis of European Socialism.—MARVIN RINTALA, *Boston College.*

Creating Political Order. The Party-States of West Africa. By ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1966. Pp. vi, 168. $2.50, paper.)

Despite the depressing tendency of late of African politicians to succumb to military *juntas*, the study of African politics is far from dormant. In fact, as reflected in the present work, it is still quite lively. Zolberg's essay is a fine example of the emergence of the "second generation" of political scientists interested in Africa. In the best tradition of a rising generation Zolberg criticizes his immediate antecedents and suggests future lines of development.

Creating Political Order is a frankly revisionist document. But rather than engage in demolition work alone, Zolberg utilizes the structures of previous architects and builders in an attempt to make the structures more serviceable. The result may not be as striking as the previous models, but it may be a good deal more workable.

On the basis of a remarkable review of the internal politics of Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, Ivory Coast and Mali, the author concludes that there are more similarities than differences in overall patterns, despite the conceptual divisions created by categories such as "mobilization" and "pluralist" regimes, and despite the doctrinal separations insisted upon by leaders pursuing different styles of politics, *e.g.*, in Ivory Coast and in Ghana. (The same theme is suggested in our conceptions of "mass" and "cadre" parties.) On the other hand, familiar and comfortable labels are not restored. It is still the case that "totalitarianism" has no analytical meaning in West Africa. Zolberg reinforces the point of previous analysis that traditional forms of authority and traditional patterns of politics (Zolberg prefers the term "residual") generally endure and sometimes enjoy limited triumphs. Furthermore, as the author observes, ". . . practically speaking, it is unlikely that an imitative authoritarianism would be as successful in Africa as it was in the original from which it is copied, not because African tyrants are necessarily less skillful than European ones, but rather because other conditions that contributed to the success of authoritarian rulers, such as the scale of the political community, its physical resources, and the cultural predispositions of the population, are simply not met."

Nevertheless Zolberg does not take the view that African one party regimes are "really democratic." In fact he implies that previous analysts and branches of the intelligentsia around the world have been less than even-handed in their evaluation of African governments. As an overall conceptual referent for West Africa, Zolberg suggests the politics of the "machine": stable, flexible, absorptive of solidary and ascriptive norms, interest-oriented, informal, and basically popular. Obviously, such a less-than-inspiring view is prey to misinterpretation, but it is descriptively realistic and accords with the "feel" of West African politics. (For what it is worth I would add that it also fits with what I know of several political systems in East and Central Africa.)

But what analytical benefits accrue? First, Zolberg suggests that previous discussions of the one party state have been restricted by concentration on the internal structures of the parties alone as well as on the parties' relationship (largely aspirational) to their societies. Such an approach was victimized by an apparent overwhelming strength in the nationalist parties in their moments of victory. Now summarizing research in the post-colonial years in West Africa, Zolberg observes that both scholars and citizens were misled by the professed ambitions of politicians and the "bandwagon effect" of rapid triumphs.

Second, in comparing the attempts to create new orders in West Africa over the past ten years, Zolberg is able to reverse previous emphases. The bureaucracy, rather than the party, becomes the key instrument of rule. Instead of the victorious nationalist party absorbing the government, the party has collapsed into the arms of the bureaucracy, with suitable stylistic variations in each country.

Third, Zolberg moves on to hints for middle-range theory. Utilizing familiar Weberian conceptions of authority and certain parallels to European state-creation, the author conceives of a transitional category of authority development. This is "patrimonial-bureaucratic," an incorporation of the "traditions" of colonial rule, indigenous cultural patterns and reconstructed history—all of which characterize West African party-state regimes. Politics may be seen as the interaction of existing (primordial?) authority, a slowly expanding political community and the regime itself. But since polities are viewed as reflecting "modern" and "residual" sectors simultaneously, "systems can then be characterized as clusterings of legitimacy variables," with the salience of one or another denoting changes in the regime. How this serves the cause of explanation must await future studies.

Zolberg notes that his essay is published almost

exactly ten years after Apter's path-breaking study of the Gold Coast. While the allusion may be grandiloquent, there is perhaps functionally equivalent stimulation contained in this thoughtful and absorbing re-assessment. Above all, the author demonstrates that the study of African politics is not the preserve of the "Africanists," but that it can be brought into the main normative and empirical streams of political science today.—HARVEY GLICKMAN, *Haverford College.*

Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa. BY RUTH S. MORGENTHAU. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1964. Pp. xxii, 445, maps. $8.80.)

Detailed, scholarly analysis of politics in former French Africa has long been one of the more conspicuous gaps in the growing body of English-language literature on post-war African political development. Prior to 1958, the work of two British scholars, Thomas Hodgkin and Kenneth Robinson, stood virtually alone in the field, but since then American scholars such as Aristide Zolberg, William Foltz, Immanuel Wallerstein, Victor Dubois, L. Gray Cowan, Elliot Skinner, John Ballard, David Gardinier, and Douglas Ashford have done much to fill the gap by publishing valuable country studies. The two encyclopedic volumes by Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff on former French West and Equatorial Africa, the recent volume by Claude Welsh on attempts at political unification, and the economic studies of Elliot Berg and Mark Karp are noteworthy attempts to deal with the area in broader, less episodic terms. These names do not, of course, exhaust the list of recent contributors in this field; the list is, nevertheless, both relatively short and recent.

In this perspective, Prof. Morgenthau's long-awaited book is at once a major contribution to the study of French-speaking Africa and a valuable addition to the work of political scientists concerned with supranational phenomena of nationalism and political culture. In short, we are here given—under the somewhat misleading title of "Political Parties"—a most illuminating study of the political evolution of particular African states in the context of the distinctive political culture that arose in what was formerly French West Africa.

Prof. Morgenthau's approach is frankly eclectic. She takes considerable pains to develop the political sociology and, if you will, the political ecology of the area. She is concerned to trace the social setting within which politics grew in French West Africa, the impact of French policies and their African institutional and legal reflections, and most interesting, the effect of French political style and behavior upon the African politicians who sat in the French parliament up to, and as late as, 1959. The first three parts of the book, which treat of these matters, could very well stand by themselves as a case study of one of the less successful colonial efforts of our time. The French were never, to use O. Manoni's suggestive metaphor, wholehearted Prosperos. They were torn, almost from the first, between their egalitarian principles—which dictated that subject peoples be treated not as Calibans, but as capable of assimilation to and into French culture—and the fact of colonialism, which insisted that empire required domination of the colonized, not their equality with the colonizer. It was this painful ambivalence, which many "francophone" Africans were quick to understand and use for their own ends, that permitted the growth of a unique set of Franco-African political institutions and groups in the area and in the territories themselves. Having made the point in rich detail, Prof. Morgenthau then examines four political systems and the growth of political group expression in each. The political histories of Senegal, Guinea, Mali, and the Ivory Coast come to appear very much disparate, yet logical examples of the consequences of French colonial policies and of the transterritorial political culture France fostered in West Africa. The final two chapters in the book deal with the interterritorial political movements that often preceded and spurred political growth within the several territories, the attempts at territorial unification (the Mali Federation), and with the tendency to one-partyism that has characterized political development in these states in more recent years.

The fact that Prof. Morgenthau spent a good deal of time in French West Africa, talking to the principal African politicians in the territories she discusses, gives the book immediacy and the reader a sense of participation. (It is even, perhaps, too much written from the African standpoint.) In form and style the book is scholarly, but never pedantic. Those of its readers who know nothing or little of French Africa, and to whom the array of abbreviated parties and movements (RDA, MSA, IOM, etc. etc.) mean even less, will have little problem understanding what went on, who did what, and what groups were important. In this connection, the book's several appendices are most helpful. There is a party repertory by which one can keep parties, movements, and groups straight in the narrative; there are several social background profiles of French African legislatures; and there are electoral data, a list and table of Africans in France's Chamber of Deputies, a list of French Prime Ministers and their overseas ministers during the Fourth Republic, and finally, texts of relevant passages in the French Constitu-

tions of 1946 (both) and 1958. Useful maps and an index are also included.

To catalogue the minor flaws in this otherwise excellent book would be to go on an unnecessary—and discourteous—nit-picking expedition. One aspect of Prof. Morgenthau's analysis does need comment, however. Underlying much of her discussion of the growth of political groups and central to her analysis of the so-called "one-party" trend in West Africa is the distinction she makes between "mass" and "patron" parties. (It is not hers, to be fair, but comes to her through Hodgkin from Duverger.) "Patron" parties are usually weakly articulated, undisciplined, restrictive in recruitment, and most important, tend to personal leadership. They are the parties of the "status quo," and because they draw heavily from the traditional elite, tend to be conservative in ideology. Mass parties, on the other hand, place high value on broad recruitment and participation, tend to be highly articulated, and are led by the more educated, more activist elite. They are the parties of mass integration and nationalist aim. "In the internal struggle for power which develops during the period of decolonization," contends Prof. Morgenthau, "elite parties tend . . . to lose ground to mass parties" (p. 70). The latter parties are, in this view, more highly evolved organisms. The problem is the all-too-common temptation to apply analytic structures derived from one context (Europe) to another (here, French West Africa) without asking if the contexts are sufficiently similar to warrant the transfer. Mass parties in Europe are not necessarily the same as mass parties in Africa; in the latter case what has often appeared as extensive organization, mass participation, high articulation in a party has, on closer examination, turned out to be simply a bandwagon with a band only temporarily united to play nationalist marches. Nor are mass parties—the alleged basis of the one-party state—necessarily more democratic because they have a broader base of participation than do elite parties. Membership and participation can be and have been often coerced in Africa, particularly if those who run the party also run the state. Finally, the distinction has a built-in self-fulfilling prophecy, in that it tends to equate political success with party structure. If it is indeed true that mass parties superseded elite parties during the period of decolonization, it was not necessarily so because of the superior structural characteristics of the former. It could be because the symbols (democracy, equality, participation, modernity) attached to the latter had greater affect in a situation in which elections and referenda had become procedural rungs in the ladder to political autonomy and independence. These are symbols, after all as easily appropriated by the leaders of "elite" parties as by those of "mass parties." The dominant or single parties of Mauretania, Niger, Upper Volta, and Dahomey, for example, were never true mass parties (at least in the participative and recruitment sense), yet this did not prevent their leaders—before and after independence—from extolling the mass party and claiming it as the basis of their particular organization of political power. There was the form, perhaps, but only the illusion of content.

These objections, raised not only here but previously by others of her colleagues, ought in no way to detract from the worth of Prof. Morgenthau's book. It has already—since its publication in 1964—become something of a classic in the field of African studies. It is also that rarity of books in political science, a *genuine* contribution to knowledge.—VICTOR T. LE VINE, *Washington University, St. Louis.*

African Socialism. By FENNER BROCKWAY. (Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour Editions, 1963. Pp. 128. $3.50.)

African Trade Unions. By IOAN DAVIES. (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966. Pp. 256. $1.25.)

The bewildering rapidity of change in Africa has the latent consequences of outdating events—and scholarly understanding of them—so as to make a thorough and timely analysis of the continent somewhat frustrating. Because of current developments, the immediate issues in Africa involve the analysis of the military and their emergence as the crucial forces controlling development on the continent. Neither of these books deal with the military, and, indeed, when analyses of the military coups are forthcoming, the probabilities are that Africa will have shifted to some completely different problems.

Where *African Socialism* and *African Trade Unions* remain completely timely is in their concern with ideology and institutional structures that characterize post-independent Africa. The Brockway volume deals with a significant ideological formulation that occupied the energies of Africa's intellectual elite for several years in the immediate post-independence period. Searching for a binding idea system that would complement nationalism and provide integration in the period in which the unity engendered by the struggle against colonialism was beginning to dissipate, African socialism constitutes a significant first attempt to develop a meaningful indigenous ideology. Brockway's lengthy connection with African political leaders provides him with insights into the roots and development of the ideology. However, his own commitment to socialism leads to a relatively uncritical assessment of socialist devel-

opments in Africa. In the chapter "The Socialist Sector of Africa," for example, he cites the Gezira Scheme as "one of the most impressive socialist achievements on the whole continent." Since the Scheme was initiated, as he points out, under British tutelage, I suppose it becomes necessary to classify it as "colonial socialism." Somehow, the terminology bothers one; in fact, of course, it is Brockway's loose definition of socialism that produces this kind of formulation. The same problem emerges in Brockway's discussion of the socialism of Nkrumah and Nasser. Any development of state planning, the growth of education, the spread of social welfare, the development of cooperatives, and so forth, is defined as socialist. Brockway defines the Volta River project as a "socialist arterial highway with a capitalist feeder."

The main weakness with Brockway's study is his failure to recognize the latent function of African socialism as an ideology—the fact that Africa, in the post-independence period required (and continues to require) some unifying principle. Panafricanism constituted one such attempt; African socialism another. Africa's situation continues to require some continentally unifying ideology although the exigencies of local instabilities have somewhat eclipsed the urgency of continental identity.

The strength of Davies' *African Trade Unions* from the viewpoint of the readers of the *Review* is his concentration on the political aspects of African trade unionism. Indeed, each chapter of the volume is more an essay in political analysis than a rounded treatment of the work of the unions. Thus, Davies does not deal to any extent with the area of industrial relations nor the development of an expanded body of law concerning protection of workers. His examination of colonial labor policies provides an excellent comparative study in colonial administration. Several chapters dealing with the unions before and after independence concentrate almost exclusively on the political implications of union activities.

Davies' approach is to deal with the continent as a whole and there is no focus on the unions of a particular country or region. Although unions in Africa are not very well organized or institutionalized, the subsuming of such a complex phenomenon in a small volume leads to considerable oversimplification. For the nonspecialist, however, *African Trade Unionism* provides an excellent overview of its subject matter. The first to appear in English, it can be considered as a useful adjunct to similar overviews such as Thomas Hodgkin's *African Political Parties* and Lucy Mair's *Primitive Government*.—WILLIAM H. FRIEDLAND, *New York State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cornell University.*

National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States. EDITED BY GWENDOLEN M. CARTER. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 565. $10.00.)

This is Miss Carter's third volume on the politics of African states, following *African One-Party States* (1962) and *Five African States: Responses to Diversity* (1963). As in the previous volumes the title has little specific significance; it is general enough to apply to any group of African states one may care to group together.

The bulk of the volume consists of five essays, dealing with politics in Nigeria, Niger, Uganda, Ethiopia, and the four equatorial states of Gabon, Congo (Brazzaville), Central African Republic and Chad. These are individually valuable and include in some instances much material not previously available in English or indeed at all, while the bibliographies for each chapter will serve a particularly useful function for Africanists and teachers of comparative government. The essay on Nigeria by Richard Sklar and C. S. Whitaker Jr. is a good if conventional outline, cramming all sorts of information into its pages, full of election statistics and charts of the judicial system in the various regions. Most of the essential points are there, but one has an impression of surface very broadly skimmed; would it not have been more useful to assume acquaintance with James S. Coleman's *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* and Mr. Sklar's own previous work, and go on from there? It is particularly unfortunate for this essay that it has been so overtaken by events; essentially, it ends in late 1964.

Virginia Thompson, writing on Niger, gives a picture of the stresses and strains under which that country operates, with fissiparous tendencies on an east-west as well as a north-south basis. Tribal and economic problems emerge clearly; the political splits which have produced Djibo Bakary's outlawed Sawaba party are well recounted; a feeling for the limits of political choice and action emerges. One would like Miss Thompson to develop further, however, her statement that "Niger exists at the sufferance of stronger powers; it has been allowed to survive and to improve its economy because it has a nuisance value as a potential source of disorder in central West Africa" (p. 153).

The four equatorial countries are considered in one essay by John Ballard, which does not produce entirely satisfactory results. There are indeed economic ties and similar political histories in the colonial period, but there are also political differences which this treatment tends to disguise. This is perhaps most serious for Mr. Ballard's discussion of the Congo (Brazzaville) whose politics have diverged markedly from the others in the last few years. We are only introduced to the

revolutionary regime of Massamba-Debat, and we are not told enough about the preceding Youlou regime to make the reasons for revolution very clear. In general, we simply get less information about politics in these four countries than we do in other areas considered in the book. This may merely reflect the general state of political knowledge concerning the area. Mr. Ballard's failure to make specific references to his source material, however, adds some impression of uncertainty.

Donald Rothchild and Michael Rogin write on Uganda, reassembling the involved story of party disputes and Baganda separatism. This telling seems satisfactory, and includes some interesting material on the social basis for elections and the role of religion. The writers go further than some previous commentators in calling the Democratic Party a straight confessional party. Their story unfortunately sometimes bogs down in the details of names and places and local controversies.

On Ethiopia, Robert Hess gives us a well-organized history and brings out two points very clearly: the complexity of the Ethiopian empire, and the crucial individual role of Haile Selassie. Both of these points are particularly useful for modern political scientists who sometimes forget that empires still exist and have politics worth studying. We do not learn a lot about constitutional structure or political process in general, but there is a useful discussion of the dynasty, the traditional nobility, and the 1960 coup, excellent background for the political research still needed in this country.

In the midst of this miscellany of information, which tells us even the size of family allowances in Gabon and the number of Ethiopian university students overseas, some helpful facts and some ideas emerge. One statistic alone, a note that forty percent of the population of the Congo lives in Brazzaville or Pointe Noire, gives a major clue to the extreme left-wing politics which that country has developed. Discussion of the political role of Europeans in Central Africa, and of Asians in Uganda brings in a fascinating and often forgotten factor. All the authors deal with the role of the various presidencies and their tendency to become the sole source of power and decision-making. We obtain considerable testimony on the increasing integration of politics and administration, and the functioning of parliaments and councils of ministers as representatives of group interests. We hear more of the role of religion, and of the military. And we realize anew the sophistication of African politics and the expertise at manipulation of much of the political leadership. What is left out is equally interesting: there is very little mention of ideology, and treatment of political parties does not seem to take us very far. In six of the eight countries discussed, party structure was largely irrelevant by the time the essays were written.

The chapters generally cover material only into 1964, and some are really written as of 1963. The organisational structure of the chapters is inflexible and unsatisfactory, giving us long sections of political material and then suddenly reverting to a basic description of land and people; the typography adopted by Cornell University Press does not make the change any less abrupt. As one of the authors of the first volume who found this scheme unsatisfactory then, I wonder why it has been so long retained. And although the writers have a common outline they have no basic theoretical structure to give focus to their comments. A concluding chapter by Gwendolen Carter and Robert Hess deals very generally indeed with the problems of national unity and regionalism raised by the title of the volume, but does not really relate very closely to other chapters.

The volume raises continuing questions about American and Western writing on African politics. Its descriptive material is very useful, and it shows clearly some of the areas in which more research now needs to be done—urban politics, political culture, socialization and impact of modern political forms on the ordinary African, to list only a few. The curiously incomplete feeling one has after reading the book leads me to say again, however, that in African politics we have still not discovered the right questions to ask.—MARGARET L. BATES, *Smith College.*

Southern Africa in Transition. EDITED BY JOHN A. DAVIS AND JAMES K. BAKER. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger for The American Society of African Culture, 1966. Pp. xxviii, 427. $8.50.)

Britain and South Africa. BY DENNIS AUSTIN. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 191. $5.60.)

Southern Africa in Transition presents twenty-one papers originally prepared for the Fourth International Conference of the American Society of African Culture, held at Howard University in the spring of 1963. The editors have included brief accounts of the discussions which followed the presentations of these papers. Among the primary contributors are American and foreign scholars, other writers on African affairs, African political leaders and representatives of governmental, commercial and private organizations interested in Africa. Many of the papers were updated in the spring of 1965, and where necessary, the editors have added postscripts to report more recent happenings. The result is expert treatment, often in considerable depth, of a broad range of contemporary problems in Southern Africa. Some of the topics considered are African nationalist

movements and the efficacy of violence in South Africa; the position of the U.N. in South-West Africa; U.S. policy towards Africa; the economic future of Central Africa; African nationalist revolts in Angola and Mozambique; and the role of private capital in Africa. Because of the varied backgrounds of the contributors, this volume achieves a rare mixture of the detachment of the scholar and the commitment of the involved activist.

These papers suggest an exciting conference. As presented, however, they do not make a very good book. The quality of the papers varies, and notwithstanding a lengthy introduction by one of the editors, *Southern Africa in Transition* lacks both a theme and a consistent focus. The lasting value of this volume, which will be considerable, lies in the wealth of data it presents on the recent history of African nationalist movements in all parts of Southern Africa. So much information is presented, in fact, that analysis and conclusions are frequently obscured, and the non-specialist is likely to be overwhelmed by dates, names, and, particularly, the initials of African political parties. Finally, despite the title of the book and the obvious commitment of many of its contributors to political change in Southern Africa, it seems noteworthy that many of the contributors seem to feel that for the moment, at least, the forces for continuity in this area outweigh local pressures for change.

This is also the conclusion of Dennis Austin regarding South Africa alone. "In the *short* run," he writes, "the position is plain. Neither revolution nor reform is likely." Accordingly, those angered with the existing pattern in South Africa have turned to demands for external pressures to achieve, in Austin's words, "what cannot be done by South Africans themselves." *Britain and South Africa* is an able effort to assess the extent of British interests in South Africa, the probable impact upon those interests of meaningful international action against the Republic, and the extent to which these interests are likely to influence U.K. policy towards South Africa. Austin is addressing British public opinion. Innumerable considerations commend the view, however, that no realistic international action against South Africa can be foreseen in the absence of British support for such action. All interested in the future of Southern Africa, within which the Republic of South Africa is clearly crucial, will benefit from Austin's sober definition of the limits to Britain's freedom of action in this part of the world.

Austin considers five fields of British interests affected by the question of South Africa: the black African states, the three former High Commission Territories on the borders of the Republic, the United Nations, defense and trade. A final chapter draws the contemporary "Rhodesian parallel." Austin denies the view that Britain may be obliged to choose between South Africa and the remainder of the continent. The African states, he writes, are incapable of intervening in the situation militarily; nor are they likely to be able to exert economic pressures on Britain, for U.K. markets in "independent Africa" are not more important than those in Southern Africa. And Austin finds exaggerated fears that apartheid threatens the political stability of the continent. As for Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland, the author believes there is little Britain can and perhaps should do to alter the dependence of these territories upon the good will of the Republic. Austin denies the legality and practicality of U.N. sanctions against South Africa and suggests Britain use her vote in the Security Council to prevent such a decision.

The author's consideration of Britain's defense interests in South Africa is an original contribution. The practical benefits, he concludes, from military collaboration with the Republic for Britain "stand out plainly. The disadvantages have to be expressed on moral grounds, or in terms of the general uncertainty which surrounds South African affairs." Austin doubts that Pretoria could extract concessions for defense facilities granted Britain and feels, therefore, that there is "little harm and some advantage" in Britain maintaining her defense links with the Republic "provided they are kept at a minimum."

As expected, economics is at the heart of British interests in South Africa. Austin shows that the Republic is the fourth principal buyer of British goods and takes more British exports than all the Commonwealth countries of Africa together. British investments now constitute 60 percent of all foreign liabilities of the Republic and earn about £60 million per annum. Over two-thirds of the gold imported into Britain is mined in the Republic. In short, British economic interests in South Africa, Austin writes, while not "vital" to the wealth and security of Britain, are important. Alone they do not determine British policy, but they cannot be dismissed as irrelevant.

Austin emphasizes, however, the point that these economic interests are vital to South Africa. Indeed, the book's foremost conclusion is that Britain should exercise only a "watching brief" on South African developments, not for "dislike of having to forfeit its interests in South Africa but [for] fear of the consequences likely to follow United Nations action." "Britain," Austin concludes, "is a prime factor in the argument over sanctions, and must weigh the effects of its decisions with anxious care for what may follow—damage to the economies of South Africa's neigh-

bors, hunger and bloody repression in the Republic, the dislocation of world markets, and the intensifying of east-west conflicts." Austin's caution will disappoint many. Yet in the public debate on Southern Africa which is already in progress, it is undeniably profitable that such views be heard.—NEWELL M. STULTZ, *Brown University.*

The Passing of French Algeria. By DAVID C. GORDON. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. 265. $6.75.)

Professor Gordon has given English readers the first balanced and well documented account of independent Algeria. In seeking to analyze "how Algeria has struggled for its identity and how France has come to accept this identity," the author lucidly covers much of Algeria's recent political and cultural history up to the fall of Ben Bella (June 19, 1965). As a historian who has specialized in French studies while teaching at the American University of Beirut, he is well qualified to understand both the French and the Arabo-Islamic influences upon contemporary Algeria. And unlike many political scientists, he writes well. His book is an important contribution to the growing body of American scholarly writings on North Africa.

Yet to those who read French newspapers and literary journals much of this book will be *déjà vu.* Though he has done his homework well, Gordon fails to transcend his sources and present an original analysis of the problems of Algerian "identity." Perhaps this reviewer is asking too much of an American writer, given the confused political situation, given the difficulty of doing research in Algeria, and given the poverty (with the exceptions of Jacque Berque, Pierre Bourdieu, and possibly Mostefa Lacheraf) of French and Algerian writings on the subject. But it does not seem unfair for the political scientist to remark that this book lacks even the implicit theoretical framework required of a historian who would be more than a journalist and especially of one who would analyse a struggle for identity rather than write history (p. 2).

On one level Gordon discusses political happenings, especially since independence (1962), gives useful biographical sketches of many of the main protagonists, and analyzes Franco-Algerian cooperation. On another he discusses the ideals, identity, and "culture" of the new nation. But the two levels of analysis are not organically connected as, say, in Beer's recent work on British politics. As the author admits, the "problem of identity" is "a well-worn but indispensable cliche" (p. 161). What the book lacks is a concept of political culture sufficiently explicit to link literary themes with political events and structures.

Why, for instance, did the FLN collapse at independence rather than serve as a revolutionary vanguard party? Why the gap, noted by most observers, between the revolutionary aspirations of the one-party state and the anarchic realities of the no-party state? Gordon suggests that "the problems of independent Algeria are largely a result of the manner in which the French and the FLN waged the war" (p. 62), but the explanation of guerilla dispersion is not born out by the comparable Vietnamese case. Obviously the political actors' confusions about their Algerian "identity," the main theme of the book, must have some relevance, but the connection is even less explicit than the several suggested by Pye for Burma.

Moreover, it is never quite clear in what sense and for what reason the Algerian identity crisis is more severe than that of other countries of the *tiers monde* in general or of its neighbors, in particular Morocco and Tunisia, which underwent comparable experiences of French domination. It is suggested that Algerian alienation—the tension stemming from "a struggle both for entry into the modern world and for a revitalization of Islamic values"—was especially profound as a result of the length of colonial conquest, the unusual exposure of its elite to French acculturation, and the expanse of *colon* settlement (p. 50). But the author does not rigorously develop the dialectical analysis of anticolonial responses which his references to Berque's "anthropological" phenomenology of the Maghrib should suggest. Hence he occasionally slips into the static dichotomous way of thinking of lesser spirits, like Jean Daniel, who urge Algerians to strike a balance between religion and *progressisme* (p. 215), as if they were fighting Europe's old ideological battles between Reason and Tradition. (American devotees of Max Weber tend to make the same mistake in other third world settings.) Hence, too, in this reviewer's opinion, he overrates Frantz Fanon, who was too European to articulate, beyond the chiliastic moment of peasant violence, an Algerian identity, while underrating Mostefa Lacheraf, who is one of Algeria's few serious social thinkers.

What does emerge from this generally careful and accurate report of "sleepwalking" under Ben Bella is impressive evidence that the "superstructure," whatever its organic connection with political and economic infrastructure, has confused and frustrated most Algerian and foreign activists, especially the vulgar Marxists, for whom Algeria subsequently under Boumedienne became a nightmare.—CLEMENT H. MOORE, *University of California, Berkeley.*

Ghana: End of an Illusion. By Bob Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer. (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966. Pp. x, 130. $3.50.)

The question "What went wrong in Ghana?" is both complex and fascinating. According to the authors of this book, Dr. Nkrumah was a conscious neo-colonialist until 1961; when he began to reset his course toward genuine revolutionary socialism, it was already too late. Economically, Nkrumah failed because he did not see the crucial distinction between ethical goals and vulgar pragmatism, between genuine socialist development and partial improvements obtained in a neo-colonial framework. He failed because he regarded existing property relations as legitimate instead of adapting them to African (read socialist revolutionary) needs; because he did not sever Ghana's economic ties with Britain and instead contributed to his country's continued enslavement; because he did not allow Africans the credit needed to replace the colonial-oriented merchant class; because the increased productivity of the workers contributed not to their welfare but to the profits of foreign capital; and because he merely substituted African personnel to run colonial structures instead of extirpating the structures themselves. Politically, Nkrumah failed because his power was based on section and faction, and was increasingly removed to the summit; because he negotiated and compromised with tribal and bourgeois opposition instead of drowning it by attracting its followers to the CPP; and because he did not fight the real enemies of Ghana, *viz.*, World Bank bureaucrats, foreign merchant capitalists, and the like.

Regrettably, the army officers who ousted Nkrumah are "Anglo-Africans" in black sheeps' clothing and therefore, if anything, worse than their predecessor. Ghana is—or ought to be—ready for a counter-revolution (did not Engels predict it?).

The ideal against which Nkrumah's performance is measured is that of true social revolution. The world is a gigantic, altruistic welfare organization where the wealthy's riches are used freely to succor the less fortunate. Ghana's public powers control the entire economy since tensions inherent between private and public sectors endanger progress and since these sectors cannot, by definition, coexist peacefully. The masses are the repository of the political good and, allowed to develop freely, are not only united but also filled with the spontaneous enthusiasm leading to sacrifice for the country's future; they devote themselves to furthering their material interests without government constraints, and are simultaneously transformed into happy Stakhanovites. Political power is based squarely on the urban and rural proletarians, and there is full reciprocal confidence between people and leaders. The leaders' task is to remove the obstacles on the way to unfolding the people's potentials, to win the inevitable struggle against the capitalist owner class. The masses participate consciously in the national decision-making process, and democracy has been achieved or is around the corner.

Given the authors' assumptions about political and economic phenomena, their presentation is internally consistent. They are at their best in unravelling some disadvantageous elements in Ghana's economic relation with Britain, and they do convey an impression of sincerity in expressing their beliefs. But what light is cast on external and internal economic conditions is adumbrated by lack of perspective—would that it were so simple. The book is more a polemic than an attempted objective study unless, as the authors suggest, professional Africanists are lost on the wrong track.—W. A. E. Skurnik, *University of Colorado.*

Zanzibar: Background to Revolution. By Michael F. Lofchie. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965. Pp. 316. $7.50.)

This book is a welcome addition to the growing number of formal studies dealing with the politics of East Africa. As the book's bibliography indicates, Lofchie's is the first scholarly effort to explain modern Zanzibari politics, including the events directly preceding the Zanzibari African revolution of January, 1964. In our opinion the effort is successful on both accounts.

Some of Lofchie's few questionable points and probable errors can be disposed of quickly. He estimates the present Arab population of Zanzibar to be about 50,000 (p. 8). But during the revolution and its immediate aftermath, many Arabs were killed and deported, and still others expatriated themselves from Zanzibar and Pemba Islands. Arab population estimates are prone to inaccuracy since there is no way to determine precisely the number of Arabs still living on Zanzibar and Pemba. From the information, albeit hearsay, gathered while one of us lived in Bagamoyo (across the Zanzibar Channel on mainland Tanzania), it seems probable that Lofchie's figure is an over-estimate.

Lofchie maintains: "Piecemeal modification of the composition and character of representation in the Legislative Council, timed in most cases to coincide with educational and social advance, was the principal technique through which British colonial policy transformed oligarchic colonial rule into parliamentary democracy" (p. 64). He might also have said that this "technique" of colonial policy concerning the issues of internal

self-government and national independence worked no better in the rest of the British African territories than, as he demonstrates, it did in the Zanzibar protectorate.

Lofchie states that the few Asian Zanzibaris (Zanzibaris of Indian and Pakistani origin) ". . . possess an enormously disproportionate share of the nation's wealth . . ." (p. 79). This certainly was true before the revolution, and may well have been the case shortly thereafter. But since the revolutionary government with a concerted effort embarked upon its program of wealth redistribution, the Asians seem to have lost most of their economic advantage over other Zanzibaris.

Other minor objections could be entered, but because they are quite minor one more will suffice for the purposes of this review. Lofchie acknowledges the journal of the Zanzibar Federation of Progressive Trade Unions—*Kibarua*—and translates this Kiswahili title into "The Message" (p. 262). A better translation in the context of a trade union journal might be "Labor" or "The Laborer."

Far more important than the book's errors are its assets. Chapter I is devoted to an analysis of the Arab occupation of Zanzibar and Pemba, and the subsequent turning of the islands into the trading and slaving capital of East Africa. This is fairly familiar ground to the reader who is at all acquainted with East African history, and is of less value than the chapters that follow. In Chapter II, Lofchie discusses British colonial policy, emphasizing the important but little-recognized fact that, from the beginning of colonial administration, Britain viewed Zanzibar as an occupied Arab state and not as an African colony. This construction of Britain's relationship to Zanzibar meant that, although the Arabs constituted a minority of the Zanzibari population, they were given social and economic opportunities, and political rights and privileges, which were denied to the majority African segment of the population.

The African revolution was not quite the simple product of this pattern of oligarchic stratification. As Lofchie notes in Chapter III, during the "responsible government" phase of colonial rule, Africans had a hand in perpetuating the Arab domination of Zanzibar's domestic affairs by returning many Arabs to public office: ". . . Arab rule had not only survived the introduction of representative institutions, but had acquired a degree of legitimacy under constitutional democracy" (p. 68). The society of Zanzibar remained, however, sharply stratified along social, economic, political lines; and the resulting inequalities between Arabs and Africans eventually were enough to facilitate the destruction of the Arab state patterned after the Westminster model.

Lofchie discusses the course of pre-World War II politics in Chapter IV; which centered upon the issues of British favoritism toward the Arabs but the Arabs' inability to be masters of what the British told them was their own house, the growing Asian domination of Zanzibar's economic sector, and the first glimmerings of African political organization. Chapters V and VI trace the emergence and complex manifestations of post-war Arab and African nationalisms.

Chapters VII and VIII are perhaps the most interesting parts of the book. Chapter VII is an analysis of the turbulent Zanzibari electoral politics from 1957 until directly prior to independence in 1963. Chapter VIII is a lucid survey of voting behavior since 1961, and its association with political party, racial and ethnic, socio-economic, and religious divisions and unities within Zanzibar Town and Zanzibar and Pemba Islands. This voting study is all the more remarkable when one considers the difficulties in collecting accurate electoral data which Lofchie must have encountered.

A conclusion to the book presents the best attempt we have read to appraise the current and underlying causes of the African revolution, and its first effects. Because the revolution is still not open to any kind of scholarly investigation, even Lofchie's convincing account should, with some reservation, be accepted as a still incomplete statement.

Zanzibar: Background to Revolution is highly recommended for those readers who would understand the political life of a small part of Africa, which may in the future, as it has in the past, significantly influence the political life of Africa as a whole.—Fred G. Burke and Rodger Yeager, *Syracuse University.*

The Communism of Mao Tse-Tung. By Arthur A. Cohen. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964. Pp. 210. $5.00.)

Although the reviewer has been inexcusably tardy in taking up Professor Cohen's important study, an accidental advantage of the delay is that it enables us to consider Cohen's analysis in the light of the Cultural Revolution which presently seems to be sweeping over China. It was already clear at the time *The Communism of Mao Tse-tung* appeared that Mao was being accorded adulation greater than that bestowed upon any man in living memory. Indeed, even the great Marx would appear to pale (perhaps to a medium pink) before the Mao described by Chinese Communist historians and commentators. Yet, when Cohen noted this in 1964, the campaign for the

virtual deification of Mao was still in its adolescence. Today one would imagine that even Mao must be uncomfortable at the extravagance of the claims made on behalf of China's "great teacher, great leader, great supreme commander and great helmsman" even as we realize the important political and psychological reasons behind the frantic campaign to "hold high the Great Red Banner of the Thought of Mao Tse-tung."

Cohen is more than ready to admit, nay, assert, that Mao has made truly great contributions with his idea of rural guerilla revolution, his already "classic" works on rural self-sustaining bases and protracted guerilla warfare. But he holds the question open as to whether this systemization of the political and military doctrine of protracted guerilla conflict may be regarded as true *theory*. In fact, the burden of Cohen's entire work is that while Mao has made important contributions *to practice* and has *added* certain new elements to basic Marxist-Leninist doctrine, he has not earned yet the title of major theoretician and certainly cannot offer himself as a philosopher of stature within the Communist tradition. To support his contentions, Cohen examines and evaluates the claims made for Mao in the following categories: 1) Mao the philosopher; 2) Mao and revolution; 3) Mao and state form; 4) Mao on the "transition to socialism"; 4) Mao on contradictions in a socialist society; and 5) Mao on the transition to Communism (the people's communes). Utilizing the vast literature of Marxism, including works in Russian and Chinese, he painstakingly examines Mao's writings and writings on Mao's behalf against the background of a century of Marxism in the West, the Soviet Union, and finally in China. He concludes that many of the Maoist pretentions to originality are spurious, quoting Mao's masters, Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, to demonstrate the frequency with which Mao has simply taken over existing theory with a great show of originality. Cohen points out, correctly, that it is not accidental that the term "Maoism" has recently been abandoned by Chinese writers and sloganeers in favor of "the Thought of Mao Tse-tung." There can be Marxism, and Marxism-Leninism, but the thought of Mao must stand separate and distinct, springing from the traditional isms but having a new Chinese life of its own. The Maoists having issued the challenge, particularly to the Soviet "revisionists" represented by Khrushchev and his successors, have proceeded to the next step, claiming absolute orthodoxy for their version of Marxism, and the primacy of China in the world revolutionary movement. This claim, we might add, is not based on China's population strength, size or even her great historical and cultural tradition (though these are mentioned often enough in Chinese propaganda) but almost solely on the uniqueness and originality of Mao's thought, hence upon Mao's preeminence as a thinker and leader.

Cohen believes that Mao is a poor philosopher; his so-called "philosophical" contributions being largely rehashes of Stalin, Lenin, etc. But in fact, Mao has written relatively few truly philosophical works, and were it not for the insistence of the Maoists themselves, it is unlikely that Cohen or anyone else would have to go to the trouble of studying his "philosophy." The epitome of Mao's philosophy is supposedly contained in his two major works, "On Practice" and "On Contradictions," which furnish a good part of the text for the little red-covered books now being distributed to Red Guards and the masses in China, and currently best-sellers in London, New York and Paris. But the little books resemble much more the home-spun type philosophy of a Lincoln (less the humor and humanity) than the serious scholarly philosophy of a Marx. But Cohen does demonstrate effectively that Mao has made some useful as well as signficant additions to Marxist thought, such as the addition of new groups (the national bourgeoisie) to the class forces working for revolution, "a tactical expansion of the united front." Mao, according to Cohen, has not altered Lenin's view of the dictatorship of the proletariat, but he has *added* the national bourgeoisie to the group of classes retaining political rights.

Certain of Mao's formulations on practical matters are, in Cohen's view, novel. He sees Mao's greatest strength to be in the devising of pragmatic policies for attaining and consolidating political power. (At this very moment the Great Cultural Revolution in China is testing this hypothesis.) As for Mao's *departures* from "classical" Marxist doctrine, among others Cohen distinguishes the following: describing anew the process of qualitative change in things; formulating the strategy for revolution as being protracted guerilla warfare waged from self-sustaining bases in rural areas; including the small capitalists in the post-revolutionary political structure (a policy possibly now in process of reversal); postulating a non-antagonistic contradiction between worker and capitalist; openly rejecting the myth that no conflicts exist between leaders and led under a Communist regime; encouraging (temporarily) non-Communists to criticize the Communist party; and organizing the people's communes as a new socio-economic formulation. From these and other pronouncements, Cohen concludes that the thought of Mao Tse-Tung appears in the final analysis to draw its uniqueness from "revisions, improvements or even complete abandonment of various aspects of the foundation tenets and Soviet practices."—STANLEY SPECTOR, *Tokyo.*

Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia. By DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1965. Pp. xvi, 279. $5.95.)

Dr. Nuechterlein, who has since become a civilian officer in the Department of Defense, wrote this book in 1963–1964 when the United States had not yet made a major commitment of combat forces to South Vietnam and was not waging air warfare against North Vietnam. The study is based primarily on observations in Bangkok from 1961 to 1963, where the author served at the time with the United States Information Agency. During those two years President Kennedy had to respond to the Laotion crisis and found it necessary to give Thailand, on March 6, 1962, a special pledge to support its independence and territorial integrity against Communist aggression and subversion, even without the prior agreement of other parties to the SEATO Treaty.

For students of Thai affairs this is a lucidly written book on the foreign policy of the governments in Bangkok since the beginning of World War II. Although the author is not an area expert on that country and did not use Thai primary sources, his judgment is sound and his readers will not be misled by his interpretations.

I was glad to see Dr. Nuechterlein record what I had known directly from the mouth of the late Prime Minister Pibun Songkhram—that his December 1941 decision to permit Japanese troops to enter Thailand and the resulting Thai-Japanese alliance came after his appeals to the West had failed. The author notes that in the autumn of 1941, Pibun had been "frantically calling for planes and arms from the United States and Britain" and "sought also to coordinate Thai defense plans with those of Britain in Burma and Malaya" (p. 72).

The main purpose of these historical reminiscences is to provide perspective for that part of Dr. Nuechterlein's book which constitutes his genuine contribution to the understanding of international relations in Southeast Asia. Those who are skeptical about the necessity to demonstrate the reliability of the American commitment to the security of Southeast Asia will find some useful food for thought in this study.

Before Pearl Harbor, Prime Minister Pibun sought Western military assistance against the Japanese threat. After the Communist takeover in China in late 1949, the same man, back in power, was anxious to have American support, being convinced that Communist China was now the menace to the countries of Southeast Asia.

In 1949 Pibun rejected an anti-Communist front, proposed by the Philippines, because the United States was not prepared to assume an active role in Southeast Asia (p. 104). But in the early spring of 1954, when the United States suggested a collective security arrangement for Southeast Asia, it took the Bangkok government only two days to reply that it would accept such an arrangement "unconditionally" (p. 114).

Thereafter Thailand's solidarity with the West seems to have been directly related to American steadfastness. Whenever we seemed to hesitate, the Thai responded with guarded steps in a neutralist direction. When we manifested determination to contain the spread of Communism, the Thai rallied to our side. Dr. Nuechterlein devotes, rightly, considerable space to the crises of 1959–1960 which turned Laos into a major testing ground for the policies of the great powers in Southeast Asia.

Following Captain Kong Le's coup on August 9, 1960, when it became clear that SEATO would not interfere in the internal affairs of Laos, "Thai spokesmen and the Thai press began to ask what value SEATO had for Thailand if it could not prevent Laos from falling under Communist control" (p. 167). President Kennedy's decision not to send American troops into Laos, which had to be taken during the week when the Bay of Pigs invasion by Cuban exiles had failed, left the Thai leaders "astonished and even angry" (p. 201). The decision to seek a negotiated settlement at the Geneva Conference which opened on May 16, 1961, confronted the United States with the difficult problem of obtaining the acquiescence of its Asian allies:

> Not only was Thailand, but the Philippines, South Vietnam, Nationalist China, and Pakistan were all shocked by what they believed to be a significant sign of American weakness in the face of Communist pressure in Asia (p. 208).

The result was a "crisis of confidence" in Thai-American relations and rumors concerning "a strong trend toward neutralism in official Thai circles" (p. 217). But cooler counsel prevailed and the Thai government sought a bilateral alliance with the United States. Dr. Nuechterlein is of the opinion that "the fears and frustrations expressed by the Thai government at this time were genuine" (p. 229). The Thai reaction to the guarantee finally given by the United States to Thailand on March 6, 1962, was "an emotional outpouring of praise and renewed confidence in the United States" (p. 231).

It is neither necessary nor possible to trace here the ups and downs in the relations between the United States and Thailand in the following five years. Understandably, the American position in Southeast Asia has been constantly scrutinized and reevaluated by the Thai in the light of our responses to the various challenges that we have encountered. Dr. Nuechterlein concludes that "the current crisis in Vietnam is . . . a test of how far the United States will go to defend a country

which is thousands of miles away and in which the United States has been very cautious about committing its power" (p. 266).

I believe that this is an accurate interpretation of Thai views.—GUY J. PAUKER, *The RAND Corporation.*

The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study. By HASSAN ARFA. (London: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 178. $5.60.)

Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917–1927: A Study of Soviet Policy Towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan. BY HARISH KAPUR. (Geneva: Michael Joseph, Ltd., for the Geneva Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1966. Pp. 266. 45s.)

The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia: A Background Book. By GEOFFREY WHEELER. (Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour Editions, 1966. Pp. 126. $3.50.)

These three books differ in size, conception, utility, and subject matter, but are loosely united in that they deal with contiguous geographical areas and all throw some light on Soviet policy toward non-Russians in the USSR and abroad. Wheeler offers an overview of and introduction to Soviet Central Asia, very general in content, without attempt at "new" information or interpretation. His book is deceptively superficial, wearing very lightly the many years of serious study and thoughtful consideration devoted to the subject by the author. Wheeler's unique contribution in the field has always been the fruit of his long experience in India, and resulting competent comparison of Soviet and British "imperialism" in practice.

Arfa writes of the Kurds from long experience in fighting them; he shows a surprising sympathy and objectivity in his assessment. He knows his enemy, and likes him. His assessment of a nationalistic minority and the problems it faces in the Twentieth Century deserve the thoughtful consideration of all concerned with nationalism and with the fate of diversity in the world. He is sympathetic, but not romantic. He does honor to Iran, his country.

Both Wheeler's and Arfa's are "mature" books, written by older men with long field experience and no great theoretical bent. There are no great interpretations, no sweeping generalizations, no easy answers. Neither offers prescriptions and formulae; both show at least a trace of sadness that colorful and attractive peoples are threatened with loss of identity.

Kapur's is an "immature" book, a doctoral dissertation showing all the marks of its origin. It is somewhat pretentious, and often wrong. Perhaps its most serious shortcoming is that it fails to offer what is often a strong point of dissertations: leads to fugitive literature on the subject. It uses Russian-language material, but not nearly enough; it relies too heavily on English-language sources. And the book's main title ought to have been something like, "Soviet Russia and the Middle East, 1917–1927." Kapur claims to offer a theory and a general application, but without sufficient underpinning to justify the claim. Wheeler's and Arfa's represent shorter, but better, books.

Wheeler's conclusions about Central Asia include:

1) The large number of Russian settlers and domination of the area by Russians is the key factor.

2) Economic progress has far exceeded that in adjoining countries.

3) Literacy and higher and technical education for the "natives" is far more advanced in Soviet Central Asia than in any Muslim country in the world.

4) "The effect of Russian political and cultural influence in Muslim Central Asia was as great as, if not greater than, British influence in India."

5) Contemporary literature in Soviet Central Asia indicates far less originality, vigor, and artistry, than that in Iran and independent Arab countries.

6) "The evolution of the peoples of Central Asia under the Soviet regime has been entirely different from that of any of the other peoples of Asia or Africa. Among the latter, nationalism has resulted in independence owing to the presence of at least some of the following circumstances: easily identifiable national leaders with some freedom of speech and action; religious and cultural freedom for all; aid and encouragement from abroad; native armed forces trained in the use of modern weapons; and finally, support from liberal opinion in the metropolitan country, or relaxation of metropolitan control as a result of political or military weakness. None of these circumstances has been present in Soviet Central Asia during the past forty years."

Arfa indicates three million Kurds in Turkey, well over a million in Iran, one million in Iraq, and 59,000 in the USSR. He summarizes their fundamental problem as deriving from lowland Turk, Iranian, and Arab control of all the outlets from highland "Kurdistan." He divides Kurdish leaders, and hence Kurdish nationalism, into modernist intellectuals and traditionalist tribal chiefs and religious figures. He expects increasing influence of the former and decreasing influence of the latter.

Kapur overestimates Tsarist commitment to Asia, and also Stalin's. Lenin certainly appreciated the opportunities in Asia, but did not live long enough to do much about them; Stalin failed

to exploit Lenin's insight, and Asia soon became the preoccupation of those whom Stalin destroyed rather than of Stalin himself. Kapur uncritically accepts the idea of Russia's "urge to the sea," and causal relationship of Soviet turning to Asia when policy in Europe foundered.

All three of these books are traditional and descriptive. None opens up new avenues of inquiry or asks new questions, or even old questions in new ways. They remain largely uninfluenced by recent trends in political science. Methodologically, they might have been written fifty years ago. Reading them awakens a kind of nostalgia for the good old days, uncluttered by jargon and characterized by a desire to communicate effectively. Wheeler and Arfa attempt simply to inform; they are never harsh and strident. Kapur presents for the most part a traditional international relations study. They are all a little old-fashioned. They are sincere and fair and honest.

Wheeler and Arfa are completely at home in their material; they exude a confidence combined with unpretentiousness. The reader feels that they know much more than they have written, that discussion with them would be immensely profitable. They have selected and organized with care. Kapur, it seems, has told us all that he knows, with a little of the potpourri in his presentation. He will probably write better books in the future, but this book does not reflect the sympathy and humanity of Wheeler and Arfa. They are writing about people they know; Kapur is bookish and abstract.

Arfa is probably indispensable for the Kurd specialist, his contribution is greatest; Wheeler in his book writes mainly for the non-specialist and provides a useful introduction; Kapur tends to fall short of appeal to the specialist, and is not satisfactory for introduction. Arfa and Wheeler instruct their target audiences; Kapur is still instructing himself.

Two of Colonel Wheeler's points merit special consideration: he suggests that a Tsarist government of Russia continuing after 1917 to the present, "would inevitably have moved with the times and would have had to defer not only to the nationalist but to world opinion." To put this in extreme form, which Wheeler does not do: a non-Communist Russian government would have been forced to grant independence to the Central Asian Republics just as the British had to grant independence to India. But the interrelated factors of physical contiguity and large-scale white settlement suggest the unlikelihood of this. Perhaps we must accept the opposite formulation: any Russian government would retain political, and economic, control of the Central Asian Republics, just as any Chinese government would retain Tibet and Sinkiang. As Colonel Wheeler clearly knows, and tells us in his book, British control in India rested on a far more fragile base than Russian control in Central Asia.

The other, far more minor, point concerns Central Asian native deserters to the Germans in World War II. Wheeler states (p. 78), "many of them were no doubt killed or recaptured and the great majority of the remainder were handed back to the Soviet Union by the Germans after the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. Only a few thousand managed to evade repatriation. . ." But many Central Asia refugees, at least, believe that the Allies bear responsibility for the "handing back"; ascribing it to the Germans is very misleading.—ROBERT A. RUPEN, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

Central Asians under Russian Rule. A Study in Culture Change. BY ELIZABETH E. BACON. (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1965. Pp. xi, 273. 12 plates, 2 maps. $6.50.)

Cultural change in Soviet Central Asia, often discussed by writers concerned with political matters, has at last been taken up by a cultural anthropologist. Although meant primarily as an ethnographic study, the book will attract wider interest as an indication of the success enjoyed by the Soviet system among non-Slavic minority peoples.

Professor Bacon gained a first-hand acquaintance with the steppe culture of Central Asia during field study of Ka-akhstan in 1933–1934, and has since become familiar with the oasis culture of the region by work in neighboring Afghanistan and Iran. Inadequate for any non-Communist region, this background is the best possible for any westerner who would study the peoples of the USSR.

After an introductory chapter on the land and the people, the author describes the pastoral nomads and the traditional oasis culture before the Russian conquest, under Imperial rule, and under Soviet rule.

With regard to economic life, Professor Bacon finds a strong tendency among Central Asian natives to cling to traditional occupations. Pastoral nomadism has survived great vicissitudes, and is now sanctioned. In the oases, most of the inhabitants continue to be village-dwelling cultivators.

In their social organization, the nomads retain their kinship groups within the kolkhoz, the oasis dwellers retain their traditional villages, and the town dwellers their wards. The Soviet program of crèches has had little success; children are still brought up in the home, where they are instilled with traditional attitudes and behavior patterns. The status of women has improved; some achieve higher educations, though most are taken out of

school early. The seclusion of women and polygyny are now status symbols, sometimes cherished even by local party and government leaders.

In the cultural sphere the spread of education and the campaign against religion are well known. Yet, knowledge of Russian remains at best superficial on the village level, and the native urban population remains unassimilated. The more organized aspects of religion have been vulnerable to official interference, but rituals and ceremonies continue to be observed, saints' shrines continue to be visited, and religious feasts and holidays are still celebrated.

Politically, the region was divided into the several Soviet republics to thwart a growth of regional solidarity, but this device has aroused nationalism to an unintended degree. National heroes and epics, allowed currency during World War II, were taken up with a fervor which the regime later took some pains to suppress.

Professor Bacon credits the Soviet regime with a number of worthwhile innovations: education, greater chances for individuals to get ahead, and modern technology (improved irrigation, veterinary science, more food and creature comforts). She concludes, however, that although the native peoples have had to withstand efforts on the part of the Soviet regime in many sectors, they have neither lost their sense of ethnic identity, nor are they likely to merge with the Russian people. Rather, they have adapted their traditional patterns and values to the new conditions, borrowing selectively. They have learned to avoid overt resistance, assuming instead an appearance of outward submission. The Russians have been disappointed in their hope that a converted native intelligentsia would lead the masses to Russianization and sovietization.

One might conclude from the evidence presented—although the author does not go so far—that the cultural evolution of Central Asia has reached a stalemate. The native population has taken all that it wishes of Soviet culture, but the restrictive nature of the Soviet system hinders further development of the native culture. Restrictions on travel in and out of the region and on the flow of ideas, and limitations on consumer demand and purchasing power under the collective economy hold back westernization. The nature of the Soviet regime defeats the very ends it would promote.

Though admittedly based on only a part of the literature available—V. V. Barthold's *History of the Cultural Life of Turkestan* or the writings of V. P. Nalivkin or N. S. Lykoshin could have supplemented the sources used in the first part of the book—this objective readable account will be a useful addition to literature on Central Asia and may lead to other studies in this field. The book is well documented, with an extensive bibliography.—Richard A. Pierce, *Queen's University, Canada.*

Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth. Edited by Myron Weiner. (New York: Basic Books, 1966. Pp. xviii, 355. $6.95.)

This book consists of a collection of essays by twenty-five well-known scholars, such as Leonard Binder, Cyril Black, Norton Ginsburg, Alex Inkeles, David McClelland, Max Millikan, Lucian Pye, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Myron Weiner, and Robert Wood, on the nature of modernization and how it can be stimulated. "These essays were originally prepared as lectures for Forum, an educational radio program sponsored by the Voice of America" (p. v).

Often successful, the essays are attempts to make understandable to the layman and especially to the policy makers of nations desiring modernization the state of our knowledge on modernization. Consequently, these essays contain little of the paraphernalia of scholarly studies. The technical vocabulary of the economist, sociologist, or political scientist is employed minimally; supporting footnotes and bibliographies are rare; methodological problems are not discussed; tables and statistical findings are omitted.

Except for being loosely partitioned into sections on perspectives and conditions, the modernization of society and culture, the modernization of politics and government, the modernization of the economy, and conclusion, the only framework connecting this collection of essays is a broad topic and a common binding.

The primary value of this collection lies precisely in its reflection of what we know about modernization.—R. J. Rummel, *University of Hawaii.*

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, LAW, AND ORGANIZATION

Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians. Harold K. Jacobson and Eric Stein. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 538. $8.50.)

The nuclear test ban negotiations from 1958 to 1963 offer many attractions to the scholar, the historian, and to the policy maker as a focus for study and analysis. The negotiations themselves illustrated well the changed character of international relationships following World War II and the sudden importance of a dynamic technology to those relationships. Perhaps even more impor-

tant, because it is rare to observe in such sharp relief, an analysis of the policy process by which the American position at the negotiations was formulated would starkly illuminate both the conflicting pressures that have beset American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union since the war and also the problems within the U.S. of formulating policy when scientific factors are of major relevance.

Wrapped up in the question of an international agreement to cease nuclear testing under controlled conditions are many of the central issues of foreign policy: U.S./Soviet detente, nuclear proliferation, military forces structure, the future of NATO, arms control and disarmament, and future international organization. In addition, the test ban brought to the fore a host of questions that science and technology have raised for the decision-making process in government: for example, how to evaluate the significance of actual or potential advances in science and technology for military power? How to estimate relative national power when the weapons systems in being are extremely complex and have never been tested in actual warfare? How to evaluate risks of various alternative policies when those risks would be affected by uncertain and unknowable scientific advances? How to obtain objective scientific /political estimates of the future and evaluations of the present? And how to come to grips with the significance of continuing scientific and technological developments for traditional concepts of sovereignty and international political organization?

With these questions in mind, the first attempt at a full-scale objective study of the test ban negotiations by Harold Karan Jacobson and Eric Stein is welcome indeed. Their study does not attempt to meet most of these issues directly, but by providing much of the factual material in coherent and detailed form the authors have in fact thrown welcome light on them. The solid value and dependability of their analysis is also its greatest weakness, for in the interests of accuracy they have avoided many speculative and controversial aspects of the test ban debate within the U.S. Government on which their information may of necessity have been scanty: why certain agencies took the positions they did, what were the behind-the-scenes roles of individuals such as Atomic Energy Commission Chairman McCone, Secretary of Defense McNamara, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and so forth. It would be interesting, for example, to know more about how the Committee of Principals set up by President Eisenhower to advise him on the test ban issue actually operated. And what was the full role of President Kennedy's personal staff in forming his attitude which dominated the U.S. policy process on this subject much more fully than did that of his predecessor?

What Jacobson and Stein have done is trace the history of the test ban issue from the 1957 London meetings of the UN Subcommittee of the Disarmament Commission through to the signing of the Moscow treaty in 1963, primarily from the vantage point of the American position and policy process. They describe in extremely valuable detail the various major landmarks—the Conference of Experts in 1958, the political negotiations that followed, the introduction of new scientific evidence that cast doubt on the effectiveness of the original "Geneva system" of inspection and control, the problems within the U.S. Government in reaching firm conclusions during the next several years, the improving situation prior to the blowup of the 1960 summit meeting, the sharp changes in the firmness of the U.S. position after Kennedy came into office, and finally the course of the negotiations in 1963 that led to an agreement on a partial test ban.

The authors make a vigorous effort to avoid sharp judgments on the strength and weaknesses of the participants in the policy process, and to avoid definitive evaluations of the quality of American policy. Yet what comes through to one reader is the conclusion (that the authors may possibly not share) that the Soviet Union made the major concessions during the negotiations and was in general more consistent in its desire for a treaty. What also emerges is a picture of great confusion in the U.S. policy machinery, particularly during the Eisenhower administration, with the most serious problem being that of relating scientific developments and scientific uncertainties to national objectives. By implication, we see the constant pressure from the more militant forces in American life to use scientific uncertainties appropriately or inappropriately to prevent a rapprochement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The best example of this is the effect of the formulation of the "big hole" theory by Albert Latter of RAND, a year after the Geneva system for monitoring a test ban was negotiated by the scientists on the basis of admittedly scanty evidence. The big hole theory in essence postulated that a nuclear explosion in a large underground cavity would be "muffled"; that is, would result in seismic signals typical of a much smaller explosion. This theory, which raised the spectre of undetectable (by seismic means) cheating, caused grave consternation among American policy makers far beyond what was justified, and resulted in a drawing back by the U.S. in the negotiations. In effect, the new scientific information and hypotheses tended to overshadow other aspects of the test ban issue, and somehow it was

overlooked that information that was uncertain to us was almost surely uncertain to the Russians as well (it is abundantly clear now that in the early stages of the test ban negotiations, the Russians were far less technically prepared and had far less information than did the U.S.). The overall political objectives of a test ban were submerged in a sea of oversimplified arguments that in effect demanded near absolute protection against violation of an agreement; the likelihood of detecting violations through extra-treaty means such as intelligence (big holes are not easy to construct or use without telltale signs) were given inadequate weight; the dangers to a nation of being detected in a treaty violation, which were not amenable to calculation because the technical information was uncertain, were discounted; the importance for weapons development of multiple testing, which would be easier to detect than single-shot violations, was played down; and so forth.

Jacobson and Stein discuss issues such as this in great and accurate detail. Yet, what is missing is the kind of interpretation that gives a fuller flavor of the actual policy deliberations, that provides more evaluation of the arguments, and that provides insights into the motives and influence of the various actors in policy roles. It is as though the authors have all the information, have interviewed the right people and have assimilated all the arguments, but lack the key, or the confidence, to make the incisive judgments that truly illuminate the policy process.

This failing may be the inevitable characteristic of a history written by those who have not actually participated in the making of that history. It is also certain, however, that had Jacobson and Stein experienced from within the government some of the policy battles they report, their recounting of events would not be as objective and impartial as it is. Which kind of history is preferable may be a matter of taste; in fact, of course, both are required.

This is an excellent, reliable, well-written and detailed account of a complicated issue. Hopefully it will provide the essential factual basis for other, more politically oriented and perhaps more polemical, analyses of the test ban issue.—EUGENE SKOLNIKOFF, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology.*

The Anzus Treaty Alliance. By J. G. STARKE. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1965. Pp. xiv, 315.)

If ever the three ANZUS nations find themselves in disagreement on any paragraph, sentence, or even word of their 1950 treaty, they will have Mr. Starke's volume as a reference. His book, while not the most readable of studies on security in the Pacific, nevertheless provides a remarkable textual analysis. For many readers the book will seem too detailed, since much of the study is presented in a legalistic format—with footnote references for almost each sentence. This reviewer found Chapter I maddeningly difficult to read, for it is accompanied by fifteen pages of footnotes, all placed at the back of the book, and numbered non-consecutively. Thus while there are 370 footnotes (!) to that chapter, the numbering is not consecutive but begins anew after every ninety-ninth footnote. As a result there are in Chapter 1, for example, four footnote references that are numbered "50."

Starke's purpose in his first two chapters is to describe in detail the developments that led to the signing of the treaty, as well as to analyze each of its provisions. For this he has tried to identify, relying on public sources, the motives of each of the three parties, and he attempts as well to compare ANZUS provisions with other security agreements to which the United States is a party. The result is very helpful to those whose interest is in the drafting of treaties, *per se*, but readers who are primarily concerned with the politics of security agreements will be less happy.

For example, Starke is concerned to deny, or minimize, the often-heard argument that ANZUS was desired by Australia and New Zealand primarily as a long-term guarantee against a resurgence of Japanese aggression. Inevitably, leaders of Australia and New Zealand have publicly denied that this was their purpose in helping to bring about ANZUS, and Starke cites many of their statements. It is nevertheless difficult to avoid the impression that had he made more extensive use of interviews in Wellington and Canberra, Starke might have reached a different conclusion on this point. In 1956, for example, the Permanent Secretary of the New Zealand Ministry of External Affairs volunteered to this writer that, from his government's perspective, ANZUS was seen as a way of achieving an American guarantee against Japan, while SEATO was entered into later to please the Americans. But pragmatic thoughts of this kind are relatively absent from Starke's book, and it is only in the last sections, in chapters 3 and 4, that topics of contemporary political interest are taken up.

In those chapters, which are the strongest in the book, Starke deals first with the behavior of the three states in the alliance, and with the workings of the alliance machinery itself. Chapter 3, which describes some of the ways in which ANZUS deliberations have been affected by other involvements of the three participants, is perhaps the most valuable of the book. It will be especially useful to those readers concerned with the potential development of new, or expanded, security arrangements in the Pacific, for here Starke pro-

vides a running commentary of the evolution of ANZUS. The impact of the West New Guinea dispute is dealt with here, as is the Malaysia confrontation with Indonesia, in which both Australia and New Zealand had very strong interests. The final chapter deals with the relationship of ANZUS to SEATO, and also with the potential relationship of ANZUS to a larger security arrangement.

As a whole, the book may be frustrating to readers concerned with political and strategic questions, though specialists in international organizations will find a great deal of value in the study. The main difficulty is that while security organizations and alliances come about ostensibly in response to security threats, this book deals primarily with questions of organization, and devotes little or no thought to the kinds of threat to which the organization may have to respond.—BERNARD K. GORDON, *Johns Hopkins University.*

Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy. ARNOLD L. HORELICK AND MYRON RUSH. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 225. $5.95.)

As Sir Keith Hancock once put it, "we make a mistake by thinking in chronological slabs, here a slab of war, there a slab of peace, so many years of war, so many years of peace. Defense and opulence, war and peace, are with us all the time as alternative ends of policy, alternative activities of government, alternative postures of society. It is a question of degree: how much of one or the other can we afford to have, or run the risk of not having, at one time or another?" The question rises now in a new frame in consequence of the Soviet Union's deployment of ABMs, pressing the United States to decide between a counterpart deployment or trusting to compensatory superiority in nuclear offensive power. It is not merely a question of the military practicality of alternative possibilities in event of the ultimate test of war. It is a question also, and more importantly, of the interim effect on policy of alternative assumptions regarding the impact of possible war—for that question lies in the background of all contests of purpose among great powers.

Near the end Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush's book, whose focus is on Soviet strategic thinking during and since the period of Nikita Khrushchev's ascendancy, touches briefly on the implications of a Soviet ballistic missile defense. They appear to line up with those who would rate it as a formidable development for United States policy. As a whole, the book has admirable relevance as a preface to the debate now stirring over alternative responses to the Soviet ABM capability. A meticulous and lucid examination of the relentless and central significance of military calculations to the conduct of foreign policy in the large, it gives scant support to millennial assumptions of an imminent deliverance, by negotiation, from the need for strategic calculation.

The book, which scrupulously avoids a hortatory line, enriches understanding of the play of strategic calculations in such recent developments as the Sino-Soviet divergence, the Cuba missile crisis, the fledgling *détente* between the Western powers and the Soviet Union, and the eclipse of Khrushchev. In so far as the *détente* has reality, the authors argue, it has resulted from prepondérance of strategic hitting power on the West's part beyond the Soviet Union's capability to redress. They portray the *détente* as a natural consequence of Soviet failures. They observe "no reason to suppose . . . that an atmosphere of détente can be prolonged and deepened only if Soviet strategic inferiority—which is the condition that brought it about—is replaced by a state of parity."

They ably depict a basic lack of symmetry between the two great nuclear rivals, related to the respective outlooks and purposes. From the Soviet viewpoint, they argue, "the threat posed by the American strategic force at any given moment is the product of American capabilities multiplied by the provocation offered by Soviet behavior . . . The United States, on the other hand, tends to see the immediate danger as the product of relative military capabilities of the rival strategic force coupled with the extent of Western resistance to Soviet pressures." Thus the Soviet rulers can avoid provocation under unfavorable circumstances, deferring the offensive to a more favorable juncture, whereas the West is constrained to "maintain on a high level its capacity to resist encroachment lest temporary slackness be exploited—politically, if not militarily—by the vigilant opponent."—CHARLES BURTON MARSHALL, *School of Advanced International Studies.*

Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926–1933: A Study in Diplomatic Instability. BY HARVEY L. DYCK. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. 279. $6.75.)

This monograph is based on a thorough examination of the accessible German diplomatic documents. The author has also made use of published German and Russian materials and of the extensive secondary literature to determine "the manner in which policy makers framed issues of external relations and perceived spectra of choice, the criteria they applied in choosing from alternative programs, and, finally, the techniques they used to test, implement, reappraise, and revise those programs." He accomplished the task he set himself in a well-reasoned, competently re-

searched volume. Unfortunately Dr. Dyck was unable to get permission to study the records germane to his study which are reported to be in the Potsdam Archives of the German Democratic Republic. The Soviet Government continues the publication of *Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSR* (Documents on the Foreign Policy of the USSR) which alleviates to a certain degree the otherwise scarce official documents on the relations of the Soviet government with the Weimar Republic.

Starting with the Treaty of Berlin in 1926 Dr. Dyck examines the various aspects of Russo-German relations primarily from the vantage point of the German Foreign Office. He reviews the secret military collaboration and finds, as did other students of that particular subject, especially John Erickson, that it benefitted the armed forces of both countries. The military collaboration survived all the vicissitudes of German-Soviet relations and it ended only with the demise of the Weimar Republic to the mutually expressed sorrow of the military involved.

The basic conflict in German and Soviet foreign policy was brought into sharp focus by the Anglo-Soviet break in 1927. Dr. Dyck explains quite succinctly why this was so: Berlin wanted more concessions from the West and for this purpose needed both the support of Great Britain and of Russia. To the Soviet regime England was the organizer of a conspiracy against Russia which therefore needed Germany and France to break this attempt at her destruction. After 1930 France began to take the place of Britain in the antagonism of the USSR and this tended to unite, at least for a while, Germany and Russia. In the early stages of the Anglo-Soviet rift the Wilhelmstrasse offered to mediate the conflict before it developed into a crisis which could lead to difficulties between Germany and the USSR. The offer was rejected. Moscow interpreted the German move as evidence that Germany was about to join the anti-Soviet camp. When diplomatic moves failed to produce an unequivocal statement of support from Berlin the Russians increased the pressure. I agree with the author that the Shakhty Trial, staged in 1928, grew in part out of the need to turn the accused technicians into scapegoats for the failures of the forced industrialization drive. However, that does not explain why three German technicians were placed in the dock with fifty Russians. The documents indicate that this was another attempt on part of the Soviet leadership to force the Wilhelmstrasse to support the USSR in its struggle with the British. When the German government remained adamant in its refusal to go beyond innocuous press releases the Russian government, unwilling to jeopardize its one relatively reliable *point d'appui* saw to it that two of the three Germans were acquitted while the third was given a one-year suspended sentence. Eleven of the Russians were condemned to death.

The economic relationship between the two countries are scrutinized through the memoranda prepared by Moritz Schlesinger, an economic expert in the German Foreign Office, whose views are given the prominence they deserve and have not received in previous English works. These memoranda and other evidence analyze the difficulties which beset even that aspect of German-Soviet relations in the years before the world depression began to affect Germany. The impact of the depression on Germany coincided with increasing needs created by the Five-Year-Plans. The German business community, which had been quite dissatisfied and had been highly critical of the Communist way of doing business, forgot its grievances, including the Shakhty Trial, and plunged into the Russian markets. After 1931 Russia provided a haven for German workers and technicians, a market for products and thus jobs for thousands of workers who would otherwise have joined the unemployed. This fact was not overlooked despite new difficulties stemming from the collectivization of agriculture. The forced collectivization procedure led to attempts by peasants of German background to escape from the Soviet Union with the aid of the country of their ancestors. Although this Mennonite affair created tensions and led to a minor crisis the relationship between the two countries was still considered sufficiently rewarding to resolve this renewed evidence of instability. The Russians made it quite clear that they were not going to be hamstrung by Mennonites or German Communists. Litvinov told a high official in the German Foreign Office, some time later, that "he would find it quite understandable if the Communists in Germany were treated as one treated enemies of the state in Russia."

With Hitler's appointment to the chancellorship German-Soviet relations entered a new phase already foreshadowed in the preceding months. It is at this point that Dr. Dyck concludes his examination. Better proof-reading would have prevented a few typographical errors and could have prevented a reference to Phillipe Berthelot as the French ambassador to the Soviet Union; he was Secretary General at the Quai d'Orsay.

Dr. Dyck's study shows that diplomatic relations can be profitably conducted between two countries, despite inherent antagonisms and difficulties, if it serves the national interests of the partners. His monograph is a highly illuminating contribution to the understanding of the relations between an industrialized, capitalist country determined to overcome a shattering military defeat by almost any means, and a developing

Communist country in the early stages of industrialization.—KURT ROSENBAUM, *West Virginia University.*

The Revolution in International Relations. By E. F. PENROSE. (New York: Humanities Press, 1965. Pp. xxii, 290. $6.75.)

This is a wise and thoughtful book, in which the author attempts both to describe contemporary reality as he sees it and to prescribe policies for his own country (Britain) as well as for others, including the United States. In this combination of analysis and recommendation, no pretense is made that the book is value-free. But the values are such as to command at least respectful attention, and more often than not approval.

It is interesting to note the differences between a book such as this and the average survey of international affairs which is the diet of the relevant American public. The present work comes closest in general outlook—if not in tone—to some of the books by Stillman and Pfaff. Little in it is entirely new to the professional reader, but a number of important, if traditional, points are made very well indeed.

The author takes as his point of departure the organization of the world into independent states, each pursuing its own interests, and each strengthened in this pursuit by feelings of national identity. In his judgment, "doctrinal" (ideological) differences are far less important than considerations of interest and advantage. He feels that the balance of power remains the foremost organizing principle for both the practice and the study of international affairs. He defines the balance of power in terms of "distribution of power"—although a few times the term "equilibrium" slips in—and he strongly leans to the view that a multiple balance is preferable to a simple, bipolar one.

Professor Penrose further emphasizes the paradox that the tremendous coercive strength of the so-called "super powers"—the ability to destroy one another—is accompanied by real political weakness in most contemporary situations. This leaves the middle and smaller powers far more room for maneuver and influence than might be supposed were one to envisage the world along lines of a pecking order based on coercive capability alone. He devotes rather more time than the average American writer would to the problems of imperialism and colonialism, but his treatment of the "emerging and reawakening countries" (a happy phrase, by the way) is very close to the interpretations which the American student of the subject would give it. According to Professor Penrose, international organizations, though they were originally misconceived as substitutes for the balance of power, are making great contributions in bringing these new states within the framework of traditional international politics—which continue to function along lines of the balance of power principle. What he is, in effect, saying is that through the United Nations and other groupings, the so-called "Western State System," with its assumptions, mechanisms, and its many problems, is being expanded throughout the world.

Nationalism in the emerging and reawakening countries is to be accepted rather than deplored. Once this is done, one becomes modest in one's expectations for the creation of larger units, embracing a number of present states. If coercive methods are rejected, the only methods which can conceivably work are persuasive ones. Even then, there are obviously no guarantees that combinations can be brought about or that they will last. Professor Penrose advises us to think in terms of federations, or even of the still weaker principle and practice of confederation. America's historical experience is cited in support of this proposition. While we all know that the Articles of Confederation were inadequate, they were in the early 1780's the strongest bonds that could be forged. As such, it was better to have them and leave open the possibilities of a stronger constitution in the future, than to risk everything by insisting on an arrangement for which the society was not yet ready.

This, by the way, is one of the very few complimentary things said in this book about the United States—and the fact that it relates to a situation which occurred 180 years ago may give one pause. The author, who was at one time an American citizen and served under Ambassador Winant during the war, is very critical of American policies and of the assumptions on which they are based. He feels that Americans tend to oversimplify the world situation, to see it entirely in terms of a "communist threat to freedom." He is critical of American policy in the Caribbean, especially of our willingness to risk nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. He is likewise critical of our policies in Western Europe, and reserves some of his choicest phrases to describe our approaches to the problems of the Far East, particularly China. He calls this "the most indefensible policy . . . that it is possible to conceive of. . . ." He deplores some aspects of the American decision-making process, including the influence of super-patriots, of military circles and other pressure groups, and the inability of our top leadership to withstand such pressures.

Similarly, he is critical of British policy in the 1950's and 60's. He feels that Britain's future lies in Europe. Specifically, he recommends rapprochement with France through a British offer to pool nuclear policies. Such a step would, in his

judgment, lead to economic integration, followed by the creation of joint political institutions, thus freeing Europe of dependence on American nuclear protection. In short, while he disagrees with President de Gaulle's methods, he basically agrees with his policies. Give Professor Penrose's frame of reference, a united Europe would tend to stabilize the balance of power and in the process, create conditions conducive to a reduction of both tensions and armaments on a world-wide scale.

In some ways, this is a curiously old-fashioned kind of book. Maybe because of this, it is also a very attractive one. There are no brilliant new theories to propose, but there are some extremely solid and competent restatements of what we might call the "conventional wisdom" of international relations—using the term in the descriptive, not the pejorative, sense. There is no sign of a new methodology of inquiry; the work is based on traditional study, experience, and thought. One misses empirical support for many statements, but one feels (though, lacking evidence, one cannot *know*) that the statements are valid. The book does not really fit very well into what we might call the "new" study of international relations, as practiced in the United States. Yet, it is wise, sensitive, sensible. It bears careful reading. Without intending to do so, it makes a good case for not abandoning the old while we search, with new methods, for new knowledge about an endlessly fascinating subject.—FRED A. SONDERMANN, *Colorado College.*

African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy. EDITED BY VERNON MCKAY. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. v, 210. $6.00, cloth; $1.95 paper.)

Dreams of Unity: Pan Africanism and Political Unification in West Africa. CLAUDE E. WELCH JR. (Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, 1966. Pp. vii, 396. $8.00.)

African Diplomacy is the product of a conference at The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in June, 1965. The resulting book by a distinguished group of Africanists covers international conflict patterns, economic, cultural, military, and political determinants of African dipolomacy, and external political pressures on African states. According to the editor the objective of the essays is a comparative and multidisciplinary study of "factors that shape the foreign relations and foreign policies of African states."

The volume is a small step forward in serious attention to African foreign policy, and some of the essays bring together data and ideas for the first time, although most of it is familiar to African specialists. The essays are largely descriptive and general assessments of events, problems and background conditions for considering African diplomacy. Overall the book lacks general theory and evidence of systematic data collection. As James Rosenau has pointed out, to identify factors in foreign policy is not to trace their influence, nor to explain how and why they are operative under certain circumstances and not under others. Simple labels variously and sometimes not defined (e.g., power, conflict, forces) do not explain complex behavior, and "conventional" categories do not escape the problem of identifying relationships (a factor *in* is not always a determinant *of* and the word "may" is simply a way of getting around the problem).

There are other conceptual problems as well. For example, William Zartman's essay on "National Interest and Ideology," while containing an excellent discussion on ideology, is, we are told by him, a "motivational study" of decision making. If so, his analysis tends to proceed on psychological personifications obfuscating levels of analysis (e.g., the "insecurity" of the state, the "state's concept of itself and challenges to it") and near reification of the functions of ideology ("ideology is power," "ideology indicates possibilities for action"). Furthermore, considering the importance of issue areas or the influence of idiosyncratic and systemic variables, the use of national interest and ideology as "two extremes of a range of foreign policy criteria" seems a weak analytical distinction for classifying state policy or action.

It is unfair to single out Professor Zartman's contribution for comment since stronger criticisms could be made of other essays and particular points such as Andrew Kamarck's suggestion that "African trade and investments are comparatively of little importance to the rest of the world." However, Zartman's essay happens to be one of the most provocative, as are those of William Foltz on military influences and Robert Lystad on cultural and psychological factors. Indeed, Lystad presents an apt discussion of the problems in isolating and then connecting factors as influences on foreign policy determinations.

The final chapter discusses questions and problems arising from the various essays and raises pertinent suggestions for further inquiry. Yet it does not tie the book together, and the study of foreign policy will remain static and descriptive unless theoretical dimensions are clarified.

Claude Welch's *Dream of Unity* is not, strictly speaking, a book on foreign policy but, rather, on "attempts by African states to achieve closer political relations at the time of independence. . . ." Four well-researched case studies are the focus and strength of the book: (1) the case of Togoland, which includes analysis of the Ewe

unity movements, the British and French mandates, the trusteeship system, and integration of British Togoland into Ghana; (2) the case of the Cameroons and the events, personalities, and parties involved in eventual unification of the Southern Cameroons with the Federal Republic of Cameroon; (3) the case of relations between Gambia and Senegal and the limited attempts to promote some form of "association"; and (4) the case of the short-lived Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union with its strong articulation of Pan-Africanism but organizational failure. Treatment of the cases is somewhat uneven in depth and length—the first two cases are 110 and 101 pages whereas the second two are 41 and 43 pages respectively.

With the exception of the Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union which is somewhat different in time and circumstances, the case studies are historical expositions examining the legacies of arbitrary boundaries in West Africa, the critical role of British and French colonial administrations in unification attempts, the varying desires of African politicians and parties for unification, and the role of the United Nations in promoting unity (at least in the Togoland and Cameroon cases).

Other than the excellent historical treatment, the chief merit of this book is the author's attempt at a comparative analysis; it gives strength to his research and perspective to his conclusions. However, although the role of elites, colonial powers, and the United Nations differed in each case, the author is reluctant to venture far into generalization or theory. The chief weakness is that the variables are topics and not theorems and the panoply of Pan-Africanism is ideology or rhetoric rather than an analytical concept. Perhaps a better perspective on the cases would have resulted from a fuller discussion of the literature and ideas on unification, integration, community and so forth than is contained in the introduction and conclusion. The theoretical shortcomings do not detract from the valuable empirical data and the book's contribution to our understanding of processes in African politics.—DAVID J. FINLAY, *University of Oregon.*

The Effectiveness of International Supervision: Thirty Years of I.L.O. Experience. By E. A. LANDY. (New York: Oceana Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 268. $12.50.)

Since its founding in 1919 a major activity of the International Labor Organization has been the drafting and implementation of conventions setting labor standards in member nations. Landy's book is a study of the effectiveness of procedures developed for supervising compliance with these conventions, by a member of the ILO secretariat writing in a personal capacity. The study is based on systematic analysis of documentary material that is interpreted and complemented by the personal experiences of a sensitive practitioner. The volume should be of interest to all concerned with the development of procedures for obtaining compliance with legal norms, both in national and international political systems.

Between 1919 and 1964 members of the ILO drafted 119 conventions setting labor standards on subjects such as hours of work, minimum working age, maternity protection, inspection of migrants, sickness insurance, labor safety, forced labor, and freedom of organization. After receiving the required number of ratifications, 104 of these conventions became operable. In 1964 the number of ratifications was 2,919, about 25 per cent of the possible number of ratifications (100 per cent is not attainable since some conventions are not relevant to all ILO members). Only fourteen nations ratified less than ten conventions, including the United States, the only industrialized nation among the fourteen.

ILO procedures for supervising compliance with conventions have slowly evolved out of practice (interrupted between 1939 and 1947), with new measures attacked as unconstitutional by some members. The most important steps in supervision are (1) reports on compliance from member nations, (2) examination of these reports by a committee of experts (serving as individuals and not as government delegates), (3) public discussion of the report of the committee of experts by delegations to the annual Labor Conference that includes government, labor, and management representatives, (4) the dispatch of questions to nations who have not reported adequately or who have not complied with conventions, (5) publication of a list of the most serious cases of non-compliance. An average of 89 per cent of ILO members submit reports on convention compliance by the time the annual conference meets. These reports are supplemented by other materials gathered by the secretariat.

Landy's study is based mainly on the 1,003 instances in which members have been cited for non-compliance with conventions. His systematic data on the effectiveness of the supervision machinery in these cases is limited to compliance through enactment of national laws, although he is able to provide some anecdotal material on execution of these laws. In 32 per cent of the cases in which members have been cited for non-compliance they have taken full remedial action, with 29 per cent followed by partial action, 2 per cent bringing denunciation from the cited government, and 37 per cent having had no apparent effect. There is not enough space here to report the substance of Landy's tabular material on compliance with specific conventions and groups of conven-

tions and on the compliance records of specific nations and groups of nations.

The remarkable success of ILO in encouraging national legislative action has been obtained through persuasion, with resort to reprobation only when all else fails. Why do national officials respond to international supervision? Relying on personal judgment rather than systematic data, Landy lists four key factors. First, he credits the public discussion of the report of the committee of experts. Governments prefer not to be charged publicly with failure to carry out international obligations, particularly when cited by a body widely accepted as objective. Second, he believes that the "persistent intervention" of nongovernmental representatives (workers and employers) in these deliberations permits franker criticisms of governmental performance than would be possible with only governmental representatives present. Third is the continuous and repetitive character of the supervision procedure. Governments recognize that criticism ignored one year will be voiced again the next if remedial action is not taken. Fourth is the influence that government spokesmen who regularly attend ILO conferences sometimes have on decision making at home.

The degree of ILO success in convention supervision is even more remarkable when taking into account the recent doubling of the membership (now 118), primarily through entry of nations from Africa and Asia. The greater heterogeneity of the membership has made the setting and implementation of worldwide labor standards more difficult. This also has created disagreement within the organization over how much emphasis should be placed on setting standards relative to activity fostering economic development. Landy draws attention to the vital role that technical assistance can play in helping nations to develop the capability to comply with labor standards. It would seem that technical assistance activity also might provide information to supervisory bodies that would facilitate their deliberations.

Landy rightly, although perhaps too briefly, suggests that ILO supervisory experience may be relevant to other fields of international supervision, mentioning specifically human rights covenants and disarmament. Some concerned with the supervision of disarmanemt treaties have discerned potential value in national reporting, citizen inspection, and further development of techniques for inducing national compliance. Landy's work draws attention to an exciting body of experience in international supervision that can enrich this speculation and provide it with a firmer empirical base. It is to be hoped that other scholars will extend the use of the ILO laboratory for the study of international supervision, supplementing his work with more precise knowledge of the efficacy of specific steps in the ILO supervision process and investigation of the effects of ILO-induced national legislation on labor conditions within member nations.—CHADWICK F. ALGER, *Northwestern University.*

Space Law. By C. WILFRED JENKS. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. xviii, 476. $16.00.)

The notion of exploring outer space has fascinated imaginative men for centuries. Before the mid-twentieth century, most writings about outer space and space travel were fantasies; including, among many others, several still popular tales by Edgar Allan Poe and Jules Verne. However, since the 1950's the monopoly of science fiction writers has been broken.

After World War II, developments in high altitude rocketry made possible scientific probes of outer space and even the orbiting of artificial earth satellites. These developments led a few international legal scholars to begin seriously to analyze the legal problems of outer space. Dr. Jenks was prominent among these pioneers.

Dr. Jenks, Deputy Director of the International Labor Office, is a prolific contributor to the literature of international law. Since 1957 he has published seven major studies; his best known and most provocative work is *The Common Law of Mankind* (1958). As the space age has advanced, he has continued to write authoritatively concerning many aspects of space law; in addition he has served as Reporter on Space Law for the Institute of International Law. Now he has written what is essentially a progress report on the development of the law of outer space.

Space Law is comprised of three major parts: The Background; The Legal Literature; and The Law. In addition there are extensive appendices where the principal space related agreements, resolutions, reports, and proposals are collected. The book purports to be primarily a tentative statement of space law; and it is an authoritative and reasonably comprehensive statement. However, the two preliminary parts concerning the political and scientific background of activities in space and the legal literature are equally important.

In his writings, Dr. Jenks has consistently addressed himself to the problem of adapting international law to the current needs of the international community; and as an niternational civil servant he has been particularly interested in the impact and role of international organizations in international law-creating processes. In *Space Law*, Dr, Jenks discusses the bilateral, regional, and international negotiations and decisions which have been a part of the process of developing a law of outer space. His analysis underscores

the role of the United Nations in this development. He describes some aspects of that role which will be of interest to political scientists generally, but particularly to students of international organization and politics. A very crucial question in the development of space law, for example, concerns the legal character of relevant General Assembly resolutions. (The exploration of space is progressing so rapidly that there has not been time for customary development as traditionally conceived and only now are there beginnings of law based on treaties.) Dr. Jenks takes the position that at least two of these resolutions—1721 (XVI), International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and 1962 (XVIII), The Declaration of Legal Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, both adopted unanimously—settle some of the fundamental principles of the law of outer space (pp. 183–184). He argues that while Resolution 1962 is something less than a treaty, it ". . . must already be regarded as more than a statement of custom" (p. 186). And, in fact, in his statement of space law, this resolution is one of the bases to which he refers most frequently. Although he apparently accepts a special role for the United Nations in making contemporary international law, he unfortunately does not pursue his analysis of a quasi-legislative competence for the General Assembly. He does, however, review several explanatory statements made by representatives in the Committee on Peaceful Uses before the Declaration was transmitted to the General Assembly. It is clear from these statements that most governments considered the Declaration to be an initial step and a statement of broad principles. Now, of course, the 1966 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies incorporates almost identically the same provisions which have been accepted by the General Assembly in the various space related resolutions.

As previously indicated, Dr. Jenks also reviews and evaluates much of the vast body of space law literature. On the basis of this review—which includes the work of major scholars from throughout the world as well as the reports and proposals of international bodies—it seems evident that there is widespread agreement on fundamental principles. There are, however, obvious doctrinal differences. Dr. Jenks advocates bypassing differences of this nature and suggests that writers devote themselves to assisting in finding practical solutions to concrete problems (p. 174). This is very likely a wishful shout into the wind. And while it is no doubt desirable to avoid excessive doctrinal controversy, it is also desirable that farsighted scholars consider so-called "remote contingencies."

In sum, Dr. Jenks has made another important contribution to the literature of international law and politics. While there is nothing particularly new in *Space Law*, either analytically or substantively, it is valuable as an authoritative progress report on the developing law of outer space. And while other more detailed analyses of the legal problems of outer space are available—*Law and Public Order in Space* (Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and Ivan A. Vlasic), for example—this book will be of immense benefit to space law specialists who will find it a useful reference handbook, to generalists who have been wishing for a concise report of activities in space and the law developing there, and to students of international politics who will find in the book valuable data concerning the role of international organizations in contemporary law-creating processes.—IRVIN L. WHITE, *University of Arizona.*

Power and Impotence: The Failure of America's Foreign Policy. By EDMUND STILLMAN AND WILLIAM PFAFF. (New York: Random House, 1966. Pp. 244, $4.95.)

Power and Impotence is in one sense easy to describe; in another sense, very difficult. It is a criticism of the prevailing ideas of at least the last decade in American foreign policy, as these have been translated into action through policy. As such a criticism it is sweeping, frank, and very often correct. Its major virtues are its ruthless handling and dissection of cherished American oversimplifications about the world in which we live, its clear description of the dead-ends to which these lead, and the pungency of its style and use of adroit quotation. Its major defects (far less important than its virtues) include an occasional obscurity deriving from its broad-brush treatment, and its failure on certain points to be concrete or detailed enough to be fully useful. About both virtues and defects, more later.

Stillman and Pfaff's main argument is that the United States, through its present globalist policies, has become over-extended and over-involved, with highly negative actual and potential results. They argue further that globalism is prewar isolationism turned outward. On p. 15: "Isolationism is an instinct of withdrawal—a rejection of the world's complexity. Globalism is this impulse turned inside out—a wish to end complexity by reforming the world through the accomplishment of an indefinable process of orderly 'revolution.'" After initially stating "the American dilemma," they devote the second chapter to "the real source of danger to America," which is that our present policy "is mired in illusions" about the world in which we live. These

illusions center around the familiar neo-idealist (my term) assumptions about consensus among the nations of the world, the possibilities for a rule of law, for a classification into good and bad, of faith in reason, etc.—ideas familiar enough to need no greater expansion in this review. They argue that there is a great lack of perception in America of fundamental political forces as they actually are at work within foreign nations, that (p. 45) "American political science as a discipline has even in recent years interested itself in developing theoretical 'models' and 'systems' . . . whose tendency, whatever their other merit, is to eliminate the need for specific understanding, or intimate data and intuition, in studying foreign affairs." They describe the basic defect in the American approach to world problems as originating in a superficial grasp of deep and powerful historical forces and a naive tendency to translate foreign political processes into American terms.

The center sections of the book (chapters III and IV) describe "the challenge to America, myth and reality," contrasting America's perception of world problems with the nature of those problems as conceived by the authors. Here they take issue with many well-accepted notions. For example, John McCloy's description (quoted, p. 99) of "the less-developed lands [as] the principal battleground [between] freedom and communism . . . in which the future shape of society may finally be tested and determined." Their view is that the areas of which this is true are very few, and involve power-centers such as Germany and Central Europe rather than weak, poor, and confused Africa. On p. 134: "The interventionist [globalist] sees Europe as a continent whose day in history is over." Which leads us to one of their most pointed and effective criticisms. The authors argue that American policies toward Europe and NATO are outmoded and retard rather than encourage a normalization of a crucial area. "The present *status quo* in Europe is abnormal—it rests on a suspension of political action" (p. 126). They argue America is resisting Europe's efforts to set its house in order, resisting the idea of mutual East-West troop withdrawals as part of a broad settlement.

The final sections of the book (chapters V and VI) are devoted to a new approach the authors endorse. The heart of their concept is that the United States ought not to continue to over-extend its commitments but to play a far more modest (often supporting rather than leading) role in world affairs. They express great skepticism about any useful consequences stemming from such dynamic interventions of the Kennedy-Johnson era as the Dominican affair and Viet-Nam War. They indict particularly commitments stemming from such notions as Assistant Secretary of State MacArthur's claim (see p. 136) that "Freedom is indivisible."

There are defects in this broad-brush treatment. For example, the point is made (p. 102) that Stalin's successors, checked in Europe, turned toward Afro-Asia as a main theater of Cold War competition. Yet there is no real notice taken of the hardline Khrushchev approach as it produced the very serious Second Berlin Crisis in Europe. Again (p. 166), the authors, discussing the possibility of crumbling American public support for the Viet-Nam War, go on to say: "The result could be a replica of the Korean tragedy: a military victory won in the field, in which the American people did not believe, and since they did not believe in it, forced to be thrown away." It is not at all clear what this means; its possible ramifications might lead to the assumption that the authors either preferred a broadened Korean war or feel the Korean peace was very unfavorable to the UN. There are no other clues, so one wonders. In short, the authors sometimes present judgments without enough context to convey their point.

Yet such criticisms are truly minor. When all is said and done the authors have turned out a masterful and provocative book. While many of its criticisms are not new, some are, and all of them are woven together into a highly useful conceptualization. If, as the authors clearly believe (and I suspect is true), we are approaching now the crest of a wave of reassessment of postwar American foreign policy, this book is also very timely.—FREDERICK H. HARTMANN, *Naval War College.*

The Society of Man. By LOUIS J. HALLE. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966. Pp. 203. $4.95.)

Mr. Halle is an excellent example, if not of a philosopher king, at least of a vizier turned philosopher, for he spent a number of years in the State Department concerned with the practice of the international system and for a number of years now he has been devoting himself to thinking about it. This gives him a comparative advantage over many philosophers who have never left the armchair. And the most interesting and instructive part of his work, for this reader at any rate, is in those passages where he reveals, sometimes with a certain sense of shock, the devious and causal processes by which important decisions are actually made. His account, for instance, of the formation of the Point 4 policy in the Truman Administration is a delightful illustration of the gap between formal organization and the realities of decision-making.

The main purpose of the work, however, is not to tell interesting tales after school but to reflect

soberly on the present crisis of mankind, and to glance hopefully at some possible recipes for the future. The book really consists of three rather separate essays. In the first the author develops the contrast between the conceptual world within and the real world without and suggests indeed that there is a reciprocal relationship between the two. If the world within diverges too much from the world without the holder of unrealistic conceptual images will soon find himself in trouble and will have to modify the inner world. On the other hand, the inner world frequently creates the external world of the future. The statesman, he suggests, has to mediate between the two worlds and he is worried about the fact that formal education may be an actual handicap in performing this function. He never really faces up to the old philosophical teaser of how we compare the world within and the world without, when all we know is the world within. He does not really face up to the epistemological problem of what we really mean by testing. As far as it goes, however, the analysis is sound.

The second essay is a case study in Marxist ideology taken as an example of a divergence between the inner world of the ideologue and the brute facts of reality. This is an agreeable exercise, and it fulfills its intention of illustrating the general principle without, perhaps, throwing any great new light on Marxism itself.

The third essay returns to the theme of the first, giving it a more evolutionary and dynamic cast. These chapters revolve around two themes, the extraordinary acceleration of change in the modern world under the impact of science and technology, and the obsolescence of the national state in the face of these changes. For an ex-member of the State Department this certainly represents existential reality breaking into a pre-existing conceptual framework in a pretty big way, and one cannot help admiring the courage with which Mr. Halle is willing to re-examine the current postulates of the international system. Here again, unfortunately, one feels he has left the task incomplete. There is not very much analysis of the real dynamic process by which the international system changes or of what hopes there are of changes in the direction of more survival value. Again, however, as far as it goes, the essay is highly perceptive, and is written with considerable elegance. It is encouraging that in this day there does seem to be a certain convergence of view among thinkers who have started from very different philosophical positions about the nature of the international system, the depth of the crisis through which it is passing and the necessity for its profound transformation. Mr. Halle is to be congratulated on an agreeable contribution to this important literature.—KENNETH E. BOULDING, *University of Michigan.*

The Obligations of Power: American Diplomacy in the Search for Peace. By HARLAN CLEVELAND. (New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Pp. xiii, 168. $4.50.)

A genial but persuasive series of essays by the former Assistant Secretary of State for International Affairs make up this neat little volume. After moving to the post of U. S. Permanent Representative to NATO in 1965, Harlan Cleveland put together a number of speeches and articles which he wrote as Assistant Secretary of state and some fresh writing to round out a coherent discussion of American foreign policy with an emphasis on multilateral institutions. The result is a book that is generally comfortable to read, occasionally thought provoking, and worthy of emulation as an example of the intelligent and good-humored proselytizing for official United States policy.

The author displays more of his background as an editor of *The Reporter* than as a professor at the Maxwell Graduate School at Syracuse University in the style and method of this book. His ten chapters glide gracefully from one significant issue to another without the burden of footnotes or labored argumentation. His topics cover the basic distinctiveness of American foreign policy, "to make the world safe for diversity," and a variety of topics related to the responsibility which our superior power imposes upon us. He deals with the present world of small wars, the frustrations bred by our success in promoting pluralism abroad, five lessons that we should learn from our experiences in crisis diplomacy, and the necessity to think of peace not as a goal but as a process which is pursued by many agencies, both regional and functional. One of the best chapters, entitled "The Third Man" puts the peace-keeping operations of the United Nations in realistic and favorable perspective. The U.N. undertaking in the Congo is tagged as "one of the brightest chapters in the history of international cooperation." The growing international community of science, and its fruitful activity in the Antarctic is deftly set forth in an urbane chapter on the merits of functional multilateral organization. Ambassador Cleveland's long experience in foreign aid administration finds clear expression in a chapter analyzing the caricature and illusions of foreign aid. He deftly reviews the fashions in foreign assistance theory, without rancor or pessimism. He confidently destroys five false propositions concerning our foreign aid efforts and concludes with a call for more than two-year personnel and one-year appropriations. The concluding essay deals with five tasks which seem to require the urgent attention of American citizens during the coming two decades. These involve our relationship with the Soviet Union, the proliferation of nuclear

weapons, the deterence of Mainland China, an enforceable ethic to govern intervention in internal affairs, and the development of operational international agencies.

Obviously such essays are designed to have the greatest impact on lay members of the attentive public or political scientists with only a casual interest in international affairs. Specialists in international relations will occasionally bristle at the admonitory style, derived no doubt from the public lecture circuit, and simplistic justifications for American policies. We are told, for example, that so many people around the world are willing to cooperate with us because our goals spring from aspirations deeply rooted in human nature. Clearly one must guard his audience against self-righteous cant in such an argument. The United States intervention in the Dominican Republic is ingeniously used in praise of our ability to limit our efforts to attainable aims. President Eisenhower, however, is implicitly chided for having stated our aim in Vietnam in too open-ended a form. The Johnson administration's decision to bomb North Vietnam is nonetheless imbedded in a discussion of the doctrine of restraint, the cool, calm and collected manipulation of power for collective security. The purpose of this action, Mr. Cleveland avows, was to make the political point that secret aggressors could not count on sanctuary for their military base.

It may strike the reader as too neat in a discussion of the need to widen the international community concerned with crisis situations, to claim credit for our actions in internationalizing the Cuban missile crisis and the Dominican Republic affair. If we were successful in these actions, as well as in Korea and Lebanon, in transforming "our own resolve into a system of collective security," we should seek a better answer than Mr. Cleveland gives us for our failure to accomplish this in Vietnam. He explains that Hanoi and Peking are not part of any international peace system and the *ad hoc* arrangements designed at Geneva turned sour almost from the first moment. The reluctance of Far Eastern Communists, "to be caught anywhere near a conference room" does not explain the reluctance of the United Nations or our allies to assist our own operations in Vietnam. Similarly, the non-membership of Peking in the United Nations peace system is not attributable entirely to her own actions and choice, as the author implies, but has been actively fostered by the United States.

It would be captious to dwell on any other simplifications of difficult policy questions occasioned by the style and origin of these essays. Their general impact is illuminating and reinforcing of the best arguments in favor of realistic American diplomacy for a world of diversity. The style and phrasing from the pen of a man who claims the coinage of the phrase "revolution of rising expectations" is engaging and occasionally memorable (the anti-U.N. people exist on a "diet of moldy tidbits" such as "Alger Hiss wrote the charter" and other "improbable but imperishable canards"). The author performs his main task of informing the attentive public concerning the realities of this country's responsibilities as "the world's residual peace keeper" and the potentialities of multilateral agencies with both conviction and disarming ease.—MacAlister Brown, *Williams College*.

DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

IN UNIVERSITIES OF THE UNITED STATES

COMPILED BY WALTER E. BEACH

Office of the Executive Director, APSA

I. DISSERTATIONS-IN-PREPARATION

ADDITIONS, CHANGES, AND DELETIONS SINCE THE 1966 LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Additions

Sister Joseph Ancilla, C. S. J., The Political Theory of Mercy Otis Warren. *St. John's.*

Robert Axelrod, Conflict of Interest. *Yale.*

David V. J. Bell, An Analysis of the Political Thought of the United Empire Loyalists. *Harvard.*

Marshall Berman, The Search for Authenticity: A Study in the Political Thought of the Enlightenment and Romanticism. *Harvard.*

Steven R. Brown, A Psychological Study of Political Ideology. *University of Missouri* (Columbia).

James Thomas Burnett, American Trotskyism and the Russian Question. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert E. Calvert, The Political Theory of Progressive Education: An Investigation into the Sources and Character of American Political Thought. *Harvard.*

Jacob Citrin, The Roots and Correlates of Political Cynicism. *California* (Berkeley).

Larry Cobb, The Political Theory of Henry Nelson Wieman. *Southern Illinois.*

Paul Conn, Pluralism and Democracy: An Analysis of the Implications and Assumptions of Pluralist Literature. *Yale.*

F. Barry Cooper, Existential Phenomenology and Marxism: An Exploration of the Politics of Merleau-Ponty. *Duke.*

Edwin L. Crosby, Processes of Justification: An Empirical Study of Normative Discourse. *Minnesota.*

Richard W. Crosby, The Political Thought of the Federalists: Publius, Washington, Hamilton, J. Adams. *Cornell.*

James L. Danielson, Democratic Political Participation: The Norm and the Real. *Minnesota.*

Paul A. Dawson, The Orientations of High School Students Toward Authority and Modes of Authority-Reliant Behavior. *Michigan State.*

Robert Brown Denhardt, Empirical and Valuational Anomalies in Contemporary Organization Theory. *Kentucky.*

Clare Wille Denton, Rhetorical Aspects of Judicial Reasoning Specifically as It Applies to the "Topos" of the "Nature of Things" in Comparative Law. *California* (Berkeley).

Michael R. Dillon, A Study of Authority in the Writings of Bertrand de Jouvenel. *Notre Dame.*

Reverend Mathias F. Doyle, O. F. M., Theology and Politics in the Works of Reinhold Niebuhr. *Notre Dame.*

Louis B. Fike, The Political Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. *Brown.*

Thomas E. Flanagan, The Second Reality: Robert Musil and the Modern World. *Duke.*

John G. Ford, A Comparison of the Political Thought of John Locke and John Dawson. *St. John's.*

Elliot M. Fox, The Dynamics of Human Organization: A Critical Study of the Ideas of Mary Parker Follett. *Columbia.*

Edward Friedland, Decisionism and the Theory of Real Decisions. *California* (Los Angeles).

Enid Greenberg, German Presence in American Political Thought. *Cornell.*

Nathan Greenspan, A Psychological Analysis of the Radical Right in the United States. *Columbia.*

Charles William Hill, The Political Thought of John Taylor of Caroline: The Pluralist Basis for Individualism. *American.*

John Holm, A Comparison of Marxism and African Socialism: A Study in Ideologies of Transition. *California* (Los Angeles).

Galen A. Irwin, Obtaining Estimates of Voter Transition Probabilities. *Florida State.*

Karen Denyse Johnson, The Problem of Political Obligation: Pluralism and Political Obligation. *California* (Berkeley).

Arpad Kadarkay, George Lukacs: A Political Portrait, *California* (Santa Barbara).

J. Gary Kepl, Pilgrim Political Thought and the Mayflower Compact: Neglected Precursors in the Development of American Political Thought. *California* (Santa Barbara).

Alkis Kontos, The Idea of Revolution in Locke, Burke and Marx. *Pittsburgh.*

Richard J. Landry, Political Thought of Hsuntzu. *Cornell.*

Harlan Jonathan Lewin, Charisma: Myth, Iden-

tity, and Power: A Study of the Social and Psychological Origins of Charismatic Leadership Drawn from Selected Historical and Modern Cases, *California* (Berkeley).

Stuart A. Lilie, Contemporary Evaluations of Non-Participation: Analysis and Critque. *Johns Hopkins.*

Steven R. McCarl, The Bonds of Liberty: Contemporary Psychological and Ethical Dimensions of a Political Concept. *California* (Santa Barbara).

Ellen Meiksin, Kant's Theory of Community. *California* (Los Angeles).

Horst Mewes, Theory and Practice in Kant and Hegel. *Chicago.*

Jeremy J. Millett, The Libertarian Political Philosophers from Spencer to the Present. *Texas.*

Syng Ek Moon, The Anti-Science Position: The Theses Against the Positivist Political Science in Some of the Contemporary Political Writings. *Florida State.*

Nestor A. Moreno, The Image of the United States in the Spanish American Novel. *South Carolina.*

Thomas Railton Morrison, Political Equality. *California* (Berkeley).

Lawrence H. Nitz, The Measurement of Political Manipulation: An Experimental Study of Machiavellian Orientations. *Michigan State.*

Walter Odajnyk, The Question of Continuity in Marx. *Columbia.*

Michael Ormond, The Political Significance of Freudian Thought. *Cornell.*

Stefano A. Passigli, Relation of Certain Concepts of American Administrative Theory to European Theory. *Harvard.*

Larry Peterman, A Commentary on the Fifth Book of the Nicomacheum Ethics. *Claremont.*

William Michael Reid, Obligation and Freedom in the Political Thought of Edmund Burke and John Adams: A Comparative Study. *Missouri* (Columbia).

Patrick T. Riley, Development of the Theory of Federal Government, 1550–1900. *Harvard.*

Graddon R. Rowlands, British Contributions to Political Development Theory. *Duke.*

Brent M. Rutherford, Social Status Inconsistencies as Independent Variables in Political Behavior Research. *Northwestern.*

Alfred L. Shilling, Frank Lester Ward. *Brown.*

Thomas A. Spragens, The Politics of Motion: An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Modern Political Theory. *Duke.*

Jung Karp Suhr, The Confucian Ideology and Modern Political System. *Oklahoma.*

Robert W. Sutherland, The Political Ideas of George Orwell: A Liberal's Odyssey in the Twentieth Century. *Duke.*

Wilmer A. Sweetser, The Political Philosophy of José Ortega y Gasset. *Louisiana State.*

Mignon Swihart, The American Conception of War: An Historical Analysis of Changing American Attitudes. *Harvard.*

Elias Thermos, Political Theory and Foreign Policy of the Athenian Fifth Century Democracy. *Southern Illinois.*

Sondra Simon Thorson, Political Theory and Political Socialization: A Theoretical Framework for the Study of Political Socialization. *Wisconsin.*

Ngo Dinh Tu, The Political Philosophy of François Guisot. *Harvard.*

Janet Vaillant, Pre-Industrial Social Theory. Sedilla Francois *Harvard.*

Herman Fred Vetter, Jr., Applications of New Regression Techniques to Policy Output Analysis. *Florida State.*

Edward Wilde, Marx and Alienation in Eastern Europe. *North Carolina.*

Elliot Martin Zashin, Civil Disobedience and the Democratic Polity. *California* (Berkeley).

Richard E. Zody, Age and Political Behavior. *Southern Illinois.*

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Changes

Mary M. Grow, An Analysis of Some Factors in the Peaceful Settlement of Historical Disputes in the Western Hemisphere. *Fletcher*

Judith Stiehm, Contemporary Theories of Nonviolent Resistence. *Columbia.*

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

Additions

Benson D. Adams, The Weapons Innovation Process and its effect on U. S. Strategic Thought 1955–65: A Case Study of the Effort to Develop an American Anit-Ballistic Missile Defense. *Pennsylvania.*

Paul Alexander, The Measurement of American Federalism. *Rochester.*

Charles H. Baer, Participation Predictors in the Southern Civil Rights Movement. *Northwestern.*

Marlan Blissett, Politics and Science. *Texas.*

Casimir A. Bobiński, The Politics of Ethnic Interest Groups in the United States: The Case of Polish-American Congress. *Michigan State.*

Philip Borst, President Johnson and the 89th Congress: A Functional Analysis of a System Under Stress. *Claremont.*

Edward A. Bozik, National Defense and Congressional Behavior: An Analysis of Congressional

Action on Authorising and Appropriating Legislation for Military Budgets and Military Construction Programs, 1951–1966. *Georgetown.*

Philip J. Briggs, Executive Congressional Relations in the Formulation of American Post-World War II Collective Security Agreements. *Syracuse.*

Jere Bruner, Interpersonal Imagery and Political Imagery in Two Contrasting Professional Groups. *Yale.*

Ronald J. Busch, Some Intergenerational Differences in American Working-Class Political Behavior and Attitudes: An Exploration into the Political Implications of Age as a Variable. *Ohio State.*

Eric H. Carlson, The Relationship of Role Type to Legislative Voting. *Michigan State.*

John N. Colas, The Influence of Military Background on Congressional Behavior. *Washington* (St. Louis).

Kenneth Dameron, Jr., Presidential-Congressional Relations During the Kennedy Administration. *Harvard.*

Paul H. De Forest, The Social Sciences in the Foreign Policy Subsystem of Congress, 1959–1966. *Georgetown.*

Donald Devine, The Attentive Public: Polyarchical Democracy. *Syracuse.*

Eldridge B. Duffee, The National States Rights Party (NSRP). *Maryland.*

Robert E. Eagle, Clients and Constituents: Representation in Administrative and Congressional Decision Making. *American.*

J. William Ellwood, George Wallace: Third Party Politics in the 1968 Presidential Campaign. *Johns Hopkins.*

Gary C. English, The Development of Effectiveness Criteria in the U. S. Informational Programs, Particularly With the U. S. A. *Emory.*

Richard Ganzel, Foreign Aid and American Foreign Policy. *Claremont.*

Parris N. Glendening, The Metropolitan Dade County Government: An Examination of the Reformists' Position. *Florida State.*

W. Vance Grant, The Emergence of Republican Voting Patterns in Presidential Elections in the South. *Maryland.*

P. Edward Haley, U. S. Attitude Towards Revolution. *The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.*

Paul J. Halpern, The Politics of Auto Safety Legislation. *Harvard.*

Janet Carter Hannigan, The Political Socialization of Party Personnel. *Columbia.*

William H. Harader, The House Committee on Veterans' Affairs: A Study of Milieu and Pressures. *Johns Hopkins.*

Douglas S. Harlan, Political Campaigning: Theory and Practice. *Texas.*

Judith Ann Heimlich, The Business of Poverty: Title IV of the Economic Opportunity Act in Its Formulation and First Year. *Columbia.*

Barbara Ann Hinckley, Seniority and Representation in Congress, 1920–66: An Appraisal of the Standard Charges Against the Seniority System. *Cornell.*

Lois Holzman, The Impact of Federal Funds on the Operation of Universities. *Rochester.*

William E. Jackson, Jr., Strategic Analysis and Weapons Option: To Build or Not to Build Surface Nuclear Warships, 1963–1966. *Columbia.*

Ruth Schuessler Jones, The Electorate, Parties and Policy in the United States: A Test of Three Models. *Georgetown.*

Doris Kearns, Prayer and Reapportionment: A Comparative Case Study and Theory of Congressional Consideration of Constitutional Amendments. *Harvard.*

Denis Killeen, Joint Economic Committee: Integration and Fragmentation in Congressional Economic Policy. *Columbia.*

Ruth Allen Lane, A Computer Simulation of Voting in the U. S. House of Representatives. *Georgetown.*

Robert Laudicina, Merger Policy and Group Behavior. *Columbia.*

Frank P. LeVeness, The Democratic Solution to the Problems Facing Puerto Rico. *St. John's*

John M. Lewis, Franklin Roosevelt and His Commanders. *Cornell.*

Joyce Rohr Lilie, The Politics of Education: A Case Study in Congressional-Executive-Interest Group Relations. *Johns Hopkins.*

David S. Lindsay, The Doctrine of Agency and Publicity in the Regulation of Campaign Finance (Florida). *Florida State.*

Charles Longley, Politics and the Pentagon: An Empirical Study of Contemporary Civil-Military Relations. *North Carolina.*

Frances M. Mamolito, Federal Conciliation of Civil Rights Disputes. *Georgetown.*

George E. Marcus, Political Participation and Mental Illness. *Northwestern.*

Ben L. Martin, Interpretations of U. S. Policy Toward the Chinese Communists, 1944–66: Survey and Analysis. *Fletcher.*

Allen B. Maxwell, Wartime Collaboration Between the U. S. and Latin America: A Study of the Office of the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs, 1940–46. *Fletcher.*

Onalee McGraw, The Madisonian Model in Theory and Practice. *Georgetown.*

Carroll R. McKibbin, The Career Structure and Success in the United States Foreign Service. *Kansas.*

Michael Mezey, A Multi-variate Analysis of Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives, 1949–1967. *Syracuse.*

Michael A. Morris, The Criteria Guiding American Military Interventions. *The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.*

Margaret R. Munk. Origins and Evolution of Party Leadership in the United States Senate. *Harvard.*

Peter Natchez, The Reasonable Voter: An Empirical Inquiry Into Electoral Rationality. *Harvard.*

Garrison Nelson, Leaders of the United States House of Representatives: Patterns of Recruitment and Selection (1780-1967). *Iowa.*

Walter J. Oleszek, Congressional Career Patterns: 1910–1960. *State University of New York* (Albany).

Malcolm C. Peck, Saudi Arabia in U. S. Foreign Policy: The Nature and Determinants of American Interests. *Fletcher*

Martin J. Plax, National Identity and the Obligation to Participate in Politics. *State University of New York* (Buffalo).

Carolyn Pratt, Political Socialization and Political Ideology: The Development of Equalitarian and Inequalitarian Attitudes in Young People. *Yale.*

David Price, The Legislative Role of Three Senate Committees. *Yale.*

Leonard G. Ritt, Socio-economic Correlates of Voting Behavior in Appalachia. *Tennessee.*

Dorothy Rudoni, Presidential Perspective: A Study of Harry S. Truman and Presidential Performance. *Southern Illinois.*

Sherwood S. Sandweiss, Jewish Organizational Leadership and the Separation of Church/State Issue: A Study of the Political Attitudes and Behavior of a Religio-Ethnic Elite in a Pluralist Setting. *Washington*, St. Louis.

Byron L. Schmid, The American National Lutheran Church and Politics. *Duke.*

Grace A. Sease, A Continuing Tradition? Negro Opposition to Military Service: World War II–Vietnam. *Michigan State.*

Harry J. Shaw, The Military Assistance Program as an Instrument of U. S. Foreign Policy. *Virginia.*

John D. Shea, The Impact of Types of High School Training on Political Socialization: A Case Study. *Pittsburgh.*

Allen Shinn, Professional and Political Attitudes of Annapolis Midshipmen. *North Carolina.*

Herbert W. Stephens, The Role of a Legislative Committee in the Appropriations Process: A Study Focused on the House Armed Services Committee. *Florida State.*

Emily S. Stoper, A History of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. *Harvard.*

Roger I. Tauss, Participation Predictors in the Southern Civil Rights Movement. *Northwestern.*

Hasan M. Tiro, The President as Party Leader: Selected Case Studies During Franklin D. Roosevelt's Administration. *Columbia.*

Jean Torcom, Minority Leadership in the United States Senate: A Case Study of Everett M. Dirksen. *Johns Hopkins.*

Richard Vance, Decision-Making in the Federal Trade Commission: A Study of Value Premises in the Decision-Making Process. *North Carolina.*

Jack R. VanDerSlik, Constituencies in Roll Call Voting: An Analysis of the House of Representatives of the 88th Congress. *Michigan State.*

Harold Walter, The Effect of Scientific Culture and Training on the Political Orientations, Perceptions, and Attitudes of Natural Scientists. *Georgetown.*

John Whelan, Congressional Committees and the Reserves: A Case Study in Defense Policy Making. *Pittsburgh.*

Frank Wolf, Some Determinants of Public Affairs Programming by Major, Commercial and VHF Television Stations in the United States. *Columbia.*

Alan P. Wolfe, The Senatorial Campaign: A Stage in the Legislative Process. *Pennsylvania.*

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Additions

David Atkinson, Justice Sherman Minton and the Work of the Supreme Court: 1949–1956. *Iowa.*

Carl Barr, Patterns of Legislative-Judicial Relations. *Chicago.*

Stanley B. Bernstein, The Abolitionists in Court. *Harvard.*

Winfield S. Bollinger, The Impact of Recent Supreme Court Decisions in the Area of Search, Confessions and Counsels on Criminal Administration in Onondaga County. *Syracuse.*

Edward J. Bronson, The Federal Constitution and the Colorado Courts, 1945–1965. *Colorado.*

Rodney A. Burrows, Non-Judicial Determinants Involved in the Implementation of a Judicial Decision, with Special Reference to the Application of the Decision in Brown v. Board of Education in Two Louisiana Parishes. *Ohio State.*

Jonathan Casper, The Lawyer as a Variable in Supreme Court Consideration of Civil Liberties and Civil Rights. *Yale.*

Charles Cayton, The Concept of Self-Incrimination. *Claremont.*

Abraham L. Davis, The Utilization of Sociological

Data in Judicial Decision-Making at the Supreme Court Level. *Ohio State.*

C. Thomas Dienes, A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Legislative and Judicial Interaction in the Process of Legal Change: Case Studies in Birth Control and Artificial Insemination. *Northwestern.*

Dennis D. Dorin, A Case Study of National Leadership: The Previous Career and Supreme Court Service of Arthur J. Goldberg. *Virginia.*

Leo J. Flynn, Constitution Problems of Controlling Prejudicial New Media Publicity. *California* (Santa Barbara).

Anthony J. Iezzi, Public Prayer and Public Schools: The Religion Clause and Public Education. *Western Reserve.*

Richard A. Knoller, State Aid to Non-Public Institutions of Higher Education: The Political, Administrative, and Constitutional Implications. *Johns Hopkins.*

James P. Levine, Obscenity and the Law: Judicial Doctrine and Social Control. *Northwestern.*

John L. McCullen, Mr. Justice Rutledge: Judicial Civil Libertarian. *Florida.*

Robert E. McDonough, Founding Politics in Virginia: Individual Rights and the American Political Tradition. *Notre Dame.*

Lois B. Moreland, The Concept of State Action Under the Fourteenth Amendment and Its Relation to Private Distribution. *American.*

William A. Pickering, Federalism and the Judicial Process: The Impact of the Habeas Corpus Cases. *Alabama.*

Francis M. Rich Jr., Role Perceptions and Legal Training as Independent Variables Influencing Judicial Decision-Making: An Analysis of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. *Georgia.*

Harrell R. Rodgers, The Refusal to Utilize Judicial Machinery in Conflict Resolution: A Political Systems Analysis of the Amish Dispute. *Iowa.*

Robert D. Smith, The Supreme Court in the Political Process: Impact of the Engel and Schempp Decisions. *Vanderbilt.*

Arthur Stern, The Influence of the Clear and Present Danger Formula on Constitutional Law. *Arizona.*

Charles Umbanhowar, United States Citizenship: The Right to Have Rights? *Chicago.*

Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Fair Trial Versus Free Press: Trial Publicity and Procedural Due Process. *Alabama.*

Changes

Joel Patrick McBride, Changing Patterns of Natural Law: An Analysis of Some Interpretations of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment *California* (Los Angeles).

Deletions

Robert Gerstein, The Judicial Process. *California* (Los Angeles).

CANADIAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

Howard Aster, Third Party Movements in Quebec. *Yale.*

David A. Cowell, Devising an Amendment Formula for Canada: The Development of the Fulton-Faureau Formula. *Georgetown.*

Hugh Forbes, Nationalism and National Identity: A Study of Canadian High School School Students. *Yale.*

Joseph F. Krauter, Civil Liberties and the Canadian Minorities. *Illinois.*

Richard Marshall, Canada and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development: A Study of Canadian Policy and Attitudes, 1960–1966. *Pennsylvania.*

William Gilbert Simpson, The Politics of Metropolitan Reform. *Western Reserve.*

Richard A. Wier, Interest Groups and the Canadian Political System: The Case of the Canadian Medical Association. *Georgetown.*

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

William D. Anderson, Political Aspects of Public Law 480. *Illinois.*

Richard Balkema, The Committee Role in the Legislative Process: The Case of the Michigan State Senate. *Southern Illinois.*

Kathleen A. Barber, Reapportionment in Ohio: The 1965 Plan. *Western Reserve.*

Eugene Stanley Bardoch, Elaboration of a Theory of How Political Issues Arise and Develop, Supported by Data Concerning Issues in the Mental Health Field in California. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert Earl Black, Southern Governors and the Negro. *Harvard.*

Henry Brubaker, A Computer Simulation of State Legislative Behavior: Development of a Best-Fit Model Based on the Socio-Economic and Political Backgrounds of State Legislatures. *Syracuse.*

Frank Burd, Robert Alphonso Taft: A Study in Congressional Statesmanship. *Chicago.*

Patrick A. Carone, The Governor as Legislator in West Virginia: An Analysis of the Legislative Role of Selected West Virginia Governors. *Duke.*

Gerald M. Church, Intergovenmental Relations in a Rural County. *Claremont.*

James W. Clarke, Environmental Factors and Municipal Reform in Selected Pennsylvania Cities. *Pennsylvania State.*

Robert Crew, State Political Systems and Public Policy: An Analysis of State Commitment to Natural Resources Conservation and Development. *North Carolina.*

Roland Dufault, The Regulator: A Case Study in State Administration. *Brown.*

Delmer Dunn, The Press and State Government. *Wisconsin.*

Victor L. Emanuel, The Out-Groups: A Study of Republican and Liberal Democratic Organizations in Houston, Dallas, and San Antonio. *Harvard.*

Robert S. Erikson, Congressional Elections: A Systematic Analysis. *Illinois.*

Robert B. Eyestone, Policy Outcomes and Political Structure in 89 Bay Area Cities. *Stanford.*

Frank B. Feigert, The New York Liberal Party: A Behavioral Analysis. *Maryland.*

Richard D. Feld, The Impact of Metropolitanism upon State Governmental Policies: A Comparative Study of California, Michigan and New York. *Syracuse.*

Gerald P. Flynn, The Political Meaning of Suburbia: Social Class and Local Political Culture in Two Suburban Municipalities. *Pennsylvania.*

Joseph F. Freeman, III, The Metropolis and Ideas: A Survey of the Theoretical Bases of the Contemporary Study of American Metropolitan Government. *Virginia.*

Gordon Friedman, Issues, Partisanship and Political Subcultures: A Study of Voting in Statewide Referenda Elections in New Jersey. *North Carolina.*

Paul Friesema, Intergovernmental Relations and Political Integration in the Quad-Cities. *Iowa.*

Peter Galie, Apathy and the Nature of Political Commitment. *Pittsburgh.*

John W. Gerdes, Health Interest Groups and State Government: The Case of Pennsylvania. *Pittsburgh.*

James P. Gifford, The Political Relations of the Patrolmen's Benevolent Association in the City of New York 1946–1966. *Columbia.*

Andrew Glassberg, The Political Effectiveness of Local Campaign Workers: The 1965 Mayoral Campaign in New York City. *Yale.*

Louis H. Gold, The Politics of the Civil Rights Struggle in New York City: The Case of the Civilian Police Review Board Controversy, 1953–1967. *Columbia.*

Leigh E. Grosenick, The Many Faces of Interlocal Governmental Cooperation. *Minnesota.*

Richard Hallin, The Tri-State Transportation Commission: A Study of Intergovernmental Relations in Metropolitian New York. *Columbia.*

Elton Ham, A Case Study in Policy Formation: Kalamazoo, Michigan. *Chicago.*

William Arch Harrison, Jr., Legislative Specialization in the Making of Education Policy in the California Legislature. *California* (Berkeley).

Richard Hoffman, Community Action: Innovative and Coordinative Strategies in the War on Poverty. *North Carolina.*

Anne Hopkins, Political Opinion and Public Policy: A Comparative State Analysis. *Syracuse.*

James L. Hutter, A Study of a Political Interest Group: The Oregon Education Association. *Oregon.*

Judith Jamison, Administrative Reforms of the Hiram Johnson Era in California Government 1911–1917. *California* (Los Angeles).

Charles F. Levine, Roles and Decision-Making in Small Legislative Bodies. *Stanford.*

Eric George Levine, Political Consequences of the Poverty Program: Case Study of Los Angeles. *California* (Berkeley).

Eugene Lewis, Socio-Economic Variables Associated with Political Change in Philadephia 1950–1965. *Syracuse.*

Carl Lieberman, 1966 Gubernatorial Election in Pennsylvania. *Pittsburgh.*

Robert Lineberry, Political Structures and Public Policy in American Cities. *North Carolina.*

Edward S. Malecki, A Quantified Application of Group Theory to National Politics. *Illinois.*

John Terence Manns, Religion and Politics: A Case Study of St. Louis. *St. Louis.*

Vincent L. Marando, A Study of Political Integration of a Metropolitan Area. *Michigan State.*

James L. McDowell, Changes in the Representational System: Illinois General Assembly, 1963–1967. *Illinois.*

Thomas J. Mikulecky, Intergovernmental Relations in the Community Development of Tucson, Arizona. *Arizona.*

Roy E. Miller, Partisan Defection: A Systematic Analysis. *Illinois.*

Val. G. Mixon, A Study of County Governments in Metropolitan Atlanta. *Emory.*

David Paletz, Congressional Conference Committees, *California* (Los Angeles).

Ernestine Patterson, Revolution in the Making? The Impact of the Black Struggle on Representative Government in St. Louis, Missouri. *St. Louis.*

Henry I. Penfield, The Political Socialization of the Alabama School Child. *Alabama.*

Richard Pious, The Conservative Party in New York City: 1962–1967. *Columbia.*

Melchior D. Powell, The Impact of Land-Use on the Administrative Organization of Local Governments. *Maryland.*

Harold E. Quick, The Role of Newsmen in the Legislative Process: A Comparative Analysis of

Missouri and Illinois. *Washington* (St. Louis).

William S. Quigley, Effects of Reapportionment in Selected States on the Legislative Product. *Ohio State.*

George Walter Robbins, SNCC: Participatory Democracy and Leadership in the South. *California* (Berkeley).

Bruce W. Robeck, The Impact of Reapportionment on the Political System in California. *California.* (Santa Barbara).

Edward Rogowsky, Changing Patterns of Urban Political Leadership: A Study of Local Party Leaders. *Columbia.*

Conrad P. Rutkowski, Legislative Politics and Apportionment: New York State. *Fordham.*

John W. Soule, The Influence of Political Socialization, Interpersonal Values and Differential Recruitment Patterns on Legislative Adaptation: The Michigan House of Representatives. *Kentucky.*

Arthur R. Stevens, Political Socialization in the Tri-State Area of Michigan, Indiana, Ohio: A Comparative Study of Three Border Towns. *Michigan State.*

William H. Stewart, The Politics of Resource Development: The Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. *Alabama.*

Michael Stoddard, The Political Dynamics of Military Manpower Procurement Systems. *California* (Los Angeles).

Ronald H. TeBeest, Judicial System of Metropolitan Atlanta. *Emory.*

Dennis L. Thompson, Domestic Diplomacy: Aspects of Inter-State Relations. *California* (Santa Barbara).

Albert R. Trost, A Comparison of Public and Parochial Elementary Schools as Agents of Political Socialization. *Washington* (St. Louis.)

Conrad Weiler, Comparative Metropolitan Fiscal Systems. *Syracuse.*

Thomas L. Wells, The Legislative Consequences of Urban Growth: The Case of Virginia, 1966. *Virginia.*

Alan J. Wyner, The Governor's Office: Fourteen Offices as Seen by Participant-Observers. *Ohio State.*

Fred Zuercher, The California State Superintendent of Public Instruction: A Study in Politics and Administration. *California* (Los Angeles).

Changes

Henrik Dullea, The New York State Constitutional Convention of 1967: A Study in Role Analysis. *Syracuse.*

Jack Goldsmith, The Politics of Inter-governmental Relations in the Context of Metropolitan Crisis—The Case of the Watts, Los Angeles, Riots of 1965. *California* (Los Angeles).

Ronald Hedlund, Legislative Socialization and Role Orientations: A Study of the Iowa House of Representatives. *Iowa.*

Edward Jackson, Peaceful Resolution of Racial Conflict. *Iowa.*

David R. McGregor, The Effects of the Convention Nominating System on New York State Political Organizations, 1946–1966. *Columbia.*

Michael J. Zavacky, A Study of Interest Groups in the Initiative Referendum Process: Ohio 1958 "Right-to-Work" Amendment—A Case Study. *Pittsburgh.*

Deletions

Ellis Perlman, Community Politics in a Metropolis. *California* (Los Angeles).

James W. Robbins, The Unicameral Movement in Missouri. *Missouri* (Columbia).

Leo Douglas Vichules, Jr., Political Communication at the Grass Roots Level, Factors Relating to the Success of Campaign Workers as Senders and Receivers of Political Information. *California* (Berkeley).

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Additions

Marvin Abrahams, Functioning of Boards and Commissions in the Los Angeles City Government. *California* (Los Angeles).

Nathaniel H. Barish, A Study of the Priority System for Reviewing Public Health Service Research Proposals. *American.*

Edward Bitar, The Lebanese Civil Service Board. *Louisiana State.*

Wesley E. Bjur, Some Comparative Aspects of Concepts of Administrative Leadership in the Americas. *Claremont.*

Phaibul Changrien, Development Planning In Thailand. *Syracuse.*

Stephen Chitwood, Group Problem-Solving in the Metropolitan Community. *Southern California.*

Donald E. Crawford, The University as a Dynamic Response System: A Comparative Study of the Effects of Growth Upon Essential Operations and Organizational Patterns of Northwestern Universities. *Oregon.*

Walter M. Cunningham, Coalescence of Municipal Police and Fire Services: A Comparison of Experience in the United States, Canada and Great Britain. *Claremont.*

Harry Diamond, Juvenile Delinquency: Linkage Between Maintenance & Precipitating Variables as Part of a System. *Southern California.*

Harry J. Donahue, The Politics of Reorganization in the Federal Government: A Study of the Formation of the Department of Transportation. *American.*

Grover W. Durnell, An Analysis of Federal Organization and Management of Vocational and Occupational Education Programs, With Spe-

tial Reference to the Office of Education, Department of Health, Education and Welfare. *American.*

George Frederickson, Measuring The Impact of Community and Government Characteristics on Municipal Expenditures. *Southern California.*

Eleanor Bush Gubins, Economic Expertise, Bureaucratic Structure and the Policy Process. *Johns Hopkins.*

Harold B. Handerson, The Air Coordinating Committee (ACC): Inter-agency Coordination in Federal Aviation Matters, 1945–1960. *American.*

Stephen Hartman, A Comparative Analysis of Municipal Expenditure Patterns Within the State of New York. *Syracuse.*

Richard J. Hayes, A Study of the Transfer from R&D to Commercial Operations in Selected Electronic Companies. *American.*

Jack M. Hertzog, Matching Men and Jobs in the United States Army. *American.*

Mel Huden, Attitudes on Mobility in the Public Service—The Junior College Case. *Southern California.*

Charles A. Heubner, The Transfer of Technical Requirements from Advanced Systems Planners to Managers of Applied Research (With Special Emphasis on a Model for the Study of the Transfer in N.A.S.A.). *American.*

Asoy Khambatta, Relation of the Higher Civil Service in India to the Training Programs of the National Academy of Administration. *Syracuse.*

Kenneth Kraemer, An Exploration and a Proposal for a Model Information System for the Planning Function in Medium-Sized Cities. *Southern California.*

Fred A. Kramer, Indian Administrative Response to the Food Crises of the "Sixties": An Application of a Model of Administrative Development. *Syracuse.*

William McLauchlan, The Federal Power Commission and Its Control Over Hearing Examiners. *Wisconsin.*

Kleber Nascimento, Change Strategy and Client System: Administrative Reform in Brazil. *Southern California.*

Morgan O'Dell, Distribution of Authority Within the California State College System. *Southern California.*

Arthitya Ourairatana, A Comparative Study of Selected Career Executive Development Programs in the United States Federal Service: 1963–1966. *Colorado.*

Marjorie A. Schier, The Federal Government's Response to an Urban Problem: The Development of a Public Policy on Urban Mass Transportation. *American.*

Mujib Sheikh, Executive Behavior: A Temporal Analysis. *Southern California.*

Anwar Hussain Siddiqui, The Role of the Legislative in the Budgeting Process. *Southern California.*

Lyle E. Sonnenschein, Sponsored Research Administration: Colorado State-Supported Colleges and Universities. *Colorado.*

James Underwood, Administration by Contract: A Study of Administrative Accountability with Emphasis on Case Studies of NASA and AEC. *Syracuse.*

Paulo Vieira, Toward A Theory of Decentralization: A Comparative View on Forty-Five Countries. *Southern California.*

Charles E. Walcott, Budgetary Decision-Making: An Experimental Study. *California* (Santa Barbara).

Charles A. Zusak, Developmental Administration: A Viable Program of Non-Centralized Responsibility. *Maryland.*

Changes

Mohamed A. Abdel-Hamid, Consultation for Better Public Management with Special Reference to the Governments of the United States of America and the United Arab Republic. *American.*

Donald Baxter, Comparative Analysis of Advanced Management Training Programs in the Philippines, Thailand, and India. *Syracuse.*

Giorgio Freddi, Bureaucratic Structure and Functional Requirements in the Italian Judiciary. A Study of Organizational Tensions, Conflict and Change. *California* (Berkeley).

Deletions

William S. Koschny, An Analysis of the Ramifications and Effects of the Postal Modernization Program on the Postal Unions in the Post Office Department Since 1952. *American.*

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Additions

Fred Ablin, The Administration of Soviet Higher Education Since 1953. *Columbia.*

Robert F. Adie, Agrarianism in the Mexican Political System. *Texas.*

Shahrough Akhavi, The Image of the Soviet Union in the Egyptian Press. *Columbia.*

Jose Carlos Aleixo, S.J., The Catholic Hierarchy and Civil Elections in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Puerto Rico, 1930–1965. *Georgetown.*

John William Amos, II, Middle Eastern Political Development. *California* (Berkeley).

Carol C. Andrews, The Relationship Between the Chinese Communist Party and the Peasant

Movement, 1921–1927: Ideological and Organizational Aspects. *Columbia.*

Luis E. Aguilar, Cuba 1933: The Impact of a Revolution. *American.*

Ali Ashraf, The Politics of Urban Development: The Case of Calcutta. *Cornell.*

Re Sumo Atuquayefio, The Antecedents of Contemporary African Diplomacy (A Theoretical Study of Intertribal and International Relations in Contemporary Africa. *American.*

Robert Ayres, A Comparative Study of Chilean Political Parties. *North Carolina.*

Daniel Frederic Baedeker, The Role of the Church in Chilean Politics. *California* (Berkeley).

Alastair G. K. Bain, Attitudes to Violence in Wartime in the United States and Great Britain. *Chicago.*

Kendall L. Baker, The Political Attitudes of the German Youth: A Study in Political Allegiance and Alienation. *Georgetown.*

Barnett Baron, A Study of Southern African Political Refugees: Socialization, Motivations, and Political Perspectives. *Yale.*

Gordon Bennett, Provincial Administration in Communist China. *Wisconsin.*

Anthony M. Berrett, Old and New Ruling Classes in Ghana and the Ivory Coast. *Columbia.*

Leonard Billet, The Political Prerequisites of Economic Development. *California* (Los Angeles).

William J. Bishop, Political Elites in a Context of National Development. *Northwestern.*

Carl E. Boggs, Jr., Comparative Political Analysis, with Special Emphasis on Communist Ideology and Organization, and the Communist Movements of Western Europe. *California* (Berkeley).

Thomas Charles Bruneau, A Comparative Analysis of the Catholic Church in Brazil With Main Lines of Investigation Being: The Organizational Growth of the Church, the Church as a Political Actor, and Catholicism as an Ideology. *California* (Berkeley).

Ronald Brunner, Issues, Strategies, and Alignments in Political Development: A Systemic View. *Yale.*

William R. Bryant, The Diplomatic Role of Japanese Trade Missions, 1957–1966. *Columbia.*

Emory Bundy, Local Politics and District Level Development in Uganda. *California* (Los Angeles).

Cornelius Bushoven, III, The Judicial System of Kenya. *Duke.*

Spiros J. Caramalis, The French Catholic Church and the Working Class: A Study in Sub-Culture Formation and Relations. *Columbia.*

Emily Card, Voluntary Associations in Ghana, 1957–67. *Columbia.*

Manuel Carlos, Jr., Political Participation and Leadership in Contemporary Mexican Peasant Society. *California* (Santa Barbara).

Sue Ellen Charlton, Attitudes and Politics of the French Socialist Party (SF10) Regarding European Integration, 1945–1965. *Denver.*

Roderick A. Church, Urban Politics in India: A Comparative Study of Lucknow and Kampur. *Duke.*

Paul Cohen, The Political System of Uruguay: Modernization with Industrialization. *Chicago.*

Robert R. Cole, The Union for the New Republic: A Study of Party Organization. *Duke.*

David Paul Conradt, A Study of the Role of the Third Party in a Bipartie Party System: The British Liberal Party and the German Free Democrats. *Brown.*

Thomas M. Cooke, The Contemporary Foreign Policy of Venezuela. *American.*

Egambi F. Dalizu, A Study of Agitational and Integrative Politics with Special Reference to Jomo Kenyatta. *Claremont.*

Robert H. Donaldson, The Bases of Soviet Policy Toward Independent India. *Harvard.*

William Dunn, Federal Government in Yugoslavia. *Claremont.*

Robert E. Elder, Jr., Administrative Aspects of Population Control Policy in India. *Duke.*

Shwikar I. Elwan, Constitutionalism and Islam. *Emory.*

Donald Emmerson, Student Political Activity in Indonesia. *Yale.*

Stuart Irwan Fagan, Labor-Party-Government in Venezuela. *California* (Berkeley).

Victor C. Falkenheim, A Study of the Structure and Functioning of Provincial Government in Fukien Province, Communist China, 1949–1966. *Columbia.*

Lee C. Fennell, Class and Region in Argentina: A Study of Political Cleavage, 1936–1966. *Florida.*

Mariano Fiallos, The Nicaraguan Political System. *Kansas.*

Merton Don Fletcher, Labor Unions in Communist China. *California* (Berkeley).

Roger W. Fontaine, The Foreign Policy Making Process in Brazil. *The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.*

Edmund Fowler, A Cross National Study of Governmental Responsiveness. *North Carolina.*

Mark N. Franklin, Pressures and Protests: Interest Articulation in British and American Local Government. *Cornell.*

Trond Gilberg, The Relations Between the Norwegian Communist Party and the CSPU in the Period 1917–Present. *Wisconsin.*

Fredrick R. Gladeck, The Peking Government and the Chinese Eastern Railway Question, 1917–1922: A Study of Decision-Making. *Pennsylvania.*

Roy Godson, Post World War II Foreign Policy Perspectives and Strategies of the AFL and CIO. *Columbia.*

Madan Lal Goel, Political Participation in India. *State University of New York* (Buffalo).

Martin Goldstein, American Policy Toward Laos, 1954–1962. *Pennsylvania.*

Robert Grey, Education and National Loyalty: Ethiopia. *Yale.*

Jane W. Gurganus, Political Activities of V. P. Meshcherskii. *Emory.*

Ibrahim Toufil Hachem, The Civil Strife in Lebanon and the Crisis of 1958. *American.*

William L. Hamilton, Student Politics and the Venezuelan Political System. *Fletcher*

Ki-Shik Han, Political Elites in South Korea (1945–1965). *California* (Berkeley).

Barbara Hazelwood, The Roles of Latin American National Revolutionary Parties in Countries Undergoing Basic Socio-Political Change. *University of Missouri* (Columbia).

Milda K. Hedblom, Political Participation Patterns. *Minnesota.*

Larry Hill, The Transfer of Political Institutions With Special Reference to New Zealand's O'mbudswan. *Tulane.*

John Stephen Hoadley, A Study of the Urban Polity of Hong Kong. *California* (Santa Barbara).

Emmett J. Holland, A Study of Bolivian Foreign Relations 1935–1946. *American.*

Harriet Hollenberg, Israel, the Development of Nuclear Weapons and its Implications for American Foreign Policy: A Problem of Nonproliferation. *Harvard.*

Abu Nasar Shamsul Hoque, An Analysis of Administrative Reform Doctrine in Pakistan. *Duke.*

Robert C. Horn, III, Soviet-Indonesian Relations, 1956–66: A Case Study of Soviet Foreign Policy. *Fletcher*

Curtis E. Huff, National Integration and Foreign Policy: Problems in the African Countries. *Michigan State.*

Abel Jacob, The Role of the Intermediate State in Development Cooperation: Israel's Role in Africa. *California* (Los Angeles).

Abdul Aziz Jalloh, Regional Organization in French West and Equatorial Africa. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert Louis Jervis, Signaling and Perception in International Relations *California* (Berkeley)

Rodney W. Jones, The Impact of Urbanization and Industrialization on Municipal Politics in the Punjab (India). *Columbia.*

Elliot Kalner, The Political Role of the Intellectual: The Experience of Mexico. *Columbia.*

Savak J. Katrak, Dadabhai Naoroji and the Response to British Rule in India. *Harvard.*

Susan B. Kaufman, Policy-making in Mexico: A Case Study of the Profit-Sharing Decision. *Columbia.*

Anwar Kemal, Constitutional Development in Thailand 1932–1966. *Pennsylvania.*

George D. Kent, The National Radical Union Party of Greece. *Colorado.*

Kwan Bong Kim, Korean Parties and Politics as Revealed in the Korea-Japan Treaty Crisis. *Pennsylvania.*

James L. Kingsland, Local Government Decision-Making in Sierra Leone. *Northwestern.*

Jeane Kirkpatrick, Peron and the Peronist Movement. *Columbia.*

Dennis E. Knab, The Development of Pakistan's Defense Policy. *The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.*

Peter Knauss, Communications and Social Change in a Closed and an Open Society: A Comparison of Jackson, Tennessee and Kitale, Kenya. *Northwestern.*

Seung Ko, The Korea-Japan Rapprochement: A Study of Korea's Foreign Policy to Japan. *Pennsylvania.*

Jerome Kraus, Soviet Attempts at Transformation of the Rural Sectors of Byelorussia and Kazakhstan, 1929–1934 and 1953–1958. *Wisconsin.*

Richard J. Krickus, Rapid Urbanization: A Challenge to Political Development. *Georgetown.*

Stanislas Lasocki, Participation in Nation Building, Polish Emigration to Southern States of Brazil. *Claremont.*

Eduardo Latorre, The Dominican Republic: A Case Study of Political Instability in an Underdeveloped Country. *Columbia.*

Toshun Lee, Sokagakkoi as a Political Party: A Case Study of Religion in Politics. *Wisconsin.*

Richard B. Leigh, Political Integration in Malaysia: A Case Study of Sarawak. *Cornell.*

Barbara C. Lewis, Interest Group Formation in a Developing Nation. *Northwestern.*

Raymond J. Lewis, Jr., The Peace Corps and Cultural Secularization Among Secondary School Students in Sierra Leone. *Syracuse.*

Richard Ned Lebow, England, Ireland and the Great Famine: A Case Study in Colonial Perception. *City University of New York.*

Nancy G. Ma, Education and Political Control in the People's Republic of China. *Cornell.*

Kazuro Machii, The Japanese System of Judicial Review. *California* (Los Angeles).

Susan R. Maclay, The Women's Movement in India. *Virginia.*

John Magill, Labor Unions and National Integration in Bolivia. *Wisconsin.*

Thomas W. Mahoney, The Diplomacy of United States Military Aid to Latin America, 1945–1952. *Pennsylvania.*

R. Roger Majak, Collective and Non-Collective

Foreign Policy Strategies: A Comparative Study of Foreign Office Elite Perceptions. *Ohio State.*

Max G. Manwaring, The Military in Brazilian Politics. *Illinois.*

Richard Maullin, Political Recruitment and Socialization of Youth in the Mexican Partido Revolucionario Institucional. *California* (Los Angeles).

Peter B. Mayer, Urbanization and Political Integration: Two Indian Cities. *Wisconsin.*

Lawrence C. Mayer, Interest Groups in Australia: The Case of the Japanese Trade Agreements. *Texas.*

James D. McBrayer, The Role of the Military in Developing South America. *Emory.*

Dorothy E. McBride, Elite Political Culture in Costa Rica. *Vanderbilt.*

J. Thomas McKechnie, Communist Party Elite Recruitment, Structure and Transformation in Yugoslavia. *Pittsburgh.*

Margaret Meister, Merida: Community Power Structure in a Mexican Town in Transition. *Columbia.*

Paul E. Menge, Administration of Public Welfare in India. *Duke.*

Jake C. Miller, African Diplomats and the Racial Attitudes and Practices of Americans. *North Carolina.*

Phillip D. Mikesell, Political Party Recruitment of Young Technically Trained Persons in Chile. *Vanderbilt.*

David L. Milbank, Evolution and Impact of Yugoslav Policy Toward Developing Countries and Dependent Areas in Africa and Asia: 1945–1966. *The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.*

Frances Millard, The Emergence of National Democracy in 19th Century Poland. *Columbia.*

Robert W. Miller, Diffusion of Academic Political Science Doctrine in the Philippines since Its Independence. *Duke.*

Richard Mock, Organization Control and Response in the Ghanaian Civil Service. *Wisconsin.*

Robert Allan Monson, Right-Wing Politics in Mexican Education: The Textbook Conflict. *Georgetown.*

Robert B. Moody, Egypt's Popular Powers: Assembly and Arab Socialist Union. *California* (Berkeley).

Lynn K. Mytelka, Interstate Relations in a Regional Organization: The Case of UDEAC. *The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.*

Tae Yul Nam, Singapore and Malaya: 1963–1965. *Iowa.*

Betty A. Nesvold, Turmoil to Civil War: A Cross-National Analysis. *Minnesota.*

Stephen Newlin, Krushchev and Tito: A Study in Conflict Resolution. *Claremont.*

Liisa Lukkari North, The Politics of Agrarian Change in Peru. *California* (Berkeley).

Lillian M. Noyes, Civil Aviation in India: Public Policy and National Development. *Texas.*

Jean F. O'Barr, Differential Responses to National Development: Pare, District, Tanzania. *Northwestern.*

Charles R. Ostrom, The Malaysian Federation. *Claremont.*

James R. Ozinga, The Relevance of Ideology to the Soviet Transition to Communism. *Michigan State.*

Barbara Paley, The Role of Legislative Attitudes in the Making of Foreign Policy: The Case of United States-Latin American Relations. *Yale.*

Kenneth Pedersen, The Social Democratic Party of Denmark, *California* (Los Angeles).

Mary Pedersen, Party and Government Centralization in Mexico. *Yale.*

Patrick V. Peppe, Labor in the Political Development of Chile. *Columbia.*

Jerry D. Perkins, The Role of Political Parties in the Developing Areas. *Emory.*

Nixdorff Peter, State Politics and Education in West Germany. *Florida.*

John Peterson, Politics and the University of Bolivia. *Pittsburgh.*

David I. Petts, National Security and Civil Liberties in Great Britian. *California* (Santa Barbara).

Donald Pienkos, The Role of the United Peasant Party in Polish Agricultural Policy. *Wisconsin.*

Raymond Pomerleau, A Functional Approach to the Study of Community Development in Cross-Cultural Milieux. *Oregon.*

Jeanne M. Anderson Posada, The University and the Colombian Political System: Political Socialization and Recruitment. *California* (Berkeley).

Christian P. Potholm, II, Political Development in Swaziland, 1960–65. *Fletcher.*

John F. H. Purcell, Community Power in a Socially and Culturally Plural Society: A Study of Durban, South Africa. *California* (Los Angeles).

Robert Putnam, A Comparative Study of Elite Political Cultures in Britain and Italy. *Yale.*

Karen Rawling, Directed Cultural Changes and Psychological Self-Conceptualization: A National Identity Crisis in Central Asia. *North Carolina.*

Richard Reagan, Conflict and Consensus: Religious Freedom and the Second Vatican Council. *Chicago.*

Alan B. Reed, Swiss Political Parties and Political Integration in a Multi-Cultural Society. *Texas.*

Inez Smith Reed, Constitutional History and Con-

stitutional Problems of an Emerging Nation: A Case Study of Congo-Kinshasa. *Columbia.*

Alfred A. Reisch, The Contribution of Sandor Boloni Farkas'. *Columbia.*

H. Jon Rosenbaum, Trends in Contemporary Brazilian Foreign Policy, An Eclectic Approach. *Fletcher.*

Marc H. Ross, The Effects of Urbanization: Political Participation and Alienation in Nairobi, Kenya. *Northwestern.*

H. Edwin Rossea, The Social Concerns of Moises Saens, Mexican Educator (1888–1941). *American.*

Salvatore Rotella, Government Crisis in the Italian Republic. *Chicago.*

Stephen L. Rozman, A Comparison of Liberal and Conservative Party Leadership in Cali, Colombia. *Florida.*

Key Sun Ryang, The Japanese Premier (1885–1945). *Columbia.*

Christopher Schaefer, National Sovereignty and European Integration: Effective Compromise or Temporary Illusion? *Fletcher.*

James Scott, Bureaucracy in Malaya. *Yale.*

Donald D. Searing, The Study of Social Background in Elite Analysis. *Washington* (St. Louis).

Hans Eric Segal, Violence as a Dynamic Element of National Socialism. *Western Reserve.*

Kuo-kong Show, Communist China's Foreign Policy on the Pattern of Relations Among the Communist States, 1956–1965: A Critical Analysis. *Pennsylvania.*

Robb E. Smith, French Business and the Political System of Madagascar. *Columbia.*

Gad Soffer, The Role of Military Officers in Politics and Society of Syria. *American.*

Robert W. Spencer, The Effects of Discontinuity on the Process of Political Socialization, a Comparison of the Political Attitudes of Italian American Field Service Students with a Matched Control Group. *State University of New York* (Buffalo).

Robert F. Stephens, A Comparative Analysis of the Structure and Procedures for the Conduct of Foreign Relations of Three East African States. *Michigan.*

Willard B. Stoufer, Jr., Native Authority Government in Sokoto. *Duke.*

Richard Eli Stren, Urbanization and Development in East Africa: A Case Study of Mombasa, Kenya, *Califcrnia* (Berkeley).

William Gerald Studdert-Kennedy, Military in the British Constituency Parties, *California* (Berkeley).

David Charles Sturtevant, The Process of Reforming Primary Education in Chile. *California* (Berkeley).

Fuad K. Suleiman, The Arab Boycott of Israel. *Fletcher.*

Herschelle Sullivan, Decision-Making in Dahomey: A Study of Policy Formation Relevant to the Expulsion of Dahomeyan Nationals from Neighboring Countries in 1958, 1962 and 1964. *Columbia.*

James Allen Sundberg, The Interrelationship of Policy, Economy, and Society in the Middle East: A Comparative Study. *California* (Berkeley).

John Swanson, Soviet and Communist Policies in Syria and Lebanon, 1944–1959. *Wisconsin.*

Gloria N. Tait-Mendez, An Evaulation of the Impact of the San Migeulito Housing Project in Panama on the Social Development of the Residents. *American.*

Shoshana Tancer, Civilian Supremacy: Some Factors Relating to the Contemporary Role of the Military in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. *Columbia.*

Elliot L. Tepper, Aspects of Local Government Reform in Pakistan. *Duke.*

Mark A. Tessler, Tunisia: A Study in Modernization. *Northwestern.*

Laurence C. Thorsen, The Pharmacists' Association of the Loire: A Political Interest Group. *Illinois.*

Irmtraud Toelle, The Growth of Public Authority in Brandenburg-Prussia from 1640–1806: A Study in Political Modernization. *Columbia.*

Thomas R. VanDervort, Social and Political Change in the Middle East. *Tennessee.*

Joel G. Verner, An Analysis of the Guatemalan Congress. *Kansas.*

John A. Voekel, Union-State Relations in India. *California* (Berkeley).

Ivan Volgyes, Russian Bolshevik Influences on the Hungarian Revolutions: A Case Study of Some Aspects of Russian Foreign Policy in 1917–1919. *American.*

David R. Weaver, Food for Peace in Indo-American Political Relations. *Cincinnati.*

Kent M. Weeks, The New Zealand Ombudsman System. *Western Reserve.*

Warren Weinstein, Belgian Colonial Administration in Burundi. *Columbia.*

Dursilla A. Wendoloshi, The Egyptian Bureaucracy under Mohammed Ali. *Harvard.*

Lynn Townsend White, III, The Politics of Shanghai City Since 1949. *California* (Berkeley).

John K. Wildgen, The Regional Government of Vally d'Aoste. *Duke.*

Frederick B. Williams, Origins of the Sino-American Conflict. *Illinois.*

John F. Wolfi, The Decision for an Alliance for Progress. *Pittsburgh.*

Minoru Yanagihashi, Voting Patterns and Electoral Strategies in Recent Japanese Elections:

An Analysis of Different Levels and Types of Elections. *Michigan.*

Ma Yeh-shiang, Chinese Foreign Policy During the Boxer Movement: A Study of 'Tung Nan Hu Pao.' *American.*

Chong Kun Yoon, The Role of the Red Army in the Rise and Fall of the Kiangsi Soviet Republic. *American.*

Maximino C. Zaragoza, The Role of Mexico in the O.A.S. *St. Louis.*

Shimshon Zelniker, Changing Patterns of Trade Unionism in Zambia. *California* (Los Angeles).

Dolph Zink, The United States Governmental Response to the Christian Democratic Movement in Chile. *Pennsylvania.*

Changes

E. Abrahamian, The Social Bases of the Tudeh Party (1941–1953). *Columbia.*

Paul Abramson, Education and Political Socialization: A Study of English Secondary Education. *California* (Berkeley).

Willard M. Berry, A Study of the Parliament of India. *Duke.*

Vagn Aage Carisius Christensen, The Godesberger Socialists and the German Catholic Church: An Appraisal of Their Political Relationship, 1959–1966. *California.* (Berkeley).

Charles H. Cutter, Explorations in Malian Political Communication. *California* (Berkeley).

Edward Drachman, The Vietnam Problem in United States Foreign Policy, 1943–1953. *Pennsylvania.*

Ralph E. Fretty, The Politics of Ceylon's International Payments Deficit. *Fletcher.*

Isebill W. Gruhn, Functionalism in Africa: Scientific and Technical Cooperation. *California (Berkeley).*

Melville Kahn, French Politics and the Tunisian Question 1947–1956. *Columbia.*

Henry Kennedy, Politics in Northern Ireland: A Study of One Party Domination in a Democratic System. *Michigan.*

John A. Lepper, Philippine Student Politics: With Special Emphasis on the University of the Philippines. *Georgetown.*

Angelo Loiria, Political Awakening in South Sudan 1945–1955: Decolonization and the Crisis of National Integration. *California* (Los Angeles).

Charles S. Rooks, Politics and Public Policy in a New Nation: Higher Education in Nigeria. *Duke.*

Barry Schutz, The Political Impact of European Immigration After World War II in Southern Rhodesia. *California* (Los Angeles).

John Richard Sisson, The Party System in Rajasthan: Political Institutionalization in a Traditional Society. *California* (Berkeley).

Maynard J. Toll, Australian Foreign Policy, 1919–1939. *The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.*

Kenneth R. Thompson, Class Change and Party Choice: A Cross-National Study of the Relationship Between Intergenerational Social Mobility and Political Party Preference. *Wisconsin.*

Deletions

Willard M. Berry, The Constitutional System of Afghanistan. *Duke.*

Joseph P. Lia, Britain and European Integration Since Messina. *California* (Berkeley).

Lillian Rivlin, A Study of the Evolution of Neutralism with Particular Attention to Those States Which Claimed Leadership Roles. *California* (Berkeley).

EdithMarianne Schein, The International Commonwealth: Its Forces of Cohesion and Counterpoise. *California* (Berkeley).

INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS, AND ORGANIZATION

Additions

Matthew J. Abrams, The Role of Congress in the Formulation of U.S. Policy Toward Latin America. *Columbia.*

Gordon M. Adams, The African Association to the European Economic Community: Case Study in European Integration. *Columbia.*

Bashir Ahmad, Kashmir in World Politics. *Nebraska.*

David R. Albright, The Soviet Union, Communist China, and Ghana, 1955–1966. *Columbia.*

Arthur Michael Benvenuto, The United Nations Development Program: The Politics of Multi-Lateral Aid. *California* (Berkeley).

Jorge Berguno, Toward a General Theory of Spanish American Interaction. *American.*

Frank William Biglow, The Alliance for Progress, the O.A.S., and the Kennedy Administration: A Decision-Making Study of United States Foreign Policy Objectives in Latin America, 1960–3. *California* (Berkeley).

Robert Bledsoe, Critical Analysis of Theories and Approaches Presented in College Level International Relations Textbooks. *Florida.*

Richard Bohan, Intervention in the Organization of American States: 1959–1967. *Florida.*

Wilson T. Boots, Protestant Christianity in Bolivia: An Historical Interpretation of Three Major Groups. *American.*

H. Eugene Bovis, The Jerusalem Problem. *American.*

James M. Boyd, United Nations Peacekeeping Activities: Pattern and Prospect. *Columbia.*

Ralph L. Brown, The Limited Test Ban Treaty:

An Inquiry Into the Military-Political Context of Its Negotiations and of Its Acceptance. *Georgetown.*

John D. Caldwell, Decision-Making Aspects of the Suez Crisis of 1956. *California* (Berkeley).

Gregory Casey, The Supreme Court: Sectors of Support Among Elite and Mass. *Georgetown.*

Orley B. Caudill, The Economic and Social Council of the OAS. *Maryland.*

Nam-Yearl Chai, Asian Attitudes Toward International Law: A Case Study of Korea. *Pennsylvania.*

Rong Cheng Chen, Chinese Concept of International Relations. *Oklahoma.*

Nazli M. Choucri, Nonalignment in International Politics: An Analysis of Attitudes and Behavior. *Stanford.*

Chin O. Chung, The North Korean Worker's Party in the Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1955–1965. *Nebraska.*

Roger Cobb, The Use of Opinions, Transactions, and Inter-governmental Collaborations as Indicators of Integration. *Northwestern.*

Richard Coe, Youth Mobilization in Transitional Societies of Africa: The National Youth Service Approach. *Syracuse.*

Rhoda N. Copeland, Consensus Formation in Deliberative Bodies at National and International Levels. *Minnesota.*

Frank W. Corley, Jr., Democracy at the International Level: A Theoretical Inquiry. *American.*

Adrian Crutwell-Vaughn, The Development of the Preliminary Objection in the Jurisprudence of the World Court. *Cornell.*

Douglas W. Davis, The Inter-American Defense College. *Maryland.*

William J. Davidshofer, The Role of Transitional Governments in Soviet Foreign Policy: Their National Foundations and International Significance. *Notre Dame.*

Owen de Long, The Origins and Development of Dean Acheson's Conception of Postwar United States Foreign Policy. *Harvard.*

George G. Deverall, Russian-Soviet Images of 'Peaceful Coexistance.' *American.*

Jerome P. Dickhaus, The American Private Foundation and International Cultural Affairs: Foreign Policy Implications. *St. Louis.*

Edward Duane, Legislative Attitudes Toward Foreign Aid: A Case Study of Congress and United States Aid to Latin America Under the Alliance for Progress, the 87th, 88th and 89th Congresses. *Pennsylvania.*

Andrew E. Dzirkalis, The External Environment and Foreign Policy: An Examination of Aspects of German Foreign Policy, 1961–1966. *Columbia.*

James Meikle Eglin, The Soviet-American Air Defense Dialogue, 1946–1956. *Harvard.*

Charles D. Elder, An Empirical Study of Some Conditions of Inter-Nation Collaboration. *Northwestern.*

Ustun Erguder, The Politics of Agricultural Taxation in Turkey, 1950–1965. *Syracuse.*

Richard L. Erickson, Theory and Practice: The Soviet Union and Customary International Law. *Virginia.*

Lawrence S. Finkelstein, The Origins of the United Nations Trusteeship System. *Columbia.*

Edgar J. Fredericks, Egyptian-Soviet Relations From 1955–1965 and Their Effect on Communism in the Middle East and the International Position of the Soviet Union. *American.*

Martin Glassner, Access to the Sea for Underdeveloped Landlocked States. *Claremont.*

Alan W. Goldstein, The Origins, Dynamics, and Prospects of the National War of Liberation in Vietnam: The Diplomatic Factor. *American.*

Branislav Gosovic, Decision-Making in U.N.C.T.A.D. (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). *California* (Berkeley).

Andrew W. Green, The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Communities in the Process of European Political Integration. *Pennsylvania.*

Franklyn Griffiths, The "Two Tendencies" Thesis: A Soviet Analysis of American Policy-Making and its Relevance for Soviet Policies in 1962–1964. *Columbia.*

Ziaul Hasan Hashmi, From the Baghdad Pact to the Central Treaty Organization. *South Carolina.*

Lyman H. Heine, Jr., Latin American Theories of International Law. *Nebraska.*

John R. Hennessey, Partition: An Alternative to Conflict in the Twentieth Century. Four Case Studies. *Georgetown.*

Mehdi Heravi, Relations Between Iran and the U.S. from the Beginning Until the End of World War II. *American.*

P. Terry Hopmann, International Conflict and Cohesion in International Coalitions: The Communist System and NATO During the Postwar Years. *Stanford.*

Lee Stretton Houchins, Naval Aspects of the Chinese Civil War: The First Phase, August 1945–August 1946. *American.*

Arthur H. House, The Phasing-Out of United Nations Civilian Operations in the Congo. *Fletcher.*

Emmanuel Hyde, The United Nations Policy of Non-intervention in the International Affairs of the Congo. *Pennsylvania.*

Clyde Ingle, Center Periphery Relationships: A Tanzanian Case Study. *Syracuse.*

Robert E. Jones, Anti-Colonialism in the United

Nations: A Study of the Origin and Policy of the United Nations Special Committee on Colonialism, 1960–1965. *Notre Dame.*

Walter S. Jones, Jr., American International Lawyers and U. S. Foreign Policy. *Fletcher.*

James R. Jose, An Inter-American Peach Force Within the Framework of the Organization of American States: Advantages, Impediments, and Implications. *American.*

Peter H. Judd, Containment or Appeasement? A Study of British Perspectives on the Growth of American Power. *Columbia.*

Brigitte S. Kelm, The Study of Crises. *State University of New York* (Buffalo).

Kathleen Kenny, Economic Development Planning in Ireland. *Syracuse.*

Kenneth L. Kornher, The Psychological Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: U.S.I.A. 1953–1963. *Georgetown.*

Sylvia Kowitt, The Politics of a Tacit Alliance: France and Israel 1956–1966. *Columbia.*

Arvin M. Kramish, The Coordination of Development Assistance: Problems and Prospects. *American.*

Kiyoko Kurusu, Foreign Policy Making Processes in Japan: Problems of Interest Group Influences and Southeast Asia. *Michigan State.*

Roland J. Lamontagne, The International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia, 1954–64. *Duke.*

Lincoln Landis, Petroleum in Soviet Middle East Strategy. *Georgetown.*

Gare Le Compt, Soviet Central Asia as an Instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy in the Middle East. *American.*

Christopher Leu, The Quest for Consensus in the United States Foreign Aid Policy: A Study of the Roles and Relation of Congress and the Executive with Reference to Aid to Africa, 1957–1964. *California* (Los Angeles).

Kenneth Libbey, The Influence of the Federal System on the Politics of the Socialist Party. *Syracuse.*

Sang un Lim, Electoral Behavior in the Republic of Korea. *Syracuse.*

Andrew Ludanyi, Hungarian Minorities in Rumania and Yugoslavia. *Louisiana State.*

Leon C. Martel, Jr., The Soviet-American Consular Treaty: A Case Study of the American Foreign Policy Process. *Columbia.*

Harry Matthews, Small State Participation in the United Nations General Assembly, 1955–1965. *Claremont.*

Robert M. McChesney, International Law and Mexican Foreign Policy. *Virginia.*

Manus Midlarsky, Status and Consistency and the Onset of International Warfare. *Northwestern.*

Arnold Miller, A Study of Recommendations, Analysis, and Values of Proposals for De-escalation on the Part of the U.S. in Vietnam: A Case Study of Leaders in Pittsburgh. *Pittsburgh.*

Jeffrey S. Milstein, Interaction and Influence: The United States and North Vietnam. *Stanford.*

James H. Molineau, United States Intervention in the Caribbean: A Comparative Analysis. *American.*

Nazir A. Mughal, Manchurian Crisis, 1929–1933: The Great Powers, the League, and the United States. *Southern Illinois.*

Terry W. Nardin, The Use of Threats in Strategic Interaction: An Experimental Study. *Northwestern.*

John Nellis, Tanzanian Development Ideology: An Investigation of the Relation Between Political Thought and Political Behavior. *Syracuse.*

Daniel J. Nelson, The Evolution of the Status of Berlin, 1945–1955: A Study of the Interrelationships of International Law and Diplomacy. *Columbia.*

David Oden, Israeli-Arab Relations in the United Nations, 1948–1965. *Pennsylvania.*

W. B. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The Development of the Principle of Self-Determination in Customary International Law. *Columbia.*

Joseph J. Palisi, The Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unions (CLASC), 1954–1967. *American.*

Richard G. Park, The Control of Nuclear Weapons and Alliance Issues. *Pennsylvania.*

Robert E. Pendley, Negotiations in International Nuclear Energy Organizations. *Northwestern.*

John G. Peters, Yugoslav Foreign Policy as Directed Towards Non-aligned Countries. *American.*

David Powers, Chinese Policy Towards India—1959–1962. *Pittsburgh.*

James A. Rhodes, The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and The Development of a Regional Consciousness in Latin America. *Michigan.*

Zeller Robertson, Soviet/Mexican Relations: Application of Paradigm. *California* (Los Angeles).

Tibor S. Rodin, The Israeli Foreign Assistance Program. *Nebraska.*

Paul Saenz, An Analysis of the Achievements of the Organization of African Unity in Promoting Continental Co-operation. *Arizona.*

David C. Saffell, The Secretary General as Chief Executive of the United Nations. *Minnesota*

Anna P. Schreiber, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. *Columbia.*

Harvey B. Seim, An American Initiative in Nuclear Sharing: The MLF Case. *Maryland.*

L. Ahmed Sheikh, Establishment of a United Na-

•tions Police Force—Its Problems and Prospects. *Oregon.*

Norman L. Simmons, An Analysis of the Opposition to the United States Arms Control Policies. *American.*

Charles J. Stevens, International Law Questions in Commonwealth Conference Discussions, 1887–1937. *Duke.*

Michael Struelens, O.N.U.C. and International Politics. *American.*

John D. Sullivan, Domestic Sources of Alliance Policy: Great Britain in the Nineteenth Century. *Stanford.*

Patricia C. Sympson (Mrs.), The Kashmir Crisis of 1947. *St. John's.*

Harry R. Targ, Political Socialization and the Inter-Nation Simulation. *Northwestern.*

William J. Taylor, The Act of State Doctrine: Its Meeting and Effects in the Contemporary International System. *American.*

Paul A. Tharp, Jr., The Historical Sociology of International Law. *Wisconsin.*

Robert S. Thompson, An Analysis of War: A Pre-Theoretical Analysis. *Illinois.*

Tang thi thanh Trai (Mrs.), United States Foreign Policy in Vietnam. *Chicago.*

F. F. Umar, The International Behavior of Developing Nations: An Analysis of U.N. Voting on Key Issues by Selected Nations Progressing through Economic Stages. *Southern Illinois.*

Melvin W. Wachs, The Forge of Power: American International Science Policy and Administration. *American.*

Andrew B. Wardlaw. Accomplishments and Problems of the Central American Common Market. *American.*

Robert J. Weber, United States Non-Governmental Organizations in the Political Action Field: Their Programs Since World War II to Increase the Sources, Scope and/or Institutions of Public International Law. *American.*

Martin E. Weinstein, Defense Policy in Post-War Japan. *Columbia.*

Steve Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo (1960–present). *Chicago.*

Roger Whitcomb, The American Approach to Alliances: A Study of Pragmatic Disorders. *American.*

Melford Wilson, Criticism and the Policymakers Reaction: United States Foreign Policy on Vietnam 1961–1966. *American.*

Gilbert Winham, The Marshall Plan: An Analysis of Foreign Aid Decision-Making. *North Carolina.*

John B. Wolf, The Eisenhower Doctrine in Action (Lebanon 1958). *American.*

Carolyn Zinn, The Role of Paul Henri Spaak in the Political-Economic Integration of Europe. *West Virginia.*

INTERNATIONAL LAW, POLITICS AND ORGANIZATION

Changes

William R. Gilmore, A Case Study of Spanish-American Power Relations, 1946, 1953, 1963. *Pittsburgh.*

John S. Gordon, Britain's Parties and the Integration of Western Europe. *Duke.*

Sanford Jarashaw, The United States and Germany's Persecution of Jews, 1933–1941: A Study Impact Group Upon United States Policy. *Columbia.*

Robert H. Manley, Guyana and the International System. *SUNY* (Albany).

John J. Weltman, Two Periods of Naval Technology: Parallelisms and Dissimilarities. *Johns Hopkins.*

Deletions

Edward Gonzales, Soviet Strategy and the Cuban Revolution: 1959–1963. *California* (Los Angeles).

Barbara B. Moll, French Motivations in French-Israeli Relations. *Pittsburgh.*

II. DISSERTATIONS COMPLETED SINCE THE LAST LISTING

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

Chee Soon Ahn; B.L., Seoul National, 1962; M.S., Florida State, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. A Comparative Study of the Political Ideas of Two Contemporary Theologians: Reinhold Niebuhr and Jacques Maritain. *Florida State.*

Claude Ake; B.S., University College, Ibadan, 1962; M.A., Columbia, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Toward a Theory of Political Integration. *Columbia.*

Richard Ashcraft; B.A., Harvard, 1960; M.A., California (Berkeley); Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Politics of Silence: Notes for the Restoration of a Dialogue. *California* (Berkeley).

George H. Beggs; B.A., Emory, 1959; M.A., Stetson, 1962; Ph.D., Arizona, 1966. The Fairhope Single Tax Corporation: An Analysis of the Efforts by a Single Tax Colony to Apply the Idea of Henry George. *Arizona.*

Maria M. Brau; B.A., College of the Sacred Heart, 1952; M.A., Fordham, 1954; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1967. The Concept of Academic Freedom in Sidney Hook. *Georgetown.*

Charles Butterworth; B.A., Michigan State, 1959; M.A., Chicago, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Reason and Rhetoric: A Study of Averroes' Commentary on Aristotle's Rhetoric. *Chicago.*

Jacob H. Carruthers; B.A., Houston-Tillotson College, 1950; M.A., Texas Southern, 1958; Ph.D., Colorado, 1966. The Theory of Nonviolent Civil Disobedience. *Colorado.*

Maurice G. Chenoweth; B.A.; Earlham, 1954; M.A., Minnesota, 1958; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. The Politics of Four Types of Christian Chiliasts. *Minnesota.*

Ronald S. Christenson; B.A., Wisconsin (Eau Claire), 1959; M.A., Minnesota, 1961; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. The Tension Between Freedom of Conscience and Civic Religion with Special Reference to American Political Thought. *Minnesota.*

Anne Meyers Cohler; B.A., Chicago, 1962; Ph.D. Harvard, 1967. Rousseau and Nationalism. *Harvard.*

Peter N. Crossland; B.A., Miami (Ohio), 1959; M.A., Miami (Ohio), 1962; B.D., Yale, 1963; Ph.D., Duke, 1966. A Critical Analysis and Reformulation of the Democratic Theory of Voting and Elections Contained in Several Contemporary Voting Studies. *Duke.*

Patricia B. Edmondson; B.A., Midwestern, 1963; M.A., Duke, 1965; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Sartrean Freedom: A Changing Perspective, *Duke.*

Garland W. Fothergill; B.A., Texas, 1936; M.A., Wisconsin, 1948; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1966. Stalinist Communism and Fascism: A Study in the Ambivalances of *New Republic* Liberalism. *Minnesota.*

Robert Booth Fowler; B.A., Haverford, 1962; M.A., Harvard, 1966; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Sage of Chelsea: Thomas Carlyle as a Representative Nineteenth Century Political and Social Thinker, *Harvard.*

Rodney G. Grubb; B.A., Concordia College (Moorehead), 1953; B.Th., Luther Theological Seminary, 1957, M.A., Minnesota, 1957; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Theory of Political Obligation in the New Testament: A Study of the Views of Five Recent Protestant Theologions. *Minnesota.*

George Haggar; B.A. Assumption University of Windsor, 1960; M.A., Fordham, 1963; Ph.D., Columbia, 1966. The Political and Social Thought of G.D.H. Cole. *Columbia.*

Robert A. Heineman; B.A., Bradley, 1961; M.A., American, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Approaches to a Science of Politics and the Problem of Social Control: A Critique of Selected American Thinkers. *American.*

Joseph H. Hennessy; B.A., LaSalle, 1959; M.A., Notre Dame, 1961; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Political Philosophy of Maurice Barres: A Critical Analysis. *Notre Dame.*

Suzanne Duvall Jacobitti; B.A., Swarthmore, 1962; M.S., Wisconsin, 1964, Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Political Theory and Comparative Politics: A Critique of the Political Theory of the Committee on Comparative Politics. *Wisconsin.*

George Armstrong Kelly; B.A., Harvard, 1953; M.A., Stanford, 1954; Ph.D., Harvard, 1967. Toward Hegel: Idealist Political Philosophy and the Historical Consciousness 1750–1830. *Harvard.*

Peter F. Krogh; B.A., Harvard, 1958; M.A., Fletcher School, 1961; M.A.L.D., *Ibid.*, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Summer Welles and United States Relations with Cuba; 1933. *Fletcher.*

John J. Logue; B.A., Yale University, 1946; M.A., Pennsylvania, 1948; Ph.D., Chicago, 1966. Political Philosophy of Edward Hallett Carr. *Chicago.*

John Anthony Long; B.A., Montana, 1961; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1962; Ph.D., Missouri, 1967. English Pluralist Theory Reconsidered: An Analysis and the Development of a Normative Model. *University of Missouri* (*Columbia*).

Frank N. Marini; B.A., Arizona State, 1960; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1966. The Impact of Certain Empirical Findings upon Democratic Theory and the Special Function of Theory of Democratic Government. *California* (*Berkeley*).

Kent McCallum; B.A., Omaha, 1962; Ph.D., Claremont, 1967. Authority and Legitimacy in Anthropological Conceptions of the Political System. *Claremont.*

Andrew Stuart McFarland; B.A., Oberlin, 1962; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Power and Pluralism. *California* (*Berkeley*).

George N. McKenna; B.A., Chicago, 1959; M.A., Massachusetts, 1962; Ph.D., Fordham, 1967. A Critic of Modernity: The Political Thought of Hannah Arendt. *Fordham.*

Robert J. McShea; B.A., Queens, 1948; Ph.D., Columbia, 1966. The Political Philosophy of Spinoza. *Columbia.*

Wilson Carey McWilliams; B.A., California (Berkeley), 1955; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Idea of Fraternity in American Politics. *California* (*Berkeley*).

James S. Nyman; B.A., British Columbia, 1956; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1958; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Edmund Burke's Esthetic and his Political Role. *California* (*Berkeley*).

Hihun Pak; B.A., Gustavus Adolphus, 1957; M.A., Minnesota, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. Relativism in Contemporary Political Theory: Kelsen, Popper, Weldon, Brecht. *Minnesota.*

Douglas W. Rae; B.A., Indiana, 1962; M.S., Wisconsin, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Electoral Law

and Party System: An Analysis of General Elections in Twenty Western Democracies. *Wisconsin.*

Ira S. Rohter; B.S., Illinois Institute of Technology, 1960; M.A., Michigan State, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Radical Rightists: An Empirical Study. *Michigan State.*

Rozann Cole Rothman; B.A., Temple, 1956; M.A. Louisiana State, 1958; Ph.D., Illinois, 1967. Acts and Enactments: The Constitutional Convention of 1787. *Illinois.*

Sister John Francis Ryan; B.A., College of St. Rose, 1949; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1956; Ph.D., Notre Dame, 1966. The Political Thought of Pius XII. *Notre Dame.*

Norman Samuels; B.A., McGill, 1958; M.A., Duke, 1962; Ph.D., Duke, 1967. German History and the Rise of Hilter: Gerhard Ritter's Conservative Analysis. *Duke.*

Lyman T. Sargent; B.A., Macalester College, 1961; M.A., Minnesota, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. The Relationship Between Political Philosophy and Political Ideology: A Study of Etienne Cabet and His Communitarian Experiments. *Minnesota.*

Gordon J. Schochet; B.A., John Hopkins, 1958; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1966. The Patriarchal Content of Stuart Political Thought: The Relation Between the Family and Political Obligation in Seventeenth Century England. *Minnesota.*

Michael J. Shapiro; B.A., Tufts, 1962; M.A., Hawaii, 1963; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1966. The House and the Federal Role: A Computer Simulation of Roll Call Voting, 1966. *Northwestern.*

Taketsugu Tsurutani; B.A.; Lawrence College, 1958; M.A., Wisconsin, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Tension, Consensus, and Political Leadership: A New Look into the Nature and Process of Modernization. *Wisconsin.*

Mark Warden; B.A., Capital, 1960; M.A., Chicago, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Political Thought of Juan Donoso Cortes. *Chicago.*

Michael A. Weinstein; B.A., N.Y.U., 1964; M.A., Western Reserve, 1965; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Santayana on Liberty, Interest, and Representation. *Western Reserve.*

Paul Zehner; B.A., Valparaiso, 1949; M.A., Northwestern, 1955; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Some Religious Beliefs and Political Behaviors of Chicago Clergymen from Nine Denominations. *Northwestern.*

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS DEPENDENCIES

Irving Berg; B.A., Massachusetts, 1950; M.A., Boston, 1951; Ph.D., Florida, 1965. Raymond Robins and the Progressive Party, 1912–1916. *Florida.*

Agnes Thorton Bird; B.S., Texas State College for Women, 1943; M.A., Tennessee, 1959; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Resources Used in Senatorial Primary Campaigns: 1948–1964. *Tennessee.*

Joseph George Chall; B.S., Long Island, 1943; M.A., Columbia, 1949; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Constituency, Party and Ideology in the House of Representatives: a study of coalition behavior on school aid in the 84th Congress. *Columbia.*

Cleo Cherryholmes; B.A., Yale, 1960; M.S., Kansas State Teachers College, 1963; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1966. The House of Representatives and Foreign Affairs: A Computer Simulation of Roll Call Voting. *Northwestern.*

William E. Coyle; B.A., Emory, 1943; M.A., Georgetown, 1953; Ph.D., Florida State, 1966. The Ninth Amendment and the Right of Privacy. *Florida State.*

Lee Armistead Denson, Jr.,; S.B., U.S. Military Academy, 1956; MPA, Harvard, 1962; Ph.D. *Ibid.*, 1967. John Foster Dulles: The Master Planner as Statesman. *Harvard.*

David F. Dickson; B.A., Princeton, 1954; LL.B., Yale, 1959; M.S., Florida State, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Florida Law in the Federal Courts: One State's Experience in the National Judicial System, 1940–1965. *Florida State.*

David A. Frier; B.A., Southern Illinois, 1954; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1957; Ph.D., *ibid.*, 1966. Conflict of Interest in the Eisenhower Administration. *Southern Illinois.*

Jackson A. Giddens; B.A., Allegheny, 1958; M. A., Fletcher School, 1959; M.A.L.D., *Ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. American Foreign Propaganda in World War I. *Fletcher.*

Donald Roots Hall; B.A., Chicago, 1958; M.A., Colorado, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Cooperative and Intergroup Lobbying by Certain National Interest Groups. *Colorado.*

B. Douglas Harman; B.A., Nebraska Wesleyan, 1962; M.A., American, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The National Capital Planning Commission and the Land Use Planning Problem. *American.*

Louis D. Hayes; B.A., Colorado, 1962; M.A., Arizona, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Policy-Making and Problem Perception: The 1965 Foreign Assistance Act. *Arizona.*

Peter J. Henriot, S. J.; B.A., St. Louis, 1962; M. A., *Ibid.*, 1963; Ph.D., Chicago, 1967. One Man-One Vote, One Vote-One Value: The Numerical Theory of Representation. *Chicago.*

Claude Herbert Heyer; B.B.A., Oklahoma, 1957; M.B.A., *Ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. American Indian Self-Sufficiency: A Study in Human

and National Resource Development Policy. *Oklahoma.*

Enid Hill (Mrs.); B.A., George Washington, 1954; M.A., Chicago, 1961; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Montesquieu and the Need of Relativistic Political Science to Admit Values. *Chicago.*

Joseph C. Honan, Jr.,; B.A., USC, 1950; M.A., Missouri, 1957; Ph.D., Missouri (Columbia), 1966. The National Farmers' Organization: A Study of Agricultural Protest. *Missouri* (Columbia).

Dennis S. Ippolito; B.A., Adelphi, 1964; M.A., Virginia, 1965; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Political Perspectives and Party Leadership: A Case Study of Nassau County, N.Y. *Virginia.*

Charles C. Jones; B.A., Marshall, 1949; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1950; Ph.D., West Virginia, 1967. The Peace Corps: An Analysis of the Development, Problems, Preliminary Evaluation and Future. *West Virginia.*

Endsley Terrence Jones; B.S., St. Louis, 1963; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1967. The House of Representatives of Keynesian Economics, 1945–1964. *Georgetown.*

Virginia M. Kemp; B.A., West Virginia, 1957; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1959; Ph.D., Pittsburgh, 1966. Congress and China, 1945–1959. *Pittsburgh.*

Byron Gilbert Lander; B.S., Missouri, 1958; LL.B, *Ibid.*, 1960; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Emergence of Poverty as a Political Issue in 1964. *Missouri* (Columbia).

Thomas C. Laughlin; B.A.E., Florida. 1954; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1956; Ph.D., Florida State, 1966. The Right to Bail: A Reappraisal. *Florida State.*

William A. Lucas, II; B.S., North Carolina State, 1963; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1967. The Military Mind, Self-Selection and Self-Image. *North Carolina.*

Bhanwar L. Maheswari; B.S., Agra, 1956; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1958; M.A., Rajasthan, 1960; Ph.D., Pennsylvania, 1966. Foreign Aid and the Policy Process—A Study of the Struggle Over Foreign Aid in Congress, 1961–1965. *Pennsylvania.*

John F. Manley; B.S., LeMoyne, 1961; M.A., Syracuse, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The House Committee on Ways and Means: 1947–1966. *Syracuse.*

Kevin McKeough; B.A., Loyola (Chicago), 1960; M.A., St. Louis, 1961; Ph.D., Kansas, 1967. Suburban Voting Behavior in the 1960 Presidential Election: The Case of Cook County Illinois. *Kansas.*

David S. Myers; B.S., West Chester State College, 1959; M.A., Lehigh, 1961; Ph.D., Maryland, 1967. Foreign Affairs and the Presidential Election of 1964. *Maryland.*

Roald Mykkeltvedt; B.A., St. Olaf College, 1951; M.A., Florida State, 1955; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Nationalization of the Bill of Rights: Impact on the Administration of Criminal Law in Florida. *Florida State.*

Edwin E. Olson; B.A., St. Olaf College, 1959; M.A., American, 1961; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Federal Public Service Orientation of U.S. Congressmen. *American.*

Robert L. Piper; B.A., Transylvania, 1954; M.A. Syracuse, 1959; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. Candidates for the Presidential Nomination, A Role Analysis. *Syracuse*

Victor Profughi; B.S., Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 1959; M.A., Pittsburgh 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Party Platforms and Performances: 1900–1964. *Pittsburgh.*

Edward Renwick; B.A., Georgetown, 1960; M.A. Arizona, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Long's Legislative Lieutenants. *Arizona.*

Robert L. Ross; B.A., Iowa State Teachers College, 1950; M.A., Columbia, 1958; Ph.D, Michigan State, 1967. Dimensions and Patterns of Relations Among Interest Groups at the Congressional Level of Government. *Michigan State.*

Orville H. Schmidt; B.A., Minnesota, 1956; M.A., George Washington, 1962; Ph.D., West Virginia, 1967. An Examination of Certain Regulatory Problems Arising Out of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. *West Virginia.*

Robert Schoenberger; B.A., CCNY, 1955; Ph.D., Rochester, 1967. Conservatives and Conservatism: A Study of the Attitudes and Characteristics of Conservative and Republican Party Members. *Rochester.*

Stephen B. Slingsby; B.S., Loyola (Los Angeles), 1960; M.A., Claremont, 1965, Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Gerrymander: Its Rise, Use and Future Development. *Claremont.*

Bobbie Braly Smetherman; B.A., Trinity, 1957; M.A., Claremont, 1961; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. U.S. Military Aid to Cuba. *Claremont.*

Robert Smetherman; B.A., Claremont, 1954; M.A., Los Angeles State College, 1960; Ph.D., Claremont, 1967. U.S. Aid to Latin America, 1956–1960. *Claremont.*

William C. Spragens; B.A., Kentucky, 1947; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1953; Ph.D., Michigan State, 1966. Press Coverage of Congressional Campaigns: A Content Analysis of the 1960 Campaign in Michigan and Tennessee. *Michigan State.*

Jimmie W. Stevens; B.A., Florida State, 1962; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Community Influentials: A Comparative Study of Two Florida Counties. *Florida State.*

Ronald J. Stupak; B.A., Moravian College, 1961; M.A., Ohio State, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Dean Acheson: The Secretary of State as a Policy-Maker. *Ohio State.*

Bernard Weiner; B.A., Miami, 1962; M.A., Claremont, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Truman Doctrine: Background, Evolution, Implications. *Claremont.*

Dean L. Yarwood; B.A., State University of Iowa, 1957; M.A., Cornell, 1961; Ph.D., Illinois, 1966. Congress in Crisis: A Systems Analysis of the Senate During the Decade Prior to the Civil War. *Illinois.*

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN THE U.S.

Dean Alfange, Jr.,; B.A., Hamilton College, 1950; M.A., Colorado, 1959; Ph.D., Cornell, 1967. The Role of the Supreme Court in the Protection of Freedom of Expression in the United States. *Cornell.*

A. Stephen Boyan, Jr.: B.A., Brown, 1959; M.A., Tufts, 1961, Ph.D., Chicago, 1966. The Expanding Judicial View of the Free Exercise of the Religion Clause. *Chicago.*

Ivan Brychta; JUDR., Masaryk, 1946; M.A., Oberlin, 1951; Ph.D., Ohio State, 1966. The General Welfare Clause. *Ohio State.*

James D. Carroll; B.A., Cornell, 1956; LL.B., *Ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., Syracuse, 1967. Federal Policies for the Funding of University Research. *Syracuse.*

Penelope B. Case; B.A., Rockford College, 1962; Ph.D., Virginia, 1967. A Constitutional Dilemma: Censorship of the Obscene. *Virginia.*

Martin Edelman; B.A., C.C.N.Y., 1959; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Democratic Theories and the Constitution: Varieties of the Competition Theory. *California* (Berkeley).

Paul Eidelberg; M.A., Chicago, 1957; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Political Philosophy of the American Constitution: A Re-Interpretation of the Intention of the Founding Fathers. *Chicago.*

Donald E. Fouts; B.A., Chicago, 1959; M.A., Minnesota, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Canadian Supreme Court 1950–1960: A Study of Judicial Policy-Making. *Minnesota.*

Robert Gerstein; B.A, UCLA, 1961; LL.B, Harvard Law School, 1964; Ph.D., UCLA, 1967. Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: A Legislative Problem in the Adjudicatory Context. *California* (Los Angles).

Kathryn Griffith (*Mrs.*); B.A., Wichita, 1947; M.P.A., Syracuse, 1954; Ph.D., Chicago, 1967. Judge Learned Hand: An Examination of His Philosophy and Its Implications for the American Judiciary. *Chicago.*

Mary Karlynn Hinman; B.A., Utah, 1961; M.A., Harvard, 1967; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Lost Clause: An Analysis of the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States. *Harvard.*

Douglas Stillman Hobbs; B.A., Harvard, 1955; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Reapportionment in Retrospect: An Evaulation of the Judicial Quest for Standards, 1962–1964. *Harvard.*

Dorothy Buckton James; B.A., Barnard, 1959; M.A., Columbia, 1961; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Judicial Philosophy and Accession to the Court: the Cases of Justices Jackson and Douglas. *Columbia.*

Ellis Katz; B.A., Rutgers, 1960; M.A., Columbia, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Supreme Court in the Web of Government: the ACLU, the Supreme Court and the Bible. *Columbia.*

Brother Adrian E. Leonard; B.A., LaSalle College, 1952; M.A., Norte Dame, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Mr. Justice Roberts and the Constitutional Revolution of 1937. *Notre Dame.*

Eugene W. Linse, Jr.; B.A., Concordia Seminary, 1944; M.A., Northwestern, 1950; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1965. Due Process in Practice: A Study of Police Procedures in Minneapolis. *Minnesota.*

Justice S. Mann; B.A., Tulane, 1940; M.A., Alabama, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Political and Constitutional Thought of John Archibald Campbell. *Alabama.*

Richard E. Campbell; B.A., Bowdoin, 1959; M.A., Columbia, 1961; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Backs to the Wall: A Study in the Contemporary Politics of Church and State. *Columbia.*

Richard I. Nunez; B.A., C.C.N.Y. (Brooklyn), 1952; LL.B., St. John's University School of Law, 1957; M.P.A., Syracuse, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Proposed Reforms of New York State's Administrative Procedures: A Critical Analysis and Evaluation. *Syracuse.*

Luther W. Odom; B.A., North Texas State, 1953; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1956; Ph.D., Texas, 1966. Justice Holmes, the Fourteenth Amendment and the Reasonable Man Standard. *Texas.*

Robert L. Rabin; B.S., Northwestern, 1960; J.D., Northwestern Law School, 1963; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1967. Constitution, Court and Community: The Problem of Racial Stability in the Northern Urban School. *Northwestern.*

Richard J. Richardson, B.S., Harding College, 1957; M.A., Tulane, 1961; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. A Study of the Judicial Process in Three United States Courts of Appeals, 1956–1961. *Tulane.*

Isabel Robbins Rosenberg; B.A,. Wellesley College, 1963; Ph.D., Harvard, 1967. The Warren Court, 1954–64: The Right Wing Reaction. *Harvard.*

Michael D. Shmidman; B.A., Brooklyn, 1954; Ph.D., Columbia, 1967. Definitions of Religion,

Religious Officials and Religious Activities in the Last Two Decades. *Columbia.*

Elmer W. Williams; B.A., Wisconsin, 1948; M.A., Colgate, 1950; Ph.D., Missouri, 1967. The Advisory Opinion in American Courts. *Missouri* (Columbia).

Richard M. Yearwood; B.A., Tennessee, 1959; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., Florida, 1966. The Law and Administration of Subdivision Regulation: A Study in Land Use Control. *Florida.*

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

John A. Bailey; B.S., College of Texas, 1939; MGA, Pennsylvania, 1949; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Development of Regional Transportation Policies—An Analysis of the Political Process with Emphasis on Decisions. *Pennsylvania.*

Jack E. Bizzell; B.A., Southern Illinois, 1957; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1958: Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Automating the Court House: A Limited Study of County Governments to Establish Criteria Relative to the Justification, Procurement, Installation and Operations of Electronic Data Processing Equipment. *Southern Illinois.*

Arnold J. Bornfriend; B.A., CCNY, 1956; Ph.D., Columbia, 1967. The Business Group in Metropolis: The Commerce and Industry Association of New York. *Columbia.*

B. Dean Bowles; B.A., Yale, 1955; M.A., Claremont Graduate School, 1959; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Educational Pressure Groups and the Legislative Process in California, 1945–1966. *Claremont.*

Irvin Bromall; B.A, Pennsylvania State, 1962; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1963; Ph.D., Wisconsin 1967. Wisconsin Lawyers in Politics: An Exploratory Study. *Wisconsin.*

Margaret Law Callcott; B.A., North Carolina, 1950; M.A., Emory, 1954; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1967. The Negro in Maryland Politics, 1870–1912. *North Carolina.*

Ernest A. Chaples; B.A., Massachusetts, 1961; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1965; Ph.D., Kentucky, 1967. The Voting Behavior of United States Senators for Four Selected Issues, 1953–1964. *Kentucky.*

Yong Hyo Cho; B.A., Seoul National, 1960; M.P.A., Syracuse, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. State-Local Governmental Systems: Their Determinants and Fiscal Implications. *Syracuse.*

Charles Francis Cnudde; B.A., Michigan, 1960; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1967. Consensus, "Rules of the Game" and Democratic Politics: The Case of Race Politics in the South. *North Carolina.*

Richard Connors; B.S., Seton Hall College, 1950; Ph.D., Columbia, 1966. The Local Political Career of Mayor Frank Hague. *Columbia.*

Edmond G. Costantini; B.A., NYU, 1954; M.A., Connecticut, 1956; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1966. A Study of Inter-Level Differences Among Political Party Leaders, with Particular Reference to California Democratic Party. *California* (Berkeley).

Richard R. Dohm; B.A., Minnesota, 1952; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. Politics and Pollution: Defeat of the 1961 Proposal for a Metropolitan Sanitary District in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Area. *Minnesota.*

Bryan T. Downes; B.S., Oregon, 1962; M.S., *Ibid.*, 1963; Ph.D., Washington, St. Louis, 1966. Suburban Differentiation and Municipal Policy Choices: A Comparative Analysis of Suburban Political Systems. *Washington,* St. Louis.

Reginald John Eyre; B.A., Utah, 1955; M.A., New Mexico, 1957; Ph.D., Colorado, 1966. The Colorado Preprimary Convention System of Nomination. *Colorado.*

William V. Ford; B.A., Richmond, 1951; M.A., American, 1958; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. A Community Decides: Policy Making in Arlington County, Virginia. *American.*

Millard L. Gieske; B.A., Hamline, 1953; M.A., Minnesota, 1957; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. The Politics of Knute Nelson, 1912–1920. *Minnesota.*

Brett W. Hawkins; B.A., Rochester, 1959; M.A., Vanderbilt, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1964. Sources of Opposition and Support for Metropolitan Reorganization: The Nashville Experience. *Joint University Libraries.*

Victor Stewart Hjelm; B.S., U.S. Naval Academy, 1961; Ph.D., Colorado, 1967. The Colorado State Legislator: Tenure and Turnover. *Colorado.*

Judson L. James; B.S., MIT, 1959; Ph.D., Columbia, 1966. The Loaves and Fishes: New York State Gubernatorial Patronage: 1955–1958. *Columbia.*

Edward Keynes; B.A., Queens, 1962; M.A., Wisconsin, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Dirksen Amendment: A Study of Legislative Strategy, Tactics and Public Policy. *Wisconsin.*

George G. Kundahl, Jr.; B.A., Davidson, 1962; M.A., Alabama, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Organized Labor in Alabama State Politics. *Alabama.*

David W. Friedrichs; P.D., Concordia Seminary, 1952; M.A., Auburn, 1959; Ph.D., Tulane, 1967. The Role of the Negro Minister in New Orleans Politics. *Tulane.*

William W. Lammers; B.A., Minnesota, 1959; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Politics of Economic Decline in Northeastern Minnesota. *Minnesota.*

Eleanor Catherine Main; B.A., Hunter, 1963; Ph.D., North Carolina, 1967. The Impact of

*Urbanization: A Comparative Study of Urban and Non-urban Political Attitudes and Behavior. *North Carolina.*

Robert E. McArthur; B.A., Millsaps, 1960; M.A., Vanderbilt, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Impact of Metropolitan Government on the Rural-Urban Fringe: The Nashville-Davidson County Experience. *Joint University Libraries.*

Ellis Bernard Perlman; B.A., UCLA, 1957; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1958; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Public Perspectives on Public Services. *California* (Los Angeles).

Paul Peterson; B.A., Concordia, 1962; M.A., Chicago, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Implementation of the Poverty Program in Three American Cities. *Chicago.*

Joseph Paul Pisciotte; B.A., Hawaii, 1963; Ph.D., Colorado, 1967. The Colorado State Legislator: Entry into the Legislative Process. *Colorado.*

Reuben J. Snow; B.A., Utah, 1962; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1964; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1966. Local Experts: Their Roles as Conflict Managers in Municipal and Educational Government. *Northwestern.*

Elwin Nelson Swinerton; B.A., Massachusets, 1960; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1964; Ph.D., Kentucky, 1967. Explorations in Administrative-Political Role Relations: A Comparative Study of American State Executives. *Kentucky.*

Augustus B. Turnbull, III; B.A., Georgia, 1962; Ph.D., Virginia, 1967. Politics in the Budgetary Process: The Case of Georgia. *Virginia.*

Donald S. Vaughan; B.A., Vanderbilt, 1943; M.A., Alabama, 1947; Ph.D., Columbia, 1967. Administrative Responsibility in Alabama. *Columbia.*

Meredith W. Watts, Jr.; B.A., Lawrence, 1962; M.A., Northwestern, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Legislative Response to Social and Economic Change. *Northwestern.*

Louis Weschler; B.S., Long Beach State College, 1958; M.A., UCLA, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Orange County Pump Tax System: A Case Study in Ground Water Basin Management. *California* (Los Angeles).

Stuart K. Witt; B.A., Columbia, 1961; M.A., Syracuse, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Legislative-Local Party Linkage in New York State. *Syracuse.*

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Mohamed A. Abdel Hamid; B.A., Cairo, 1941; M.B.A., Columbia, 1959; Ph.D., American, 1967. Consultation for Better Public Management with Special Reference to the Governments of the United States of America and the United Arab Republic. *American.*

Nathaniel H. Barish; B.A., California (Los Angeles), 1938; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1940; Columbia, 1948; Ph.D., American, 1967. A Study of the Priority System for Reviewing Public Health Service Research Proposals. *American.*

Harriet Berger; B.A., Wellesley College, 1938; M.A., Pennsylvania, 1958; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Exclusive Recognition in the Public Service: Federal Agencies in Philadelphia and the City of Philadelphia. *Pennsylvania.*

Richard Lee Bowen; B.A., Augustana, 1957; Ph.D., Harvard, 1967. The Personnel System of the United States Foreign Service Design and Practice. *Harvard.*

Richard L. Chapman; B.S., South Dakota State, 1954; M.P.A., Syracuse, 1958; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. A Case Study of the U.S. Weather Satellite Program: Is there Politics in Public Scientific Programs: *Syracuse.*

Suk Choon Cho; B.A., Chungang (Korea), 1955; M.A., Minnesota, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. Administrative Decentralization in the Government of the Republic of Korea. *Minnesota.*

Robert B. Dove; B.A., Ohio State, 1960; M.A., Duke, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Government and Civil Rights: An Administrative Perspective. *Ohio State.*

Richard J. Hayes; B.S., MIT, 1954; M.S., *Ibid.*, 1958; M.B.A., George Washington, 1964; Ph.D., American, 1967. A Study of the Transfer of Technology from R&D to Commercial Operations in Selected Electronic Companies. *American.*

Charles A. Huebner; B.M.E., Detroit, 1958; M. S., MIT, 1960; Ph.D., American, 1967. The Transfer of Technical Requirements from Advanced Systems Planners to Managers of Applied Research (With Special Emphasis on a Model for the Study of the Transfer in N.A.S.A.) *American.*

Loren A. Helberg; B.A., Cornell, 1939; M.A., Minnesota, 1949; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. A Method of Analyzing the Budgetary Process Based on A Study of a Small State Agency. *Minnesota.*

Pyung Kun Kang; B.A., Seoul National (Korea), 1950; M.A., Minnesota, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Role of Local Government in Community Development in Korea. *Minnesota.*

Zillur Khan; B.A., Dacca (India), 1957; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1958; M.A., Claremont, 1965, Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. An Evaluation of the Concept of Mobility in Comparative Administration with Special Emphasis on American and Indo-Pak Administrative Systems. *Claremont.*

Robert Dale Miewald; B.A., Oregon, 1960; Ph.D., Colorado, 1966. The Stability of Military Managerial Doctrine: The United States Army, 1866–1941. *Colorado.*

Basil J. F. Mott; B.A., Amherst, 1949; M.P.A., Harvard, 1953; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. How a Coordinating Council Operates. *Harvard.*

Dale W. Olsen; B.A., Minnesota (Duluth), 1954;

M.A., *Ibid.*, 1955; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, The Minnesota Department of Business Development: An Administrative History. *Minnesota.*

Jack Posner; B.S., Queens, 1941; M.E.A., George Washington, 1960; Ph.D., American, 1967. Implementation of the Communications Satellite Act of 1962. *American.*

Joseph Rajbansee; B.A., Minnesota, 1963; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1964; Ph.D., American, 1967. The Transferability of the U.S. Federal Incentive Award System to the Public Service of Trinidad and Tobago. *American.*

Robert L. Rosholt; B.A., Luther, 1951; M.A., Minnesota, 1952; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. Organizing the United States Civilian Space Effort: A Study of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration with Special Emphasis on Structural Change and Program Coordination. *Minnesota.*

John A. Rotstan; B.A., Whittier, 1957; M. Ed., *Ibid.*, 1961; M.A., Claremont Graduate School, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. An Inquiry into the Political Order Underlying the Independent Regulatory Commissions: A Case Study of the Federal Power Commission. *Claremont.*

John William Seigle; B.S., U.S. Military Academy, 1953; Ph.D., Harvard, 1967. Military Advice on Force Structure: The American Experience, 1900–1940. *Harvard.*

John A. Straayer; B.S., Western Michigan, 1963; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1964; Ph.D., Arizona, 1967. The Politics of Water Resource Management in the Tucson, Arizona S.M.S.A. *Arizona.*

Octavio J. Tocchio; B.A., Suffolk, 1953; M.A., American, 1955; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Legislation and Law Enforcement in California for the Protection of the Physically Battered Child. *American.*

Marvin M. Wofsey; B.S., NYU, 1935; M.A., American, 1940; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Management of Automatic Data Processing Systems. *American.*

Arthur V. Wolfe; B.A., Columbia, 1946; M.A., Wisconsin, 1947; Ph.D., Chicago, 1966. American Civil Service Examinations. *Chicago.*

FOREIGN AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS

Benedict R. O'G. Anderson; B.A., Cambridge, 1957; Ph.D., Cornell, 1967. The Origins of the Indonesian Revolution, 1944–1946. *Cornell.*

Mohammed Ayoob; B.A., Ravenshaw College, Cuttack, 1961; M.A., Muslim, 1963; Ph.D., Hawaii, 1966. Pakistan's Alliance With the United States, 1954–1965: A Study in Loads, Capabilities and Responsiveness. *Hawaii.*

Ross K. Baker; B.A., Pennsylvania, 1960; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Military Intervention and Status Deprivation in Post-War Latin America. *Pennsylvania.*

Benjamin Reynolds Barber; B.A., Grinnel, 1966; Ph.D., Harvard, 1967. Freedom in Graubuenden: A Study of the Origin, Development and Contemporary Significance of Political Freedom in a Swiss Mountain Canton. *Harvard.*

Lucy Creevey Behrman; M.A., Boston, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Political Influence of Muslim Brotherhoods in Senegal. *Boston.*

Suzanne Doris Berger; B.A., Chicago, 1960; Ph.D., Harvard, 1967. Peasants Against Politics: Rural Organization in Finistere. *Harvard.*

Seweryn Bialer; M.A., Institute for Social Sciences, Warsaw, Poland, 1952; Ph.D., Columbia, 1966. Soviet Political Elite: Concept, Sample, Case Study. *Columbia.*

Henry S. Bienen; B.A., Cornell, 1960; M.A., Chicago, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Party, the State and Economic Development in Tanganyika. *Chicago*

Donald Laurence Blackmer; B.A., Harvard, 1952; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1956; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Italian Communism and the International Communist Movement, 1956–1964. *Harvard.*

Richard A. Blue; B.A., Portland State, 1962; Ph.D., Claremont, 1967. Foreign Assistance to India: The Development of India's Public Sector Steel Industry. *Claremont.*

Kenneth Adlam Bode; B.A., South Dakota, 1961; M.A., North Carolina, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Latin American Diplomats in Washinging, D. C.: Backgrounds and Attitudes. *North Carolina.*

Wilson B. Brown; B.A., Brown, 1961; M.A., Fletcher School, 1962; M.A.L.D., *Ibid.*, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Government Measures Affecting Exports in Peru, 1945–1962: A Study in Policy and Its Making. *The Fletcher School.*

James D. L. Byrnes; B.A., St. Ambrose College, 1953; M.A., CCNY, 1955; Ph.D., Maryland, 1967. Bourguibism: An Approach to the Politics of Modernization within the Focus of the Decision-Maker. *Maryland.*

Louis J. Cantori; B.A., Massachusetts, 1959; M. A., Chicago, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Organizational Basis of a Mass Party: The Egyptian WAFD. *Chicago*

Audrey Ruth Chapman; B.A., Wellesley, 1963; M.A., Columbia, 1965; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Political Development in Eastern Nigeria: The Role of the Ethnic Unions. *Columbia.*

In Teak Chung; B.A., Southwest Missouri State College, 1959; M.A., Miami, 1960; Ph.D., American, 1966. The Korean Minority in Manchuria (1900–1937). *American.*

Richard Ennis Combs, Jr.; B.A., California (Berkeley), 1957; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Role of Ideology in Postwar Soviet Policy Determination. *California* (Berkeley).

James Conway Decker; B.A., Illinois, 1953; M.A., Colorado, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Politics and Administration in New Zealand's Electrical Industry. *Colorado.*

Richard H. Dekmejian; B.A., Connecticut, 1959; M.A., Boston, 1960; Ph.D., Columbia, 1966. The Dynamics of Egyptian Politics: Charisma, Ideology and Institutions (1952–1966). *Columbia.*

Paul F. deLespinasse; B.A., Willamette, 1961; M.A. Johns Hopkins, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Monarchial Institution in Constitutional Democracy. *Johns Hopkins.*

John De Luca; B.A., UCLA, 1955; M.A., Harvard, 1956; Ph.D., UCLA, 1967. The Italian Road to Socialism. *California* (Los Angeles).

Edward M. Dew; B.A., Pomona, 1957; M.A., Washington, 1957; Ph.D., UCLA, 1966. Politics in the Altiplano: A Study of Provincial Political Change in Peru. California (*Los Angeles*).

John Randolph Dinkelspiel; B.A., Amherst, 1957 Ph.D., Harvard, 1967. Administrative Style and Economic Development: The Organization and Management of the Guayana Region Development of Venezuela. *Harvard.*

Stephen A. Douglas; B.A., Kansas State, 1960; M.A., Illinois, 1961; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Political Socialization in Indonesia. *Illinois.*

Sara Edelstein; B.A., Minnesota, 1959; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., UCLA, 1966. The Failure of Consensus: The British Labour Party and Unilateralism, 1957–1961. *California* (Los Angeles).

Luigi Roberto Einaudi; B.A., Harvard, 1957; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Marxism in Latin America: From Aprismo to Fidelismo. *Harvard.*

Abdel M. El-Biali; B.A., Cairo (Egypt), 1958; M.A., American, 1965; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. A Comparative Analysis of the Countries of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria to the USSR and USA Foreign Aid Programs. *American.*

Darryl D. Enos; B.A., Sacramento State, 1963; Ph.D., Claremont, 1967. Dynamic Mexico: Its Unknown Changes. *Claremont.*

John Dixon Esseks; B.A., Oberlin, 1960; M.A., Harvard, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Economic Independence in a New African State Ghana: 1956–65. *Harvard.*

Julio A. Fernandez; B.A., San Diego State, 1963; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1964; Ph.D., California (Santa Barbara), 1967. The Political Elite in Argentina: Some Recruitment and Attitude Patterns. *California* (Santa Barbara).

Marcus F. Franda; B.A., Beloit, 1959; M.A., Chicago, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Federalizing Process in India: Study of West Bengal and the Union. *Chicago.*

Wolf D. Fuhrig; Certificate, Paedagogische Hochschule Celle, 1948; M.A., Miami, 1953; Ph.D., Columbia, 1966. State and University in the Federal Republic of Germany. *Columbia.*

Narayan M. Ghatate; B.A., Nagpur, India, 1957; M.A., American, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Disarmament in India's Foreign Policy 1947–1965. *American.*

Jerome M. Gilison; B.S., MIT, 1956; Ph.D., Columbia, 1965. The Soviet Image of the Future Communist Society: A Critical Analysis of Contemporary Soviet Doctrine. *Columbia.*

Roy Glasglow; B.A., Howard, 1962; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1964; Ph.D., American, 1967. British Guiana: Problems, Policies and Prospects. *American.*

Paul H. Godwin; B.A., Dartmouth, 1960; M.A., Minnesota, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Mancher-Mongol Relations: A Study of Political Integration. *Minnesota.*

Arthur B. Gunlicks; B.A., Denver, 1958; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1967. Representative and Party at the Lower Level in Western Germany: The Case of Lower Saxony. *Georgetown.*

C. Eric Hansen; B.A., Lawrence, 1961; M.A., Fletcher School, 1962;, M.A.L.D., *Ibid.*, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. In Search of Sarvodaya: The Indian Intellectuals' Perceptions of the Chinese Regime and Revolution. *Fletcher.*

Robert L. Hardgrave; B.A., Texas, 1960; M.A., Chicago, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Political Sentiment in Tamiland: A Comparative Analysis of Three Nadar Communities. *Chicago.*

Roy Mark Hofheinz, Jr.; B.A., Rice Institute, 1957; B.A., Oxford, 1959; Ph.D., Harvard, 1967. Chinese Communism and the Peasant Base: The Evolution of the Maoist Rural Revolution, 1923–42. *Harvard.*

Gary W. Hoskin; B.A., Drake, 1960; M.A., Johns Hopkins, 1962; Ph.D., Illinois 1967. Community Power and Political Modernization: A Study of a Venezuelan City. *Illinois.*

Asrar Husain; B.A., Agra, 1947; M.A., Punjab, 1954; M.A., Duke, 1965; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. A Study of the Distribution of Legislative Powers between the Center and the Units in India Pakistan, Nigeria, and Malaysia, *Duke.*

Ronald Inglehart; B.A., Northwestern, 1956; M.A., Chicago, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Socialization of "Europeans." *Chicago.*

Kamel Saleh Abu Jaber; B.A., Syracuse, 1950; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. The Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party. *Syracuse.*

Richard E. Johnston; B.A., East Central State (Oklahoma), 1952; M.A., Chicago, 1953; Ph.D. Texas, 1967. Federalism: A Study in Comparative Constitutional Law. *Texas.*

George S. Kanahele; B.A., Brigham Young, 1960; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., Cornell, 1967. The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence. *Cornell.*

Arthur Jay Klinghoffer; B.A., Michigan, 1962; M.A., Columbia, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The

Soviet View of Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1955–1964. *Columbia.*

Sondra Z. Koff; B.A., Wells, 1958; M.A., Syracuse, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. The Italian Socialist Party: 1945–1961. *Syracuse.*

Peter D. Latimer; B.A., Ohio Wesleyan, 1961; M.A., Fletcher School, 1962; M.A.L.D., *Ibid.*, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Formation of the Alliance for Progress. *Fletcher.*

Chae Jin Lee; B.A., Seoul National, Korea, 1959, M.A., UCLA, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Chinese Communist Policy in Laos: 1954–1965. *California* (Los Angeles).

Raymond William Liddle; B.A., Yale, 1959; M.A., Yale, 1961; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Politics in Simalungun: A Study in Political Integration. *Yale.*

Jerry K. Loveland; B.A., Brigham Young, 1951; M.A., California, 1954; Ph.D., American, 1967. The Establishment of the Instruments of Modern Rule in Western Samoa. *American.*

James J. Lynskey; B.A., Maryland, 1956; M.A., Minnesota, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Role of British Backbenchers in the Modification of Government Policy: The Issues Involved, the Channels Utilized and the Tactics Employed. *Minnesota.*

Ramaswamy Mani; B.A., Patna College, India, 1956; Ph.D., Harvard, 1967. Political Corruption and Political Change. *Harvard.*

Yogendra K. Malik; B.A., Banjab, 1949; M.A., Florida, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Democratic Labor Party of Trinidad: An Attempt at the Formation of a Mass Party in a Multi-Ethnic Society. *Florida.*

Warren L. Mason; B.A., Minnesota (Duluth), 1959; M.A., Minnesota, 1961; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Cognative Foundations of Stability in the Electoral Support of the British Labor Party. *Minnesota.*

George Robert Moe; B.S., U. S. Military Academy, 1943; M.A., Maryland, 1959; Ph.D., American, 1966. A Survey of Politically Significant Innovations in the German Bundeswehr. *American.*

William D. Muller; B.A., Ohio, 1960; M.A., Illinois, 1961; Ph.D., Florida, 1966. The Parliamentary Activity of Trade Union MP's, 1959–1964. *Florida.*

Gunnar Nielssen; B.A., UCLA, 1961; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1963; Ph.D., UCLA, 1966. Denmark and European Integration: A Small Country at the Crossroads. *California* (Los Angeles).

Ki Song Oh; B.A., Chou, 1940; LL.B., *Ibid.*, 1942; M.A., Pennsylvania, 1961; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Land Reform in Communist China and Post-War Japan. *Pennsylvania.*

C. Ojha; B.A.Hons., Lucknow, 1951; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1953; M.A., Fletcher School, M.A.L.D., *Ibid.*, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Soviet and Chinese Conceptions of the National Bourgeoisie of the Developing Areas, 1955–1964. *Fletcher.*

John R. O'Neill; B.A., Fresno State, 1960; Ph.D., Claremont, 1967. The Functional Genesis of a National Communist Party: Czechoslovakia, 1945–48. *Claremont.*

N. D. Ukachi Onyewu; M.A., Howard, 1962; Ph.D., American, 1966. Nation-building in Nigeria, 1900–1960. *American.*

James Payne; B.A., Oberlin, 1962; M.A., California (Berkeley), 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Political Party Conflict in Colombia. *California* (Berkeley).

Richard J. Powers; B.A., New Mexico, 1953; M.A., Claremont, 1965; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Kennan Against Himself: From Containment to Disengagement. *Claremont.*

Somsak Rakwijit; B.A., Illinois Institute of Technology, 1956; M.S., *Ibid.*, 1957; M.A., Vanderbilt, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Military in Southeast Asian Politics. *Joint University Libraries.*

Thomas Rasmussen; B.A., Earlham, 1961; Ph.D., Syracuse, 1967. The French Revolutionary Tradition and African Ideologies of Modernization and Independence. *Syracuse.*

Jon McEwan Reinhardt; B.A., Brigham Southern, 1959; M.A., Tulane, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Nationalism and Confrontation in the Southeast Asian nations: The Sources of Indonesian Foreign Policy. *Tulane.*

Carey G. Rickabaugh; B.A., Western Maryland, 1958; M.A., Western Reserve, 1961; Ph.D., Maryland, 1967. The Politicalization Function of Agrarian Interest Groups: A Case Study of the Bolivian Campesino Sindicatos. *Maryland.*

Robert M. Rodes; B.A., Kentucky, 1955; M.A., Johns Hopkins, 1957; Ph.D., Columbia, 1966. Soviet Attitudes toward the Independence Movements in South and Southeast Asia, 1945–1952. *Columbia.*

William Arthur Rugh; B.A., Oberlin, 1958; M.A., Johns Hopkins, 1961; Ph.D., Columbia, 1967. The Politics of Broadcasting in West Germany after World War II. *Columbia.*

Anthony Rweyemamu; B.A., Nebraska, 1960; Ph.D., Syracuse, 1965. Nation-Building and the Planning Process in Tanzania. *Syracuse.*

John F. Rys; B.A., Gettysburg, 1951; M.A., Columbia, 1952; Ph.D., American, 1966. Tensions and Conflicts in Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic Between 1945 and 1959. *American.*

Halil Ibrahim Salih; B.A., Pacific, 1963; M.A., American, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Cyprus: An Analysis of Cypriot Political Discord. *American.*

Jerry M. Silverman; B.A., Long Beach State, 1963; Ph.D., Claremont, 1967. Indonesianizing Marxism-Leninism: The Development and Consequences of Communist Polycentrism. *Claremont.*

Harvey G. Simmons; B.A., Brandeis, 1956; M.A., Boston, 1960; Ph.D., Cornell, 1967. The Crisis of French Socialism Since 1956. *Cornell.*

James Stegenga; B.A., Michigan, 1959; M.A., UCLA, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The United Nations Force in Cyprus. *California* (Los Angeles).

Sister Mary Grace Swift; B.S., Creighton, 1956; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., Notre Dame, 1967. The Art of the Dance in the USSR: A Study of Politics, Ideology and Culture. *Notre Dame.*

Makoto Takizawa; B.S., Sophia (Tokyo), 1961; M.S., Florida State, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Japanese Re-armament: A Dilemma In Search of Peace and Security. *Florida State.*

Soji Tomikawa; M.A., Tohoku Imperial, 1942; M.A., Syracuse, 1956; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. Impact of Public Opinion on the Postwar Administration of Japan—Problems Connected with the Supplying of Facilities and Areas for Use by United States Forces. *Syracuse.*

Andrew C. Tuttle; B.A., California (Santa Barbara), 1960; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1962; Ph.D., Claremont, 1967. The West Indies Federation: Politics and Prospects. *Claremont.*

Joan Barth Urban; B.A., Northwestern , 1956; M.A., Radcliffe, 1959; Ph.D., Harvard, 1967. Moscow and the Italian Communist Party: 1926–1945. *Harvard.*

Norman Joseph Vig; B.A., Carleton, 1961; M.A., Columbia, 1966; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. British Government Policy for Civil Science and Technology: Historical Development and Recent Controversy. *Columbia.*

James Wagman; B.A., Colorado, 1960; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Modern Science, Communist Faith and Soviet Society. *Colorado.*

Paul Wallace; B.A., California (Berkeley), 1953; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1957; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Political Party System in the Punjab (India): A Study of Factionalism. *California* (Berkeley).

Herbert Werlin; B.A., Chicago, 1953; M.A., Yale, 1957; Ph.D., California (Berkeley), 1966. The Nairobi City Council: A Study in Comparative Local Government. *California* (Berkeley).

Edward J. Williams; B.A., Duquesne, 1960; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., Johns Hopkins, 1966. The Christian-Democratic Party in Latin America. *John Hopkins.*

William E. Wright; B.A., Millsaps, 1954; M.A., Vanderbilt, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Local Leadership in Two West Berlin Political Parties *Joint University Libraries.*

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION

Younis J. Al-Azzawi; B.L., Baghdad, 1957; M.A., Tennessee, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Criminal Responsibility of Individuals Under International Law. *Tennessee.*

Manuel S. Aldana; B.A., Philippines, 1956; M.A., Minnesota, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The International Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens in Recent International Law. *Minnesota.*

George Pope Atkins; B.A., Texas, 1955; M.A., American, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The United States and the Dominican Republic During the Era of Trujillo. *American.*

Clinton Bailey; B.A., Hebrew, 1962; M.A., Columbia, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Participation of the Palestinians in the Politics of Jordan. *Columbia.*

Walter C. Bandazian; B.S., Westchester State, 1961; M.A., Pennsylvania, 1963; Ph.D., American, 1967. The Crisis of Alexandrotta. *American.*

Charles Barber; B.A., West Virginia Wesleyan, 1963; M.A., American, 1965; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Restricted Inter-Governmental Postal Unions: Agents of Regional Functionalism. *American.*

Robert E. Beranek; B.A., St. Vincent, 1953; M.A., Fordham, 1959; Ph.D., Pittsburgh, 1966. The "Second" Berlin Crises and the Foreign Ministers' Conference at Geneva (1959): A Case Study of Soviet Diplomacy. *Pittsburgh.*

Howard Bliss; B.A., Haverford, 1952; M.A., Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, 1958; Ph.D., Cornell, 1967. A Process of Federalism: Belgium's Participation in the European Community. *Cornell.*

Walter W. Boehm, B.A., San Francisco State, 1952; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1959; Ph.D., American, 1967. The Role of Youth as a Means in the Achievement of Political Ends in Francophone African Nation-States. *American.*

Philip Mark Burgess; B.A., Knox, 1961; Ph.D., American, 1966. Norway, The North, NATO: A Study of Authoritative Elite Perceptions as Related to Foreign Policy. *American.*

Richard Chadwick; B.S., Illinois Institute of Technology, 1962; Ph.D., Northwestern, 1966. Developments in a Partial Theory of International Behavior: A Test, Revision, and Extension of Inter-Nation Simulation Theory. *Northwestern.*

Teh-Kuang Chang; B.A., National University of Amoy, China, 1949; M.A., Washington, 1958; Ph.D., American, 1966. Communist China's Foreign Policy: Concept and Formulation. *American.*

Young Hang Chang; B.A., Kyung Hee, 1960; M.I.S., Clarement, 1965; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The International Court of Justice. *Claremont.*

Babalola Cole; B.A., Howard, 1954; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1957; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1967. The United Nations Peace-keeping Operations: The Actions and Policies of the African Nations in the Congo. *Georgetown.*

Jack E. Corbett; B.A., Temple, 1950; B.D., Crozer Seminary, 1950; Ph.D., American, 1967. An Analysis of the Race for Peace Program of the Methodist Church, June 1, 1961 Through May 31, 1963. *American.*

Kenneth Arthur Dahlberg; B.A., Northwestern, 1957; M.A., Stanford, 1961; Ph.D., Colorado, 1966. The Common Market Commission and the Politics of Integration. *Colorado.*

George A. Daoust, Jr.; B.S., U.S. Military Academy, 1945; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1967. The Role of Air Power in U.S. Foreign Policy in the Far East, 1945–1958. *Georgetown.*

Daniel D. Di Piazza; Ph.B., Marquette, 1952; M.A., Missouri, 1957; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Bucareli Conference and United States-Mexican Relations. Missouri (*Columbia*).

David VanDeusen Edwards; B.A., Swarthmore, 1962; M.A., Harvard, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Arms Control in International Politics. *Harvard.*

Raza S. Elim; Licence en Droit, Elim Shamar University (Cairo), 1955; M.A., Chicago, 1959; Ph.D., American, 1967. An Analytical Approach to the Study of Some Aspects of Neutralism. *American.*

John David Evans, Jr.; B.S., Loras College, 1932; M.A., Columbia, 1954; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1967. The Dilemma of the Horn: A Study of Conflict in Northeast Africa. *Georgetown.*

Bahram Farzanegan; B.A., Lafayette, 1960; M.A., Pennsylvania, 1962; Ph.D., American, 1966. United States' Response and Reaction to the Emergence of Arab and African States in International Politics. *American.*

Adnan I. Fawwaz; B.A., American (Beirut), 1961; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1962; Ph.D., American, 1966. The Role of Lebanon in the Power Struggle of the Contemporary Arab World. *American.*

Edward Gonzalez; B.A., UCLA, 1955; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Cuban Revolution and the Soviet Union: 1959–1960. *California* (Los Angeles).

Forest L. Grieves; B.A., Stanford, 1960; M.A., Nevada, 1964; Ph.D., Arizona, 1967. Supernationalism in International Tribunals. *Arizona.*

Manfred H. W. Grote; B.A., Kansas, 1960; M A., *Ibid.*, 1962; Ph.D., Maryland, 1967. A New West German Policy Toward Eastern Europe. *Maryland.*

Raymond N. Habiby; B.A., Beirut (Lebanon), 1941; M.A., Minnesota, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. Problems of Loyalty of United Nations Personnel. *Minnesota.*

Muhammad Y. Hallaj; B.A., South Carolina, 1959; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., Florida, 1966. Afro-Asian Politics in the U.N. *Florida.*

Betty Hanson; B.A., Southern Methodist, 1956; M.A., Columbia, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. American Diplomatic Representatives to the Soviet Union, 1933–1945: A Study of Political Reporting. *Columbia.*

Jonathan Harris; B.A., Wesleyan, 1957; M.I.A., Columbia, 1959; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Communist Strategy Toward the "National Bourgeoisie" in Asia and the Middle East: 1945–1961. *Columbia.*

Joseph T. Hart; B.A., Emory & Henry, 1951; M.A., Duke, 1953; Ph.D., American, 1967. Gaming as a Research Tool in International Relations. *American.*

Doris M. Hull; B.S., Virginia State, 1947; M.S., Drexel, 1951; M.A., Howard, 1957; Ph.D., American, 1966. The Role of Selected African Nations in the United Nations System. *American.*

Asad Husain; B.A., Patna University (India), 1951; M.A., Minnesota, 1956; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1965. British India's Relations with the Kingdom of Nepal from 1857 to 1947. *Minnesota.*

Joannes N. Huyen; B.A., Ohio Wesleyan, 1957; M.A., Western Reserve, 1959; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1964. The Juridicial Status and Functions of Consuls in Recent International Law and Practice. *Minnesota.*

Mahmoud I. Ismail; B. Com., Cairo, 1959; M.A., Pittsburgh, 1962; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Nationalism in Egypt Before Nasser's Revolution. *Pittsburgh.*

E. Luther Johnson; B.A., Clark, 1950; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1951; M.A., American, 1964; Ph.D., American, 1966. Freedom from Alliances—Contemporary Swedish Views Toward International Relations. *American.*

David Allen Kay; B.A., Texas, 1962; M.I.A., Columbia, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The New Nations in the United Nations: A Study in the Exercise of Political Influence in the United Nations. 1960–1964. *Columbia.*

Gholam H. Kazemian; B.S., Rhode Island, 1961; M.A., American, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The Impact of the U.S. Technical and Financial Aid on the Rural Development of Iran. *American.*

Dean R. Kellams; B.S., Indiana State, 1958;

M.A., *Ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., Southern Illinois, 1966. U.S. Policy on Intervention in the Congo, 1960–64: A Legal and Political Analysis. *Southern Illinois.*

Joseph Lazar; B.A., Chicago, 1939; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1940; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1965. The Status of the Leasehold in International Law. *Minnesota.*

Russell John Lenz; B.A., Middlebury, 1960; Ph.D., American, 1967. The United States' Response to the United Nations Financial Crisis. *American.*

Alan T. Leonard; B.A., Tulane, 1960; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1961; Ph.D., Duke, 1967. The Legal Thought of the Latin American Judges on the International Court of Justice. *Duke.*

William F. Lewis; B.S., U.S. Military Academy, 1940; M.A., George Washington, 1964; Ph.D., American, 1967. Reappraisal of Appeasement: A Comparative Study of the Munich and Vietnam Decisions. *American.*

Kai O. Lie; M.A., Chicago, 1960; Ph.D., American, 1967. An Analysis of the Changing Role of Norway in the Struggle for Power and Peace in the North Since the Second World War. *American.*

Neville O. Linton; B. Com. Hons., McGill, 1958; M.A., Fletcher School, 1959; M.A.L.D., *Ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The United Nations and the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes in Cases Outside of the Cold War Dispute. *Fletcher.*

Hsien-Tung Liu; B.A., National Taiwan, 1958; M.A., Chico State, 1962; Ph.D., Claremont Graduate School, 1967. Border Disputes Between Imperial Chica and Tsarist Russia. *Claremont.*

William F. McLaughlin; B.A., New Jersey State Teachers, 1953; M.A., New York, 1958; Ph.D., American, 1967. Universalism and Regionalism: A Comparison of the Development Decade and the Alliance for Progress as Methods of Promoting Economic and Social Development. *American.*

Urabi S. Mustafa; B.S., Roosevelt, 1957; M.A., American, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The United States and Jordan with Special Reference to the Palestine Question. *American.*

Mumulla V. Naidu; B.A., India, 1950; M.A., Osmania (India), 1959; Ph.D., Minnesota, 1965. The United Nations Force: Legal Theory and Political Practice. *Minnesota.*

Nafhat N. Nasr; B.A., American (Beirut), 1957; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1960; Ph.D., Vanderbilt, 1967. Military Bloc Formation: The Case of NATO, 1949–1962. *Joint University Libraries.*

William Asa Nighswonger; B.A., Oklahoma City, 1951; B.D., Southern Methodist, 1954; M.A., American, 1965; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Rural Pacification in Vietnam: 1962–1965. *American.*

Robert Frank Pajak; B.A., Michigan State, 1958; M.A., Harvard, 1960; Ph.D., American, 1966. Soviet Military Aid: An Instrument of Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the Developing Countires. *American.*

Jozef F. Patyk; LL.M., Jagiellonski, Poland, 1945; Ph.D., Colorado, 1966. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance: Its Political Importance. *Colorado.*

Ronald E. Puhek; B.A., College of St. Thomas, 1961; M.A., Johns Hopkins, 1963; Ph.D., Nebraska, 1967. The Rationale of American Foreign Policy: Containment. *Nebraska.*

Gene E. Rainey; B.S., Harding, 1958; B.A., George Washington, 1957; M.A., Fletcher, 1960; Ph.D., American, 1966. The American Image of Peace. *American.*

Walter Raitt; B.A., Redlands, 1937; B.D., Yale, 1941; Ph.D., Claremont, 1967. American Ideology and the United Nations: A Study in Ambivalence. *Claremont.*

David P. Rawson; B.A., Malone, 1962; M.A., American, 1964, Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. The Role of the United Nations in the Political Development of Ruanda-Urundi, 1947–1962. *American.*

T. Ramakrishna Reddy; B.A., Mysore (India), 1958; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1959; Ph.D., Kentucky, 1967. India's Policy at the United Nations. *Kentucky.*

Francis J. Romance; B.A., Notre Dame, 1954; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1956; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1967. Sino-Soviet Policies Towards the Mongolian People's Republic, 1945–1965: A Study of the Political and Economic Factors Involved. *Georgetown.*

Elias Sam'o; B.A., Washington State, 1963; M. A., Idaho, 1964; Ph.D., American, 1967. The Arabs in the United Nations. *American.*

Thomas. O. Schlesinger; B.S., Maryland, 1960; M.A., American, 1966; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Austrian Neutrality in Post-War Europe. *American.*

Mohammed Hassan Shehabeddin; B.A., Cairo, 1958; M.A., American, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1966. Pan-Arabism and the Islamic Tradition. *American.*

James Paul Speer, II; B.A., George Washington, 1941; Ph.D., Colorado, 1967. Society and Polity at the World Level. *Colorado.*

Steven Lee Spiegel; B.A., USC, 1962; Ph.D., Harvard, 1967. The Soviet-American Role in the Current International System: A Theoretical Analysis. *Harvard.*

Howard A. I. Sugg; B.A., Jackson, 1959; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1960; M.A., American, 1966; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Soviet Disarmament Theory Since 1959: An Analytical Study. *American.*

Mamerto S. Ventura; B.A., Washington State, 1935; M.A., Washington, 1938; Ph.D., Southern Illinois, 1966. Philippine Post-War Recovery: A Review of U. S.-Philippine Cooperation and Cross-Purposes. *Southern Illinois.*

Walter B. Wentz; B.Sc., Southern California, 1951; M.A., Claremont, 1958; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Nuclear Proliferation. *Claremont.*

Irvin L. White; B.A., Pennsylvania State, 1954; Ph.D., Arizona, 1967. An Analysis of the Applicability of International Air and Sea Law to Legal Problems in Outer Space. *Arizona.*

G. Robert Wills; B.A., Duke, 1962; M.A., *Ibid.*, 1964; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. The European Policies of General de Gaulle. *Duke.*

Kenneth L. Wise; B.A., Midland Lutheran, 1961; M.A., American, 1963; Ph.D., *Ibid.*, 1967. Reporting the World Wars: An Analytical Comparison of Accounts of Battles in Flanders Fields and the Ardemes. *American.*

Clyde Curtis Wooten; B.S., State College of Washington, 1940; Ph.D., Georgetown, 1967. The Empirical Basis for Chinese Communist World Strategy. *Georgetown.*

NEWS AND NOTES

The sixty-fourth Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 3–7, 1968 at the Washington-Hilton Hotel, Washington, D. C.

Professional Conferences

SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS AND INFORMATION REGARDING THE 1968 PROGRAM

The Program Committee for the 1968 meeting of the American Political Science Association wishes to provide the fullest possible opportunity for the participation of younger scholars. To this end, those who have recently entered the profession are encouraged to communicate directly either with the Program Committee Chairman, or with the Chairmen of individual sections of the program, as designated below.

Where specific panel topics or general orientation of program sections are designated, scholars whose research or professional interests are directly pertinent to such topics are especially encouraged to contact section chairmen. In this regard, it would be of considerable help to have a brief description of the research on which one might be willing to report.

The tentative topics selected for the 1968 meeting are as follows:

Public Administration. Chairman: Stephen K. Bailey, Syracuse

1. Interagency Politics and Creative Federalism
2. Politics and Administrative Rationality
3. PPBS and the Administration of Soft Services
4. The President's Committee on Administrative Management Revisited after 30 years.

Comparative Administration. Chairman: Ralph Braibanti, Duke

1. The Theory of Development Administration: Field Research and Theoretical Implications
2. Administrative Reform in the Context of Political Development.
3. The Structure of Administrative Innovation in the Developing States.
4. The Administration of Economic Planning.

International Politics and Organization. Chairman: Inis Claude, Jr. Michigan

1. International Organization and Collective Legitimization
2. The Resurgence of Nationalism in Europe.
3. Small States in Contemporary International Politics
4. The Politics of Intervention

Political Science and Public Policy. Chairman: Frederick N. Cleaveland, North Carolina

1. The Political Scientist as Policy Maker and Policy Advisor
2. Relationship between Political Science Theory and Public Policy
3. The Measurement of Public Policy
4. The Social Sciences and Specific Areas of Public Policy
5. The Military and Public Policy

American Government and Politics. Chairman: Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Rochester

1. Congressional Behavior
2. The Presidency
3. State Legislative Behavior
4. Comparative Study of State Politics I
5. Comparative Study of State Politics II
6. New Perspectives on American Political History

Ideology and Political Science. Chairman: Andrew Hacker, Cornell

1. Postwar Development of American Political Science
2. The American Political Scientist
3. Professors and Petitions

Historical Dimensions of Political Development. Chairman: Robert T. Holt, Minnesota. (See special announcement, below)

Public Opinion and Representation. Chairman: Duncan MacRae, Jr., Chicago

1. Constituency Structure and Its Effects.
2. System and Sub-System: Intra- and Extra-Community Influences
3. Opinion Structure in Elite and Mass.
4. Opinion Dynamics: Representation, Protest, Reform.
5. Parties, Opinion, and Representation.

Urban Problems. Chairman: Daniel P. Moynihan, MIT and Harvard

1. Political Science and the Study of Municipal Politics: Retrospect and Prospect
2. The Political Effects of Urbanization
3. Sources of Urban Violence.
4. The Politics of Municipal Employees

Mathematics and Political Science. Chairman: William. H. Riker, Rochester

1. Research Papers on Coalition Theory, Output Theory, Causal Models.
2. Mathematical Models in Specific Branches of Political Science.
3. Economics, Psychology and Polimetrics.

Comparative Politics. Chairman: Dankwart A. Rustow, Columbia

1. Modernization: Development, Decay, and the Sequence of Crises
2. The Preconditions of Democracy
3. Tensions and Dynamics of Single-Party Regimes
4. Political Protest and Unrest
5. Changes and Continuity of Regimes
6. Rulers and Political Elites
7. Political Culture
8. Intra-Nation Comparisons
9. Electoral and Survey Data: An Appraisal

American Foreign Policy. Chairman: Kenneth Thompson, Rockefeller Foundation.

Public Law and Judicial Processes. Chairman: S. Sidney Ulmer, Kentucky

1. Judge-Made Policy and the U. S. Supreme Court
2. Judicial, Legal and Environmental Factors in the Judicial Process (two panels).
3. Theories of Judicial Decision-Making at State, National and International Levels
4. Research in Public Law and Judicial Processes: Retrospect and Prospect
5. Graduate Student Research (See announcement, below).

Political Theory. Chairman: René Williamson, Louisiana State

General Theme: "Identity, Selfhood and Image in Political Life."

1. Theological and Psychiatric Dimensions
2. Traditional Political Theory
3. Problems as Manifested in the New Nations
4. Recent Thinking on the Problem: Behavioralism, Empirical Theory and Pluralist Society.

For the section on *Historical Dimensions of Political Development,* the following communication from Professor Robert Holt is pertinent:

"The rapidly growing study of political development is to be represented in the 1968 annual meeting by a set of five to eight panels concentrating specifically on *Historical Dimensions of Political Development.* This specific focus was chosen primarily for two reasons: (1) The very term political development necessarily implies changes over time and thus an historical aspect is always involved. (2) Although the behavioral revolution in political science was in many respects an explicit reaction against legalism, institutionalism, and historicism, the difference between "historicism" and "history" was not always recognized. It is therefore necessary and useful to analyse historical dimensions of change in terms of contemporary concepts and with contemporary tools and techniques of analysis.

"The procedures for selecting papers and topics for the specific panels will depart somewhat from the methods usually employed. The general panel chairman will not suggest topics for each panel and then solicit papers on those topics. Instead, the chairman has established two criteria for the selection of papers to be presented: (1) They must employ either a conceptual framework from contemporary behavioral sciences, or apply a contemporary technique of analysis; (2) they must deal substantively with some historical dimension of political development. In other words an attempt will be made to exclude papers that either simply explain how modern methods and techniques might be used or simply present a narration of a series of historical events.

"Any member of the association who would like to present a paper which meets these two criteria should send a page or two summary of the proposed paper indicating the methods and techniques to be used and the substantive area to be explored to the panel chairman, Robert T. Holt, Department of Political Science, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn. 55455.

"Papers will be selected on the basis of these summaries. Papers on similar substantive problems or methodological approaches will be included in the same panel session and an appropriate chairman and discussants will then be chosen.

"Several papers by scholars from other disciplines, who have been working on problems of historical dimensions of political development and who have something useful to present to

political scientists, will be selected by the panel chairman."

For the section on *Public Law and Judicial Processes*, the following announcement is directed to graduate students:

"In connection with the 1968 APSA meeting, national competition for graduate students in Public Law and Judicial Processes will be held. Papers will be unrestricted as to precise topic, but will be limited to twenty-five pages (double-spaced) in length. Eligibility will be limited to those who can be classified accurately as graduate students in September, 1968. Final selection of the papers to be presented will be made by a student-faculty committee consisting of one student and one faculty member from each of three institutions. Additional details may be obtained by writing to S. Sidney Ulmer, Department of Political Science, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky. 40506."

For further details regarding any aspect of the 1968 program, colleagues are urged to communicate with the Program Committee Chairman or appropriate section chairmen.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA
CHAIRMAN OF THE PROGRAM COMMITTEE

The Western Political Science Association held its 21st annual meeting at the Pioneer International Hotel in Tucson, Arizona, March 16–18, 1967, with the University of Arizona as host. In addition to sixteen panels, the conference featured addresses by Robert A. Dahl, President of the American Political Science Association; Don Hummel, Assistant Secretary, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development; and Hans Daalder of the University of Leiden, The Netherlands. The Association elected the following officers for 1967–68: president, Robert L. Morlan, University of Redlands; vice-president, Bernard L. Hyink, California State College at Fullerton; secretary-treasurer, Don W. Driggs, University of Nevada. The members of the executive council are: Heinz R. Hink, Arizona State University; Fred Krinsky, University of Southern California; Paul R. Murray, Sacramento State College; James C. Davies, University of Oregon; Phillip O. Foss, Colorado State University; F. Wesley Walls, Seattle Pacific College; Norman Meller (ex officio), University of Hawaii; Ellsworth E. Weaver (ex officio), University of Utah. The 1968 WPSA meeting will be held in Seattle, Washington, March 21–23.

The Northern California Political Science Association held its nineteenth annual meeting at the University of San Francisco on May 6, 1967. Panels discussed "Are Issue-Oriented Party Organizations Desirable?" and "America's Response to Foreign Revolutions." John Emmerson, Diplomat-in-Residence at Stanford University, a recent U.S. Minister at Tokyo, gave the luncheon address on "Japan Today." Officers elected for 1967–1968 were: president, Louis Wasserman, San Francisco State College; vice president, Raymond E. Wolfinger, Stanford University; secretary-treasurer, John M. Selig, City College of San Francisco. The following were elected to the council: Samuel B. Bloom, Cabrillo College; Donald Brandon, University of San Francisco; Stephen Jurika, University of Santa Clara; Karl A. Lamb, University of California (Santa Cruz); John Livingston, Sacramento State College; Hanna Pitkin, University of California (Berkeley); and Kern Richmond, College of San Mateo.

At the annual meeting of the New England International Studies Association the following officers were elected: president, David L. Larson, New Hampshire; vice president, Karl W. Deutsch, Harvard; secretary-treasurer, Ruth C. Lawson, Mt. Holyoke; Members of the Board; Morton Halperin, Harvard; Kenneth N. Waltz, Brandeis; Hayward R. Alker, Yale; Louis Morton, Dartmouth; Don D. Humphrey, Fletcher.

The annual meeting of the Southwestern Political Science Association was held in Dallas March 23–24, 1967, in conjunction with the meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association. New officers of the Southwestern Political Science Association are: Oliver Benson, University of Oklahoma, president; Jewel Prestage, vice-president and program chairman; Dan Nimmo, University of Houston, associate editor of the *Southwestern Social Science Quarterly;* and Clifton McCleskey, University of Texas, secretary-treasurer. Other members of the executive council are Irving Dawson, Lamar State College of Technology; Fred Gantt, North Texas State University; Earl Lewis, Prairie View A&M College; Emmette Redford (*ex officio*), University of Texas; and Harry Stumpf, University of New Mexico.

The Midwest Conference of Political Scientists held its 25th annual meeting at Purdue University, April 27–29, 1967. Robert A. Dahl, President of the American Political Science Association, addressed the members.

A new constitution was ratified and the name of the organization was changed to the Midwest Political Science Association. New officers elected were: John D. Lewis, Oberlin College, president; Murray Edelman, University of Wisconsin, vice-president. Norman Wengert, Wayne State University and Marvin A. Harder, Wichita State

University, were elected to the executive council for three year terms. Samuel Eldersveld was elected to the newly created office of president-elect. Malcom E. Jewell, University of Kentucky, succeeded Merle Kling, Washington University, as editor of the *Midwest Journal*.

The 1968 meeting will be held in Chicago, May 2–4.

The Pacific Northwest Political Science Association held its annual meeting at the College of Idaho, Caldwell, April 29, 1967. The following officers were unanimously elected: president, Dell Hitchner, University of Washington; vice-president, Russell Maddox, Oregon State University; executive council members, Ronald Chinn, University of Alaska and Lowell Culver, Pacific Lutheran University. The 1968 meeting will be held in Seattle in conjunction with the Western Political Science Association meeting.

New officers of the International Studies Association-Southern Region are: president, Harry H. Ransom, Vanderbilt University; vice-president, Richard Butwell, University of Kentucky; secretary-treasurer, Donald Weatherbee, University of South Carolina.

The Committee on Comparative Politics at the University of Michigan, was host to a group of foreign policy and international relation specialists at a conference on the Comparative Study of Foreign Policy, March 10–11, 1967. Henry L. Bretton, University of Michigan, organized the conference and Herbert J. Spiro, University of Pennsylvania was general discussant. Papers were presented by James Rosenau, Rutgers University; Donald P. Warwick, University of Michigan; Roy C. Macridis, Brandeis University; Kenneth Waltz, Brandeis University; William Zimmerman, University of Michigan; and Robert H. Johnson, the Brookings Institution.

On April 26–28, a conference was held at Rutgers University in celebration of 100 years of cultural exchange with Japan. Eventually the series of essays presented at the conference will be published under the editorship of Ardath W. Burks, director of International Programs.

A national conference on Content Analysis is being planned for November 17–19, 1967 at the University of Pennsylvania. Well-known researchers in various fields are preparing some two dozen specially commissioned papers in such general areas as "Theory and Definition," "Recording and Notation," "Inference," and "Computer Techniques and Computational Linguistics." Meetings will be open to the public. Final announcement will be made circa September 15 in a national mailing. For further information now write Dean George Gerbner, Annenberg School of Communications, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.

The Association for Comparative Economics will hold an international conference on "Convergence and Divergence of Economic Systems in the Process of Socioeconomic Development" at the Villa Serbelloni, Bellagio, Italy, from September 3 to 9, 1967. The facilities of the Villa limit the number to twenty invited guests from the United States, Western and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Asia. For any further information, write to Albert Lauterbach, Sarah Lawrence College, Bronxville, N.Y. 10708.

Philip Converse, University of Michigan, chaired an International Conference on Comparative Electoral Behavior at the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, April 5–8. The participants were: Samuel H. Barnes, University of Michigan; David Butler, Nuffield College, Oxford, England; Angus Campbell, University of Michigan; Vittorio Capecchi, Universita Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Italy; Terry N. Clark, University of Chicago; Hans Daalder, University of Leiden, The Netherlands; Mattei Dogan, Centre National de Recherches Scientifiques, France; Georges Dupeux, University of Bordeaux, France; Samuel J. Eldersveld, University of Michigan; Andries Hoogerwerf, the Free University, The Netherlands; G. Kuypers, The Free University; Klaus Liepelt, DATUM, West, Germany; Milan Matic, Institute for Social Sciences, Yugoslavia; Warren Miller, University of Michigan; John Meisel, Queens University, Canada; Robert Mokken, University of Amsterdam; Pertti Pesonen, University of Tampere, Finland; Roy Pierce, University of Michigan; James K. Pollock, University of Michigan; Stein Rokkan, Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway; Richard Rose, University of Strathclyde, Scotland; Bo Sarlvik, University of Gothenburg, Sweden; Erwin Scheuch, University of Cologne; David Segal, University of Michigan; Donald E. Stokes, University of Michigan; Henry Valen, Institute for Social Research, Norway; and Jorgen Westerstahl, University of Gothenburg.

Other Activities

The Universal Reference System is seeking unpublished bibliographies and fugitive materials for annotation in its quarterly supplements to Bibliography of Bibliographies in Political Science, Government and Public Policy. Please send items to Universal Reference System, 20 Nassau Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540.

The book review editors of *Military Affairs*, a

scholarly publication in the field of military, naval and air history and national security affairs, wish to expand their file of academic and professional reviewers. Interested persons can contact the book review editors, *Military Affairs*, American Military Institute, 1307 New Hampshire Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

Beginning with Volume II, No. L (Fall, 1967), the *Law and Society Review* will include a bibliographic section which will include areas of research formerly listed in the *American Political Science Review* under the headings "Constitutional Law and Civil Liberties," "Judicial Administration and Law Enforcement," and "Administrative Law." The bibliography will be prepared under the direction of JOEL B. GROSSMAN, HERBERT JACOB and JACK LADINISKY, all of the University of Wisconsin.

Denison University has joined the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research. RAY MOREY has been appointed Consortium representative for the university.

The Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan will sponsor a symposium on "The Atlantic World: The Question of Community" in Ann Arbor, September, 26–28, 1967. The symposium will be chaired by A. F. K. ORGANSKI and will honor JAMES K. POLLOCK on the occasion of his retirement and will be a part of the university's sesquicentennial celebration.

The University of Washington was host to the Northwest American Assembly on State Legislatures. DONALD H. WEBSTER was director and HUGH A. BONE editor of the proceedings.

Three members of the Maxwell School, Syracus University, have assumed posts with the New York State Constitutional Assembly. ALAN K. CAMPBELL is a delegate-at-large and chairman of the Local Government and Home Rule Committee; GUTHRIE BIRKHEAD is executive director of the Local Government and Home Rule Committee; and MICHAEL O. SAWYER is executive director of the Bill of Rights and Suffrage Committee.

EMILE B. ADER, University of Arkansas, will be in Liberia during 1967–68 on a Fulbright lectureship.

STEPHEN K. BAILEY, dean of Maxwell School, Syracuse University, has been elected president of the American Society for Public Administration. He has been elected to a 14-year term on the New York State Board of Regents.

WILLIAM B. BALLIS, University of Michigan, delivered a paper at the Sixth International Conference on World Politics on Fifty Years of the Soviet Union, in Berlin, September, 1967.

DANIEL M. BERMAN, American University, will be on sabbatical leave in New Delhi during 1967–68. He has received a fellowship from the American Institute on Indian Studies.

ALLAN BLOOM was awarded the Clark Distinguished teaching award in the College of Arts and Sciences at Cornell University.

CARL Q. CHRISTOL, University of California, was on sabbatical leave, spring term, 1967.

DOROTHY I. CLINE, University of New Mexico, has been appointed a public member of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relalations, Washington, D.C.

RICHARD CORNELL, SUNY at Buffalo, delivered a paper at the Conference of Students and Politics, held in San Juan Puerto Rico in March. The meeting was sponsored by the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University and the University of Puerto Rico.

RICHARD H. COX, SUNY at Buffalo, gave a paper at the International Institute of Political Philosophy Conference at Chatillon, Italy, June 30–July 2, 1967.

ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, Wellesley College, has received a Social Science Research Council postdoctoral fellowship for 1967–68.

MORRIS DAVIS, University of Illinois, Urbana, has been awarded a Guggenheim fellowship for 1967–68.

JOHN C. DONOVAN, Bowdoin College, has been appointed to Governor Curtis' Council of Economic advisors.

ARCH T. DOTSON, Cornell University, has been appointed executive director of the Committee on Intergovernmental Relations of the New York State Constitutional Convention. He will be on leave during 1967–68.

RUSSELL H. FIFIELD will be on leave from the University of Michigan during 1967–68. During that time he will be an associate in research at the East Asian Research Center, Harvard University. He holds a grant from the Twentieth Century Fund.

FEDERICO GIL, University of North Carolina, has been reappointed to the National Screening Committee of the Foreign Area Fellowship Program for the academic year 1967–68.

MAURICE M. GOLDSMITH, Columbia University has received a Guggenheim fellowship for 1967–68.

BARBARA B. GREEN, Wellesley College, has been appointed a Radcliffe Institute Scholar. She will be on sabbatical leave in 1967–68.

BERTRAM M. GROSS, Maxwell School, Syracuse University, will undertake an exploratory study for the Twentieth Century Fund on new ways to measure and assess social change.

JOEL B. GROSSMAN, University of Wisconsin, will be the director of the university's 1968 Summer Institute in Behavioral Science and the Law. The interdisciplinary institute is financed by the National Science Foundation.

CHARLES B. HAGAN, University of Illinois, spent a 1965–66 sabbatical leave in Europe and New South Wales, Australia where he served as lecturer with the Australian American Educational Foundation.

DONALD HANCOCK, University of Texas, has received matching grants from the University of Texas Research Institute and the Research Associates Program, University of Denver, for 1967–68. He will conduct field research in Germany.

ELISABETH HANSOT, Columbia College, will hold a Chamberlain fellowship, spring term, 1968.

ERWIN C. HARGROVE, Brown University, will be on research leave, 1967–68.

MURRAY HAVENS, University of Texas, has been appointed to the editorial board of the *Journal of Politics*.

FERREL H. HEADY, University of New Mexico, has been appointed to the Governor's Commission on Reorganization of State Government in New Mexico. He is vice-chairman of the commission.

ROBERT E. HOSACK, University of Idaho, will be on sabbatical leave in the Far East, 1967–68.

RICHARD D. HUGHES, Sacramento State College, has received a fellowship from the Council on Graduate Education for Public Administration and will spend 1967–68 in Washington, D.C.

WILLARD J. HUTZEL, Wright State campus of Miami and Ohio State Universities, participated in the First National Conference of the Council of Governments held in Washington, D.C., April, 1967.

OSCAR IBELE, Kent State, will be on a sabbatical leave during 1967–68 and will do research in Canada.

SCOTT JOHNSTON directed a four-week faculty institute on the Far East at Hamline University during the summer.

GARTH N. JONES, formerly of the University of Southern California, is now chief of the Public Administration Division, AID, Pakistan.

CONRAD JOYNER, University of Arizona, will be on sabbatical leave, 1967–68.

CAESAR E. A. KRAUSE, deputy secretary-general of the Franco-German Office of Youth, has been named the first lecturer-in-residence at Rutgers College of South Jersey.

ALDEN E. LIND, University of North Carolina, has received a Faculty Computer Studies fellowship.

H. MALCOLM MACDONALD, University of Texas, has been appointed a member of the Department of Naval Personnel Task Force on educational policies. He has terminated his tour as president of the association of NROTC Colleges and has been elected to a four year term on the executive committee.

HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, Columbia University will hold the Ford Research professorship at the university during the autumn term.

JOHN D. MARTZ, has returned to the University of North Carolina after a year's leave of absence under a Guggenheim fellowship. He spent 1966–67 in Ecuador and Peru.

LOUIS H. MASOTTI and DON R. BOWEN, Western Reserve University, have received a research grant from the Greater Cleveland Association Foundation.

C. PETER MCGRATH, Brown University, will be on sabbatical leave first term, 1967–68.

EDWARD N. MEGAY, University of Nebraska, has received a Fulbright grant to lecture at the University of Graz, 1967–68.

NORMAN N. MILLER, Michigan State University, has returned from 22 months of field work in East Africa.

BERNARD S. MORRIS, Indiana University, has received a citation for his book, *International Communism and American Foreign Policy*, as one of the most distinguished books by an Indiana author published in 1966. The award was made by the Indiana University Writers' Conference.

PAUL R. MURRAY, Sacramento State College, was on sabbatical leave, spring term, 1967.

FRANK MYERS, SUNY at Stony Brook, will spend the fall term doing advanced research at Yale University and the spring and summer terms in Italy. He has a grant from the Foreign Area Training Program of the SSRC.

ROBERT G. NEUMANN, University of California, Los Angeles, is on leave of absence and is

serving as United States Ambassador to Afghanistan.

A. F. K. ORGANSKI, University of Michigan, spent the month of April at the University of the Philippines where he delivered a series of lectures.

FRANK B. PESCI, Prince George's Community College, Suitland, Maryland, served as full-time administrative assistant to State Senator Royal Hunt during the 1967 session of the Maryland General Assembly.

RICHARD L. PARK and JOHN H. BROOMFIELD, University of Michigan, were co-chairman of the Third Annual Conference on Bengal Studies held in Ann Arbor, May 11–13, 1967.

ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR., University of Pennsylvania, has been named a nominated member of the Institute for Strategic Studies, London. He has also been appointed to the Advisory Panel on Developed Countries, Policy Planning Council, Department of State.

FRANK PINNER, Michigan State University, taught during the 1966 fall semester at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna.

JAMES W. PROTHRO has returned to the University of North Carolina after a year's leave at FLASCO University in Chile, 1967–68.

AUSTIN RANNEY, University of Wisconsin, taught at the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna, during June, 1968.

EMMETTE REDFORD, University of Texas has a university research grant for the fall term. He spent the month of July in the Department of Agriculture in Washington D.C. and the month of August teaching at the University of Syracuse.

ADOLPH REED, formerly of the Agricultural, Mechanical and Normal College in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, was a faculty fellow during 1966–67 at the University of North Carolina.

MELVIN RICHTER, Hunter College, CUNY, has been awarded a Senior Fellowship by the National Endowment for the Humanities for the academic year 1967–68.

JAMES ROACH, University of Texas, has been appointed the Vice-Chancellor's special assistant for International Education Programs.

EDGAR S. ROBINSON, The American University, will be on sabbatical leave, 1967–68.

RAYMOND S. RODGERS, University of Southwestern Louisiana, has been appointed chairman of a state negotiating team charged with drafting a cultural accord between Louisiana and Quebec.

EDWARD J. ROGERS, San Jose State College, has been elected Mayor of the city of Campbell, California.

CARL G. ROSBERG, University of California, will be acting head of the department of University College, Dar es Salaam, 1967–68.

HERBERT D. ROSENBAUM, Hofstra University, has been appointed executive director, Committee on Executive Branch, New York State Constitutional Convention.

CLINTON ROSSITER, Cornell University, will be on sabbatical leave, 1967–68. Part of his time will be spent as a visiting scholar at the newly opened Institute of United States Studies at the University of London.

JOSEPH ROTHSCHILD, Columbia College, has received a Guggenheim fellowship for 1967–68.

THOMAS RUSCH, California State College, Los Angeles, spent the 1967 spring term in India on a creative leave grant from the college.

KARL SCHMITT, University of Texas, has received a grant from the Institute of Latin American Studies of the University of Texas.

GORDON J. SCHOCHET, Rutgers University, pursued research in England during the summer under a university faculty fellowship.

DAVID C. SCHWARTZ, University of Pennsylvania, has been appointed to the editorial board of the new journal, *New Directions in Teaching*.

JASPER B. SHANNON, University of Nebraska, will be on leave during 1967–68 to do research in Switzerland. He has grants from the Woods Foundation and the University Research Council.

JERRY SILVERMAN, Central Washington State College, will be on leave until September, 1969. He will serve as an assistant provincial representative for AID's Office of Civil Operations in Vietnam.

JAMES SOUKUP, University of Texas, has received a grant from the University's Research Institute. He spent the summer in Japan.

IVAN M. STONE, Beloit College, directed the Beloit Seminar on International Organization during the summer.

BARBARA TETERS, Iowa State University, will be on research leave until October, conducting research in Tokyo.

ROLF THEEN, Iowa State University, will be

on leave during 1967–68. He will do research in Moscow and Leningrad under an Inter-University Committee Travel grant.

ROBERT THOMPSON, Sacramento State College, was on sabbatical leave, spring term, 1967.

PETER A. TOMA, University of Arizona, spent the summer in research in Hungary under an Inter-University Committee Travel grant.

JOHN E. TURNER and ROBERT HOLT, University of Minnesota, attended the Conference on Mediterranean Development, sponsored by the Institute of Man and Science, held in Tunis, Tunisia, March 17–April 2, 1967.

JACK L. WALKER, University of Michigan, will be on leave during 1967–68.

MEREDITH W. WATTS, JR., University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, will be on leave, 1967–68.

BYRON S. WENG, Wright State campus of Miami and Ohio State Universities, has been awarded a grant by the Regional Council for International Studies to travel and do research in Taiwan. He spent the summer in Taiwan.

LEA E. WILLIAMS, Brown University, has returned from a leave of absence in Malaysia.

ANN RUTH WILLNER, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, spent the spring and summer in Indonesia and Africa. She has been awarded grants by the Rockefeller Foundation and the American Council for Learned Societies.

CLIFTON E. WILSON, University of Arizona, will be on sabbatical leave, 1967–68.

DESMOND P. WILSON, formerly of Emory University, has joined the professional staff of the Center for Naval Analyses.

JAMES S. YOUNG, Columbia University, received a 1967 Bancroft prize for his book, *The Washington Community, 1800–1828*.

GEORGE T. YU, University of Illinois, Urbana, has been awarded an SSRC grant for 1967–68.

ARISTIDE ZOLBERG, University of Chicago, will be on leave from January–August, 1968 to do research in Western Europe. He has an SSRC grant.

STAFF CHANGES

NEW APPOINTMENTS

JOEL ABERBACH, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

EMILE B. ADER, professor, University of Arkansas.

VICTOR ALBA, lecturer, Kent State University.

BENEDICT R. ANDERSON, assistant professor, Cornell University.

JEAN DOUGLAS ANDREW, assistant professor, University of Maine/Augusta.

THOMAS ANTON, associate professor, University of Michigan.

E. RAMON ARANGO, associate professor, Louisiana State University; formerly of Kenyon College.

ROBERT J. ART, assistant professor, Brandeis University; formerly of the Kennedy Institute at Harvard University.

ROBERT L. AYRES, acting assistant professor, University of California/Berkeley.

RICHARD BALKEMA, assistant professor, Valparaiso University.

EUGENE BARDACH, assistant professor, Brandeis University; formerly of University of California/Berkeley.

WELDON V. BARTON, assistant professor, Texas Technological College.

THOMAS J. BELLOWS, assistant professor, University of Arkansas; formerly of Yale University.

FRANCIS BEER, assistant professor, University of Texas, September 1967.

RUTH A. BEVAN, instructor, Yeshiva University.

THAD BEYLE, assistant professor, University of North Carolina.

JAMES BILL, assistant professor, University of Texas, February 1968.

WILLIAM BISHOP, assistant professor, Denison University; formerly of Northwestern University.

WINFIELD S. BOLLINGER, assistant professor, University of Toledo.

JAMES BOLNER, associate professor, Louisiana State University; formerly of the University of Massachusetts.

GAYLOR MATTHEW BONHAM, assistant professor, University of California/Berkeley; formerly

of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

STEVEN J. BRAMS, assistant professor, Syracuse University.

BERNARD BRODIE, professor, University of California/Los Angeles; formerly of Rand Corporation.

STEVEN BROWN, assistant professor, Kent State University.

JERE BRUNER, assistant professor, Oberlin College; formerly of Yale University.

CORALIE BRYANT, assistant professor (half time), School of Government and Public Administration, American University.

EMORY BUNDY, assistant professor, Oberlin College; formerly of the University of California/Los Angeles.

JAMES D. L. BYRNES, assistant professor, Emory University; formerly of University of Maryland.

LARRY CALDWELL, assistant, Occidental College; formerly of Wellesley College.

BLAIR CAMPBELL, assistant professor, University of California/Los Angeles.

LOUIS CANTORI, assistant professor, University of California/Los Angeles.

ERIC CARLSON, Instructor, University of Nebraska.

GREGORY CASEY, assistant professor, University of Missouri; formerly of Trinity College, Washington, D.C.

DOUGLAS CHAFFEY, assistant professor, University of Montana.

SAMUEL G. CHAPMAN, professor, University of Oklahoma.

HSI-SHENG CHI, assistant professor, University of North Carolina; formerly of University of Chicago.

DOUGLAS A. CHALMERS, associate professor, Columbia University.

JAMES R. COBBLEDICK, assistant professor, Trinity College/Hartford, Connecticut; formerly of Skidmore College.

TERRENCE E. COOK, instructor, Washington State University; formerly of Princeton.

CORNELIUS COTTER, professor, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee; formerly of Wichita State University.

ANTHONY R. C. de CRESPIGNY, associate professor, Western Reserve University; formerly of Monash University, Australia.

ROBERT E. CREW, assistant professor, University of Minnesota.

MELVIN CROAN, associate professor, University of Wisconsin; formerly of Harvard University, September 1967.

RICHARD W. CROSBY, assistant professor, Emory University; formerly of Cornell University.

ADRIAN CRUTTWELL-VAUGHN, instructor, Wheaton College.

JOE B. DARNALL, assistant professor, Iowa State University.

JORGE A. CAPRIATA D'AURO, assistant professor, University of California/Berkeley.

J. CLARENCE DAVIES, assistant professor, Princeton.

PAUL DAWSON, assistant professor, Oberlin College; formerly of Michigan State University.

CHARLES DECHERT, professor, The Catholic University of America.

ALFRED DIAMANT, professor, Indiana University; formerly of Haverford College.

DENNIS D. DORIN, assistant professor, School of Government and Public Administration, American University.

LYLE A. DOWNING, assistant professor, Louisiana State University/New Orleans; formerly of Emory University.

LEWIS J. EDINGER, professor and research associate in the European Institute, Columbia University; formerly of Washington University, St. Louis.

ROBERT V. EDINGTON, instructor, University of Nevada.

JAMES EISENSTEIN, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

JAMES L. ELSTON, instructor, University of Arkansas; formerly of Princeton, September 1967.

ROBERT B. EYESTONE, assistant professor, University of Minnesota.

SALO ENGEL, professor, Louisiana State University; formerly of the University of Tennessee.

ADA W. FINIFTER, assistant professor, Michigan State University.

DAVID P. FLINT, instructor, University of Idaho, 1967–68.

R. BOOTH FOWLER, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

DOUGLAS FOX, instructor, Bowdoin College.

EDWARD I. FRIEDLAND, assistant professor, SUNY at Stony Brook.

EDWARD FRIEDMAN, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

RICHARD B. FRIEDMAN, assistant professor, SUNY/Buffalo; formerly of University of Pittsburgh.

WAYNE L. FRANCIS, associate professor, University of Washington; formerly of Syracuse University.

JOSEPH FREEMAN III, assistant professor, Emory University; formerly of University of Virginia.

JOHN GARGAN, assistant professor, Kent State University.

ROBERT GERSTEIN, assistant professor, University of California/Los Angeles; formerly of University of Minnesota, September 1967.

VERNON M. GOETCHEUS, Columbia College.

LOUIS GOLD, instructor, University of Illinois/Urbana.

EDWARD GONZALEZ, lecturer, University of California/Los Angeles; formerly of Wellesley College.

JEAN GRAHAM, adjunct professor, University of Denver.

A. JAMES GREGOR, acting associate professor, University of California/Berkeley; formerly of University of Kentucky/Lexington.

FREDERICK W. GRUPP, assistant professor, Louisiana State University; formerly of University of Wisconsin/Racine.

ISOBIL GRUHN, assistant professor, Oberlin College; formerly of University of California/Berkeley.

TED GURR, assistant professor, Princeton University; formerly research associate, Center of International Studies, Princeton.

CHARLES B. HAGAN, professor, University of Houston; formerly of University of Illinois/Champaign-Urbana.

DONALD W. HANSON, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

ROBERT HARDGRAVE, assistant professor, University of Texas; formerly of Oberlin College.

B. DOUGLAS HARMAN, assistant professor, School of Government and Public Administration, The American University. He will be associated also with The Washington Center for Metropolitan Studies.

FRED M. HAYWARD, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

NANCY W. HEER, instructor, Wellesley College.

ARNOLD J. HEIDENHEIMER, professor, Washington University; formerly of University of Florida.

RICHARD H. HEINDEL, dean of the faculty and professor, Capitol Campus, Pennsylvania State University; formerly president of Pratt Institute.

GERALD J. HEWITT, assistant professor, Whittier College; formerly of Kent State University.

MARVIN HOFFENBERG, professor in residence, University of California/Los Angeles; formerly of the Institute of Industrial Relations, UCLA.

RICHARD I. HOFFERBERT, assistant professor, Cornell University; formerly of Williams College.

JOSEPH C. HONAN, assistant professor, Sacramento State College; formerly of University of Wisconsin/Kenosha.

MICHAEL J. HORAN. assistant professor, University of Wyoming.

JACK W. HOPKINS, assistant professor, Emory University; formerly of Georgia State College.

J. WOODFORD HOWARD, associate professor, Johns Hopkins University.

J. PAUL JOHNSTON, assistant professor, University of Alberta.

ZILLUR KAHN, assistant professor, Wisconsin State University/Oshkosh; formerly of Sonoma State College.

TETSUYA KATAOKA, assistant professor, State University of New York/Buffalo; formerly of Vassar College.

GERALD E. KEARNS, assistant professor, University of Dayton; formerly of Wayne State University.

HONG N. KIM, assistant professor, West Virginia University.

GEORGE L. KRAFT, assistant professor, Washington University; formerly of University of Michigan.

RICHARD LANDRY, instructor, Cornell University, 1967–68.

RUTH A. LANE, assistant professor, School of Government and Public Administration, The American University.

MICHAEL A. LEISERSON, assistant professor, University of California/Berkeley.

CHARLES F. LEVINE, instructor, SUNY at Stony Brook.

JOHN M. LEWIS, instructor, Cornell University.

CHARLES LIEBMAN, associate professor, Yeshiva University.

JAMES W. LINDEEN, assistant professor, University of Toledo.

SHIRLEY A. LINDEEN, instructor, University of Toledo.

GENEVIEVE LINEBARGER, associate professor, Trinity College, Washington, D.C.

ROBERT LINEBERRY, assistant professor, University of Texas; formerly of University of North Carolina.

NOAH LUCAS, lecturer, Sheffield University, Great Britain, October, 1967; formerly visiting lecturer, Glasgow University.

WILLIAM A. LUCAS, assistant professor, SUNY at Buffalo; formerly of Ohio State University.

STUART A. MACKOWN, assistant professor, University of Wyoming; formerly of Washington College.

EDWARD S. MAKECKI, JR., assistant professor, California State College/Los Angeles; formerly of University of Illinois.

VINCENT MARANDO, lecturer, University of Arizona; formerly of Michigan State University.

THEODORE R. MARMOR, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

GEORGE J. MAUER, associate professor, Drake University; formerly of Oklahoma State University.

MARVIN MAURER, assistant professor, Louisiana State University; formerly of University of Southwestern Louisiana.

CHARLES G. MAYO, assistant professor and associate dean of the graduate school, University of Southern California.

JOEL PATRICK MCBRIDE, assistant professor, Sacramento State College; formerly of UCLA.

STEVEN MCCARL, assistant professor, University of Denver.

J. PETER MEEKISON, assistant professor, University of Alberta; formerly of University of Washington.

RICHARD MERELMAN, assistant professor, University of California/Los Angeles; formerly of Wesleyan University.

PATRICK M. MORGAN, instructor, Washington State University; formerly of Yale University.

JEREMIAH MURPHY, instructor, Wheaton College.

TERRY W. NARDIN, assistant professor, SUNY at Buffalo; formerly of Northwestern University.

JACK NORAGON, instructor, Denison University.

JEFFREY OBLER, assistant professor, University of North Carolina/Chapel Hill.

VICTOR OLORUNSOLA, assistant professor, Iowa State University; formerly of San Jose State College.

BARBARA C. OSAKWE, assistant professor, California State College/Los Angeles; formerly of Mt. St. Mary's College.

JAMES S. PACY, assistant professor, University of Vermont; formerly of Westminster College.

ARVIN PALMER, lecturer, Whittier College.

THOMAS A. PARNELL, JR., instructor, University of Wyoming.

DAVID F. PAULSEN, associate professor, Louisiana State University/New Orleans; formerly of University of Arizona.

SOPHIA PETERSON, assistant professor, West Virginia University.

PAUL E. PETERSON, assistant professor, University of Chicago.

JOHN M. PHELPS, interim assistant professor, The Catholic University of America.

CHARLES R. PLANCK, assistant professor, SUNY at Buffalo; formerly of John Hopkins University (SAIS).

NELSON W. POLSBY, professor, University of California/Berkeley; formerly of Wesleyan University.

NATHAN S. POPKIN, assistant professor, Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, September

1967; formerly visiting assistant professor, Simon Fraser.

G. BINGHAM POWELL, assistant professor, University of California/Berkeley.

DOUGLAS W. RAE, assistant professor, Yale University; formerly of Syracuse University.

ALAN REED, assistant professor, University of Nebraska.

EDWARD F. RENWICK, assistant professor, Louisiana State University/New Orleans; formerly of University of Southwestern Louisiana.

RANDALL B. RIPLEY, associate professor, Ohio State University; formerly of the Brookings Institution.

IRA S. ROHTER, lecturer, University of California/Berkeley, 1967–68.

GEORGE K. ROMOSER, associate professor, University of New Hampshire; formerly of Connecticut College.

LESLIE J. ROOS, JR., assistant professor, Brandeis University; formerly of M.I.T.

RICHARD N. ROSECRANCE, professor, University of California/Berkeley; formerly of UCLA.

JON ROSENBAUM, instructor, Wellesley College.

ALBERT H. ROSENTHAL, professor, University of New Mexico.

STEPHEN ROZMAN, instructor, University of Nebraska.

ROBERT RUSSELL, assistant professor, Wisconsin State University/Oshkosh; formerly of Bowdoin College.

BRENT M. RUTHERFORD, assistant professor, SUNY at Buffalo; formerly of Northwestern University.

PHILIPPE SCHMITTER, assistant professor, University of Chicago.

GLENDON SCHUBERT, William Rand Kenan, Jr. professor, University of North Carolina; formerly of Michigan State University.

PAUL SEABURY, professor, University of California/Berkeley; formerly of University of California/Santa Cruz.

DONALD SEARING, assistant professor, University of North Carolina; formerly of Washington University.

MORLEY SEGAL, associate professor, School of Government and Public Administration, The American University.

JAMES C. SCOTT, assistant professor, University of Wisconsin.

ROBERT S. SHARLET, assistant professor, Union College; formerly of University of Missouri.

HENRY SHUE, joint appointment as assistant professor, political science and philosophy, University of North Carolina.

SARA M. SHUMER, assistant professor, Haverford College; formerly of University of California/Berkeley.

RANDOLPH M. SIVERSON, acting assistant professor, University of California/Riverside.

BRUCE L. R. SMITH, associate professor, Columbia University.

ROGER M. SMITH, assistant professor, University of Michigan; formerly of University of Washington.

STEVEN SPIEGEL, assistant professor, University of California/Los Angeles.

WILLIAM C. SPRAGENS, assistant professor, Wisconsin State University/Oshkosh; formerly of Millikin University.

GEORGE STAMBUK, professor, George Washington University program, Naval War College Center, New Port, Rhode Island.

HERBERT W. STEPHENS, assistant professor, University of Arkansas, September 1967; formerly of Florida State University.

STEPHEN V. STEPHENS, assistant professor, University of California/Los Angeles, September 1967.

DENNIS C. STORER, lecturer, University of Colorado, September 1967.

JOHN R. SWANSON, assistant professor, University of Missouri.

RICHARD TAYLOR, professor, Kent State University; formerly of Coe College.

PAUL A. THARP, instructor, University of Oklahoma.

ELIAS S. THERMOS, instructor, Roosevelt University.

DENNIS THOMPSON, lecturer, University of Arizona; formerly of University of California /Santa Barbara.

THOMAS LANDON THORSON, associate professor, University of Toronto; formerly of the University of Wisconsin.

GLEN E. THUROW, assistant professor, SUNY at Buffalo; formerly of Bucknell University.

JAMES W. TODD, assistant professor, University of Washington; formerly of University of Iowa.

TAKETSUGU TSURUTANI, assistant professor, University of Maine.

WILLIAM P. TUCKER, professor, Texas Technological College.

EDWARD R. TUFTE, assistant professor, Princeton; formerly of Yale.

FRANKLIN TUGWELL, Pomona College, February 1, 1968.

PAUL W. VAN DER VEUR, professor and director Southeast Asia Studies Center, Ohio University; formerly of Northern Illinois University.

HERBERT WEISBERG, assistant professor, University of Michigan.

DONALD WILHELM, professor, Kent State University; spring 1968.

T. ALDEN WILLIAMS, associate professor, Kansas State University; formerly of University of Denver.

RICHARD WILSON, lecturer, Princeton.

DEIL WRIGHT, professor, University of North Carolina; formerly of University of Iowa.

SHERMAN WYMAN, assistant professor, University of Denver.

RODGER D. YEAGER, assistant professor, West Virginia University.

RICHARD M. YEARWOOD, associate professor, Center for Urban and Regional Studies, Virginia Tech.; formerly executive director, Asheville Metropolitan Planning Board.

ORAN R. YOUNG, assistant professor and bicentennial preceptor, Princeton; formerly of Center of International Studies, Princeton.

ELLIOT ZASHIN, assistant professor, University of Texas; formerly of University of California /Berkeley.

SUSAN G. ZIELENBACH, instructor, Trinity College, Washington, D.C.

KENNETH C. ZIMMERMAN, assistant professor, University of Maine.

MARVIN ZONIS, assistant professor, University of Chicago; formerly of MIT.

VISITING APPOINTMENTS

PHILIP ABRAMS, Cambridge University: professor, M.I.T., 1967–68.

A. DOAK BARNETT, Columbia University: professor, M.I.T., 1967–68.

GLENN E. BROOKS, Colorado College: professor, University College, Nairobi, Kenya, 1967–68.

GEORGE E. G. CATLIN, London, lecturer, University of Illinois, fall, 1967.

PETER PING-CHII CHENG, reappointed professor, University of Nebraska, 1967–68.

ALAN F. DAVIES, University of Melbourne: professor, University of Alberta, 1967–68.

RAYMOND H. DAWSON, University of North Carolina: professor and research associate, Institute for War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, 1967–68.

OLCOTT DEMING, former Ambassador to Uganda and currently Senior State Fellow in Residence: professor, University of North Carolina, 1966–67.

LYLE A. DOWNING, formerly of Emory University: assistant professor, Louisiana State University.

JOSEPH DUNNER, Yeshiva University: professor, Research Institute of Political Science and European Problems, University of Cologne, summer, 1967.

BEN FRANKLIN, Chico State College: professor, Sacramento State College, fall, 1967.

ANNE FREEDMAN, associate professor, Roosevelt University.

RICHARD M. FULTON, instructor, Western Reserve University.

MICHAEL P. GEHLEN, Purdue University: associate professor, University of California at Berkeley.

HARVEY GLICKMAN, Haverford College: professor and Fulbright lecturer, Hebrew University Jerusalem, 1967–68.

RUDOLPH GOMEZ, Colorado College: Fulbright-Hayes lecturer, Catholic University, Lima, Peru, April-December, 1967.

KENNETH W. GRUNDY, Western Reserve University: professor, Makerere University College, University of East Africa, Kampala, Uganda, 1967–68.

DARRELL P. HAMMER, Indiana University: professor, Columbia, spring 1967.

DONALD HANCOCK, University of Texas: assistant professor, Columbia, summer, 1967.

MILTON HOBBS, Indiana University: lecturer, University of Illinois, 1967–68.

CHARLES JUDAH, University of New Mexico: professor, Sacramento State College, 1967–68.

ARTHUR KALLEBERG, professor, University of Minnesota, 1967–68.

SANFORD A. LAKOFF, SUNY at Stony Brook: professor, University of Toronto, 1967–68.

REMY LEVEAU, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris: associate professor, University of Michigan, 1967–68.

KLAUS LIEPELT, DATUM, Germany: lecturer, University of Michigan summer, 1967.

VERNON MCGEE, formerly director of the Legislative Budget Bureau of the State of Texas: lecturer, University of Texas, spring, 1967.

VAL G. MIXON, instructor, Emory University.

RAY MOREY, Denison University: Ohio State University, summer, 1967.

MARK NEUWALD, University of New Mexico: associate professor, University of California at Berkeley, summer, 1967.

KARL O'LESSKER, professor, University of Illinois, Urbana, 1967–68.

FELIX E. OPPENHEIM, University of Massachusetts: professor, Columbia University, autumn, 1967.

CHARLES PARRISH, University of Texas: senior lecturer, University of Essex, Colchester, England, 1967–68.

STEFANO A. PASSIGLI, University of Padua, Italy: associate professor, University of Michigan, fall, 1967.

WILLIAM RITCHIE, Western State University (Michigan): associate professor, University of Texas, spring, 1967.

BERNARD SCHAFFER, University of Sussex, England: professor, Cornell University, fall term, 1967.

RICHARD F. STARR, Emory University: professor, National War College, 1967–68.

HANS B. THORELLI, Indiana University; professor, University of South Africa, summer, 1967.

HERBERT TINGSTEN, George A. Miller professor, University of Illinois, Urbana, fall, 1967.

IRWIN L. WHITE, assistant professor, University of Arizona, 1967–68.

JERZY WIATR, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw: professor, University of Michigan, summer, 1967.

FREDERICK M. WIRT, Dension University: professor, University of California, 1967–68.

PROMOTIONS (with new rank)

CHARLES W. ANDERSON, University of Wisconsin; professor.

DONALD L. M. BLACKMER, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: associate professor.

BOHDAN R. BOCIURKIW, University of Alberta, Canada: professor.

FRANK BONILLA, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: professor.

ROBERT B. CALLAHAN, California State College/Los Angeles: professor.

C. W. CASSINELLI, University of Washington: full professor.

DAVID CHANG, Wisconsin State University /Oshkosh: professor.

JOYOTPAUL CHAUDHURI, University of South Dakota: associate professor.

DOROTHY I. CLINE, University of New Mexico: professor.

FRANK T. COLON, Lehigh University: associate professor.

MICHAEL N. DANIELSON, Princeton University: associate professor.

ARTHUR DARKEN, Wisconsin State University /Oshkosh: professor.

JAMESON W. DOIG, Princeton University: associate professor.

ALEX EDELMANN, University of Nebraska: professor.

JOHN D. ESSEKS, Wisconsin State University /Oshkosh: assistant professor.

LEONARD J. FEIN, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: associate professor.

JEFF FISHEL, The American University: assistant professor.

RICHARD FLATHAM, University of Chicago: associate professor.

DONALD M. FREEMAN, University of Arizona: associate professor.

FELIX V. GAGLIANO, Purdue University: assistant professor.

ROBERT S. GETZ, Kent State University: associate professor.

ROYAL C. GILKEY, West Virginia University: professor.

ALBA M. GILLESPIE, Humboldt State College: associate professor.

ROBERT G. GILPIN, JR., Princeton University: associate professor.

BETTY GLAD, University of Illinois: associate professor.

EMILIA L. GOVAN, Trinity College: assistant professor.

REV. FRANCIS J. GROGAN, S. J., St. Peter's College: associate professor.

JOEL B. GROSSMAN, University of Wisconsin: associate professor.

MANFRED HALPERN, Princeton University: professor.

ROYCE HANSON, American University: professor.

ERVIN C. HARGROVE, Brown University: associate professor.

KENNETH KOFMEHL, Purdue University: professor.

FRED IKLÉ, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: professor.

WARREN F. ILCHMAN, University of California /Berkeley: associate professor.

HERBERT JACOB, University of Wisconsin: professor.

JAMES H. LARE, Occidental College: professor.

CHARLES S. LIEBMAN, Yeshiva College: associate professor.

N. O. LINTON, University of Alberta: associate professor.

JOHN P. LOVELL, Indiana University: associate professor.

ROBERT E. MACARTHUR, Vassar College: assistant professor.

DAVID S. MCLELLAN, University of California at Riverside: professor.

LOUIS H. MASOTTI, Western Reserve University: associate professor.

JOSEPH NYOMARKAY, University of Southern California: associate professor.

WILLIAM MELNICOE, Sacramento State College: professor.

HUSAIN MUSTAFA, Kent State University: associate professor.

BRUCE F. NORTON, The American University: assistant professor.

BEEMAN PATTERSON, Kent State University: assistant professor.

T. C. POCKLINGTON, University of Alberta: associate professor.

MOJMIR POVOLNY, Lawrence University: professor.

NATHANIEL S. PRESTON, The American University: professor.

GEORGE W. RICE, West Virginia University: associate professor.

JOHN B. RICHARD, University of Wyoming: associate professor.

GERALD RIGBY, University of Southern California: associate professor.

PETER H. ROHN, University of Washington: associate professor.

CARL G. ROSBERG, University of California /Berkeley: professor.

WARNER R. SCHILLING, Columbia University: professor.

WALTER S. SCHOENBERGER, University of Maine: professor.

ALLEN A. SPITZ, Washington State University: associate professor.

JOHN D. SPRAGUE, Washington University: associate professor.

JAMES WATSON, San Jose State College: professor.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPOINTMENTS

LUCIUS J. BARKER: professor and joint appointment as a research associate in the Chancellor's office, University of Illinois/Urbana, September 1, 1967.

WILLIAM J. BLOCK: head, North Carolina State College/Raleigh.

BERNARD C. BORNING: acting head, University of Idaho, 1967–68.

ROBERT E. CECILE: chairman, Wright State Campus of Miami and Ohio State Universities.

JAMES B. CHRISTOPH: professor and chairman, Indiana University, formerly of Ohio State University.

JAMES T. CROWN: chairman, University College, New York University.

ATHERN P. DAGGETT: acting president, Bowdoin College, 1967–68.

FRANK C. DARLING: head, DePauw University; formerly of University of Colorado.

RICHARD R. DOHM, University of Missouri, has been named director of the university's Governmental Affairs Program.

JOSEPH C. DOHERTY: professor and chairman, University of Scranton, September, 1967; formerly of Saint Leo College, Florida.

ROBERT S. FRIEDMAN: acting director of the Institute for Public Administration, University of Michigan.

WILLIAM R. GABLE: professor and director, Institute of Public Administration, Arizona State University/Tempe; formerly of University of Michigan.

JAY S. GOODMAN: chairman, Wheaton College.

REV. FRANCIS J. GORGAN, S. J.: chairman of the newly created Department of Political Science, St. Peter's College.

HARRY S. HALL: associate professor and chairman, California State College/Los Angeles.

ROBERT HOLT: director, Center for Comparative Research in Technology and Social Change, University of Minnesota.

ROBERT W. HATTERY: assistant dean in the Division of University Extension at Indiana University. This is an addition to his duties as director of the Bureau of Public Discussion.

LYNWOOD M. HOLLAND: head, Texas Technological College; formerly of Emory University.

J. TERRY IVERSON: academic coordinator international affairs, University of Illinois Extension Division; joint appointment in political science.

EDWARD G. JANOSIK: chairman, State University College, Geneseo, New York; formerly University of Pennsylvania.

MALCOLM H. KERR: chairman, University of California/Los Angeles. July 1.

EUGENE C. LEE: director, Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California/Berkeley.

JOHN M. H. LINDBECK: senior lecturer in government and director of the East Asian Institute Columbia University.

EUGENE A. MAWHINNEY: head, University of Maine.

GRANT MCCONNELL: chairman, University of Chicago.

GERALD R. MCDANIEL: chairman, Sacramento State College.

R. JUDSON MITCHELL: assistant professor, Emory University.

ROBERT MORTIMER: assistant professor and chairman, Haverford College.

ROBERT PEALY: professor and director of the Bureau of Governmental Research and Service, University of Washington.

RICHARD POWERS: professor and director, The American University's Center for Technology and Administration.

ROBERT PRESTHUS: professor and chairman, York University, Toronto.

MERTON L. REICHLER: assistant to academic vice-president, SUNY at Stony Brook, July 1, 1967.

JAMES A. ROBINSON: professor and director, Mershon Center for Education in National Security, Ohio State University.

MARSHALL D. SCHULMAN: professor and director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University.

CARL J. SCHNEIDER: professor and chairman, Kirkland College/Clinton, New York; formerly of the University of Nebraska.

HOWARD WRIGGINS: professor and director of the Southern Asian Institute, Columbia University; formerly of the U.S. State Department.

RETIREMENTS

PRESTON W. EDSALL, has retired as professor and head of the department at North Carolina State University at Raleigh.

MARTIN L. FAUST has retired from active teaching at the University of Missouri. He has been designated professor emeritus.

NEIL F. GARVEY, University of Illinois, Urbana, retired from the department in August, 1967.

CHARLES B. HAGAN, University of Illinois, retired in June, 1967.

CHARLES B. JUDAH, University of New Mexico, retired on June 30, 1967 after twenty years of service.

JAMES K. POLLOCK, Murfin Professor of Political Science, University of Michigan, retired in June.

ROY E. SHERMAN, has retired from the University of Akron after 38 years of service. He will become a professor at the College of Emporia in September, 1967.

CARL B. SWISHER, Johns Hopkins University, retired in June.

RALPH M. WADE, has retired as professor of political science at the University of Wyoming.

FRANCIS G. WILSON, retired in June from the University of Illinois. He will teach at Long Island University, Greenvale, N.Y.

IN MEMORIAM

CARL L. HEYERDAEL, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Purdue University, died in Yuma, Arizona, on December 30, 1966. His first appointment at Purdue University was as instructor of history and economics in 1928. He advanced through the ranks of assistant and associate professor and in March of 1966, the Board of Trustees bestowed the title of Professor Emeritus of Political Science upon him. During his final years on the faculty he served in a variety of positions at the departmental and school level. In these assignments his stability and strength of character were particularly prized by younger colleagues who sought him out for counsel on both academic and personal matters.—PURDUE UNIVERSITY.

JOHN HALVOR LEEK, David Ross Boyd professor emeritus of government, University of Oklahoma, died February 14, 1967, at the age of 70, following a long illness. He is survived by his sister, Norma Leek, 478 College, Norman, Oklahoma.

A native of Batavia, Illinois, Professor Leek received his advanced training at James Millikin University, A.B., 1920; the University of Illinois, A.M., 1921; and the University of Pennsylvania, Ph.D., 1925. His teaching career subsequently was devoted to the University of Oklahoma from the time of his appointment as assistant professor of government in 1925.

He will always be affectionately remembered and revered by his students and colleagues as a superb teacher—rigorous, systematic, and interesting. He had broad cultural interests, which unobtrusively enriched his contribution to countless students of his classes in American National Government, American Constitutional Law, and Government and Labor. In addition to his fields of specialization, he always maintained a specialized interest and appreciation in the fields of American biography and political history, and music. He was an activist in the civil rights field.

In 1949, the evaluation of Professor Leek as a teacher, manifest by the actions of students and colleagues, was recognized by his university, with his appointment as David Ross Boyd professor—a distinguished professorship, honoring vigorous performance and leadership in teaching and guidance of students.

His published works included: *Legislative Reference Work, A Comparative Study*, 1925; *Principles and Functions of Government in the United States* (co-author), 1948; and *Government and Labor in the United States*, 1952, as well as articles in professional journals, and literally hundred of book reviews in local newspapers.—JOSEPH C. PRAY.

LINDEN ALFRED MANDER, Professor of Political Science at the University of Washington died on April 2, 1967 at the age of 70, two months short of his scheduled retirement in June. Professor Mander arrived in Seattle from his native Australia in 1928, and served the University with unmatched devotion to both his students and the civic community from that time until his death.

His contribution to the interests of the "civic community" deserves separate mention because his involvement in what has been called "continuing education" both antedated his connection with the University and would have postdated it had he lived to fulfill arrangements already entered into before his death. He was active in the Worker's Education movement of the Twenties while still a student at Adelaide, and he would have continued his highly successful University Conversation series on TV appearances on local channel 9 had he lived beyond his allotted three score and ten.

Mander's principal teaching interest was international organization, a subject writ large in portent within the span of his active career by the institution of two ostensible Parliaments of Mankind. And he responded to the intellectual challenge of these events with a combination of opti-

mistic faith and scholarly integrity which his students in particular, and the reading public in general, will long remember with affection and respect.

But I suspect those who knew him best will cherish most fondly the memory of a truly generous colleague who played the role of Christian gentleman to perfection precisely because he was one. It is, therefore, supremely fitting that a memorial fund to be used for scholarships has already been set up, largely at the spontaneous suggestion of his grateful graduate students—a gesture which testifies far more eloquently than mere words to the profound impact of his life's work on its most immediate beneficiaries.—KENNETH C. COLE

EARL C. SEGREST, a member of the Department of Government at Sacramento State College since 1950, died on April 9, 1967. He had been recently promoted to a full professorship.

JAMES A. STORING, Professor of Political Science, Dean of the Faculty, and Provost of Colgate University, died suddenly of a heart attack February 9, 1967, at the age of 61. Born in Slater, Iowa, July 20, 1905, he received his A.B. at Iowa State Teachers College, taught in Iowa public schools, and earned his graduate degrees at the State University of Iowa. In 1938 he came to Colgate University, which he served devotedly to the end of his life. For many years a leading member of the faculty he was appointed dean in 1961 and provost in 1964. In these administrative posts he astutely guided the university's recent academic innovations and growth.

Dean Storing's contributions to scholarship, professional societies, and public service were numerous and distinguished. He was author of a recent volume on *Norwegian Democracy*, and coauthor of *Men, Groups, and the Community*. His articles and monographs reflected wide-ranging interests. Actively engaged in educational and public affairs, he served as Director of the American Institutes of Indian Studies, Chairman of the General Education Committee of the Association for Higher Education, and member of the national council of A.A.U.P. During the war he served with U.N.R.R.A., and in his local community of Hamilton, N.Y. he held offices on the Village Board, and as President of the Board of Education.

He is sorely missed by colleagues, students, and friends, who remember him with deep affection.—EDGAR L. SHOR.

WILLIAM S. STOKES, Senior Professor of Comparative Political Institutions at Claremont Men's College, died on April 23, 1967.

Professor Stokes graduated from elementary and high schools in Montebello, California and secured his bachelor and and doctor's degrees from the University of California at Los Angeles. He was an instructor and assistant professor at Northwestern from 1943 to 1946 and an associate professor and full professor at the University of Wisconsin from 1946 to 1958. He was a visiting professor at Berkeley from 1951 to 1952 and came to Claremont Men's College in 1958.

Professor Stokes was the author of a widely used Latin American textbook and of *Honduras, an Area Study in Government*. He contributed numerous chapters to edited books and a tremendous number of articles to various learned journals. Along with these activities, he managed to give a substantial fraction of his time to his students, both graduate and undergraduate.

He also had an exciting career in fields outside the strictly academic. He was a guest lecturer at the National War College on a number of occasions and served as a professor there for the year 1962–63. In this capacity he traveled considerably in Africa, Asia and Europe and developed a deep appreciation of the quality of the people in the State Department, and "Intelligence Community" and other federal agencies dealing with international relations.

He was for several years Chairman of the Committee on Latin American Affairs of the American Political Science Association. For a period of time he served as commentator at Station WGN in Chicago.

His colleagues all share a deep sense of loss in the death of this vital and dynamic man.—GEORGE C. S. BENSON, *Claremont Men's College*

ROCCO J. TRESOLINI died of a cerebral hemorrhage 27 June at the age of 47. He devoted the greater part of his professional career to promoting a humanistic study of American public law with special emphasis on decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court concerning civil liberties. He consistently attempted to expand the audience for these subjects; and in recent years he worked hard to promote the teaching of constitutional law and civil liberties in the high schools. Always, he tried to write to interest the general reader as well as the scholar. Author or editor of seven books and many articles, he once remarked, "Sometimes I think that for a professor to write in a manner that the lay public cannot understand is a form of intellectual snobbery. It has been my ambition to write as well as I can, so that I cannot be criticized too much professionally, but at the same time to put together a book that the reader may enjoy."

He received his baccalaureate from Hartwick College in 1942 and his doctorate from Syracuse

University in 1949. In that year he joined the staff of Lehigh University, where in 1958 he became Professor of Political Science and, four years later, Chairman of the Department of Government. He actively worked for constitutional revision in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, was a frequent contributor to panels at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, and from 1965 to 1967 gave lectures on "The Court, the Constitution, and Public Policy" for the Brookings Institution. At the time of his death he was serving a term as Vice President of the Pennsylvania Political Science and Public Administration Association.

W. Ross Yates

Lehigh University

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION'S

Personnel Service . . .

The American Political Science Association's Personnel Service operates as a "clearing house," bringing together political scientists seeking positions and prospective employers. Registration in the service is open to all members of the Association. Here are the details of its operation.

Position Openings

- A Newsletter is mailed monthly to those Association members seeking positions through the Personnel Service. There are presently about 900 members in the Personnel Service.
- The Newsletter lists position openings and job descriptions.

Employers Using the Service

- Any employer may use the Association's Personnel Service.
- Types of positions listed include teaching and research on the university level, research and administrative positions with professional organizations, research and administrative positions with federal, state and local government agencies.
- There is no cost to the advertising institution.

Registration Fee

- An annual fee of $6.00 entitles members of the Association to register with the Personnel Service.

For further information concerning registration write to:

Director, Personnel Service

The American Political Science Association

1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington D.C. 20036

APSA SUMMER FLIGHTS TO EUROPE

FLIGHT A—Approximately June 15 to September 1, 1968

FLIGHT B—Approximately August 1 to 31, 1968

For the ninth successive summer, the Association will provide air service to Europe for its members.

Flights will originate at New York International Airport and arrive on the continent of Europe. The cost per seat will be approximately $300.00.

Final details will reach every APSA member in several weeks. Persons wishing to make reservations now may write directly to the Association, in care of the Director, Summer Flight Programs, 1527 New Hampshire Ave N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

WORLD POLITICS

A Quarterly Journal of International Relations

October 1967

Vol. XX No. 1

Measurement and Models in the Study of Stability ..... *Sten Sparre Nilson*

Self-Determination: The New Phase ..... *Walker Connor*

The Rise of the Justice Party in Turkey ..... *W. B. Sherwood*

Politics and Population Control in Latin America ..... *J. Mayone Stycos*

Toward Explaining Military Intervention in Latin American Politics ..... *Robert D. Putnam*

Review Articles by Sidney Verba, Henry Bienen, and T. V. Sathyamurthy.

One Year $7.50 • Two Years $12.50 • Single Copies $2.50

CENTER OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. 08540

1968-69 CONGRESSIONAL FELLOWSHIPS

The deadline for submitting applications for the 1968-69 Congressional Fellowship Program is December 1, 1967. Preference will be given applicants between the ages of 23 and 35.

Qualifications:

- **For Political Scientists**— Completion or near completion of Ph.D. in political science. Preference will be given to persons who are teaching or who intend to teach.
- **For Journalists** — Bachelor's degree and at least two years of professional experience in newspaper, magazine, radio or television work.
- **For Law School Faculty Members**— LL.B. degree and at least one year's teaching experience in an accredited law school.

Further information and application blanks may be obtained from:

The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Invitation to Membership

The International Political Science Association invites American political scientists to join IPSA, to make a contribution to international cooperation and to avail themselves of the advantages of individual membership. Founded in 1949, IPSA offers two rates of individual membership fees—one at $3 and one at $8, per year.

IPSA membership entitles one to receive the Newsletter describing IPSA activities and meetings; to buy books published under IPSA auspices; to buy sets of papers submitted at the triennial congress at reduced rates; and to pay a lower registration fee at the triennial congress. Individuals who pay the higher membership fee are also entitled to receive either *International Political Science Abstracts* or the *International Social Science Journal.*

The International Political Science Association also offers memberships to national associations and to associate members, such as universities, libraries, departments, and institutes.

To join the International Political Science Association, request membership forms from: International Political Science Association, 27, rue Saint-Guillaume, Paris 7e, France.

THE ILLUSION OF PERMANENCE

British Imperialism in India

By Francis Hutchins

By combining the techniques of intellectual history and social psychology Professor Hutchins provides a new perspective for an understanding of the intellectual atmosphere of British imperialism in India in the nineteenth century. 240 pages. $6.50

IMPERIAL JAPAN'S HIGHER CIVIL SERVICE EXAMINATIONS

By Robert M. Spaulding

In this historical analysis of the examination system that regulated access to Japan's inner civil bureaucracy and shaped its political outlook, the author describes the steps by which Japan came to accept examinations as the key to office.

368 pages. $10.00

WORLD ORDER AND LOCAL DISORDER

The United Nations and Internal Conflict

By Linda B. Miller

Through a careful analysis of selected cases, the author clarifies the legal and political factors limiting the United Nations' effectiveness in containing violence and promoting peaceful change. Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University. 224 pages. $6.50

STATE POLITICS IN INDIA

Edited by Myron Weiner

The essays in this book compare and analyze political processes in eight states within the Indian Union. A long introductory chapter by Myron Weiner sets the stage for individual studies of each state by separate scholars.

480 pages. maps. November. $12.00

Scholars are invited to write The Editor for a complimentary copy of our style booklet.

Princeton University Press

Oxford University Press PAPERBACKS

GB 197

Mitre and Sceptre

By CARL BRIDENBAUGH. "Puts the religious issue in the Revolution back closer to the center where it ought to be." — RICHARD HOFSTADTER $1.95

GB 199

The Crossroads of Liberalism

By CHARLES FORCEY. The Progressive Era, 1900-1925, is examined as a major turning point in American political thought. $2.25

GB 159

The Evolution of American Foreign Policy

By DEXTER PERKINS. The development of American foreign policy from the birth of the republic to the present. $1.65

GB 179

The Machine in the Garden

By LEO MARX. A study of the conflict between technology and the pastoral idea in America, its expression in American literature. $2.25

GB 211

The Republican Party 1854-1966

By GEORGE H. MAYER. The organization from its origins, the personalities and issues that unite and divide it. *Second Edition.* $2.95

GB 209

Slavery in the Cities

By RICHARD C. WADE. Shows what happened to slavery from 1820 to 1860 in a southern urban environment. $1.95

GB 6

The Strange Career of Jim Crow

By C. VANN WOODWARD. The classic account of racial segregation in America, expanded to consider the last decade's crises. *Second Revised Edition.* $1.50

GB 160

Patriotic Gore

By EDMUND WILSON. "Rich and fresh, full of accurate portraits of writers and historic figures . . . a strikingly original panorama of the years 1850-1880." — ALLAN NEVINS $3.75

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
1968-1969

Fellowships for College Teachers of the Arts and Sciences

FELLOWSHIPS: Fellowships are available in 1968-69 for several college and university teachers in the arts and sciences for a year of study at the Harvard Law School. Holders of these fellowships will ordinarily have the title of Fellow in Law and . . . (History, Political Science, Economics, Sociology, Philosophy, etc., depending upon their particular discipline).
PURPOSE: The purpose of these fellowships is to enable teachers in the social sciences or humanities to study fundamental techniques, concepts, and aims of law, so that, in their teaching and research, they will be better able to use legal materials and legal insights which are relevant to their own disciplines.
PROGRAM: Fellowship holders will presumably take at least two first year courses in law, in addition to more advanced courses, and will participate in a joint seminar. The year of study will not count toward a degree.
STIPEND: Within the limits of the funds available, the fellowship grants will be equivalent to the teacher's current salary, plus tuition. (A portion of the fellowship will ordinarily be free of income tax, in accordance with the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code.)
APPLICATIONS: Teachers of liberal arts, of any rank or age, may apply. Each must send a curriculum vitae (including academic record and list of publications), a statement explaining what he hopes to achieve through his year of study, and two letters of recommendation. There are no special application forms.
DEADLINE: Applications for 1968-69 must be submitted by January 15, 1968, to the Chairman, Committee on Liberal Arts Fellowships, Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138.

Awards will be announced before February 15, 1968.

Catalog of GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS
The New York Public Library, Economics Division

This outstanding collection includes the fundamental documents of all national and colonial governments so far as they have been published or attainable. Holdings are strongest for the United States, Great Britain, its related States, and for the Scandinavian countries and western Europe. Eastern Europe, the Near East, Asia, Africa and Latin America are also well represented. The library is a depository for United Nations documents, and has a strong collection of publications on international and regional agencies.

Estimated 700,000 cards reproduced in 40 volumes
Prepublication price: $2200.00; after April 30, 1968: $2750.00

Bibliographie Courante d'Articles de Périodiques Postérieurs à 1944
sur les Problèmes POLITIQUES, ECONOMIQUES et SOCIAUX
(Index to Post-1944 Periodical Articles on
Political, Economic and Social Problems)
Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris

Estimated 304,000 cards reproduced in 17 volumes
Prepublication price: $950.00; after January 31, 1968: $1190.00

10% additional charge on orders outside the U.S.
Descriptive material on these titles and a complete catalog of publications are available on request.

G. K. HALL & CO. 70 Lincoln Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02111



You mean I can get $50,000 of TIAA Life insurance for less than $100?

That's what an Assistant Professor asked us when he heard about TIAA's low life insurance costs.

It's true. At his age 30 the annual premium for a 20-Year-Home Protection policy providing $50,000 initial amount of insurance is $159.00. The first year dividend, based on our current dividend scale, is $61.00, making a net payment of $98.00. Dividends, of course, are not guaranteed.

The Home Protection plan is level premium Term insurance providing its largest amount of protection initially, reducing by schedule each year to recognize decreasing insurance needs. This is just one example of the many low-cost TIAA plans available. If you need more protection for your family, ask us to mail you a personal illustration with figures for a policy issued at your age. We'll also send the Life Insurance Guide describing other TIAA policies.

ELIGIBILITY FOR TIAA INSURANCE is limited to faculty and staff members of colleges, universities, private schools, and other nonprofit educational or scientific institutions that qualify for **TIAA** services.

tiaa

TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ASSOCIATION aG
730 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017

Please mail the new Life Insurance Guide and a personal illustration.

Name_____ Your Date of Birth_____

Address_____ ZIP_____

Dependents' Ages_____

Nonprofit Employer_____
college, university, or other educational or scientific institution

The Van Nostrand Political Science Series

Franklin L. Burdette, General Editor

THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE, The Soviet System in Theory and Practice, *Third Edition*

Edited with introductory notes by *Samuel Hendel,* The City University of New York. Available Fall, 1967, approximately 600 pages, about $4.95 (paper).

"*The Soviet Crucible,* edited by Samuel Hendel, provides a uniquely valuable selection of original Marxist and Soviet sources, together with substantial selections from many of the most penetrating analysts of Soviet power and society. This well-chosen compendium is an extremely useful supplement to courses on Russian history or Soviet politics." *Philip E. Mosely, Columbia University*

CONDUCT OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, *Third Edition*

Elmer Plischke, University of Maryland. 1967, 704 pages, $9.75

EUROPEAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

A Comparative Reader, *Second Edition*

Edited by *William G. Andrews,* SUC at Brockport, N.Y. 1966, 608 pages, $4.95 paper).

"This is an excellent and well selected collection of articles, speeches, and documents. It makes a most useful supplement to the usual textbook of comparative European government . . ." *E. Feit, University of Massachusetts*

PRELUDE TO NATION-STATES: The French and German Experience, 1789-1815

Hans Kohn, formerly The City University of New York. Available October, 1967, approximately 300 pages, probably $7.50 (cloth) and $3.50 (paper).

ARMS CONTROL FOR THE LATE SIXTIES

James E. Dougherty and *J. F. Lehman, Jr.,* both of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania. Just published in the Cloth Edition—$5.95. Paper Edition available November, 1967 about $3.25.

New Perspectives in Political Science

General Editor: Franklin L. Burdette

Forthcoming Fall Paperbacks . . .

MARXISM: A Re-Examination

Irving M. Zeitlin, Indiana University. About $1.95 (#13)

THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE

American Political Theory, Volume I

Neal Riemer, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee. About $2.45 (#14)

CIVIL LIBERTIES IN EUROPE

Four Case Studies

Edited by *Ronald F. Bunn,* Louisiana State University; and *William G. Andrews* About $2.45 (#15)

CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS

The Conflict of Interest Issue

Robert S. Getz, Kent State University. About $1.95 (#16)

Send for your on-approval copies. Write College Department,

Van Nostrand

120 Alexander Street

Princeton, New Jersey 08540

Scott Foresman College Division

New in 1967

THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

Readings in Constitutional Law

MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, University of California, Irvine

This substantive collection of readings, designed to survey the most important current cases, doctrines, and issues in the area of constitutional law, focuses on what the Supreme Court has done and ought to do about current issues. Topics examined in depth include freedom of speech, freedom of religion, reapportionment, Negro civil rights, expatriation, and the rights of accused persons. While a certain amount of necessary technical discourse is included, most of the materials deal with important general questions of public policy. The editor has written chapter introductions and selection headnotes and has added a brief section on research methods and problems at the end. *256 pages, softbound, $3.95*

CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATION

Issue 4

JAMES FINDLAY, DePauw University

Introduction by HENRY STEELE COMMAGER

A collection of essays on the world in the mid-sixties, this book can be used as a basic text in a current affairs course, as one element in a social science survey, or as supplementary material in a political science course such as American Institutions or International Relations. While the selections are completely different from those appearing in the previous editions of the book, they represent a wide range of institutions and areas of special interest. Instead of separate chapters on the Soviet Union and Communist China, a single essay on the Communist world as a whole is included. The new essay on Africa considers the Middle East, and a new chapter on religion increases the coverage given to contemporary socio-cultural areas. Two of the authors, Vera Dean and Holland Hunter, appeared in *Contemporary Civilization: Issue 3;* the remaining eleven contributors are new and include Soviet expert Donald Zagoria, sociologist Robert Nesbit, and critic Robert Ellman. The essays are generally political in emphasis but include consideration of social problems, science, religion, and the arts. An introduction by Henry Steele Commager and a separate section of readings from current journals and magazines provide additional perspective. Issue 4 contains four maps, 50 photographs, and a chronological chart of significant events since 1945 which has been updated and keyed more directly to the essays. *320 pages, softbound, $3.75*

SCOTT, FORESMAN AND COMPANY College Division

Glenview, Illinois Atlanta Dallas Palo Alto Oakland, N.J.

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

COEXISTENCE: COMMUNISM AND ITS PRACTICE IN BOLOGNA, 1945-1965
Robert H. Evans
"Communism — Italian Style" is well reflected in the twenty years of peaceful and continuous coexistence of communism and capitalism in Bologna.
Oct. 4 **224 pp.** **$7.95**

FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY IN THE WEST
Edited and with an Introduction by George N. Shuster
Noted scholars, philosophers and teachers present a study of freedom and authority in Church, government and society.
Nov. 6 **208 pp.** **$8.50**

THE CANAL, COMMUNISM AND CHAOS
Aspects of United States—Panamanian Relations
Sheldon B. Liss
A concise history and interpretation of United States relations with Panama, this study extends from 1903 to 1966.
Oct. 2 **304 pp.** **$5.95**

THEORY AND PRACTICE
History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx
Nicholas Lobkowicz
The dual concept of theory and practice is generally acknowledged to be central to Marxist thought. Dr. Lobkowicz examines the shifts of meaning and emphasis characterizing the history of this concept.
Oct. 3 **432 pp.** **$8.95**

THE INTEGRATION OF MAN AND SOCIETY IN LATIN AMERICA
Edited by Samuel Shapiro
The integration of men and nations is seen as the answer to the weakness and poverty of Latin America.
Jan. 23 **320 pp.** **$6.50**

PERSONALITY, POWER, AND POLITICS
Gordon J. DiRenzo
This study presents a comprehensive analysis of the modal personality structure of the professional politician.
Nov. 13 **272 pp.** **$7.95**

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556 / London, England

"Here is a book that should be within easy reach of all who would understand one of the great enigmas of democratic government."
—Hubert H. Humphrey

DEMOCRACY'S DILEMMA:

The Totalitarian Party in a Free Society

Benjamin E. Lippincott
University of Minnesota

Here is a searching study of the practical and ethical problems posed by a totalitarian party in a democracy. The author presents an informed critique of the traditional liberal approach to the problem, and considers the application of theory to practical policy in dealing with Communism. *1965. 246 pp. $6.50*

". . . a bold and frank exposition of one of the most critical issues confronting many contemporary democracies."—**International Journal of Comparative Sociology**

". . . exquisitely researched. . . . Dr. Lippincott has done his profession a real service."—**America**

". . . in every respect a major contribution."
—Professor Arnold Brecht

ESTABLISHED 1900

The Ronald Press Company
79 Madison Avenue • New York, N.Y. 10016

Two New Additions to The International Yearbook of Political Behavior Research Series

FP

PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS
Cross-National Perspectives

Edited, with an Introduction, by Seymour M. Lipset, *Harvard University,* and Stein Rokkan, *University of Bergen*

The most exhaustive international report to date containing eleven original contributions on voting patterns and the social basis of party support.
1967 512 pages $9.95

QUANTITATIVE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Insights and Evidence

Edited by J. David Singer, *University of Michigan*

The first book-length presentation of data-based studies touching all areas of international politics—from the psychology of individual decision-makers to the behavior of entire nations and alliance systems.
1967 352 pages $8.50

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ANALYSIS

Edited by James C. Charlesworth, *University of Pennsylvania*

A discussion and evaluation of the major contemporary methodologies in political science research through 17 papers, more than half of which were written especially for this volume. The twenty distinguished contributors include David Easton, Heinz Eulau, Milford Q. Sibley, William Flanigan, Edwin Fogelman, Robert T. Holt, Oliver Benson, Andrew Hacker, Morton A. Kaplan, Herbert J. Spiro, James N. Rosenau, Thomas C. Schelling, Martin Shubik, Karl W. Deutsch, Robert C. North, Fred W. Riggs, and Karl von Vorys.
1967 480 pages cloth edition $8.50 paperbound edition $3.95

DOMESTIC SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY

Edited by James N. Rosenau, *Rutgers University*
With a Foreword by Samuel P. Hayes

Ten previously unpublished studies by Bernard C. Cohen, Johan Galtung, Scott Greer, Theodore J. Lowi, Herbert McClosky, Lester W. Milbrath, Warren E. Miller, Milton J. Rosenberg, Kenneth N. Waltz, and Professor Rosenau.
1967 352 pages $8.50

THE FREE PRESS *A Division of The Macmillan Company*
866 Third Avenue, New York 10022

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*



New from the University of Chicago Press

The Future of Germany

Karl Jaspers

Introduction by Hannah Arendt

Translated and edited by E. B. Ashton

In her introduction, Hanah Arendt points out that this book is politically the most important to appear in Germany after the Second World War. The original edition, *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?*, has been at the top of the best-seller list in Germany for over a year. Americans will find Jaspers' ideas about the relationship of Germany to the United States and Russia and about the reunification of Germany especially interesting. A postscript to this edition includes Jaspers' thoughts on the "great coalition."

November 1967 LC:67-25510 208 pages, $5.00

Studies in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics

Friedrich A. Hayek

These eloquent, vigorous studies voice Hayek's endeavor to make "the philosophical foundations of a free society once more a living intellectual issue, and its implementation a task which challenges the ingenuity and imagination of our liveliest minds." His concerns range from the nature of economic theory to the philosophy of David Hume; from the ethical basis of free enterprise to the appeal that socialism has for intellectuals; from the way *The Road to Serfdom* was received to a critique of *The Affluent Society.*

1967 LC:67-18436 336 pages, $6.50

Constitutional Politics in the Progressive Era

Stephen B. Wood

This book focuses on the campaign during the progressive era to establish federal child labor legislation. It sheds light on what the author calls "the deeply political process by which constitutional law is formed." It has remarkable breadth of interest: it is important as social and economic history, as a contribution to constitutional theory, as a detailed study of the judicial process, and as a case study in pressure group operation before Congress and in the courts. *November 1967 LC:67-25525 408 pages, $8.95*

The Politics of Oil

Robert Engler

"The book is . . . a study of the relation of power and responsibility. [Engler's] contention is that the oil industry, one of the most complex collective systems known to modern man, has become, in effect, a private government controlling most of the petroleum resources of the world. The most impelling issue, therefore, is the impact of this control upon American political life."—Earle Wallace, *Journal of Politics.* This book is based on a series of articles which won the Sidney Hillman Foundation award for political writing, and was first published in 1961. *1967 575 pages Paper $2.95*

The Garden and the Wilderness

Religion and Government in American Constitutional History

Mark DeWolfe Howe

In this book the author contends that the Supreme Court has read into the First Amendment only its *political* principles, seeing the Amendment exclusively as "the safeguard of public and private interests against ecclesiastical depredations and excursions." He suggests that the Supreme Court has failed to recognize that the rule of separation was no less a postulate of faith than an axiom of doubt. "The Justices themselves would be well advised to read Professor Howe's truly creative essay."—Robert J. Steamer, *Journal of Politics.*

1965 LC:65-24977 180 pages Cloth $4.50, Paper $1.95

University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

more than 100 major adoptions!

". . . a great deal of careful planning has gone into this work; the result—a useful, readable, and lively text." Jerome G. Kerwin

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC:
An Introduction to American National Government

By MARTIN DIAMOND
and WINSTON M. FISK,
both of Claremont Men's College,
and HERBERT GARFINKEL,
Michigan State University

A wide-ranging and comprehensive examination of the American political order blending constitutional, legal, and institutional analyses with modern behavioral research. Called ". . . perceptive and imaginative . . ." by Clinton Rossiter, this introductory political science text provides a concise, factual account of the essential structure, functions, regulations, and powers of the American government.

The authors examine the processes of government to reveal the fundamental premises which they embody and to illustrate the direct relationship between political behavior and the constitutional structure. The 15 chapters stress the compatibility of the democratic and republican elements of the American system and emphasize that from the outset the Constitution supplied an essentially democratic frame for government.

Enough material is given in the book for a complete one-semester course. When supplemented with outside readings, *The Democratic Republic* supplies the framework for a longer course.

"The scholarship imbedded and embodied in this book is profound, probative, literate, and convincing. It is a delight . . ."—Victor G. Rosenblum, Northwestern University. *572 pages. $7.50.*

Important new books in Political Science from RAND McNALLY

ENEMIES IN POLITICS
By DAVID J. FINLAY, *University of Oregon,*
OLE R. HOLSTI, *Univ. of British Columbia,*
and RICHARD R. FAGEN, *Stanford University*

This book provides a theoretical and empirical discussion of the ways in which enemies are defined in politics and the functional relationship of conflict at the national and international levels. Includes three case histories, with the late John Foster Dulles, the Castro government, and Ghana as their subjects. *264 pages. $2.50 paper, $7.50 cloth.*

INTERNATIONAL REGIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM:
A Study in Political Ecology
By BRUCE M. RUSSETT, *Yale University*

This book explores some of the relationships between political systems and their social and physical environments. The author applies a methodology of new computational techniques using factor analysis. *320 pages. c. $6.50.*

MOVING THE SPHINX:
Government and Slum Housing in America
By LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN
University of Wisconsin

Develops general concepts and considerations about slum housing and goes on to discuss those housing programs which have directly attacked the problem of the slums in which the American poor live and have lived. *c. 250 pages. January 1968.*

A METHODOLOGICAL PRIMER FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS
By R. T. GOLEMBIEWSKI
University of Georgia
W. WELSH, and W. CROTTY
Northwestern University

Develops specific methodological guidelines for empirical research in political science, shows how these can be applied, measures various disciplinary areas of interest against the guidelines, and sketches the integrative approach by tying empirical analysis to the ethical concerns of political scientists. *640 pages. Spring.*

Write for examination copies.

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY The College Department, Box 7600 · Chicago, Ill., 60680

Robert A. Dahl's new American Government text

PLURISTIC DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES:

Conflict and Consent

"... the volume as a whole is truly outstanding ... the chapters on conflict represent not only a new departure in texts but also a splendid analysis in their own right..."

Aaron Wildavsky

"... this is a superb book which will be enormously useful to students and teachers alike... a valuable contribution to the political theory of the American system."

Austin Ranney

A clearly written, smoothly organized basic text introduces students to an original political philosophy of American government and shows how and why a pluralist democracy emerged on the American continent.

Organized around an historical analysis of conflict and consensus within a pluralist democracy, it discusses our political institutions and how they contribute to that democracy, examines our democracy as it functions in conflict, and finally assesses the influence which an individual can have on a pluralistic structure of government.

The author analyzes the purposes behind the establishment of our political institutions, then traces their evolution to the present. He integrates the theories and findings of behaviorally oriented studies wherever relevant, refers to traditional sources, and quotes extensively from classical writings. His development of pluralist democracy in the presence of conflict gives an innovative dimension to the book and is supported by case studies and analyses. Intensive examinations of specific cases illustrate or explain theoretical problems, problems of political action, or functions of institutions.

Dahl's use of personal references and frequent asides aids in promoting a rapport and involvement on the part of the reader. He encourages personal analysis by offering penetrating questions about the formation, principles and applications of pluralist democracy. *471 pages. $7.50.*

Write for examination copies.

New

RAND McNALLY Series on the Organization Sciences

Edited by ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI
University of Georgia

EMPATHY AND IDEOLOGY:
Aspects of Administrative Innovation
Edited by CHARLES PRESS
Michigan State University,
and ALAN ARIAN, *Tel Aviv University*
Here is a highly interesting collection of generalized and specific readings on problems and issues of administrative innovation. *276 pages. $3.50 paper, $6.00 cloth.*

ORGANIZING MEN AND POWER
By ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI
University of Georgia
Utilizing a broad range of materials from recent management experience, this book formulates an unorthodox model of line-staff functions which challenges traditional theories. *288 pages. $3.50 paper, $6.00 cloth.*

THE PROFESSIONAL IN THE ORGANIZATION
By MARK ABRAHAMSON
Illinois Institute of Technology
Concentrates on the professional as a member of an organization, dealing with organizational structure and control, norms, the management of strains, and socialization of future professionals. *168 pages. $2.95 paper, $7.00 cloth.*

MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION DEMANDS
Edited by ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI
and FRANK K. GIBSON
both of the University of Georgia
The 30 managerially related articles contained in this book portray demands to which managers must respond, develop specific analytical tools for understanding and describing these demands, and suggest ways by which managers can improve their effectiveness. *464 pages.*

ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
Edited by GEOFFREY Y. CORNOG,
ELLIS L. SCOTT, JAMES B. KENNEY,
and JOHN J. CONNELLY
The papers in this volume introduce government executives to EDP as it can be applied to law enforcement, tax and fiscal systems and educational systems. *Spring.*

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY The College Department, Box 7600 · Chicago, Ill. 60680

RAND McNALLY Public Affairs Series

Edited by ROBERT A. GOLDWIN
Kenyon College

New:

LEFT, RIGHT, CENTER
Essays on Liberalism and Conservatism in the United States

Authoritative spokesmen with opposing viewpoints discuss the controversies of liberal and conservative politics. *160 pages. $1.50 paper.*

REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION
January, $1.50 paper.

HIGHER EDUCATION, *January, $1.50 paper.*

A NATION OF CITIES, *January, $1.50 paper.*

Recently published books in the series:

POLITICAL PARTIES
Seven essays describe the sense of confusion and dissatisfaction shared by observers of the American political process. *158 pages. $1.50 paper.*

WHY FOREIGN AID?
Facts, theories, pros, and cons of foreign aid programs presented through eight essays. *140 pages. $1.50 paper.*

AMERICA ARMED:
Essays on United States Military Policy

Six essays in this volume treat the "unthinkable"—thermonuclear war. *140 pages. $1.50 paper.*

A NATION OF STATES:
Essays on the American Federal System

An examination of the federal system as it appears in civil rights, the farm program and welfare programs. *148 pages. $1.50 paper.*

100 YEARS OF EMANCIPATION
Treats the question of why slavery problems still exist 100 years after the Emancipation Proclamation. *217 pages. $1.95 paper.*

Write for examination copies.

American Politics Research Series

Edited by AARON WILDAVSKY
University of California, Berkeley

New:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE ISSUES IN THE FIFTY STATES
By WAYNE FRANCIS, *University of Washington*

This new book gives a clear, insightful picture of the nature of political conflict in the state legislatures, with an eye toward the implications of such conflict for actual policy. It identifies the major issues in the fifty states and classifies these issues into twenty policy areas. The major findings in this study are based on a legislator survey, correlational analysis, a classification scheme for legislative issues, and, to some extent, coalition reasoning. *c. 250 pages.* January.

Other books in series:

POWER IN COMMITTEES:
An Experiment in the Government Process
By JAMES DAVID BARBER, *Yale University*

An empirical study of the exercise of power in the decision-making process. *189 pages. $5.00.*

SOCIAL INSECURITY:
The Politics of Welfare
By GILBERT Y. STEINER
The Brookings Institution

A critical examination of the role of politics in the making of American public assistance policy. *270 pages. $6.00.*

POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE PUBLIC:
Policy Outcomes in the American States
By THOMAS R. DYE, *University of Georgia*

A systematic inquiry into the forces shaping public policy in the American states. *325 pages. $6.00.*

AMBITION AND POLITICS:
Political Careers in the United States
By JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER
Michigan State University

Demonstrates how the structure of political opportunities in the United States controls the behavior of politicians by directing their ambitions. *226 pages. $6.00.*

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY The College Department, Box 7600 · Chicago, Ill., 60680

Studies in Political Change Series

Edited by MYRON WEINER
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

New:

CULTURAL PLURALISM AND NATIONALIST POLITICS IN GUYANA

By LEO A. DESPRES
Western Reserve University

The author's field research analyzes the cultural dimensions of nationalist politics in British Guiana (now Guyana) and their development during the closing years of colonial rule (1960-61). Emphasizing the integration of the major Guyanese ethnic groups—Anglo-Saxon, Portugese, East Indian, Creole and Afro-Guyanese—into a modern society, Despres discusses the nationalist movement with special reference to the sociocultural system in which it grew. *240 pages.*

Recently published titles:

CREATING POLITICAL ORDER:
The Party-States of West Africa
By ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, *Univ. of Chicago*
Features an intensive analysis of the origins, structure, and future of one-party regimes as illustrated by Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal. *168 pages. $2.50 paper.*

SONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT:
Elite Youth in Panama and Costa Rica
By DANIEL GOLDRICH, *University of Oregon*
Shows how the direction of future national politics will be affected in Panama and Costa Rica by the thinking of the sons of incumbent elites who presently stand to inherit the establishment. *139 pages. $2.50 paper.*

PUBLIC LIBERTIES IN THE NEW STATES
By DAVID H. BAYLEY, *University of Denver*
This book discusses the current status of important civil liberties in emerging nations and analyzes the factors which have developed or curtailed these freedoms. *152 pages. $2.50 paper.*

Write for examination copies.

Books in International Relations

INDEPENDENT BLACK AFRICA:
The Politics of Freedom
Edited by WILLIAM JOHN HANNA
The American University
This collection of readings covers the history and problems behind black Africa's struggle for independence; it is designed for courses in African politics. *651 pages. $8.50.*

THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
By WILLIAM D. COPLIN, *Wayne State Univ.*
Here is an introduction to the role of international law in the contemporary world which employs analogies with democratic legal systems and applies a game theory concept to international bargaining. *312 pages. $3.50 paper.*

HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Edited by J. DAVID SINGER
University of Michigan
A collection of articles and excerpts written by outstanding sociologists and psychologists which relates behavioral sciences to international relations. *466 pages. $9.00.*

COMPONENTS OF DEFENSE POLICY
Edited by DAVIS B. BOBROW
Princeton University
These readings set boundaries and catalog problems of defense analysis within the social-science context. *445 pages. $6.50.*

TOWARD A STRATEGY OF PEACE
Edited by WALTER C. CLEMENS, Jr.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
A dozen scholars and public officials examine the obstacles to peace, emphasizing the interrelationships of domestic and international affairs. *264 pages. $3.50 paper.*

BEYOND THE COLD WAR
Edited by ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, *Kenyon College*
Future world politics are discussed by eleven authorities who stress global strategy, disarmament, war policy, and economic and political problems. *235 pages. $6.00.*

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY The College Department, Box 7600 · Chicago, Ill., 60680

Additional
RAND McNALLY titles in
Political Science

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM:
A New View of Government in the United States
By MORTON GRODZINS
late of the University of Chicago
Edited by DANIEL J. ELAZAR
403 pages. $6.00.

THE POLITY:
Selected Articles by Norton E. Long
Edited by CHARLES PRESS, *Mich. State Univ.*
247 pages. $5.50.

INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
Edited by S. SIDNEY ULMER, *Mich. State Univ.*
465 pages. $4.75.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:
Readings in Institutions, Processes, Behavior
Edited by R. T. GOLEMBIEWSKI, F. K. GIBSON, and G. Y. CORNOG
all of the University of Georgia
544 pages. $6.50 paper.

BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION:
O & M and the Small Group
By ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI
University of Georgia
258 pages. $5.00.

POLITICAL BEHAVIORALISM AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE
A Working Theory and Study in Judicial Decision-Making
By THEODORE L. BECKER, *Univ. of Hawaii*
177 pages. $2.50 paper. $5.00 cloth.

JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR:
A Reader in Theory and Research
Edited by GLENDON SCHUBERT
Michigan State University
603 pages. $9.50.

DEMOCRACY IN THE FIFTY STATES
Edited by CHARLES PRESS, *Mich. State Univ.* and OLIVER P. WILLIAMS, *University of Penna.*
528 pages. $6.50 paper.

Write for examination copies.

DEMOCRACY IN URBAN AMERICA:
Readings on Government and Politics
Edited by OLIVER P. WILLIAMS
University of Pennsylvania
and CHARLES PRESS, *Michigan State Univ.*
473 pages. $4.50 paper.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:
How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?
By LESTER W. MILBRATH
State University of New York at Buffalo
195 pages. $1.75 paper. $3.50 cloth.

THE WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS
By LESTER W. MILBRATH
State University of New York at Buffalo
431 pages. $6.50.

POLITICAL PARTIES:
A Behavioral Analysis
By SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD
University of Michigan
613 pages. $8.00.

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Edited by ROBERT L. PEABODY
The Johns Hopkins University
and NELSON W. POLSBY, *Wesleyan Univ.*
392 pages. $3.50 paper. $6.50 cloth.

THE PRESIDENT:
Roles and Powers
Edited by DAVID E. HAIGHT and LARRY D. JOHNSTON
both of Hunter College
400 pages. $3.75 paper.

CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR CONSTITUENCIES
By LEWIS A. FROMAN, Jr.
University of California, Irvine
127 pages. $1.75 paper.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
Edited by JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER
State University of Iowa
544 pages. $8.50.

HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Edited by LEO STRAUSS and JOSEPH CROPSEY
both of the University of Chicago
790 pages. $8.50.

THE CITY AND MAN
By LEO STRAUSS, *University of Chicago*
245 pages. $6.50.

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY The College Department, Box 7600 · Chicago, Ill. 60680

PROMOTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

with Illustrations from Kenya

by Jacob Oser

With the establishment of programs of economic development, many of the more recent nations—once the passive recipients of the benefits of more viable economies—have entered into an age where they themselves plan their own economic well-being. This study examines the problems of economic development in the light of the interests, requirements, and viewpoints of those countries and tests the validity of its theoretical conclusions with a close study of Kenya's attempts toward development. 242 pages $7.50


REVOLT IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA, 1896-97

by T. O. Ranger

This document on native opposition to white domination explains the causes, background, organization, and results of the uprisings in Matabeleland and Mashonaland and reveals the attitudes of both Europeans and Africans toward the colonial experience. 416 pages $12.95

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS

Evanston, Illinois



"This is an information-packed but very readable book . . . fascinating and appalling." —*The Virginia Kirkus Service*

MOVIES, CENSORSHIP and the LAW

By IRA H. CARMEN

"A very valuable and original piece of research . . . Professor Carmen's book is significant and useful . . . He undertakes for the first time to describe how movie censorship actually works in the United States, who the censors are and how they operate . . . By questionnaires and personal interviews he was able to determine how the machinery worked in each of these jurisdictions."

—*C. Herman Pritchett*
Professor of Political Science
University of California

$7.95

Leslie W. Dunbar
A REPUBLIC OF EQUALS $4.00

Werner Sombart
LUXURY AND CAPITALISM $6.50

Charles M. Rehmus and Doris B. McLaughlin, Editors
LABOR AND AMERICAN POLITICS $9.00
paper **$5.25**

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS

ANN ARBOR



Books of particular merit from ACC

VAN DYKE: International Politics, 2nd Ed.

VERNON VAN DYKE, *The University of Iowa*

1966 527 pages $6.50

ATWATER, FORSTER, PRYBYLA: World Tensions
Conflict and Accommodation

ELTON ATWATER, KENT FORSTER, *and* JAN S. PRYBYLA,
all of The Pennsylvania State University

Just published 396 pages illustrated paper $3.95

Instructor's manual for *World Tensions* now in preparation

SNIDER-GOVE: American State and Local Government, 2nd Ed.

CLYDE F. SNIDER, *In collaboration with* SAMUEL K. GOVE,
both of the University of Illinois

1965 735 pages illustrated $7.50

DOBY *et al.*: An Introduction to Social Research, 2nd Ed.

Edited by JOHN T. DOBY, *Emory University*

". . . a good, clear, simple introductory text for social research methods . . . highly useful in undergraduate political science methods courses."

1967 381 pages illustrated $7.50

MCKINNEY: Constructive Typology and Social Theory

JOHN C. McKINNEY, *Duke University*

". . . the most extensive discussion yet on social science typologies and 'typologizing' "—*APSR*. "Political scientists familiar with sociology and methodological problems," adds the *Review*, "should find Professor McKinney's book of considerable interest."

1966 250 pages $5.00

and the CUSHMAN supplements . . . each $.95

Cases in Constitutional Law, 1964-1966
Cases in Constitutional Law, 1966-1967

Edited by ROBERT F. CUSHMAN, *New York University*

Appleton-Century-Crofts
Division of Meredith Publishing Company
440 PARK AVENUE SOUTH, NEW YORK 10016

New

The California Oath Controversy
David P. Gardner
"An objective and judicious reconstruction of one of the most momentous events in American academic history . . . it has the special virtue of drawing on heretofore unopened sources."—Walter P. Metzger **$6.50**

Armenia on the Road to Independence, 1918
Richard G. Hovannisian
In an impartial clarification, Mr. Hovannisian demonstrates that the establishment of the Republic of Armenia was nonpartisan, and sanctioned by Armenian leaders in a desperate attempt to salvage the remnants of their people and the few districts still free of Ottoman occupation. **$8.95**

The Working-Class Tories
Authority, Deference, and Stable Democracy
Eric A. Nordlinger
One-third of the English working class vote goes to the Conservative Party, providing it with half its electoral strength. Mr. Nordlinger examines this seemingly paradoxical choice by examining the attitudes and experiences which shape the workers' electoral preferences as well as their self-identification as members of a working class. **$8.95**

Sea Warfare, 1939-1945
New edition, extensively revised
John Creswell, Captain, R. N.
Captain Creswell deals with the entire war at sea; the efforts of all the principal navies, and their strategy, tactics, weapon developments, single actions, and major campaigns. **$7.00**

Public Opinion and Canadian Identity
Mildred A. Schwartz. *Foreword by* **Seymour Martin Lipset**
Although it is common knowledge that Canada is divided on regional and ethnic lines, the extent of these differences is less well known. Dr. Schwartz's compilation and interpretation of Gallup poll materials affords enlightening information on Canadian political opinions, and enables her to describe how Canadians view their nation and to discuss the role of political parties in shaping a more integrated national identity. **$7.50**

Morley and India, 1906-1910
Stanley Wolpert
The Morley Era of Indian history was a crucial period of transition. Mr. Wolpert's central theme, carried forcefully throughout the entire text, is Morley's struggle to liberalize the Indian government against a host of strongly entrenched conservatives. **$6.95**



from California
University of California Press
Berkeley 94720

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

A new textbook from ***RONALD***

GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

STUART GERRY BROWN
University of Hawaii

•

WEBB S. FISER
State University of New York at Albany

•

JOHN S. GIBSON
Tufts University

Recently Published—This textbook surveys concisely but comprehensively the framework of the American governmental system. Intergovernmental relations are developed as cooperative action between levels of government rather than as compartmentalized treatments of federal, state, and local systems. Going beyond discussion of politics, parties, and pressure groups, this book shows how the political process unfolds around concrete policy issues in the context of changing historical developments. The many illustrative examples and the emphasis upon the shaping of governmental functions by broad political, social, and economic forces help to relate the subject matter directly to the interests of the citizen.

Particular attention is given to such currently important problems as urban renewal, metropolitan areas, poverty, race relations, law enforcement, agriculture, and education. The chapter on science and government and those on the international scene create a sense of student involvement in America's place in the world order.

An Instructor's Supplement containing multiple-choice, completion, and essay questions has been prepared by Bernard K. Johnpoll of the State University of New York at Albany.

1967. 803 pages. $8.50

ESTABLISHED 1900

The Ronald Press Company

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

for the college curriculum

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

John M. Pfiffner, University of Southern California; and Robert Presthus, York University, Toronto

Recently Published—Fifth Edition. This famous textbook examines administration at all levels of government. It integrates descriptive-institutional materials of administrative science with behavioral analyses of administration in action. It analyzes such aspects as the historical and institutional framework, separation of powers, role of executives (particularly that of the modern specialist), and the problem of obtaining superior talent. Covers decision-making and the data-processing revolution, and incorporates recent research into group behavior, individual motivation, and leadership dynamics.

5th Ed., 1967. 567 pages. $8.00

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

Russell H. Ross, University of Iowa; and Kenneth F. Millsap, Assistant City Manager, Iowa City, Iowa

This text provides a thorough treatment of the governmental activities of the fifty states and their local governmental units. Although predominant emphasis is on administrative aspects of state and local government, the book also presents material on the structure of governmental units below the national level. The role of counties, the position of the municipalities and special districts, and the peculiar problems of metropolitan areas are examined in detail. The importance of intergovernmental coordination is stressed, as is the growing relationship between the national and local governments.

1966. 705 pages. Illustrated. $8.50

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Donald C. Blaisdell, The City College of The City University of New York

This textbook acquaints the student with the theory and practice of international organization. It also serves to identify problems in international organization and to open fresh paths for further inquiry. The governmental structures that the world's nation-states have agreed to establish, their procedures, staffs, and finances are examined together with methods for meeting threats or breaches of the peace. The book analyzes the success of these organizations in maintaining peace, promoting respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms, and dealing with problems of general welfare. There are questions at the end of each chapter.

1966. 531 pages. $7.50

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY

Paul Buckholts, Eastern Michigan University

This recently published textbook provides a systematic approach to political geography for students of geography or related fields. It focuses on the internal aspects of political geography, underscoring the need for stressing relationships within a state before attempting a meaningful exploration of the international aspects. References to history disclose views of the subject which emphasize both its continuity and the variety of approaches taken to it. The main theme is how man, as a political animal, controls and affects, or is influenced by, this environment—never alone but in relation to other and different environments. In this approach, technology and man's attitudes play key roles.

1966. 534 pages. Illustrated. $9.00

79 Madison Avenue • New York, N.Y. 10016

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY PRESS

A major book, modest in its presentation— overwhelming in its implications

THE HUMAN DIMENSION

EXPERIENCES IN POLICY RESEARCH

by Hadley Cantril

In this book a noted American psychologist describes his attempts over many years as a consultant to the Federal Government to inject consideration of psychological factors into the making of crucial government decisions. Dr. Cantril explains how, if full use had been made of the polls conducted by the Institute for International Social Research, of which he is Chairman of the Board, the United States might have avoided our 1960 catastrophe in Cuba. And again, had action been taken on the information acquired by the polls of 1962 in Santo Domingo, the violence of 1965 might well have been prevented.

This book is an urgent invitation to top policy-makers to look at the peoples of the world—through the eyes of the people themselves—by means of a constant and sympathetic use, at all levels of policy-making, of the easily applied techniques he demonstrates.

DR. CANTRIL has been psychological advisor to all but one of the last five administrations. During World War II, he was an expert consultant to the Secretary of War and to the Office of War Information. *Charts, notes, index* $7.50

At all bookstores or direct from

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY PRESS

New Brunswick, New Jersey 08903

General Politics Quarterly

of Political Arts and Science

For political scientists, practical politicians, lawyers, public officials and employees, armed forces personnel, economists, administrators, and others who are active in public affairs and concerned with public policy from the local to the world-wide spheres.

Associate Editors

Rita Kapoor Bricksin, Saint Ambrose College
Elijah Ben-Zion Kaminsky, Arizona State University
John B. McConaughy, University of South Carolina
John R. Schmidhauser, University of Iowa
John E. Westburg, Saint Ambrose College
Urban Whitaker, San Francisco State College

Please include stamped return envelope with manuscript submissions.

GENERAL POLITICS, QUARTERLY
Of Political Arts and Science

1-year subscription - $3.50 — 2-year subscription - $5.50
3-year subscription - $6.00

Published by JOHN WESTBURG & ASSOCIATES
Conesville, Iowa 52739
Publishers of the North American Mentor Magazine

"The first serious effort to measure the consequences of the changes of the 1960s." —*THE ATLANTIC*

DONALD R. MATTHEWS AND JAMES W. PROTHRO

NEGROES AND THE NEW SOUTHERN POLITICS

A penetrating analysis of the Negro voter in the South: his past, his present, and the South's future—based on the largest collection of systematic data on Negro political behavior ever compiled.

"Easily the best book on Southern politics since V. O. Key's classic; makes use of detailed voting studies and comes up with some surprising conclusions."—Max Lerner

"Interesting and important."
—*The New York Times Book Review*

"Breaks new ground in political science and in the social sciences... richly multifaceted... A book that no one interested in American politics can afford to ignore."
—Prof. Fred Greenstein, *Wesleyan Univ.*

$12.50 HARCOURT, BRACE & WORLD

FROM CAMBRIDGE

MARTOV: A Political Biography of a Russian Social Democrat

ISRAEL GETZLER

This is the first full study of Julius Martov, the founder and leader of Menshevism, and of his ideas and activities in the Russian revolutionary movement and international socialism.

It records his revolutionary apprenticeship in Vilno and St Petersburg in 1893-96, his early friendship and partnership with Lenin in Siberian exile and on the newspaper *Iskra*, the break-up of that partnership in 1903 and the division between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks, and the ensuing feud between Martov and Lenin.

Dr Getzler discusses Martov's role in the 1905 revolution, his later activities as leader of the Menshevik-Internationalists, then of the socialist opposition in Bolshevik Russia until 1920, and of the Mensheviks in exile, until his death. $12.50

The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938-1965

ALAN WATT

Sir Alan Watt, Director of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, and former Australian Ambassador to the USSR, Japan and Germany, speaks at first hand of the changes in direction and scope of Australian diplomatic activity during and after World War II.

His study begins with the Munich crisis, at which time Australia had no diplomatic missions in any foreign country, was still relying mainly on British sources of official information, and tended to follow the British lead in foreign affairs.

He explains the reasons for radical changes in this situation, tells how and why current policy has developed, and concludes with a critical appraisal and suggestions for future policy. $11.50

1867: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution


MAURICE COWLING

A detailed historical narrative explaining how Disraeli in 1867 was able to pass a reform bill that seemed more extensive than the bill Gladstone could not pass in 1866. The work is based on a wide range of archive material, including manuscript collections from both political sides. $13.50

This book by Mr Cowling on the passing of the Second Reform Bill is the first of **a new series, Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics.** The series will include original works on the history of political thought, political history and the relationship between theory and practice; and modern editions of important texts in the history of political theory. James Fitzjames Stephen's classic of Victorian conservatism, *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity*, which went out of print in 1914, will be published early in 1968 in an edition edited by R. J. White.

The editors of **Cambridge Studies in the History and Theory of Politics** are Maurice Cowling, G. R. Elton, E. Kedourie, J. R. Pole and Walter Ullmann.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022



LATIN AMERICA IN WORLD POLITICS

by NORMAN A. BAILEY

Preface by RONALD SCHNEIDER
Latin America Institute of Columbia University

As an area of shifting political alliance in the "backyard" of the United States, Latin America holds a particularly significant place in world politics today. The international repercussions of the 1959 revolution in Cuba served as a violent reminder of this fact, and yet, there is a conspicuous gap in the literature on this aspect of Latin American affairs.


In his comprehensive treatment of the subject, Professor Bailey has set out to fill this gap and provide the student and informed general reader with an understanding of the role of Latin America in the international power structure. Working from an overview of the setting of world politics and the domestic situation of Latin America, he demonstrates the political challenges that arise from their interaction and proceeds to analyze the various ways in which the Latin American Nations have tried to meet these challenges through law, association and union.

Norman Bailey is Associate Professor of Political Science and Chairman of Latin American Studies, Queens College of the City University of New York.

"The frankest treatment of the subject since John Normanno's classic study published in 1930 . . . provocative and refreshing."—*Hobart A Spalding, Jr., History Department, Brooklyn College*

Index, Maps, Charts, Chapter Bibliographies, 320 pages $7.50

THE DILEMMAS OF AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE



by L. GRAY COWAN

In this important book, originally published in 1964 and now reissued in a completely updated edition, Dr. Cowan, director of Columbia University's Program of Studies on Africa, discusses the many problems which confront modern Africa: the emergence of single-party governments; the growing tensions between civilian and military leaders; the scarcity of trained personnel; the numerous obstacles to economic cooperation; and many others.

"If a library could have but one book on Africa, this might well be it."—*Library Journal*

"This is a perceptive and provocative study."—*New York Times*

162 pages *hardcover: $4.50 paperback: $2.25*

For examination copies, sent free for a 60-day period, write to



WALKER AND COMPANY
720 FIFTH AVENUE / NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10019

DOUBLEDAY ANCHOR BOOKS

THE FIRST NAME IN QUALITY PAPERBACK PUBLISHING

AMERICAN STRATEGY
A New Perspective
Urs Schwarz; preface by Henry A. Kissinger

A concise, comprehensive analysis of the changes since 1945 in the relationship between military planning and foreign policy, tracing the development of politico-military thinking in the United States. 95¢

CONGRESS
The First Branch of Government
Edited by Alfred de Grazia

Twelve studies by well-known political scientists which suggest ways in which the role of Congress can be strengthened, especially in relation to the executive branch of our federal government. $1.75

A HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM
Arthur Rosenberg; introduction by Samuel J. Hurwitz

First published in 1934, this is a history of Bolshevism from Marx to the first Five Years' Plan which ended with Stalin's consolidation of power. It predicts the failure of the international Communist movement, and is remarkable for both its clarity and its informed long view. $1.45

HITLER'S SOCIAL REVOLUTION
Class and Status in Nazi Germany 1933-1939
David Schoenbaum

A study of the impact of National Socialism on German society, analyzing the various appeals Hitler had for different social classes and groups. $1.45

MARX IN THE MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY
Gajo Petrovic

One of Yugoslavia's leading contemporary philosophers offers a fresh and lively reinterpretation of Marx as a philosopher, in the light of modern developments that Marx could not have foreseen. *An Anchor Original.* $1.25

DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC.
Garden City, New York
Our Laidlaw division, River Forest, Illinois,
serves the textbook needs of today's schools.

DOUBLEDAY ANCHOR BOOKS

THE FIRST NAME IN QUALITY PAPERBACK PUBLISHING

TAMING MEGALOPOLIS
Edited by H. Wentworth Eldredge

More than sixty experts from many disciplines delineate what the city is now, what it might be, and how it is to be managed—a unified yet many-pronged approach to the complex process of building an urban society of style and quality. *An Anchor Original.*

Volume I: What Is and What Could Be, $2.45
Volume II: How to Manage an Urbanized World, $1.95

A MAN OF THE PEOPLE
Chinua Achebe

This novel of political unrest in a new African nation, which ends in a military coup foreshadowing the Nigerian revolution of 1966, is, says *Time,* "worth a ton of documentary journalism." "Much of Achebe's considerable power . . . is achieved through his fine sardonic sense of the comic."—*New York Times.* 95¢

THE STUDY OF TOTAL SOCIETIES
Edited by Samuel Z. Klausner

Nine essays with a new approach to an understanding of modern society—the simultaneous investigation from the anthropological, economic, historical, political, psychological, and sociological points of view. *An Anchor Original.* $1.25

WRITINGS OF THE YOUNG MARX ON PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIETY
Edited and translated by Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat

A selection of Marx's major writings before 1847, the year of the Communist Manifesto, many of which have never before been translated into English, with a substantial introduction and detailed headnotes. $1.95

DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC.
Garden City, New York
Our Laidlaw division, River Forest, Illinois, serves the textbook needs of today's schools.

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

COLUMBIA  COLUMBIA

YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 1965

Published in cooperation with the United Nations, this nineteenth annual edition of the *Yearbook* provides a compact, fully indexed account of the wide range of the activities of the United Nations and the intergovernmental agencies related to it during 1965. Like its predecessors, it will serve as an indispensable aid for all those concerned with international affairs. $21.75

MANPOWER STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Lessons from Ethiopia

ELI GINZBERG and HERBERT A. SMITH

Drawing on their field investigations in Ethiopia in 1966 and on earlier studies in Asia and Latin America, the authors provide a new analytical model for the role of manpower in economic development. They delineate and assess the relationships between manpower and the key sectors—agriculture, industry, education, and government—in terms of the development of manpower supply, demand, and utilization. $6.75

DAKAR AND WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

RICHARD J. PETEREC

This study provides a historical picture of the development of transportation, agriculture, and industry in what was the former French West Africa, focusing on the role of the port of Dakar within the political and economic framework of the area. $8.75

THE GEOGRAPHY OF MODERN AFRICA

WILLIAM A. HANCE


"A clearly written, fact-packed handbook which will prove a mine of information to anyone interested in the many facets of the economic scene within the many countries and groups of countries of Africa."—*Economic Geography*

"A comprehensive economic geography of Africa—well illustrated, clearly written, packed with statistical, demographic, political, and economic information."—*Scientific American* $13.50

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

440 West 110th Street

New York, N. Y. 10025



COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

5 from BASIC BOOKS

ORGANIZATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Knowledge and Policy in Government and Industry
Harold L. Wilensky

A pioneering work which analyzes the use or abuse of both technical and ideological "intelligence" in government and industry (including the FBI and the CIA). *$5.95*

STUDENT POLITICS
Seymour Martin Lipset, Editor

A sociological and political analysis of *student unrest* in the United States: its causes, conditions, and consequences. *$8.95*

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE COLD WAR
Paul Seabury

The Cold War analyzed as a specific historical phenomenon questioning how the new types of international conflict relate to such venerable antitheses as capitalism vs. communism and American vs. Russian national interest. *$4.95*

NATIONALISM
K. R. Minogue

An account of the history of nationalism in the modern world which explores the various manifestations of the nationalist spirit and its impact in Europe, Africa, and Asia. *$4.95*

CONVERSATIONS IN JAPAN
Modernization, Politics, and Culture
David Riesman and Evelyn Thompson Riesman

"In *The Lonely Crowd,* David Riesman displayed an almost Tocquevillian capacity for microscopic and telescopic observation. I shall not be surprised if many students of Japanese culture do not find *Conversations in Japan* worthy of comparison."—Robert A. Nisbet, *Book Week.* *$7.50*

At your bookseller, or write **BASIC BOOKS, INC.** 404 Park Ave. S., NYC 10016



HENRY WILKINSON BRAGDON

WOODROW WILSON

The Academic Years

This study fills the long felt need for an authoritative assessment of Woodrow Wilson's professional career until his election as Governor of New Jersey in 1910. The author tells the story of Wilson's varied roles as an educator and traces the development of his political and economic philosophies. *Belknap Press.* $9.95



DAVID WILKINSON

MALRAUX

An Essay in Political Criticism

Mr. Wilkinson attempts to define and assess the political concepts of Andre Malraux through a chronological dissection of the themes implicit in his work. His critical analysis illuminates the essential continuity and significance of Malraux' thought and reveals a man who is complex but comprehensible. $5.95



JOHN D. MONTGOMERY *and* ARTHUR SMITHIES, *editors*

PUBLIC POLICY XV

Contributors to this annual publication include Kermit Gordon, Charles R. Cherington, Hugh Nugent, Maurice Ford, Dennis F. Thompson, Morton H. Halperin, Tang Tsou, Karl F. Spielmann, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, George F. Gant, Ward Elliott, Stanley J. Reiser, Donald Wilhelm, Jr., Robert Erwin, Scott R. Pearson, and Raymond Vernon. *Distributed for the John F. Kennedy School of Government.* $7.00



JOHN D. MONTGOMERY *and* ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, *editors*

PUBLIC POLICY XVI

Contributors to the present volume include Glenn D. Paige and Doo-Bum Shin, Philip M. Raup, Robert O. Tilman, P. J. Honey, William Y. Smith, Bruce M. Russett, John Jackson, Joseph J. Walka, George A. Kelly, Dennis F. Thompson, John S. Harris. *Distributed for the John F. Kennedy School of Government.* $7.00



JOHN L. BLACKMAN, JR.

PRESIDENTIAL SEIZURES IN LABOR DISPUTES

In cases involving the national interests four American presidents have resorted to seizure of private companies to prevent or halt work stoppages. This is the first thorough study of presidential policy and its effect during government possession and operation in the 71 seizure cases to date. *Wertheim Publications in Industrial Relations.* $10.00



MAURICE MEISNER

LI TA-CHAO AND THE ORIGINS OF CHINESE MARXISM

"Li Ta-chao, one of the founders of the Communist party of China in 1921 [is] now for the first time the subject of a full-length biography. . . . Meisner's book throws important light on the emergence of Chinese radicalism, and on the man who more than anyone else introduced Mao to Communism."—*The New York Times Book Review.* Harvard East Asian *Series, 27.* $4.95.



L. C. B. GOWER

INDEPENDENT AFRICA

The Challenge to the Legal Profession

Dealing with those countries of what was formerly British Tropical Africa, Mr. Gower examines the legacies of colonialism and the changes they have undergone since independence, and assesses the challenge thus implied for the legal professions of these nations. *The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures, 1966.* $3.95.



JOHN P. HALSTEAD

THE ORIGINS AND RISE OF MOROCCAN NATIONALISM, 1912–1944

This study examines in detail the growth and rise of the nationalist movement in Morocco and the international organization and reform programs of the various political parties involved. *Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs, 18. Distributed for the Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University.* $8.25.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

"A Body Incorporate"

The Evolution of City-County Separation in Virginia

Chester W. Bain, Olin D. Johnston Professor of Political Science, University of South Carolina

xii, 142 pp., frontis., tables, index, 6 x 9¼, L.C. 67-21656, $5.00

A fundamental and unique feature of Virginia local government is city-county separation. Under this practice, which is not followed on a statewide basis elsewhere in the United States, Virginia cities are politically and administratively independent of the county, or counties, in which they are geographically situated. The larger cities are completely independent of any county, but smaller cities share with the adjoining county the same circuit court and certain attendant officers. Virginia towns, unlike the cities, are not independent but remain a part of the county in which they are located for all governmental services and functions required of the county by the state.

This study examines the origins, development, nature, and creation of Virginia municipal corporations.

Annexation in Virginia

The Use of the Judicial Process for Readjusting City-County Boundaries

Chester W. Bain, Olin D. Johnston Professor of Political Science, University of South Carolina

xiv, 258 pp., 6 x 9¼, index, L.C. 66-12468, $6.00

"This is a study of Virginia's use of judicial procedure for adjusting city/county boundaries over the past sixty years. Where there is no separation between cities and counties, the extension of a city's boundaries raises no great problems for the county. Where the two are separated as in Virginia, however, any extension of a city's boundaries causes a shift of area, population, and tax revenue from the county to the city, together with a related shift in responsibility for social services and other functions formerly handled by the county. There is a good deal of very practical material here on the various steps in the procedure of boundary adjustment, and a thoughtful, value-oriented appraisal of the success of the procedure."

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

Published for the Institute of Government of the University of Virginia by
University Press of Virginia Charlottesville

New

PRAEGER

paperbacks for
political science
courses

INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle. This long-awaited text provides a much-needed topic-by-topic analysis of the major factors in international relations. "A learned and systematic contribution to the historical sociology of international relations. No other text like it is available in America."—Stanley Hoffmann, Professor of Government, Harvard University. ca. 450 pp. Cloth/$8.50; Praeger Paperbound Text/$3.95

THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME

Documents
and Commentary

Edited by Theodore H. E. Chen. An ideal book of readings for all courses on contemporary China, this comprehensive volume covers all aspects of the Chinese Communist Government and Party from 1949 to the 1966-67 "cultural revolution." More than 40 key official documents are presented with Professor Chen's thoughtful introduction and interpretive commentary. ca. 354 pp. Cloth/$8.50; Praeger Paperbound Text/$3.95

IDEOLOGY, POLITICS, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE SOVIET UNION:

An Introduction
Revised Edition

By John A. Armstrong. New material in this fully revised edition includes an ideological analysis of the Sino-Soviet split, expanded treatment of the nationalities question, and a new look at the workings of the post-Khrushchev economic system. "Professor Armstrong has a gift for succinct statement and a feeling for the important issues which enable him to compress the relevant interrelationships . . . into a coherent whole."—Merle Fainsod, reviewing the first edition in the **Slavic Review.**

U-524/$1.95

THE CHALLENGE OF FOREIGN AID

Policies, Problems,
and Possibilities

By Jacob J. Kaplan. "He has compiled a history of U.S. foreign aid, presented under appropriate subject headings rather than by chronology, and a critique of our foreign-aid policies. Both are rendered readable as well as intelligible by the author's ability to draw on concrete examples that come from his own long involvement with the program. . . . We are treated to a dispassionate exposition of objectives and policies and to a trenchant evaluation of their worth and meaning."—Hans Landsberg, **The Reporter.** 433 pp. U-641/ca. $2.95

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER
Publishers
111 Fourth Avenue, New York 10003

Oxford University Press

The American Party Systems:

STAGES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Edited by WILLIAM NISBET CHAMBERS *and* WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, *both of Washington University.* In the ten essays in this volume leading historians and political scientists give their opinions on the major themes of American politics, as they discuss the effect of historical conditions on competitive politics, the relationship of party competition to state welfare output, the structure of American political systems, and many other topics. The authors share a concern for the relationship of partisan activities to the course of American political development, and for the significance of the functions which American party systems have performed.

1967 336 *pp.* *cloth* $6.75 *paper* $2.50

British Cabinet Government

By KARL LOEWENSTEIN, *Amherst College. Translated from the German by* ROGER EVANS. Placing the unique British system in its international and historical perspective, this book gives an authentic and vivid picture of how British parliamentarianism has continued to develop and progress through the centuries. The text surveys in Part One the political evolution of what is known today as the British Constitution, and in Part Two gives a picture of the present evolved from these historical beginnings. The author demonstrates that the adaptability of the Constitution is the secret of the present enviable system and the working guarantee of British politics.

1967 224 *pp.* *paper* $2.50

The Notion of the State:

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL THEORY

By ALEXANDER PASSERIN D'ENTRÈVES, *University of Turin.* To present the basic notion of political theory in a new perspective, the author distinguishes three levels of approach: might, power, and authority. Using this distinction, he discusses some of the most significant versions of politics put forward in the past and held at present by scientists, lawyers, and philosophers, and concludes that the state is not merely a system of force, but the rightful holder of power and essentially a legal construction.

1967 248 *pp.* *cloth* $5.60 *paper* $2.95

The Government of Modern Britain

By FRANK STACEY, *Swansea University.* This detailed, comprehensive text covers most aspects of central government, including elections, Parliament, the cabinet, party organization, opinion polls, pressure groups, the Civil Service, administrative tribunals, and such recent matters as the powers of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration under the 1967 Act. Developments since 1945 are examined, and some of the main academic controversies are evaluated. Reading guides follow each chapter.

1967 500 *pp.* *text figures* *cloth* $7.20 *paper* $4.50

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Oxford University Press

The Nature and Function of International Organization

SECOND EDITION

By STEPHEN S. GOODSPEED, *University of California, Santa Barbara.* "Not only has the material been revised and brought up-to-date, but the inclusion of the financial burden facing the United Nations since 1960 and the United Nations Peace Service has added to the value of the book. I think this is a leading work in the field."—James A. Gathings, Bucknell University.

1967 752 *pp.* *illus.* $7.50

A History of War and Peace, 1939–1965

By WILFRID F. KNAPP, *Oxford University.* "A remarkably competent synthesis of events, with many of the reasons and contemporary arguments involved, on the traditional pattern of historiography. It should serve well as a text in introductory courses in international relations to provide background before the addition of a theoretical analysis."—George T. Little, University of Vermont.

1967 672 *pp.* 11 *maps* *trade edition* $10.00 *text edition* $7.50

Freedom and the Court:

CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES

By HENRY J. ABRAHAM, *University of Pennsylvania.* ". . . I found this a skillful and eloquent treatment of the relation of two vital institutions—the problem of freedom and the role of the court. Professor Abraham has treated the subject with discernment and conviction."—James MacGregor Burns, Williams College

1967 352 *pp.* *cloth* $7.50 *paper* $2.75

The Politics of Science:

READINGS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT

Edited by WILLIAM R. NELSON, *United States Air Force Academy*

January 1968 500 *pp.* *paper* $3.95

The Politics of the Third World

By J. D. B. MILLER, *Australian National University*

1967 144 *pp.* *cloth* $3.75 *paper* $1.50

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Oxford University Press

The Unfinished Revolution

RUSSIA 1917-1967

By ISAAC DEUTSCHER. "The most perceptive and illuminating work of its kind, either currently in print or likely to be published in the foreseeable future. I know of no other account which presents with such insight and in such highly readable prose a survey of the origins and course of the Russian Revolution, the current structure of Soviet society, the dilemmas and problems of the Kremlin, the course of Sino-Soviet relations, and the issues of present and prospective relations between the Soviet Union and the West."—FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, Williams College $3.75

Friends Not Masters

A POLITICAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY

By MOHAMMAD AYUB KHAN, *President of Pakistan.* Here is a rare event; a book written by a head of state and head of government when in office. It is both Mohammad Ayub Khan's biography and an intimate description of the major events in the history of Pakistan. The major part of the book describes the revolution of 1958, the reforms the author introduced, and Pakistan's attitudes towards India and the world. Of special importance are the chapters on foreign policy explaining the author's reaction to increasing Indian military capability after the Indo-Chinese clashes of 1962. *33 halftones, 2 maps.* $7.50

The Republican Party 1854–1966

SECOND EDITION

By GEORGE H. MAYER, *Purdue University.* The first complete history of the Republican Party examines its major policies and beliefs, the Republican presidents, Congressional and party leaders, the conducting of campaigns, and the impact of social and economic forces on the party. The new edition includes additional material on the 1964 Presidential election and the 1966 Congressional election—particularly the developing use of public-relations techniques in American politics and particularly in the campaigns.

Cloth, $9.75. *A Galaxy Book,* GB 211, *paper,* $2.95

The Puritan Ethic and Woman Suffrage

By ALAN P. GRIMES, *Michigan State University.* "With succinctness and style, Grimes lays out evidence which demonstrates that the goals of the woman suffrage movement were patently and profoundly conservative. . . . It well deserves to be read. For Grimes challenges some of the mythology and shatters some of the complacency about the virtues of American society. He replaces a widely popular misconception with a glimmer of truth that gives us a sounder perspective on ourselves."—MILTON VIORST, *Book Week* $4.75

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Oxford University Press

African Integration and Disintegration

CASE STUDIES IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC UNION

Edited by ARTHUR HAZLEWOOD, *Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics.* The cash market of most African countries individually is no larger than that of a moderately-sized European town. This makes economic integration and the formation of common markets vital. Here is the first book to analyze in detail the experience and problems of economic and political unity in the various regions of tropical Africa. Among the subjects covered are: the Equatorial Customs Union, the East African common market, the defunct Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and pan-Africanism and integration. *(Royal Institute of International Affairs.) 9 maps.* $10.10

The Problems of Smaller Territories

Edited by BURTON BENEDICT, *London School of Economics.* What sort of independence can small territories have? How can they defend themselves? Or survive economically? How can they administer themselves and provide for their increasing populations? Can they hope to maintain, or even improve, their standard of living? All of these questions were investigated in an exhaustive two-year seminar at the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, University of London, providing the material for this collection. *(Commonwealth Papers No. 10.)* $5.60

Thoughts on Nigerian Constitution

By OBAFEMI AWOLOWO. In Nigeria's changing situation, Chief Awolowo has just been installed as the vice chairman of the General Executive Council. In this particularly timely book he presents a lucid and objective analysis of Nigeria's political situation, making a comprehensive restatement of the cases for and against both federalism and unitarianism in order to clear away distortions and misconceptions, and presents his views on the re-making of the constitution for the future. *Map; tables.* *Paper* $2.35

Samoa mo Samoa

THE EMERGENCE OF THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF WESTERN SAMOA

By J. W. DAVIDSON, *Australian National University.* From the point of view of a long-time Samoan resident, Professor Davidson explores the effects European expansionism had on its isolated independence. He describes the resulting changes wrought on Samoan society by expansionist actions—their character, scale, and stages of development—and relates the events of Samoan history to Pacific history generally and to political theory with objectivity and also with a deep sympathy for Samoan aspirations. $12.70

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

COMING IN '68

AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, Fifth Edition

ROBERT K. CARR, President, Oberlin College
MARVIN H. BERNSTEIN, Dean, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University
WALTER F. MURPHY, Chairman, Department of Politics, Princeton University

Revised throughout, this new edition of *American Democracy in Theory and Practice* is essentially a new book. The major emphasis of this work is on the American government as a system—a set of closely related institutions, roles and functions. The authors also make comprehensible to the beginning student the way in which Americans, in and out of governmental office, interact to shape public policy.

A new opening chapter introduces the student to American political culture and to the new approach of this book. The material on the constitutional system, federal welfare programs, foreign policy, the Presidency, and political parties has been completely revised and brought up to date. Also, annotated bibliographies have been added at the end of each chapter.

February 1968 672 pp. $9.00 (tent.)

ALSO AVAILABLE AS . . .

ESSENTIALS OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, Fifth Edition

This version contains the same material as *American Democracy*, Fifth Edition, except for four chapters dealing with the functions of state and local governments which have been deleted.

February 1968 504 pp. $6.00 paper (tent.)

COMING SOON . . .

GOVERNMENT OF THE METROPOLIS
A Reader

Edited by JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, The State University of New York, Albany

The purpose of this reader is to make readily available to students significant material dealing with metropolitan problems and solutions in the United States, Canada, and England. The major emphasis is on the governmental problems of metropolitan areas. Attention is also given to the changing views of the nature of metropolitan problems since the turn of the century. In addition, several readings deal with the politics of metropolitan areas and help explain why many widely heralded reorganization movements have had no lasting effect.

September 1967 384 pp. $4.95 paper (tent.)



Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

NEW FROM **PRAEGER**

THE STUDY OF TOTAL SOCIETIES

Edited and with an Introduction by Samuel L. Klausner. The noted contributors to this interdisciplinary volume—James S. Coleman, Ithiel de Sola Pool, Edward A. Tiryakian, Kenneth D. Boulding, Anatol Rapoport, Amitai Etzioni, Marion J. Levy, Jr., and Abram Kardiner—aim at a synchronization of methodology and theory construction for viewing society as an integral unit. Drawing on the resources of the behavioral sciences, they construct models to illuminate the "total" society. $6.00

THE INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

Three Essays on Ideology and Development

Raymond Aron. What is the nature of modern industrial society? Are the Soviet and American systems two variants of a single type? France's foremost political scientist explores these and other basic questions relating to ideology and development in our time. "The reader . . . will find himself rewarded by the company of a humane, liberal, and stimulating mind."—*Library Journal.* $4.95

ISSUES OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE 1970's

Edited by Amos A. Jordan. Fifteen contributors discuss the future of U.S. defense policies. Their essays probe such problem areas as NATO's future, the structure of the defense establishment, the effects of new technology on strategy, and arms control and nuclear proliferation. "A well-written, authoritative book."—*Library Journal.* $7.50

WESTERN EUROPE A Handbook

Edited by John Calmann. Part One of this comprehensive work examines the entire range of political, economic, cultural, and social facts, patterns, and concerns of Western Europe today. In Part Two, twenty-six distinguished authorities survey questions ranging from Western European defense to the state of the contemporary arts. Part Three analyzes the functions and structure of the organizations that are helping to integrate the economies, trade patterns, and legal systems of Western Europe.

20 pp. of maps, 8 pp. of illus. 720 pp. $20.00

THE CONTEMPORARY SOVIET UNION SERIES

Institutions and Policies

Edited by Robert Conquest. Each volume in this new series will examine in detail an important aspect of Soviet rule as it has affected the Soviet citizen in the fifty years since the Bolshevik Revolution. The examination of Soviet policy in each instance is based entirely on original Soviet source material. The first three titles: INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN THE U.S.S.R., $6.25; THE POLITICS OF IDEAS IN THE U.S.S.R., $5.25; SOVIET NATIONALITIES POLICY IN PRACTICE, $5.25



FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, Publishers
111 Fourth Avenue, New York 10003



Introduction to Political Science

GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
An Introduction to Political Science
Edited by JOHN C. WAHLKE, *The University of Iowa, and* ALEX N. DRAGNICH, *Vanderbilt University*

Random House, 1966; 623 pages; $7.95

A collaborative effort by eight specialists, this text combines description of political systems with analysis of the nature of political science itself. Its unusual application of both institutional and behavioral approaches affords a broad, systematic, and unified introduction to the whole field of political science.

State and Local Government

Recently published...

THE FIFTY STATES AND THEIR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
JAMES W. FESLER, *Yale University, Editor, and*
KARL A. BOSWORTH, *University of Connecticut*
DAYTON D. McKEAN, *University of Colorado*
HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Columbia University*
ROBERT L. MORLAN, *University of Redlands*
ALLAN R. RICHARDS, *Louisiana State University*
VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, *Northwestern University*
YORK WILLBERN, *Indiana University*

Knopf, 1967; 616 pages $8.50

A revision and substantial expansion of THE 48 STATES on which six of the present authors collaborated.

"The best text dealing with the totality of intergovernmental relations below the national level."—James E. Dornan, Jr., *Purdue University*

CHALLENGE TO THE CITIES
An Approach to a Theory of Urban Leadership
by HENRY W. MAIER, *Mayor of Milwaukee, Wisconsin*

Random House, 1966; 210 pages; $2.50 paperbound

Foreign Policy

Just published... the Second Edition of

THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Its Global Range
by WILLIAM G. CARLETON, *Professor Emeritus, University of Florida*

Random House, July 1967; 576 pages;
$3.95 paperbound

This lively survey of post-war American foreign policy has become a classic. The second edition includes material on the Vietnam War, on the phenomenon of Gaullism, and on future trends in international relations.

For further information write to **Random House, Inc. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.**



Random House Studies in Political Science

Newly revised . . .

COMMUNISM

by ALFRED G. MEYER, *The University of Michigan*

July 1967; PS34; 221 pages; $1.95 paperbound

The third edition of what is still the best short introduction to Communism. In considering what he calls "the variety of Communist experience," Prof. Meyer discusses Maoism and the Sino-Soviet rift; Titoism; Castro, who he finds is not a Communist at all; and Communism in the developing nations.

Available soon . .

WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC REALM

by THOMAS R. ADAM, *New York University*

November 1967; PS61; about 256 pages; about $2.45 paperbound

An examination of the political, economic and strategic interests of major Western nations in the southwest Pacific region of Oceania, and of the effects of Western politics on the area's development during and after the era of colonial dominance. The Vietnam war, recent events in Indonesia, and the evolving role of China in Southeast Asian affairs all make this an especially timely book.

SUEZ: Ten Years Later

by PETER CALVOCORESSI, *Sussex University (England)*

November 1967; PS62; about 160 pages; $1.95 paperbound

The Arab-Israeli War of 1956 examined in the perspective of ten years. Material is included from candid and illuminating interviews with President Nasser, David Ben-Gurion, Abba Eban, Christian Pineau, Moshe Dayan, and a number of scholars and journalists.

THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE INTER-WAR YEARS: 1919-1939

by WILLIAM J. NEWMAN, *Boston University*

December 1967; PS60; 192 pages; $1.95 paperbound

The concept of balance of power studied in depth through the analysis of the balance established by the 1925 Locarno treaties among Germany, France, Great Britain, Belgium, and Italy, and its gradual collapse with Hitler's rise to power. The author is especially concerned with the question of whether the balance of power "system" could have prevented war, and, if so, why it failed.

The College Department 501 Madison Avenue New York 10022

W. W. Kulski
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE*

Kurt London
THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY: East and West

Paul Thomas Welty
THE ASIANS: Their Heritage and Their Destiny

Harry Schwartz
THE SOVIET ECONOMY SINCE STALIN

Richard Hiscocks
THE ADENAUER ERA

Arthur Mann
LA GUARDIA COMES TO POWER: 1933

Karl W. Deutsch, Philip E. Jacob, Henry Teune, Wm. L. C. Wheaton, James V. Toscano
THE INTEGRATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITIES

1792
1967

*$7.50, all others $1.95

J. B. Lippincott Company
College Department
East Washington Square • Philadelphia, Pa. 19105

2070 Neil Avenue Columbus, Ohio 43210

Ohio State University Press

Deadly Logic: The Theory of Nuclear Deterrence

By Philip Green A searching and devastating examination of the premises of deterrence theory that exposes the faulty base of a logic proceeding from highly questionable, unsupported assumptions. $6.00

The Common Aid Effort: The Development Assistance Activities of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development

By Milton J. Esman and Daniel S. Cheever An appraisal of a recent attempt on the part of the rich nations of the world to co-operate in giving economic and technical assistance to less-developed areas. $7.50

Nuclear Weapons Safety and the Common Defense

By Joel Larus An investigation of the at least twenty nuclear accidents in which the United States has been involved since Hiroshima, and of the desperate need to remove the threat of accidental nuclear disaster in the face of arms proliferation. $6.50

Congress and the Citizen-Soldier: Legislative Policy-making for the Federal Armed Forces Reserve

By William F. Levantrosser An examination of the problems confronting the reserve forces at a time when elements in the Congressional policy-making process have tended to weaken civilian control of the military. $6.00

Cyprus: Conflict and Conciliation, 1954-1958

By Stephen G. Xydis An account of the Cyprus crisis of the mid-1950's, and of Greece's five recourses to the United Nations, that assesses the effectiveness of the world organization as an agency for conciliation in disputes among nations. $15.00

The OAS and United States Foreign Policy

By Jerome Slater An examination of the basis of the remarkable effectiveness of the OAS as a collective-security system, and of the causes behind its frequent failure as an anti-Communist or anti-dictatorial alliance. $6.00

The Law of the Sea: Offshore Boundaries and Zones

Edited by Lewis M. Alexander An investigation of possible means by which the resources of the seas may be protected from exploitation, the territorial waters of sovereign nations safeguarded, and free international use of the high seas guaranteed. $12.50

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

NOW AVAILABLE . . .

WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN POLITICS

A biographical directory of 12,500 key U.S. political leaders representing virtually every active political group in the country.

Here's the research and reference tool you need to find up-to-date facts about the people who direct and influence federal, state and local government:

- Information on legal and mailing addresses, political party affiliation, present and previous political positions, religion, military service, achievements, and more.
- listing of governors and state delegations of Congressmen and Senators, arranged by state and district.

Compiled by a distinguished, bipartisan editorial team . . .

A twelve-man editorial advisory committee for WHO'S WHO IN AMERICAN POLITICS was formed under the co-chairmanship of John M. Bailey, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, and Ray C. Bliss, Chairman of the Republican National Committee. The directory was edited by Paul A. Theis, Public Relations Director of the Republican Congressional Committee, and Edmund L. Henshaw, Jr., Research Director of the Democratic Congressional Committee.

Cloth. 748 pages. Postpaid price: $25 net in the U.S. and Canada; $27.50 elsewhere. In New York please add applicable sales tax.

Order your copies today!

R.R. BOWKER COMPANY, Dept. A
1180 Avenue of the Americas, New York, N.Y. 10036

• The Quest for Peace Through Diplomacy

By Stephen D. Kertesz, University of Notre Dame. Analyzing past attempts to gain lasting peace, and new forms, methods, and limits of diplomacy, the author advocates a more constructive use of such multinational diplomatic agencies as the U.N. for the attainment of world security. July 1967 cloth $4.95, paper $2.45

• The United States and Eastern Europe

An American Assembly Book edited by Robert F. Byrnes, Indiana University. The experts in this volume survey U.S. policy toward the countries of Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Eastern Germany. They analyze the current plans and strategies of the U.S. and Russia towards this region and urge a future policy of "economic diplomacy" and cooperation. July 1967, cloth $4.95, paper $1.95

• The American President

Edited by Sidney Warren, California Western University. This book offers a unique view of the Presidential office through articles by such authoritative observers as Theodore Sorensen and James Mac Gregor Burns. Intimate observations by the past Presidents themselves reveal their glories and burdens, and important documents vividly illustrate the responsibility and complexity of the job of the American President. Sept. 1967, cloth $4.95, paper $1.95

• A Short History of Chinese Communism

By Franklin W. Houn, The University of Massachusetts. In this book, leading sinologist Franklin W. Houn, who was born and educated in China, draws upon his first-hand knowledge and the results of years of research to provide a concise account of the political organization which directs the fate of 700 million people—and may drastically affect the future of the rest of the world. Recounting the Party's earlier history, this interpretive study brings into focus the social and cultural forces that led to its growth. Houn explores the Party's extraordinary industrial progress and social reforms, and reveals the CCP's changing strategies, foreign policies, internal structure, and power struggles. Oct. 1967, cloth $5.95, paper $2.45

• The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy

By Charles L. Black, Jr., Yale University. Available for the first time in paperback, this highly acclaimed book traces the development of judicial review, endorses the Supreme Court's place in the system of checks and balances, and presents a carefully reasoned argument in its defense. Oct. 1967, paper $2.45

• The European Common Market and the World

By Werner Feld, Louisiana State University. In this book Werner Feld examines the vital economic, political, and trade policies of the European Economic Community toward nonmember nations, the many developing nations, and the Communist satellite countries. Reviewing the EEC's special structure, its unique problems, its effects on U.S. foreign policy and its crucial relationship with the European Free Trade Association, Feld argues that the EEC may well become a powerful instrument for the foreign policy of its member states and may alter the established patterns of international trade. Nov. 1967, cloth $4.95, paper $1.95

• Goals for Urban America

Edited by Brian J. L. Berry, The University of Chicago, and Jack Meltzer, Director of the Center for Urban Studies at The University of Chicago. This volume presents the views of such noted authorities as Nathan Glazer and August Heckscher, who propose realistic, yet imaginative solutions to the major problems facing American cities today. Oct. 1967, cloth $4.95 paper $1.95

Seven New SPECTRUM BOOKS

Published by Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 07632

Chandler Publications in the political science field



NEW Anti-Federalists Versus Federalists:
Selected Documents
edited by John D. Lewis, Oberlin College

The arguments for and against the adoption of our constitution are presented in this book. Analyzing them, the student will be able to understand more fully the present American system and its historical development. Approximately 320 pages.
5½″ x 8¼″ paper Write for prices.

The Warren Court:
Cases and Commentary
by Harold J. Spaeth, Michigan State University

The period from 1953 to the end of 1965 is covered in this text. This period is, if not the most, then one of the most controversial periods in the history of the Supreme Court. The major decisions rendered by the Warren Court are reviewed in a political context rather than a legal or historical one.
xiv + 405 pages 6″ x 9″ © 1966 List $4.75

Leading Decisions Of The United States Supreme Court
by Charles Aikin, editorial consultant,
University of California (Berkeley)

These documents are in pamphlet form and offer teachers a convenient way of reviewing the major decisions made by the Supreme Court in the last 150 years. All decisions contain both majority and minority opinions.
8½″ x 10½″, individually bound, each 25¢. Longer decisions are 40¢ or 50¢, each

From the Chandler Publishing Company, San Francisco:
Distributed by

SRA

Science Research Associates, Inc.
259 East Erie Street, Chicago, Illinois 60611

A Subsidiary of IBM

Off Press

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE: Toward Empirical Theory

Edited by ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

What is the relevance of the heritage of political theory for modern political science? Addressing themselves to this question in the main Plenary Session of the 1966 American Political Science Association meeting were the following contributors:

GABRIEL A. ALMOND, *Political Theory and Political Science*
ROBERT A. DAHL, *The Evaluation of Political Systems*
KARL DEUTSCH, *Nation and World*
HARRY ECKSTEIN, *Political Science and Public Policy*
HEINZ EULAU, *Changing Views of Representation*
ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, *The Public and the Polity*
LUCIAN W. PYE, *The Formation of New States*
EDWARD SHILS, *Privacy and Power*
HERBERT A. SIMON, *The Changing Theory and Changing Practice of Public Administration*

Newly Revised and Updated

FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL SCIENCE SERIES

JOSEPH P. HARRIS, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley, Series Editor

ROWLAND EGGER, *The President of the United States.* Off press

JOSEPH P. HARRIS, *Congress and the Legislative Process.* Available fall

CHARLES R. ADRIAN, *Governing Our Fifty States and Their Communities, Second Edition*

HUGH A. BONE and AUSTIN RANNEY, *Politics and Voters, Second Edition*

H. FRANK WAY, *Liberty in the Balance, Second Edition*

CHARLES O. LERCHE, *America in World Affairs, Second Edition*

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, *The American Constitutional System, Second Edition*

ANDREW HACKER, *The Study of Politics*

JOHN J. CORSON and JOSEPH P. HARRIS, *Public Administration in Modern Society*

Each series volume: $3.75 (clothbound), $1.60 (soft-cover)

McGraw-Hill Book Company

330 West 42nd Street, New York, New York 10036

The Dorsey Press Announces

A THEORY OF POLITICAL INTEGRATION

By Claude Ake, *Columbia University*

A comprehensive study of political integration in the new states. Included is a systematic exploration of the conditions of political integration, rapid social change, and political stability and the relation among the three phenomena. About 160 pages; About $5.00 text price.

Other Outstanding Political Science Texts from Dorsey . . .

THE LANGUAGE OF MODERN POLITICS:
An Introduction to the Study of Government
By H. Mark Roelofs, *New York University*; 401 pages; $7.50 text price

THE NATURE OF POLITICAL INQUIRY
By Fred M. Frohock, *Syracuse University*; 230 pages; $5.00 text price

PATTERNS OF SOVIET POLITICS, Revised Edition
By Richard C. Gripp, *San Diego State College*; 399 pages; $8.00 text price

CONGRESS AND FOREIGN POLICY MAKING:
A Study in Legislative Influence and Initiative, Revised Edition
By James A. Robinson, *The Ohio State University*; 266 pages; Pprbd. $3.50 text price

THE ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Revised Edition
By Gerard J. Mangone, *Syracuse University*; 551 pages; $8.50 text price

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THOUGHT: A Critical Study
By Eugene J. Meehan, *Brandeis University*; 449 pages; $7.50 text price

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM: Notes and Readings
Edited by Bernard E. Brown, *Brooklyn College of the City University of New York*, and John C. Wahlke, *The University of Iowa*; 682 pages; Pprbd. $4.75 text price

Published in THE DORSEY SERIES IN POLITICAL SCIENCE
Consulting Editor: NORTON E. LONG, *Brandeis University*
Write for Examination Copies for College Adoption

THE DORSEY PRESS — DORSEY PRESS — HOMEWOOD, ILLINOIS

Major new books from Macmillan

THE RELATIONS OF NATIONS, Third Edition

By Frederick H. Hartmann, Naval War College

Thoroughly revised and updated, the Third Edition of this book continues to provide a systematic analysis of international politics in a careful combination of theory and historical data. The book progresses from general background material to specific relations between countries. Case studies are used throughout. Charts, tables, and maps illustrate the book. 1967, 701 pages, $8.95

WORLD IN CRISIS: Readings in International Relations, Third Edition

Edited by Frederick H. Hartmann

Here is a collection of essays which provides the reader with the stimulating thinking of scholars and statesmen on all major aspects of international relations. More than one half of the selections in this edition are new. Each of the selections is given at sufficient length to develop fully the contributor's position, and contrasting views are frequently represented. New to the book is a complete case study of the Cuban Crisis and a chapter on Viet Nam.

1967, 417 pages, paper, $3.95

THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM

By Andrew M. Scott, The University of North Carolina

This book applies systems analysis to international politics in an approach which facilitates an integrated study of interests, attitudes, decision-making, action, communications theory, and specific foreign policy techniques. Each chapter consists of a set of linked propositions centering around a particular subject; established assumptions in the field are challenged and realistic alternatives offered. The book provides an unusually compact and orderly presentation of large quantities of material. 1967, 244 pages, paper, $2.95

POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND POWER: Ideology and Practice Under Capitalism, Socialism, Communism, and Fascism

By Nathaniel S. Preston, The American University

This incisive new book describes and analyzes the dominant politico-economic systems in terms of their objectives and actual policies. Factual rather than argumentative in approach, the book is carefully arranged to facilitate comparison between systems. The power concept is emphasized throughout, and the entire discussion is placed within a cultural framework.

1967, 242 pages, paper, $2.95

Write to the Faculty Service Desk for examination copies.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY, 866 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Force, Order, and Justice

By ROBERT E. OSGOOD and ROBERT W. TUCKER

In this study of crucial issues of war and peace in the modern world, two eminent political scientists analyze and interpret the role of force in the relations between states, both before and after the advent of the nuclear age. Their central premise is that international politics remain based today, as in the past, on the prospect of war. This prospect, on the one hand, promotes international order, and, on the other, threatens to plunge mankind into unparalleled disorder. The authors' purpose is to examine the ways in which nuclear weapons have sharpened this apparent paradox and accentuated the moral problems of statecraft. $10.00

The Quest for a United Germany

By FERENC A. VÁLI

The present divided condition of Germany, according to Professor Váli, must be understood as part of a complex historical process. His first chapter is thus devoted to the origins of the German problem in relation to the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam agreements. Against this background he discusses his main themes: the impact of the reunification issue on West and East German governments, politics, and public opinion; the role of Berlin as a microcosm of the larger issue; and the role of reunification in international politics. $8.50

NEW JOHNS HOPKINS PAPERBACKS

THE DIMENSIONS OF DIPLOMACY

Edited by E. A. J. JOHNSON

The six essays in this volume attempt to ascertain whether the forms and quality of diplomacy in the modern world are equal to the crucial task of communicating between nations. The techniques and efficacy of diplomacy are considered in relation to strategy, science, economics, and scholarship.

"We have here an exiting series of essays by men actively advising the government: McGeorge Bundy, Henry A. Kissinger, W. W. Rostow, James R. Killian, Jr., Adolf A. Berle, and Livingston Merchant."—*Library Journal*

JH-36/$1.95

THE FOREST RANGER

A Study in Administrative Behavior


by HERBERT KAUFMAN

By focusing on the central problem of co-operation between planners and field officers, the author determines how the leadership of a large organization gains or fails to gain its objectives. After analyzing the success of the Forest Service in influencing the behavior of its field officers, he evolves a set of hypotheses which he then tests against the experiences of other organizations.

"A penetrating and provocative study . . . excitingly perceptive."—*Public Administration Review* JH-37/$2.45

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

Baltimore, Maryland 21218



JUST PUBLISHED IN PAPERBACK

THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS

by Murray Edelman

The symbolic manifestations, purposes, and uses of politics are revealed in this provocative analysis of the institution of politics and of man as a political animal. "This is a truly social-psychological study of politics, done in an unconventional, imaginative, and appealing style."—*The Annals.* ". . . a wealth of fascinating ideas, the useful synthesis of diverse theory and research, and above all, a number of intriguing hypotheses."—*Midwest Journal of Political Science.* 201 pages. Paper, $2.45.

AS WE SAW THE THIRTIES

Essays on Social and Political Movements of a Decade
edited by Rita James Simon

First person, eye-witness accounts of major movements of the depression decade, written by the men who led them—Earl Browder, Hal Draper, Granville Hicks, A. J. Muste, Max Shachtman, Gerald L. K. Smith, Norman Thomas, and Burton K. Wheeler. From the turbulent chronicle of American radicalism to the impact of the New Deal, the most formative political decade of the century is re-examined in terms of purposes, goals, and actual achievements. 253 pages. Paper, $2.45.*

WHITE-COLLAR TRADE UNIONS

Contemporary Developments in Industrialized Societies
edited by Adolf Sturmthal

The past, present, and future of white-collar trade unionism in Australia, Austria, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Sweden, and the United States are traced and analyzed by authorities in each of these countries in this timely and important book. ". . . no better source than this volume."—*Labor History.* ". . . interesting and informative and the labor official or labor union student can learn a good deal from it."—*Labor Herald.* 412 pages. Paper, $3.50.*

THE LABOR ARBITRATION PROCESS

by R. W. Fleming

A probing analysis of the history, practice, and future of labor arbitration, written by one of the country's best-known labor law professors and arbitrators. "A thoughtful and thought-provoking book. Written by a highly qualified technician, it is eminently readable. And it is interesting."—*The Arbitration Journal.* "This book should be placed high on the 'must read' list of those concerned with arbitration, regardless of their experience."—*Personnel Administration.* 233 pages. Paper, $2.45.*

**(Also available in clothbound editions.)*



An outstanding Harper series in the Social Sciences

Just published

PROTEST AND PREJUDICE

By GARY T. MARX. A landmark in primary research, this is the first nationwide study of Negro attitudes toward themselves, the conditions of their lives, and whites. The study is based on a set of questions asked by Negro interviewers of a cross-section of Negroes in both urban and rural areas. The questions' goal was to measure the Negro's conception of progress, his intellectual sophistication and self-esteem. Militancy is defined and assessed; anti-white attitudes in general — and anti-Semitism in particular — are analyzed and evaluated.

The results of this ground-breaking study will startle even those who consider themselves well-informed about civil rights issues and may well lead them to re-evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the various civil rights and "black power" groups. PROTEST AND PREJUDICE is a book no social scientist can afford to neglect. $8.50

Published earlier

CHRISTIAN BELIEFS AND ANTI-SEMITISM

By CHARLES Y. GLOCK and RODNEY STARK. The work of two prominent sociologists, this objective study of anti-Semitism in America has attracted wide attention. It provides vital new insights into contemporary bigotry, and suggests ways in which anti-Semitism may be overcome. "Devastating."— *Boston Herald.* "Recommended."— *Library Journal.* $8.50

THE APATHETIC MAJORITY

By CHARLES Y. GLOCK, GERTRUDE J. SELZNICK and JOE L. SPAETH. "Based on a sampling of public opinion in Oakland, Calif., on the Eichmann trial . . . Important for anyone who believes that the American public would be well-informed on an event which has received extensive coverage in the press."— *Library Journal.* $6.95

These important books are the first three volumes in the PATTERNS OF AMERICAN PREJUDICE SERIES being conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of California at Berkeley and the Anti-Defamation League.

At your bookstore or from Dept. 14

150th ANNIVERSARY

Harper & Row 51 E. 33rd Street, New York, N. Y. 10016

From ST. MARTIN'S

Parliament, Parties and Society in France, 1946-1958

Duncan MacRae, Jr. 1967 418 pp. $10.00

The New Urbanization

Editors: Scott Greer, Peter Orleans, Dennis C. McElrath, David W. Minar
Spring 1968 398 pp. About $8.50

The Manual of Public International Law

Sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Max Sørensen, Editor Spring 1968 766 pp. $12.00

Announcing:

British Politics in the Age of Anne
G. Holmes Fall 1967 $17.00

The Social Geography of British Elections
1885-1910 H. Pelling Fall 1967 $14.00

The Whig Party and the French Revolution
F. O'Gorman Winter 1967 $9.00

***British Political Facts*, 1900-1967**
D. E. Butler & J. Freeman, eds. 2nd edn. Jan. 1968 Cl: $10.00 Ppr: $3.95

. . . and a paperback edition of

Independent Eastern Europe
C. A. Macartney & A. W. Palmer 1962 512 pp. Cl: $12.00 Ppr: $4.95



College Department
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS
175 Fifth Avenue New York, N.Y. 10010

The Interpretation of Agreements and World Public Order

Principles of Content and Procedure

by Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and James C. Miller

In this, the fifth volume in a monumental series on international law by Mr. McDougal and associates at the Yale Law School, the authors reappraise the traditional principles of interpretation in the light of advanced communications and the participation of new nations in the world community. "Professor McDougal is making one of the most significant contributions of our time to international law."—Committee on Annual Awards, American Society of International Law. $9.75

Political Oppositions in Western Democracies

edited by Robert A. Dahl

Mr. Dahl and nine distinguished collaborators analyze the role of the opposition in ten countries, Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United States. "On the whole the volume is one of the major contributions to Comparative Politics. . . . The study of the issue as such as well as the individual reviews is highly rewarding."—*The Annals.* $12.50

Comparing Nations

The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research

edited by Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan

"For anyone concerned in the development of empirical social science, this is an indispensable Handbook and invaluable conspectus of the promises and pitfalls of quantitative research."—*The Australian Journal of Politics and History.* $12.50

World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators

by Bruce M. Russett et al.

"The best of the genre of statistical handbooks."—*American Behavioral Scientist.* "The *Handbook* is valuable for both teaching and research. Its usefulness lies first in the ready access of the student and researcher of statistical data for each political unit."—*Midwest Journal of Political Science.* $10.00

available through your bookstore

Yale University Press YA
New Haven and London LE
in Canada: McGill University Press

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW



The City in the Future of Democracy
Robert A. Dahl 953

Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy
Wolfram F. Hanrieder 971

Compatibility, Consensus, and an Emerging Political Science of Adaptation
James N. Rosenau 983

Dimensions of Modernization in the American States
John Crittenden 989

Some Conditions of Democracy
Deane E. Neubauer 1002

Representative Bureaucracy: A Reassessment
V. Subramaniam 1010

Measurement Identity in the Longitudinal Analysis of Legislative Voting
Aage R. Clausen 1020

Political Recruitment: The Case of Japanese Prefectural Assemblymen
Young C. Kim 1036

Socio-economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952
Glaucio Soares and Robert L. Hamblin 1053

Research Notes

Government Expenditures and Public Services in the American States
Ira Sharkansky 1066

The Impact of Universal Suffrage: A Comparison of Popular and Property Voting
Kenneth N. Vines and Henry Robert Glick 1078

The State of the Profession

Political Science and the Proposal for a National Social Science Foundation
Fred R. Harris 1088

Communications to the Editor 1096

Book Reviews and Notes
James W. Prothro (ed.) 1105

Announcements 1187

Index to Volume LXI
Mary H. Grossman 1191

VOL. LXI DECEMBER, 1967 NO. 4

Published Quarterly by

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Announcing

The Newly Revised Third Edition of

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

Cases and Other Problems

Paul Freund — **Arthur Sutherland**

Mark DeWolf Howe — **Ernest Brown**

Many have found that the most meaningful study of American Constitutional Law is achieved through reading and analyzing the reported opinions of the Supreme Court justices, skilfully selected, edited and annotated.

Published only a few months ago, the new edition of this standard work is based on the belief that noteworthy decisions of the Supreme Court are not merely data, but events—legal, political and even literary. This book preserves the flavor of the cases as cases through full statements of facts and procedures, and as Great Debates through the generous inclusion of dissenting and concurring opinions.

The general organization is topical, thus permitting an integrated treatment of different sections of the Constitution bearing on a single problem. Each topic, however, is introduced by a consideration of the historic problems and decisions germaine to it.

Of an earlier edition of this book, Alan F. Westin wrote: **"I think this is, all elements considered, the best constitutional law casebook around. I particularly like the way in which the editors have broadened the materials to include legislative debates, committee reports, transcripts of oral arguments before the Court, and similar items which permit a better appreciation of the constitutional process."**

The first volume of this two-volume work deals with the topics of Judicial Review and Problems of Federalism. The second is devoted to the constitutional safeguards of Liberty and Property. Each volume contains, in addition to the text of the Constitution, the complete Index and Table of Cases for both.

Both Volumes Clothbound 1967 Volume I. 912 pages $8.00 Volume II. 1273 pages $10.00



LITTLE, BROWN AND COMPANY
Law Book Division
34 Beacon Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02106

FOCUS ON POLITICAL SCIENCE

Nations in a Multipolar World

CECIL V. CRABB, JR. This new text examines and analyzes succinctly, yet completely, the basic data needed to understand present day international relations. Recognizing that the field of International relations is vast and diverse, the author utilizes several approaches or principles to make the subject matter meaningful, intelligible, and relevant. Historical background, domestic factors, economic and sociological data, "behavioral" approaches, and ideological and philosophical studies are related, where significant, to the country or region under examination. *Coming in March.*

American Democracy in World Perspective

WILLIAM EBENSTEIN, C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, HENRY A. TURNER, DEAN MANN. "An excellent contribution to the teaching literature." David R. Derge, *Indiana University.* A unified, well-balanced analysis of the problems and processes of American government in the perspective of other contemporary political systems, both democratic and non-democratic. *748 pages; $8.50.*

Beyond Ideology:

THE REVIVAL OF POLITICAL THEORY

DANTE GERMINO. The thesis of this volume is that the so-called "decline" of political theory in our time is a myth. The myopia prevalent among numerous social scientists to the current revival of political theory is attributable chiefly to a profound misconception of the nature and function of political theory itself. The author examines the function of political theory from Plato to Meehan. *235 pages; $5.00. Coming in January.*

Political Continuity and Change

PETER H. MERKL. Provides a comprehensive, general introduction to political theory and comparative government. *606 pages; $8.50.*

The Metropolis:

ITS PEOPLE, POLITICS AND ECONOMIC LIFE

JOHN C. BOLLENS, HENRY C. SCHMANDT.
643 pages; $9.95.

HARPER & ROW, PUBLISHERS 150th ANNIVERSARY 49 EAST 33D ST., N.Y. 10016

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION'S

Personnel Service . . .

The American Political Science Association's Personnel Service operates as a "clearing house," bringing together political scientists seeking positions and prospective employers. Registration, at an annual fee of $6, in the service is open to all members of the Association. Here are the details of its operation.

Position Openings

- A Newsletter is mailed monthly to those Association members seeking positions through the Personnel Service. There are presently about 900 members in the Personnel Service.
- The Newsletter lists, by code number, position openings and job descriptions.

Employers Using the Service

- Any employer may use the Association's Personnel Service.
- Types of positions listed include teaching on the university level, administrative positions wth professional organizations, research and administrative positions with federal, state and local government agencies.
- There is no cost to the advertising institution.

For further information concerning registration write to:

Director, Personnel Service
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20036

APSA SUMMER FLIGHTS TO EUROPE

FLIGHT A—Approximately June 15 to September 1, 1968

FLIGHT B—Approximately August 1 to 31, 1968

For the ninth successive summer, the Association will provide air service to Europe for its members.

Flights will originate at New York International Airport and arrive on the continent of Europe. The cost per seat will be approximately $300.00.

Final details will reach every APSA member in several weeks. Persons wishing to make reservations now may write directly to the Association, in care of the Director, Summer Flight Programs, 1527 New Hampshire Ave N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

Published quarterly by The American Political Science Association

EDITORIAL BOARD

AUSTIN RANNEY, *Managing Editor, University of Wisconsin*

FRED I. GREENSTEIN, *Wesleyan University*
HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, *Columbia University*
WARREN E. MILLER, *University of Michigan*
WALTER F. MURPHY, *Princeton University*
J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College*
JOHN E. TURNER, *University of Minnesota*
VERNON VAN DYKE, *University of Iowa*
MYRON WEINER, *Massachusetts Institute of Technology*

EDITORIAL ASSOCIATES

JAMES W. PROTHRO, *Book Review Editor, University of North Carolina*
MARY H. GROSSMAN, *Madison*

EDITORIAL OFFICE

Managing Editor, APSR
North Hall, University of Wisconsin
Madison, Wisconsin 53706

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Executive Director, APSA
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Individual and institutional memberships are $15.00 a year ($6.00 for graduate and undergraduate students). Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $3.75 per copy; for *back issues* address Johnson Reprint Corp., 111 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003.

Applications for membership, orders for the REVIEW, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of change of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the month before publication.

Address correspondence about contributions to the REVIEW to Austin Ranney, North Hall, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis. 53706. All manuscripts should be submitted IN DUPLICATE. They should be double-spaced and may be in typed, mimeographed, hectographed, or other legible form. Footnotes should appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page.

Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name and affiliations should appear only on a separate covering page. All footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate page.

Address books intended for review to James W. Prothro, Caldwell Hall, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C. 27514; *News and Notes items* to Leo B. Lott, Department of Political Science, University of Montana, Missoula, Montana 59801; *advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence* to the Executive Director at the Washington office.

Articles and notes appearing in the REVIEW before the June, 1953 issue were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature. The International Political Science Abstracts* and the *International Index to Periodicals* index current issues. Microfilm of the REVIEW, beginning with Volume 46, may be obtained from University Microfilms. 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan. A *Cumulative Index* of the REVIEW, Volumes 1-57: 1906-1963, may be obtained from Northwestern University Press, 1735 Benson, Evanston, Illinois.

Office of publication: Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.
Foreign Agent: P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.
Second class postage paid at Menasha, Wisconsin. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in Section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized May 12, 1926.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.
Copyright, 1967, by The American Political Science Association

SOUTH ASIAN HISTORY, 1750-1950

A Guide to Periodicals, Dissertations, and Newspapers

MARGARET H. CASE

This is a major bibliographic research guide designed to assist scholars of South Asian History (India, Pakistan, and Nepal) in finding materials relevant to their research. It includes an annotated and indexed list of articles from periodicals and from books of collected essays and encyclopedias, lists English and bilingual English-vernacular newspapers, and vernacular papers published in South Asia, and provides an extensive unified list of dissertations for degrees in modern South Asian history from South Asian, European, and American universities. About 3100 of the entries are annotated.

$15.00

TANZANIA: PARTY TRANSFORMATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

HENRY BIENEN

In this detailed study of the relationship between political and economic development in an African country, the author makes the data relevant for the comparative study of politics in new states. His focus is on the organization and operation of the ruling party, the Tanganyika African National Union, as it interacts with the economy it undertakes to transform. Mr. Bienen examines the party in terms of recruitment, ideology, and intraparty relationships, in order to demonstrate how political elites operate, both at the center and in the regions and districts. *Published for the Center of International Studies, Princeton University.* *$11.50*

Princeton University Press

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

CENTRAL LIBRARY UNIVERSITY

The American Political Science Review

VOL. LXI DECEMBER, 1967 NO. 4

THE CITY IN THE FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY*

ROBERT A. DAHL
Yale University

I need hardly remind this audience that one of the characteristics of our field is the large number of old and quite elemental questions—elemental but by no means elementary—for which we have no compelling answers. I don't mean that we have no answers to these questions. On the contrary, we often have a rich variety of conflicting answers. But no answer compels acceptance in the same way as a proof of a theorem in mathematics, or a very nice fit between a hypothesis and a satisfactory set of data.

Whether the obstacles that prevent us from achieving tight closure on solutions lie in ourselves—our approaches, methods, and theories—or are inherent in the problems is, paradoxically, one of these persistent and elemental questions for which we have a number of conflicting answers. For whatever it may be worth, my private hunch is that the main obstacles to closure are in the problems themselves—in their extraordinary complexity, the number and variety of variables, dimensions qualities, and relationships, and in the impediments to observation and data-gathering.

However that may be, a question of this sort often lies dormant for decades or even centuries, not because it has been solved but because it seems irrelevant. For even when no satisfactory theoretical answer exists to a very fundamental question, historical circumstances may allow it to be ignored for long periods of time. Even specialists may refuse to take a question seriously that history seems to have shoved into the attic. What seem like fundamental controversies in one age are very likely to be boring historical curiosities in the next. And conversely it is my impression that a great many of the elemental political questions regarded as settled in one age have a way of surfacing later on.

* Presidential address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 7, 1967.

I

One question of this kind is the problem of the appropriate unit for a democratic political system. Some aspects of this problem are, at least to me, quite puzzling. For example, suppose we accept the guiding principle that the people should rule. We are immediately confronted by the question: what people? I don't mean which particular individuals among a collection of people, but rather: what constitutes an appropriate collection of people for purposes of self-rule? Among the vast number of theoretically possible ways of dividing up the inhabitants of this globe into more or less separate political systems, or, if you will, into "peoples," are there any principles that instruct us as to how one ought to bound some particular collection of people, in order that they may rule themselves? Why *this* collection? Why *these* boundaries?

Of course there are answers, like Schumpeter's statement that "a people" must define itself. But answers like these do not take us very far, or else they take us too far toward the simple doctrine that past might makes present right, and hence present might will make future right. A century ago in the United States a Civil War was fought to compel the Southern States by force of arms and military conquest to remain in the Union, a war, it is now painful to recall, that did not have as its official, ostensible, or ideological purpose the noble end of liberating Negroes and incorporating them into American life but, simply, the maintenance of the Federal Union, if necessary at the cost of the Negro. We can understand

this easily enough as pure nationalism. But it is more difficult to see that the proclaimed goals of the North were much more than a particular and somewhat arbitrary definition of American nationhood. Do we then conclude that even if the development of a strong and uniform nationhood might be a condition for large-scale representative democracy, the manner and process by which a "people" defines itself—how it becomes a nation—cannot be judged or determined by any criteria derived from democratic theories or principles?

Just in case you may be about to dismiss all the questions I have just raised as irrelevant or uninteresting, let me be deliberately provocative by asking whether it could be wrong for the American South to have seceded in 1861 but right for South Vietnam to do so today. Alternatively, if military conquest of the Southern Confederacy by the North was justified, is military conquest of the South also justified by North Vietnam? If autonomous self-rule was right for Belgium in 1830 is it wrong for the Flemings today? If the independence of Canada from the United States is right, is the independence of Quebec from Canada also right? And if autonomy is right for France is it also right for the Celtic fringe in Brittany? Or in Britain?

I hope I have asked enough questions to persuade you that the problem of what particular and peculiar collections of people can be said to form a proper unit for self-government is relevant. And not only relevant: It is also perhaps just a bit disturbing, quite possibly even a frightening problem. Yet I do not think we are going to be permitted to ignore it in the near future.

Now that the problem of the appropriate unit for a democratic political system has been opened up, I want to skirt around the questions I have just raised in order to focus in the brief time available to me this evening on certain other aspects of the problem. I propose to ask what *kind* of unit is most appropriate for democratic government. Is there a unit within which the policies steadfastly supported by a majority of citizens should prevail against minorities within that unit and against all persons outside that unit? In fact, can we say that any specific unit is more appropriate for popular rule than any other?

Before I proceed, let me clarify what I mean by the kind of unit. Should democracy be based on a territorial unit, like a town, state, or country, or a non-territorial unit, like a labor union, business firm, or industry? How big should the unit be? Small, like a committee or neighborhood, large like a country or world region, or something in between like a state, province or region? Or should it be any and all of these things?

Like the question of what constitutes a people, the question of what constitutes an appropriate unit is very widely regarded as settled. Yet a little reflection shows that it is actually a wide-open question. The approved school-solution is, of course, the nation-state. Yet the bare possibility that the question has not been so much answered by this solution as ignored is hinted at by the troubling recollection of a simple historical fact: accepting the nation-state as the appropriate unit for democracy required the flat negation of an older conventional view that prevailed for some two thousand years.

II

The prior view, as I surely need not remind this audience, held that the appropriate unit for democracy is the city-state. The vision of democracy in the city-state that prevailed, by and large, from the Greeks to Rousseau is surely one of the most seductive ever generated in the Western world. Its millenial appeal draws its force, I think, from the vision of man living in a genuine human community of man-sized proportions. In this vision, the city-state must be small in area and in population. Its dimensions are to be human, not colossal, the dimensions not of an empire but of a town, so that when the youth becomes the man he knows his town, its inhabitants, its countryside about as well as any of us knows his own college or university. Given these human dimensions, at its best citizenship would be close to friendship, close even to a kind of extended family, where human relations are intense rather than bland, and where the eternal human quest for community and solidarity can be wholly satisfied within the visible and comprehensible limits of the *polis*. If the city-state is democratic—and it is this particular vision I have in mind—it would be small enough to insure extensive opportunities for direct participation by all free (male) citizens in the management of the community; and in the best of circumstances policies and decisions would reflect wide discussion and a pervasive consensus. Above all, the city-state would be autonomous, in the sense that no one who is not a citizen of that community would possess any legitimate right or power to interfere in the management of the affairs of the city.

I cannot think of any better description of this vision than Kitto's lovely account of an imaginary conversation between an Ancient

Greek and a present-day member of the Athenaeum Club in London:

> The member regrets the lack of political sense shown by the Greeks. The Greek replies, "How many clubs are there in London?" The member, at a guess, says about five hundred. The Greek then says, "Now if all these combined, what splendid premises they would build. They could have a clubhouse as big as Hyde Park." "But," says the member, "that would no longer be a club." "Precisely," says the Greek, "and a polis as big as yours is no longer a polis."[1]

One cannot help wondering how much the geography of Greece helped to stimulate this vision, for that land of mountains, valleys, islands and the sea provided magnificent natural boundaries for each community and such a limited supply of arable land for each valley and island that it is only the barest poetic license to say that nature herself suggested the small, autonomous city state—and with this hint from nature a people to whom Prometheus himself had given the first elements of civilization were bound to elaborate among themselves the ideal form of the harsher and very often uglier reality they knew so intimately.

If the deficiencies of the vision seem obvious to the modern man who prefers the grandeur of the great nations and the glories of great metropolises like New York, London, Tokyo and Calcutta, it is worth recalling that the Greeks, too, understood that a price had to be paid for the small, autonomous city-state. If the city were to maintain its autonomy, and particularly if it were to be truly self-sufficient the price included a frugal and austere standard of daily life, pervasive violence and anarchy in inter-city relationships, and the need to defend one's city against all comers, including the giants. The Athenians, as we know, proved unwilling to accept the first and developed an empire; they suffered horribly from the second; and in the end they could not pay the last.

Nonetheless, for two thousand years thereafter the vision of democracy in the city-state dominated thought about democratic-republics. Today, that vision may be seen by a few people as a beguiling form of political life; but as a reality and as an ideal it is in no sense fundamental to modern political culture, it is known mainly to specialists, and almost no one seriously proposes that the modern democratic nations be carved up into genuinely autonomous city-states.

What happened is simply this: In the course of the nineteenth century, the nation-state displaced the city-state as the appropriate unit for democracy. The change, when it came, came swiftly. We can bracket the transition quite nicely by comparing Montesquieu and Rousseau, who still see the city-state as the only proper and indeed viable unit for a democratic republic, with John Stuart Mill, who in *Representative Government* dismisses as irrelevant in a single sentence at the end of a chapter, almost as an afterthought, the two-thousand year-old tradition. By Mill's time the nation-state had triumphed, the city-state was for all practical purposes an historical curiosity, and if democratic ideals were to survive they had to survive, it seemed, in the form of representative governments for nation-states and subordinate—but not autonomous—territorial units within nation-states.

In retrospect, the change seems simpler and more complete than it was. Nonetheless, it is almost as if Americans were to go away for a long week-end and come back on Monday morning believing that the Soviet Union represented free enterprise and bourgeois democracy.

We could zero-in even more precisely on this historic cross-roads by looking at the debate in our own Constitutional Convention of 1787, which was to create a constitution for the first of the giant representative democracies. By 1787, the population of the United States was already greater than that of all of Ancient Greece; in area it was immense, and everyone knew that its territory would go on growing. Yet the traditional view that a republic could flourish only in relatively small communities still persisted even among leading members of the Convention. In his famous argument in *Federalist No. 10*, which he originally advanced in the Convention itself, Madison met this prejudice head-on and in a brilliant exercise turned it upside down by arguing that faction, the inevitable and fatal disease of small republics, could be mitigated only in a republic of large size. Extend the bounds of a republic, the old tradition argued, and you destroy it. Narrow the bounds of a republic, Madison argued in rebuttal, and you make it vulnerable to the dread disease of all small republics—factionalism. Extend the bounds of a republic and you help to generate immunity to that disease.

As we all know, the institutional innovation that made it possible to extend the bounds of a republic was representation: an innovation that democrats like Madison, Jefferson, their French contemporary whose work Jefferson so

[1] H. D. F. Kitto, *The Greeks* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1951, 1957) p. 79.

much admired, Destutt de Tracy, and James Mill all regarded as one of the most profound political inventions of all time.

When the years of the American republic grew into decades, its mere existence stood as living proof that a democratic republic need not be as small as the city; thanks to representation it might indeed be gigantic. In the contest for supremacy in Europe the nation-state had long since come to prevail over the city-state; and as democratic ideas spread, they were focussed not on the obsolete and by now largely forgotten city-state but, naturally, on the nation-state. By the middle—and certainly by the end—of the nineteenth century the idea of democracy in the city-state had been entirely displaced by the idea of representative democracy in the nation-state. The triumph was complete.

Although it is often thought that the older view was refuted, it seems to me that it was not so much refuted as rejected. It is not clear, at least to me, that the kind of political life the Greeks thought possible in the small, autonomous, democratic city-state—even if these possibilities were not often fulfilled—is even theoretically possible with representative government in the large nation-state. Perhaps we create needless trouble for ourselves by claiming that the ideals and potentialities of democracy in the city-state are realized, or theoretically capable of being realized, through the institutions of representative government in the nation-state. One may question the value of the city-state ideal, and suspect the extent to which it was ever realized, for practise fell far short of the ideal even in Athens, and the seamy side of the city-state was, if one looks at it unromantically, pretty appalling. Yet however one may feel about these matters, the essential point is that representative government in the nation-state is in many respects so radically—and inescapably—different from democracy in the city-state that it is rather an intellectual handicap to apply the same term, democracy, to both systems, or to believe that in essence they are really the same.

III

In any case it would surely be a sign of *hubris* to assert that the ideals and institutions of democracy have reached or will reach their final destination, and their fulfillment, in the nation-state. For one thing, with each passing day it grows more reasonable to see the nation-state as a transitory historic form, to foresee that the nation-state will some day cease to exist as an autonomous unit, just as the city-state did. I do not mean to rush things. The nation-state is a tough organism, with great capacities for survival; it is still far and away the strongest and most durable political unit we know. In much of the world political leaders are even now struggling desperately to create their own nation-state out of the fragments of traditional societies; or, having achieved a momentary success, they go to bed each night half sick with worry lest they awake next morning and find their fragile nation has fallen into fragments during the night. In many parts of the world, it will be generations before peoples have defined themselves and have arrived at that state of confident nationhood where it finally becomes possible to imagine, without panic, the decline and supercession of the nation.

Those Western nation-states in which democracy has flourished for some generations are not only tough, but on the whole, I believe, extraordinarily benign units of government. Historically and comparatively, all the alternatives to representative government in the nation-state seem to me, and I imagine to most of us here, markedly inferior by comparison and often malignant, vicious, and anti-human. Nonetheless, straining to peer into the thick murk of the future, it is difficult, at least for me, to see mankind still existing on this globe without larger political orders than the nation-state, without greater displacement of international anarchy by constitutionalism and the rule of law. In the West, the nation-state has already lost some of its autonomy; it will lose more. Unless we political scientists are to be overswept by events, as we usually are; if we try, as Bertrand de Jouvenel keeps urging us, to conjecture about the future, in order to help shape it; if we use the past to help foresee the longer stretch ahead and not merely to dissect yesterday in order to understand a moment in the past and a moment today—then it is not too soon for us to anticipate a future for democracy when the major unit that has prevailed during the past two centuries, the nation-state, has become an integral and subordinate unit in some larger legal and constitutional order.

There is a second and more immediate reason why the nation-state is not an altogether satisfactory fulfillment of the ancient and continuing aspiration for democratic self-government: its immensity—immensity not so much of territory, which becomes less and less important, as immensity of numbers, of population, of citizens.

Unless wholly new evidence turns up, we shall never have anything more than the shakiest estimates of the population of Athens, but there are some reasonable if very rough guesses as to the approximate number of adult male citizens at about the time of Pericles—the

demos, then, in the Athenian democracy. A quorum in the Assembly was fixed for some purposes at 6,000. There were about 18,000 seats in the Pnyx, where the Assembly met. An estimate of 40,000 adult male citizens may be high; it is surely not too low.[1] And Athens, remember, was the largest of the ancient Greek city-states.

Consider, now, some present-day nation-states. The smallest democratic nation-state, Iceland, has more than twice as many adult citizens as Athens had by our outside estimate. What we ordinarily call small democracies are, in fact, gigantic. The number of adult citizens in New Zealand is around 30 times that of Athens, while the Netherlands has more than 100 times as many adult citizens as Athens had. France has more than 500 times as many, the United States about 2500, and India, the largest representative democracy in the world, five to six thousand times as many. In fact the number of new voters coming of age each year in India would supply a citizen body for more than a hundred city-states the size of Athens.

Fortunately for these giant systems, there are some important ways of participating in the political life of a democracy that are not significantly limited by the size of the citizen body or its territory. One of these, happily, is voting. Because different individuals can vote more or less simultaneously, and in different places, time and space do not limit the size of an electorate. Nor do time and space limit the number of citizens who can engage in various forms of consummatory and symbolic participation, such as reading about politics in the press, listening to the radio, or watching TV.

Some kinds of participation, on the other hand, cannot be performed simultaneously. Instead they have to be carried on sequentially. In these cases, time does impose restraints on size, and particularly on the number of individuals who can participate. For example, time's harsh and inescapable constraints impose severe limits on the size of a group that is intended for full and free discussion—a group, that is, in which every member has an opportunity to present his views to all the other members. I shall come back to these constraints in a moment.

[1] Various classical scholars have made valiant attempts to guess the population of Athens and its composition—citizens, adult males, metics, slaves—from the most fragmentary bits of evidence. I have not been able to locate any estimate that does not seem to leave great room for error. Kitto suggests "30,000 as a reasonable estimate of the normal number of citizens" in the Fifth Century: *op. cit*, p. 131.

Returning to our question of the appropriate unit for democracy, and keeping in mind time's inexorable constraint, we discover that this simple and elemental limit on human behavior cuts both ways: Whenever the number of citizens grows large, to maximize their equal opportunities to control their government people must resort to representation. They have no alternative. Yet if time's constraint demands this shift from direct democracy to representative government, it also reduces and ultimately eliminates the possibility that every citizen can engage in a discussion that includes the officials who are charged with the authority to decide.

The greater the number of citizens, then, the longer and more indirect must be the channel of communication from the citizen to his top political leaders. But the communication between a citizen and his leaders is not a symmetrical relationship. Even in the Assembly at Athens, Pericles could speak directly and at great length to many more Athenians than could ever hope to speak directly to Pericles. But where the size of Pericles' audience was limited by the range of the unamplified human voice, radio and television have eliminated all constraints on the size of a speaker's audience. As a result, the larger a system grows, the more and more one-sided becomes communication between citizens and top leaders: the President of the United States can, in principle, speak directly to a hundred million potential voters, of whom only an infinitesimally small fraction can ever speak directly to him. If you doubt that the fraction is infinitesimally small, I urge you to try a few simple arithmetical exercises using the most generous calculations as to the President's time and the most severe restrictions on the length of the conversation between citizen and President.

There are, of course, ways of coping with this asymmetry in communications, but it would take me too far afield to explore them here. The essential point is that nothing can overcome the dismal fact that as the number of citizens increases the proportion who can participate *directly* in discussions with their top leaders must necessarily grow smaller and smaller. The inherent constraint is neither evil men nor evil institutions, nor any other eradicable aspect of human life, but rather a dimension of all existence that is morally neutral, because it is implacable, unswerving, and inescapable—time.

IV

I have a fantasy in which a modern Constitutional Convention assembles a group of 55

men or thereabouts whose commitment to democracy and whose wisdom are neither of them in doubt. Their task is to design democratic institutions suitable for this small planet in the year 2,000. And so they come to the problem of the unit.

Being learned, as well as wise, naturally they recall the city-state. Well, says one, since full civic participation is possible only if the number of citizens is small, let us arrange for a world of small democratic city-states. Let the unit of democracy, then, be the small city.

Ah, says another, you forget that the world of the 21st Century is not ancient Greece. You even forget that ancient Greece was the setting for a highly defective international system. The trouble with the small city in the modern world is that there are too many problems it cannot cope with, because they go beyond its boundaries. Think of some of the problems of American cities: revenues, transportation, air and water pollution, racial segregation, inequality, public health . . . I would make the list longer, but it is already long enough to show that the small city is obviously an inappropriate unit and that we have to locate democracy in a larger unit. I urge that we consider the metropolis.

But, says a third, even the boundaries of the metropolis are smaller than the kinds of problems you mention. The legal boundaries of the metropolis are an obsolete legacy of the past. What we need is metropolitan governments with legal boundaries extending to the limits of the metropolitan area itself, boundaries set not by obsolete patterns of settlement but by present densities.

Your argument is persuasive, says a fourth, but you do not carry it far enough. Demographers and planners now tell us that in the United States, to take one example, there is an uninterrupted urban area on the East Coast extending from Virginia to Maine. Even your metropolitan governments will be too small there. And in the future much of the world will surely be as densely settled as our Eastern seaboard. Consequently, I believe that we must design regional democracies, controlled by democratic governments responsive to the electorate of a whole region.

Well, says a fifth, I notice you have already bypassed such things as states and provinces, which is all to the good, since they are as anachronistic as the small city. But you will have to agree that even if you carve up the world into regional governments big enough, for instance, to cover the Eastern seaboard, you cannot expect these units to be adequate for very long. With the population of the world reaching 6 billion, or 10 billion, most of the United States will soon be a vast, undifferentiated, urban mass. Other countries are headed in the same direction. There is, then, a good deal to be said for the only traditional unit that enjoys consensus and allegiance on a scale commensurate with the problems. I mean, of course, the nation-state. If we were to think of the United States as one city, as we shall have to do in the future, it is obvious that the proper unit to bound our sovereign electorate cannot be smaller than the United States. With minor changes here and there, the nation-state is probably good for another century or so. So let us proceed to make use of it by eliminating the powers of all the intermediate units, which are, after all, only obstacles that permit local groups to frustrate national majorities.

But, objects a sixth, you are still too much the victim of the past to think clearly about the future. Obviously our very existence depends on our capacity to create a government that will subordinate the nation-state to a larger legal order. Just as your villages, towns, cities, metropolises, and regions are too small to cope singlehandedly with their problems, so too is your nation-state, even one as big as the United States, the USSR, or China. The fatal flaw of the nation-state is its inability to eliminate interstate violence; and because of our genius for violence we can now destroy the species. Even prosaic problems are now beyond the control of the nation-state: the efficiencies that come from world markets, monetary problems, the balance of trade, the movement of labor and skills, air and water pollution, the regulation of fishing, the dissemination of nuclear weapons. . . .I know it is bold, but we must plan for a world government, and to us that surely means a democratic world government. The appropriate electorate for the 21st Century is nothing smaller than the human race. The only legitimate majority is the majority of mankind.

At this point there is a tumult of objections and applause. Finally the first speaker gains the floor. Each speaker, he says, has been more persuasive than the last. But, he adds, I simply cannot understand how my learned friend, the last speaker, proposes to govern the world, if he has in mind, as I thought, a single world-wide electorate, a single parliament, a single executive, all attempting to represent that nonexistent monstrosity, a single world-wide majority. I say that even if it would miraculously hold together, which I doubt, a democracy

with six billion citizens is no democracy at all. I, for one, do not wish to be only one six-billionth part of any government. One may as well accept a despot and have done with the Big Lie that what we have is a democracy.

Ah, the advocate of a democratic world government now replies, of course I meant that there would be subordinate governments, which would be democracies.

I thank my learned colleague for this important clarification, says the advocate of the small city-state. I now propose that these subordinate governments consist of units about the size of small cities.

Again there is tumult. The speaker who now gains the floor is the one who had earlier spoken in behalf of the metropolis. Hold on, he objects, if we are to have a subordinate unit, surely it must be one large enough to deal with the problems of an urban society. Obviously this unit should be the metropolis. . . .

Suddenly it becomes as clear to everyone at the Constitutional Convention as it has become to you that the argument over the unit has gone completely around in a circle, that it has now started all over again, that it has no logical terminus, that it could go on forever. Perhaps that is why we still talk about the city-state.

For the logic seems unassailable. Any unit you choose smaller than the globe itself—and that exception may be temporary—can be shown to be smaller than the boundaries of an urgent problem generated by activities of some people who are outside the particular unit and hence beyond its authority. Rational control over such problems dictates ever larger units, and democratic control implies a larger electorate, a larger majority. Yet the larger the unit, the greater the costs of uniform rules, the larger the minorities who cannot prevail, and the more watered down is the control of the individual citizen. Hence the argument for larger units does not destroy the case for small units. What it does is to make a seemingly small but radical shift in the nature of the arguments.

For we drop completely the notion so dear to the Greeks and early Romans that to be legitimate a unit of government must be wholly autonomous. With autonomy we also drop the belief that there is a single sovereign unit for democracy, a unit in which majorities are autonomous with respect to all persons outside the unit and authoritative with respect to all persons inside the unit. Instead we begin to think about appropriate units of democracy as an ascending series, a set of Chinese boxes, each larger and more inclusive than the other, each in some sense democratic, though not always in quite the same sense, and each not inherently less nor inherently more legitimate than the other.

Although this may be a discomforting and alien conception in some democratic countries where political tradition has focussed on the over-riding legitimacy, autonomy, and sovereignty of the nation-state and of national majorities, even in these countries the evolution of pluralistic institutions has vastly modified the applicability of monistic conceptions of democracy. And of course in democracies with federal systems, like Switzerland, Canada, and the United States, or in non-federal countries like the Netherlands that inherit a political tradition powerfully shaped by federalism and the legitimacy of pluralist institutions, to see the units of democracy as a set of Chinese boxes is very much easier—though even in these countries it will take some re-thinking and a vast amount of institution-building before any of us can think easily about the nation-state as a Chinese box nested in yet larger ones of equal legitimacy.

Our imaginary Constitutional Convention, and our Chinese boxes do not, of course, bring us much closer to a solution to our original problem of the appropriate unit for democracy. But they do suggest that there is not necessarily a single kind of unit, whether it be city-state or nation-state, in which majorities have some specially sacred quality not granted to majorities in other units, whether smaller or larger, more or less inclusive.

A Frenchman, perhaps even an Englishman, or any strong believer in majority rule will tell me that surely in one of these boxes there must be a majority that is sovereign, or else conflicts between different majorities, one of which may in a larger perspective be only a minority, can never be resolved. I ask, very well, a majority of what unit? And my critic will say, the majority, naturally, of the nation. To which I reply, *why* is this more sacred than the others? Because it is larger? But I can point to still larger majorities in the making in this world. Will you remain faithful to your answer when your nation is a unit in a world polity? Or will you not, instead, revert to federalist conceptions? Anyway, I might add, in a number of federal countries, including some rather old and respectable representative democracies, citizens have grown moderately accustomed to the idea that national majorities—or rather their spokesmen—are not necessarily more sacred than majorities or minorities in certain kinds of less inclusive units. This is logically

untidy, and it requires endless readjustments as perspectives and levels of interdependence change. But it makes for a better fit with the inevitable pluralistic and decentralizing forces of political life in nation-states with representative governments.

The hitherto unreported debate at our imaginary Convention also suggests that in a world of high population densities, ease of communication, and great interdependence, where autonomy is in fact impossible short of the earth itself, we confront a kind of dilemma that the Greeks could hardly have perceived. Let me suggest it by advancing a series of propositions:

The larger and more inclusive a unit, the more its government can regulate aspects of the environment that its citizens want to regulate, from air and water pollution and racial justice to the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

Yet, the larger and more inclusive a unit with a representative government, and the more complex its tasks, the more participation must be reduced for most people to the single act of voting in an election.

Conversely, the smaller the unit, the greater the opportunity for citizens to participate in the decisions of their government, yet the less of the environment they can control.

Thus for most citizens, participation in very large units becomes minimal and in very small units it becomes trivial. At the extremes, citizens may participate in a vast range of complex and crucial decisions by the single act of casting a ballot; or else they have almost unlimited opportunities to participate in decisions over matters of no importance. At the one extreme, then, the people vote but they do not rule; at the other, they rule—but they have nothing to rule over.

These are extreme cases, and if they were all there were, it would be a discouraging prospect. But may there not be others in between?

Before we turn to this question, I want you to notice that our hypothetical Constitutional Convention and the Chinese boxes also hint at the possibility that we may need different models of democracy for different kinds of units. By models I mean here both empirical models that would help us to understand the world as it *is* and normative models that would guide us in shaping the world we believe *ought* to be. We need models that approximate reality in the world of history and experience, and models that indicate standards of performance by which we can appraise the achievements of a particular democracy. I see no reason to think that all kinds of units with democratic institutions and practices do, can, or should behave in the same way—no reason, then, why we should expect democracy in a committee, in a city, and in a nation to be markedly different both in fact and in ideal. If we expect that representative government in the nation-state is roughly equivalent to democratic participation in a committee then we are bound to be misled in our understanding of political life, in our hopes, and in our strategies for changing the world from what it is to what it ought to be.

V

Let me rephrase my question. If the nation-state is too immense, and if interdependence and population densities render the autonomous self-governing city-state too costly, are there units powerful enough, autonomous enough, and small enough to permit, and in the right circumstances to encourage, a body of citizens to participate actively and rationally in shaping and forming vital aspects of their lives in common? Is there, in this sense, an optimal unit?

There are a number of candidates for this position. Occasionally, for example, one still runs across a nostalgia for the village—a nostalgia strongest, I suspect, among people who have never lived in small towns. There are also suggestions going back nearly a century that we shift our search for the democratic unit away from the government of the state to the government of non-state institutions, such as the workplace, business firm, corporation, or industry. And lately there has been a resurgence of interest, especially among young political activists, in the old and recurring idea of reconstructing democracy around small units that would offer unlimited opportunities for participation.

Although I cannot possibly do justice to these various alternatives in the brief time available to me here, I would like to venture a few comments on each.

The fragmented and even shattered community in which modern man seems condemned to live tempts one to suppose that the appropriate unit for democratic life might be the village or small town. Only there, it might be thought, could one ever hope to find a center of life small enough so that it permits wide participation, and small enough besides to foster the sense of unity, wholeness, belonging, of membership in an inclusive and solidary community which we sometimes seem to want with such a desperate yearning. Speaking for myself, I doubt whether man can ever recapture his full sense of tribal solidarity. Like childhood itself, there is no returning to the childhood of man. What is more, the attempt

to satisfy this craving, if carried far on a densely packed globe, leads not to community but to those hideously destructive forms of tribalism that this century has already seen too much of.

Anyway, I suspect that the village probably never was all that it is cracked up to be. The village, including the pre-industrial village, is less likely to be filled with harmony and solidarity than with the oppressive weight of repressed deviation and dissent which, when they appear, erupt explosively and leave a lasting burden of antagonism and hatred. I have not been able to discover much evidence of the consensual *gemeinschaft* in descriptions of the small town of Springdale in upstate New York, or St. Denis in Quebec, or Peyrane, the village in the Vaucluse, or the small English town of Glossop near Manchester, or the peasant village of Montegrano in South Italy, or the Tanjore village in South India that André Betéille recently described.[3]

Here, for example, is how Horace Miner saw political life in the French Canadian parish of St. Denis thirty years ago:

> Politics is a topic of continual interest and one which reaches fever heat during election time . . . The whole parish is always divided between the "blues" or Conservatives, and the "reds." Party affiliations follow family lines and family cliques and antagonisms. The long winter *veillées* are attended almost invariably by family groups of similar political belief. Constituents of each party have a genuine dislike for those of the other . . . Election time is one of great tension, of taunts and shouting as parishioners get their evening mail . . . Insults are common, and many speaking acquaintances are dropped. During the last election the minority candidate had to have one meeting in the parish in secret, another open but under provincial police protection . . . Campaigns reach their climax with the *assemblée contradictoire*, at which both candidates speak. Characteristically at these meetings there are organized strong-arm tactics, drinking, and attempts to make each candidate's speech inaudible . . .
>
> The chicanery of politicians is a byword in the parish. Factional strife threatens the life of every organized association . . . On the whole the associational life of the community is weak. The people are not joiners.[4]

Thus the village democracy before the demos was ruined by industrialization and urbanization!

If the democratic village seems hardly worth seeking in this industrial and post-industrial epoch, the prospect is all the more appealing that democracy might be extended to the place where most adult citizens spend most of their time—their place of work. Professional people with a great deal of autonomy, academics like ourselves who enjoy an extraordinary amount of autonomy and a fair measure of self government in our universities, executives and administrators who see authority relationships from above rather than from below, all are likely to underestimate the consequences for the average citizen in a modern industrial society flowing from the fact that at his place of work he is a rather low-level subordinate in a system of hierarchical relationships. Although the term democracy has been prostituted in the service of employee relationships, the fact is that practically everywhere in the world, the industrial workplace—the factory, industry, or corporation, whether owned privately or publicly—is no democracy in any sense consistent with our usage in the realm of the state. "The idea of a factory, nationalized or privately-owned," it has been said, "is the idea of command."[5] The factory, the enterprise, the industry, the corporation is a hierarchy; it may be an aristocracy, an oligarchy, a monarchy, a despotism, but it is not a democracy. This is as true in socialist economies as in capitalist and mixed economies. A century ago Engels asserted that hierarchy would be necessary in the factory even under socialism, that even in a socialist enterprise the worker would lose his autonomy. Over the entrance to the factory, he said, recalling *The Inferno*, the words should be written:

> *Lasciate ogni autonomia, voi che entrate!*[6]

Whether the work-place should be democratized, and if so how and how much, are questions that need to be distinguished from the

[3] Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (Garden City, N. Y.: Anchor Books, 1960); Horace Miner, *St. Denis, A French Canadian Parish* (Chicago: University of Chicago Phoenix Books, 1939, 1963); Laurence Wylie, *Village in the Vaucluse* (New York: Harper Colophon, 1957, 1964); A.H. Birch, *Small-Town Politics, A Study of Political Life in Glossop* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959); Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1958); André Betéille, *Caste, Class and Power* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966).

[4] Miner, *op. cit.*, 58–61.

[5] Graham Wooton, *Workers, Unions and the State* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966), 36.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 36. The quotation is from Engels' essay "On Authority" in Lewis S. Feuer (ed.), *Marx and Engels: Basic Writings* (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1959), 481–484.

problem of regulating the enterprise, industry, or corporation to insure that it accomplishes the social and public functions that are the only reason the rest of us are willing to grant its vast legal rights, privileges and immunities, and extraordinary power. If democratic states have become immense, so have corporations. There are privately owned corporations that have gross annual revenues greater than the GNP of most countries of the world, that spend annually sums greater than the entire budgets of the governments of most of the nation-states in the world. To insure that these immense resources and powers are used for public purposes is a staggering problem. But internal democracy in the factory, firm, industry or corporation is not necessarily a more effective means of public control than regulating a hierarchically administered firm by competition and the price system, by a regulatory agency, by government ownership, or by various combinations of these and other possibilities. Indeed, even if the modern corporation were internally democratic, no matter whether it were public or private and no matter whether it were to operate in an economy predominantly privately owned or predominantly publicly owned, I do not think we any more than the Soviets or Yugoslavs would want to dispense entirely with such external controls as competition and the price system. In short, no system of *internal* control negates the need for a system of *external* controls that compel or induce those who exercise authority within the enterprise, whether these managers are chosen by and are accountable to stockholders, workers, or the state, to employ their power and resources for jointly beneficial purposes rather than for exploiting consumers.

But even if we can distinguish the problem of internal democracy from that of external control, the problem does not vanish. And even if this problem is extraordinarily difficult—as I think it is—it seems to me too important to be neglected, particularly by political scientists. It is true that in many developed countries with representative governments, trade union power has substituted bargaining for undiluted hierarchy in the control of wages and working conditions. But even where they are most powerful, labor unions have by no means created a democratic factory or industry; moreover, as a result more of apathy than of repression, few unions anywhere have developed a really high degree of internal democracy. Aside from a few scattered instances elsewhere,[7] the most massive, ambitious, and far-reaching experiment in democratizing the workplace has been taking place in Yugoslavia since 1950. Sober studies[8] suggest that while the system of workers' control has problems—some of them, like apathy and Michel's iron law of oligarchy, familiar to every student of democratic organizations—it might well prove to be a viable system of internal control. If it does, it will surely stand as an alternative with a very great appeal—at least in the long run—to workers in other industrial nations. If workers can participate in the government of their factories in Yugoslavia, and if these factories prove to be relatively efficient, surely the whole question of internal democracy will come alive in other countries.

Yet even if it should prove to be possible, efficient, and desirable, I do not believe that democracy in the work-place is a substitute for democracy in the state. For one thing, I doubt whether democracy in the work place can be preserved indefinitely unless there is democracy in the state. Moreover, where an opposition party is illegal in the state, opposition in the factory has distinct limits.[9] Finally —and this is the most important point—the work place is not as important as the state and with increasing leisure it may grow less so. To accept as a focus for self-government a type of unit that is and must be concerned with only a small part of the range of collective concerns would be to trivialize the democratic idea. I find it hard to believe that man's aspiration toward rational control over his environment by joint action with his fellow men will ever be satisfied by democratizing the production of aspirin, cars, and television sets.

As I have already suggested, any form of political participation that cannot be performed more or less simultaneously but must be carried on sequentially runs into the implacable barrier of time. Time's relentless arrow flies directly to the Achilles' heel of all schemes for participatory democracy on a grand scale. It is easy to show that any unit small enough for all the members to participate fully (where each member has the opportunity to present his views and have them discussed) cannot be larger than a working committee. If you doubt

[7] Wooton, *op. cit.*, 113–124.

[8] Cf. Albert Meister, *Socialisme et Autogestion, L'Expérience Yougoslave* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1964); and Jiri Kolaja, *Workers Councils: The Jugoslav Experience* (New York and Washington: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966).

[9] See the comments of Kolaja, *op. cit.*, pp. 7 and 66ff.; and Meister, *op. cit.*, pp. 240–245, 263–278, 373.

this, I ask you to sit down with pencil and paper and do a few exercises with various assumptions as to the time available for decisions and the time required for each participant to make his point or at least present his point of view.[10] You will quickly see how cruel is time's neutral guillotine. Or let me simply evoke your own experience with committees to remind you how quickly a committee grows too large for every member to participate fully. Or consider the experience of legislative committees, cabinets, regulatory commissions, judicial bodies.

Would we not all agree that an effective working committee can have no more than—let us err on the side of generosity—30 to 40 members? Drawing on your own experience, most of you, I imagine, would cut these figures by a half or two-thirds.

Now if the great advantage of a unit the size of a working committee is that it allows full participation by its members, its great drawback, from a democratic point of view, is that unless it is a representative body or an agent of a representative body it ought not be given much public authority. Either the unit, though small, is granted authority because it represents a much larger number of citizens; or else, not being a representative body, it has little authority other than to recommend and advise; or else, if it has much power and is not a representative body, its power is illegitimate. In an interdependent society, any significant power wielded by a body the size of a working committee is bound to have important effects on citizens not sitting on that committee. Consequently either the committee is representative or its power is illegitimate. We can hardly espouse the small, self-governing, fully participatory unit as a normative goal if it is illegitimate. If it is representative, then it is no longer a body in which all citizens can participate fully. We have run into a cul de sac, as you see, and so we must get back to the starting point.

Some of you may regard this as a pessimistic analysis. It is, I admit, a very large fly in the ointment. Like death, it may be a brutal and perhaps even a tragic limit on man's possibilities, but I do not see why this conclusion must lead to pessimism. The idea of democracy would never have gotten off the ground if enthusiastic democrats had not been willing to settle for something a good deal less than complete and equal participation by all citizens in all decisions. It is worth recalling that in Athens, where the opportunities for free male citizens to participate in running the city seem to have been about as great as they have ever been anywhere, citizens were chosen for what was probably the most coveted participation in the life of the polis—a seat on the Council of Five Hundred, the inner council, or the various administrative boards—by lot or, in the case of the Board of Generals, by election, and to that extent these bodies were instances of representative government and not direct democracy. Participation in the Assembly, which met about once a month, was scarcely the fullest flowering of participatory democracy. I have been to enough town meetings myself to know something of their limitations. If you think of a town meeting in which a quorum sometimes required the presence of 6,000 people, where maybe as many as 30–40,000 were eligible to attend, and where perhaps 4–5,000 were frequently present, it is obvious that most Athenian citizens must have lived their lives without once speaking to their fellow citizens in the Assembly. That, one judges from the reports in Thucydides, was a forum that gave preference to orators.

Nonetheless, I doubt—although we shall never know—whether many Athenians felt frustrated because their opportunities to participate were not as unlimited as their skies. Between the working committee and the nation-state there is, I think, a critical threshold of size, below which the opportunities for participation can be so great and so fairly meted out that no one feels left out and everyone feels that his viewpoint has been pretty fairly attended to. Athens was far too large for the democracy of the working committee; de facto it had to employ a certain amount of representation. Yet I suspect that it was below the critical threshold. And even if we now reject as unattainable the ideal of full, equal, and direct participation by all citizens in all collective decisions—the ideal of committee democracy—we can still search for a unit that remains within this critical threshold for widespread participation.

VI

We have travelled a long trail and turned into a number of branching paths in our quest but we have not found a unit that seems optimal for rational self-government. The journey would have been much longer had we taken the time to explore the by-ways as carefully as they deserve. Yet if we keep going, I think that we shall finally end up about at the place

[10] Cf. Bertrand de Jouvenel, "The Chairman's Problem," this REVIEW, 55 (June, 1961), 368–372.

where the Greeks left off: somewhere within view of the democratic city.

Yet what we come to is not the Greek city, nor can it be; not the *polis*, then, but a democratic city that would be consistent with the presence of the nation-state, the institutions of representative government, a level of technology beyond anything the Greeks dreamed of, and huge populations densely spread over the face of our shrunken earth.

If ancient Greeks were the first truly modern people, choice shaped by geography and historical accident made them also city people. So, too, choice shaped by demography and technology makes us a city people. But even if the Greeks were a city people and though they were modern in almost every important sense, our cities must differ in fact and in ideal from their actual and ideal cities. For one thing, the proportion of the residents of a modern democratic city eligible to participate in political life will be very much larger—something like half of the population, so that even a city of 100,000 will have around 50,000 adult citizens. Much more quickly than the Greeks, we reach the limits of direct democracy. Moreover, the citizens of a modern city will also be highly mobile. A resident of Athens was a citizen only if his ancestors were Athenians; in any modern city, many citizens are recent arrivals, or are about to move to another city. In 1960 more than one resident out of every six in American cities had moved there within the last five years.[11] As a result of our mobility, socialization into the political life of the modern democratic city is enormously more difficult for us than for the Greeks. Then, too, the Greek city was completely autonomous in ideal and pretty much so in fact. Our cities are not autonomous in fact nor would many of us offer total autonomy as an ideal. Finally, the citizen of a Greek city ordinarily had one inclusive loyalty to the city of his ancestors and to its gods. He invested in his city a kind of engagement in comparison with which patriotism in the nation-state must seem either shallow or strident. But the citizens of our modern cities will have no single loyalty and no single community; they will have multiple loyalties to many associations; and nowhere will they find the all-inclusive community.

If for these reasons a modern city cannot be a *polis*, we can nonetheless reasonably hope one day to achieve great democratic cities. As the optimum unit for democracy in the 21st Century, the city has a greater claim, I think, than any other alternative.

To begin with, from now on into the next century man seems clearly destined to live in cities. If to live in cities is our fate, to live in great cities is our opportunity. Is it not of some significance that of the four great waves of experimentation in the West with popular government, during three of these—the Greek, the Roman, and the medieval communes of North Italy—popular governments managed to construct cities of exceptional and enduring beauty?

Yet during the fourth wave, that of representative democracy in the nation-state, we have so far failed most profoundly in our cities. Is it too much to hope that we might be on the verge of a fifth wave, the age of the democratic city within the democratic nation-state? By we, I mean of course, the whole of the Western democratic world and its off-shoots. But most of all, I mean we here in the United States.

City-building is one of the most obvious incapacities of Americans. We Americans have become an urban people without having developed an urban civilization. Though we live in cities, we do not know how to build cities. Perhaps because we have emerged so swiftly out of an agrarian society, perhaps because so many of us are only a generation or two removed from farm and field, small town and peasant village, we seem to lack the innate grasp of the essential elements of the good city that was all but instinct among Greeks, Romans, and the Italians of the free communes. Our cities are not merely non-cities, they are anti-cities—mean, ugly, gross, banal, inconvenient, hazardous, formless, incoherent, unfit for human living, deserts from which a family flees to the greener hinterlands as soon as job and income permit, yet deserts growing so rapidly outward that the open green space to which the family escapes soon shrinks to an oasis and then it too turns to a desert.

One advantage of the city as a unit for democratic government is, then, that it confronts us with a task worthy of our best efforts because of its urgency, its importance, its challenge, the extent of our failure up to now, and its promise for the good life lived jointly with fellow citizens.

These considerations point to another asset of the city as a democratic unit. While the

[11] In 1960 the percentage of migrants from another country since 1955 for all U.S. cities 25,000 and over was 18.4%. The percentages ran slightly higher (19.7%) in small cities of 25–50,000 than in cities over 150,000 (15.6%). See Jeffrey K. Hadden and Edgar F. Borgatta, *American Cities, Their Social Characteristics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), Appendix, Table 1. variable #19, p. 108.

city is not and cannot be autonomous, the policies of city hall and the totality of city agencies and activities are so important to our lives that to participate in the decisions of the city means, or anyway can mean, participating in shaping not merely the trivial but some of the most vital aspects of our environment. I say shaping and not totally controlling because the city is only one of our Chinese boxes. But it is in the city and with the powers and resources made available to cities that we shall deal with such crucial problems as the education of our children, our housing, the way we travel to and from our place of work, preventive health measures, crime, public order, the cycle of poverty, racial justice and equality—not to mention all those subtle and little understood elements that contribute so heavily to the satisfaction of our desires for friendship, neighborhood, community, and beauty.

Yet if the city and its government are important to us, can the good city today be small enough to remain below that critical threshold for wide participation that I mentioned a moment ago? I do not know any question more important to us as political scientists, nor any that we have so completely ignored. From evidence and analysis that are both all too incomplete, I should like to hazard an answer.

The existence of a few giant metropolises here and there may mislead us as to fact and possibility. Only a modest percentage of the world's population lives even today in the giant metropolis. Indeed, in 1960 only one-fifth of the people of the world lived in cities over 100,000. It is true that in the most urbanized region of the world, North America, in 1960 six out of every ten people lived in cities over 100,000. Yet even in the United States, less than one out of every ten lived in cities over a million.

It will take some doing, but we do not have to end up all jammed together in the asphalt desert of the large metropolis—unless that is really what we want. And Americans pretty clearly do not want to live in the large metropolis but rather in cities of modest dimensions. For example, in a survey by Gallup last year nearly half the respondents living in cities of 500,000 and over said they would like to live somewhere else—suburb, small town, farm; by contrast, few of the people living in suburb or town wanted to move to the big cities. About three out of four respondents are distressed by the prospect that their own community will double in population.[12] Census figures for the past several decades tell us that Americans have been acting out these preferences.

What, then, is the optimum size for a city? Curiously, this question, which so far as I know was first asked by political philosophers in Athens over 2,000 years ago, is no longer a subject of discussion among political scientists. I do not know why this should be so, but I wonder if it is because we have come to take a purely passive and defeatist view: the size of a city, we say, is beyond control, so the best we can do is to adapt political institutions to the facts. I am reminded of Rousseau's comment on Grotius, that his invariable mode of reasoning was always to establish right from fact. One might employ a more logical method, Rousseau remarked, but not one more favorable to tyrants.

If to our own loss we have ignored the question of the optimum size of cities, fortunately it has been examined by scholars in a variety of fields other than our own. It is impossible to do justice to this discussion here but the analysis and the evidence are too important for us to ignore.[13] It is only fair to warn you that this is a controversial area, yet the evidence seems to me to support the conclusion that the all-round optimum size for a contemporary American city is probably somewhere between 50,000 and 200,000, which, even taking the larger figure, may be within the threshold for wide civic participation.

There is, for example, no worthwhile evidence that there are any significant economies

[12] American Institute of Public Opinion release, April 24, 1966.

[13] The most extensive survey and analysis of the evidence seems to be the work of Otis Dudley Duncan. The findings of his Ph.D. dissertation, *An Examination of the Problem of Optimum City-Size* (University of Chicago, 1949) have been summarized in Otis Dudley Duncan, "Optimum Size of Cities" in Paul Hatt and Albert Reiss (eds.), *Reader in Urban Sociology* (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1951), 632–645; and James Dahir, "What is the Best Size for a City?," *American City* (August, 1951), 104–105. Robert A. Lillibridge, "Urban Size: An Assessment," *Land Economics*, 38 (Nov., 1952), 341–352, summarizes Duncan and others. In addition, see William Fielding Ogburn and Otis Dudley Duncan, "City Size as a Sociological Variable," in Ernest W. Burgess and Donald J. Bogue, eds., *Urban Sociology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago, Phoenix Books) 58–76; Otis Dudley Duncan, "Optimum Size of Cities" in Joseph J. Spengler and Otis Dudley Duncan (eds.), *Demographic Analysis* (Glencoe, The Free Press, 1956), 372–385.

of scale in city governments for cities over about 50,000. The few items on which increasing size does lead to decreasing unit costs, such as water and sewerage, are too small a proportion of total city outlays to lead to significant economies; and even these reductions are probably offset by rising costs for other services, such as police protection.[14]

Per capita city expenditures increase with the size of city, at least in the United States. In 1960 the mean expenditure for U.S. cities over 150,000 was $123 per capita compared with $70 per capita for cities in the 25–50 thousand range. Yet there is no evidence that these higher costs per capita provide residents of large cities with a better life, taking it in the round, than the life enjoyed by residents of smaller cities. If it costs more in a city of a million than in a city of 25,000 to build, maintain, and police a park within walking distance of every citizen, then higher per capita expenditures for parks in big cities hardly signify that their residents have better public services than residents of smaller cities. What is more, the outlays in larger cities are actually less for some key functions than in smaller cities. For example, even though larger cities employ more persons per capita in public administration than smaller cities, per capita employment in education is on the average lower in larger cities than in small cities.[15]

Roads and highways nullify the older economic advantage of the metropolis as a market and a source of specialized labor. A student of urban economics argues, for example, that A half-dozen towns of, say, 25,000 population with two or three main industries each plus a dozen small one- or two-industry towns of half that size add up to a 300,000 population, extended local labor market, built on the moderately broad base of a couple of dozen separate industries.[16]

The oft-cited cultural advantages of metropolis are also largely illusory. On the basis of his research on American cities, Duncan estimates that the requisite population base for a library of "desirable minimum professional standards" 50,000–75,000, for an art museum, 100,000, "with a somewhat higher figure for science and historical museums." Yet, even though larger cities have larger libraries, the circulation of library books per capita markedly decreases with size of city. There is also a negative correlation between city size and per capita museum attendance.[17] Moreover, just as smaller cities can retain their collective identities and yet form a larger economic unit, thanks to ease of transportation and communication, so we have barely begun to explore the ways in which small cities by federating together for specific purposes might enjoy all of the cultural advantages of the large city and yet retain their individual identities, the pleasures of living in communities of lower densities and more open spaces,[18] and relatively greater opportunities for political participation.

When we think about the size of a city in which a high culture may flourish, it is instructive to recall that Rome in the Augustan age probably had a population of about 350,000. During the Renaissance the city that produced Machiavelli and, I think it fair to say, an outpouring of great paintings, sculpture, and architecture beyond anything we Americans have yet created, had a population of around a hundred thousand. This was probably about the population of the city of Venice during the Renaissance, and of Rome when Michaelangelo chiselled out his Moses and painted his frescoes in the Sistine Chapel.

[14] I am indebted to Mr. Garry D. Brewer for undertaking an extensive survey of the writings and findings dealing with economies of scale in American cities. The relevant literature is extensive, but the most relevant studies appear to be Amos H. Hawley's seminal article, "Metropolitan Population and Municipal Government Expenditures in Central Cities," *Journal of Social Issues*, 7, nos. 1 and 2 (1951), 100–108; Werner Z. Hirsch, "Expenditures Implications of Metropolitan Growth and Consolidation," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 41 (August, 1959) 232–241; Harvey E. Brazer, *City Expenditures in the United States*, National Bureau of Economic Research Occasional Paper no. 66 (New York, 1959). See also the analysis of the evidence of these studies in Wilbur R. Thompson, *A Preface to Urban Economics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), Ch. 7, "The Urban Public Economy," 255–292.

[15] Data in the paragraph above are from Hadden and Borgatta, *op. cit.*, Appendix, Table 1, p. 110, variables 57, 58, and 65.

[16] Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

[17] Duncan, "Optimum Size of Cities," *op. cit.*, p. 381.

[18] " . . . museums, professional athletic teams, complete medical facilities, and other accoutrements of modern urban life could be supported collectively. As the federated places grew and prospered the interstices would, of course, begin to fill in, moving the area closer to the large metropolitan area form. But alert action in land planning and zoning could preserve open spaces in a pattern superior to those found in most large urban areas." Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

Now what is strangely missing from the discussion of the optimum size of cities is the voice of the political scientist. The question is, of course, broader than the problem of what size of city may be optimal for a democratic political life. But political life is not trivial. Surely political criteria have a place among the criteria for the optimum size of cities; and among these political criteria surely one of the most important is whether a city is beyond the threshold for widespread participation. The whole question needs more study than it has had. But it looks to me as if the all-round optimum size for a city—the range, say, from 50 thousand to about 200 thousand—is below this threshold. If this is so, then there is no other unit in the nest of Chinese boxes that is at once so important and so accessible; a unit that can and must be clothed with great powers, if it is to manage its problems, and yet can be small enough so that citizens can participate extensively in determining the ways in which this great power will be used. Only the city, it seems to me, can avoid the extremes we began to confront some time back. For the city need not be so huge that, like the nation-state, it reduces participation to voting, nor so small that its activities are trivial.

The city has at least one more advantage: it has great potentialities as a unit for educating citizens in civic virtue or—if I must use a term that comes more readily to the lips of a contemporary political scientist—for political socialization.

We may be approaching a crisis in the socialization of citizens into the political life of the democratic nation-state, a crisis that the challenges of nation-building, democratization, and overcoming the most blatant evils of industrialism have delayed or obscured. There are signs of malaise among young people, among the very citizens who shortly before the dawn of the 21st Century will have become—to use the word that has now become a mindless cliché—the establishment. If the malaise were only American, one could put it down to television, over-permissive child-rearing, the persistence of an unpopular and ugly war, or other causes more or less specific to the United States; but there are signs of this malaise among youth in almost all the democratic countries.

I am not going to try to explain here a phenomenon too complex for brief analysis. But a part of the phenomenon—I don't know how much it is symptom and how much underlying cause—is a belief that the government of the nation-state is remote, inaccessible, and unresponsive, a government of professionals in which only a few can ever hope to participate actively and a still smaller number can ever gain great influence after years of dedication to political life.

What we need, what they need, and what some of them are trying to create (often with incredible ignorance of elementary political wisdom) is a political unit of more truly human proportions in which a citizen can acquire confidence and mastery of the arts of politics—that is, of the arts required for shaping a good life in common with fellow citizens. What Pericles said of Athens, that the city is in general a school of the Grecians, may be said of every city of moderate size: it is a marvelous school. I have no doubt that a modern city even of moderate size is a good deal more complicated than Athens was. It has a much greater need for highly trained professionals, permanent administrative agencies, full-time leaders. Yet in the main, its problems are, I believe, within reach of the average citizen. And I believe it may be easier for citizens to reason about the good life and the ways to reach it by thinking in the more immediate and palpable context of the city than in the context of the nation-state or international politics. Even if solving the problems of the city is not quite enough for the good life, it is a great, indispensable, and comprehensible prerequisite.

VII

What I have presented is not a program but a perspective, not a prophecy but a prospect. It is not a solution to the problems of the city or of democracy, but a viewpoint from which to look at the problems of democracy and the city. It it does not lead directly to the answers, it might nonetheless help one to see the questions.

I have already suggested one implication of this way of looking at things—if popular governments in the modern world are a series of Chinese boxes, then we obviously need different models, theories, and criteria of excellence for each. I may seem to be repeating only what was commonly said nearly two centuries ago as ideas about representative government began to develop, that we cannot judge representative government in the nation-state as if it were or could be democracy in a committee, or, for that matter, a town meeting. Yet it is interesting to me that we have made so little of these palpable and evidently inherent differences in the performance of different kinds of units, all of which we are prone to call democratic.

Yet if the democratic city lies somewhere between democracy in the committee or in the

town meeting and representative government in the nation-state, then it would be important to know what the similarities and differences are, and what standards of excellence we can apply to one but not the other. Even the democratic city, I fear, cannot satisfy anyone who has a vision of leaderless and partyless democracy, for at its best the politics of the democratic city will be more like a competitive polyarchy than a committee; organized parties and interest groups are more likely to exist than the free and spontaneous formation and dissolution of groups for every issue; a full-time leader or activist will exert more influence than any of his followers; institutionalized conflict is more likely than uncoerced consensus. Yet these are hunches that do no more than point to new worlds that need exploring.

The perspective I have been describing also bears on the way we think about units of government intermediate between nation-state and city. An American obviously must take the 50 states into account. These are too solidly built to be done away with and I don't propose to break any lances tilting against them. Yet in the perspective I am suggesting the states do not stand out as important institutions of democratic self-government. They are too big to allow for much in the way of civic participation—think of California and New York, each about as large in population as Canada or Yugoslavia and each larger than 80% of the countries of the world. Yet an American state is infinitely less important to citizens of that state than any democratic nation-state is to its citizens. Consequently the average American is bound to be much less concerned about the affairs of his state than of his city or country. Too remote to stimulate much participation by their citizens, and too big to make extensive participation possible anyway, these units intermediate between city and nation are probably destined for a kind of limbo of quasi-democracy. They will be pretty much controlled by the full-time professionals, whether elected or appointed. Moreover, many of the problems that states have to deal with will not fit within state boundaries. It cannot even be said that the states, on the whole, can tap any strong sentiments of loyalty or like-mindedness among their citizens. Doubtless we shall continue to use the states as important intermediate instruments of coordination and control—if for no other reason than the fact that they are going institutions. But whenever we are compelled to choose between city and state, we should always keep in mind, I think, that the city, not the state, is the better instrument of popular government.

This argument also applies to megalopolis, to the city that is *not* a city, to the local government that is *not* a local government. The city of New York, for example, has about the same population as Sweden or Chile. It is twice as large as Norway, three times the size of New Zealand. To regard the government of New York as a local government is to make nonsense of the term. If the Swedes were to rule their whole country from Stockholm with no local governments, I am quite sure that we would begin to question whether the people of Sweden could rightly be called self-governing. Where, we might ask the Swedes, are your local governments? But should we not ask the same thing of New Yorkers: Where are *your* local governments? For purely historical and what to me seem rather irrational reasons, we continue to regard the government of the giant metropolis as if it were a local government, when we might more properly consider it as the equivalent of a state or a provincial government—and hence badly in need of being broken up into smaller units for purposes of local government. If it turns out that the government of a metropolis cannot be decentralized to smaller territorial units, then should we not quite openly declare that the metropolis cannot ever be made into a democratic city? This may be an inconvenient truth, but if it is true, it may be—like much truth—liberating in the end.

Yet I must admit that problems like these involving the metropolis demand more than we now know. The metropolis is a world to be explored, so let us explore it, hoping that we may discover how even it might be turned into a democratic city.

VIII

There are many questions that I shall have to leave unanswered. I could plead lack of time, but the fact is I don't know the answers, nor perhaps does anyone else quite yet.

There is above all the question that now overshadows all else in American life of how we shall solve the problems presented by race, poverty, inequality, discrimination, and centuries of humiliation. No failure in American society has been as enduring, as profound, as visible, as corrosive, as dangerous, and as tragic as our refusal to enable black Americans to share in equal measure with white Americans the realities of the American dream. Now this problem has become central to the whole future of our cities and indeed to the future of the country. I scarcely need to say that unless and until it is solved neither we nor our children nor our grandchildren nor any future

generation can have anything like a decent urban life.

There is also the question of how the city can acquire adequate resources, particularly funds, without becoming excessively subordinated to higher levels of government. The bloc grant is a very promising solution, but only if grants are made directly to the cities and not, as is often proposed, exclusively to the states. In the perspective that I have been suggesting, to think of the states as the natural and exclusive recipients of bloc grants is anachronistic; for if the autonomy that is promised by the bloc grant is desirable for states—those barely democratic units in the limbo—autonomy is all the more desirable, and indeed necessary, if citizens are to enjoy the power to shape their cities.

A third question is how to control the size of cities. If there is an optimum size in the broad range from about 50,000 to about 200,000, as I have suggested further inquiry might show, then how can cities be maintained within this range—to say nothing of breaking up the giant metropolis? Typically, the people who influence decisions about the future of cities have acted on the simple-minded axiom: the bigger the better. This is most notably true here in America where the rational prospect of great gain encourages an almost pathological obsession with the virtues of sheer bigness, as if the very bigness of the city, the height of its buildings, and the crowds on its streets must somehow outweigh all squalor and ugliness. There seems to be a fear, too, that the moment we stop growing we start to die, a half truth that overlooks the fact that in nature the mouse and the sparrow have outlasted the brontosaurus and the sabre-toothed tiger. There are, I suspect, all sorts of devices we could use to control the growth of a city when it reaches the optimum range. These need to be explored, but they will be of little use until we decide that this is what we really want to do.

A closely related though much more formidable question is how we can make the legal boundaries of a city coincide more closely with what might be called its sociological boundaries. As I suggested earlier, our view up to now has been passive or defeatist: we say that we must constantly change legal boundaries to fit social boundaries. But as I tried to suggest with my fantasy of a Constitutional Convention, this way lies madness; for the legal boundaries must be extended until they cover the whole globe, which, whatever else it may be, cannot be a complete substitute for smaller territorial units. In general, the political autonomy allowed a territorial unit is likely to be less, the higher the amount of interaction with others outside the legal boundaries. In building nations or international systems, the greater the interaction; and consequently the less "real" the significance of local boundaries, the easier the task. Yet if we are to build democratic cities with enough autonomy to permit their citizens to participate extensively in significant decisions about their environment, we must somehow reverse the tendency for the legal boundaries of the city to lose all social and economic significance. Nor can we simply go on creating separate authorities for each problem. Obviously different problems call for different boundaries, and we may have to live in a network of authorities. Yet the indefinite multiplication of units of government is bound to fragment the control of the ordinary citizen over a broad range of policies.

The problem of fragmented authority touches closely upon another, the problem of decentralization of authority and power within the city. Even in a city in the range from 50,000–200,000 political participation is reduced for most people to nothing more than voting in elections—as it is in the representative government of the nation-state—unless there are smaller units within which citizens can from time to time formulate and express their desires, consult with officials, and in some cases participate even more fully in decisions. Unfortunately, I can only indicate the problem; I have no answers to it. There are a number of proposals floating around for creating smaller participatory units in the city, the oldest and most popular candidate being the neighborhood; and there are even some interesting experiments of this kind going on. So far as I know none of the proposals or experiments triumph over the universal tendency for a few activists to engage in most of the overt activities while the rest participate only sporadically, symbolically, or not at all. Although this limitation seems to me to deflate rather cruelly the most grandiose and utopian claims for citizen participation, and in addition raises serious problems, I do not think it is a reason for rejecting these efforts and experiments out of hand, if we are aiming not for committee democracy but, as I suggested a moment ago, a degree of participation so great and so fairly spread about that no one feels neglected and everyone feels, with justice, that his viewpoint has been pretty fairly attended to. To aim for the point at which practically everyone in the city believes with good reason that his claims ordinarily receive a fair hearing, and decisions, even

when adverse to his claims, have been arrived at with understanding and sympathy, is already so distant and so splendid a goal that I am quite content to leave the exploration of what lies beyond it to someone in the 21st Century.

If there were time, I know that one could turn up more questions, more problems, more obstacles. We might even conclude that the fifth high tide of democracy, the age of the democratic city in the democratic republic, is not after all in our destiny.

Or it may be within the possibilities of other countries, but not our own, to achieve in the rest of this century what the Greeks did 2500 years ago, to develop an urban civilization founded on the democratic city, only consistent this time with the imperatives of modern technology, the existence of representative governments ruling over huge populations and territories, and the extension of constitutionalism and the rule of law to vast areas of the earth—ultimately, perhaps, to the globe itself.

Yet even if no one can say whether this will ever come about, or where, for everyone stirred by the prospect of shaping politics now toward the good life in the 21st Century—or at least toward a better life—the opportunities lie all around.

COMPATIBILITY AND CONSENSUS: A PROPOSAL FOR THE CONCEPTUAL LINKAGE OF EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL DIMENSIONS OF FOREIGN POLICY*

WOLFRAM F. HANRIEDER
University of California, Santa Barbara

The relative intractability of the international environment poses a problem for the foreign policy of all nations. Purpose and power meet with cross-purpose and countervailing power, and most foreign policy projects face external restraints that the makers of policy can neglect only at the risk of failure. Foreign policy—the more or less coordinated strategy with which institutionally designated decision-makers seek to manipulate the international environment—generally meets with tenacious resistance, if not insuperable obstacles.

To regard foreign policy and statecraft from this perspective, however, implies a good deal of determinism. In its more extreme analytical applications, this viewpoint reduces the pursuit of foreign policy goals to a contest between statesman and environment that is already settled by the insurmountable restrictions of the international "system." Nations are implicitly delegated to play out the roles that the international system has "assigned" to its "actors" to maintain system stability or equilibrium. Domestic political variables are largely neglected in this analytical perspective. Foreign policy aspirations are assessed primarily in terms of whether a nation has adequately "internalized" system "rules"—that is to say, whether a polity has adjusted to the contingencies of the international system, which seems to move toward a preordained historical or analytical *telos*. The strictures of necessity, imposed by the international environment, take analytical precedence over considerations of preferences and the possibility of choice.[1]

There is an analytical alternative for viewing foreign policy that focuses on the *internal* political processes of the nation-state. This perspective stresses the motivational elements that shape a nation's foreign policy goals; it highlights the sociocultural predispositions and institutional processes that lead to the formulation of goals and to the choice among methods of implementation. Although this approach apparently stresses choice rather than necessity, it frequently imposes a teleology of its own. The international conduct of nations tends to be regarded as either irreversibly determined by their historical experience and "political culture," or decisively shaped by the personal idiosyncrasies of their decision-makers. Analytical emphasis rests on the domestic political system as a "subsystem" of the enveloping international system; the strictures and opportunities of the international environment are relegated to the secondary analytical role of serving as "in-puts" from the international system into the domestic system.[2]

The advantages and shortcomings of both of these views of international politics and international statecraft result from the kinds of questions that are being raised. The choice between the "systemic" and the "subsystemic" approach does not reflect caprice on the part of the analyst but a legitimate and calculated decision that is determined by the analytical purpose of the inquiry. A primary analytical

* I am grateful for research support given me by the Center of International Studies of Princeton University. The concepts proposed here are applied in my study *West German Foreign Policy, 1949–1963: International Pressure and Domestic Response* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967).

[1] See, for example, Morton A. Kaplan, *System and Process in International Politics* (New York: John Wiley, 1957); George Liska, *International Equilibrium* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957); Morton A. Kaplan, Arthur L. Burns, and Richard M. Quandt, "Theoretical Analysis of the 'Balance of Power,'" *Behavioral Science*, 5 (July 1960), 240–252; Maurice A. Ash, "An Analysis of Power, with Special Reference to International Politics," *World Politics*, 3 (January 1951), 218–237.

[2] See, for example, Richard C. Snyder, H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin, *Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954), and the early essay by Snyder, "The Nature of Foreign Policy," *Social Science*, 27 (April 1952), 61–69; Otto Klineberg, *Tensions Affecting International Understanding* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1950).

interest in the *outcome* of foreign policy will necessarily focus on the *operational* environment that the nation-state faces in the historical circumstances of the international system. Analytical pre-occupation with *motivational* aspects of foreign policy making will necessarily turn to internal political processes and to the *perception* of external conditions that is the basis for choosing among alternatives of ends and means.[3]

Nonetheless, the analyst of foreign policy is on safe ground in arguing that a full consideration of a nation's foreign policy should focus both on the opportunities and strictures presented by the nation's external, operational environment and on the internal, psychological environment prevailing in the national system. By taking both dimensions into account, a wider range of relevant data is brought together and a more comprehensive analysis becomes possible. Almost by definition, foreign policy goals are circumscribed both by internal-motivational-psychological phenomena and by external-operational contingencies. It is literally impossible to speak of foreign policy goals without thinking at once of a psychological-motivational "unit" and the contextual, operational environment in which the unit seeks to realize its goals.[4]

It is the purpose of this essay to propose an analytical framework for a "linkage system" between the external and internal dimensions of foreign policy projects or, in a larger sense, between international systems and national systems. Before we turn to this task, it will be helpful to discuss briefly some of the concrete historical developments that lend a special urgency to this analytical issue and to comment on some of the conceptual schemes that have been proposed for its resolution.

I. THE SETTING

It has been widely recognized that contemporary historical circumstances throw serious doubt on the value of retaining the traditional and comfortably neat separation between international and domestic politics and the corollary distinction between external and

[3] Harold and Margaret Sprout suggest that "In analyzing a particular outcome, performance, or state of affairs, it is generally possible to identify certain elements of the total environment that appear to be strategic (that is, very immediate and important). These specific elements constitute the *operational* environment of the actor in that situation. The operational environment (the factors which an outside observer judges to be relevant and significant in explaining an event or state of affairs) should be distinguished from the environment as it appears to the actor in the situation. His image of reality we shall call his *psychological* environment": *Foundations of International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), 46–47. "How one draws the line between unit and milieu also has practical as well as purely analytic consequences, depending on whether the focus is on *psychological behavior* or on achievement or accomplishment as measured in terms of *capabilities*": *The Ecological Perspective on Human Affairs, with Special Reference to International Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), 41 (italics in original).

For a trenchant examination of the international and national levels of analysis and their methodological implications, see J. David Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *World Politics*, 14 (October 1961), 77–92. A "three-level" analysis is presented by Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State, and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), and a "six-level" set of variables is proposed by Robert C. North *et al.*, *Content Analysis: A Handbook with Applications for the Study of International Crisis* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1963), 5–7; see also Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), chapter 3; George Liska, "Continuity and Change in International Systems," *World Politics*, 16 (October 1963), 118–136, esp. pp. 126*ff.*; Odd Ramsoy, *Social Groups as System and Subsystem* (New York: Free Press, 1963); Raymond Aron, *Introduction à la philosophie de l'histoire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1948), esp. pp. 227 *ff.* For admirable studies that combine both systemic and subsystemic perspectives, see Richard N. Rosecrance, *Action and Reaction in World Politics* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), and Adda B. Bozeman, *Politics and Culture in International History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960).

The "level-of-analysis" problem not only is an issue in international relations and the social sciences, but poses searching questions in physics, philosophy, and linguistics, to mention just a few fields of inquiry. Cf. Daniel Lerner (ed.), *Parts and Wholes* (New York: Free Press, 1963); see especially the Introduction and the contributions by Edward Purcell, Ernest Nagel, and Roman Jakobson.

[4] See Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "Actor Objectives and International Systems," *Journal of Politics*, 27 (February 1965), 109–132; Arnold Wolfers, "The Actors in International Politics," in Wolfers, *op. cit.*, 3–24.

internal dimensions of foreign policy projects. Although the nation-state may still be regarded as the major actor in world politics, both the nature of the nation-state and that of the political processes of the international system have changed to such an extent that the analytical formulation of these transformations is a question of immediate concern.[5]

In the first place, many of the national actors in the contemporary international system find it increasingly difficult, or meaningless, to distinguish between foreign policy and domestic policy. This holds true not only for the developing new nations but also for the industrialized nations of the Northern Hemisphere, whose reallocations of resources and values are strongly affected by international contingencies. The occupation regimes in Germany and Japan in the postwar period, United States involvement in South Vietnam, United Nations operations in the Congo, foreign aid grants with restrictions on utilization—these are just a few cases where the allocation of values in a national system has been strongly affected by the prevailing patterns of power and purpose in the international system. Not only are domestic allocations of values strongly affected by the international environment, but national decision-makers have become very conscious of the fact that many external events have a more or less direct impact on the allocation of values that traditionally has taken place largely within national institutional structures.[6]

Secondly, nowhere is this phenomenon more clearly visible and institutionalized than in the operations of regional international organizations that are endowed with some measure of supranational authority, however limited. How can one distinguish between domestic and foreign policy in an institution whose policies have consequences that cannot be assessed in terms of either purely external or purely internal ramifications?[7] In fact, the whole phenomenon of "regionalism"—whether institutionalized or not—suggests the value of applying an intermediate level of analysis to avoid the traditional analytical bifurcation of national and international systems.[8]

Third, the very nature of the nation-state has been subjected to far-reaching mutations. As John Herz has cogently argued, the previously existing "hard shell" of physical, legal, and psychological boundaries that national systems have maintained against the external environment is becoming increasingly "permeated," primarily because of developments in modern weapons technology and the applica-

[5] For a full treatment of this issue and a critical review of the relevant literature, see James N. Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 27–92.

[6] See Philip E. Mosely, "Research on Foreign Policy," Brookings Dedication Lectures, *Research for Public Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961), 43–72, esp. p. 50; Robert E. Good, "State-Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States," in Laurence W. Martin (ed.), *Neutralism and Nonalignment* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 3–12; Fred Riggs, "The Theory of Developing Politics," *World Politics*, 16 (October 1963), 147–171. Andrew Scott, *The Revolution in Statecraft* (New York: Random House, 1965).

[7] See Ernst B. Haas's *Beyond the Nation-State* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1964), his "Regionalism, Functionalism, and Universal International Organization," *World Politics*, 8 (January 1956), 238–263, and his *The Uniting of Europe* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958). See also Leon Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1963); Ernst B. Haas, *Consensus Formation in the Council of Europe* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1960); Amitai Etzioni, "The Dialectics of Supranational Unification," this REVIEW, 56 (December 1962), 927–935, and his "The Epigenesis of Political Communities at the International Level," *American Journal of Sociology*, 68 (January 1963), 407–421; Karl Deutsch *et al.*, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957); Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "International Organizations and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (September 1966), 297–313.

[8] Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," *World Politics*, 10 (April 1958), 408–429; Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Southern Asia," *World Politics*, 15 (January 1963), 213–235; George Modelski, "International Relations and Area Studies: The Case of South-East Asia," *International Relations*, 2 (April 1961), 143–155, and his *The Communist International System* (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 9, 1960); Thomas Hodgkin, "The New West African State System," *University of Toronto Quarterly*, 31 (October 1961), 74–82; Richard L. Walker, *The Multi-State System of Ancient China* (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String Press, 1953).

tion of economic and psychological warfare.[9]

All these examples—and they are by no means exhaustive—go beyond the mere fact that there is an increasing "interdependence" among national actors in the system; rather, they are examples of a process in which the traditional boundaries separating the nation-state from the environing international system are becoming increasingly obscured.[10]

II. EFFORTS AT LINKAGE

It is not surprising, therefore, that the conceptual relationship between the external and internal dimensions of foreign policy, or between "international politics and foreign policy,"[11] has received increasing attention. This reflects not so much an academic fashion of the day as the saliency of the problem in an historical period when the nature of international politics and the nation-state is apparently undergoing an important transformation.

It is questionable, however, whether the abundance of literature on this matter has contributed appropriate analytical frameworks to accommodate the concrete historical phenomena of the interpenetration of international and domestic systems.[12] I do not intend to review such proposals here in any detail. Nonetheless, it may be useful to indicate briefly two major problems that diminish the value of most attempts in this direction.

(1) A major disadvantage of these efforts is their highly idiosyncratic nature. Although many are imaginative examples of conceptual creativity, they are so individualistic that it is unlikely that other analysts will feel compelled to apply them. If past performance is a valid indicator, most analysts prefer to strike out on their own in constructing conceptual frameworks.[13] Furthermore, only rarely is the

[9] John H. Herz, *International Politics in the Atomic Age* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), esp. ch. 6. See also Edward Hallett Carr, *Nationalism and After* (London, New York: Macmillan, 1945); Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defense* (New York: Harper, 1962).

[10] See Rosenau, *op. cit.*, pp. 63–65; Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "The International System: Bipolar or Multibloc?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 9 (September 1965), 299–308.

[11] James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Politics and Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1961); see especially the Introduction and Part I.

[12] In addition to the studies already mentioned, see the following: Fred W. Riggs, "International Relations as a Prismatic System," *World Politics*, 14 (October 1961), 144–181; Chadwick F. Alger, "Comparison of Intranational and International Politics," this REVIEW, 57 (June 1963), 406–418; Roger D. Masters, "World Politics as a Primitive Political System," *World Politics*, 16 (July 1964), 595–619; Bruce M. Russett, "Toward a Model of Competitive International Politics," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (May 1963), 226–247; Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," *General Systems*, 8 (1963), 1–50; Michael Haas, *Some Societal Correlates of International Political Behavior* (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1964); Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958–1960," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 10 (March 1966), 41–64; William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962). esp. ch. 9; James N. Rosenau (ed.), *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1964); Harry Eckstein (ed.), *Internal War* (New York: Free Press, 1964); Bruce M. Russett, *Trends in World Politics* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), esp. ch. 4; Otto Klineberg, "Intergroup Relations and International Relations," in Muzafer Sherif (ed.), *Intergroup Relations and Leadership: Approaches and Research in Industrial, Ethnic, Cultural, and Political Areas* (New York: John Wiley, 1962), 174–176; Raymond W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder, "The Analysis of Social Conflict—Toward, an Overview and Synthesis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 1 (September 1957), 212–248; J. David Singer in his concluding remarks in Singer (ed.), *Human Behavior and International Politics* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), 453–457. Paul Y. Hammond, "The Political Order and the Burden of External Relations," *World Politics*, 19 (April 1967), 443–464; Kenneth N. Waltz, *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); James N. Rosenau (ed.), *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (New York: Free Press, 1967).

The timeliness of the question is also reflected in the international relations program of the 1966 APSA Convention which was devoted exclusively to the issue of national-international linkages (see below, notes 13, 17, and 21).

[13] This appears to be a problem even when there is prior agreement on a highly structured, collaborative research agenda. The papers prepared for the international relations program of the 1966 APSA Convention were to follow, as much as possible, the agenda spelled out in James N. Rosenau's lead-off paper. Regardless of the intrinsic merit of the other contributions, it seems to me that only three of the eleven papers (Bernard C. Cohen, "National-International

theorist prepared to follow through with a laborious case study that tests the utility of his conceptual framework. Most proposals conclude with cordial invitations or urgent exhortations to other analysts to substantiate empirically the promise of the new analytical vista that has been opened up to the discipline. Hence, the opportunity to exploit comparative case studies for building a theory of conceptual linkages is largely foreclosed. Although some political scientists have expressed their satisfaction that analysts of international politics are increasingly building on the work of others,[14] this optimism seems to me premature. To be sure, approaches based on systems analysis, structural-functional analysis, or decision-making frameworks have advanced to a stage where a "revisionist" conceptual venture is generally linked to already existing, similar proposals. But this is a far cry from a consciously coordinated research strategy that would provide extensive comparative studies of linkage systems. On the contrary, grafting a growing number of conceptually refined models on pioneering theoretical works lends an embarrassing aura of narcissistic scholasticism to such endeavors: rarely are they followed up with the empirical evidence that fulfills the promise implied in the "improved" analytical proposals.

This may be deplorable, but it is certainly understandable. Most analysts balk at taking over someone else's conceptual framework or serving as "researcher" for a theorist. This reluctance is strengthened by the fact that an empirically oriented analyst of international politics and foreign policy—presumably the ideal researcher for individual and comparative case studies—frequently views elaborate analytical schemes with a good deal of skepticism, if not distaste. These tensions of purpose and interest are further aggravated by the apparent lack of communication between specialists in international politics and specialists in comparative government. This lack is especially impoverishing because the enterprise of correlating external and internal dimensions of foreign policy necessarily calls for such a dialogue.

(2) A second range of problems that plague efforts to link international systems with national systems is of a more substantive nature. Although undoubtedly there are advantages in considering external and internal dimensions of foreign policy in conjunction as a "linkage system," there is also a good deal to be said for separating them analytically. Separation not only sharpens a subsequent correlation of external and internal dimensions, but also acknowledges that both dimensions reach into significantly different analytical environments—namely, the external-international-operational and the internal-domestic-motivational.

This poses a problem. There is a good deal of merit in the argument that propositions derived from these two different analytical environments, or levels of analysis, cannot be readily correlated because they are culled from different sets of empirical data and methodological assumptions. This is the old problem of adding pears and apples. Propositions that can be established either for the international-systemic level of analysis or for the domestic-subsystemic-national level of analysis are frequently regarded as non-cumulative because they emerge from significantly different analytical contexts.[15] Consequently, if concepts of linkage are to be established between these two levels, they must be sufficiently isomorphic to assuage critics who contend—for sound reasons—that adding pears and apples makes good fruit salad but bad theory.[16] To put it another way, one can perhaps with analytical impunity *contrast* and *juxtapose* a great number of propositions that derive from the two levels of analysis. It is a different matter, however, to establish *cumulative* propositions for integrating the two levels of analysis, because such

---

Linkages: Superpolities"; Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, "National-International Linkages—Geographic Conditions: Insular Polities;" and Ole R. Holsti and John D. Sullivan, "Non-Conforming Bloc Polities: France and the People's Republic of China") followed Rosenau's ingenious framework, even though a conference had preceded the writing of the papers.

[14] Cf. James N. Rosenau, "The Functioning of International Systems," *Background*, 7 (November 1963), 111; and Sidney Verba, "Simulation, Reality, and Theory in International Relations," *World Politics*, 16 (April 1964), 490.

[15] Singer, for example, argues that such propositions, "representing different levels of analysis and couched in different frames of references . . . would defy theoretical integration; one may well be a corollary of the other, but they are not immediately combinable. A prior translation from one level to another must take place": "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," p. 91.

[16] Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State*, p. 74. For a symbolic-logical précis of isomorphism, see Rudolf Carnap, *Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications* (New York: Dover, 1958), p. 75.

propositions must meet the test of isomorphism and hence are much more difficult to formulate.

With few exceptions, analytical attempts to link international and domestic systems have circumvented the issue of isomorphism and hence are deficient in fundamental respects. To cite just a few examples: the proposals advanced by Riggs, Masters, Alger, and Russett all recognize the relevance of isomorphic attributes in linkage systems. However, these analysts have reduced the requisite of isomorphism to essentially one feature by suggesting, in effect, that the isomorphic quality connecting international and domestic systems consists in the fact that both ar *political* systems, and that the differences between international and domestic politica processes are not as pronounced as we hav been led to believe. Consequently, so thi argument goes, analytical precepts that apply to domestic political processes—especially i "primitive" societies that apparently resembl the disorganized "state of nature" in international politics—can also be applied t processes of the international system. The resulting analytical frameworks sidestep the issue of isomorphism—and that of linkage—by simply positing parallelisms between the processes of international and domestic politics.[17]

[17] Some typical passages indicative of this line of argument are the following: Riggs advocates a "prismatic" model of a political system which occupies a conceptual middle position between a "fused" model (traditional agricultural and folk societies) and a "refracted" model (modern industrial societies), and whose "configurations would have points of correspondence in contemporary world affairs . . . " (*op. cit.*, p. 181). The "wide range of intermediate positions having these [prismatic] characteristics . . . " rests on the possibility that "if there is any similarity between the basic political structure of government in a new state and in our international system, then perhaps models developed for one might shed light on the other. An analysis of the contemporary interstate system might help us understand the underdeveloped country, and models for politics in these countries may illuminate aspects of international relations" (*ibid.*, 147–148). Alger (*op. cit.*), although critical of the Riggs model in some respects, accepts its basic assumption of isomorphism as valid and proceeds to apply to the international system the structural-functional categories formulated for developing societies by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman in *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960). A similar argument is made by Masters, who views "world politics as a primitive political system." He suggests that "Four elements common to politics within a number of primitive societies and international relations deserve mention: first, the absence of a formal government with power to judge and punish violations of law; second, the use of violence and 'self-help' by the members of the system to achieve their objectives and enforce obligations; third, the derivation of law and moral obligations either from custom or from explicit, particular bargaining relationships (i.e., the absence of a formal legislative body operating on the basis of—and making—general rules); and fourth, a predominant organizational principle which establishes political units serving many functions in the overall social system" (*op. cit.*, p. 597). Masters contends, however, that although "there is a striking similarity between some primitive political systems and the modern international system . . . one cannot employ the polar opposites of 'primitive' and 'modern' or 'functionally diffuse' and 'functionally specific' as the basis of a comparative analysis of primitive political systems. Because primitive political systems vary enormously, one must explicitly distinguish the particular *kind* of primitive society which is supposed to present the greatest similarity to world politics" (*ibid.*, 599). Russett goes even further in postulating structural isomorphisms between international and domestic politics, arguing that "The world could be thought of as a political system in which the major blocs are analogous to two parties that compete for the favor of the uncommitted voters. Each 'party,' including a leader and loyal party members of 'partisans,' tries to convince 'voters' that it is best able to fulfill their needs and respect their ethical prescriptions. At this stage of the analysis we shall consider a voter, whether neutral or partisan, as equivalent to the government of a particular nation" (*Trends in World Politics*, p. 57).

The imaginative framework presented by James N. Rosenau in the paper "Toward the Study of National-International Linkages" also does not fully face up to the fundamental question of "cumulativeness" raised by Singer ("The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations"). Rosenau wants "to identify and analyze those recurrent sequences of behavior that originate on one side of the boundary between the two types of systems and that become linked to phenomena on the other side in the process of unfolding. Since the boundaries can be crossed by processes of perception and emulation as well as by direct interaction, allowance must be made for both continuous and intermittent sequences. Hence we will use a *linkage* as our basic unit of analysis, defining it as any recurrent sequence of

Consequently, while these analytical schemes implicitly portend to lead to conceptual linkages, they fall short on two important grounds. First, they practically ignore the injunction that concepts from different analytical environments can be used interchangeably only with grave methodological consequences. In that respect, these proposals are too radical in dismissing voices of caution that point out the dangers of interchanging concepts from one level of analysis with those of another. Secondly, they are too conservative in implying that structuring international and national politics with parallel analytic concepts "naturally" links these two levels of analysis. Ironically, the very assumption of parallelism tends to perpetuate the traditional notion that international and domestic systems are conceptual entities with ineradicably *distinct* boundaries, even though the nature of their political processes may be regarded as not fundamentally *different*. To tackle the problem of isomorphism by simply positing parallelism between international and domestic systems obscures and circumvents the issue of how to provide analytical frameworks for processes of interpenetration.

III. COMPATIBILITY AND CONSENSUS

There are, I believe, two concepts that permit the correlation of important external and internal dimensions of foreign policy aims, and that allow the analyst to view foreign policy as a continuous process bridging the analytical barriers between the international and the domestic political system. The first is the concept of *compatibility*, which is intended to assess the degrees of feasibility of various foreign policy goals, given the strictures and opportunities of the *international* system; the second is the concept of *consensus*, which assesses the measure of agreement on the ends and means of foreign policy on the *domestic* political scene.

By compatibility between the conditions of the international system and foreign policy goals, I mean that a particular objective has a reasonable chance of realization if implemented by a policy that an outside observer would deem appropriate. The degree of complementarity *among* goals—an interesting target for speculation—can be established by aggregating their respective individual compatibilities vis-à-vis the international system. If one goal is judged to be compatible with the conditions prevailing in the international system, and if the pursuit of this goal is seen to have a negative effect on another goal's chances of attainment, these two goals can be regarded as incompatible. That is, the respective degrees of compatibility between individual goals and the international system serve as the basis for evaluating the degree of complementarity among goals. The conditions of the international system provide the backdrop for both relationships.

Clearly, the concept of consensus lacks this kind of "operational" background. No standard of feasibility on the domestic political scene corresponds precisely to that which the operational contingencies of the international system provide for the external dimensions of foreign policy goals. The motivational-psychological determinants of foreign policy projects may be checked by ethical restraints, inadequate perception of opportunities, realistic perception of external strictures, and so on, but the range of political goals that the members of a political system can advocate and agree on is at least hypothetically without limits. Still, the differences between the concepts of compatibility and consensus need not be exaggerated. Compatibility is a concept of feasibility by definition, and if consensus is defined as the existing measure of agreement on policy projects among the relevant elements of a national system's decision-making process, it necessarily imposes boundaries on the activities the political system can pursue without risking fragmentation. In that sense, consensus is in fact a standard of feasibility, especially in a democratic political system; it determines, in the long run, what foreign policy goals a government can pursue without losing popular support and office.

Two major claims can be made for the application of these concepts to establish linkage systems between external and internal dimensions of foreign policy projects or, in a larger sense, between international systems and domestic systems. Both claims are addressed to the two major problem areas indicated in section II as posing difficulties for the analytical formulation of linkage systems.

---

behavior that originates in one system and is reacted to in another" (p. 12, italics in original). The concept of linkage, used as a basic unit of analysis and representing an interaction flow between the two systems, is by definition a "cumulative" concept that reaches into two different analytical environments. By focusing his basic unit of analysis on the *process* of interaction rather than on its source or target, Rosenau avoids parallelism; but the concept of linkage is intended to connect such an extensive and variegated array of phenomena (Rosenau mentions 3888 possible linkage combinations) that their cumulative quality is somewhat questionable.

(1) With respect to highly individualistic conceptual schemes that lack supportive case studies and fail to bridge the gap between international and comparative politics, the organization of data under the categories of compatibility and consensus seems to offer a fruitful compromise. Even the most diverse approaches to the study of external and internal dimensions of foreign policy—and the case studies that have already emerged from them—can be reformulated without too much difficulty in terms of compatibility patterns and consensus patterns. The idea of compatibility is inherent in the many approaches to the study of international politics that focus primarily on external determinants of foreign policy endeavors or, more broadly, on the systemic, global approach to international politics. The results of such diverse approaches as those of Morton Kaplan, Arthur Lee Burns, Hans Morgenthau, and George Liska—to mention just a few—can readily be reformulated in terms of compatibility, since all these analysts stress the systemic level of analysis, irrespective of the diverging paths of inquiry they follow within that category. At the same time, the concept of consensus has been so widely used in the field of comparative politics that it provides an invitingly open door for the specialist in international politics to exploit the work already done in comparative politics. To some extent, decision-making approaches to the study of foreign policy already draw on data closely akin to material covered by the specialist in comparative politics. In short, the concepts of compatibility and consensus can tap a large reservoir of existing studies whose findings can be couched, and economically reformulated, in terms of compatibility and consensus patterns.

(2) There remains the question of the intrinsic analytical utility of applying compatibility and consensus as concepts of linkage. In this respect, the major claim that can be made for the two concepts is that both are standards of feasibility and hence not totally non-isomorphic. As mentioned previously, the quality of isomorphism is important if analytical concepts are used to form linkage systems. The concepts of compatibility and consensus do share this isomorphic quality and hence are useful not only for contrasting external and internal patterns of foreign policy phenomena (although this is in itself desirable) but also for making integrative propositions about the linkage between international and domestic systems. To repeat: the concept of compatibility is a standard of feasibility by definition because it serves to assess the chances of success of foreign policy projects, given the strictures and opportunities of the operational environment of the international system; it falls squarely in a framework of analysis that stresses capability analysis and the importance of external stimuli for explaining the conduct of actors in the international system. The concept of consensus is subsystemically oriented and serves as an organizing principle for domestic political phenomena, but it may similarly be regarded as a standard of feasibility. Of course, the concept of consensus also includes a much larger (and different) dimension than that of feasibility. It reflects the aggregate of the *motivational* and *psychological* preferences prevailing in the body politic; its aspect of being a standard of feasibility is merely an operational consequence of psychological phenomena. This dual nature of the concept of consensus is precisely what makes it so useful, when coupled with the concept of compatibility, in a linkage system between domestic and international systems. Sterile parallelism is avoided because the notion of consensus is not only a standard of feasibility (like compatibility) but also an aggregate of motivational phenomena; hence, the coupling of the concepts of compatibility and consensus provides an analytical framework which specifically recognizes that two different analytical environments are involved. At the same time, an element of isomorphism is maintained, since consensus shares with compatibility the attribute of being a concept to assess feasibility.

We can now apply these two concepts within an analytical framework that is specifically designed for considering linkage relationships between international and national political systems.

IV. PROPOSAL FOR AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

In one of the most suggestive arguments for establishing linkages between international and domestic systems, James N. Rosenau has proposed "a new kind of political system, the *penetrated* system, . . . to comprehend the fusion of national and international systems in certain kinds of *issue-areas*."[18] Rosenau argues that national societies have become so penetrated by their external environment that they are no longer "the only source of legitimacy or

[18] Rosenau, "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," p. 53; see also his *Calculated Control as a Unifying Concept in the Study of International Politics and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Center of International Studies, Research Monograph No. 15, 1963).

even of the employment of coercive techniques." Consequently, "national political systems now permeate, as well as depend on, each other and . . . their functioning now embraces actors who are not formally members of the system." Such considerations

> not only lead to the conclusion that cogent political analysis requires a readiness to treat the functioning of national systems as increasingly dependent on external events and trends, but they also suggest the need to identify a new type of political system that will account for phenomena which not even a less rigid use of the national-international distinction renders comprehensible. Such a system might be called the *penetrated political system* and its essential characteristics might be defined in the following way: a penetrated political system is one in which *nonmembers of a national society participate directly and authoritatively, through actions taken jointly with the society's members, in either the allocation of its values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals.* The political processes of a penetrated system are conceived to be structurally different from both those of an international political system and those of a national political system. In the former, nonmembers indirectly and nonauthoritatively influence the allocation of a society's values and the mobilization of support for its goals through autonomous rather than through joint action. In the latter, nonmembers of a society do not direct action toward it and thus do not contribute in any way to the allocation of its values or the attainment of its goals.[19]

In elaborating his proposals with examples, Rosenau suggests that although "no other type of penetrated system can be more all-encompassing than a postwar occupation, it does not necessarily follow that all military occupations constitute penetrated systems. France during the German occupation of 1941–1944, for example, would not be classified as a penetrated system since the French did not accept German participation in their affairs as legitimate and therefore resisted being mobilized in support of values that the Germans had allocated for them."[20] In other words, *consensus* on the reallocation of values caused by external events is a crucial element in defining a penetrated system.

My only reservation about Rosenau's conception of a penetrated system is that while he specifically recognizes that national systems are strongly affected by external "events and trends," his formal definition of a penetrated system focuses entirely on the direct and authoritative participation of non-members of a national system in its value allocation. This definition seems unnecessarily restrictive. Its stress on authoritative participation of nonmembers renders it strongly institutional, and it cannot accommodate the penetration of national systems by external events and trends that takes place without the direct and authoritative participation of nonmembers. For example, the "permeability" of the modern nation-state as a consequence of developments in weapons technology—a most important case of penetration by external events and trends—cannot be accommodated by Rosenau's definition, although the recognition of this type of penetration by national decision-makers could plausibly lead to a shift in the allocation of values.[21] In short, penetrative processes may take place without the direct, personal, or authoritative participation of nonmembers of the national system.

A broader and more useful definition of a penetrated system would seem to be the following: a political system is penetrated (1) *if its decision-making process regarding the allocation of values or the mobilization of support on behalf of its goals is strongly affected by external events*, and (2) *if it can command wide consensus among the relevant elements of the decision-making process in accommodating to these events.* This definition not only can cover a wider range of types of penetration but also makes possible the correlation of patterns of compatibility with patterns of consensus.

Two important and directly related analytical consequences follow from viewing international and domestic systems as interpenetrated. First, the distinction between foreign

[19] "Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," 63–65 (italics in original).

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

[21] In his later paper ("Toward the Study of National-International Linkages") Rosenau views this type of permeability—which I regard as a form of penetration—as the *opposite* of a penetrative process: "A *penetrative process* occurs when members of one polity serve as participants in the political processes of another. That is, they share with those in the penetrated polity the authority to allocate its values . . . . A *reactive process* is the contrary of a penetrative one: it is brought into being by recurrent and similar boundary-crossing reactions rather than by the sharing of authority. . . . The actors who initiate the output do not participate in the allocative activities of those who experience the input, but the behavior of the latter is nevertheless a response to behavior undertaken by the former." (p. 12, italics in original).

policy and domestic policy diminishes substantially. This is part of the definition of a penetrated system: as external events affect a wide range of value allocations, it follows that few allocations can remain isolated from external contingencies. This raises the question of how "foreign" policy goals are perceived and formulated by the decision-makers of a penetrated system. As a result of the traditionally sharp analytical distinction between international systems and domestic systems, the question whether policy is made in response to domestic impulses or to international restraints necessarily had to be answered in one of three ways: policy is made (1) primarily in response to domestic impulses; (2) primarily in response to international restraints; (3) in response to both. The third alternative seems to come closest to the line of analysis suggested by the political processes of a penetrated system. But to say "in response to both" does not really fuse the two systemic levels—it actually underlines their distinctiveness. I have argued in some detail elsewhere that it might be useful to categorize goals according to three frames of value reference that national actors (or, more precisely, their decision-makers) may respond to.[22] First, policy objectives may derive from *internal* referents. Such objectives do not directly depend for their formulation and realization on forces outside the state. The advocacy of a certain sociopolitical and economic order or devotion to high living standards, natural law, and peaceful change—these are some examples of goals with internal value referents. Goals are drawn from *external* referents when their realization depends on the behavior of other members of the international system. These goals cannot be formulated or achieved without making specific reference to, or demands on, other states. Territorial revisionism, a crusading foreign policy, colonial emancipation, the advocacy of regional economic integration or of a fundamental change in the world economic system—all such goals emerge from an externally focused value referent because their formulation and achievement require the specific identification of other nations as "targets." Finally, objectives may stem from *systemic* referents. These goals are highly instrumental because they are not based on tenaciously held value systems but are formulated in response to what national decision-makers perceive to be the existing patterns of power and purpose in the international system. Goals and policies derived from systemic referents often reflect survival values of the nation. They are flexible because they change with shifting perceptions of environmental threats; they are frequently implemented by defensive armaments programs, alliances, and so forth. Systemically focused goals are imposed by the contingencies of the international system and represent the nation's "acculturation" to its environment.

In a penetrated political system these three types of goal referents overlap considerably. Goals with essentially internal value referents have to be translated into goals and policies that make demands on foreign decision-makers —that is, internal and external referents partially coincide. Furthermore, depending on concrete historical circumstances, goals and policies derived from systemic referents may closely resemble those derived from external referents. For example, in the postwar international system very few issues could escape the grip of the Cold War. Many nations perceived the system as polarized; their policies stemmed from systemic goal referents that inevitably reflected the Cold War tensions of the system. These policies, formulated against a polarized systemic backdrop, required specific reference to other states or alliance blocs, and their implementation depended on the behavior of specifically identified members of the system—that is, systemic referents were similar to external referents. Consequently many nations perceived a continuous linkage and extensive overlap among all three frames of value reference. This phenomenon may be regarded as typical of contemporary penetrated systems.

There is a second major analytical consequence that follows from viewing the international system and a domestic system as interpenetrated: the factor common to both the concept of compatibility and the concept of consensus—their status as standards of feasibility—begins to coalesce. The conceptual boundaries between the international system and a national system are initially maintained by the application of these two concepts to the external dimension and the internal dimension of policy goals. This allows the analyst to juxtapose the compatibility patterns and the consensus patterns of foreign policy goals, irrespective of the degree to which the national system is penetrated. However, as the allocation of values in the national system becomes strongly affected by external events and as the domestic consensus on the new allocation increases—that is, as the system becomes highly penetrated—analytical concepts (such as compatibility) that relate goals to external strictures necessarily begin to overlap with analytical concepts (such as consensus) that serve as

[22] Hanrieder, "Actor Objectives and International Systems."

"domestic" standards of feasibility. In a highly penetrated system, the external operational environment extends into the internal domain, and the concepts employed for structuring the two environments begin to blend. In other words, it becomes possible to analyze systems of linkage between international systems and national systems by applying concepts that, although they orginate from distinct analytical environments, are sufficiently isomorphic to allow cumulative propositions. In fact, the very notion of a penetrated system is a cumulative proposition that covers both analytical environments: the degree of penetration is established by determining (1) the perceived impact of external events on value allocation, and (2) the extent of overlap between patterns of compatibility and patterns of consensus.

A most interesting variable in this system is the relationship represented by the concept of compatibility. Compatibility is a concept for judging the feasibility of demands made by the national system on the external, operational environment: it assesses the strictures and opportunities of that environment with respect to a range of goals. As the system becomes highly penetrated, and as the distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy diminishes, the concept of compatibility necessarily begins to apply to feasibility relationships in an operational environment that is simultaneously "external" and "internal." This provides an opportunity to bridge the gap between concepts pertaining to goals and the *international* system and those pertaining to goals and the *national* system.

To offer just one example: assume that the structural-functional conceptualization of national systems proposed by Almond and Coleman[23] adequately formulates the internal, operational contingencies that impinge on interest articulation, aggregation, and so forth. The concept of compatibility in a penetrated system can easily be extended to cover these categories by tracing feasibility relationships from a macro- to a micro-level. For instance, the East-West polarization of power and purpose in the 1950's provided a (highly conducive) macro-level operational background for the economic, political, and psychological aspirations of the newly emerging nations. In accepting foreign aid, under conditions explicitly or implicitly imposed by the donors, reallocations of the recipients' values were frequently required and affected such domestic operational contingencies as transport and communication networks, economic systems, the recruitment of political, military, and bureaucratic elites and, ultimately, considerations of consensus among the relevant elements of the recipients' decision-making process. In other words, external patterns of feasibility blended into internal, structural-functional patterns of feasibility. Hence, in a penetrated system, the concept of compatibility extends over a continuum of feasibility relationships, ranging from such macro-patterns as bipolarity in the international system to such micro-patterns as structural prerequisites in a national system. (It should be noted that this linkage along a continuum is not a parallel structuring of international and domestic political processes like the examples discussed in section II; the linkage system proposed here acknowledges that two distinct analytical environments are involved by stressing the areas of their overlap and penetration.)

Compatibility can also be linked with the motivational and cognitive dimensions of consensus. Consensus, in addition to being an operational standard of feasibility, reflects the converging and conflicting aspirations of relevant elements in the decision-making process: it rests on the motivations that shape interest articulation and interest aggregation. By coupling compatibility with this dual nature of consensus, a linkage is established between the operational dimensions of policy projects and their psychological-motivational sources.[24] Furthermore, when coupled with the three types of goal referents, such a linkage of oper-

[23] Almond and Coleman (eds.), *op. cit.*

[24] It must be stressed again that the isomorphic attribute that allows this analytical coalescence is partial; it covers only the area of correspondence between compatibility and consensus in which both concepts are standards of feasibility or capability. Since the concept of consensus also includes psychological dimensions, the range of correspondence or overlap between compatibility and consensus is necessarily restricted. However, the concept of compatibility ultimately can also be tied to psychological-motivational sources. Compatibility assessments regarding goals and environment are based on the strictures and opportunities posed by the international system. These systemic contingencies are the product of the constellation of power and purpose in the international system—that is, they are the product not only of the physical capabilities of the major actors in the system but also of the purposeful behavior that motivates these actors. Hence, at both ends of a conceptual continuum—the microcosmic of a penetrated national system and the macrocosmic of the international system—capability aspects of compatibility blend into motivational aspects of consensus.

ational with psychological-motivational dimensions of goals allows interesting combinations of variables. As mentioned before, in a penetrated system goals with essentially internal value referents have to be translated into goals and policies that make demands on foreign decision-makers; internal and external referents tend to coincide. Inevitably, this means that the internal value referents of some groups in a society have a better chance of realization than those of others. For example, Kurt Schumacher, the postwar leader of the German Social Democrats, was fully aware of this in saying that "The contest over foreign policy is at the same time the contest over internal policy and the social content of the political order. . . .Foreign policy sets the limits to the possibilities of our economic and social policy."[25] Similarly, Adenauer and his supporters expected that the results of their foreign policy would help create the prerequisites for the sociopolitical and cultural values they hoped to instill in the German body politic. In Adenauer's case, internal and external-systemic value referents overlapped extensively, because systemic circumstances allowed him to guide West German society in a direction he favored on intrinsic grounds. The Socialists, on the other hand, experienced considerable tension between external-systemic referents and their internal value referents until the party felt obliged to adjust its doctrinaire stand in the late 1950's.

It would be premature at this point to speculate as to what cumulative propositions may result from applying compatibility and consensus patterns within the framework of a penetrated political system. The nature of such propositions depends on the concrete historical circumstances prevailing in international and national systems and on the results of comparative analyses of penetrated systems. The following lines of inquiry appear promising, however. By examining the value referents and goals of relevant elements of the decision-making process it is possible to measure consensus on internal, external, and systemic referents;[26] the chances of realizing these goals in the international system can be evaluated by applying the concept of compatibility. If there is wide consensus on value referents and on the goals and policies stemming from them, and if consensus patterns coincide with compatibility patterns, we have a highly penetrated political system. If there is wide consensus on goals and policies that are *not* compatible with systemic conditions, the national system makes ineffectual demands on foreign decision-makers and probably entertains a distorted perception of the international system. If consensus is lacking, the value referents and policy proposals of some elements of the decision-making process presumably have a better chance of realization than those of others; in that case, the national system is partially penetrated and it should be possible to determine what elements experience tensions among their value referents and between value referents and systemic conditions. Depending on concrete historical circumstances, this type of analysis may produce a large number of coinciding, overlapping, and conflicting consensus and compatibility configurations—while simultaneously establishing the extent of penetration.

By applying partially isomorphic concepts, all these analytical operations yield cumulative propositions that link external and internal dimensions of policy projects. If the policy projects of all members of the international system were analyzed in this fashion—in both bilateral and multilateral interactions—the resulting aggregate would automatically reflect the system's predominant patterns of power and purpose.

[25] *Die Staatsgewalt geht von den Besatzungsmächten aus* (SPD pamphlet, n.d.), p. 3; see also George Stambuck, *American Military Forces Abroad: Their Impact on the Western State System* (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1963).

[26] Disagreement over internal referents would not necessarily entail contesting the desirability or legitimacy of existing national institutions—it may be limited to advocating different sociopolitical and economic values within an accepted institutional framework; agreement on external referents would mean consensus on demands made of specifically identified members of the international system; agreement on systemic referents would indicate a common perception of international contingencies.

For a discussion of the relationship between the international system's stability and the predominant value referents of its members, see Hanrieder, "Actor Objectives and International Systems," 124–132.

COMPATIBILITY, CONSENSUS, AND AN EMERGING POLITICAL SCIENCE OF ADAPTATION

JAMES N. ROSENAU
Douglass College, Rutgers—The State University

When the laws of social dynamics are codified, surely the First will be that people see what they want to see. Given its universality, the First Law is no less applicable to scholars than anyone else. As political scientists, seeing what we want to see in a colleague's work, we find it "insightful," "constructive," and "important"; alternatively, not seeing in it what we want to see or, even worse, seeing what we don't want to see, we find it "turgid," "misleading," and "trivial."

So it is with Hanrieder's formulation. Since it is only a bare outline and contains no data, no one is likely to regard his article as a definitive statement, but reactions to it are likely to be quite varied and conflicting. Some readers, especially those who worry about the prevalence of a malady they call "methodologism" in political science, will see in Hanrieder's effort to develop the concepts of compatibility and consensus yet another case of the quibbling over words that is the prime symptom of this affliction. After all, such critics will point out, compatibility and consensus are, respectively, only thirteen- and nine-letter words and to claim great explanatory power for them without elaboration is to substitute the form of language for the substance of thought. In a similar manner those long committed to a particular framework for examining foreign policy phenomena will preserve their commitment and wonder why Hanrieder makes so much fuss about the need for a new formulation when the available conceptual equipment seems capable of handling the convergence of national and international politics. After all, these analysts will conclude, Hanrieder himself says that researchers should be less inclined to create new schemes and more ready to build on existing ones; why, then, does he not follow his own advice?

On the other hand, analysts who are themselves perplexed by the convergence of national and international politics are likely to be more sympathetic to Hanrieder's effort, if not to its result. They may have doubts as to whether Hanrieder's unqualified claims for the concepts of compatibility and consensus are justified, but they will see his article as a serious attempt to confront a genuine and difficult problem. Some might also wish that he had been more explicit as to how and by whom "a standard of feasibility" is applied, but will nevertheless respond favorably to the effort to bridge the gap between action and outcome. Others might wonder what phenomena are encompassed by his concept of compatibility and what ones are excluded by his formulation of penetrative politics, but even so they will see virtue in the endeavor to link what is desired at home with what is possible abroad. Still others will regret the absence of operational definitions, but will stress that a subject must be comprehended before its terms can be operationalized and that therefore it is premature to expect Hanrieder to specify the empirical referents for his key concepts.

Two other responses to Hanrieder's article can be anticipated on the basis of the First Law. Faced with the probability of such conflicting reactions to the article, the Editor of this REVIEW will see in it what he wants to see, namely, a chance to carry forward the policy of stimulating progress in the discipline by fomenting controversy in the pages of its journal. Since the policy has yielded lively results in the recent past,[1] why not continue it? After all, the Editor will reason, Hanrieder finds fault with Rosenau's view of the state of progress in the field and with his concept of a penetrated political system, so perhaps a controversy over these and related matters can be engendered, thereby provoking thought and fostering clarification. To be sure, the letter to Rosenau will have to acknowledge that "this article is in no sense an attack upon your analysis of the general questions," but the letter can note that "it does refer to your work a good deal" and therefore "there might well be an exchange between Hanrieder and you comparable to the LaPalombara-Lipset and Walker-Dahl exchanges."

The last predictable reaction to Hanrieder's article demonstrates the pervasive power of the

[1] Cf. Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Further Comments on 'The End of Ideology,'" this REVIEW, LX (March, 1966), 5–18: and Jack L. Walker, "A Critique of the Elitist Theory of Democracy," and Robert A. Dahl, "Further Reflections on 'The Elitist Theory of Democracy,'" this REVIEW. LX (June, 1966); 285–305.

First Law. While there may also be a group of readers who will be unhappy that Hanrieder relied so heavily on Rosenau's formulations, Rosenau himself will feel so pleased that his work proved helpful to a colleague that if he is asked to respond to the article, he will be disinclined to engage in a detailed critique of its omissions and confusions. Instead he will prefer to note its weaknesses only briefly and to then call attention to the larger trend of which Hanrieder's article is only the latest instance.

I

I am not inclined to engage in a detailed critique of Hanrieder's assertions. There is much that is unsubstantiated and even more that is ambiguous. The presentation is so continuously abstract and so lacking in concrete specifications that it is extremely difficult to evaluate the utility of the concepts of compatibility and consensus. It is contended that great advantage would follow from the use of these two concepts, but there is no indication of why this is so. In effect, the reader is asked simply to assume that somehow these concepts will array data in a more meaningful fashion than ever before. This article of faith is made even more precarious by the absence of any clearcut indication of what is meant by compatibility and consensus. Compatibility is posited as a relationship between foreign policy goals and international conditions, but what the dynamics of this relationship are and when it prevails cannot be deduced from the presentation. How does one know whether a goal and a condition are compatible? No instances of compatibility or incompatibility are cited. Rather the whole matter is left to "an outside observer" who would determine—by criteria that are not specified—whether the implementation of a particular foreign policy goal is "appropriate" to the conditions operative in the international system. The meaning of consensus is even more obscure. It is defined simply "as the existing measure of agreement on policy projects among the relevant elements of a national system's decision-making process," but what is meant by agreement and how various degrees of agreement affect the conduct of foreign affairs is nowhere indicated. Is agreement among 10 percent of the relevant decision-makers sufficient? Is 51 percent? Or must the consensus approach 100 percent? Does a 51 percent consensus have different consequences than a 100 percent one? Not the slightest hint of an answer to such questions is offered. Instead it is merely asserted that "consensus is in fact a standard of feasibility" and that "it necessarily imposes boundaries on the activities the political system can pursue without risking fragmentation."

Even greater confusion is to be found in Hanrieder's reformulation of the concept of a penetrated system. Rather than delimiting such systems in some way, he posits them as existing whenever decision-making processes are "strongly affected by external events." What might this mean? If the world is shrinking and interdependence is mounting, does it not mean all national systems are of the penetrated type? In the absence of any delineation between "strong" and "weak" external events, has he not, in effect, extended the concept of penetration to cover all international phenomena, both political and nonpolitical? The answer must be in the affirmative. Hanrieder has substituted penetration for influence and equated politics with interaction. His formulation encompasses the entire range of international relations and therefore distinguishes none. Even the influences that stem from developments in weapons technology are treated as penetrative even though they are not in themselves political in character. Indeed, it can be fairly said that in his desire to make an analytic accommodation to a shrinking world, Hanrieder has thrown out the baby with the bathwater. No distinctions survive his analysis. The boundaries between political systems are obscured rather than clarified. The boundary between a single political system and its nonpolitical environment is erased. In the name of greater differentiation, everything gets bridged and blended to the point where differentiation no longer seems possible. Even the distinction between the observer and his subject matter is lost in a welter of linkages that sometimes seem to pertain to interconnections between concrete systems and at other times appear to involve ties between conceptual levels of analysis.

Yet, no less important than the defects of Hanrieder's article is the purpose to which it is addressed. For national and international politics *are* converging and Hanrieder's efforts can be seen as the latest in a series of attempts to make an analytic accommodation to this convergence.[2] Such attempts are necessary be-

[2] For other recent attempts not mentioned by Hanrieder, see Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," *Daedalus*, Vol. 95 (Spring 1966), 503–29; Karl W. Deutsch, "External Influences on the Internal Behavior of States," in R. Barry Farrell (ed.), *Approaches to Comparative and International Politics* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966), 5–26; Rudolph J. Rummel, "Testing Some Possible Predictors of Conflict Behavior Within and Be-

cause both foreign policy phenomena and the many other types of links between national and international politics have been ignored by political theorists. For the good reason that something has to be held constant, the external world is treated as given in virtually every available model of national political systems. Politics are posited as existing in a troubled and threatening environment, but it is nevertheless assumed that foreign policy somehow copes with this environment, thus freeing the theorist to explain national systems in terms of their own internal dynamics. Where, then, does the analyst fascinated by foreign policy phenomena and by the problem of how national polities adjust to a shrinking world turn for theoretical guidance? To the recent spate of theories dealing with the development and decay of political systems? No. Even though the importance of certain external variables (such as foreign aid) is recognized in these models, their operation is also treated as a constant in order to facilitate analysis of the developmental process itself. To models of federalism and international organization? No. While such formulations do relate internal and external processes to each other, their scope is confined to the question of how and why coherence is or is not achieved in political communities and such a perspective offers little help to those interested in adaptive rather than integrative political behavior. To models of the foreign policy process? No. Most of these are explanations of particular polities trying to resolve a particular problem at a particular moment in time. To generalized models of system-subsystem interaction and system-environment relations? No. Empirical political theory contains no such models and the sociological theory that does deal with these matters is not readily translated into the context of national polities.

Thus it is hardly surprising that recent years have witnessed a widening search for conceptual equipment with which to handle the convergence of national and international systems. Unable to build upon existing theory, but convinced that the separation of the two types of systems no longer serves useful analytic purposes, a number of analysts have felt compelled to reexamine old concepts, invent appropriate terminology, and construct new models. For some the notion of national-international "linkages" seems to offer hope as a solution of the problem. For others the concept of "system transformation" appears promising. For still others the idea of a "penetrated" political system that is distinguishable from both a national and an international system opens up the possibility of accommodating the changing structures of macropolitics. For a fourth group the tenets of "field" theory in physics and social psychology appear to offer a fruitful approach to the problem. For Hanrieder "compatibility" and "consensus" loom large as central organizing concepts.

Like any new endeavor, our search for analytic control over the convergence of national and international systems has unfolded in an uneven and somewhat chaotic fashion. Often our language is ungainly, our premises are contradictory, our concepts are ambiguous, our criteria of evidence are unspecified, and our claims of originality are excessive. Sometimes it may seem as if old concepts are rejected and new words created just for the sake of being different. On occasion much of the activity may appear to be little more than a contentious striving for intellectual identity or even a combative substitute for empirical inquiry.

To dwell on these aspects of the widening search for conceptual clarity, however, is to obscure its central thrust. This amounts, in my judgment, to no less than the emergence of a new field of inquiry in the discipline of political science. Assuming that a field is characterized by a subject matter not otherwise investigated and a body of theory not otherwise pursued, what seems to be emerging is what might be called—at the risk of further proliferating terminology and for a reason to be noted below—the field of adaptive politics. The distinctive subject matter of this field is the interaction between a political actor and its external environment. The distinctive theory of the field has yet to achieve coherence but the outlines of its central dimensions can already be discerned: they consist of propositions in which the functioning of the actor is linked either to its external behavior or to variations in its environment.

At the level of the national actor the political science of adaptation embraces foreign policy phenomena and also those in which the internal functioning of the polity is linked to its envi-

---

tween Nations," *Peace Research Society Papers*, Vol. I (1964), pp. 78–111; the papers presented at the Conference on Comparative Foreign Policy, Committee on Comparative Politics, University of Michigan (Ann Arbor: mimeo., March 1967); and the proceedings summarized in my *Of Boundaries and Bridges: A Report on a Conference on the Interdependencies of National and International Political Systems* (Princeton: Center of International Studies, Research Monograph #27, 1967).

ronment through processes other than the purposeful governmental actions known as foreign policy. The subject matter of the foreign policy analyst is distinctive because his prime focus is the association between variations in the national actor and variations in its environment. Such associations do not fall within the purview of any other field of the discipline. They are not part of the study of national (or comparative) politics and they do not get explored in the field of international politics. Even when these two fields are stretched to their limits, associations between internal functioning and external developments remain unexplored. The student of national politics concentrates on the association of variables within the national system and has no theoretical justification for sustaining an interest in foreign policy once the processes it initiates extend into the external environment. Likewise, the student of international politics concentrates on the association of variables within the international system and nothing in the theoretical foundations of his field leads him to probe either the domestic repercussions of external behavior or the impact of external variables upon the domestic processes of a polity that do not lead it to undertake new actions abroad. Only the student of foreign policy—or, using the terminology of the emerging field, the student of national adaptation—is concerned with the systematic analysis and theoretical implications of such actions as these.

An analogy to the discipline of social psychology helps to clarify the distinctive qualities of adaptive politics as an emerging field of political science. Social psychology evolved as a separate analytic focus because neither psychology nor sociology dealt with the interaction between the functioning of the individual and the social influences to which he is exposed. Sociology deals with groups or whole classes of individuals, whereas psychology deals with the single individual and his internal functioning. "In neither field does protoplasm 'meet' society, for individual psychology has little or nothing to say about culture; and sociology and cultural anthropology have little or nothing to say about protoplasm as it functions in the human organism. It is social psychology which provides this meeting ground, by borrowing from both fields data upon which to build principles of its own."[3] Similarly, in neither national nor international politics does polity 'meet' environment, for the former has little or nothing to say about external conditions and the latter has little or nothing to say about domestic processes. It is adaptive politics at the national level which provides the meeting ground, by borrowing from both national and international politics data upon which to build principles of its own.

While psychologists focus on individuals, the actors that concern political scientists are much more various. The executive officer, the cabinet, the legislature, the party, the nation-state, and the international organization are but a few of the actors who serve as the focus of political analysis. It is for this reason that I prefer to treat Hanrieder's article as illustrative of an emerging political science of adaptation rather than as only indicative of a trend in the study of foreign policy phenomena. Compatibility and consensus are problems not only for polities in the international system. They confront every political actor—the local government in the national system, the party in the party system, the cabinet or the legislature in the policy-making system, and so on. All of these actors and the many others that could be listed must develop and maintain policies that both are compatible with the systems of which they are a part and fall within the consensual limits of the subsystems they serve. Foreign policy phenomena are thus merely instances of adaptive politics at the national level, and while I am not competent to assess trends in other areas of the discipline, it is my impression that the dilemmas of adaptation at other levels are increasingly occupying the attention of political scientists. A recent text on American federalism, for example, carries the subtitle "A View from the States" and begins with a section on "The States as Systems within a System."[4]

Let me call attention to the emergence of a political science of adaptation in another way. If all the problems that concern students of politics were classified in terms of either an integrative-disintegrative or an adaptive-maladaptive continuum, it is probably fair to say that the vast majority would be found arrayed along the former. Most theory and research on political units at any level is primarily concerned with the question of how the unit contributes to or detracts from the stability, change, and goal achievement (i.e., the integration or disintegration) of the larger political

[3] Theodore M. Newcomb, *Social Psychology* (New York: The Dryden Press, 1950), p. 27.

[4] Daniel J. Elazar, *American Federalism: A View from the States* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1966).

systems in which it is located. Do the enactments of a legislature reconcile conflicting interests? Do the programs of a political party deepen cleavages? Do the decisions of a chief executive facilitate the realization of community aspirations? Do the actions of a nation move the world toward war or peace? Such questions are typical of prevailing concerns and they rely on a political science of integration for solution. Yet, perhaps because this is an age in which the dignity and well-being of individuals command attention, the welfare of the political actor—that is, the price *it* pays for its integrative or disintegrative contribution to the larger system—would seem to be emerging as a focus of political inquiry. Will the enactments of a legislature be sufficiently responsive to public demands to avoid disrepute and the consequent loss of viability? Will a party's program attract sufficient new support to insure it a continued voice in the affairs of the community? Will the decisions of a chief executive be sufficient to result in re-election? Can a nation's foreign policy preserve both its independence and its way of life?

Such questions are being asked with greater frequency and they require a political science of adaptation for solution. Models and concepts must be used that allow the researcher to assess actor-environment interaction from the perspective of the consequences for the actor. Whatever the actor and whatever the level at which it is active, I would argue that such a perspective infuses the models and concepts employed with a common basis that amounts to a distinctive subject matter and a distinctive body of theory. To be sure, the adaptive problems of a political actor are integrative problems for the larger systems of which the actor is but one subsystem. However, this overlap between the two types of politics ought not be mistaken for similarity. The differences between adaptive and integrative politics are considerable and not only a matter of perspective. When the observer moves from the integrative perspective of a system to the adaptive perspective of one of its subsystems, he must employ vastly different analytic equipment even though he continues to focus on some of the same concrete phenomena. To investigate how an actor adapts to its environment is to ask different questions, use different concepts, assess different motives, trace different processes, outline different structures, and apply different criteria of effectiveness than is the case when the same actor is examined as a subsystem moving toward or away from integration with other subsystems in a larger system. Hence it seems reasonable and useful to flag the emergence of the field of adaptive politics, with foreign policy phenomena as one of its main components.

II

It is unfortunate but true that the theoretical challenges posed by political adaptation have not commanded the attention that is needed if the emerging field is to grow. At the national level, for example, many first-rate theorists tend to lose interest in foreign policy phenomena and turn to analysing integrative problems. Dahl and Almond are two good illustrations: both of these distinguished theorists started their careers with important works on foreign policy phenomena[5] and subsequently trained their talents on phenomena that originate and unfold within national boundaries. Neither ever returned to the study of foreign policy, apparently finding the construction of theory about the integrative processes of units bounded by a common system of authority more challenging. Hence the drama of foreign policy undertakings, of national actors coping with their environments, needs to be emphasized if the field of adaptive politics is to recruit and keep theorists capable of exploiting the emerging concern about such matters.

It is not difficult to make a strong case for the theoretical challenges inherent in adaptive politics. Foreign policy phenomena provide a good example. Even though national systems may collapse for strictly internal reasons, they cannot persist without coping with their environments and this never-ending effort to maintain boundaries and achieve an accommodation with the environment commands attention and provokes inquiry. It is just as dramatic as a newborn child's effort to make the transition to an oxygen-filled world, an adolescent's search for identity in a world that seems to engulf independence and demand acquiescence, a marriage's endeavor to survive in a world of possessive relatives and tempting lovers, a business firm's struggle to keep up with technological change and a world of aggressive competitors, a minority group's fight to bring about a world of fair and equal treatment, a political party's striving to extend its popularity and create a world that it can govern. For none of these—or for any of the

[5] Gabriel A. Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950), and Robert A. Dahl, *Congress and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950).

many other actors that could be listed—is accommodation with the environment easy or predetermined. At any moment the boundaries separating a system from its environment can give way and suffer drastic revision, if not elimmination. At no point can an actor assume that a permanent accommodation has been attained. Adaptation is never complete, but must be continuously achieved. Thus foreign policy undertakings are inherently intriguing, both in the basic emotional sense that they are rooted in human efforts to survive and prosper and in the theoretical sense that it is no simple matter to fathom why and how national systems manage to remain differentiated from their environments.[6]

It is from the perspective of the need for theory, then, that Hanrieder's article must be evaluated. If it cannot be said that his formulation presently contributes very much, neither can it be asserted that his concepts do not constitute the basis of a useful contribution. So little has been done on adaptive politics that it would be inappropriate to conclude that nothing can come of his formulation. Considerable elaboration and specification are needed, not only by Hanrieder, but by all those who are fascinated by the processes whereby political actors realize goals in their environment even as they remain differentiated from it.

[6] For an elaboration of the theoretical challenges posed by foreign policy phenomena, see my "Comparative Foreign Policy: Fad, Fantasy, or Field?" a paper prepared for the Michigan Conference on Comparative Foreign Policy (*op. cit.*), 44–49.

(EDITOR'S NOTE: For further comments by Professor Hanrieder, see Communications to the Editor, pp. 1096–1098).

DIMENSIONS OF MODERNIZATION IN THE AMERICAN STATES*

JOHN CRITTENDEN
Indiana State University, Terre Haute

Among the crucial facts of our time are the profound differences in "modernization" or "development" that characterize contemporary nation-states. Despite a lack of complete agreement about the nature of these differences, it seems clear that variations in incomes, literacy levels, and rates of human reproduction are intimately involved. Development also affects so many other social characteristics that it has become a major preoccupation of social science in all of its branches.[1]

The purpose of this paper is to specify modernization levels of states in the American federal system, and to relate variations in development to other aspects of the state political systems. The quest is a natural one in view of the evident concern for development shown by political activists in the states, the emphasis placed upon it in many textbooks and monographs that deal with problems of state government, and the potential relevance for more general theories about all political systems. Problems of development are undoubtedly more pressing in poor nations, but it is not inappropriate to study modernization in an advanced setting. As Siegfried has noted, modernization tends to be an American phenomenon: it is the United States "which is presiding at a general reorganization of the ways of living throughout the entire world."[2]

Questions and answers about development have been formulated in a variety of ways, reflecting a variety of analytic concerns. Scholars concerned with poverty, for example, tend to ask (not unnaturally) "What produces economic growth?" The answers have frequently consisted essentially of single causes: e.g.—technological innovation (Adam Smith), population growth (Smith and Ricardo), the Protestant ethic (Weber), the achieving motive (McClelland), empathy (Lerner). The question can, of course, be phrased more broadly: "What causes a civilization to flower?" This query elicits some of the same answers, but others in addition: climate (Huntington), leaders or luck (Muller), cultural diffusion via

* All views expressed in this paper are the sole responsibility of the author. However, I am greatly indebted to John Wahlke for encouraging my interest in comparative state analysis, to Richard Johnson and Abraham Barnett for insisting upon the usefulness of factor analysis for the problem at hand, and to Lloyd Lueptow, Richard Hofferbert, and William Buchanan for valuable critical comment on an earlier draft.

[1] In this analysis, the term "modernization" is used merely as a convenient equivalent of the term "development." I avoid the term "economic development" because it implies too much in the way of causation. As Robert Heilbroner puts it, "Economic development is not primarily an economic, but a political and social process." *The Great Ascent* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 24. The following items, selected from a voluminous literature, are especially suggestive for the concerns of this study: Seymour M. Lipset, "Economic Development and Democracy,"—Chapter 2 of *Political Man* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963); Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1958); Robert E. Ward and Dankwart Rustow (eds.), *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge, England, 1960); Karl W. Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," this REVIEW, 55 (September, 1961), 493–514; David C. McClelland, *The Achieving Society* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961). Development has been a natural concern of recent attempts to apply survey research techniques to differences among nation states. See Lipset, *op. cit.*; Arthur S. Banks and Robert B. Textor, *A Cross-Polity Survey* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M.I.T. Press, 1963); Bruce Russett *et al.*, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Boston: Little Brown, 1965). Important works appearing since the basic structure of this paper was established include Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966); and Daniel Elazar, *American Federalism: a View from the States* (New York: Crowell, 1966).

[2] Cited in Lerner, *op. cit.*, p. 43. Perhaps the most influential framework for the study of modernizing political systems is contained in Gabriel Almond and James Coleman, *The Politics of Developing Areas* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960). For comparisons among American states, see Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (eds.), *Politics in the American States* (Boston: Little Brown, 1965).

trade (Buchanan and Ellis), race (Wax), challenge of the environment (Toynbee).[3]

Perhaps the dominant characteristic of contemporary research on development is an emphasis on complex and speculative concepts based on a very large number of empirical referents. The underlying question has become "What is development?"; and "causes" and "effects" have tended to be subsumed within the phenomenon itself. Some current research is still oriented to economic aspects of development, but the primary emphasis has enlarged to include political and social characteristics.[4] These broader concepts of modernization refer either implicitly or explicitly to so many different social characteristics and individual behaviors that it becomes difficult to specify what variables are *excluded* and on what basis. The findings of this study will hopefully be of interest to those who seek a middle ground between development as an all-inclusive social pattern, and development as a single low-level variable (like income or literacy or electric power production).

Modernization has been approached in a different fashion by students of American state government and politics. A good example is that of the best general comparative study to date in which authors have taken one or more single indicators of development (urbanism, income, labor force in manufacturing, education, mobility, etc.) and used these as *independent* variables in efforts to explain differences in such political or governmental characteristics of the states as voting turnout, degree of party competition, group membership and effectiveness, volume of legislation, partisan control of legislatures, education policies, welfare policies, strength of the governor, and highway expenditures.[5]

The potential utility of the findings presented below may be somewhat different for scholars interested in questions of this sort. My approach to development appears to have the advantage of working with a larger number of variables than are usually employed in this context, of assimilating political characteristics into the independent variable in appropriate ways, and of permitting more confident assignment of individual states to relative levels of development. Although the approach is heavily empirical, it may also have the advantage of encouraging more imaginative conceptualizations of development by researchers and political activists.

[3] McClelland, *op. cit.*, 1–9; Lerner, *op. cit.*, 49.

[4] Pye, *op. cit.*; Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1965).

[5] Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, 52, 69, 114, 152, 155, 199, 230, 400, 441.

I. METHOD OF ANALYSIS

Examination of some leading works (referred to above) reveals that development involves most aspects of individual and social life. Since high income, high literacy (education) and low fertility are crucial variables that characterize the more modernized societies, I take these as basic indicators of development and relate them to other aspects of the process. Three areas of specifically political variation are also examined: participation, scope of government, and centralization.[6]

The underlying data consist of thirty-three quantitative characteristics of forty-eight American states in 1960. Although each characteristic is directly relevant to level of development, so many variables are potentially germane that the search for data depicting the process or tracing its consequences could proceed almost indefinitely.[7] As a result, there can be no claim that these indicators comprise

[6] " . . . Differences in the level of human reproductivity more sharply differentiate more-developed from less-developed areas than any other criterion, including per capita income, urbanization, literacy, industrialization, etc.": Philip M. Hauser, "World Population Problems" (Headline Series No. 174, Foreign Policy Association, December, 1965), p. 10.

[7] A preliminary analysis suggested that most of these indicators are highly stable in the short run. Little would be gained by adding variables from other years unless a specific time dimension were incorporated in the research design. The nature of the indicators is for the most part obvious either from the title or the discussion below. Benchmark variable titles are shorthand for median family income, median school years completed by persons twenty-five years old and over, and children ever born per ten thousand women ever married. Variable 10, Commuting, is based on the percent of workers who neither worked at home nor walked to work. Ethnic Diversity, variable 18, was obtained by multiplying the percentage of foreign born combined with the percentage native of foreign or mixed parentage, total quantity by the percentage non-White. Voting, variable 19, is taken from data reported at p. 40 of Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, and consists of average turnout in gubernatorial and Senatorial elections in non-presidential years 1952–1960. Variables 20 through 23 merge general revenue or expenditure patterns of state and local units. Variable 21 is amount of general revenue from own sources per $1000 of personal income. Gov-

a unique group resulting from the application of precise criteria. A number of considerations entered into the selection of particular variables:

1. *Ready availability and at least an ordinal level of measurement.* The study exploits data on the states from census and other sources, and there was no attempt to generate new data except as an end product. The requirement of ordinal measurement (with no missing data and relatively few ties) was aimed at securing maximum differentiation among the states within a common frame of reference.

2. *Comparable time period.* Most variables characterize the states in 1960; A few others deviate by no more than five years. In some cases, indicators summarize the experience of other years because of assumed relevance for the systems in 1960.

3. *Preference for relative indicators.* In order to eliminate the effect of simple differences in population or area among the states, most indicators are expressed as percentages or rates. However, it was not deemed necessary to express variables 24 (Executive Salary Score) and 28 (Power of the Governor) in relative terms. Variable 21 (Tax Level per Income Unit) controls wealth, but not population or area. Variables 29 and 30 (Population and Area) were included for reasons cited below.

4. *Descriptive relevance for social development.* Studies of modernization indicate that higher levels of material well-being usually accompany higher education and literacy, less economic dependence on agriculture, greater urbanization, more sophisticated communications technology, greater participation of ordinary people in political life, broader dissemination of mass communications, greater geographic mobility, and a larger proportion of technical specialists in the labor force. Variables 4 through 19 are assumed to correspond directly to these aspects of development.

5. *Problematic relevance for social development.* Some of the literature suggests that transition from backward to modern brings with it both a greater penetration of government into the lives of ordinary men, and greater involvement of ordinary men in political life.[8] Although they are not entirely satisfactory, usable indicators of mass political participation are available for this study in the form of turnout percentages. Penetration of government into the society is more difficult to conceptualize, and harder to measure in a way that permits state-by-state comparison.

An interesting approach is the "scope of government" concept offered by Agger, Goldrich and Swanson.[9] If all activities of a community could be classified as either governmental or private, "scope of government" would express the ratio of the former to the latter. For these writers it is intriguing to view political history "as a series of large or small movements of government along a continuum of expansion and contraction."[10] Scope of government may be at the core of politics, as these authors assert, despite the fact that the mixed public and private character of community activities makes measurement difficult. Indicators of government taxing, spending, and employment were included on the presumption that they might be scope indicators, and therefore related to modernization.[11]

Another problematic area concerns the

---

ernment Employment, variable 23, refers to the number of state and local government employees per 10,000 population. Executive Salary Score, variable 24, was based on combined salaries of Governor, Attorney General, Justice of State Supreme Court and Auditor. Variables 25, 26 and 27 refer to state government percent of state and local tax revenue, state government percent of state and local direct general expenditure, and percent of state and local employees employed by state government. Power of Governor, variable 28, is an index developed by Joseph A. Schlesinger which can be found at p. 229 of Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, based upon budget powers, appointive powers, tenure potential and veto powers. Variable 32, Party Competition, is depicted by deviations from fifty percent of grand averages of electoral victories by the Democratic party in the period 1946–1963, and represents a processing of data at p. 65 of Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.* Variable 33, Democratic Influence, depicts the same data in raw form and therefore amounts simply to the proportion of Democratic party victories in the period 1946–1963.

[8] Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 3; Pye, *op. cit.*, pp. 46–47.

[9] Robert Agger, Daniel Goldrich, and Bert Swanson, *The Rulers and Ruled* (New York: Wiley, 1964), pp. 6–14.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 7. "Scope of Government" has interesting affinities with "Political Development"; see Pye, *op. cit.*, chapter 2.

[11] One difficulty is how to treat federal grants. Indicators 20 and 21 exclude federal grants, while 22 and 23 include them directly or indirectly. When these pairs of indicators are intercorrelated, the r's are all found to be +.49 or higher, and two of them are higher than +.80. The correlations may seem high in view of the absolute dollar magnitude of federal grants in recent years. How-

degree of centralism and integration in the political system. If development means a "participation explosion," there are implications in the direction of centralism as well as decentralization. Participation on the one hand implies sharing and diffusion of governmental activity. With urbanism comes the need for more government at the local level, and penetration implies the need for structural elaboration in parties, groups and media of communication. Yet for Ward and Rustow the implications are centralist. They argue that the modern polity, in addition to large volume, wide range and high efficiency of political and administrative decisions, also possesses a high degree of integration within its system of government.[12] In order to clarify certain aspects of this issue for the United States, I test the hypothesis that Strong Governor and high proportional state shares of state and local taxing, spending and employment are related to each other and to development level. Again, the appropriateness of the indicators is moot. Both Benson and Kaufman, for example, emphasize supervision of local units by state units as the essence of centralization. For them it is not a question of *where* activities are performed in the system.[13]

6. *Inclusion of reference indicators.* A few characteristics are frequently alluded to in discussions of state politics:—Population, Area, and Party Competition. At the same time, none of these variables is wholly irrelevant to patterns of development and measures of them therefore appear in the roster of indicators. Democratic Influence is less familiar than the other indicators and finds a place in this study because it seems a logically separable component of what is commonly regarded as party completion.[14]

II. OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS

A good deal of information about modernization in the American states could be obtained by examining the way in which each of the variables included for analysis is related to the others. A 33×33 matrix of Pearsonian correlation coefficients in fact comprises one step in the analysis undertaken. However the large number of cells, like the raw data entries from which they are derived, makes for unwieldy and difficult analysis. Therefore, only a few correlations are presented in the pages that follow. Where they appear, they are termed "original correlations."

A more efficient and rigorous technique than inspection of correlations is principal axis factor analysis.[15] Factor analysis is "flexible"

---

ever, a large quantity of federal grants need not appreciably change the *orders* of the states in their levels of spending. The extent to which federal grants "equalize" can be easily exaggerated. A separate analysis suggested that federal grants operate to somewhat reduce the range of differences among states, but that they have little effect on the ordering of states within a given range.

[12] *Op. cit.*, pp. 6–7. See also the interesting finding of Russett *et al.* that the central government's role in the economy increases with development, but may diminish at very high levels. Their data show the United States to be much lower than most highly developed countries in the ratio of central government revenue to G.N.P., *op. cit.*, pp. 308–309.

[13] G. C. S. Benson, *The New Centralization* (New York; Farrar and Rinehart, 1941), p. 116; and Herbert Kaufman, *Politics and Policies in State and Local Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 12. Kaufman's comment is relevant: "No one has yet devised a method of measuring organizational centralization, so it is mostly by means of intuitive application of rough clues that we form our impressions about this trait of organization."

[14] The essence of the distinction, as suggested above, is that Party Competition measures the extent to which the parties divide the electoral stakes equally, regardless of the direction in which the deviation from fifty percent occurs. A state in which Democrats won 48% of the victories is scored as being just as competitive as a state where Democrats won 52% of the victories. Democratic Influence uses the same data to simply indicate the ordering of the states on the percentage of electoral victories won by Democrats. I thus clarify, and present separately, the two elements contained in such classificatory designations as "One-Party Democratic," "Modified One-Party Republican," etc. Austin Ranney's scheme, presented at p. 65 of Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, sets cutting points at comparable intervals, but orders twenty five states in the "Two-Party" category on Democratic Influence only, and not (directly) on party competition.

[15] The author is grateful to James B. Wigle of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, for the use of his Factor Analysis Program for the IBM 7090, and to the Technical Services Branch of the Inter-university Consortium for Political Research for performing the computations. Neither Mr. Wigle nor the Consortium is in any way responsible for flaws in the method, approach, or conclusions of the study. Standard treatments of factor analysis are described in Benjamin Fruchter, *Introduction to*

in at least two important ways: the number of factors extracted, and the method of rotation. An orthogonal type of rotation, the sort used here, results in factors which are as nearly as possible distinct from each other. Orthogonal rotation also permits a calculation of the theoretical amount of correlation accounted for by the factors. The two most commonly used orthogonal techniques are Quartimax and Varimax. The former tends to relate each variable to as few factors as possible and tends toward a general factor solution. Varimax has the objective of defining each factor as nearly as possible in terms of the variables with which it is most strongly associated, and it tends to produce factors which are more nearly of equal strength in accounting for the total variance. It was selected for this study because of the correspondence between these characteristics and the presumed complexity and multiplicity of relationships in the domain to be analyzed. Varimax also has the advantage of tending to have an "Invariance" property. That is " . . . varimax factors obtained in a sample will have a greater likelihood of portraying the universe varimax factors."[16]

Examination of output showed that the first five roots accounted for 80.53 percent of trace. This was accepted as an arbitrary cut off point for extraction of factors, in conformity with conventional standards. To raise the cumulative percent to 90.00 it would have been necessary to extract four more factors with little gain in explanatory power.

Rotated factors appear in Table 1 together with the relationships, called "loadings," of each factor to each of the original indicators. Loadings, like correlation coefficients, vary between plus one and minus one. Sums of the squared loadings appear at the bottom of the columns as "Factor Contributions," figures which indicate the relative importance of the factors in explaining relationships among original indicators. Sums of squared loadings also appear in the column labeled "Communalities." Here they indicate the proportion of the total variance of a given indicator that is accounted for by the factors in combination. The heaviest loading for each indicator is underlined in order to highlight the significance of particular indicators for given factors. Names chosen for the factors assign somewhat subjective meanings which are intended to correspond to the pattern of loadings.

Table 1 conveys considerable information in a condensed form. If one reads down a given column corresponding to a Factor identified in the caption he can identify the highest loadings and obtain a good profile of the Factor. Such profiles are in fact presented separately for the first two factors, since these have a large number of high loadings. It is also interesting to note which variables are *not* highly loaded on a given factor. For example, Newspaper Circulation is not very highly correlated with *Integrative Message Exchange*, and Automobiles are not as strongly related to *Migratory Pull* as one might expect.

In the analysis that follows, I discuss only the first four factors, although five were extracted for reasons stated above. The fifth factor has the least importance statistically. Although it is rather easily characterized, two of the three defining indicators (Area and Population Density) were included only for reference purposes. The crudity of these indicators is confirmed by the size of the corresponding communalities: although Area, Population Density and Non-Agricultural Land Use define the factor, a third or more of the variation of these indicators remains unexplained.

A major assumption of this paper is that factors can be classified as dimensions of development if they have high positive loadings for Education and Income, and high negative loadings for Fertility. The assumption can be applied to Table 1 by looking across the first three rows. In doing so, we discover that none of the factors fully meets the requirement as stated. However, it is quite clear that Factors I, II, and III have a strong tendency in this direction, while Factors IV and V do not. Accordingly, I have designated the first three factors as development factors, even though some of the loadings might well be higher. Factors IV and V clearly do not qualify, since these benchmark values are all low, and since some of the signs are in the wrong direction. The basic reason that a really good development factor fails to emerge derives from relatively low correlations among benchmark variables when states are used as units of analysis (actual values are presented in the matrix below).

It is important to understand that none of

Factor Analysis (New York: Van Nostrand, 1954); and Harry H. Harman, *Modern Factor Analysis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960). For an interesting example of factor analysis which may be compared to that used in this study see Philip M. Gregg and Arthur S. Banks, "Dimensions of Political Systems: Factor Analysis of *A Cross-Polity Survey*," this REVIEW, 59 (September, 1965), 602–615.

[16] Harman, *op, cit.*, pp. 307–308. Data were also submitted to Oblimin rotation with results that await further analysis.

TABLE 1. LOADINGS OF THIRTY-THREE INDICATORS ON FIVE FACTORS: I (METRO-URBANISM), II (INTEGRATIVE MESSAGE EXCHANGE), III (MIGRATORY PULL), IV (SCOPE OF GOVERNMENT), V (AGRARIAN SOCIETY)

	I	II	III	IV	V	Communalities
Benchmark Indicators						
1. Education	.12	.68	.52	.33	.07	.86
2. Income	.49	.71	.38	.05	−.21	.93
3. Fertility	−.65	−.34	−.29	.26	.27	.75
Other Indicators of Modernization						
4. Urbanization	.76	.31	.39	−.09	−.22	.88
5. Out-of-State Births	.00	.18	.88	.29	.02	.89
6. In Migration	−.14	−.05	.91	.22	−.01	.90
7. Population Increase	.26	−.02	.88	.06	−.04	.85
8. Non-Agricultural Land Use	.05	−.03	.23	.00	−.76	.63
9. Good Housing	.51	.68	.45	.03	−.20	.96
10. Commuting	.60	−.10	.46	−.29	−.40	.83
11. White Collar	.57	.45	.48	.21	−.15	.82
12. Television Sets	.38	.77	−.06	−.24	−.25	.85
13. Telephones	.33	.90	−.01	.06	−.02	.92
14. Lawyers	.70	.27	−.00	.35	.00	.69
15. Physicians	.63	.45	−.02	.07	−.43	.79
16. Newspaper Circulation	.66	.44	−.11	.06	−.03	.64
17. Automobiles	−.33	.68	.50	.08	.32	.93
18. Ethnic Diversity	.77	.02	.23	−.04	−.16	.67
19. Voting	−.05	.90	.05	.15	−.13	.86
Scope-of-Government Indicators						
20. Tax Level per Capita	.30	.52	.35	.68	−.04	.95
21. Tax Level per Income Unit	−.31	−.14	.03	.82	.22	.83
22. Spending Level per Capita	.13	.46	.35	.76	−.05	.92
23. Government Employment	.06	.33	.37	.77	.10	.86
Centralization Indicators						
24. Executive Salary Score	.90	.03	−.04	.00	−.10	.81
25. State Tax Share	−.33	−.70	.17	.00	−.24	.68
26. State Spending Share	−.75	−.28	−.07	.05	−.32	.75
27. State Employment Share	−.73	.05	−.06	.10	−.48	.78
28. Power of Governor	.52	.32	.04	.08	−.10	.39
Reference Indicators						
29. Population	.87	−.06	−.17	−.04	.10	.80
30. Area	.11	−.10	.38	.33	.62	.66
31. Population Density	.43	.26	−.13	−.34	−.52	.65
32. Party Competition	.18	.81	.22	.10	−.16	.77
33. Democratic Influence	.01	−.88	.14	−.24	−.08	.86
Factor Contributions	8.0	7.8	4.7	3.3	2.5	

the factors presented in the table and discussed below are correlated with each other; the first three factors explain *different* components of the variance of benchmark indicators. Thus a 5×5 correlation matrix of factor scores yields values which are all at or near zero. This is a predetermined result deriving from the use of Varimax rotation—a method that builds each factor around variables having little relationship to variables associated with other factors. One of the results is that some relationships are emphasized at the expense of others. For example, the original correlation between variable 2, Income, and variable 9, Good Housing, is .94. Instead of a separate factor emerging from this, these variables are loaded at lower levels (but in a very similar pattern) on each of the five factors.

The rotated factor matrix does not directly reveal anything of the way in which benchmark indicators themselves are intercorrelated. The original correlations of these variables with each other are as follows:

	Education	*Income*	*Fertility*
Education	—	.72	−.33
Income	.72	—	−.68
Fertility	−.33	−.68	—

None of the three different values in this matrix are as high as might have been expected, and one is rather low. If these indicators were correlated at substantially higher levels, it seems unlikely that there would be as many as three separate dimensions of modernization emerging from Table 1, and there would be a better possibility of finding a more satisfactory development factor.

While the factors are empirically distinct from each other, the interrelationships remain complex. For example, Factor IV, *Scope of Government*, does not load on the benchmark indicators in such a way that permits us to characterize it as a development factor. However, this is not true of each of the major components of *Scope of Government*, as can be seen from the following original correlations:

Major Components of Factor IV	*Education*	*Income*	*Fertility*
Tax Level per Capita	.76	.72	−.34
Tax Level per Income Unit	.16	−.25	.61
Spending Level per Capita	.71	.60	−.19
Government Employment	.70	.40	−.08

In fact, only one of the components (Tax Level per Income Unit) is loaded inappropriately. However, this happens to be the variable with the heaviest loading for the Factor. It is quite possible that other factor analyses, using somewhat different variables, would turn up analogous factors having a clear positive relationship to development.

Despite such qualifications, the clear implication of Table 1 is that comparative state politics should deal with separate dimensions of development. Data of Tables 1 and 4 enable the researcher to do this for many problems where it is appropriate to deal with the states as the units of analysis. Needless to say, these measurements can and will be improved upon —especially as researchers learn how to deal more systematically with variations *within* the states.

It is not really possible to say which of the factors in Table 1 is "most important." *Metro-Urbanism* has the highest factor contribution, but this may result merely from the choice of indicators. Loadings on the benchmark indicators point to *Integrative Message Exchange* as being an extremely significant dimension of development. In fact, given the initial benchmark intercorrelations, the relevant loadings for Factor II appear to be at the maximum. The most interesting thing about Factor IV (*Scope of Government*) is its lack of relation to development. This is discussed more fully below.

III. NATURE OF FACTORS AND COMMUNALITIES

We label the first factor *Metro-Urbanism*. The highest loading is on Executive Salary Score, followed by Population, Ethnic Diversity and Urbanization. There is a moderately strong negative relationship to Fertility. The factor contains important traces of White Collar, Physicians, Lawyers, and Newspaper Circulation. State spending and employment shares are both negatively associated, presumably because of the prominent roles played by local governments in urbanized areas. Somewhat paradoxically, Power of Governor is positively related, although the loading is only .52. Indeed, the notion of centralization as representing a greater role for state as opposed to local units does not seem to fit the pattern of factor loadings. Highest centralization loadings show up on *Metro-Urbanism*, but in a sharply inconsistent manner. The term *Metro-Urbanism* is used here in preference to "urbanism" because the high scoring states in fact contain extensive urban complexes covering large areas, and involving very great numbers of people.

Factor II (*Integrative Message Exchange*) is less easily comprehended and characterized, but it is about equal in strength to *Metro-Urbanism*. Education and Income load more strongly here than on other factors, but the

TABLE 2. FACTOR I: METRO-URBANISM

Factor Loading	Variable
.90	Executive Salary Score
.87	Population
.77	Ethnic Diversity
.76	Urbanization
.70	Lawyers
.66	Newspaper Circulation
.63	Physicians
.60	Commuting
.57	White Collar
.52	Power of Governor
.51	Good Housing
−.65	Fertility
−.73	State Employment Share
−.75	State Spending Share

most distinctive relationships have to do with Telephones, Voting, Party Competition, and (negatively) Democratic Influence. One might easily suspect that inclusion of Southern states accounts for the very high negative relationship with Democratic Influence. However, an earlier analysis which excluded the South produced a factor with very similar loadings. The simple term "Affluence" was considered as a possible name for the factor, but was rejected because of high loadings on distinctive indicators. Telephones, Television Sets, Voting and Party Competition all connote high levels of communication flow, as do other indicators which are associated at more modest levels, such as Population Density, Automobiles, and Newspaper Circulation. Association of these tendencies with measurers of affluence and Republicanism carries the implication of consolidation and stability.[17]

Migratory Pull (Factor III) is third in order of statistical strength, and is rather straightforwardly related to Out-of-State Births, In-Migration and Population Increase.[18] There are also important traces of Education, Good Housing, Commuting, White Collar, and Automobiles. (Since high loadings are clustered together in Table 1, we omit a separate tabular presentation of this factor.) Some of the states which are high on *Migratory Pull* seem to be "modern" in a rather literal sense: populations, together with their living and working structures, exist in areas which were very sparsely settled until very recently. Interestingly enough, none of the political indicators included in this study load as high as .40. It might be suspected that the lack of relationship of the Factor to political variables might not be true of some of the components. The following array of original correlations helps to clarify this matter.

Selected Political Variables	*Out-of-State Births*	*In Migration*	*Population Increase*
Voting	.28	.06	.02
Party Competition	.37	.15	.21
Tax Level per Capita	.60	.39	.46
Tax Level per Income Unit	.20	.23	.03
State Tax Share	−.02	.15	.05
State Spending Share	−.10	.05	−.25
Power of Governor	.18	−.06	.06
Democratic Influence	−.12	.10	.09

Most of these values seem quite low. Possible exceptions are correlations with Tax Level per Capita. As noted above, some of the components of *Scope of Government* are related to the

TABLE 3. FACTOR II: INTEGRATIVE MESSAGE EXCHANGE

Factor Loading	Variable
.90	Telephones
.90	Voting
.81	Party Competition
.77	Television Sets
.71	Income
.68	Good Housing
.68	Education
.68	Automobiles
.52	Tax Level per Capita
−.70	State Tax Share
−.88	Democratic Influence

[17] Systematic comparison of our findings with results of cross-nation studies is not attempted in this paper. However, the possibilities are tantalizing. For example, in the world contest too, message exchange may suggest consolidation rather than instability. Thus Russett *et al.* report significantly high negative correlations between Deaths from Domestic Group Violence and nine communications indicators: *op. cit.*, p. 272.

[18] In-Migration is the proportion living in a given state in 1960 which resided out of state in 1955. Population Increase compares 1950 with 1960.

benchmark indicators of development. Here we see that some of the same group of components are related to *Migratory Pull*, despite the zero correlation between the Factors. Otherwise, the picture conveyed by the Factor loadings does not appear to distort relationships in the matrix of original correlations. When the states are used as units of analysis, *Migratory Pull* seems less relevant to the political process than one might expect.

Scope of Government (Factor IV) is so named because the highest loadings seem to clearly confirm the speculative basis for inclusion of indicators twenty through twenty-three. Tax Level per Capita, Tax Level per Income Unit, Spending Level per Capita, and Government Employment all show high loadings on this Factor. Scope of Government thus appears to be a concept having definite operational utility in comparisons among the states. (As noted above, this is in marked contrast to the notion of centralization as I have attempted to measure it here.) The pattern of loadings is rather simple, and the reader is again referred back to Table 1 rather than to a special factor table. Unlike Factors I, II, and III, *Scope of Government* is not a dimension of development. However, the reader should recall the presentation of an earlier paragraph which shows some relationship among components. There is an impressive lack of relationship with any of the centralization indicators. Indeed, all of the trace loadings are weak: aside from the Scope of Government indicators, only Area, Population Density, Education and Lawyers load as high as .30, and none of these loadings exceeds .35. It would seem that in the American states modernization is not as conspicuously accompanied by penetration of government as it is by greater political participation. Further, political participation is associated with one specific aspect of modernization—*Integrative Message Exchange*.

Taken together, the factors cited in Table 1 account for a large share of the original variance. Many of the communalities are higher than .80, and seven are in excess of .90. Communalities are markedly low (less than .50) only with respect to Power of Governor. The loadings of this variable tend to confirm only in part Schlesinger's finding that Power of Governor is greater in highly urbanized states.[19] While association is stronger with *Metro-Urbanism* than with other factors, a large proportion of the variation remains unexplained. As noted above, indicators of "centralization" tend to be inconsistent in their loadings. A complementary point is that the strength of the associations, as measured by the communalities, tends to be somewhat weaker than average.

[19] Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, p. 228.

IV. RANKINGS OF STATES

Major factors which account for most of the relationships among indicators selected to measure development can be made the basis of a scheme of classification for the American states. This is provided in Table 4, which arrays factor scores from high to low on the first four dimensions of Table 1.[20] Because of the large number of tied scores a small number of groupings is desirable. Range quartile intervals are therefore indicated along with actual scores so that researchers may devise other groupings as appropriate.

The first three columns of Table 4 permit a multidimensional assessment of modernization levels of particular states. Cross reference between Tables 1 and 4 permits one to place any of the original indicators in a dynamic and suggestive context. Thus Population in Table 1 carries a strong connotation of *Metro-Urbanism*, while the column under this heading in Table 4 portrays the concrete nature of the differences. Although Population Density might intuitively appear more relevant to development, we see that it is far less meaningful for the major dimensions than Population. On the other hand, if one starts with specific states in Table 4, it is possible to discover many of the systematic differences and similarities. Thus Kansas and Nebraska have very similar positions on *Metro-Urbanism*, *Integrative Message Exchange*, and *Migratory Pull*. North and South Dakota are even more alike developmentally. While such cases confirm an assumption of likeness based upon geographic contiguity, the matter is somewhat different with respect to Southern states. North and South Carolina score similarly on the first three factors, as do Alabama and Georgia. But for the South as a whole, there is considerable spread except on *Integrative Message Exchange*.

Scope of Government presents a special case since it is substantially unrelated to Educa-

[20] Factor scores for the Varimax factor structure were computed according to the method of complete estimation (regression) from a matrix of standard score coefficients. The program employed produces a mean of 50.0 and a standard deviation of 10.0 for each factor on each observation. Factor V scores are omitted from Table 4 for reasons stated above.

TABLE 4. RANGE QUARTILES* AND FACTOR SCORES

Metro-Urbanism		Integrative Message Exchange		Migratory Pull		Scope of Government	
1		1		1		1	
N.Y. (87)		Conn. (63)	Id. (57)	Nev. (79)	Fla. (73)	N.Y. (76)	La. (71)
		Iowa (61)	Ohio (57)	Ariz. (77)	N.M. (68)	Wyo. (73)	N.D. (66)
2		Kan. (60)	N.D. (56)				
		Mass. (60)	Ore. (56)	2		2	
Cal. (70)	Mass. (62)	Neb. (60)	Vt. (56)				
Ill. (68)	Tex. (62)	N.H. (59)	Colo. (56)	Del. (61)	Utah (57)	Colo. (63)	Mont. (60)
N.J. (65)	Pa. (61)	Utah (59)	Del. (56)	Cal. (61)	Md. (56)	Vt. (61)	Wash. (59)
		Wis. (59)	Mich. (56)	Colo. (59)	Tex. (56)	Ore. (61)	Minn. (58)
3		Ind. (58)	Mont. (56)	Wyo. (59)	Id. (55)	Nev. (61)	S.D. (58)
		Minn. (58)	Ill. (55)	Wash. (57)	Ore. (55)	Cal. (60)	Miss. (57)
Ohio (60)	Wash. (52)	N.J. (58)	Pa. (55)				N.M. (56)
Fla. (59)	Minn. (51)	R.I. (58)	Wyo. (55)	3			
Md. (57)	Va. (51)	S.D. (58)	Me. (54)			3	
Mo. (57)	Tenn. (50)		Wash. (54)	Va. (54)	S.C. (47)		
Mich. (56)	Okla. (50)			Conn. (52)	Mo. (46)	Okla. (53)	Ariz. (48)
Colo. (54)	Nev. (49)	2		N.J. (52)	Ill. (46)	Utah (52)	Me. (47)
Conn. (53)	Ind. (49)			Mont. (51)	N.C. (46)	Mass. (51)	Neb. (47)
Ga. (52)	Kan. (48)	Cal. (52)	W.Va. (46)	Mich. (51)	Ala. (45)	Id. (51)	W.Va. (46)
La. (52)	Ariz. (48)	Md. (51)	Okla. (46)	Kan. (51)	Tenn. (45)	Iowa (50)	Wis. (46)
Wis. (52)	Ala. (48)	Mo. (51)	N.Y. (46)	N.H. (50)	Neb. (45)	Kan. (50)	Fla. (46)
		Nev. (50)		Ind. (49)	La. (44)	Ark. (50)	Ga. (46)
4				Okla. (49)	Ark. (43)		
		3		Ohio (48)	Minn. (43)	4	
R.I. (47)	Ark. (42)			R.I. (48)	Wis. (43)		
Neb. (47)	Del. (42)	Va. (43)	Tenn. (39)	Ga. (48)		Mich. (45)	Conn. (41)
Ore. (47)	S.C. (42)	Ariz. (43)	Tex. (39)			Del. (45)	Pa. (40)
Iowa (45)	Wyo. (42)	Ky. (43)	N.C. (37)	4		N.H. (43)	Ohio (40)
Miss. (45)	W.Va. (41)	N.M. (42)	Fla. (37)			S.C. (43)	Ind. (39)
Utah (44)	N.H. (40)		Ga. (34)	Me. (42)	Vt. (40)	Tex. (43)	Mo. (39)
N.M. (43)	Me. (38)			Ky. (42)	S.D. (40)	Ill. (42)	Ky. (37)
Mont. (43)	S.D. (37)	4		Mass. (41)	Iowa (40)	N.C. (42)	Va. (37)
Ky. (43)	N.D. (36)			Pa. (41)	Miss. (39)	Ala. (42)	R.I. (37)
N.C. (43)	Id. (35)	Ala. (33)	S.C. (32)	W.Va. (40)	N.D. (35)	Md. (42)	N.J. (36)
	Vt. (35)	Ark. (32)	La. (30)		N.Y. (31)	Tenn. (41)	
			Miss. (24)				

* Range quartile assignments were made by attempting to break each range of scores into four equal segments. Where this was impossible (as in Factors I, III, and IV), a reduction of the range by one point at the top yielded equal segments with a tendency towards reduction of skew.

tion, Income and Fertility. In addition to locating and comparing states on this dimension, there is a pressing need to examine *why* some states have higher levels of government activity than others. Aside from differences in level of development, why do some state governmental systems tax, spend and employ more than others?

Perhaps the states attempt to provide a uniform level of services. Because of coexistence within the confines of the same larger system, pervasive competition, and overall similarities in the patterns of governmental services, it could be hypothesized that the states seek to offer the same level of services, and that, *other things being equal*, they succeed in doing so. If this notion is correct, differences among states of column four in Table 4, are explainable in terms of characteristics which raise or lower costs of providing services. Differences in *Scope of Government*, while real enough in a sense, may connote levels of *effort* rather than

increased scope and intensity of service. The observed variations might not be the result of different ideologies about the proper role of government, or of the actions of leaders who have discovered and are implimenting ways of getting popular support. Instead, if the hypothesis is correct, these differences result from such characteristics as the following:

1. *Extreme differences in area and density.* Although loadings for Area and Population Density are low, they suggest that a small densely settled state like Rhode Island can maintain a given level of service with less effort than a large sparsely settled state like Montana.

2. *Climate and topography.* In the harsh winter climates of North Dakota, roads deteriorate relatively quickly, school buildings must be substantial, and inadequacies in shelter available to poor people make welfare a more pressing need. These considerations do not apply in the gentle climes of Maryland, Kentucky and New Jersey. Similarly, there is nothing comparable to the rugged terrain of Wyoming, Colorado and Nevada in Ohio, Indiana and Missouri, and road construction costs vary accordingly.

3. *Substitution effects.* States with a strong tradition of parochial schools (like the New England states appearing mostly in the third and fourth range quartiles) do not "need" to spend as much on public education. Toll roads in Indiana and Connecticut, and toll bridges and tunnels in Virginia shift highway costs, born directly by government in states like California, to users and bondholders.

4. *Spillover effects.* If an area like New York City, as a special case, happens to offer a higher actual level of services than is usually available, adjacent states (New Jersey and Connecticut) may not "need" to spend as much as they otherwise would.

5. *Generalized corruption and/or inefficiency.* A corrupt, inefficient state (Louisiana?) must spend more to maintain a given level of services than a clean, well administered state (Wisconsin?).

6. *Grant-in-aid incentives.* As noted above, addition of federal grants to amounts spent by state and local units, does not appreciably affect the order of differences on *Scope of Government.* However, the possibility remains that low income states (like Arkansas and Mississippi) may be induced to raise and spend more of their own funds than they otherwise would by the relatively favorable terms on which they presumably obtain federal grants. The converse may also be true. New Jersey, with the highest income level, may, because of the formulas for sharing, receive federal grants on much less advantageous terms.

7. *Specialized population characteristics.* States with large proportions of school age population (like Louisiana, Minnesota and New Mexico) may need to spend more per capita than Illinois, Missouri and Florida where a higher proportion of the population was over twenty one years old in 1960. The large influx of low income Puerto Ricans into New York increases the "need" for welfare outlays.

The above list is incomplete and emphatically speculative. Examples chosen all tend to prove the point at hand—even where contrary examples are available. Furthermore, the theoretical basis for the model needs a more thorough elaboration.[21] However, it seems to be both desirable and feasible to theorize broadly about why ordered differences in *Scope of Government* exist. In the final paragraphs of this paper I will actually suggest a possible basis for rejecting the equal-service-level hypothesis.

V. CONCLUSION

Factor analysis of thirty-three ordered differences among the American states yields a number of implications of significance for comparative state politics and comparative political systems generally:

1. Differences in development level among the states do not simply occur along one dimension. To be accurate, one must recognize at least three different contexts in which one state may appear more (or less) developed than another.

2. Political participation is, as anticipated, related to one of the modernization factors. As it turns out, this is the dimension (*Integrative Message Exchange*) which is most strongly correlated with high education, high income, and low fertility. It is also a dimension with which students of American government have little familiarity.

3. Four indicators of state and local taxing, spending, and employment load rather markedly on a Factor (*Scope of Government*) which

[21] This is especially true of the notion of pervasive competition. One difficulty is that competition among states is usually assumed to center around tax rates. If this is true, and if the eventual result is more tax *rate* equality, the developmental differences among states should lead to service *inequalities* with the more affluent states possessing a higher level of services. It is a nice question whether inequalities in service levels would in turn set competitive forces in motion that would reduce the inequalities.

is difficult to regard as a dimension of development. However, three of these indicators by themselves do possess the appropriate relation to Education, Income and Fertility. Therefore, future analyses using different variables may turn up a factor somewhat analogous to *Scope of Government* which is distinctly related to development. The present factor is substantially unrelated to any of the other twenty-nine variables included in the study.

4. The hypothesis that development leads to greater governmental centralization is best described as unproven. In this case, however, loadings fail to vindicate the concept of centralization that was employed. Instead of a clear ordering of differences, loadings of appropriate indicators are inconsistent.

This study has an important limitation in that none of the data or findings deal with variations within individual states. It should also be emphasized that findings pertain exclusively to *orderings* among states; the magnitude of differences in particular cases may not be very large. Yet there do seem to be advantages to the approach offered above. Scores and loadings capture some of the extensiveness of development as a theoretical concept, derived as they are from a reasonably large number of variables. At the same time limits and exclusions are clearly specified. None of the factors is related to the others in the slightest degree, but jointly they account for as much of the variance of crucial variables as we are likely to be interested in.

Major dimensions cited above are built up from a large number of specific characteristics of the states, but one can of course go outside these characteristics and test these dimensions against other phenomena. A preliminary analysis suggests, for example, that state rank on average welfare payments per recipient tends to be much more consistently and positively associated with *Integrative Message Exchange* than with any of the other factors. This tends to confirm the importance of socio-economic variables for certain components of government expenditure. However, the finding conflicts with a previous conclusion that socio-economic variables make a greater difference than political variables.[22]

Crime statistics provide a very different area of potential relevance. Preliminary analysis suggests that murder (and non-negligent homicide) rates, as reported by the FBI, are inversely related to *Integrative Message Exchange*, just as one might expect. The impact of this factor seems especially pronounced among those states with relatively *high* murder rates. Among states with lower rates, *Migratory Pull* seems more important, and the relationship is *positive*. *Metro-Urbanism*, on the other hand, displays an interesting curvilinear pattern: state scores are *inversely* related to murder rate in the 24 states with highest murder rates, but *positively* associated in the other states. It would seem that there may be distinct analytic and diagnostic gains for the study of crime when development is viewed as a multidimensional phenomenon.[23]

As a final example, let us note some interesting relationships between the reported dimensions and the speculative types of political culture suggested by Daniel Elazar.[24] We might expect that states with "traditionalistic" political cultures (where closed hierarchies rule, and where family ties or social position are the essential qualification for office) would score low on *Migratory Pull*. This expectation is confirmed. However, the low ranking of these (Southern) states on *Integrative Message Exchange* is much more striking, and suggests lack of openness in these systems that is more salient than "the search for continuity."[25] The "individualistic" political cultures with their marketplace orientation to politics might be expected to score low on *Scope of Government*. This turns out to be correct: eight of the eleven pure "I Culture" states identified by Elazar rank in the fourth range quartile. Similarly, we might predict that the "moralistic" political cultures (characterized by an accepting attitude towards the value of public life and an emphasis on public interest) would score high on the same factor. This too tends to be the case. Five of the nine states with a pure "M culture" rank in the first and second

[22] Data are not reported in this and the following illustrations which should be regarded as tentative findings only. See Dawson and Robinson's analysis in Jacob and Vines, *op. cit.*, Chapter 10; and Richard Hofferbert, "The Relation Between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this REVIEW, 60 (March, 1966), 73–83

[23] Cf. Richard Quinney, "Suicide, Homicide, and Economic Development," *Social Forces*, 42 (March, 1965), 401–406. On the basis of a unidimensional notion of development, this author simply asserts that highly developed countries have relatively low homicide rates, but relatively high suicide rates.

[24] *Op. cit.*, Chapter 4.

[25] *Op. cit.*, p. 109.

range quartiles. Needless to say, if differences in *Scope of Government* can be consistently related to differences in state political cultures, then the equal-service hypothesis proposed in an earlier part of this paper must be rejected.

In pursuing the kinds of concerns which have been touched upon in this paper, it would appear that certain broad dimensions, representing ordered differences among systems may be of real utility in posing significant questions, as well as offering meaningful answers. Hopefully, the approach taken will help us in realizing more fully the remarkable potential for comparative analysis which is offered by the American states.

SOME CONDITIONS OF DEMOCRACY*

DEANE E. NEUBAUER
University of California, Irvine

It has been argued that political democracy in nation-states is dependent upon certain levels of social and economic development. Some authors (Lipset and Cutright) argue that a particular complex of social and economic requisites appears necessary for the institutionalization and maintenance of democracy. Others (Lerner and Pye) suggest that national political development of any form is predicated upon the development of a system of communications sufficiently sophisticated to overcome the parochialism of traditional society. Still others (Almond and Verba) find social factors such as education crucial for the development of those attitudes deemed adequate for active citizens of democratic polities.[1]

By definition, political democracy in nation-states requires some minimal level of citizen participation in decision making. Historically the most effective method of institutionalizing such participation is through some form of representative government. This mechanism permits groups of citizens with common preferences to support representatives who will, in turn, attempt to schedule those preferences for decision by the government. Groups of representatives will form coalitions in an attempt to insure that their common preferences will be enacted into public policy. Because preferences in society are likely to vary in direction and intensity, the successful implementation of political democracy imposes two requirements. One, communication of preferences among competing groups, must be widespread. If they are not, it will be difficult for groups with shared preferences to combine their resources such that "majority" preferences can be successfully implemented. Indeed at a more basic level, communication is necessary for the identification and articulation of common preferences. Second, groups within the citizenry holding competing preferences must be socialized into the procedural norms of the system. Most important is the acceptance of the norms of compliance so that groups which "lose" on any given issue (enactment of a preference set) do not withdraw from the decision system or opt to overthrow it. In short, two primary conditions for the maintenance of any system of political democracy are, (1) communication among members of the political system and, (2) socialization into the "rules of the game."

The arguments cited above assert that these conditions are most easily maintained when certain levels of "social and economic development" have been achieved. The reason is clear; in states that are at all large, the most effective method of statewide communication is mass communication, a product of societies with relatively advanced technologies. The existence of such communication systems greatly enhances the development of nationally held values, one of which might be agreement on the norms of governmental decision making.

The argument encapsulated above represents one major thrust of recent work on "political development." If one intends the argument as a partial explanation for the existence of democratic political organization in one set of countries which are relatively "advanced," as opposed to its absence in another set of countries typified by essentially agricultural economies and traditional cultures, it appears to be sufficiently persuasive not to warrant argument. As the argument is developed in the literature, however, it seems to imply more. Although its proponents are careful to specify that they are speaking of necessary conditions for the achievement of political development (not sufficient conditions), confusions have

* I would like to thank Lewis A. Froman, Jr., Charles Cnudde and Lyman Drake for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The efforts of George Sherinian and Timothy Gilmore in assisting with data gathering are most appreciated.

[1] S. M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," this REVIEW, 53 (March, 1959), 69–105. See also his *Political Man* (New York: Doubleday, 1960), Chapters 2 and 3. Philips Cutright, "National Political Development: Its Measurement and Social Correlates," in Nelson W. Polsby, Robert A. Dentler and Paul A. Smith, (eds.), *Politics and Social Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1963), 569–582. Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1958). See also his "Communication Systems and Social Systems: A Statistical Exploration in History and Policy," *Behavioral Science*, 2 (1957), 266–275. Lucian Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., Inc., 1966). Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963).

arisen in the manner in which this particular developmental hypothesis has been presented. For example, Philips Cutright has posited a linear relationship between socio-economic development and political development. One implication of the linearity assumption is that, as countries become more "advanced" economically and socially, they tend also to become more "advanced" politically. An increment of one is associated with a commensurate increment of the other.[2]

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that to a significant degree this assumption is incorrect. The argument proceeds in two parts: (1) the findings which are utilized by Cutright to document his assertions are misleading. The index of national political development does not measure political development as defined by Cutright, but is rather a measure of democratic political development. (2) Democratic political development cannot be adequately measured by Cutright's index of national political development. When one utilizes a more appropriate index, he finds that above the "developmental threshold" there is no significant relationship between democratic political development and socio-economic development.

I. A RE-EXAMINATION OF NATIONAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Because the studies by Lipset and Cutright state most clearly the relationship of social and economic requisities to democratic political development, a closer examination of them will facilitate the argument to follow.

Lipset's studies indicate that the existence of stable democratic political systems is positively associated with selected indicators of wealth, industrialization, education and urbanization.[3] His correlations suggest that on the basis of these indicators one can distinguish between these regimes and those which are either unstable democracies, popular dictatorships, or elite-based dictatorships. While Lipset's study was the first to give some empirical substance to this previously untested hypothesis, it suffered from methodological shortcomings. (See Cutright for an analysis of Lipset's data). Philips Cutright attempted to refine Lipset's methods while at the same time broadening the theoretical scope of his findings. Lipset had sought simply to demonstrate that certain gross differences existed between the social and economic composition of different forms of regimes. Cutright, on the other hand, has attempted to demonstrate that "political development" in and of itself is a function of the social and economic characteristics of society. Defining political development as "the degree of complexity and specialization of its (a country's) national political institutions," he attempted to test the hypothesis that "political institutions are interdependent with educational systems, economic institutions, communications systems, degree of urbanization and the distribution of the labor force."[4] To test his hypothesis, Cutright constructed an index of political development by assigning points to nations on the basis of their legislative and executive composition.[5]

The most interesting feature of Cutright's index is that, while it purports to measure "political development," it utilizes indicators

[2] Cutright, "National Political Development," see especially 577–578.

[3] Lipset, "Some Social Requisities of Democracy," *op. cit.*

[4] Cutright, "National Political Development," *op. cit.* p. 571.

[5] Nations receive two points for each year that a parliament exists in which the lower or only house contains representatives of two or more political parties and the minority party or parties have at least 30% of the vote. They receive one point if the multiple party rule is operative but the 30% rule violated and no points when neither of these conditions exist. Points are given to the executive branch on the following basis: one point for every year that the nation has a chief executive in office by virtue of a direct vote in an open election in which he faced political competition, or was chosen by a political party in a two- or more-party system as defined by the conditions necessary to gain two points on the legislative point assignment scheme. No points are given for years in which the nation was ruled by a chief executive selected in some manner other than the above. The study covers a 22 year period (1940–1961). It is thus possible for a nation to receive anywhere from 0 to 66 points.

Cutright has used a similar index as a "political representativeness" scale in an examination of the relationship of economic and political development to the growth of social security programs in a number of countries. Many of the criticisms of the index developed in this paper apply to its use as a political representativeness scale. In particular, it is interesting to note that, while in this later study the index is said to measure this political dimension, no attempt was made to build into the index any participation data. Cf. Philips Cutright, "Political Structure, Economic Development and National Security Programs," *American Journal of Sociology*, 70 (1965), 537–548.

which give the highest scores to nations which have established and maintained a set of explicitly democratic political institutions. This index does not measure "political development" in Cutright's definition of the term. It measures "degree of democraticness" by which is meant the extent to which nations institute and maintain overtime multiple party political systems and "open elections." The use of Cutright's index is directly equivalent to asserting that those nations which are characterized by the institutions of liberal democracy, are those which are most highly developed politically. Given another set of normative assumptions one might wish to agree that "most highly developed" means "most democratic," but one cannot, utilizing Cutright's definition of the term "political development," easily equate development with democracy. To cite the most obvious example, many modern states are characterized by political institutions of considerable complexity, but this fact is not related to the existence of a set of democratic political institutions. The Communist countries most clearly fit this category. Impressionistically, it *is* probably the case that the complexity of political institutions is related to the social and economic factors suggested above; this seems to be an inevitable consequence of conducting the affairs of government in large nation-states which maintain or attempt to maintain distributional patterns commensurate with a highly productive and diversified economy. To repeat the important point: Cutright's index does not measure this feature of political development. An appropriate measure of political development defined as institutional complexity should probably focus on the proliferation and specialization of governmental bureaucracies. One might, if one wished, then attempt to associate this measure of political development with the existence of certain types of legislatures and bureaucracies, but this in turn would require an independent theory of governmental organization as related to the phenomenon of organizational complexity.

On balance, then, one can derive from Cutright's analysis the hypothesis that the more socially and economically developed a nation is, the more democratic it is likely to be. There is no question that in gross terms this is correct. The most casual inspection of Cutright's socio-economic data indicates a clustering at one end of the scale of the "underdeveloped" countries (predominately nondemocratic) and at the other end of the scale of the "developed" nations (predominantly European or Anglo-American democracies). What Cutright's data do not make clear is the degree to which this relationship persists beyond the measuring capability of his index. The maximum amount of points that a nation can receive on Cutright's scale is 66, a total achieved by very many of the democratic countries in his sample. Not much can, therefore, be inferred concerning the effect, if any, that differential social and economic development has upon democratic development in these countries. To what extent do *these* countries develop more politically (i.e., democratically) as they attain higher levels of socio-economic development?

In order to suggest the effect which continued socio-economic development has upon democratic development, it is necessary to have an index which goes beyond Cutright's, one which is capable of measuring variation within the sub-sample of "most democratic" countries which are largely undifferentiated on Cutright's index.

We have devised an index of democratic development expressly for this purpose This index, derived from definitional and empirical constructs of Dahl and Downs, concentrates mainly on electoral features of democratic regimes.[6] Explicitly, the index is composed of

[6] Down's conditions for a democratic political system are:

1. A single party (or coalition of parties) is chosen by popular election to run the governing apparatus.
2. Such elections are held within periodic intervals, the duration of which cannot be altered by the party in power acting alone.
3. All adults who are permanent residents of the society, are sane and abide by the laws of the land are eligible to vote in each such election.
4. Each voter may cast one and only one vote in each election.
5. Any party (or coalition) receiving the support of a majority of those voting is entitled to take over the powers of government until the next election.
6. The losing parties in an election never try by force or any illegal means to prevent the winning party (or parties) from taking office.
7. The party in power never attempts to restrict the political activities of any citizens or other parties as long as they make no attempt to overthrow the government by force.
8. There are two or more parties competing for control of the governing apparatus in every election.

four indicators which measure the relative amount of *electoral equality* and *competition* present in a given political system. The rationale behind the index construction is rather simple. The most characteristic feature of democratic regimes is the election of key governmental personnel. As suggested in the introduction, this is the mechanism whereby citizens give some indication of which preferences they wish scheduled for governmental decision. The form of elections alone, however, does not guarantee their democratic substance. Democratic elections are those in which opposition groups are given some opportunity to contest office with ruling groups. Two key indicators of a country's tolerance of electoral opposition groups are the existence of actual electoral competition and the existence of multiple sources of public information. The indicators chosen for the index reflect these considerations. They are:

(a) Percent of the adult population eligible to vote. This indicator is basic to the concept of "democraticness." The variation between nations on this measure indicates the percentage of the population which is excluded from the suffrage for whatever reasons (sex, race, residence, literacy, etc.). Those nations which score the highest are those which most closely approximate the norm of permitting all adults to participate in the choice of a preferred set of leaders.

(b) Equality of representation. The notion of one man, one vote is basic to modern concepts of democracy. The implication of this norm goes beyond the exclusion of plural voting. It demands that votes be given equal weight in the choice of candidates. We will make use of a measure which calculates the "mean range of distortion" in equating votes with seats in legislatures. The computation is arrived at by determining which parties are most over-represented in the assignment of seats and which are most under-represented. The two are combined to obtain a range of distortion and the mean for all elections studied is then computed.

(c) Information equality. An important condition in Dahl's model, but one which is absent from Downs is: "All individuals possess identical information about the alternatives." Clearly the task of measuring this directly is overwhelming. As an indicator of this condition, we have made use of a measure of the degree to which multiple sources of information are available to citizens of a given country. The measure focuses upon newspapers under the assumption that, if there is considerable "pluralism" in this sphere of mass communications, there is a positive probability that it will exist in other areas of communication. The indicator also attempts to measure the degree to which pluralistic ownership of the press

---

Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 23–24.

Dahl's definitional characteristics of polyarchy are:

During the voting period:

1. Every member of the organization performs the acts we assume to constitute an expression of preference among the scheduled alternatives, e.g., voting.
2. In tabulating these expressions (votes), the weight assigned to the choice of each individual is identical.
3. The alternative with the greatest number of votes is declared the winning choice.

During the prevoting period:

4. Any member who perceives a set of alternatives, at least one of which he regards as preferable to any of the alternatives presently scheduled, can insert his preferred alternative(s) among those scheduled for voting.
5. All individuals possess identical information about the alternatives.

During the postvoting period:

6. Alternatives (leaders or policies) with the greatest number of votes displace any alternatives (leaders or policies) with fewer votes.
7. The orders of elected officials are executed.

During the interelection stage:

8.1 Either all interelection decisions are subordinate or executory to those arrived at during the election stage, i.e., elections are in a sense controlling.

8.2 Or new decisions during the interelection period are governed by the preceding seven conditions, operating, however, under rather different institutional circumstances.

8.3 Or both.

Robert A. Dahl, *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), p. 84. For a modification of Dahl's polyarchy model, see Deane E. Neubauer, *On the Theory of Polyarchy: An Empirical Study of Democracy in Ten Countries* (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Yale University, 1965).

exists. Since adequate data of this form exist only for large cities, the indicator is explicitly concerned with the pattern of newspaper ownership in capital cities. In order to provide for greater comparability among the sample countries, one must also build into the measure some control for the size of the capital city. The formula:

$$\text{number of separately owned papers} \times \frac{\text{average circulation}}{\text{size of capital}}$$

is utilized to derive a coefficient that suggests the relative number and circulation of newspapers in capital cities.[7]

(d) Competition. Electoral competition by political parties is meaningful only if the nature of that competition is such that the alternation in office of competing sets of leaders is probable as well as possible. The measure should reward those countries which come most close to providing the electorate with this alternative. Two measures are utilized.

(1) Percent of the time period in which the dominant party held office. Competition may be close, but if no alternation occurs over a long period of time, the nature of the alternative perceived by the electorate is substantially different than that in which alternation actually takes place.

(2) Mean percentage of the vote received by the winning party (parties). This indicator actually measures the closeness of the competition. It distinguishes particularly among those situations in which alternation does not occur. Non-alternation with a margin of 51–49 is thus distinguished from non-alternation with a margin of, say, 90–10.

These two measures eliminate the need of a third, obvious measure—the number of parties competing in the election. Single party states are distinguished from multiple party states by showing no alternation in office, and by the percentage of the vote gained by the winning party.

A sample of twenty-three democratic countries was selected and scored on the above indicators. The scores were then combined into an index of democratic performance.[8]

A multiple regression analysis was undertaken correlating the socio-economic variables with the index of democratic performance. The correlation coefficients are reported in Table 1. If one compares these results with those obtained by Cutright reported in Table 2, it is clear that the two sets of findings are distinctly different. These results could occur for two reasons.

The considerable difference between the two sets of findings could result from either the fact that different samples are employed in the two studies, or because the indexes measure quite different things, or both. The factors are interrelated. It is necessary to use a smaller sample than Cutright for the simple reason that the kind of data necessary for the democratic performance indicator come only from democratic countries. But, if the Cutright hypothesis were correct, neither the use of the smaller sample nor the use of the democratic performance index should account for the diminution of the correlation between socio-economic development and democratic "development" assuming Cutright's "political development" index and my democratic performance index measure the same thing. As suggested above, what Cutright terms an index of "political development" is actually an index which measures the existence over time of liberal-democratic regimes. The index of democratic performance, at the conceptual level, attempts to measure the same thing. If socio-economic development were linearly related to democratic development operationalized as institutional maintenance, one would predict that it should also be related to the

[7] For a more comprehensive discussion of this indicator see Neubauer, *op. cit.*

[8] In order to avoid unnecessary complications in comparing these results with those obtained by Cutright, the democratic performance index was constructed in a manner analogous to that used by Cutright to construct the political development index. In fact, to enhance overall comparability between the two studies, his scoring procedure was utilized on all the data. The data for the independent variables (the indexes of communication, urbanization, education and agricultural employment) were obtained by consulting the sources cited by Cutright. The individual scores for each indicator were T-scored, combined (by adding T-scores) into the appropriate indexes and those T-scored. The twenty-three countries comprising the sample were: Austria, Denmark, Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Finland, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, Canada, Israel, Venezuela, United States, Great Britain, France, Sweden, Italy, The Federal Republic, Mexico, Chile, Japan and India. The "N" for the communications index is 21, Luxembourg and Venezuela are not included.

TABLE 1. MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS OF NATIONAL MEASURES OF DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE WITH LEVELS OF EDUCATION, COMMUNICATION, URBANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT IN AGRICULTURE

	1	2	3	4	5
1. Communication		.314	.732	−.698	.424
2. Urbanization	(21)		.578	−.612	−.008
3. Education	(21)	(23)		−.712	.055
4. Agriculture	(21)	(23)	(23)		.016
5. Democratic Performance	(21)	(23)	(23)	(23)	

(Numbers in parentheses represent the sample "N".)

minimal performance measured by the index of democratic performance. The results indicated above suggest that this is not the case. The correlation between the index of democratic performance and Cutright's index of political development is only .182. This suggests that the two indexes are not measuring the same phenomena. In particular, the low correlation points again to the undifferentiated manner in which relatively well-developed democratic countries are treated in Cutright's index. Close inspection of Cutright's index suggests that its success as a measure of democratic performance is only sustained by the use of countries in the sample which feature wide variation.

II. PATTERNS OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

What then is the status of this particular developmental hypothesis? "Can it be saved?" Assuming that my index of democratic performance differentiates among levels of performance in democratic countries, the answer is no, at least not without serious modification. The data presented in Table 1 suggest that, for this set of democratic countries, there is simply no relationship between level of democratic performance and measures of socio-economic development. (Urbanization, −.008, education, .055, agriculture, .016. The correlation between democratic performance and communication, .424, is partially due to the intercorrelation between this measure and the informational equality measures in the performance index.) This in turn suggests that political development, to the extent that it represents democratic political development, is a threshold phenomenon. Certain levels of "basic" socio-economic development appear to be necessary to elevate countries to a level at which they can begin to support complex, nation-wide patterns of political interaction, one of which may be democracy. Once above this threshold, however, the degree to which a country will "maximize" certain forms of democratic practice is no longer a function of continued socio-economic development. In fact, as Table 3 suggests, in a variety of instances one observes some democratic countries that are highly developed socio-economically have high levels of democratic performance, whereas others rank quite low.

Why should this be so? How does one account for this considerable variation in the performance of democratic countries? In answer to these questions, one is tempted to reply that countries perform differently in this respect because democracy is a very complicated form of political organization. The

TABLE 2. MATRIX OF CORRELATIONS OF NATIONAL MEASURES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT WITH LEVELS OF EDUCATION, COMMUNICATION, URBANIZATION AND EMPLOYMENT IN AGRICULTURE

	1	2	3	4	5
1. Communication		71	85	−79	80
2. Urbanization	(69)		75	−72	64
3. Education	(69)	(70)		−72	62
4. Agriculture	(57)	(56)	(58)		−56
5. Political Development	(71)	(74)	(72)	(58)	

(Cutright's correlations are multiplied by 100 to produce whole numbers.)

TABLE 3. ORDERING OF SAMPLE COUNTRIES ON INDEX OF DEMOCRATIC PERFORMANCE

1. Great Britain	236.3
2. France	231.4
3. Finland	229.2
4. Sweden	225.8
5. Netherlands	220.9
6. Belgium	214.9
7. Japan	212.7
8. Luxembourg	210.1
9. Norway	209.7
10. New Zealand	209.4
11. Denmark	205.7
12. Israel	203.2
13. West Germany	199.4
14. Italy	198.6
15. Canada	196.8
16. United States	190.9
17. Venezuela	188.3
18. Austria	186.9
19. Chile	184.6
20. Ireland	181.4
21. India	172.7
22. Switzerland	169.3
23. Mexico	121.9

unique feature of democratic political organization is that it permits the variety of interests which characterize society to be translated into controlled social conflict. Although some kinds of political problems are common to all democratic countries, each differs somewhat in its social composition, its pattern of social organization, its political culture and its tradition of resolving political conflict. Thus, if one wishes to explain such variation in performance, it is necessary to examine the effect which these kinds of factors have on the democratic development of a country. In a recent study of ten democratic countries, the author found that, to a considerable degree, such variations in performance could be explained by variations in the patterns of pluralism and cleavages. This study suggests that, when cleavages are intense and disruptive, the level of democratic performance is not commensurate with that expected given existing levels of social and economic development. It also suggests the obverse. When some countries are characterized by an ameliorative pattern of pluralism and cleavages, democracy can function relatively well despite a somewhat lower level of social and economic development.[9] Similarly, Robert Dahl has examined the political development of the United States in terms of its pattern of pluralism and cleavages and found this to be a satisfactory explanatory device.[10] In a comparative study of Britain and Germany, Harry Eckstein has suggested that the congruence (or lack of it) between social norms and the authority patterns of regimes may account for the stability or instability of some democratic regimes.[11] In short, variations in the performance of democratic countries appears to be a function of factors such as pluralism and cleavage which, though obviously related to the gross level of socio-economic development, have an effect on performance which extends far beyond this development.

It is also prudent to acknowledge the degree to which choice influences the relationship of socio-economic development to democratic development. The real world is not a deterministic one, and within quite appreciable limits, countries and their leaders are free to choose from a variety of alternatives concerning their form of political organization.

The case of Communist countries is the most clear. Many of these have made remarkable progress toward obtaining higher levels of socio-economic development of the type referred to by Cutright and Lipset. This socio-economic development is not reflected in higher levels of "political development" or democratic development of the form discussed in this study.[12] By choice these regimes prefer a quite different type of institutional structure than that of traditional liberal democracy. Less obvious examples also exist such as India where the governing elite makes considerable efforts on the one hand to extend the suffrage, but limits the effect of citizen participation by supporting a system of representation which heavily over-represents the Congress Party. The examples could be easily multiplied. The point is that the nature and extent of democratic practices in many countries appear to be less a function of their state of social and economic development than of certain values embedded in their political culture; values which, in turn, are related to particular patterns of conflict resolution which need not result in the growth of democratic institutions.

In conclusion, one must be most careful when drawing inferences about the effect which social and economic conditions have on the institutions and practices of nations. It is quite clear, one might say obvious, that extremely poor, traditional societies characterized by illiterate, rural populations in which intergroup communication is barely developed and

[9] Neubauer, *op. cit.*

[10] Robert A. Dahl, *Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict and Consent* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967).

[11] Harry Eckstein, *A Theory of Stable Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959). For additional uses of this form of explanation see: Giovanni Sartori, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner (eds.), *Political Parties and Political Development* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 137–176; Robert A. Dahl (ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).

[12] With one exception. One of Cutright's indicators gives points to nations which for each year had in existence a parliament "whose members were the representatives of one or more political parties, but where the 30% rule was violated", (p. 547). This is one of the most unfortunate features of his index, for it permits parliaments such as the Soviet parliament to be considered as a functional decision-making organ. Communist states consequently receive scores on the index which are unjustified from any practical point of view.

national identifications and institutions barely extant, will have considerable difficulty in establishing and maintaining political democracy. It is not at all clear that the more well developed these societies are, the more likely they are to become democratic, at least if one wishes to respect differences in the degree to which basic democratic practices are implemented. If we are to have theories of democracy which take into consideration the full range of factors which impede or enhance democratic development, we must go beyond consideration of those factors which are at best threshold conditions.

REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY: A REASSESSMENT

V. SUBRAMANIAM
Indian Institute of Public Administration

The term "representative bureaucracy" was first given currency in 1949 through Donald Kingsley's book with the same title[1] and since then it has gained popularity/through the discussions of a few American political scientists and British sociologists.[2] The underlying concept, however, is still subject to some confusion owing in part to its normative overtones. This paper attempts, in the first place, to analyse some important sources of confusion and, secondly, to show the practical difficulties in the realization of a representative bureaucracy by comparing the social backgrounds of civil servants in different countries.

I. CONCEPTUAL CONFUSION

Kingsley himself was partly responsible for injecting some ambiguity into the meaning of the term. He pointed out—though without giving precise figures—the actual dominance of the middle class in Britain's higher civil service and traced its history. He was generally satisfied that this class 'mirrored the dominant forces in society' and so 'can be entrusted with power' and at the same time he was anxious that the civil service should draw proportionately more from the working class.[3] In other words, he was happy in one part of his book to see the same class which called the political tune well represented in the higher civil service—thereby ensuring harmony between the body politic and body administrative and sorry in another part that the working class was left out. This ambivalence confuses the straight meaning of the term 'representative bureaucracy.' Literally, it would mean a civil service in which *every* economic class, caste, region or religion in a country is represented in exact proportion to its numbers in the population. In practice, its American proponents interpret it less literally to mean a bureaucracy drawn 'from all social, racial and religious groups on the basis of ability'—but not necessarily in exact numerical proportion to produce 'a copy of the total society'.[4] European research workers on the social backgrounds of higher civil servants would agree by implication with the American definition.

There is thus broad agreement on the basic meaning of the concept—though people can and do disagree about the desirable degree of representation and the categories to be represented.[5] But two other basic confusions still remain. The first of these, found usually among European leftwing critics of middle class-dominated civil services, shows itself in their disappointment with the simultaneous and apparently incongruous evolution of representative democratic political institutions and unrepresentative civil services in the course of of the last 150 years. The second confusion inheres in the naive and dogmatic argument advanced in favor of representative bureaucracy—that it is necessarily responsive to the needs of all the classes it is drawn from and to the general public. I shall analyse each confusion in turn.

To understand the disappointment of leftwing critics with the processes of recent history it is revealing to examine them with the help of the sociological categories, 'ascriptive' and 'performance-oriented,' rather than use normative political terms such as representative and unrepresentative. These twin sociological categories are used as modes of reference—in judging men and things in different societies.[6] In the ascriptive mode some abilities are 'ascribed' to those who belong to certain families or clans, or groups—and whenever and wherever such abilities are required, the 'ascribed' are automatically called up. In the latter mode, the presence of such abilities is tested for by actual performance. The first mode is histori-

[1] J. Donald Kingsley, *Representative Bureaucracy* (Yellow Springs, Ohio. The Antioch Press, 1944).

[2] E.g. Van Riper, Long and Warner (American), Kelsall and Bottomore (British). Their published research is referred to in detail in other footnotes that follow.

[3] See Kingsley, *op. cit.*, 282–283, for the social harmony argument; and the second half of the chapter "The New Aristocracy" for the working class representation argument.

[4] Warner *et al.*, *The American Federal Executive* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), p.5.

[5] For example, the Western critics would be interested in the proportionate representation of economic classes while an Indian politician would lay stress on representation by caste, region and language.

[6] Concerning the two modes of reference, see Talcott Parsons, *The Social System* (London: Tavistock, 1952), 63–65.

cally older and *prima facie* less rational than the second, but neither mode has a necessary logical relation with a representative or unrepresentative bureaucracy. But the first mode has been associated with an unrepresentative upper-class-dominated bureaucracy just as the latter has come to be associated with representative bureaucracy. We shall see why. Until about a century and a half ago, the higher positions in government and administration in all countries were filled by men from a numerically small upper class, regardless of whether the social organization was feudal, mercantile or semi-industrial and the form of government parliamentary, monarchic or aristocratic! This was justified by the ascription of certain abilities to members of that upper class. It was replaced by a performance-oriented mode of reference in the course of the 18th and 19th centuries, for two reasons. The first was the general growth of rationalism in Europe from the Renaissance onwards and its increasing influence in the late 18th century. In such a climate it appeared rather indefensible to ascribe abilities where they could be tested for by performance. The second reason was the patent failure of 'ascribed' groups in some European countries to deliver the goods. It was most dramatic in France where the decadent *ancien regime* with its tradition of patronage appointments and sale of offices collapsed suddenly. It was more gradual in countries such as Prussia and Britain but nevertheless evident.[7]

The most important historical feature from our point of view—of this replacement of ascription by performance-testing—was that it coincided in time with the spread of democratic institutions. Again, France provides the dramatic example. The fall of the *ancien regime* was followed simultaneously by the rise of two most powerful slogans—that of liberty, equality and fraternity and that of a career open to talents. In Britain too, the introduction of competitive examinations went on *pari passu* with the enlargement of the franchise. This historical association, not unnaturally, led some to look upon selection by performance tests and representative democracy as complementary and even corollary and raised expectations, not altogether logical, that these two in combination should lead to a representative bureaucracy. The disappointment implied even in academic discussions about the non-development of representative civil services is largely the result of such association. The expectation was not altogether logical as it was based on the somewhat temporary and sporadic phenomenon of some unrepresentative 'ascribed' groups being replaced in power by more representative groups who had perforce to prove their ability by performance. As we shall see a little later, ascription and performance-orientation are both to be found fairly well mixed up in stable societies both old and new—and the representativeness of a bureaucracy and its selection by performance-testing (or merit) are logically separate. Whether they are practically compatible or otherwise is a matter of observation and political manipulation.

Historical developments in the United States followed a different path wherein these implications were sorted out more clearly.[8] Representative democracy started more or less with a clean slate, ascription played too insignificant a part in American modes of thought to produce any reaction against it and the Jacksonian democrats were not without some logic in their rejection of a whole corpus of contemporary European ideas and practices. They set their face against the European concept of property in office and instituted rotation in office. As against ascription of abilities to a few noble-born, or a test for their presence by examination performance, they attributed a minimum of ability to all citizens—which they declared was ample for the performance of the simple duties of a public office. Conceived as a rejection of decadent European ideas about property in office and the mystique of bureaucratic work, this Jacksonian theory as a whole was self-consistent. Its results were rather mixed. Its immediate consequence was the spoils system, which withered away in due course. A more lasting effect was a moral commitment to keep public services in America open to, and representative of, all sections and classes of the general public and this has, since then, influenced all procedures of selection to official posts. To sum up the different developments in Europe and the U.S.A. somewhat sweepingly: in the former, the parallel growth of representative political institutions and performance tests for civil service recruitment raised some misplaced expectations about the automatic evolution of a representative bureaucracy; whereas in the U.S.A. representa-

[7] For the gradual introduction of the middle class element in British administration, see Kingsley, *op. cit.*, Chapter Seven. For Prussia, see H. Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Autocracy and Aristocracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958).

[8] This paragraph is based upon Paul Van Riper, *History of the United States Civil Service* (Evanston: Row, Peterson & Co., 1958), Chapter 3.

tive political institutions and representative civil services were developed in fact simultaneously, separately and deliberately as partly soft-pedalling the need for, and the rigor of, performance tests.

II. ASCRIPTION V. PERFORMANCE-TESTING

We shall now examine the related question—whether ascription and performance-testing are so sharply different and whether they were and are practised in all their theoretical rigor anywhere. Ascription of a certain ability or quality, say, (a) to those who possess another quality, (b) such as membership of a class, family or clan, is by itself neither irrational nor opposed to the practice of testing for this quality by actual performance. It is not irrational, if observation over a period suggests that (a) and (b) have a significant correlation and concrete tests for ability (a) might themselves have suggested earlier or confirmed later such correlation. It failed in those societies where the correlations were false or overrated or never tested. Conversely, performance-testing, to be perfectly rational, would test one's performance of a single act—before entrusting him with further performances of that specific act—a procedure somewhat expensive and elementary.[9] In actual practice, performance tests or examinations in the recruitment of civil services are usually based on a more complex chain of correlations. Some of these examinations are relatively specific—when technicians are tested broadly in their subjects and techniques, and professionals such as doctors and engineers are recruited on the basis of proven ability through professional examinations. Even here the test is for general technical or professional performance and not for ability to perform a specific act. Other examinations are based on somewhat conjectural correlations; thus the competitive examination for the British Administrative class is not based on actual performance in any given administrative situation but rather on a tenuous chain of Macaulayan reasoning:[10] that those who show ability in their teens and early twenties keep it to the end of their career; that such ability is best revealed by a competitive examination—which tests intelligence, academic ability and self-discipline; that ability is general, i.e., ability of one type is easily transformed into another type and therefore the ability revealed by competitive examination is transformed into administrative ability. There seems to be plenty of room for ascription to slip into this long chain of reasoning, relating examination performance in the humanities to administrative ability, as there is even more in reliance upon a short interview. In other words, ascription is not as irrational or unfunctional as appears at first sight even as performance-testing is not so rigorously rational. It is therefore possible for the social composition of civil services elected by the latter to be not so strikingly different from those selected by the former.

Moreover, in actual practice, ascription was modified in older societies in many ways so as to include some recruits from all ranks of society. Thus entry into, and advancement in, institutions based on celibacy such as the Catholic Church and various eunuch groups of the Turkish and Chinese Empires was always open to all classes and it was possible to climb to high administrative positions through them. Even where a small class controlled administrative recruitment tightly, it could accept members of somewhat less wellplaced classes through marriage and adoption. The commercial classes of England and Japan penetrated the ranks of the landed aristocracy by the former method as many talented Roman and Turkish slaves rose up socially through the latter. Again, a new king or a new dynasty, keen to break the control of an older class over administrative recruitment might encourage men of lower social origins to enter and advance in the governmental bureaucracy.[11] In some bureaucratic empires, the King tried continuously to gain control of civil service recruitment and even instituted elementary performance criteria for this purpose.[12] Absolute practice of ascription and continuous monopoly of one social class was much less usual in non-democratic regimes than popularly supposed.

[9] Such elementary rationality—i.e. taking into account specific ability for the duties of a specific post—is shown in traditional Australian public service definitions of fitness or efficiency in the respective State and Commonwealth Public Services Acts. But good sense has mitigated its literal application.

[10] For the two famous speeches of Macaulay, see *Speeches—Parliamentary and Miscellaneous by Rt. Hon. Thomas Babington Macaulay* (London: Clarke Beeton & Co.), p. 183, Vol. I for the speech of 1853, pp. 267–273, Vol. II, for the speech of 1855.

[11] Re the efforts of kings to gain greater control of bureaucracies in bureaucratic empires, see S.N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Bureaucratic Empires* (The Free Press of Glencoe 1963), Chapter 10 particularly pp. 278–279.

[12] For an early advocacy of selection by performance, see Shamasastry, *Kautilya's Arthasastra*, p. 13 and chapter X for details of tests.

Nor were ascriptive assumptions taken too seriously by the ruling class even as they were preached. There were other important reasons for recruitment by an upper class from its own ranks to the state bureaucracy. In the first place it provided some guarantee of loyalty to the existing regime on the part of the recruit—out of sheer self-interest.[13] Secondly, the recruit could be expected to understand the unstated major premises of the regime without tedious explanation and might even have picked up some of the finer details of administration through the vicarious experience of watching his family elders at work. As a last resort, a blatantly inefficient or disloyal person could be silently removed or relieved in the interests of the class image by some established methods.

III. THE ARGUMENT FOR REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY

I have dealt with the confusion flowing from some naive expectations of the establishment of representative bureaucracy in the wake of representative democracy. I shall now examine briefly the confusion attaching to the argument in support of the former. The essential case is that a civil service which includes members of all classes *therefore* ensures that all their different values and interests are articulated and hence brought to bear upon the decisions taken and policies formulated by it.[14] This argument is implied by some and explained by others. We may set aside Kingsley's argument, which is really a case for political harmony, and summarize—as an example—Kelsall's use of the foregoing pattern of argument to plead for a wider representation of all classes.[15] In his view, the attitudes and sympathies of the British civil servant such as 'smugness and complacency' and 'lack of touch with working class problems' are those of the middle class he is drawn from. He has unconsciously imbibed a sense of superiority to the working class and with no 'memory of misery, hunger, squalor, bureaucratic oppression and economic insecurity,' his perception of such problems lacks depth. The greater representation of the working class through various means would make for a truly representative and *therefore* responsive civil service. The American proponents are more direct and precise in presenting this case. Thus Van Riper makes it clear that a representative bureaucracy must "(1) consist of a reasonable cross section of the body politic in terms of occupation, class, geography and the like, and (2) must be in general tune with the ethos and attitudes of the society of which it is part," and he would attribute the success of American democracy in part at least to the representative character of the Federal Civil Service.[16] Norton E. Long goes even further to say that it is 'a better sample of the mass of the people than the Congress,' that 'important interests which are unrepresented or malrepresented' in the Congress receive 'more effective and more responsible representation through administrative channels,' that it has saved the democratic process from bogging down and should be duly recognized as 'our great fourth branch of Government.'[17]

The arguments for representative bureaucracy (or rather guaranteed representation for some unrepresented groups) put forward in India around the turn of the century followed the foregoing basic pattern with local variations.[18] Indian society, it was argued, was really divided into caste and religious groups rather than economic classes, but these divisions were more rigid, being based on birth, and had more influence on their members than class. The case for equitable and proportionate representation of each caste and religious group was founded frankly on the probability of the sectional sympathies or even sectional loyalties of recruits causing harm to unrepresented sections. The danger was held to be very real in late 19th and early 20th century India more than elsewhere because (1) India had a purely bureaucratic form of government with little democratic control, and membership in the civil service meant more power than elsewhere, which power could be used and was often alleged to be used by the administrator in favor of one's community; and also because (2) membership in the civil service conferred significant financial security, a prize most sought after in Indian society. It was argued that there was a strong case for the more equitable, i.e., proportionate, distribution of the two scarce commodities of power and security, particularly be-

[13] In this regard, aristocrats, imperialists and communists are all the same in trying to recruit members of a given class for key administrative positions on grounds of political reliability.

[14] The argument becomes stronger, the greater the power of the civil service.

[15] R. K. Kelsall, *Higher Civil Servants in Britain* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955), pp. 189–193.

[16] Van Riper, *op. cit.*, pp. 549–559.

[17] Norton E. Long, 'Bureaucracy and Constitutionalism,' this REVIEW, 46 (1952), 808–818.

[18] For further details and references regarding the Indian arguments, see V. Subramaniam, "Graduates in the Public Service—A Comparative Study of Attitudes," *Public Administration* (London), 35, 377–378.

cause competition for them was weighted heavily in favor of the more fortunate early starters (the higher Hindu castes) who could deliberately use it to keep out the latecomers.

Thus the basic argument—stated in different ways in different contexts—is that bureaucrats carry their class attitudes and prejudices into their official life and only when all classes (or castes) are properly represented in the civil service will their different needs and interests find due consideration. Norton E. Long would stretch this further to say that such a representative bureaucracy would even make up for the sins of unrepresentative political institutions such as the Congress in U.S.A.[19]

How good is this basic case founded on the inevitability of one's sympathies for one's class of origin? Is it as self-evident as its proponents make it out? Of course, Freudians and Behaviorists are agreed that childhood influences are long-lasting. There is also plenty of empirical research evidence (in regard to the U.S.A.) to show that the middle and working classes differ substantially in several regards, from toilet training for children to the style of promiscuity, from the nature of their mental disorders to their marital lives. But all this neglects the existence of deviants from class norms, in both the upper and lower classes. We are familiar with aristocrats and rich heirs who have passionate sympathy for the working class. On the other hand, the proportion of deviants among the members of the lower classes who work their way up is held by many observers to be high. Leaving aside the familiar upstart and the climber, they point out that those founders of Britain's industry in the 19th century who came from poor families were not conspicuous for their sympathy to their class of origin and that leadership studies of working class parties and unions reveal the same story. It has been suggested that the men who climb out of the lower classes, the upward-mobiles, under present conditions anyway, shed their class sympathies either at the beginning of the climb itself or halfway through. The proven existence of deviants from class norms and the probability of their high proportion among recruits from the lower classes, shakes to the foundations the basic argument for representative bureaucracy.[20]

Besides this, one has still to explain—in more detail than its advocates have done—the process by which a representative bureaucracy becomes responsive to sectional *as well as* general interests. If the various classes represented have all different and conflicting interests and if their members in the bureaucracy advocate mainly class interests—in accord with the basic argument—the result is likely to be a divided and even ineffectual bureaucracy. It might work after a fashion—on the basis of a hostage theory according to which bureaucrats of each class do not harm the interests of others for fear of retaliation.[21] Or to think of a less gruesome picture, bureaucrats with different social backgrounds may influence each other by formal and informal contacts and bargaining. This is known to happen but such mutual influence and bargaining is not half as free as in the open legislative forum between politicians of different persuasions—for it is severely cramped by the hierarchical position of the incumbent.[22] The actual picture is often brighter than the foregoing ones at least in the United States, mainly because the majority of bureaucrats cherish some common values which are part of the nation's socio-political consensus and they also expose themselves to all influences regardless of their class origins. In other words, this responsiveness is more a reflection of the consensual and equalitarian ethos of the community as a whole than a direct result of its representativeness only.

The old Wilson-Goodnow argument against 'elective' bureaucracy may not hold good in its old form against 'representative' bureaucracy but it is not without relevance. The original

---

[19] Long, *op. cit.*; see in particular the latter half of the article.

[20] Re the several differences in attitudes and customs of the middle and working classes, see Harold M. Hodges, Jr., *Social Stratification: Class in America*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1964), the two chapters on Values and Behaviour, and the chapter on Social Class and Social Intimacy. Regarding lack of class sympathies among successful men from the lower classes, see Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties*, Chapter III, Section III, and Kenneth Robinson, "Selection and the Social Background of the Administrative Class," *Public Administration* (London), 35, 388. All this evidence is impressionistic and Hodges produces no evidence about deviants to rebut this impression.

[21] For a version of the hostage theory see *Speeches and Writings of Mohammed Iqbal*, Speech in the Punjab Legislative Council, July 19, 1927.

[22] For hierarchy and the inhibition of free communication see Blau and Scott, *Formal Organizations* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1962), 121–124.

argument may be paraphrased thus.[23] Political institutions such as Parliaments and Presidents should reflect, shape and so represent the popular will—and it is right they should be constituted on the elective-representative principle. Administrators carry out this will—and should be selected solely on the basis of competence in execution—as revealed by professional qualifications or (competitive) performance tests. It is disastrous to apply the ethos of one to the other—to apply the principle of appointment by performance-testing to political institutions and that of election (or representativeness?) to administrative establishments. The main flaw in this argument has been recounted *ad nauseam* by proponents of representative bureaucracy, namely, that the dichotomy does not work as strictly as stated and that administrators influence political decisions and make them too. But this does not make an automatic case for representative bureaucracy, though it weakens the original argument against elective offices. From a purely logical and dichotomist standpoint, if an administrative position involves a large proportion of political decisions, it should be made a purely political position—perhaps even elective or politically responsible in some way. For many practical reasons this proved extremely difficult in the American governmental framework. At the same time, administrators have progressively grown politically responsive without going embarrassingly partisan—a fortunate development that seems to have saved American democracy from the need for drastic reorganization. This development owes something to the 'representative' character of the Federal Service and a lot more to other factors too. It is clearly stretching the evidence somewhat to claim that 'representative' bureaucracy is the only or even the most effective answer to the problem of increasing bureaucratic power. It is stretching it too far to assert, as Norton E. Long does, that it is a part-cure for unrepresentative political institutions.

IV. SOCIAL BACKGROUNDS OF CIVIL SERVANTS

I have so far pointed out some conceptual and logical shortcomings of the idea of representative bureaucracy—even while conceding its limited advantages. I shall further justify this cautious approach by a comparative analysis of the social backgrounds of higher civil servants in different countries. In the present stage of my research I would not like to hazard any firm conclusions on the subject because reliable data are not available for many countries and even the readily available data need some reprocessing and reinterpretation.[24] Even so, it is difficult to resist the tentative conclusion about the widely prevalent middle class domination of higher civil services in the six countries listed in Table 1, in spite of their different economic, social and political backgrounds.[25] The extent of the domination is nearly the same (from 80 to 95 percent) and the differences relate mainly (a) to the degree or coefficient of over-representation of the middle class as a whole, and (b) to the different degrees of representation of different sections of the middle class. To illustrate; the percentage of the sons from middle class occupational categories does not differ very much between U.S.A. (81%) and India (87.6% for the Accounts Services and 96% for the Administrative Service) but in the former, these categories constitute something near 60 percent of its working population and so, the degree of over-representation is of the order of 1.35. In India, however, they constitute just about 9 percent of the working population and the degree of their over-representation is near 10. Thus,

[23] For the original argument and detailed references, see R. S. Parker and V. Subramaniam, "Public and Private Administration," (section II) *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, Brussels, Vol. XXX, No. 4.

[24] I am processing material for a book entitled *Social Composition of Public Bureaucries* to be published M/S Longman Green in a series under the general editorship of J. W. Grove. The present paper is a preview of the general argument of the book.

[25] Please see Table 1 for details. The sources for the figures for different countries are as follows:

For Denmark—Henry Stjernquist, "Centraladministrationens Embedsmaend 1848–1946", *Centraladministrationen 1848–1948*, Ministerialforeningen, Copenhagen, 1948.

For Turkey—C. H. Dodd, "The Social and Educational Background of Turkish Officials." *Middle Eastern Studies*, London, Vol. I, p. 271.

For U.S.A.—Warner *et al*, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

For Great Britain— R. K. Kelsall, *op. cit.*, pp. 150–51.

For France—T. B. Bottomore, "Le Mobilité Sociale dans la Haute Administration Française," *Cahiers Internationaux Sociologie*, Vol. XII, Sommaire, p. 169.

The Indian figures are based on my own research.

TABLE 1. COMPARATIVE TABLE OF THE OCCUPATIONS OF THE FATHERS OF HIGHER CIVIL SERVANTS IN SIX COUNTRIES

Name of Country	Middle Classes						Others	
	Shopkeepers Businessmen etc.	Governmental (incl. Army) Employees	Business Employees	Professionals	Skilled Workers	Total for Middle Classes	Unskilled Workers	Agricultural Workers and Farmers
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
1. Denmark (1945)	19.5	25.1	4.3	38.3	—	87.2	4.3	8.5
2. Great Britain (1949–52)	17.8	27.0	13.3	30.4	8.7	97.2	1.5	1.3
3. France (1945–51)	11.4	50.2 (41.8)	8.3	23.1	3.3	96.4	—	3.6
4. U.S.A. (1959)	20.0	?	24.0	20.0	17.0	81.0	4.0	15.0
5. Turkey (1960)	16.0	45.5	—	29.0	—	90.5	1.0	8.5
6. India (1947–56) (a) I.A.S.	12.0	50.6	4.5	29.2	—	96.3	—	4.7
(b) A/cs Services	7.5	46.7	5.2	28.2	—	87.6	4.2	8.6

N.B.: Research workers differ about the inclusion of skilled workers in the middle class. In this table, it affects the size of middle class representation only in the case of the U.S.A. and to a much lesser extent to the case of Great Britain. The inclusion can be justified in the former case on the basis of (a) their nearness to the professional and clerical middle classes in their earnings and ethos and (b) the significant proportion of them that transfer to the professional and clerical middle classes in one generation.

while the middle class share is about the same in different countries, the degree of its over-representation depends on its size, and the larger it is, the more representative the bureaucracy. Secondly, the representation of different sections of the middle class differs sharply from one country to another even when its total representation is about the same. Thus in India, Turkey and France, the sons of civil servants form more or less half (46 to 50%) of the total number of recruits—whereas in Denmark and Britain, their percentage comes down to about 25 and to even less in the case of the U.S.A., in all of which countries the skilled workers, business executives, farmers and businessmen are better represented. These variations may be explained in part by the different origins and history of the middle class in different countries. In India and Turkey it was artificially created in response to Western occupation or influence—and is still largely made up of salaried employees of government and business.[26] As the sons of the former have a traditional predilection for following in their father's footsteps the degree of over-representation is very high indeed. The middle class of France is more varied but seems to be nearly as tradition-bound as its counterparts in Eastern countries with the result that civil servants' sons are just as well represented in her civil service as in India's and Turkey's. Greater occupational mobility and lack of traditionalism seem to have weakened the urge to follow the father's profession in U.S.A. which has a more varied pattern of middle class representation, with Denmark and Britain standing midway. It is again interesting to note in the case of India (for which detailed figures are available from my researches) that the social composition of the various services as revealed in Table 2 follows closely their prestige rating.[27]

To reiterate the main point, the higher civil

[26] Regarding the evolution of the Indian middle class, see B. B. Misra, *The Indian Middle Classes* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

[27] The table is based on my researches to be published by the Government of India. The table tallies with evidence available elsewhere about social mobility. The sons of the lower middle class and working class make easy entry into the less coveted and lower services—as for example the Executive Class in U.K., but *their* sons find it easier to enter the more prestigious services. It seems to take two generations to bridge the distance between working class and the higher civil services.

service is drawn to an equally large degree from the middle class in all these countries, in spite of their different social, economic and political backgrounds—and is more 'representative' just where the middle class itself is large. This is rather sobering but it can be explained by the combination of skills and qualities cultivated by the middle class—which increases immensely its chances of success vis-a-vis the working class. If civil servants were chosen through a random number table from the whole population, it is highly probable that each class (i.e., the upper middle, lower middle and working class) might be represented in the civil service more or less in proportion to its numbers. In practice the selection is restricted by several requirements operating more or less in favour of the two branches of the middle class. Let us take note of four important requirements relating to age, intelligence, a certain level of education and eagerness to compete. We can see that the middle class has *prima facie* a higher probability of meeting the last three requirements than the working class and the final combined probability which is a product of the separate probabilities is therefore so much higher than that for the working class. Let us see how.

We may assume that under normal conditions the age distribution in all the three classes is the same—with perhaps a slightly higher proportion of the working class in their twenties and thirties—perhaps enjoying a very slight advantage in regard to their numbers in the recruitable age groups. During some periods of history this advantage may constitute a significant factor against an ageing and infertile middle class—whose depleted ranks may be filled up rapidly from below. We are not concerned with this rare occurrence at the moment and may proceed on the assumption of the same age distribution in all classes.

We do not have any reliable knowledge about the distribution of native intelligence in the different classes.[28] Some researchers suggest that it is about the same in all classes, others that it is slightly higher in the city working class than in the middle class and still

[28] For summaries of I. Q. surveys, see N. Eysenck, *Uses and Abuses of Psychology* (Pelican); P. E. Vernon, *Intelligence and Attainment Tests* (University of London Press, 1960); and John B. Miner, *Intelligence in the United States* (Springer, N. Y. 1957). It would appear from Miner, *op. cit.*, pp. 78–84 and C. O. Carter, *Human Heredity* (Pelican), pp. 132–135, that I.Q. increases proportionately with social class, but this I.Q. is based somewhat heavily on verbal ability.

TABLE 2. INDIA'S ADMINISTRATORS: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY FATHER'S OCCUPATION, COMPARATIVE TABLE FOR ALL SERVICES

	Higher Civil Servant	Doctors	Other Learned Professions	University Professors	Total % of Upper Middle Class Occupations	Businessmen	Employees of Private Firms	Lawyers	School teachers	Lower Civil Servants	Total % of all middle class occupations	Land-owners	Farmers	Workers Artisans
1947–48														
1. I.F.S.	45.90	3.28	0.56	3.28	50.02	11.48	1.64	4.92	6.56	4.92	88.53	11.47	0.00	0.00
2. I.A.S.	32.91	5.06	1.89	7.59	47.45	12.03	4.43	11.39	3.80	17.72	96.81	3.19	0.00	0.00
3. I.P.S.	19.85	5.16	2.06	5.94	33.0	9.28	3.09	13.14	6.44	17.78	82.73	13.66	2.32	1.29
4. A/cs Services	24.53	3.30	2.83	6.60	37.26	7.55	5.19	8.49	7.55	22.17	88.20	4.25	3.80	4.25
5. Customs & Postal Services	12.13	6.06	3.03	9.09	30.3	12.12	0.00	9.09	7.58	25.76	84.85	10.61	1.51	3.03
1957–58														
1. I.F.S.	42.17	3.61	1.2	10.85	57.83	10.84	8.43	3.61	4.82	4.82	90.35	3.61	0.00	6.02
2. I.A.S.	26.60	5.13	3.0	4.70	39.33	8.55	5.98	6.84	6.92	17.09	84.71	11.54	0.85	2.90
3. I.P.S.	22.92	4.17	0.26	3.13	30.48	12.24	3.13	5.45	6.77	19.01	77.08	18.49	0.52	3.91
4. A/cs Services	12.01	3.36	2.10	4.20	21.67	13.03	5.88	7.56	8.40	25.23	81.76	6.90	6.72	4.62
5. Customs & Postal Services	11.84	3.95	1.32	5.26	22.37	9.21	7.23	7.24	7.89	26.32	80.26	3.95	12.50	3.29

1. I.F.S. = Indian Foreign Service. 2. I.A.S. = Indian Administrative Service. 3. I.P.S. = Indian Police Service.

others that it is lower. At the same time, psychologists have identified different areas of intelligence and suggested that different groups may excell or fail in different areas, women in shape and color perceptions, working class children in manipulative tests and middle class children in verbal ability. Perhaps there is no conclusive evidence of advantage to any one class in regard to *general* intelligence, but we may accept the evidence in regard to the greater verbal ability of middle class children. Thus they have an edge on others in something which matters a great deal in competitive examinations.

We know a little more about the opportunities for school and university education for different classes. In most industrial and developed societies, the differences in the proportion of school-leavers in different economic classes are not very large; they are rather small at the junior school level and somewhat larger at the secondary school level. But the difference is more striking in regard to university education even in industrial societies—the proportion of the university trained in the middle classes often being a hundred times their proportion in the working classes.[29] Thus any system which recruits University graduates in their early twenties is bound to give a striking advantage to the middle class at the expense of the working class and the peasantry.

There is little doubt that the middle class boy—by the very nature of his class—is more aware of the existence of professions and salaried jobs in the civil service and realizes that he has to look after himself by competing for life's prizes. As against this middle class competitive individualism, the working class boy suffers by his proneness to, and training in, cooperative effort.[30]

The middle class boy thus enjoys at least three advantages separately, and his combined advantage, which is the product of the separate advantages, is conspicuously greater than that of the working class boy. We have shown in Figure 1 how this combined advantage and the class structure react to produce two different models in the case of India and the U.S.A. We shall now illustrate concretely how recruiting systems can favor one class or another by stressing or soft-pedalling one or more of these advantages. The traditional British system of recruitment to the Administrative Class is based on a competitive examination of University Honours standard open to those between the ages of 20 and 25. The traditional pre-second World War Australian system recruited youths between the ages of 14 and 18 with an examination at junior or secondary school level. The American system recruits people at nearly any age through specific job-oriented examinations. It is clear that the British system favors the middle class whose members put their children through University before 21 or 22 as a matter of course. The older Australian system threw it open to a much wider section of the population—indeed the whole school-going population, but deliberately kept out those who wanted to go on to the University.[31] The American system is the most open in allowing a very large section of the population within the widest age limits to compete—without keeping out the would-be graduates. It is also clear that changing one factor or other in a system would alter its clientele and products. If the British system had extended its upper age limits to thirty or more, many working class young men, who graduated later in life, might have competed and entered the Administrative Class. Similarly, the Australian system by merely extending its upper age limits in the postwar years has been able to recruit many graduates and the American system, if it imposed narrower age limits would automatically exclude late developers from the less fortunate sections of the community. In practice most countries follow a modified British system and offer a clear advantage to the middle class.

V. CONCLUSION


Let us now sum up the thesis and end on a practical note. There are serious weaknesses in the case for representative bureaucracy and in practice the sons of the middle class occupy over eighty percent of the posts of the higher civil service in several (non-communist) countries regardless of their stage of economic development—because of possessing a combina-

[29] The distribution of university education among the middle class and the working class and its bearing on civil service recruitment has been discussed by Kelsall, *op. cit.*, Kingsley, *op. cit.*, pp. 146–147 and Bottomore, *op. cit.* It seems that the opportunity for university education for the middle class boy was about 35 times that for the working class boy in Britain according to Kingsley and about three to four times in the U.S.A. according to Hodges, *op. cit.*, pp. 260–261. In other Western countries the ratio might be in between the two, whereas in India, it may be well over 100.

[30] For some evidence of the competition-proneness of the middle class vis-á-vis the working class, see Hodges, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

[31] W. K. Hancock, *Australia* (1930 edn.), p. 142.

FIG. 1. Diagrammatic comparison of U.S.A. and India.



In both model diagrams the classes are arranged in slabs one over the other in the same order and the proportion of each is indicated by its respective area.

Each diagonal line separates those who have an ability or qualification (placed on the right) from those who do not (placed on the left). Line 1 does this for verbal ability, Line 2 for University education and Line 3 for eagerness to compete. The first quality is distributed probably in the same way in U.S.A. and India but the second and third are much more in short supply in India—as indicated by the sharper turn to the right of Lines 2 and 3.

The shaded area on the right of Line 3 includes those who have the best chance of getting into the higher civil services by virtue of possessing all the three qualities. It is seen that in India, the bulk of this comes from the small middle class (darker shaded area) giving it a very high coefficient of representation. In U.S.A. too the bulk comes from the middle class which is however larger—giving it only a moderate coefficient of representation.

tion of advantages. We have also suggested that the U.S. Federal Civil Service is representative because U.S. society is largely middle class. In fact, there are further reasons to justify caution about the possibility or benefits of a representative bureaucracy outside the American context.[32] If the representativeness of the U.S. Federal bureaucracy is based on its middle class society, its responsiveness flows much from factors other than mere representativeness. Reference has been made to the general American consensus transcending class barriers and covering a wide field of political and social values—and the reflection of this in bureaucratic attitudes. An important element in this consensus is one's general accessibility regardless of class or position and this exposes the bureaucrat to many prevailing winds of opinion and interest. Indeed his sensitivity is heightened to public and professional needs because he moves in and out of the Federal bureaucracy frequently into the private practice of his profession or to private enterprise. In short, a numerically representative bureaucracy may not be possible to establish when torn from its American context except with immense difficulty, and its consequences would be certainly unpredictable and perhaps even undesirable.

[32] As against the enthusiasm of Norton E. Long, Van Riper has doubts about the exportability of representative bureaucracy and would anyway treat it as only one of several possible devices to ensure democratic administration: *op. cit.*, p. 559.

MEASUREMENT IDENTITY IN THE LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE VOTING*

AAGE R. CLAUSEN
University of Wisconsin

Recent advances in data processing technology have made it possible for the political scientist to extend the coordinates of his research space across political systems as well as through time. Without the present-day capacity to retrieve and process speedily the large banks of data accumulated through comparative analyses, such studies would be prohibitively time-consuming, and probably not done at all. As it is the technical hurdles are diminishing in importance, only to be replaced in our attention by the methodological barriers to comparative analysis. In this paper the focus is on one of the basic problems of comparative analysis: the achievement and validation of measurement identity.

Measurement identity refers to the content equivalence of two or more measures and is a key consideration in comparative studies whether the comparison is cross-cultural or historical. Unless there are clear indications of the identity of the measures on which the comparisons are based, such comparisons are meaningless. For the political scientist engaged in cross-cultural research, the problem of measurement identity virtually thrusts itself upon him, since he is already sensitive to differences between culturally different political systems. In contrast, the historical researcher who is working within a single cultural context, and is attuned to the continuity of historical themes, may neglect the measurement identity requirements of his research. The purpose of this paper is to give visibility to this measurement issue as it confronts historical research in the field of legislative behavior. My specific referent is the longitudinal study of legislative voting behavior.[1] A model for the validation of measurement identity will be presented, and subsequently applied to a longitudinal analysis of roll call voting in the United States House of Representatives.

* I am deeply indebted to Professors Warren E. Miller and Philip E. Converse for their critical evaluations and judicious suggestions. My thanks go to the Survey Research Center, The University of Michigan, for the use of its facilities.

[1] For a review of the methodology and literature of roll call voting research see Lee Anderson et al., *Legislative Roll-Call Analysis* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966).

I. LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE VOTING

The foundation for my longitudinal analysis is laid by a series of objective measurements of the legislator's perceptions of roll call propositions advanced at different points in time and his reactions to them. The most commonly employed models of measurement, Guttman scalogram and Thurstone factor analysis, provide orderings of legislators on dimensional continua. When a pattern of voting leads to an ordering of legislators on a common dimension, as a result of that pattern's fit with a measurement model, the pattern is assumed to be the result of the legislator's sharing a common frame of reference. A further assumption is that the sharing of perceptions is made possible by the commonality of the roll call attributes. Thus, the scalar or factoral relationships between roll calls are attributed to shared policy attributes which are perceived in terms of the same policy referent by various legislators. The policy referent (e.g., federal versus local control, civil rights) constitutes the substance of the voting dimensions on which the legislators are ordered according to their positions on the commonly perceived items.

On the assumption that Guttman scalogram and Thurstone factor analysis are valid methods for discovering roll call dimensions, we can turn our attention to the criteria which may be used in establishing dimensional identity over time. The question we are asking is: *How do we know that the policy dimension being measured at time-one by scale X is the same as that being measured by scale Y at time-two?* There are two criteria commonly employed here: (1) the strength of the statistical correlation between the measures taken at different points in time, and (2) the comparability of the content of the roll calls at times one and two. Let us first consider the substantive criterion.

The substantive criterion of dimensional identity comes under suspicion almost immediately since the specific character of the legislative items are rarely identical from one measurement of a voting dimension to the next. Unlike the survey researcher and the psychometrician, the roll call analyst is not given the opportunity to construct the set of items on

which his measurements are based. Neither can he repeat the measurements utilizing the same set of items. Instead he must base his measurements on items that emerge at the different points in time.

Even if the specific character of the legislative items being used in the time comparison remains the same, there is no assurance of dimensional continuity. There is the very real possibility of a change in the policy context within which the legislation is presented. This in turn may produce a change in the referents employed by the legislators in their consideration of the same piece of legislation. For example, *before* Sputnik, federal aid to education may have been perceived in terms of federal versus local responsibility for educational support. *After* Sputnik the Congressman's vote on federal aid may have been determined by the extent of his concern for the "education gap" between the United States and Russia.

A second and quite different criterion concerns the statistical correlation between measures taken at two different points in time. The correlation criterion of measurement identity is even more difficult to apply to roll call analysis than is the criterion of manifest content. In the application of this criterion a level of correlation must be specified as supporting the conclusion that measurement identity has been achieved. Unfortunately, there is no basis for setting the requisite statistical level. The investigator can only assume that a given correlation is "high enough" and report it to his readers—*caveat emptor*.

I propose to reduce the dependence on criteria of dimensional identity involving the arbitrary specification of acceptable levels of correlation and subjective evaluations of policy content by using a *pattern* of statistical and substantive relationships which extends through time. This pattern is designed to fix each dimensional measure into a context which is substantively and statistically coherent. The two components of this model of analysis are: (1) the analysis of the statistical relationships (a) among measures of roll call dimensions and (b) between dimensional measures and predictor variables; and (2) content analysis of the voting dimensions. The major component of this model is the pattern of statistical relationships and will be discussed first.

The statistical portion of my measurement identity model consists of two interlocking parts: 1) correlations between the measures of the voting dimensions both *within* and *between* Congresses, and 2) correlations between measures of the voting dimensions and measures of other politically relevant variables at the same points in time. The strength of this web of relationships derives from the mutual support one part provides the other. Before considering the web in its entirety, let us consider each of the parts.

A certain pattern of differential correlations may be expected to emerge when measures of voting dimensions constructed on one session are correlated with measures of parallel dimensions in a second session. This is a *pattern in which each measure of a given dimension has a higher correlation with other measures of the same dimension than it has with measures of a different dimension.* In the case where measures of two dimensions have been constructed at two points in time, the pattern of differential correlations is as shown in Figure 1.




FIG. 1. Pattern of correlations between measures at time-1 and time-2.

This pattern is based on two interrelated postulates: 1) correlations between measures of the same dimension must be higher and will have an upper limit of 1.0; 2) correlations between measures of different dimensions should be lower with the limit of zero. As the measurements of the dimensions increase in their validity and reliability these differential tendencies will be clarified. The point is, measures of the same dimension may be expected to be more highly correlated with each other than with measures of different dimensions, and the better the measurements are, the clearer will be the definition of this pattern of relationships within the constraints imposed by the actual underlying pattern.

It will be noted that this model avoids the specification of absolute minimums or maximums providing instead an *expected* pattern of *differential* correlations to which the *observed* pattern may be fitted. Furthermore, it is theoretically possible to extend this model to include as many dimensions and time points as required. The analytic complexity resulting from the extension of the model is always reducible to the simple test applied to the individual measures of the voting dimensions: *Is measure X more highly correlated with other measures of the same dimension than it is with any of the measures of another dimension?*

The complementary segment of the web of statistical relationships used in the validation

of dimensional identity consists of the correlations between the measures of the voting dimensions and other quite different but theoretically relevant variables. The expected or model pattern is one in which the indices of the voting dimensions are differentially correlated with the relevant variables and maintain the same pattern over time. Figure 2 presents this pattern as applied to two voting dimensions (A & B) and two differentially associated variables (X & Y) at two points in time:




FIG. 2. Pattern of correlations between voting dimensions and relevant variables.

Variable Y has a stronger correlation (.80) with both measures of dimension A and a weaker correlation (.20) with both measures of dimension B. Variable X, on the other hand, has a stronger correlation with both measures of dimension B but a weaker correlation with the two measures of A.

The assumption underlying this pattern of relationships is that the dimensions of voting differ in the magnitude of their correlations with at least some of the variables thought to be relevant as influences on legislative voting. Consequently, measures of the same dimension, although taken at different points in time, can be expected to maintain the differential pattern in their correlations with the theoretically relevant variables. Similarly, measures of different dimensions may be expected to correlate differently with a given variable and their correlations with this variable may be expected to remain at the same *relative* levels over time.

The model of differential correlations never specifies absolute magnitudes but only relative ones. This allows for the possibility that the correlation between a voting dimension and an associated variable will fluctuate from one measurement to the next as a function of measurement error. Focusing on the relative magnitudes of the correlations does not preclude the distorting effects of measurement unreliability, but it does diminish their influence. Given the extensive correlation network of the model patterns, there is little reason to fear that measurement error will produce spurious fits of the data to the model. There are simply too many pieces that would have to fall into place for this to occur. At the same time it is true that a limitation on the applicability of this correlation pattern model accompanies the reordering of legislators that may take place on a given dimension over a period of time. Such a reordering reduces the correlation between two measures, even though they are highly reliable and valid measures of the same dimension. The overall effect of this limitation is to decrease the likelihood of the data fitting the model, thereby making it a conservative test of measurement identity.

Prior to the selection of the independent variables which are hypothesized as relevant to the voting behavior represented as the voting dimensions, the content of these dimensions must be inspected. This inspection constitutes the second component of our model and is directed toward determining whether the roll calls included in the measures of the voting dimensions may be subsumed under a single policy referent, and whether different policy concerns are reflected in indices of different dimensions. In other words, we do indeed return to the use of a manifest content criterion. When a Guttman scale analysis is employed, this review of the manifest content linked to the voting dimension is straightforward because items are uniquely associated with a single measure. When factor analysis is utilized, the same observations may be made in terms of the major factor loadings of the legislative items.

It was observed earlier that specific legislative proposals may be viewed in an altered context at different points in time. It is also possible that some overlap in manifest content may occur between different dimensions. However, it is reasonable to expect that measures of the same dimension usually include the same kinds of legislative proposals from one time to the next, whereas different dimensions emerge in items of a different character.

The content analysis of the items making up the several voting indices constitutes the final component of this model of measurement identity (or differentiation). When this component is considered in relation to the statistical component, the pattern of correlations among the voting indices and between the voting indices and the relevant variables, a solid basis is provided for an interpretation of the roll call indices. An application of the model follows.

II. AN APPLICATION TO A LONGITUDINAL STUDY

The model of measurement identity was applied to a longitudinal analysis of roll call voting in the United States House of Representatives during the four Congresses of the Eisenhower administration. In each of the four Congresses a minimum of thirty-seven roll call votes was selected from the domestic policy domain. This selection was confined to legislation concerned with socio-economic, regulatory and fiscal policy. These are policy issues commonly thought of in terms of a single liberal-conservative dimension. Contained under the rubric of socio-economic policies are the matters of social welfare, public works, and federal services. The regulatory category includes legislation on labor-management relations, patent rights of private corporations under government contract, and development of natural resources including atomic energy, water power and mineral resources. The fiscal policy category subsumes legislation on debt limitations, revenue policy and interest rates. Excluded from the study are roll calls taken on questions of foreign policy, defense policy and civil rights. In addition, legislation representing the demands of special interests has been set aside; this includes veteran and farm policy, and legislation pertaining to the operation of federal agencies not involved in the policy deliberations to which we have restricted the analysis. These designations of policy domains, and the partial listings of the legislative matters included within them, are provided to assist the reader in his comprehension of the scope of the legislation covered in this study; they do not in any way affect the subsequent analysis.

In addition to the substantive criteria for selecting roll calls, a set of "distributional" criteria were employed for the purpose of collecting as much information as possible while skirting the absurd, such as including roll calls with only one or two members in the minority. Included in the analysis were roll calls on which more than 350 members voted and more than five percent of either party opposed a House majority. In the case of party conflict votes, roll calls were included if at least ten percent of the members of one party deviated from the party position. In addition, a single roll call was selected from any subset characterized by the same content and by highly similar alignments. These criteria were relaxed on occasion to allow the inclusion of relevant roll calls which fell one or two votes off the required distributions.

Separate Guttman scalogram analyses were performed on the roll call set in each of the four Congresses. The technique employed to identify scalable roll call sets was the Lingoes Multiple Scalogram Analysis (MSA) program designed for the 7090 IBM computer. Since a detailed description of the MSA program may be found elsewhere I shall confine my description of its properties to those of relevance to the present roll call analysis.[2]

The MSA program proceeds by searching through the set of items for a scalable subset. Setting aside those items, it makes another pass picking up another scalable subset. This process continues until all of the roll calls are either included in scalable subsets or designated as non-scalar. In each pass the MSA seeks out the set of items which *best fits* the scalar model while satisfying certain minimum criteria. As a consequence of these features of the program, if there is a large pool of items which tap a single dimension, a number of scales may be produced which measure that same dimension. Thus on the first pass the subset of items which best fit the model are selected and on the second search, the best set among the remaining items in the unidimensional pool is selected, with as many iterations as there continue to be items.

The fact that the MSA program may produce a number of scales measuring the same dimension, as well as a set of scales measuring different dimensions, can pose a bothersome interpretive riddle: How does one distinguish the scales measuring a common dimension, with varying degrees of reliability, from scales which are tapping different but correlated dimensions? An example of this kind of situation is provided by the present study. An inspection of the correlations among the scales constructed within each Congress (see Table 1) makes it clear that there is little basis for deciding which scales are measuring the same dimension and which ones are measuring different dimensions—within each Congress. In no case does the correlation between two scales reach such a high level (near 1.0) that it is safe to presume that both are measuring the same dimension. On the other hand, some of the correlations may reflect dimensional commonality if one allows for a certain amount of measurement error. It does seem fairly reasonable to conclude that two or more dimensions are being tapped in each Congress.

[2] James C. Lingoes, "Multiple Scalogram Analysis," *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, 23 (Autumn 1963), 501–524.

TABLE 1. INTRA-CONGRESS, INTER-SCALE CORRELATIONS*

83rd

	A	B	C	D	E
A	—	.743	.659	.394	.501
B		—	.663	.474	.584
C			—	.739	.669
D				—	.610
E					—

84th

	A	B	C	D
A	—	.806	.472	.396
B		—	.574	.388
C			—	.388
D				—

85th

	A	B	C	D
A	—	.815	.707	.655
B		—	.682	.550
C			—	.503
D				—

86th

	A	B	C	D	E
A	—	.725	.765	.703	.702
B		—	.666	.658	.606
C			—	.846	.868
D				—	.851
E					—

* The matrix entries are "gamma" rank order correlations. See Leo A. Goodman and William H. Kruskal, "Measures of Association for Cross Classifications," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 49 (December 1954), p. 749.

However, it is literally impossible to draw the line between the two conditions of measurement identity and measurement differentiation, on the basis of the information provided by Table 1.

The strong correlational ties among the scales constructed in each of the four Congresses is a complicating factor, not only in the discrimination between dimensions in a single Congress, but also in the determination of dimensional identity across Congresses. The reader will recall that my model of measurement identity is dependent on the observation of a differential pattern of correlations to define the measures of the same and of different dimensions. In the present situation in which even the least related scales are quite strongly correlated, and where measurement reliability may be relatively low because of the uncontrolled conditions under which the measurements are taken, the manifest pattern of correlations may be extremely difficult to interpret because of the small differences among the correlations. On the one hand, the statistical constraints between the individual scales limit their capacity to differ in their correlations with other scales and other variables. On the other hand, some of the observed differences in the correlations may be due to measurement error. Thus it may happen that the measurement error associated with each of two scales will equal the maximum difference that is possible in their correlations with a third variable. As a result, the differentials in the underlying pattern of relationship will not be clearly articulated in the correlations among the derived measures.

The means for resolving this statistical quandary has been devised. Although a discussion of these means involves a relatively lengthy detour from the main line of exposition, it is essential. I am confident that the statistical terrain which is covered in this detour is not unique to this study, or to this general field of study, and is therefore of general interest.

III. DETOUR

Clarification of the dimensional structure underlying the scale relationships is dependent on a reduction of the correlations between scales measuring different dimensions, while avoiding a commensurate reduction in the correlations between measures of the same dimension. Since it is expected that the higher correlations are those which obtain between measures of the same dimension, with the weaker ones characterizing the relations between measures of different dimensions, there is the rather paradoxical need to reduce the weaker correlations more than the stronger ones. Surprisingly, this can be accomplished under a specified set of conditions, nor do these conditions appear to be particularly uncommon.

By way of introduction to the necessary conditions, let me briefly indicate the manner in which the reduction in correlations is to be




FIG. 3. Bivariate distributions.

achieved, leaving a fuller description for a later and more appropriate point in the discussion. It consists of setting aside those legislators whose positions on the several scales are most highly correlated. The expectation is that for the residual set of Congressmen, the correlations are not only all reduced, as expected, but reduced in the differential manner described above: *lesser* reductions in the correlations between scales measuring the *same* dimension, *greater* reductions in the correlations between measures of *different* dimensions. Although this generally implies the greatest reduction in the weakest correlations, it is also possible that some of the stronger correlations are between measures of different dimensions. In either case, it is the form of the bivariate distribution underlying the correlation, rather than the strength of the correlation which determines the size of the expected reduction.

Let us examine the form which the bivariate distribution must take to produce a correlation which is both high and relatively resistant to diminution by the physical removal of cases contributing to that correlation. A prime example is the perfect correlation in which each case is located on the regression line. So long as three cases (the minimum necessary to evaluate a bivariate relationship) remain, the correlation will stay at 1.0. The bivariate distribution yielding the perfect correlation is a special case of a more general form characterized by minor deviations of data points all along the regression line, as represented by Form A in Figure 3. Although the selective removal of cases located nearest the regression line would reduce the original correlation, we would not expect the reduction to be anything approaching that which would occur in Form B in Figure 3.

A distribution of Form B is one which is heavily dependent on the cases located at the extremes of the dimension to produce the correlation. Indeed, a concentration of extreme cases about the regression line can produce a rather substantial correlation. By the same token the removal of a few cases from the extreme score positions, where these cases are correlated in their positions on the two variables, can cause a dramatic reduction in the magnitude of the correlation.[3] We expect that the bivariate distribution of measures of the same dimension will approach Form A. Due to measurement error there will be some minor reversals in the ordering, but generally one would expect that each subject will deviate only slightly from his position on the underlying dimension.[4] On the other hand, if the scales are measuring different dimensions, there is no reason to anticipate a parallel ordering of cases, or any other bivariate distribution.

In sum, there is a certain asymmetry in our expectations regarding the forms the bivariate distribution may take for measures of the same and of different dimensions. We expect

[3] Hubert M. Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), 290–291.

[4] The expectation of minor reversals in ordering on two measures of the same dimension is based, in the present case, on the error characteristics of Guttman scales. In a Guttman scale there is a steeply inverse relationship between the frequency of error response patterns and the number of errors in the patterns. Thus if the Guttman scale is accepted as a reliable representation of legislator ordering on a given dimension, when two such scales tapping the same dimension are correlated, the minor reversals in the orderings will be predominant.

that when measures of the same dimension are involved, the bivariate distribution will conform to Form A. However, when the correlations are inter-dimensional, the bivariate distribution may assume a variety of forms, including both A and B.

The same asymmetry accompanies the anticipated effects of the correlation reduction operation on the intra-dimensional as opposed to the interdimensional correlation. Since we are fairly certain that scales measuring the same dimension will have bivariate distributions similar to Form A (involving minor deviations from the regression line) we feel fairly confident that the removal of some of the cases contributing to the inter-scale correlations will leave the original correlation relatively intact. We are much less certain of the impact of a similar operation, involving the removal of the same number of cases, on the correlation between measures of different dimensions. If the original correlation is highly dependent on the extreme cases as in the Form B distribution; the removal of some of these cases will have a sharply depressing effect on the magnitude of the correlation. As the inter-dimensional correlation distribution approaches the A form, the reduction in the correlation will be less. However, we anticipate that measures of different dimensions will not match the measures of the same dimension in their fit to Form A. Certainly the odds of success favor our entry into the next phase of the analysis, that of assaying the differential reduction in the inter-scale correlations.

IV. REDUCING THE CORRELATIONS

Earlier in the discussion of the correlation reduction operation, I stated that those legislators whose positions on the scales are highly correlated would be set aside. This operation was performed on each of the Congresses and consisted of three phases: 1) the definition of the negative and positive poles on each scale, 2) the division of scale scores into positive and negative scores, and 3) the sorting out of all Congressmen who either scored positively on all scales, or negatively on all.

The definition of negative and positive poles of the scales in each Congress proceeds by fiat for the first scale but is determined for the remaining scales by the correlations between them, i.e., the poles of the scales are designated so as to maximize the positive correlations between them. Once the positive and negative poles have been established, there remains the determination of which scale scores are positive and which are negative. This is needed in order to sort out the consistently "negative" and consistently "positive" legislators. For our purposes we could probably do well enough by using the median as the cutting point. However, the alternative chosen in this study is less arbitrary. At the most presumptive level, the cutting point we use may be designated as zero point of the scale where this refers to a central point of origin for the positive and negative positions on a bi-polar dimension. It is highly comparable to the notion of the zero point of an attitude scale that divides the *anti* from the *pro* attitude positions.[5]

Our designation of a zero point follows from the finding that the function described by computing the *ratio of the number of cases observed in each perfect scale pattern* to the *number expected by chance* (computed from the item marginals) is nearly always of a U-shape with a single scale position at its minimum. (This assumes an *ordering* of scale patterns by scale score.) See Figure 4.


The U-shape function of score distributions is a general characteristic pertaining to the scoring of subjects on dichotomous items. Guilford observed the same phenomenon in relation to the strength of item intercorrelations, "As item intercorrelations increase, the distribution of total scores grows flatter, from mesokurtic to platykurtic, to rectangular, to bimodal and finally U-shaped."[6] The relatively late arrival of the U-shape in Guilford's description follows from his attention to score frequencies. When these score frequencies are taken in ratio to the frequencies expected by chance (observed: expected), the resultant probability ratio function is already rectangular (all probability ratios at 1.0) when the items are independent. The function assumes a convex form when the items are mutually positively correlated.

The rationale underlying this designation of a zero point, generalizable to other index forms utilizing dichotomized items, is based on the assumption of a bi-polar dimension. The more polarized the population is, the steeper the sides of the probability ratio function become. In the condition of maximum polarization, the function assumes an "open box" form

[5] Edward S. Suchman, "The Intensity Component in Attitude and Opinion Research" in *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II*, Vol. IV (Measurement and Prediction), S. A. Stouffer (Ed.), (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1950).

[6] J. P. Guilford, *Psychometric Methods*, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1954), p. 360.

FIG. 4. Probability ratio function.



Scores: Perfect Scale Patterns	*Expected*	*Observed*	*Probability/Ratio Observed Expected*
0	.12	25	208.33
1	1.04	48	46.20
2	2.72	22	8.10
3	4.60	21	4.60
4	6.12	6	0.98
5	6.35	4	0.60 <0-point
6	5.86	7	1.20
7	4.44	14	3.20
8	3.08	100	32.50

(⌊——⌋) which reflects the concentration of cases at the polar extremes. One would argue in this case that the minimum of the function denotes the zero point on a bi-polar dimension. Extrapolating from this extreme case I am for the moment equally willing to argue that the minimum of the function continues to perform the same service when the polarization is not so sharp. Beyond the moment and the purposes at hand, I would strongly recommend that the general validity of this representation of the zero point be subjected to a more formal analysis than is presently available. A more detailed exposition of my argu-

TABLE 2. CORRELATION REDUCTION: 83RD CONGRESS

(a)

	Pre-reduction correlations (N = 475)						Post-reduction correlations (N = 266)				
	A	B	C	D	E		A	B	C	D	E
A	—	.743	.659	.394	.501	A	—	.616	.289	.006	−.037
B		—	.663	.474	.584	B		—	.344	.160	.151
C			—	.739	.669	C			—	.675	.362
D				—	.610	D				—	.328
E					—	E					—

(b)

	Absolute decrements						Proportional decrements				
	A	B	C	D	E		A	B	C	D	E
A	—	.127	.370	.388	.538	A	—	.17	.56	.98	1.07
B		—	.319	.314	.433	B		—	.48	.66	.74
C			—	.064	.307	C			—	.09	.46
D				—	.282	D				—	.46
E					—	E					—

ment may be found elsewhere;[7] the more formal analysis is in process.

Employing the minimum of the probability ratio function as the positive-negative watershed, I set aside those legislators who occupied a positive position on all the scales constructed on a single Congress, as well as those occupying a negative position on every scale. As an example of the efficacy of the technique, the pre- and post-reduction correlations for the 83rd Congress are presented in Table 2(a); in Table 2(b) is shown the absolute as well as the proportional decrement in each of the correlations.

As anticipated, the general effect of the correlation reduction sort was to reduce the lower correlations more than the higher correlations. Thus, before the sort was performed, the highest correlation was .743 whereas after the sort the highest was .675, a decrease of only .068. In contrast, the lowest correlation before the reduction was .394, after the sort it was −.037, a decrease of .431.

Closer inspection of the post-reduction matrix reveals that the sorting process has laid bare the communality of scale A with scale B, and of scale C with scale D. There is also an absence of a strong relationship between the two pairs. This pattern was suggested by the original correlations, but is illuminated in the post-reduction correlation matrix. The fact that the post-reduction correlation matrix reveals the same general pattern as the pre-reduction matrix suggests that the procedure provides a clarification of the existing order rather than being a distorting intrusion.[8]

V. LONGITUDINAL RELATIONSHIPS

At the conclusion of the correlation reduction operation, I had in hand a set of House members in each Congress on which the pattern of interscalar relationships had been sharpened. In order to look at the scalar relationships across Congresses to test them against the longitudinal validity model, it was necessary to define a more restricted subset of Congressmen who were members in all four Congresses. This definition consisted of setting aside all House members who had been sorted out in

[7] Aage R. Clausen, "Policy Dimensions in Congressional Roll Calls: A Longitudinal Analysis," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1964), pp. 108–119.

[8] I want to emphasize that this procedure for clarifying statistical relationships is not being presented as a measurement innovation of widespread utility. It is useful in the present case; it *may* be useful in other analyses of roll call voting. Perhaps the strongest feature of this correlation reduction technique is that it does not simply reduce *all* correlations by eliminating the significant variance on each measure. As we shall presently observe, the differential pattern of correlations involve substantial variations in the magnitude of the correlations.

TABLE 3. INTER-SCALE CORRELATIONS FOR CONTINUOUS MEMBERSHIP 83RD-86TH CONGRESS

N = 149

	85-D	86-E	84-B	84-A	83-D	83-C	83-E	86-C	86-D	85-A	85-B	86-A	83-B	84-C	86-B	85-C	83-A	84-D
85-D	—	72	68	71	60	66	56	59	46	39	25	21	21	12	10	12	08	10
86-E		—	72	68	54	56	61	63	53	49	31	37	25	14	11	20	09	21
84-B			—	70	59	68	52	53	42	43	27	32	34	21	20	25	19	06
84-A				—	68	64	52	66	46	41	17	24	25	08	11	09	11	02
83-D					—	69	51	54	26	14	−07	−04	04	−18	−20	−17	−13	03
83-C						—	55	43	40	35	20	21	27	10	14	15	18	01
83-E							—	45	35	34	15	15	22	02	−02	02	−04	21
86-C								—	44	38	−01	24	24	−09	−03	−21	06	13
86-D									—	59	34	33	29	06	14	13	35	−14
85-A										—	64	62	46	51	42	55	45	−06
85-D											—	51	44	27	46	50	35	00
86-A												—	53	60	58	59	53	11
83-B													—	55	51	44	53	04
84-C														—	69	62	61	−06
86-B															—	71	60	01
85-C																—	52	11
83-A																	—	−06
84-D																		—

Cluster X

Cluster Y

Average Within Cluster Correlation
Cluster X = .61
Cluster Y = .53
Average Between Cluster Correlation
.12

the reduction process in three out of the four Congresses in our study.[9]

On this continuous membership base, correlations were obtained between all the scales constructed in the four Congresses. These correlations were arranged in a matrix in a manner which would define the inter-scalar correlational structure (Table 3). The emergent structure consisted of two distinct scale clusters, two scales (86-D, 85-A) whose relationships to either of the two clusters were too mixed to warrant their inclusion in either, and one scale (84-D) which was not correlated with any other scale to any significant degree.

Two aspects of this correlation matrix are of particular interest. First, there is the marked clustering effect with two clusters accounting for 15 of the 18 scales. The clarity of these cluster formations is reflected in the high averages (.61 and .53) of the within-cluster correlations and the low average (.12) of the between-cluster correlations. This strongly suggests the presence of two dimensions of voting behavior. Secondly, there is the presence

[9] This definition of the analytic subset might have involved one, two, or four Congresses as well as three. In the present case, the selection criterion involved three Congresses because this was the minimum number necessary to provide the required differentiation in the pattern of inter-scale correlations.




FIG. 5. Pattern of longitudinal relations for measures of dimensions X and Y.

of at least one scale from each Congress in each of the clusters. This suggests the longitudinal extension of the two dimensions throughout the Eisenhower administration.

Given our interest in longitudinal analysis, which is facilitated by using the measures providing the most reliable comparisons of legislative voting over time, it is advantageous to select from each Congress the two scales which are the most reliable measures of the two dimensions. The remaining scales are useful only for the information they provide on the content of the two dimensions, to be considered later. The test for the relative reliability of the scales involves an expansion of the subject base on which the inter- and intra-dimensional correlations are computed. This is accomplished by returning to the post-reduction matrices in each Congress. Since these were based on the separate Congresses, and not restricted by any continuous membership definition, they provided a membership base approximately twice that of the continuous membership set used in the longitudinal correlations. From the post-reduction matrices, I selected those scales which showed the strongest intra-dimensional and weakest inter-dimensional correlations. For example, from the 83rd Congress scale A was selected from the highly correlated pairing, A and B (see Table 2a), and scale D was selected from the pairing, C and D, to represent the two dimensions suggested by the two pairings. Scale A was selected from the A-B pairing because of its relatively low correlation with scales C and D; similarly scale D was selected from the C-D pairing because of its relatively low correlation with scales A and B. Note that the correlation of .006 between scales A and D is the lowest of the four correlations between the members of the two pairings A-C, A-D, B-C, B-D). Comparable, but independent, operations were performed on each of the four Congresses to select the set of scales to be used in the remainder of the analysis; their longitudinal pattern of correlations is shown in Figure 5.

A visual penetration of the maze of lines showing the 28 correlations is aided by observing that the solid exterior lines join the scales which measure the same dimension at different points in time whereas the internal broken lines represent all of the possible inter-dimensional correlations. The average correlation for the intra-dimensional relationships is .63 to be contrasted with the −.01 average for the inter-dimensional correlations. Nor are these "average" correlations obscuring any overlap in the magnitude of the intra- and inter-dimensional correlations. The range in the first instance is from .54 to .72 and in the second instance from −.20 to .12, a difference of .42 between the lowest correlation in the intra-dimensional set and the highest among the inter-dimensional correlations. When one

considers the many elements which may enter to reduce the reliability of the measures taken at points in time as far apart as eight years, this pattern of relationships is remarkable, and suggests a high degree of order in Congressional perceptions and responses to roll call stimuli.

On the basis of these formal statistical relationships we are prepared to view the manifest content of the scales within a bi-dimensional framework. Although it is clearly beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed discussion of the substantive character of the two dimensions, I can indicate the major points of difference and similarity which appear to underlie the different patterns of voting. Due to space limitations I cannot list all the items identified with the two dimensions. Instead, a partial listing is provided which consists of items drawn from subject matter areas uniquely identified with one of the two dimensions.

Economic Policy (*Dimension X*)	*Welfare Policy* (*Dimension Y*)
Health Insurance Plan	Hospital construction
Rural Telephone Subsidy	Unemployment Compensation
National Debt Limit	Tidelands
Public Land Management	Mexican Farm Labor
Atomic Energy	Minimum Wage
Public Power	Municipalities Loan Fund
Postal Rates	Fed. Preemp. Doc. Modification
Federal Securities trading	Federal Employee Raise
Gov't Defense Work to Private Sector	Labor Department
	Labor Union Restrictions
Monetary Policy Study	Govt. or pvt. ownership of NASA Research Patents
Federal Airport Construction	
	Auth. of Fed. Res. Bd. to Ease Reserve Requirements
Irrigation Acreage Limit	

An inspection of the items located on these two dimensions clearly suggests a substantive differentiation between them. To indicate what I believe to be the nature of the substantive difference I have called one of the dimensions "Economic Policy" and the other "Welfare Policy." The items located on the Economic Policy dimension represent attempts to define the public and private sectors of the economy, to stipulate the degree of control to be exercised by the federal government over the private elements of the economic system and to establish fiscal policy. In contrast, the dominant theme of the Welfare Policy dimension is that of individual and social welfare.

The validation of the two voting dimensions rests presently on the pattern of correlations between the indices of the two dimensions and the content of the roll calls included in the indices. The Miller-Stokes study of representation provides a most unusual opportunity for a subsequent validation of the two dimensions within the attitude-vote context.[10] In this study, probability samples of the members of the House in the 85th and 86th Congresses were asked the following policy questions:

1) "Do you approve the use of federal funds for *public housing* or do you generally feel that housing can be taken care of better by private effort?"
2) "Do you think the federal government ought to sponsor programs such as large public works in order to maintain *full employment* or do you think that problems of economic readjustment ought to be left more to private industry or state and local governments?"
3) "Do you think the government should provide grants to the states for the construction and operation of *public schools* or do you think the support of public schools should be left entirely to the state and local governments?"
4) "How about the controversy over the development of atomic power. Do you think the government should develop power from *atomic energy* or do you think this should be left to private industry?"

The correlations between these items, based on the set of representatives in the 85th Congress who remained after the reduction sort, is shown in Table 4.

The correlation matrix reveals a cluster of three items, namely, education, housing, and employment, which are relatively highly correlated with each other as compared to their correlation with the fourth item, atomic energy. The last item reflects the same policy concern as the atomic energy roll calls which were uniquely identified with the Economic Policy dimension in the voting analysis. The first three items express a concern with social welfare which is comparable to that represented in the roll calls located on the Welfare Policy dimension.

This finding impels the subsequent analytic stratagem of utilizing the first three attitude items as a measure of Welfare Policy attitudes, while reserving the single item on atomic energy as an indicator of the Economic Policy attitude dimension. Both measures are then related to the scalar representations of the two voting dimensions. This examination of the correspondence between the attitude and

[10] Warren E. Miller and Donald D. Stokes, *Representation in Congress* (forthcoming book to be published by Prentice-Hall).

TABLE 4. ATTITUDE ITEM CORRELATIONS

	Housing	Education	Employment	Atomic Energy
Housing	—	.468	.395	.110
Education		—	.426	.121
Full Employment			—	.037
Atomic Energy				—


vote dimensions marks our entry into the last stage of our validity analysis: *the correlation of voting dimensions with theoretically relevant policy variables to test whether a pattern of differential correlations emerges which conforms to the expected model pattern* (see Figure 2) *and remains constant over time.*

The Miller-Stokes representation study provides interviews with a probability sample of both the 85th and 86th Congresses, thus allowing us to examine the pattern of attitude-vote correlations over time (Figure 6). In each Congress the policy attitude measure is more highly correlated with its roll call counterpart than it is with the other dimension. The differences in the correlations of the Welfare Policy attitude measure with the two voting dimensions are .476 in the 85th Congress and .316 in the 86th Congress. The comparable differences for the Economic Policy attitude measure are .434 and .265. (Note: In Figure 6 and in the statistical presentations that follow, when the signs of the coefficients are reversed the algebraic difference is computed. Hence, the negative correlation should be read as a "lesser positive" correlation. This follows from the fact that the original correlations were all positive but as a result of the correlation reduction procedure, some of the correlations were reduced below zero, so to speak.)

In addition to the congruence between the attitude and voting measures, further evidence that two distinct dimensions of voting behavior have been measured is provided by the persistence of the differences in the correlation between partisan affiliation and the two dimensions. This correlation was computed for each of the four Congresses, using as a base the set of representatives remaining after the correlation reduction sort. This means that the population varies from Congress to Congress for there is no requirement of membership continuity when the Congresses are treated independently. Despite this source of variation the clearest and most consistent results emerge (Figure 7).

My investigation of the voting dimension correlates is concluded by an analysis of the correlations of two constituency characteristics with the two voting dimensions. The constituency characteristics are industrialization and urbanization. A measure of industrialization was derived from Congressional Quarterly figures on the blue collar percentage of the working force in each Congressional district; the urbanization measure reflects the urban-rural balance via a calculation of the difference between the urban and rural proportions of each district, setting aside the proportion of the district considered by the Congressional Quarterly as suburban. The correlations between these indices and the voting dimension measures is presented in Table 5.


FIG. 6. Attitude-vote.*



* It should be noted that the findings shown here emerge despite there having been no opportunity to formulate the attitude items with the express purpose of tapping the two dimensions. As a matter of fact, the same four items have been used in the Miller-Stokes study as a single measure of social welfare attitudes. Their utilization of the four items was justified in that they satisfied the standard requirements of the Guttman scalar model when applied to the total sample. Only by virtue of the correlation reduction sort is it recognized that two policy dimensions are present; when all Congressmen are brought into the correlation analysis this is not at all obvious.

FIG. 7. Party-vote.*

Vote Measures of Economic Policy Dimensions



Vote Measures of Welfare Policy Dimension

* The extremely high correlations of the Economic Policy measures with party must be understood in terms of the gamma statistic being used. This statistic allows for the possibility of considerable within-party variation in scale position so long as there is no overlap across party lines. The distribution of the Economic-Policy scale scores by party in the 85th Congress illustrates this point:

	Anti		Government Activity				Pro
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
Republicans	17	51	14	1	5	—	1
Democrats	2	1	14	16	30	29	26

gamma = .917

Thus, although the Economic Policy dimension is highly related to party it is by no means simply a matter of party line voting.

The correlation of the two constituency characteristics with the Welfare Policy scales is the expected one of greater urbanization and industrialization leading to greater support for social welfare activity on the part of the federal government. Furthermore, both measures are consistently more highly related to the Welfare Policy than to the Economic Policy dimension. In light of the model pattern of differential correlations we propose as a test for dimensional identity and differentiation, it is significant to note that the urbanization-industrialization factors are most highly associated with the voting dimension which is least highly associated with party. Thus party is most highly associated with the Economic Policy dimension whereas the character of the district seems more relevant for voting on social welfare policies.


VI. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion let me briefly retrace my steps with an occasional pause to mark the trail more clearly. I began by selecting a set of items of similar content in four successive Congresses. Independent scale analyses were performed within each Congress. Correlations between the scales, both within and between the Congresses, revealed a bi-dimensional structure. Finally, the scales which best represented the bi-dimensional structure were correlated with theoretically relevant variables to complete the test of their conformity to the model pattern of differential correlations.

Perhaps the best way to appreciate the severity of the validity test implied by the procedure followed is to consider an alternate strategy. Instead of performing simultaneous but independent scale analyses of the four Congresses, I might have initiated the analysis by performing a single scale analysis on the first and earliest Congress. On the basis of that analysis, the roll calls in the succeeding Congress could have been classified prior to the scaling operation so as to promote the construction of scales with the strongest substantive and statistical ties to those built in the first Congress. This procedure might then have been extended to the two remaining Congresses. However, this would have meant incorporating the longitudinal validation into the scale construction stage of the analysis. Instead, two independent operations were performed: the construction of the scales in


TABLE 5. INDUSTRIALIZATION AND URBANIZATION BY ROLL CALL VOTE

Vote Measures of Economic Policy Dimension



Vote Measures of Welfare Policy Dimension

Vote Measures of Economic Policy Dimension



Vote Measures of Welfare Policy Dimension

each Congress, and the subsequent longitudinal validation of those scales.

The longitudinal validation of the scales built in the several Congresses was complicated by the relatively high correlations between the least highly related scales. This necessitated the introduction of a somewhat unusual method for clarifying the statistical relationships among the measures of the voting dimensions. The method consisted of setting aside those House members whose positions on the voting indices were relatively highly correlated, and performing the validation analysis on the remaining legislators.

One may ask whether the findings based on the "residual" set of Congressmen can be generalized to those legislators excluded from the longitudinal analysis. My affirmative conclusion is based on the theory of Guttman scaling. This theory holds that when a set of items (roll calls) conforms to the Guttman scalogram model, it implies the existence of a single dimension extending to all members of the test population (members of the House). Accordingly, the voting dimensions validated for one set of House members should be equally applicable to any other set. There does remain the possibility that the separation of the legislators into two sets has inadvertently resulted in two groups with unequal rates of response error. If one of these groups exhibits a high rate of error, which was balanced off in the scaling of the entire membership by the very low rate of error in the second group, there would be reason to suspect that the high error set was not scalable on the same dimension as the low error set. Hence, in the present situation, the Congressmen excluded from the validation analysis might be characterized by a rate of response error which is so high as to raise doubts about generalizing the dimensional structure of the *residual* set to them. In brief, the facts of the matter are quite the opposite in that the excluded set of Congressmen displayed a somewhat lower error count than their colleagues on whom the validation was performed.

My confidence in this methodology is supported by the coherence of the findings. The evidence is most impressive in support of the measurement of two dimensions of roll call voting behavior where only one (the liberal-conservative) is generally thought to exist. Furthermore, the evidence supports the con-

tinuous presence of two separate dimensions over a period of eight years, despite the changes that can occur in such a time span. Consider, for example, the personnel turnover alone. This was fairly substantial, as indicated by the shift in the partisan balance from one which narrowly awarded the Republicans with House control (221–213) to one which abundantly indulged the Democratic party (283–154). Add to this the personnel changes resulting from more idiosyncratic sources of tenure termination. Yet despite these personnel changes, the relationships among the indices of legislative voting, and between them and associated variables, maintained a consistent pattern. This was true whether the pattern was observed for the continuous membership or the more variable membership represented by the four separate Congresses.

The validation of the measures of the voting dimensions which has been accomplished in this study is in a sense no more than a preliminary phase of a longitudinal analysis of roll call voting behavior. Although this "preliminary" analysis provides a delineation of voting dimensions, and an examination of their correlations with other theoretically relevant variables, the most productive part of the longitudinal analysis is yet to be engaged. At hand is the opportunity to specify the conditions under which legislators stabilize in their positions on voting dimensions as well as the influences productive of changing positions. Similarly, an analysis of the representation provided for a given constituency by different individuals, with or without concomitant changes in the partisanship of the representation, may be performed with reference to the positions of the legislators on a single dimension extending through time.

The ability to follow a voting dimension through time is complemented by the capacity to observe its disappearance. Thus, we are in a position to study the life of a dimension, possibly to observe the continuing relevance of a given dimension for the older generation of legislators and the emergence of different dimensions of greater relevance for the younger generation. How indeed does a legislature adapt to changing circumstances? Is it only through the infusion of new members or is it assisted by the capacity of legislators to revise their responses to the changing environment? If this revision does take place, does it occur through the employment of different frames of reference or do attitudes change along the same dimension?

It is beyond the limits of this paper to lay out all the possibilities of longitudinal analysis; my few suggestions have but scratched the surface. At the same time, I feel it worthwhile to emphasize the point which this paper has attempted to make, that a longitudinal analysis requires the greatest care in the identification and the validation of the measures used to represent voting behavior at different points in time. It is my conviction that if the full potentials of historical analysis of legislative voting behavior are to be realized, we can do no less.

POLITICAL RECRUITMENT: THE CASE OF JAPANESE PREFECTURAL ASSEMBLYMEN*

YOUNG C. KIM
Hobart and William Smith Colleges

This paper is an attempt to specify and assess the significance of a variety of factors that condition the recruitment of Japanese prefectural assemblymen. The term recruitment is used here to refer to the entire process involved in a person's induction into a position. Since the aspirants must formally undertake candidacy for the prefectural assembly elections, this paper is in essence concerned with those factors which significantly shape the processes of their candidacy and elections.

Data used here were gathered in Japan during the period of June, 1965 to February, 1966 and are mostly of three kinds: 1) official documents such as election returns, 2) semi-official surveys and polls concerning electoral behavior, and 3) data obtained through interviews which the author conducted with a sample of prefectural assemblymen and other local government officials in Chiba and Kanagawa prefectures.[1] Whenever pertinent and available, comparable data regarding other prefectures and Japan as a whole will be given. They serve as norms whereby the data on Chiba and Kanagawa can be appropriately evaluated.

I. CANDIDACY

Motivation. At the outset, we need to examine the basic question of why some people decide to undertake candidacy. Motivational data, particularly those psychodynamic in nature, are simply unavailable. The limited discussion of this question which follows is based on the interview data. A few open-ended questions were used and the responses were extemporaneous, but the answers represent consciously-formulated reasons for the candidates' political interest and involvement. Socialist Party (SP hereafter) members, who, by the way, usually claim to have been drafted for candidacy, held different kinds of objectives at the time of their candidacy: Some sought the office in order to promote the interests of their labor unions, while others sought to extend their party influence into a predominantly Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) district. An SP member attributed his initial political interest to his study of "theory of class" and "socio-economic problems." Another SP member related how his prisoner-of-war experience made him aware of the plight of the ruled and aroused his political consciousness. One SP member conceived and sought the office as a means of livelihood which would make his active involvement in politics possible. Another explained his candidacy in terms of the sense of duty he felt.

The responses of Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) members somewhat resemble those of the SP counterparts. Most interviewees explained their candidacies in terms of local labor union interests, whereas one member attributed his candidacy to a sense of public service. This particular interviewee traced the beginning of his interest in politics to the readings of his student days, while the others gave their local unions greater weight in arousing and sustaining the level of their political interest and participation. The lack of reference to the role of party organization is striking.

The objective of Kōmei Party (KP) candidates is clear. The incumbents interviewed all recited that their involvement in politics, sanctioned by their religious doctrine, aimed at the welfare and prosperity of the masses. The chairman of Kanagawa prefectural party said that the restrictive powers of prefectural government he experienced as a city councilman impelled him to seek a seat in the prefectural assembly. The impotence of prefectural government in the face of the power of the national government now makes it necessary for him to seek a seat in the House of Represen-

* I would like to thank Professors G. Almond, R. Beardsley, S. Hoki, T. Nakano, R. Scalapino, K. Steiner, J. Wahlke and R. Ward for their valuable comments and assistance given at different stages of the author's research on Japanese prefectural government and politics. This paper is part of a forthcoming larger study.

[1] Interviews were conducted with 164 persons, most of whom are officials of national, prefectural, city and town governments. A total of twenty prefectural assemblymen, representing all the parliamentary groups in the two prefectural assemblies, were interviewed. There is one Communist Party member represented in the Kanagawa Assembly, who refused interview. Interviews in most cases lasted two to three hours.

tatives. His point is that any significant improvement in the welfare of the masses must await KP's attainment of power at the national level.

As for LDP incumbents, reference to altruistic motives is generously absent. They tend to explain their initial interest and current involvement in politics primarily in personal terms. No clientele group is named as the intended beneficiary of their successful candidacy. Even the notion of promoting their local interest is hardly mentioned as a reason for their candidacy. During the interview, an LDP member could only recall nostalgically his now deceased patron; another declared that he first got into politics by mistake by allowing himself to be pressured into seeking an office of mayor and then he sought the present post to avoid the exacting burden and responsibility of a town mayor. For some elderly LDP members the attainment of office appeared to have been something men of their socio-economic and familial status are entitled to.

For SP members, as compared with LDP members, personal motivation is submerged, verbally at least, and the party and labor union serve as meaningful reference groups. Their realistic appraisal of dependence on the party or union for elections may account for this. KP members in general appear to be imbued with a sense of mission and their apparent belief in the righteousness of their cause may help sublimate the personal dimension.

If it is difficult to probe into the nature of motivation, it is less difficult to note the intensity with which a seat is desired. Indirect evidence in this connection is the proportion of the incumbents who voluntarily retire. Examination of the record between 1955 and 1963 reveals a small incidence of voluntary retirement. About ten to fifteen percent of the membership in Kanagawa and Chiba assemblies retire, usually after serving two terms, and the remainder desires and attempts with high degree of success to return to the assembly.[2] Another indication of the strength of desire for the office is the tenacity with which previously unsuccessful candidates stand for the elections. In Kanagawa, at the time of the 1959 election, seven previously unsuccessful candidates were running for the second time and four were successful at their second try. In the 1963 election, two candidates tried for the third time with success. Eleven candidates were running for the second time and two were successful. Three successful candidates in 1963 were ex-assemblymen who had been defeated in 1959. In Chiba, at the 1959 election, out of fifteen candidates trying for the second time, seven won the seats. As of the 1963 election, out of eleven who tried for the second time three were successful.[3] The above data indicate steady availability of aspirants, and that whatever the motivations, the candidates exhibit strong desire for the office.

Party Nominee vs. Independent. Having decided to undertake candidacy, a candidate must decide whether to run as an independent or as a party nominee. Perusal of the three elections of 1955, 1959 and 1963 shows that independent candidates comprise 28 to 31% of the total candidates in Kanagawa, and 14 to 30% in Chiba.[4] The decision to run as an independent reflects, in some cases, the genuine conviction of the candidates, but perhaps more frequently it reflects electoral strategy. In other cases, candidates have no choice because they cannot obtain a party nomination due to such factors as factional rivalries within local party organization.

The decision to seek party nomination varies with the perceived degree of one's dependence on party support. As will be discussed later in some detail, the perceived degree of candidates' dependence on party organization is generally low and the degree of dependence varies with one's party affiliation, with SP and KP members ranking high, followed by DSP and LDP, in that order.

As a crude indirect test of the value of party label in obtaining votes, we may compare the independents and party nominees with regard to their respective rates of getting elected. Table 1 shows that one's chances of getting elected are far greater for party nominees, especially in Kanagawa prefecture.

The proportion of successful independents among the entire field of winning candidates (i.e., the total membership of a prefectural assembly) is given below, together with nation-

[2] Computed from the following sources: Kanagawa Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Chihō Senkyo no Kiroku* (hereafter CSNK), 1955, pp. 54–61; *CSNK*, 1959, pp. 49–54; *CSNK*, 1963, pp. 79–84; Chiba Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Senkyo Kekka Shirabe* (hereafter SKS), 1955, pp. 118–129; *SKS*, 1959, pp. 74–83; *SKS*, 1963, pp. 51–60.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *CSNK*, 1955, pp. 64–65; *CSNK*, 1959, pp. 54–55; *CSNK*, 1963, p. 85; *SKS*, 1955, pp. 112–113; *SKS*, 1959, p. 61; *SKS*, 1963, p. 38. There are three legal requirements for candidacy: the minimum age of 25, residence in a locality for three consecutive months and a deposit of ¥30,000.

TABLE 1. RELATIVE PROPORTIONS OF INDEPENDENTS AND PARTY NOMINEES ELECTED

	1955		1959		1963	
	Ind.*	P.N.†	Ind.	P.N.	Ind.	P.N.
Kanagawa	23.2%	53.3%	31.4%	71.3%	46.5%	66.7%
Chiba	31.4	50.5	22.2	52.2	48.1	58.6

* Independents = winning independents/total number of independent candidates.
† Party Nominees = winning party nominees/total number of party nominees.

wide data.[5] The nationwide data indicate the decreasing trend in the proportion of independents among the successful candidates, and this is usually taken to mean an increasing politicization of prefectural governmental process. With regard to the two prefectures under study, it is difficult to discern a clear trend, but it is at least demonstrated that the independents constitute a distinct minority within the legislatures.

How Nominations are Made.

A) Who decides: With regard to the LDP, SP and DSP, the party organization in each electoral district does in fact make a decision. The candidates recommended are then routinely approved by party prefectural headquarters. The national party headquarters exert no control over nominations.[6] In the case of KP, prefectural party officials, especially the chairman of the prefectural office, play an active part in the selection of candidates. The recommendees are then subject to the approval of national party headquarters. The control by the national headquarters in this case is not a mere formality, for some recommendees have actually been rejected.

TABLE 2. PROPORTION OF WINNING INDEPENDENTS AMONG THE TOTAL NUMBER OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDATES

	Kanagawa	Chiba	All-Japan
1955	14.9%	21.0%	32.8%
1959	15.1%	6.3%	15.7%
1963	25.0%	20.3%	12.7%

B) Eligibility for Party Nominations: Interviews with ranking party officials as well as with legislators themselves point to the employment of a rather flexible and informal set of criteria in nomination. As do other parties, the LDP gives priority to incumbents, and in the case of new candidates the party prefers that they have held some public office or that they be celebrities for other reasons. The DSP nominees in Kanagawa are expected to have had a satisfactory record of service in party posts, to enjoy confidence in and out of the party organization, and to be competent to carry on the work of a legislator. The DSP candidates in Chiba are subject to a much less stringent test. SP candidates must meet the following criteria: 1) willingness to obey and abide by party regulations and directives and 2) a minimum of two years of party work. In the case of a man with labor union background, the latter rule may be waived. Kōmei party nomination is given to those faithful and devout believers of many years standing who have demonstrated their grasp of the true meaning and basic principles of Buddhism, who have actively provided "correct" leadership, and who have gained the confidence of the members of the *Sōka Gakkai*.

The fact that the incumbents are generally given priority over new candidates has an important implication. The number of opportunities available to new candidates is limited. An examination of election data of 1959 and 1963 in Kanagawa and Chiba indicates that the incumbent candidates accounted for about one half of the total number of candidates. Breakdown of the data by party shows that the proportion of incumbent candidates is especially high in the case of LDP. As for the SP and

[5] *SKS*, 1955, pp. 114–117; *SKS*, 1959, p. 85; *SKS*, 1963, p. 62; *CSNK*, 1955, pp. 68–69; *CSNK*, 1959, p. 68; *CSNK*, 1963, pp. 92–94. Jichishō (Senkyo Kyoku). *Chihō Senkyo Kekka Shirabe*, 1963, p. 15.

[6] This is not to deny the incidence of intervention by national Diet members or of the prefectural party headquarters' taking a more active part. In the case of Kanagawa, the local chapters of labor unions sometimes participate in the nomination process. The writer was impressed by discrepancies in the views held among legislators and party officials. They were not altogether clear where the formal authority in nomination matters lie, though all agreed that the district party organization in fact makes the decision.

DSP, the proportion of *new* candidates is slightly larger, particularly in Chiba. In the case of independents, the proportion of new candidates is far greater than that of incumbent candidates.[7] This is so partly because of a high degree of absorption of independents by the LDP following elections. Thus, the opportunities available to new candidates are especially limited among LDP members.

II. ELECTIONS

Ability to obtain votes may be viewed as a function of the following sets of factors: 1) electoral system and other circumstantial variables related to the mechanism of election; 2) general political orientations, such as the degree of political interest and role perceptions; and 3) kinds and strength, objective and perceived, of sources of influence that are brought to bear upon the voters. The third category may be subdivided into two; one is concerned with the voters' orientations regarding such influences, the other with the candidates' orientations.

Electoral System. The first set of factors subsumes the size and nature of electoral district, the number of obtained votes necessary for elections, the ratio of competition, and the incidence of non-contest. Each county (Gun) or city within a prefecture constitutes an electoral district for the prefectural assembly. In the case of major cities like Yokohama, each ward serves as an electoral district. The number of assembly seats allocated to each district is determined by prefectural ordinances in proportion to population.[8] The following table shows the varying size of electoral districts in the two prefectures under study as of the 1963 elections.

Notice the preponderance of single-member districts, which account for about 47 percent and 31 percent of all the electoral districts in Chiba and Kanagawa respectively. When combined with two- and three-member districts, about 86 percent of the Chiba electoral districts and 78 percent of the Kanagawa districts are accounted for.

As of 1963 elections, the number of eligible voters of electoral districts ranged from 17,999 to 163,449 in Chiba and 21,647 to 473,861 in Kanagawa. The modal category for Kanagawa is 30,000–40,000, accounting for about 40 percent of electoral districts. The remainder was distributed fairly equally among various sizes up to 185,000. In Chiba, the modal category is 20,000 to 30,000 which accounts for 27 percent of the total. The bulk of the remainder fell between 31,000 to 80,000 fairly equally.[9] The law requires that a candidate be deemed elected when he obtains a plurality, provided that his obtained votes exceed one-fourth of the number computed by dividing the total valid votes cast by the number of seats allocated to his district.[10] Perusal of electoral returns shows that in some districts successful candidates in the 1963 elections obtained about 4,000 and 5,000 respectively in Chiba and Kanagawa. In most cases, however, successful candidates do need and did obtain about 9,000 to 10,000 in either prefecture.[11] The size of electoral district and especially the prevalence of single-member districts offer fertile soil for the operation of traditional orientations and practices. The chief beneficiary of single-member districts appears to be the LDP. The effect of party weakness, characterized by factional strife and inability to allocate supporters' votes in an advantageous manner among multiple candidates, is minimized in the single-member district.

TABLE 3. THE NUMBER OF ELECTORAL DISTRICTS AND SEATS ALLOCATED

Chiba		Kanagawa	
Number of Seats Allocated	Number of Electoral Districts	Number of Seats Allocated	Number of Electoral Districts
7	1	15	1
4	3	7	1
3	7	5	2
2	5	4	1
1	14	3	7
		2	7
		1	9
Total	30	Total	28

Another factor shaping one's electoral chances is the competition ratio. The ratios of

[7] *CSNK*, 1959, pp. 54–55; *CSNK*, 1963, p. 85; *SKS*, 1959, p. 61, 85; *SKS*, 1963, p. 38, 62.

[8] Kōshoku Senkyo Hō, Articles 12, 15–18. For the relationship between the size of electoral district and electoral chances of different political parties, see M. Hoshino, "Dai Yonkai Tōitsu Chihō Senkyo o megru Shomondai," *Toshi Mondai*, V. 50, #8 (August, 1959), 7–9.

[9] *SKS*, 1963, pp. 39–40; *CSNK*, 1963, pp. 86–89.

[10] Kōshoku Senkyo Hō, Article 96.

[11] *SKS*, 1963, pp. 51–60; *CSNK*, 1963, pp. 92–94.

candidates to the seats in the past three elections were 1.8, 2.0 and 2.2 in Chiba and 1.7, 1.7 and 2.2 in Kanagawa.[13] The comparable ratio for the nation as a whole has been steadily on decline, with the 1963 figure being 1.7.[13] This may be due to the amalgamations of cities, towns and villages and to the consolidation of the power of incumbents.[14] The incidence of no-contest elections also shapes electoral chances. In 1963, four candidates in two electoral districts of Kanagawa and three candidates in three separate districts of Chiba were unopposed and won their seats without ballot. The incidence of no-contest elections, about 10 percent in both prefectures, is very low as compared with other prefectures like Gifu, Aichi and Hyogo where the percentage runs up to 30 to 40 percent. The nation-wide figure has been increasing, so that 175 electoral districts saw no contest in 1963 while the number of districts involved in the 1955 and 1959 elections were 54 and 115. Thus, in 1963, 251 candidates, i.e., about 10 percent of the total successful candidates involving 175 districts, won unopposed. The chief beneficiary of this practice has been the LDP, about 73 percent of the unopposed winners in 1963 being LDP members.[15] As Steiner notes, the increase in the number of uncontested elections is related to the increase in the number of single-member districts and this may be explained by the coincidence of an electoral district with the *jiban* (bailiwick) of a prefectural politician, which discourages competition.[16] The campaign period is legally limited to two weeks. This, together with enormously complicated and strict legal provisions governing campaigns, gives advantages to certain candidates, notably incumbents and new candidates with deep local roots.

General Political Orientations. One's ability to obtain votes is conditioned by another set of factors shaping the extent and direction of voting. This set of factors subsumes political orientations regarding such matters as the meaningfulness of election, perceived connection between elections and governmental process, degree of interest in politics and in elections, and sense of political competence. The theoretical assumption here is that these orientations constitute intervening variables significantly shaping one's overt voting behavior.

a) Knowledge and Political Interest: The extent of knowledge about local autonomy on the part of the Japanese appears to be small. According to a nation-wide survey conducted in 1952, 60 percent of the respondents (N = 2,711) have heard of the term "local autonomy."[17] An earlier survey of 1951 shows that 84 percent of the respondents (N = 855) were totally uninformed about the present distribution of functions or powers between the central and local governments.[18] A nationwide survey of 1954 found about one-third of the respondents (N = 2,634) professing to be fairly well informed on local community affairs, while about 60 percent belonged to the "don't-know-much" category, and 12 percent to the "don't-know" category.[19]

Roughly speaking, the degree of interest in elections increases directly with the geographical propinquity of those being elected to the voter. A greater interest is shown in prefectural elections than in national elections and in city-town-village elections than in prefectural elections. For example, a nation-wide survey of 1963, making use of a composite measure found that the degree of interest in different elections varies in the decreasing order of 1) city-town-village council elections, 2) city-town-village mayor elections, 3) prefectural assembly elections, 4) prefectural governor elections, 5) House of Representatives elections, 6) House of Councillors elections.[20] The voters' interest in elections and governmental process at the prefectural level is relatively low.[21] The general lack of interest or low de-

[13] Computed from the sources cited in Footnote 2.

[13] Jichishō, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[14] On amalgamation, see Kurt Steiner, *Local Government in Japan* (Stanford Calif., Stanford University Press, 1965), pp. 186–194, 203–206.

[15] Jichishō, *op, cit.*, p. 80.

[16] Steiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 432–437.

[17] Kokuritsu Yoron Chosajo, *Chihō Jichi ni kansuru Yoron Chōsa*, 1952, pp. 58–59.

[18] Kokuritsu Yoron Chosajo, *Chihō Jichi ni kansuru Yoron Chōsa*, 1951, p. 7.

[19] Jichichō, *Chihō Jichi ni tsuite no Yoron Chōsa*, 1954, p. 8.

[20] Kōmei Senkyo Renmei, *Tōitsu Chihō Senkyo no Jittai*, 1964, pp. 38–40.

[21] For example, only six percent of Kagoshima respondents (N = 676) named the prefectural assembly elections to be the one in which they were most interested. Forty-two percent mentioned city-town-village council elections and twenty-five percent chose the House of Representatives elections. In the same study, eight percent claimed to be more interested in prefectural politics than any others, while fifty-seven percent chose city-town-village politics and twenty-six percent national politics. Kagoshima Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Kagohima Kenmin no Seiji Ishiki to Kōmei Senkyo Undō Kōka ni tsuite*, 1965, pp. 84–89, 137–143.

gree of interest in prefectural politics and elections in both absolute and relative terms does not entail a corresponding low degree of voting participation. As for the extent of voting participation in prefectural assembly elections, the prefecture-wide percentage figure is usually in the lower seventies in Chiba and in the the upper sixties in Kanagawa. The nation-wide figure is in the upper seventies. Voting participation in rural electoral districts is more extensive than in urban districts, reflecting a higher degree of social pressure and a greater effectiveness with which the network of diffuse, personal relationship—involving the influentials of various levels connecting hamlet residents and prefectural assemblymen—can be brought to bear upon the voters.[22] The percentage figure in the seventies is somewhat lower than the figure for the city-town-village level elections, but higher than the figure for national elections. A high degree of voting participation must then be explained in terms other than the degree of political interest. The relevance of the category of political interest for the present discussion is that it seems to be associated with the degree of susceptibility to kinds of external sources of influence that are being brought to bear upon the voters.

b) Role Perceptions: One's perception as to the role—in the normative sense—of prefectural assemblymen may be assumed to shape one's voting behavior directly or indirectly. No data are available with regard to the two prefectures under study. A survey conducted in March, 1963, in Miyagi prefecture included a question "what do you think prefectural or municipal assemblymen ought to be doing?" Since the question contains a reference to municipal assemblymen as well, the result is hard to interpret. However, some glimpse of the voters' role perception may be gained. A small proportion of the respondents (18%; total N=635) had some vague and abstract notion that the assemblymen ought to promote the growth and development of their districts (prefecture or city) and that their acts must somehow embody the desire of the residents. A slightly larger percentage of respondents (about 23%) thought that assemblymen ought to work for the improvement of governmental services in the major areas of social welfare, industry and agriculture, thus attending to various concrete problems of daily life. About one-third of the respondents belonged to the DK and NA categories.[23]

c) Perceived Effect of Elections: The assumption here is that the belief in the efficacy of electoral method and perceived effect of elections have some bearing on the degree and, to a lesser extent, on the direction of voting. In the 1951 survey, one-half of the respondents were indifferent to the questions concerning the quality of those elected. Thirty-two percent, however, said that the electoral method is still a good thing even though the quality of the elected may not be good at the present. A belief in the meaningfulness of elections to one's daily life is not extensive. Forty-six percent of the interviewees thought rather intuitively that electoral outcome must have some impact on their living.[24] Eighty percent of Kagoshima respondents (N=676) thought that their living standards would improve if they elected good representatives to the House of Representatives.[25] Thirty percent of the Miyagi sample thought that repeated elections would gradually bring about "good government"; while about 26 percent did not see any difference that the elections would make.[26] In the 1952 survey the overwhelming proportion of the respondents showed a rather low degree of sense of political efficacy.[27]

Voter's Orientations Regarding Kinds and Strength of Sources. The focus will be on the kinds and strength of external sources of influence which are brought to bear upon voters, and relevant political orientations held by voters regarding the propriety and strength of each such source of influence. The sources of influence include political parties, candidates' personal supporters' associations, town and hamlet associations, friends, acquaintances and relatives. An assumption here is that the impact of various sources of influence upon voting behavior is conditioned by what the voters think to be legitimate sources of influence and by the relative weight the voters themselves feel they ought to attach to any such sources.

Before we proceed to specify kinds of influ-

[22] Steiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 374–440; S. Yamada, "Senkyo ni arawareta Seiji Ishiki," Nihon Seiji Gakkai (ed.), *Seiji Ishiki no Riron to Chōsa* (1965), pp. 180–188; Jichichō (Senkyo Bu), *Chihō Senkyo Kekka Shirabe*, 1955, pp. 58–61; Jichishō, *op. cit.*, p. 64; *SKS*, 1963, pp. 39–45; *CSNK*, 1963, pp. 86–89.

[23] Miyagi Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Kōmei Senkyo Jittai Chōsa*, 1963, pp. 27–28, appendix p. 17.

[24] Kokuritsu Yoron Chosajo, 1951, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–11.

[25] Kagoshima Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *op. cit.*, pp. 73–76.

[26] Miyagi Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *op. cit.*, pp. 50–51.

[27] Kokuritsu Yoron Chosajo, *op. cit.*, 1952, pp. 41–42.

ence, we should note the time at which voting decisions about for whom to vote are made. For the effectiveness of various influences is conditioned by the timing of the voting. The nation-wide survey of 1963 shows that a majority of respondents made a decision before the opening of the campaign period. About 60 percent made up their mind by the time the names of all the candidates were announced. When asked whether they had known much about the candidates for whom they voted before the campaign period began, 64 percent of national sample said they had known the candidate they voted for to a certain extent, 16 percent knew the names only, and 14 percent had not even known the names.[28] The data are indicative of the difficulty confronting new aspirants. Another implication of the data is that from the viewpoint of the influencers, they must try to reach the bulk of electorate prior to the beginning of the campaign period or develop more effective campaign technique. This fact probably has some impact on the effectiveness of various influences.

Kinds or Sources of Influence: The nation-wide survey of 1963 had the respondents identify the groups or individuals which recommended or asked them to vote for a particular candidate. Although defensive attitudes may have operated to produce some distortions, about one-third of the sample conceded the experience of being subjected to such influences. Of various sources of influence, friends, acquaintances, and recommendations by groups to which respondents belong stand out.[29]

In a Chiba study about 34 percent of the sample said that they are usually subject to various sorts of influence, with 63 percent claiming no experiences. A supplementary question led to the following results with regard to who made the request or recommendation. The category of acquaintances (29.7%) accounts for the largest proportion, followed by local influentials (16.1%), candidates and agents (15%), and friends (13.9%), in that order (N=279). These categories together account for about three-fourths of the sources of influence.[30]

Effect or Strength of Influences: According to the Mainichi newspaper poll taken shortly before the 1963 local elections, about 40 percent (N=2,946) of its sample would not take into account a recommendation from any quarter while about 60 percent said that consideration would be given to such influences. A Yomiuri newspaper poll taken about the same time found 34 percent (N=2,557) denying that they would go along with the recommendation of groups or associations to which they belong, while 11 percent said that they would abide by such a recommendation. On the whole, about 50 percent conceded some degree of effect that such a recommendation has on their decisions.[31] The Chiba study found, regarding elections generally, 65 percent (total N=278) saying that they would give no heed to a request or recommendation from any individuals or groups, the remainder conceding varying degrees of effect: 12 percent would vote as requested without much ado; 10 percent would find it difficult to decline because of personal relationships with candidates; 4 percent would accede when no decision had been made; 8 percent upon further checking such as listening to speeches; and 1 percent would go along to avoid any trouble.[32]

Some assessment of the proportion of the electorate amenable to influence attempts of all sorts in aggregate is thus possible, but it is more difficult to assess relative strength of specific sources of influence separately. As has been mentioned above, the effectiveness must vary with the degree of saliency the recipient attaches, (which in turn must be partially a function of the legitimacy he accords to a particular source) as well as of his assessed advantages and disadvantages. Also, the effectiveness must be conditioned by his general criteria for making voting decisions to be discussed later.

Some data are available concerning orientation toward, and perceived strength of, one influence source, namely hamlet and town associations. A sample of residents (N=433) in Chikuhō area of Fukuoka prefecture was asked, among other things, the following three questions: 1) whether they feel they are doing him wrong unless they vote for a candidate from their own hamlet or town, 2) whether they feel that they ought to vote for a man who is from the same locality (hamlet or town) and who at the same time has been recommended by their hamlet or town associations, and 3) whether they would still feel that they ought

[28] Kōmei Senkyo Renmei, *op. cit.*, pp. 8–10.

[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 15–17. For a discussion of influence of various groups, see N. Kobayashi, H. Shinohara, M. Soma, *Senkyo* (1960), pp. 76–90.

[30] Chiba Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Chiba Ken ni okeru Seiji Ishiki no Jittai Chōsa*, 1962, pp. 210–234.

[31] Kōmei Senkyo Renmei, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

[32] Chiba Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Chiba Ken ni okeru. . . op. cit.*, pp. 234–240.

to vote for the recommendee of their associations even when he is from some other locality. The proportion of affirmative answers to Question 3 is reduced by 10 percent from that of Question 2, the overall patterns of distribution still remaining the same.[33] This is suggestive of the strength of local recommendation as a source of influence.

Another source of influence, the organization to which one belongs (exclusive of hamlet or town association) was examined in the same study. The organization here refers to labor union, craft union, trade guild, agricultural cooperative and the like. The question was whether the voters felt they ought to vote for a recommendee of these organizations to which they belonged. About 30 percent were in the affirmative and 14 percent negative. The rest belonged either to the hedging or DK categories. The organizations as a source of influence seems more salient and effective than locality. This was further evidenced by the response to the question, "In case your locality and organization had recommended different candidates, by which would you feel more bound?" The result was as follows: 25.5 percent named organizations, while 10.6 percent named locality. 25.1 percent said it would depend on candidates. The pull of one's affiliated organization seemed stronger.[34] Of course, no general statement is warranted on the basis of this particular study, but it is noteworthy that the patterns of distribution of attitudes remain about the same regardless of the differences in ecological or party characteristics of various districts represented in this sample.

Whatever the relative effectiveness of local associations as sources of influence, an examination of election returns by precincts reveals a significant pattern of relationship between the candidates' place of abode and the proportion and direction of voting on the part of the residents of the precincts. Of course, numerous factors in addition to the pressure of local associations are conceivable. At any rate, in the 1963 election, the Chiba data show that the overwhelming majority of the voters of a town or village invariably voted for their local candidates, that is, those who resided in the same town or village.[35] It is true that the votes from one's own district alone, whatever the size of majority support, are not usually sufficient to assure one's election. However, a candidate from a populous town or village enjoys a substantial comparative advantage, while a man from a small town must rely more on the votes from other towns and villages. One may note in this connection that multiple candidacies from the same town or village have an important bearing on one's chances for a prefectural assembly seat. It appears that somewhat unusual cases of incumbent defeat can in part be explained by the division within one's own district of residence due to multiple candidacies. No comparable data are available with regard to urban electoral districts, but the essentially same pattern may exist in those sections of cities which formed part of a rural county prior to a recent amalgamation.

A somewhat more direct approach to the problem was taken when the voters were asked to indicate the reason for their decision or what they think was the most conclusive factor in determining their voting decision. The nation-wide survey of 1963 posed the following question: "Which was the most conclusive factor in making your decision for whom to vote in the election for the prefectural assembly? Please indicate only one from this list." What emerges from this and other surveys is that the proportion of those to whom "attribute of candidate" is the most salient factor far exceeds the proportion of people to whom the party label of the candidate is salient.[36]

General Criteria for Voting Decision: Candidate-emphasis vs. Party-emphasis. The literature on voting studies speaks of the voter being issue-oriented or candidate-oriented. A similar notion is expressed in the Japanese phrase of "candidate-emphasis" or "party-emphasis." There is a considerable amount of data that deals more directly with the relative proportions of the two groups. The nation-wide survey of 1963, conducted with specific reference to the local elections found that 19 percent of

[33] Fukuoka Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Chikuhō Chiiki Jūmin no Seiji Ishiki*, 1964, pp. 30–33.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 35. For the voters' attitude toward Diet members personal supporters' associations, see Senkyo Seido Shingikai, *Senkyo no Jittai ni kansuru Yoron Chōsa*. 1965, pp. 27–30.

[35] *SKS*, 1963, pp. 32–37, 51–56. For an analysis of this problem with regard to House of Representative elections, see T. Shibuya, "Tokuhyō Jōkyō yori mitaru Tōhyō Kōi," *Niigata Daigaku Hōkei Ronshū*, V. 8, #1 (October, 1958), 42–53; S. Yamada, *op. cit.*, pp. 188–193.

[36] Kōmei Senkyo Renmei, *op. cit.*, p. 27, 147; Chiba Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Chiba Ken ni okeru . . .*, *op. cit.*, pp. 188–190. Kanagawa Ken Kikaku Chōsabu, *Dai Nikai Kanagawa Kensei Yoron Chōsa*, 1965, p. 61. In this connection, see a discussion of "local notable politics," Alfred B. Clubok, *Electoral Politics in Rural Japan* (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1962), pp. 3–5, 70–84, 146–185.

the respondents (total N=2,426) made their choice according to party affiliation of candidates, 30 percent because of personal attributes. Twenty-seven percent voted the way they did mainly because of personal attributes, though party affiliation was also taken into account. Seventeen percent said that they gave equal weight to both.[37] In interpreting data of this kind, it must be borne in mind that the Japanese notion of personal attributes encompasses not only personality, character, and qualifications, but also others such as being a relative, acquaintance, friend, or local resident. It is more of a residual category exclusive of party affiliation. It may be said then that the bulk of the Japanese electorate attaches greater importance to personal attributes and about 20 percent of the people attach importance to party affiliation of candidates. Later on we will consider the question of how candidates' qualifications such as experience of public service and type of occupation may affect the direction of voting. No direct orientational data are available concerning what the voters perceive to be desirable qualifications in these matters.

A panel study conducted in Kyoto prefecture demonstrates that those without party identification tend to give special importance to personal attributes and those with party identification, especially those with strong identification, vote according to the criterion of party. It was also found that LDP supporters tend to emphasize personal attributes.[38] Whatever the correlates of the personal-attribute-priority and party-priority, the relevance of the data in this section is that the proportion of the Japanese electorate theoretically susceptible to all sources of influence other than party label is larger than that which is susceptible to the influence of party label. For a small proportion of people (about 20%) the sources of influence other than party affiliation except those tending to reinforce party affiliation (e.g., friends speaking for the recipients' party) would not be salient.

TABLE 4. DETERMINANT OF VOTING DECISIONS PERCEIVED TO BE MOST CONCLUSIVE (NATION-WIDE)

Perceived Determinant	Percent of the Respondents
Long thought the candidate is a man of good character	29
Took political party into account	11
Read official election bulletin	6
Heard campaign speeches and broadcasting	8
Saw posters	5
Recommended by various groups*	5
Personally asked by relatives, friends, or acquaintances	5
Consulted the family	7
Hearsay	8
Read newspaper articles	5
Forgot or none	11
	100% N=1,838

* Groups refer to unions and such associations as hamlet, town, youth and women.

[37] Kōmei Senkyo Renmei, *op. cit.*, pp. 24–25.

Party as an Influence: By determining the proportion of people who apply the criterion of party affiliation of candidate in the voting decision, I have been indirectly talking about the party as a source of influence. However, in order to assess the influence of party on the direction of voting of both candidate-emphasis and party-emphasis people, we need to look into such things as the image of the party entertained by the voters, perceived and actual socio-economic strata of party supporters, and the reasons given for one's support for a party.

A) Composition of party support: In talking about the relations between certain demographic characteristics and party identification, I am not denying the utility of other intervening variables that might interpret correlations between the two. I merely review here some pertinent data so as better to understand, however crudely, the direction of voting. Perusal of the data dealing with Miyagi, Kyoto, Gifu, Kagoshima and Chiba prefectures suggests the following observations.[39] 1) Roughly speaking,

[38] I. Miyake, Kinoshita, J. Aiba, "Kotonaru Reberu no Senkyo ni okeru Tōhyō Kōdō no Kenkyū (3)," *Hōgakuronsō*, V. 73, #4 (July, 1963), 112–114.

[39] Gifu Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Gifu Ken ni okeru Senkyo to Kenmin no Seiji Ishiki*, 1963, pp. 34–38; Miyagi Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *op. cit.*, pp. 33–34; Chiba Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Chiba Ken ni okeru . . . , op. cit.*, pp. 168–181; Kagoshima Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *op. cit.*, pp. 77–89; Miyake, Kinoshita, Aiba, *op. cit.*, p. 91. For the relationship between "basic political and social attitudes" and party affiliation, see Miyake, Kinoshita and Aiba, "Seiji Ishiki Kōzōron no Kokoromi," Nihon Seiji Gakkai (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 62–65.

in terms of age, voters in their twenties and thirties tend to be SP supporters, and the proportion of LDP supporters varies directly, i.e., increases with the increase in age group, especially after the age of forty. 2) In terms of education, again speaking crudely, the proportion of SP supporters increases with the level of education. Though the proportion of LDP and SP in the category of college graduates reveals no large percentage differences, the overwhelming proportion of those below the level of middle school (junior-high), especially of those with an elementary school education or lower, are LDP supporters. 3) In terms of occupation, clerical employees and workers tend to support SP, while LDP supporters tend to be concentrated among those with agriculture-fishery-forestry related occupations, among managerial people in private industries and commerce, and among people in service sectors (barbers, etc.).

B) Perceived support of parties by occupational groups: It is assumed that the perceptions one has about the support of different parties by different occupational groups may affect one's direction of voting through the mechanism of reference group theory. The only firm data available to this writer are the results of a study of rural Shimane. There, salary men, wage earners and daily laborers are perceived more commonly to be SP supporters while men in trade and service sectors are thought to contain mostly LDP supporters. In the same study, out of 12 occupational groups, employees of national railways and the post office were named most frequently to be the groups in support of "progressive parties" such as the SP.[40] Neither prefecture nor nationwide data of this type are available. However, it appears likely that the perceptions in this regard are widely shared. My interviewees, a part of the voters, hold perceptions corresponding to the occupational characteristics of party supporters listed in the preceding passages. There seems to be a general congruence between perceived and actual characteristics of party supporters. The relevance of the data is that one's voting decision about for whom to vote may be influenced in the direction that the "significant others" are perceived to be voting. This of course in turn assumes that the voters give some consideration to the party affiliation of the candidates, and hence this source of influence would be applicable to the party-emphasis voter.

[40] Kōmei Senkyo Renmei, *Shimane Ken ni okeru Nōsonbu Jūmin no Tōhyō Kōdō*, 1965, p. 46, 58.

C) Images of the nature of parties: In the Kyoto study, roughly half of the sample was not able to say what they thought to be either the good or the bad aspects about each of the political parties. This reflects a low degree of cognitive orientation. The predominant images entertained by the remainder are as follows: The LDP is commended for its stability, ability to carry out its programs, and for its fiscal and foreign policies. The negative aspects mentioned are the LDP's alleged close connection with "big enterprise" and the "capitalist class" and its arbitrariness in the legislature. The SP is viewed positively for being a progressive friend of workers and negatively for being too radical and for its extra-parliamentary direct actions such as demonstrations and strikes. The DSP is commended or rebuked for its middle-of-the-road attitude. The idealistic and "theoretical" aspects of the Communist Party are praised, but its totalitarian character and propensity for recourse to violence are deplored.[41] It is conceivable that these images held by men perform the function of accentuating, reinforcing or sustaining either the attractive or repulsive attitude he has toward a particular candidate, whether he be a party-emphasis or candidate-emphasis man. The present category would be applicable to the party-emphasis man as well because some party supporters have a friendly image not only of their own party but also of other parties.[42]

D) Reasons cited for supporting the political parties: The Kyoto study yielded the following result. The major reasons cited for SP support are 1) class character of party, i.e., the perception that SP is a friend of workers and 2) general character of the party variously described as socialist, progressive and "theoretical." The two major reasons cited for LDP support are 1) general character of the party identified as capitalist, liberal, pragmatic, and conservative and 2) general confidence in the party owing to its stability and ability to carry out its program. DSP is supported largely for the following two reasons: 1) general character of the

[41] Miyake, Kinoshita, Aiba, "Kotonaru Reberu . . . ," *op. cit.*, p. 117. See also an earlier article by the same authors, "Kotonaru Reberu no Senkyo ni okeru Tōhyō Kōdō no Kenkyū (2), *Hōgakuronsō*, V. 73, #2 (May, 1963), 107–108. See also K. Nakamura and F. Horie, "Kinkō Nōson ni okeru Jūmin no Seiji Ishiki," *Hōgaku Kenkyū*, V. 34, #4 (April, 1961), 36–51.

[42] In this connection, see Heiwa Keizai Keikaku Kaigi, *Seitō Shiji to Seiji Ishiki no Dōkō ni tsuite no Chōsa Hōkoku*, 1964, pp. 84–99.

party such as the middle-of-the-road and compromising attitude and 2) its pragmatic virtue.[43] These "reasons" identified deal essentially with a highly cognitive dimension and constitute rather rationalization for their support of a particular political party. A study in Shimane prefecture employed a different classification. It was found that about half of the respondents support their parties because of the confidence they have in the future (expected) policies of these parties; about a quarter because of the individual's affiliations with parties, about 10 percent supporting parties capriciously depending on the moods of the moment.[44] No comparable data are available concerning Japan as a whole or the two prefectures under study. It appears that the support for a particular party is a result not so much of a rational decision based on the perceived general characteristics, including policies, of the party, but rather of a less rational acceptance based on the influence of primary, secondary and reference groups. What is more relevant for the purpose of this paper is the question of whether the categories of reasons for party support have any bearing on voting behavior. An educated guess is that the varying reasons for party support, especially of the cognitive dimension, are not directly or significantly correlated with particular directions of voting. Rather, their impact on voting decisions may be felt through the stability or instability of the voters' party affiliation which may have some connection with the types of reason given for party support. It is noteworthy that the authors of the Kyoto study found that there was no significant relationship between kinds of reason given for party support and the degree of consistency in supporting one's party candidates.[45]

E) Party affiliation: More relevant to voting decision is the intensity of party identification. The operation of party identification itself must depend on the more general orientation summarized in the phrase of candidate-emphasis and party-emphasis unless one can assume that the candidate-emphasis people are without any party identification. It is interesting to note that according to the Kyoto study the lower the degree of party identification, the greater the proportion of inter-party voting, and that LDP supporters show the lowest degree of consistency in terms of supporting candidates of the same party at different levels of elections.[46] This is hardly surprising in that a greater proportion of the candidate-emphasis people are found among LDP supporters.

Candidates' Resources and Orientations. In this section the focus will be on what the candidates and their supporters do, and particularly what they think they *ought* to do, to get elected. One's ability to obtain votes depends, among other things, on resources effectively used, and the utilization of resources is in turn based on the perceived nature of one's supporters and the means deemed to be most effective to obtain votes. In addition to presenting these data, an assessment will be made concerning the effect of certain attributes of candidates.

Public Service Experience: It will be recalled that the proportion of people with the personal attribute-emphasis approach to voting decisions is quite extensive and that no data are available concerning the relative weight that qualifications such as the occupational background of candidates occupies in the perceptions of the voters. The data presented below throw some light on the effect of candidates' attributes and qualifications on their electoral chances. Table 5 shows that about one half of the assemblymen had experiences in public service prior to their attainment of their present posts.[47]

TABLE 5. TYPES OF PUBLIC SERVICE EXPERIENCE (AS OF SEPT. 1965)

	Number of Assemblymen	
	Chiba	Kanagawa
City, town, village councilman	17*	24
City, town, village mayor	10	2
Prefectural government employee	7†	12†
Central government employee	1	0
City, town, village government employee	1	2
	36	40
Total number of Assemblymen	61	80

* Includes one person who was also a prefectural government employee.
† Mainly teachers.

This may be explained in terms of one or more of the following ways. It may be a reflection of conscious career perspectives on the part of the legislators. Our interview data

[43] Miyake, Kinoshita, Aiba, "Kotonaru Reberu . . . (2)," *op. cit.*, pp. 122–126.

[44] Shimane Ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Seiji Ishiki to Chihō Senkyo no Mondaiten*, 1963, p. 50, 97, 110.

[45] Miyake, Kinoshita, Aiba, "Kotonaru Reberu . . . (3)," *op. cit.*, pp. 114–115.

[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 98–104.

[47] Compiled from the data obtained at the assembly secretariats.

suggest, however, that those who intended to use the prefectural assembly post as a stepping stone to higher public office or those who now aspire for higher office constitute a minority of the present membership.[48] Generally speaking, DSP, SP and KP incumbents in particular, have such aspirations. They readily admit their desire and willingness to participate in national politics, provided they get party endorsement. There have been some instances in our two prefectures where prefectural assemblymen have successfully reached the Diet, but this avenue constitutes a rather narrow and infrequently-trodden path to the Diet. The prevailing opinion of the incumbents is that involvement in a prefectural assembly is a detour that is not likely to lead to the Diet. In the case of LDP, younger members indicate a similar aspiration and willingness. The seeming inter-party difference may be spurious when the age is held constant. LDP members tend to be more elderly than the others. Moreover, the difference may simply be a reflection of a more pessimistic appraisal on the part of most LDP members of their electoral chances. Whether by choice or not, for most members the office of the prefectural assembly is a terminal one. During the 1955–63 period, only several assemblymen of the two prefectures made a move to the Diet. The high percentage of ex-public-office-holders in the assembly may be explained simply by the ready availability of candidates from this category of people. It may also be explained as a result of the nomination criteria discussed earlier. It may indicate the voters' preference or propensity to vote for such a candidate both because he is better known to the voters and because he is thought to be better qualified for the office. It is instructive to recall that the majority of the electorate makes its voting decision before the commencement of campaigns.

Age: The average age of prefectural assemblymen in Japan in 1963 was 52. Throughout the past three elections, the assemblies in Chiba and Kanagawa maintained about the same average age of 52. A review of all the candidates in the three elections for the two assemblies indicate that about two-thirds of the candidates and the same proportion of the winners for each election were within the age range of 45 to 60. The mode for each prefecture and the nation as a whole was the 50–60 group.[49] In view of the legal minimum age requirement of 25, a heavy concentration of men in their fifties in the assembly calls for some explanation. First, there is the practical difficulty of attaining early in one's life a certain level of social, economic and professional status. Such a status plus one's command over the necessary resources, material or otherwise, would facilitate a bid for the office. A traditional notion that an office such as a prefectural assemblyman should properly be occupied by the elderly men of distinction reinforces this. An LDP member remarked, with an apparent sense of exasperation, that his bid for the office had to overcome the cool reception of his constituents caused by his youth. He was in his early forties.

Occupation: The nation-wide data indicate that four occupational categories have consistently accounted for about 70 percent of those elected in each of the past three elections. They are, to take the 1963 data, in the order of magnitude of proportion, company executives and employees (31% of the total); agriculture-forestry (24%); "organizational officers" such as labor union officials (18%). Trade accounts for 5% and other occupations such as doctors and lawyers each account for a very few percent.[50] As for the two prefectures under study, the first three categories account for nearly 70 percent of the winners in each of the three elections. While medicine and fishery in the Chiba assembly and party bureaucrats in the Kanagawa assembly each account for about six percent of the membership of the respective assemblies, no other single occupational category accounts for more than a few percent.

[48] In a Kagawa study none of 11 assemblymen (10 LDP and 1 SP) interviewed by a Kyoto University team showed an aspiration for higher office. Virtually no one expressed willingness to remain in the present post for a long time, Kyoto Daigaku Seijigaku Kenkyūkai, "Chihō Seijika no Jittai Chōsa," *Hōgakuronsō*, V. 67, #3, 74–81. A computation shows that as of 1958, 18% of LDP Diet membership and 27% of the SP Diet membership were ex-prefectural assemblymen. The relative proportion of the ex-assemblymen has in recent years somewhat declined in the case of the LDP while that of the SP has slightly increased, Robert A. Scalapino & Junnosuke Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1962), pp. 56–57, 165–167.

[49] Jichishō, *op. cit.*, p. 19, 79; *CSNK*, 1955, p. 67, 71; *CSNK*, 1959, pp. 56–57, 66; *CSNK*, 1963, pp. 85, 79–84; *SKS*, 1955, pp. 114, 117; *SKS*, 1959, pp. 61, 85; *SKS*, 1963, pp. 38, 62.

[50] It should be noted that this classification used by the Autonomy Ministry does not reflect either the fact of public service experience or the fact of incumbency.

What are more pertinent for this paper are the patterns of stability and change in the occupational composition of the two assemblies. During the period 1955 to 1963, the weight of the category of agriculture-forestry has been on the decline in Chiba, and the second category of company employment has increasingly gained weight. As of 1963, the second category slightly outweighed the first. In Kanagawa, the pattern of occupational composition has remained fairly stable with company employment leading. Although the category of company employment occupies the leading position in both prefectures, its respective ratios to the category of agriculture-forestry are different: 4.3 to 1 in Kanagawa and 1.2 to 1 in Chiba. It should be noted also that the occupational composition of the winning candidates is roughly proportional to that of the entire body of candidates.[51] Put another way, one's occupational category probably does not operate independently or directly to attract support. The relative prestige perceived to be enjoyed by candidates' occupations may in some way affect the voters' evaluation of the candidates' overall qualifications, thus indirectly influencing voting decisions.[52]

Incumbency as an Attribute: In Table 6 the incidence of failure or success on the part of legislators in maintaining their seats is shown. As a comparison, the number of successful candidates among two other categories of candidates is also given.

In each of the last three elections in Chiba, a much greater proportion of the incumbent candidates, as compared with the other two categories, consistently won their seats. For example, in 1959, 74 percent of the Chiba incumbent candidates (regardless of their respective party affiliation) as compared with 34 percent of new candidates won their seats, and 75 percent as against 35 percent in 1963. In Kanagawa, too, in all three elections, incumbent candidates consistently showed a high degree of electoral success, particularly in the case of LDP candidates and Independents. This is consistent with nation-wide data.[53] The high incidence of incumbent's electoral success cannot be viewed as a direct effect of being an incumbent. A higher degree of exposure to the public and the greater opportunity given to the incumbents for cultivating personal and organizational ties may largely account for the relationship between the attribute of incumbency and the high degree of electoral success. However, even when these factors are held constant, it is conceivable that the candidate-emphasis people may tend to vote for an incumbent, particularly in the absence of strong dissatisfaction with the life situation, political system or with government output.

TABLE 6. INCIDENCE OF SUCCESSFUL CANDIDACY AMONG DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF CANDIDATES

	Chiba		Kanagawa	
	No. of Candidates	No. Elected	No. of Candidates	No. Elected
		1959		
New candidate	61	21	48	17
Incumbent	50	37	62	49
Ex-assemblyman	10	5	12	7
	121	63	122	73
		1963		
New candidate	52	18	66	30
Incumbent	52	39	59	46
Ex-assemblyman	10	7	8	4
	114	64	133	80

Perceived Characteristics of Supporters of Their Own and Other Parties: An assumption here is that what the candidates do is in part conditioned by the perceived social characteristics of the supporters of their own and other parties. Our interviewees were asked to describe any characteristics of supporters of their own party and then were asked to describe any characteristics of supporters of the other parties.

(1) *SP:* SP members view their party's supporters as likely to have one or more of the following characteristics: 1) members of *Sōhyō*-affiliated labor unions, especially the unions in the public enterprise sector, 2) urban residents and those rural residents commuting to urban centers, 3) white collar workers, especially clerical employees. In addition, in the case of Chiba, due to special historical circumstances, residents of some agrarian villages were mentioned. Members of other parties single out the labor union members as the major source of SP support.

(2) *DSP:* DSP members identify the "intelligentsia" and those in the leading position of "the progressive movement" to be in support

[51] Jichishō, *op. cit.*, pp.72, 78.

[52] Educational background of assemblymen is:

School Completed

	Elementary	*Junior-high*	*High*	*Junior-college*	*College*
Chiba	3	8	19	10	21
Kanagawa*	0	21	19	15	24

* No information on one member.

[53] Jichishō, *op. cit.*, 17–18, 68–71, 76–77; and compiled from the sources cited in Footnote 2.

of the DSP. They maintain that the SP, in contrast, receives support from the lower stratum of "progressive people." In terms of organized support, *Dōmei Kaigi*-affiliated labor unions and small-medium business are identified as the major sources of support. Members of other parties believe that labor unions of moderate political tendency support the DSP, and that the DSP is destined to go on decline. Both SP and LDP members emphasize that the DSP support is largely personal in nature and that its campaign strategy is essentially that of the LDP. Both SP and LDP members view the DSP as being much closer to the LDP than to the SP.[54] Thus, the LDP, as one of its party officials remarked, can and does aim at shifting the allegiance of members of the SP to the DSP, because a sudden, all-out shift to the LDP would be very difficult to achieve.

(3) *KP:* According to KP members, the LDP and SP are concerned exclusively with big business and organized labor respectively, while their party promotes the interest of all strata of people. They say KP supporters are believers, and the believers, together with their relatives and friends, vote for KP candidates in elections. They insist that at present KP supporters come from "all income brackets" and include people of medium-small enterprises, professors, doctors, and labor union members. They concede, however, that initially the supporters came predominantly from the lower stratum of people. Members of other parties state that KP supporters are believers, and that the lower stratum of the poor constitutes the bulk of KP supporters. They characterize the KP supporters as being "ignorant," "illiterate" or "a person without any sense." More frequently, they perceive KP supporters to be "the unfortunate people," such as women with family discord caused by husbands' fickleness. All opposition members especially members of LDP and DSP, show some concern with the growing strength of the KP: an LDP official speaks of the need for some action; the DSP plans to explore new sources of support; and the SP would try to check the loss of current union members by "rational and theoretical discussions" with the wavering union members.

(4) *LDP:* LDP members identify their party supporters as those who are engaged in "primary industry" i.e., agriculture-forestry-fishery and those in business. They say "the middle-stratum" constitutes the bulk of the party's supporters. Members of other parties view the LDP supporters as being capitalists, business people, shopkeepers, wealthy farmers and the poor who are the proteges of local notables and influentials. The ordinary voter's perceived images of parties and of supporters are thus congruent with those held by the legislators and party bureaucrats.

Resources and Perceived Prerequisites for Election: The interview data persented below deal with 1) kinds and extent of assistance from party and other organizations such as labor unions and personal supporters' associations, 2) sources and amounts of campaign funds, 3) factors deemed by the candidates to be essential for election, and 4) the techniques of campaign deemed to be most effective.

(1) *KP:* The officials of KP in both prefectures studied emphatically dismiss the utility of money for elections. The chairman of Kanagawa prefectural party headquarters states that their candidates would not need even ¥ 100,000 each, and his counterpart in Chiba went so far to say that their candidates simply have no use for money. No financial assistance is formally provided either by the national party headquarters or by the prefectural headquarters. The Chiba official said that he voluntarily sends, in his private capacity, "a comfort bag" of an insignificant sum to each KP candidate for various offices. The fellow members of the party assist in canvassing, and the party publication media duly carry the news of party endorsement of nominees. KP campaigning requires no new organizational set-up or communication channels. For party cadre are virtually in daily contact with, and are giving religious instructions to, the members of *Sōka Gakkai*. Announcement of the names of candidates at some juncture and intensification or reinforcement of politico-religious doctrine suffices. The KP leaders take great pride and have tremendous confidence in their organizational cohesiveness and effectiveness. Their confidence, as well as their ability to assess the size of votes they can obtain, is extraordinarily high. The KP members dismiss the utility of such campaign techniques as campaign speeches, whether delivered indoors or at street corners. The most effective means is perceived to be the enlargement and consolidation of Gakkai influence, with the corresponding expansion of KP supporters.[55]

[54] For a similar finding in Kanagawa, see I. Yagishita, "Seiji Ishiki ni okeru Chiekiteki Yōin," *Yokohama Shiritsu Daigaku Ronsō*, V. 13, #2–3 (March, 1962), 145.

[55] In their perception the confidence which they enjoy within their religious organization is the crucial determinant of their electoral success. This is not to deny the tremendous energy they expend on establishing personal contacts with

(2) *SP:* The nature of the funds made available to SP candidates is complex. No financial assistance is expected from either national or prefectural party headquarters. Labor-union-affiliated candidates in Chiba receive a considerable sum from their union either directly or indirectly through the prefectural party treasury. The candidates without a labor union background must raise their funds themselves, and some candidates rely on their personal supporters' associations for funds. The prefectural party office renders support primarily in two ways: 1) the use of the party newspaper, pamphlets and posters for publicity and 2) the arrangement of public speeches and symposia. The party appears to aim primarily at obtaining support from various labor unions and community and occupational groups. The party officials in Chiba seem more interested in consolidating the present supporters—rather, perceived supporters—than in exploring potential supporters. An SP incumbent said that he himself had to raise funds by borrowing, and added quite seriously that he has to pay back the loans in the course of his four-year tenure. His estimate of campaign funds expended by SP members in Chiba is about one million yen each, though he himself used about ¥ 500,000.

Service functions performed by incumbents on behalf of constituents are deemed to be the most important means of obtaining support. The SP member who said that the most effective method of gaining support would be to "wrestle rigorously with various problems of prefectural government" readily conceded that probably one-third of his constituents appreciates his legislative activities, while another one-third needs to be subjected to "public relations work," and the remaining one-third must be won over by rendering various services. He perceived his basis of support to be composed primarily of the stratum of salary men and that the people in the small and medium enterprises comprise the core of his personal supporters' association, with ranking members of the SP serving as advisors. Another SP member in Chiba remarked that union votes would automatically pour in in his favor, but the nursing of his constituents through the performance of service function is more important. The SP members in Kanagawa maintain that party endorsement is the greatest assistance that the party can give. The degree of dependence on party label varies inversely with the strength of labor union support one has.[56] At any rate, they state that the most essential step in a campaign is to win endorsement from various organizations as well as labor unions. They concede that there have been instances in which some SP members, like some LDP colleagues, resorted to such a method as footing the bill for a prearranged sightseeing tour for his constituents. Their reliance on this method, however, is limited. As an SP member put it, SP members would eventually lose out in such competition with LDP members, for constituents would flock to the well-to-do LDP members who could subsidize more lavish entertainment. When asked to identify what he considers to be the most essential factor affecting one's electoral chances, he stated that a new candidate should have to his credit a record of labor union activities in his community, thus assuring himself of union support. In the case of incumbents seeking reelection, he added, the most crucial factor is how much the candidate has accomplished in terms of taking care of miscellaneous chores for his constituents.

Thus, SP candidates have to operate with more limited funds. The extent of their personal contribution or fund-raising is substantial, but probably less than that of LDP members. This limitation on funds is compensated for by the effective support that the labor unions give to some candidates. SP members' dependence on organized support such as party and labor union is considerably greater than for LDP members, but they are keenly aware of the insufficiency of such support. They realize as acutely as do LDP members that a careful nursing of a candidate's constituency on a personal basis is a most crucial factor.

(3) *DSP:* Candidates receive no financial assistance from either national or prefectural

their constituents. The difference is that they do not, verbally at least, perceive the relevance of these activities to their re-election. For them such activities constitute a faithful implementation of their religious-political doctrine.

[56] The extent of labor union involvement in prefectural politics can be seen in the following statistics: In the 1963 elections, 56.8 percent of the total number of SP candidates in the entire country and 63.6 percent of all the SP winners were from the labor unions. In the case of DSP, 27.7 percent of its candidates and 21.4 percent of its winners came from the labor unions. 15.4 percent of the Communist Party candidates and 18.2 percent of the total number of CP winners were from the labor unions. Some labor union-backed candidates ran as independents and the percentage of successful candidacy was 65 percent for SP, 44 percent for DSP, and 15 percent for the CP, Naikaku Chōsashitsu, *Nihon no Kumiai no Seiji Katsudō*, pp. 96–101.

party headquarters. The party chairman in Kanagawa remarked that each candidate is expected to contribute ¥ 30,000 to be used by the prefectural party office. An occasional fund-raising campaign by the party office does not yield an adequate sum. Aside from party endorsement, the party's support takes, primarily, the form of "public relations work" conducted through speeches and media releases. Some candidates could rely on their supporters' associations, but in general candidates have to bear the bulk of their campaign expenses. As the chairman emphasized, the greatest proportion of support can be and is obtained through the performance of service functions, and other sources of support include relatives, DSP-oriented unions, and party supporters. It is not surprising, then, that the careful cultivation of personal ties is considered to be the most important factor aiding reelection, though support of DSP-oriented labor unions and small and medium business groups is considered important. The party chairman in Chiba estimated that about 40 percent of the votes necessary for his election came from organized sources such as party members and labor unions, and the remainder was based on personal ties. He complained bitterly about the expense of meeting constituents' expectations for contributions on a variety of ceremonial occasions. The picture emerging from these data is that DSP members attach relatively minor importance to party and are much closer to the LDP in the degree to which the importance of personal support is emphasized.

(4) *LDP:* LDP candidates receive no financial aid from either the national or prefectural party office. A prefectural party official in Chiba stated that his office makes a gift of a nominal sum, approximately one-twentieth of the legally allowed limit of campaign expenses, under the name of a "comfort bag," but individual candidates bear virtually all the necessary expenses. Some candidates can expect a varying amount of aid from their "bosses," members of the House of Representatives with whom they are in special relationships. The party official said that the value of the party label is steadily increasing and party endorsement is of some value. He felt that the fact of endorsement by the governing party generates confidence among the voters. He added, however, that personal assets such as financial resources, character, and public confidence are much more crucial in elections. LDP incumbets interviewed go so far as to say that party support is virtually non-existent and readily dismiss the value of party nomination for elections. The personal bases of power, they insisted, account for their electoral successes. Both LDP and SP incumbents interviewed agreed in their estimate that ordinarily an LDP candidate in Chiba expends about two to three million yen, with some candidates spending about twice as much. A ranking LDP member who suggested the figure of a few million yen insisted that his expenditure usually runs ¥ 900,000. It should be noted that even this figure exceeds the legally allowed campaign expenditure in his district.

The legally allowable amount of campaign funds in the 1963 election, which varies with the size of the electoral district, ranged from ¥ 562,600 to 929,100 in Chiba and from ¥ 719,400 to 1,029,600 in Kanagawa. The amount officially reported to have been spent by each candidate is always within the legal limit. The modal category reported is about several hundred thousand yen.[57] It is an open secret that the amount claimed to have been spent falls far below the actual sum expended. According to an LDP member, about one-half of the LDP candidates in Chiba finance their campaign expenses from their own personal funds, which have been accumulated from the earnings from their occupational pursuits. Other sources of support include national politicians from the same city, business firms and local notables. In view of the virtual absence of party support, LDP candidates' dependence on personal ties is especially strong. As compared with any other parties, it is probable that a greater proportion of LDP members make use of personal supporters' organizations. The size of such organizations in the case of the respondents varies from a few thousand to 11,000 people. Interview revealed that there are no sets of categories of people which are consistently or frequently mentioned by LDP members to be their supporters. In contrast to SP members, LDP members offer a truly varied response when asked to describe their own supporters. It is significant that although they can and did recite, when prompted, essentially correct perceptions of the socio-economic compositional characteristics of LDP supporters, they do not spontaneously perceive their personal followers in these terms. This is consistent with the non-ideological character of LDP.

There was a lone outspoken LDP maverick in Chiba who condemned the use of supporters' organizations by his colleagues on the ground that they constitute a hotbed of dishonesty and corruption, and that unlike most of his

[57] *SKS*, 1963, pp. 62–66; *CSNK*, 1963, p. 71, 97–100.

colleagues, he does not engage in electioneering prior to the official commencement of the campaign period. The other LDP members interviewed in general did not seem particularly bothered by the supporters' organizations, which they accept as a matter of necessity. This is in contrast with SP and DSP members who showed signs of embarrassment and disapproval-in-principle regarding their involvement in such organizations.

The questions designed to get at what the legislators believed to be most essential factors contributing to their elections yielded the following responses. First of all, LDP members attach greater importance to the cultivation of new friends and acquaintances by bestowing personal favors on individual constituents than do the members of other parties. Importance is also given to support by one's relatives. Second, in contrast to members of other parties LDP members tend to emphasize the importance of personal assets and qualifications, such as financial resources and individual character. The maverick reacted instantly and in unequivocal terms, pointing out that his colleagues make effective use of bribery and how prevalent the practice is. The follow-up question, raised hesitantly with all the look of innocence this writer could command, evoked a swift and candid response: "How does bribery work? To buy electors—you just hand them cash!" Despite this blunt assertion, such open and crass bribery does not appear to be widespread.

III. SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION

Whatever the mixture of motivations involved, there is no dearth of people who aspire for the office of assemblymen with a high degree of intensity.

Electoral chances are shaped in part by what the candidates and their agents do, and this in turn is based on the following: A) the kinds and relative amount of resources available, B) the perceived characteristics of personal supporters and party supporters and C) the perceived prerequisites for electoral success. The fact that the incumbents perceive their personal supporters in terms of characteristics different from those they ascribe to their party supporters—this reflects, and varies with, the different degrees of dependence they feel toward their parties—is correlated with what they consider to be the essential factors shaping electoral success.

With the exception of KP members, incumbent members generally attach great importance to the cultivation of personal ties by performing sundry errand and service functions. This they consider to be a most effective and essential factor affecting their electoral fortunes. The degree of importance attached to personal ties varies inversely with the perceived utility of their respective parties for electoral success. The parties can be ranked in terms of the perceived utility of the party in this order: KP, SP, DSP and LDP. Furthermore, in the order of SP, DSP, and LDP, the reliance on financial resources and organization of more personal and communal type (the supporters' association, hamlet and town association) increases. The candidates' orientations regarding the factors deemed essential for their election are significantly associated with what they think they ought to be doing, what they think their constituents expect them to do, and with what they are actually doing, but this is a topic for another paper.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES AND VOTING FOR THE RADICAL LEFT: CHILE, 1952*

GLAUCIO SOARES
Facultad Latinoamericana De Ciencias Sociales
AND
ROBERT L. HAMBLIN
Washington University (St. Louis)

This is the first of a number of investigations of the socio-economic basis of politics, with a special focus on voting for the radical left or right. In this case, the voting data are the percentage of votes cast for Allende, the socialist candidate in the 1952 presidential elections in Chile.

I. INTRODUCTION

The study of political behavior is relatively a late undertaking of the human sciences. To a certain extent, this delay can be explained in terms of the compartmentalization of academic life. Sociologists and psychologists, for example, hesitated to enter a province thought to be the exclusive domain of political scientists, and, when they finally did, explanatory theories of political behavior had a relatively isolated development along departmental lines, thereby losing the benefits derived from the intercourse among different perspectives. It was, indeed, a lonely development, partly because of the notion that political behavior has a specificity of its own, that it has an etiology different from that of other forms of social and psychological behavior. In this, of course, social scientists may have erred. Voting behavior is probably just another manifestation of basic social and psychic phenomena.

Although the degree of inequality varies from system to system, every system favors some of its members more than others and it is ordinarily the disadvantaged who become aliented.[1] It has been suggested that this alienation may be manifested in many ways—in mental illness, in suicide, in drug addiction, in certain types of crime (but *not* in others), and, interestingly enough, in the active support of radical political movements. Actually, it has also been suggested that some of these responses are functional alternatives.[2] Whether this is true or not remains an empirical question. Some of these alienation responses are essentially a retreat from life in the system; others are essentially aggression against the system. Voting for a radical party is an aggressive form of alienation oriented against the existing socio-economic system, which aims at replacing the system with another. The percent of the radical vote is a good indicator of the extent of this kind of alienation.

As each independent variable is discussed below, several indexes are suggested. Our strategy will be to investigate the underlying relationships of each of these indexes to the index of alienation or radical response—the percentage of a population voting for Salvador Allende, the far left candidate in the Chilean 1952 Presidential Elections.

Industrial Development in Capitalistic Society. Marx's basic hypothesis is to the effect that working class alienation increases as a capitalistic system matures or industrialization develops. He had numerous reasons for making this prediction (too many to review here) and he considered the prediction inevitable as do most orthodox Marxists.

In an economic system based primarily on the private ownership of the means of production, capitalistic development is almost synonymous with industrial or economic development. Based upon a tradition which was systematized by Colin Clark,[3] we considered the proportion of the total labor force in the primary sector (agricultural and extractive businesses such as farming, fishing, and lumbering but excluding mining). Thus, on the basis of the Marxist hypothesis, it is expected that the percent voting for the radical left will increase as the proportion of the labor force in the manu-

* "The computer analyses reported herein were supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation, G-22296, to Washington University."

[1] Although for Marx in a class society every individual is alienated from work, we are using here the term alienation in the sense of economic-political alienation. For theoretical statement on the Marxist theory of alienation see Jean Calvez, *El Pensamiento de* Carlos Marx (Madrid: Tourus, 1962), Chapter II.

[2] Ronald Ridker, "Discontent and Economic Growth," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, XI (October, 1962), 1–15.

[3] Colin Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress*, (London: Macmillan, 1951). See also S. S. Kuznets, *Six Lectures on Economic Growth*, (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), Lecture III.

facturing and in the tertiary sectors *increases*, but as the proportion in the primary *decreases*.

However, another stream of sociological theorizing arrived at conclusions which are diametrically opposed to this Marxist hypothesis. Kornhauser using cross-sectional international data found *negative* correlations between various indicators of industrial development and communist vote.[4] Cutright, also relying on cross-sectional international data, suggests that political development is a positive function of economic development. His dependent variable, political development, is patterned after the Western, capitalistic model and its political institutions. His conclusions nevertheless have a bearing upon our hypothesis in spite of the ideological bias implicit in the very definition of political development used by Cutright.[5] Lipset also relates positively economic development to democracy, Western style.[6] Ulam also predicted that in the advanced stages of industrial development leftist radicalism would diminish.[7] Ulam's theoretical predictions are longitudinal, but he does not present systematic objective data. Thus, there is a considerable amount of research and theory which reverses the Marxist hypothesis[8] at the cross-sectional level, of analysis. Primarily, we are then left with two contradictory predictions, which may operate at two different levels of analysis. Our purpose here is to see which hypothesis has a higher predictive value. However, we will use intranational, rather than international data. As such, our paper aims to explain static differences among provinces, rather than nations. Needless to say, our results do *not* explain change.[9]

Anomie and the Breakdown of Traditional Society. Usually characterized as a condition of normlessness, anomie was assumed by Durkheim to produce alienation. Further theoretical work has refined the concept, but the normlessness dimension continues to be central to the concept. In a developing country, anomie is usually experienced as part of a loss of faith in, or a rejection of, traditional norms and values so the individual tends no longer to be governed by them. Of course, this is not to imply that every post-traditional society is forever doomed to remain anomic; rather, we believe that sooner or later another value and belief system will become accepted and act as guidelines, providing normative orientations. However, we hypothesize that there is a time lag between the rejection of the traditional value system and the institutionalization of a replacement system. This also means that in this period, which may affect more than one generation, a considerable proportion of the total population may lack such an orientation. If, as we assume, there is a psychological "need" for this orientation (all with a varying intensity from individual to individual), these transitional periods may provide coherent ideologies, political and otherwise, a ready and numerically significant audience.

Traditional norms and values may function as tranquilizers by limiting aspirations and by rationalizing frustrations. Furthermore, participation in a traditional community often provides the stability and an identity that contributes toward a satisfactory life. Thus, immersion in traditional norms and values may cushion the frustrations of poverty and therefore tend to prevent alienation. Marx intuitively recognized this when he accused religion of being the opium of the masses.

Durkheim assumed that Catholicism of his day represented such a system of traditional norms and values, and that participation in the Catholic religion was a negative index of the kind of anomie talked about here. Catholic values would still function as guidelines after other traditional values had been rejected. Consequently, we used the percentage of the population listed as members of the Catholic Church as a negative index of anomie.

On the other hand, Marx's observation about religion *per se* suggests that the proportion of the total resident population without religious affiliation (including atheists, free-thinkers, and without religion) can be taken as an indi-

[4] William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*, (London: Routledge and Kegan, Paul, 1960).

[5] Phillip Cutright, "National Political Development: Measurement and Analysis," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (April, 1963), 253–264.

[6] Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man*, (New York: Doubleday, 1960), Part I, and "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," this REVIEW, 53 (1959), 69–105.

[7] Adam B. Ulam, *The Unfinished Revolution*, (New York: Random House, 1960).

[8] Glaucio A. Dillon Soares, "Desenvolvimento Económico e Radicalismo Político; o Teste de una Hipótese," *América Latina, ano V*, n. 3 Julho-Setembro, 1962), 65–82. See also Glaucio A. Dillon Soares, "Desarrollo Económico en América Latina (México, D. F., 1965), 516–559.

[9] We deemed it necessary to emphasize this point because many sociologists working in the area of comparative studies all too often forget that cross-sectional analyses are poor substitutes for longitudinal analysis.

cator of a rupture of traditionalism or a positive index of anomie.[10] Thus, on the basis of the amonie hypothesis, we would expect the percent voting for the radical left to *increase* as the percent of Catholicism *decreases* and the percent with no religious affiliation increases.[11]

However, indexes of affiliation or non-affiliation are on the surface blurred reflections of anomie since membership can be a poor indication of the impact of religion. A more powerful, more nuclear measure is needed. With Catholicism's emphasis on the family and its rather strong taboo against divorce, the percentage of the population divorced may be such a measure. (Durkheim used this as a positive index of amonie in his study of suicide and with good results.)[12] The anomie hypothesis will be supported, then, if the percent voting for the radical left is significantly and positively related to the percent divorced.

Amomie ordinarily occurs in other contexts; for example, when people migrate from home, and particularly when they move to cities. Consequently, the percentage of the resident population born out of state was included as a possible positive index of anomie. Thus, the prediction; the percentage voting for the radical left will increase with the percent of out-of-state immigrants.

Economic Deprivation. Both Marx and Durkheim assumed that alienation would occur as a direct result of economic deprivation, the best index of which may be the percent unemployed. For Marx, unemployment and underemployment associated with the downswings of the economic cycle were a mjaor cause of alienation of the working class in a capitalistic system. For Durkheim the economic instability associated with both downswing and upswing of the business cycle was a major cause of alienation, as manifested in suicide rates. Ignoring the state of the cycle, our prediction is simply that the percent voting for the radical left will *increase* as the percent of the labor force unempolyed *increases.*

Recent studies have also shown that immigration is influenced by economic conditions. Furthermore, migration usually goes from the more deprived areas to the less deprived areas. Thus, the percentage of the total population born out of state may be taken as a *negative* indicator of economic deprivation. As such, it should be negatively correlated with the percent voting for the radical left candidates or parties. This creates an interesting situation; on the basis of the social dislocation theory, the percent of the population born out of state can be used as an indicator of anomie, and should therefore correlate positively with left radicalism. But this expectation is reversed if one takes the same variable as a negative indicator of relative economic deprivation.

Urbanization. Finally, let us turn to urbanization, a variable we have saved until last because it is apparently related to two of our previous variables—anomie and economic deprivation.

Urbanization brings men into contact with thousands of others, removing them from their previous social isolation, introducing them to new norms and values. It also provides new problems, new reference groups and new reference classes. Consequently, one result of urbanization is the breakdown of traditional norms and values with the subsequent anomic gap.

But anomie is not the only result. Urbanization also displays new forms of material civilization, it stimulates the consumption of new goods, creates new tastes, raises aspirations which oftentimes cannot be easily satisfied. Consequently, while the rural populations migrate to the city to escape economic deprivation, they often find it there in a more severe, a more insidious relative form.[13] Thus, urbanization may serve to increase *relative* economic de-

[10] Most Latin American countries do not provide alternatives such as atheists, free-thinkers, and non-religious in their censuses. As a result, the overwhelming majority (say, 99%) of the population appears as Catholic, thus rendering this variable useless at the operational level. The Chilean questionnaire, fortunately, included alternatives in the instructions. (It reads: What is the respondent's religion? Write down whichever he declares. Exs. Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Free-Thinker, None, etc.).

[11] Notice that the percentage Protestant in a predominantly Catholic country may be considered as an indicator of the breakdown of traditionalism. Actually, the same may be true of any religion. Thus, the percentage Catholic in some sections of a few African countries may be taken as an indicator of modernization as opposed to traditionalism. The point that is being made here is that the meaning of indicators of *values* is dependent upon the concerte socio-economic context at hand.

[12] Emile Durkheim, *Suicide* (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1951), 259–276.

[13] There is some evidence that most migrants from deprived areas at first have a feeling of relative reward as they compare their present status with their rural past. However, as time goes on, relative reward gives place to relative deprivation as their rural past is progressively idealized.

privation, the kind that may effectively stimulate political radicalism.

Thus, on the basis of anomie and relative economic deprivation, urbanization should be positively related to the percentage vote for the radical left.

Urbanization has been thought by Kornhauser to be negatively associated with the communist vote. However, he adds that *within* each nation, communist vote is strongest in larger cities. Also, preliminary studies by the first author show substantial positive zero order correlations between measures of urbanizaton and the communist vote in Brazil, Costa Rica, Japan, and Venezuela.[14]

Miscellaneous Indexes. At this point, the traditional political scientist might begin to think that we have "left politics out of the analysis of political behavior." But we have not altogether, as two political variables are included. One is based on studies which show that women are usually more conservative than men and thus suggest that the "females as a proportion of the total number of voters" may be a negative predictor of radical leftist vote. Another prediction is based on the simple suggestion that elections do not take place in a political and personality vacuum; there are alternatives and choice is among these alternatives. Visual inspection of zero-order correlations among political and economic variables suggested that the percentage of the total valid vote given to Matte Larrain, a conservative candidate representing the Liberal and Traditionalist (*Conservador Tradicionalista*) parties, correlated negatively with the Allende vote and we decided to leave it in.

The Dependent Variable. A final word with respect to our dependent variable, the percentage of the total valid vote given to Don Salvador Allende Gosens, who was in terms of the official registrar, the candidate of the Socialist Party and "other political groups." Allende was the candidate of the far left in three Chilean Elections: 1952, 1958, and 1964. In 1958 and 1964 he was the candidate of the FRAP, a leftist coalition which included the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, and PaDeNa. Although Allende is not a communist nor a Communist Party member, he never tried to hide his radicalism and in the three aforementioned presidential elections he was placed at the left of all other candidates. In 1952 he was the candidate of a radical minority, having obtained 51,975 votes of 954,131 valid ones, or 5.5 percent. He obtained 15 percent of the vote in Arauco, a coal-mining province with a low degree of social development, and less than 2 percent in Linarea (1.9 percent), Maule (1.6 percent), and Chiloé (1.2 percent), which are rural, non-industrial provinces. His popularity grew from 1952 to 1958 to 1964, when he attracted larger proportions of nonradical, left-of-center groups. Thus, the present study is not an analysis of communist vote, strictly speaking, but an analysis of radical left voting. This is a relevant difference, as it has been shown that voting for communist and socialist has different patterns of relationships with outside variables.[15]

II. ANALYSIS I

A preliminary analysis was made for the 1952 Chilean election using the thirteen indexes selected on the basis of the aforementioned theoretical considerations. The indexes were computed for each of the twenty-five states (or provinces) of Chile, and these data were then analyzed using a linear multiple regression analysis. The results were fairly promising: the twelve independent variables accounted for 60 percent of the variance in the percent of the vote for Allende.

However, twelve independent variables are difficult to manage theoretically. As the beta coefficients of some of the variables were not significantly different from zero, we performed a condensation analysis where the variables were eliminated one at a time in an order inverse to their t-values, and the regression analysis was done over and over (automatically) until the beta coefficients of all of the remaining independent variables were significantly different from zero (at the .05 level).[16] Four independent variables survived this pro-

[14] Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, and Glaucio A. Dillon Soares, *Economic Ddvelopment and Political Radicalism*, (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Washington University, St. Louis. 1964).

[15] Kornhauser, *op. cit.* Soares has suggested that Labor and Socialist vote is positively related to social development after economic development is controlled, whereas the Communist vote is negatively related to social development. See Glaucio A. Dillon Soares, "Congruencias e Incongruencias entre Indicadores de Desenvolvimento Economico," *America Latina* (January, 1965), 47–60. Note, however, that Chilean socialists are far more radical than the European social democrats, and that in recent times a considerable wing of the party is attracted to the Peking line.

[16] We used this reduction process based on the beta coefficients and t-values as a simplifying device only. Insofar as we deal with census and electoral data, all errors are non-sampling errors but there is room for problems of significance.

cedure and the explained variance decreased to 45 percent as may be noted in Table 1.

III. DISCUSSION I

Some may object to the loss of 15 percentage points of explained variance via our condensation procedure, but we consider this a small price for conceptual simplification.

Even so, 45 percent of the variance means a multiple correlation of .67 which is promising given the present state of research findings in social science.

Even so, we should aspire to do better. But how? The usual strategy is to search for other significant independent variables to include in the analysis. This is important, of course, but there are other sources of error variance. For example, what reason is there to believe that voting for the radical left should increase as a linear, additive function of a number of socio-economic variables? None in particular, but if not a linear, additive relationship, what?

We have assumed that aggressive alienation, or voting for the radical left, is the result of certain frustrations or feelings. Feelings, and emotions generally, are part of a class of non-voluntary responses. There are many other types of non-voluntary responses besides feelings or emotions; to name a few, the various reflexes, the activities of many internal organs such as the heart, and interestingly enough, the psychological sensations produced by physical stimuli via sensory receptors. The latter are an important class because we know so much about their relationship to the stimuli which produce them.[17] The magnitude of a psychological sensation Ψ always increases as a power function of the magnitude of the physical stimulus as in Stevens' law: $\Psi = c\Phi^n$ or in its logarithmic equivalent: $\log \Psi = \log c + n \log \Phi$, where c and n are parameters which vary from one physical stimulus to another.

Evidence thus far, although limited, suggests that a power function may be the general form between the relationship of the magnitude of all non-voluntary responses (R) and the magnitude of the stimuli (S) which produced them as in the following equation:

$$R = cS^n$$

or in its logarithmic equivalent

$$\log R = \log c + n \log S.$$

[17] S. S. Stevens, "The Surprising Simplicity of Sensory Metrics," *American Psychologist*, 17, 1962, 29–39. See also "The Psychophysics of Sensory Function," *American Scientist*, 48, 1960, 226–253. These are summary articles.

TABLE 1. SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES AND THE VOTE FOR ALLENDE, 1952*

Variables	Beta Weights†	*t* test	Partial Correlations
Percent unemployed	.58	1.78	.37
Percent in primary sector	1.23	2.34	.46
Percent in mining	.70	2.65	.51
Percent divorced	.78	2.59	.50

* Results of a linear multiple regression analysis using a stepwise condensation procedure which eliminates insignificant variables.

† Explained variance is 45 percent. With 20 degrees of freedom a *t*-value of 1.72 is needed for significance at the .05 level, one-tailed test or at the .10 level, two-tailed test.

This apparently includes non-voluntary responses at the physiological level as well as the social-psychological level.[18] Of most relevance here, a measure of aggression was found to increase as a .54 power function of a measure of interference in an experimental situation. (It was assumed that the aggressive response increased as a function of feelings of frustration and the feelings of frustration increased as a function of the interference stimulus.) This experiment has led to the appropriate revision of the traditional interference-frustration aggression theory and suggests to us that voting for the radical left, an aggressive alienation response, may increase as a power function of the feeling of frustration produced by relevant socio-economic stimuli.

However, the evidence thus far involves a bivariate relationship. How would the effects of several socio-economic stimuli combine to produce the collective frustration response which is reflected in the aggressive alienation response or the vote for the radical left? The second author has recently extended the above analy-

[18] For two straightforward physiological studies see C. I. Hovland, and H. H. Riesen, "Magnitude of Galvanic and Vasomotor Response as a Function of Stimulus Intensity," *Journal of General Psychology*, 23 (1940), 103–121; H. K. Bartoshuk, "Human Neonatal Cardiac Response to Sound: A Power Function," *Psychonomic Science*, 1 (1964), 151–152. For two social psychological studies which suggest a stimulus response power law see R. L. Hamblin et al., "The Interference-Aggression Law?" *Sociometry*, 26 (1963), 190–216; T. Sellin and M. E. Wolfgang, *The Measurement of Delinquency* (New York: Wiley, 1964).

TABLE 2. SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES AND THE PERCENTAGE VOTE FOR ALLENDE, 1952*

Variables	Beta Weights†	*t* test	Partial Correlations
Percent unemployed	.75	2.40	.48
Percent in primary sector	.40	2.51	.50
Percent in mining	.14	2.95	.56
Percent in tertiary sector	−1.42	−2.31	−.47
Percent divorced	1.40	4.00	.68

* The results are for a multiple regression analysis using the log transformations of the original indexes. The variables shown survived a stepwise condensation procedure which eliminated all insignificant predictors.

† Explained variance is 79 percent. With 19 degrees of freedom, a *t*-value of 1.73 is significant at the .05 level, one-tailed test, or at the .10 level, two-tailed test.

sis to the multivariate case where the equation is:

$$R = cS_1^{n1}S_2^{n2}S_3^{n3} \ldots S_j^{nj}$$

or in logarithms

$$\log R = \log c + n_1 \log S_1 + n_2 \log S_2 + n_3 \log S_3 \ldots + n_j \log S_j$$

This equation has worked well in two stratification studies; multiple R^2 hit circa .98 in both cases.[19] It may be that this multiplicative power function might also describe the relationships which obtain among data in this investigation.

IV. ANALYSIS II

How can one test for a multiplicative power function? The logarithmic version of the equation suggests the answer: transform the indexes to their logarithms; this makes the equation linear and, therefore, a linear multiple regression analysis may be used to obtain least squares estimates of the exponents $n_1 \ldots n_j$. (These will be the regression coefficients.) That is exactly what we did. We transformed all the index values to logarithms and redid our linear regression analysis.

[19] R. L. Hamblin and Carole Smith, "Values, Status, and Professors," *Sociometry*, 29, (September 1966), 183–196; and R. L. Hamblin, *Ratio, Measurement and Sociological Theory*, (mimeographed, Department of Sociology, Washington University, St. Louis, 1966).

The results presented in Table 2 are quite an improvement; the combined predictive power of the thirteen independent variables is much more satisfactory; they explain 81 percent of the variance in the vote given to Allende. That is to say, their multiple correlation with the radical vote increased to about .90, indeed a rewarding result.

However, for the sake of theoretical parsimony the stepwise condensation procedure was again used to eliminate those variables whose regression co-efficients were not significantly different from zero. The condensation procedure reduced the number of predictive variables to five, whose joint effect happily explained 79 percent of the variance in the vote for Allende. We consider the loss of 2 percent in explained variance a small price for achieving conceptual simplification.

V. DISCUSSION II

With the multivariate power function, only one variable was added to the list of significant predictors, yet the explained variance is almost doubled. A jump from 45 percent to 79 percent is a considerable improvement, enough to indicate the multivariate power function does provide a better description of the underlying processes in these data. At least, the results indicate that the underlying relationships are *multiplicative*, not additive, in their effects, and curvilinear, not as we first implicitly assumed.

We will discuss the theoretical implications of the multiplicative power effect later; now, however, let us turn to the substantive issues raised by the results of the last analysis.

The Industrial Development Hypothesis. On the basis of Marx's industrial development hypothesis we predicted that the percent vote for the radical left would *increase* with the percent of the labor force in the manufacturing sector and the percent in the tertiary sector but decrease with the percent in the primary sector. Actually, none of these predictions were borne out by the Chilean data for the 1952 election. The percent vote for the radical left was *not* related to the percent of the labor force in the manufacturing sector; it was *negatively* instead of *positively* related to the percent in the tertiary sector; and it was *positively* instead of *negatively* related to the percent in the primary sector.

Thus the data suggest that the percentage vote for the radical left is negatively related to industrialization. This is consistent with Kornhauser's findings.[20] and with the prediction of a number of current analysts including Cut-

[20] Kornhauser, *op. cit.*

right,[21] Lipset,[22] and Ulam.[23] The one exception to this is the size of the manufacturing sector, which did not relate to the percentage vote for Allende.

If industrialization is the key process that reduces alienation, then why should the size of the manufacturing sector not be related to the percentage vote for Allende? The answer may be found in the relationship of industrialization and alienation to class polarization.

Marx predicted that cutthroat competition during the low ebb of the economic cycles would eventually result in a two-class system where the rich became richer and smaller in number and the poor became poorer and larger in number. As Marx analyzed the situation, he assumed that the middle classes would tend to disappear and that the only mobility would be downward. Polarization, the process which describes the development of such a two-class system, was assumed to be a major cause of alienation.

Interestingly enough, cross-sectional data suggest that industrialization is *negatively* related to class polarization.[24] Since class polarization exists in a community or state to the extent of middle class is absent, let us use the percent of the labor force in three occupational groups—employers, employees and self-employed—as a positive index of the size of the middle class, or as a negative index of polarization.[25] (In doing this we ignore the possibility that some in these categories are upper class. However, by most definitions the upper class comprise a very small proportion of the total labor force, usually less than 1 percent, so they hardly affect the index.)

[21] Cutright, *op. cit.*

[22] Lipset, *op. cit.*

[23] Ulam, *op. cit.*

[24] Although historical data suggest that the longitudinal trend is curvilinear and that twentieth cetnury economic take-offs may co-exist with a growth in both middle-classness and urban unemployment. See Glaucio A. Dillon Soares, "Economic Development and the Class Structure," in R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset (eds.), *Class, Status and Power: Social Stratification in Comparative Perspective*, (New York: The Free Press, 1966, rev. ed.).

[25] Actually, the self-employed category may artificially increase the middleclassness of the agricultural sector. For there are many small farmers, with no hired labor, with no mechanization whatsoever, with a very small plot of poor land, who would be better classified in the working class group.

The three middle class occupational categories comprise 16 percent of the working force in the mining sector, 30 percent in the rest of the primary sector, 43 percent in the manufacturing sector, 51 percent in the service sector and 84 percent in the commerce sector.

On the basis of Marx's class polarization hypothesis, then, we would expect the percentage vote for Allende to *increase* as the relative size of the primary sector (including mining) increases, but decrease as the relative size of the tertiary (service and commerce) sectors increase. The prediction for manufacturing is less clear. Of course, the results conform precisely to these predictions and, in addition, they suggest a tipping point. Apparently, when the middle classes are represented by about 40–45 percent of those occupied in a sector, little or no radicalism occurs. However, when the middle class is represented less than this, as in the primary and mining sectors, alienation evidently occurs and the more these sectors are represented in a state, the greater the percent vote for the radical left. On the other hand, when the middle class is represented significantly more than 40–45 percent, as in the tertiary sector, evidently alienation is reduced, and the more this sector is represented in a state, the smaller the percent vote for the radical left.

What are we to make of these findings? Does class polarization act as an intervening variable between industrialization and alienation, or do industrialization and alienation exert independent effects? The data in their present form do not allow us to answer these questions. Thus, the interpretation of the results involving the relative size of the various economic sectors is not at all clear. This, then, is a serious shortcoming of the present analysis.

The Anomie Hypothesis. Only one of the several indexes of anomie turned out to be a significant predictor of the percent vote for Allende in the 1952 election. This was the percent divorced, which we assumed would be a good measure. Actually, this was an important variable as the exponent of 1.4 suggests.

We were somewhat surprised that the percent urban and the percent immigrants did not turn out to be significant predictors of radical vote.

The Socio-Economic Deprivation Hypothesis. We had only one index of socio-economic deprivation, the percent unemployed, and it turned out to be an important predictor of the percent vote for Allende. The exponent was .75. Even so, this index may be less than adequate, for underemployment is omitted, and agricultural unemployment more often than not goes unreported.

VI. ANALYSIS III

We have already noted that some of the above results have a serious shortcoming; ambiguity. Specifically, the result involving the relative size of various economic sectors support 1) the hypothesis that alienation decreases with industrialization or 2) the hypothesis that it increases with class polarization or 3) perhaps both? What is the pattern of relationships? A simple way to find out is to develop several polarization indicators and include them in a new analysis. If the economic sector measures then drop out of such a new regression analysis, being replaced by one of the polarization indicators, the results would support the class polarization hypothesis at the expense of the industrialization theory. If, on the other hand, they remained significant in the context of the direct indicators of class polarization, then the economic-sector results would support the industrialization hypothesis.

To run this crucial test and generally to elaborate our findings we decided to develop additional indicators of polarization, anomie, and urbanization for each of Chile's twenty-five states.

Class Polarization.

a) The percent of the labor force who are employers or employees (*empleadores y empleados*) may provide an accurate indication of the size of class polarization.

b) The percent of the labor force who are self-employed may provide an alternative *negative* indicator of class polarization since the polarizing process is supposed to reduce the number of businessmen.

c) The percent of the labor force who are workers (*obreros*) may provide a *positive* indicator of class polarization since the polarizing process is supposed to increase the proportion of workers.

d) The percent of the agricultural labor force who are non-manual workers may be an important *negative* indicator of polarization in that sector. Although Marx considered the peasants to be a useless class for revolutionary purposes, the empirical question is: Does polarization produce alienation in the agricultural sector just as it does in other sectors of the economy?

e) The percent of the non-agricultural labor force who are non-manual may be the crucial *negative* indicator of polarization, particularly if Marx was right about the reduced significance of the agricultural sector.

f) We decided to include an educational indicator, one that approximates the size of the middle class: the percent of the population 15 years or over with a high school or college education, a *negative* indicator of polarization. High school education would scarcely indicate membership in the middle class in an advanced industrial economy, but it does in a developing country such as Chile.[26]

g) The percent of the dwelling units whose construction and maintenance was coded "good" or "partly good" by the census interviewers, and,

h) the percent of the dwelling units which have piped drinking water (*Agua potable por cañería*).

These last two are negative indicators of polarization; they should show roughly at least the proportion of the families who have escaped rural or urban slum conditions.

Urbanization. Our first index of urbanization may have had a bad cutting point (2,500 or more) for an investigation of the process which produces alienation. The urbanization which produces anomie and alientation may well be large scale rather than small scale. Consequently, the percent of the population living in urban *comunas* with 10,000 inhabitants or more may be a more adequate indication of urbanization. Although there may be several comunas in a large city.

Results. Those ten indexes were coded then for each of the twenty-five states in Chile and together with the original thirteen were transformed to logarithms and subjected to multiple regression analysis with the percent vote for Allende as the dependent variable.

The explained variance with all 22 independent variables is 90 percent. The results, again using the condensation procedure to achieve simplification and significance, may be seen in Table 3.

[26] It might be argued that sheer literacy should be used instead of high school membership. However, the Chilean 1952 census indicates that workers (*trabajadores*) comprised 79% of the economically active population. This suggests that a large proportion of the workers is literate, as illiterates accounted for only 20% of the population 14 years and older. Actually, the manual non-manual stratification (working class-middle class) might, in the Chilean case, correspond more closely to the less than high school-high school or more educational stratification. However, in countries where over half of the population is illiterate, sheer literacy may grant individuals an upper-working class or even lower-middle class status.

TABLE 3. SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES AND THE VOTE FOR ALLENDE, 1952*

Variables	Indexes	Type of Index	Regression Coefficient[b]	*t*-test
Class polarization (P)	% in high school or college	−	−1.33	−3.84
Industrial development (I)	% in primary sector	−	.45	2.62
Industrial development (I)	% in mining	−	.10	2.34
Anomie (A)	% divorced	+	1.57	5.03
Urbanization (U)	% in communities 2,000 or more	+	1.30	2.49
Relative deprivation (D)	% immigrants	−	− .46	−1.87

* Results of multiple regression analysis, using logarithmic transformations of the various indexes. The variables shown survived a stepwise condensation procedure which eliminated all insignificant predictors. The vote for Allende is the vote for the radical left indicating those alienated (V_a) from Chile's socio-economic system as of 1952. Thus, the equation $V_a = cP^{1.33}I^{-.56}A^{1.57}U^{1.30}D^{.46}$.

[b] Explained variance is 85 percent. With 18 degrees of freedom, a *t*-value of 1.73 is significant at the .05 level, one-tailed test.

VII. DISCUSSION III

A multiple regression analysis isolates the underlying relationships between the dependent and a number of independent variables. When the sample of independent variables changes, so might the results, that is, a variable that is significant or insignificant in one context may not be in another. Such is the case in this analysis: two variables that were previously insignificant predictors now appear to be significant, the percent of the population living in communities 2,500 or larger and the percent of the population who were born out of state (immigrants). Also, two indexes became insignificant predictors; the percent employed in the tertiary sector and the percent unemployed. Apparently, these changes occurred because of the inclusion of the poulation 15 years and older with a high school or college education.

This analysis is a better approximation to reality since a larger proportion of the variance was explained. Thus, the results supercede those of the previous analysis.

How did the underlying hypotheses fare?

Industrial Development. The percentage of the labor force in mining and the percentage in the rest of the primary sector survived with exponents of .10 and .45 respectively. This evidently means that these indicators should be interpreted in the way they are usually interpreted, as negative indicators of industrialization. Thus, the results appear to support the hypothesis that alienation as evidenced by the percentage vote for the radical left *decreases* with industrialization. These findings then are consistent with Kornhauser's data, and with the Lipset-Ulam hypothesis but inconsistent with the Marxian hypothesis.

Class Polarization. As might be recalled, in this analysis nine alternative indexes of the size of either the middle or the working classes were included in an attempt to gauge polarization directly, for we have assumed that polarization occurs to the extent the middle class decreases in size, or conversely, to the extent the working class increases in size.

Of the seven measures of the size of the middle or working classes, one turned out to be a significant predictor of the percent vote for Allende: the per cent of the population 15 years or older with high school or college education. A measure of the size of the middle class, and hence a negative indicator of polarization, the percent with high school or college has an important negative relationship with the percentage vote for Allende; the exponent was −1.33.

The Anomie Hypothesis. In the previous analysis only one indicator of anomie, the percent divorced, turned out to be significantly related to the percent vote for the radical left. In the present analysis this same indicator turned out to be significant and the magnitude of the relationship with the percent vote for Allende is similar for the second and third analyses, 1.40 and 1.57, respectively. Of all the results, this appears to be the strongest. Apparently, anomie may be more important than any other of the variables investigated in the production of radicalism.

Economic Deprivation. It may be recalled the percentage immigrants from out of state was taken as a possible indicator of two variables as a positive indicator of anomie and as a negative indicator of economic deprivation (the

latter on the assumption that people migrate to prosperous areas). These epistemic assumptions led to alternative predictions. If the anomie assumption were valid, then the percentage in migrants should be positively related to the percentage vote for Allende. Alternatively, if the economic deprivation interpretation is correct, then the percent immigrants should be *negatively* related to the percentage vote for Allende.

Of course, the data support the latter interpretation. The exponent for the percentage immigrants was −.46.

Evidently the percentage of immigrants is a better indicator of economic deprivation than of anomie. Actually, migration may produce anomie, but only in the long run. Most migration in developing economies is from rural, tradition-oriented areas to urban areas. It may take time, perhaps a few decades, before migrants lose traditional norms and values.[37] Hence, the immigration measure may indicate the percent of a residentially urban population that is predominantly rural—that is, oriented toward traditional norms and values. If so, then the immigration indicator may be negatively rather than positively related to anomie. This interpretation is, of course, consistent with the results presented thus far; the percent vote for Allende is negatively related to the percent immigrants. But is there any further evidence? Consistent with our assumption that the percent urban is closely tied up with the percent immigrants, their zero order correlation is .75 and when one is omitted from the regression analysis the other is not significant. It is as though the percent urban indicator is valid only when the effects of immigration are held constant. This of course, lends support to our interpretation of "interdependence". When the proportion of migrants is not partialed out, it obliterates the positive association between urbanization and radicalism.

Finally, we should note that none of the other significant relationships in this analysis support the economic deprivation hypothesis directly. None of the positive or negative indicators of economic deprivation—the percent unemployed, the percent of the residences which are dilapidated, or the percent of the residences with piped-in water—were significantly related to the percent vote for the radical left.

Why? Perhaps because the deprivation that counts most is relative and not absolute deprivation and then only when the relative deprivations are not cushioned and explained away by traditional norms and values.

Urbanization. The results support the urbanization hypothesis. Two measures were included: one which includes the percentage living in communities 2,500 and over and the other in communities 10,000 and over. The latter was included when the other failed in second analysis. Ironically, it was not the second but the first indicator that turned out to be significant in this analysis. Probably it was not the cutting point that was wrong previously, but the context. When the context is correct, the effect is strong—the exponent is 1.30. This result then tends to confirm previous research by the first author where positive zero-order correlations between indexes of urbanization, and the percent communist vote in Brazil, Costa Rica, Japan, and Venezuela.

VIII. SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT METHOD

Before concluding, we wish to confront four sources of uneasiness which the reader may have about these investigations and the conclusions. One is a question about the application of a non-voluntary response "law" to voting behavior, one a question about economic determinism, one a question about macro versus micro theory, so-called, and the final question is about implications of the multiplicative power function which describes the relationship among the significant variables in this investigation.

The Conditioned Stimulus-Non-voluntary Response "Law". This investigation even in the context of the others which were previously cited does not pretend to establish the multiplicative power function as the form of the conditioned stimulus-non-voluntary response law. This will take many, many investigations; some in the field, some in the laboratory. However, the results reported here do require that we consider how this law, if it is a law, might apply in the case of voting behavior. In particular how can voting in a free election be thought of as non-voluntary? In answering this question, let us start with the concept non-voluntary.

By non-voluntary we refer to particular responses which occur automatically when the eliciting stimuli are present. Unless the individ-

[37] This is confirmed by Brazilian data, which show that recent immigrants to Rio de Janeiro identify with the "poor" or "working" classes and many vote conservative, whereas many old migrants identify with the proletariat (*classe operaria*) and vote for reformist parties. See Glaucio A. Dillon Soares, "The Political Sociology of Uneven Development in Brazil," in Irving L. Horowitz (ed.), *Revolution in Brazil*, (New York, Dutton, 1964), 192.

ual learns how to control the eliciting stimuli, he cannot choose, rather he just experiences a non-voluntary response. At night when entering an illuminated room, a person does not choose to see the light; it happens automatically because his eyse and his central nervous system are built that way. However, he can choose to modify the stimulus presentation by closing his eyes, turning his head, switching off the current, etc. The latter he can choose to do because they are voluntary responses. A great part of individual learning in life has to do with the discovery of the stimuli which modify, elicit, or control the many non-voluntary responses: hunger pangs, fatigue, sexual orgasm, satisfaction, frustration.

Sensing light is almost if not altogether a purely biological response to unconditioned stimuli. The latter examples, however, involve classical conditioning. Theoretically, at least, frustration occurs automatically to the extent an individual is prevented from acquiring or achieving something of value to him according to expectations. However, what is valued and what is expected is largely a function of individual conditioning in a particular culture. But given that history of conditioning, the frustration response to interference will occur automatically; it will be involuntary as surely as sensing light is involuntary.

What does this have to do with casting a ballot in a free election, a voluntary response if ever there was one? Certainly, the secret ballot was invented to give the voter the opportunity to choose whom he would vote for according to his own feelings and the dictates of his own conscience. Precisely because voting is free, we can expect that by and large, the vote will reflect how the voters feel. However, as we have suggested, the feelings of satisfaction with, frustration with, or alienation from a candidate or a party are largely non-voluntary depending upon a voter's values; they occur rather automatically as the eliciting conditioned stimuli occur. In the United States, many, if not most, liberal Republicans were alienated from Goldwater as they watched the crucial sessions of the Republican Presidential Convenion on TV. Similarly, vast numbers of intellectuals in the United States have been alienated by Johnson's international policies. The exodus of voters from the Goldwater ballot and the flurry of criticism of the Johnson policy is quite predictable given values of these voters.

In their theories, some social scientists have often acted as though they believed in Locke's folly, as though man's behavior were a clean slate that could be written as desired. Yet it is fatal to ignore the invariances in man. More than that, it is a fascistic assumption for it implies that any deviant, alienated response signals a sick or inferior individual instead of a sick or inferior social system. If man is a clean slate whose behavior can be written altogether as desired, then certainly he should be able to adapt happily to any social or political arrangement.

In point of fact, the big task for social scientists is to discover the invariances in man's behavior, the laws which describe the dynamics of man's non-voluntary as well as his voluntary responses. In the case of the voting response, it is crucial to discover the conditioned stimuli which evidently elicit the feelings which are expressed in the choices marked on the ballot. In this, the present study may have made a small start. Certain socio-economic variables apparently function directly or indirectly as conditioned stimuli to produce an alienated vote, and they explain 85 percent of the variance thereof. However, to understand the conditioned stimuli which produce the wide variety of voting will take many more investigations such as this, in Chile and in many other countries as well.

Economic Determinism. At least some readers may see the theory which has emerged in these investigations as blatant single-factor economic determinism. Actually, we have gone well beyond the economic determinism erroneously attributed to Marx.[28] True, the degree of industrialization, the degree of class polarization, and the degree of economic deprivation are crucial variables in our analysis and we are clearly indebted to Marx for them.[29] But anomie is also a crucical non-economic systems variable which evidently interacts with class polarization and the other economic variables, and for it we are indebted to Durkheim. Marx relegated such concepts as anomie to minor functions, devaluating their causal importance.

[28] The description of the Marxist model as a single factor determinism exists in what has been called "vulgar Marxism." Engels clearly refuted the idea that the economic factor was the only determinant factor in Marxist theory. See his celebrated "Letter to Joseph Block," in L. Feuer (ed.), *Marx and Engels*, (Garden City: Doubleday-Anchor, 1959), 397–398.

[29] Although we have stressed the importance of *relative* deprivation, whereas Marx tended to stress absolute deprivation, and underscore the relative approach. Thus, the *verelendung* theory was stated by Marx in absolute terms, not in relative ones. See Karl Marx, *Salario, Preco e Lucro*, (Rio de Janeiro: Vitoria, 1955).

Yet the curvilinear multiplicative interaction which we found is hard to interpret other than causally, and judging from the exponents in our last analysis, anomie is just as important as industrialization, class polarization, or relative economic deprivation. Urbanization, another systems variable which most would not consider strictly economic in character, was important also.

Secondly, we must assume that the political alienation indicator—the percent vote for the radical left—did turn out to be related to industrialization, class polarization, anomie, economic deprivation, and urbanization, because there was an election in Chile in 1952 and because there was an attractive leftist candidate, Salvador Allende, who effectively campaigned on a radical platform. In other words, Allende and his campaign gave the voters an outlet to express their alienation; the secret ballot allowed them to cast their votes freely so that their feelings were expressed accurately. Thus, politics and political institutions do matter in our theory. Beyond this point, variations in political variables, if they could be measured, might well account for part of the additional 15 percent of the variance which we could not explain. (Another possibility, as noted, is that a significant portion of the residual variance is due to measurement error.)

Macro versus Micro Theory. Some may feel that the theory developed out of this research is "interesting," but they would want it to be verified in an analysis of individual survey data. Since we have used social-psychological assumptions about individuals in our derivations, they reason that individual data should be used in verification of the theory. It is as though we were involved in an ecological fallacy; drawing conclusions about the behavior of micro units using data from macro units.

Actually, our theory does not necessarily partake of the ecological fallacy. True the data are macro but so are the conclusions: We claim no prediction with regard to individual voting behavior. Using tested social-psychological assumptions we have simply put "man back into" macro social system theory.[30] This, because "man" is the micro unit which does the voting which is totaled up to determine the vote of the macro unit, i.e., the state. It is interesting, however, that the stimulus-response relationship for the macro units is evidently described by the same general law which describes the stimulus-response relationship for micro units. This does not imply a psychological reductionism, but rather the elaboration of a theory that applies both to individual behavior and to the behavior of larger, aggregate units. Even so, stimuli such as industrial development, class polarization, and anomie may produce alienation in advantaged as well as in disadvantaged individuals. There are advantaged individuals who empathize with the disadvantaged, thus rebelling against what they see as an unjust system. Senator Salvador Allende is just one of many documented examples. Our only real claim is that stimuli such as industrial development, class polarization, and anomie interact to produce an alienated response of populations which comprise the macro units under investigation.

[30] George C. Homans, "Putting Man Back In." *American Sociological Review*, January, 1965.

Modernization and the Multiplier Effect. Finding the variables which affect the outcome of an election is, of course, an important theoretical problem but so is the discovery of how the effects combine. Suppose that Galileo had erred. In his famous law of falling bodies, instead of $D = AT^2$, suppose he had concluded $D = A + T^2$. In the latter case, even though all of the correct variables would have been present, the crucial multiplier effect of A, the accelerating force, would have been missed, the theory would have been grossly inaccurate, the error variance would have been very large.

The finding here is that voting for the radical left in the 1952 elections in Chile was a *multiplier* effect of several variables; class polarization, industrialization, anomie, urbanization, and relative economic deprivation. Since a multiplier effect is rather novel for social science theories, let us explore its meaning in a brief way.

Consider the simple multiplicative equation $Y = X \cdot Z$ (which by convention is the simplified version of $Y = 1.0X^{1.0} \cdot Z^{1.0}$), and consider its linear cousin, $Y = X + Z$. In the linear equation the effects of X and Z are literally independent. If X is increased four units, Y will increase four units regardless of the value of Z. However, in the multiplicative equation, the effects of X and Z are quite *interdependent.* If X and Z are both 1, then Y is 1, and increasing X to 5 will increase Y from 1 to 5. However, if X is 1 and Z is 100, then Y is 100 and increasing X from 1 to 5 will increase Y from 100 to 500. Thus a four-point increase of X will increase Y by 4 or by 400 points depending upon the value of Z. This is the essence of the multiplier effect.

In the case of the present results, the theoretical equation is more complex:

$$V_a = cP^{1.23}I^{-.55}A^{1.57}U^{1.30}D^{.42}$$

where V_a is the alienated vote for the radical left; P, class polarization; I, industrialization; A, anomie; U, urbanization; and D, relative economic deprivation. In this equation the independent variables are given differential weight or importance by the various exponents. Beyond that the multiplier effect is so elaborate that is seems to exceed our ken.

Even so, the development of an economy will ordinarily decrease polarization, increase industrialization, and decrease relative economic deprivation. These effects evidently combine to decrease the alienated vote. On the other hand, the development of an economy will also result in urbanization and for a time an increase in anomie which function to increase the alienated vote. The exponents suggest that if development is even, perhaps a precarious balance will obtain, the alienated vote will remain constant. However, if development does not serve to reduce class polarization significantly, or if development occurs unevenly enough to produce serious relative economic deprivation, the multiplier effect could be such as to produce a substantial shift in votes toward the radical left. In other words, while the results suggest a conflict in the effects of our independent variables which evidently produce something of an equilibrium, the interaction among these variables is such as to make wild fluctuations in an alienated or radical vote probable.

In Chile, development during the past fourteen years has been rather uneven, scored with many problems not the least of which has been a debilitating inflation. The result is rather expected. The vote for Allende was about 6 percent in 1952, 29 percent in 1958 and 39 percent in 1964. Although impressive, these figures actually mask the vast change that has taken place in politics in Chile. Allende's opposition has shifted continually to the left so that Senator Eduardo Frei, who was elected president in the 1964 elections, is a moderate socialist of the Christian Democrat variety. In spite of this shift, Allende has gained votes, both in absolute and relative terms, thus indicating a shift to the left in the Chilean voting population.

While this represents only the first of a series of investigations the theory which has emerged may be up to the job of accounting for such wild swings in voting behavior. Nevertheless, the above conclusions should be accepted with caution: in this paper we have not analyzed change data which would be required to substantiate many of our speculations.

Even so, it may be important to consider implications such as was done here particularly for future research. Actually, the present investigation should be replicated many times if the phenomena of the alienated vote is to be understood. Beyond this, however, the present investigation is severely limited; votes for all shades of political parties using trend as well as cross-sectional data will be required for an adequate understanding of the voting patterns of macro systems. The present study is simply a prototype of what might be done; its virtue as a prototype lies in the suggested leads for future research.

GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES AND PUBLIC SERVICES IN THE AMERICAN STATES*

IRA SHARKANSKY
The University of Georgia

Much recent policy analysis is based on the assumption that the amount of money spent in a jurisdiction indicates the nature of services provided. This study seeks to test this assumption as it applies to the American states.

Among the studies that have attempted to explain the "outputs" of state and local governments by reference to political and economic characteristics, several have identified expenditures with services implicitly by mixing indicators of spending with indicators of services as the "outputs" to be explained.[1] Other studies have claimed explicitly that government expenditures reflect the "scope and character" or "calibre" or the "alpha and the omega" of public services.[2] A contrary argument is that "money is not everything." Such nonmonetary factors as the quality of personnel or the nature of the political environment may exert the greatest influences upon the quality or quantity of public services within a jurisdiction.

In assessing the relationship between spending and services, this study first defines static relationships between measures of spending and measures of public services. Secondly, it examines relationships over time in an attempt to discern if increases in government expenditures are likely to bring about increases in the quality or quantity of public services.

* Grants from the Social Science Research Council and the University of Georgia Office of General Research provided funds to support this research.

[1] Richard Dawson and James Robinson, "Interparty Competition, Economic Variables, and Welfare Policies in the American States," *Journal of Politics*, 25 (May, 1963), 265–289; Thomas R. Dye, "Malapportionment and Public Policy in the States," *Journal of Politics*, 27 (August, 1965), 586–601; Richard I. Hofferbert, "The Relations between Public Policy and Some Structural and Environmental Variables in the American States," this REVIEW, 60 (March, 1966) 73–82.

[2] See, respectively, Robert C. Wood, *1400 Governments* (Garden City, 1961), p. 35; Jesse Burkhead, *Public School Finance* (Syracuse, 1965) p. 50; and Phillip C. Burch, *Highway Revenue and Expenditure Policy in the United States* (New Brunswick, 1962), p. 34.

I. TECHNIQUES

One of the first problems encountered in the analysis of public services is the identification of services that are likely to respond to the expenditures of specific governmental units. In part, this is the problem of Morton Grodzins' marble cake. As he saw it, there are no major services that are solely the product of any one government level.[3] Rather, local, state and federal agencies share in the planning, financing, staffing and directing of prominent domestic services. This is certainly true in the major categories of state and local services. For several fields, it is possible to go beyond Grodzins and note that they are the products of private efforts as well as the activities of local, state and federal governments. For example, officials in education, public welfare, health and hospitals, and natural resources seem likely to adjust their own services, in part, to the programs of private institutions within their jurisdiction.

Because of the public-private marble cake, it is virtually impossible to obtain measures of public services that are solely the outputs of particular governments. In order to cope with this difficulty, this study examines measures of services provided *within* each state. It relates these service indicators to measures of combined state and local government expenditures, and it evaluates these expenditure-service relationships in the light of measures pertaining to federal aid, private economic activity and other elements likely to influence services.

The study considers three measures of expenditures as having likely influence upon public services. Along with the other independent variables, they pertain to 1962:

a) combined state and local general expenditures per capita[4]
b) combined state and local general expenditures per $1,000 of personal income

[3] Morton Grodzins, "American Political Parties and the American System," *Western Political Quarterly*, 13 (December, 1960), 974–998.

[4] "General expenditures" include all state spending for each major category except for insurance trust funds. The year 1962 was selected for all variables because of the data in the *Census of Governments, 1962*.

c) combined state and local general expenditures for each major function as a percentage of total general expenditures

Each of these measures is calculated for spending in the major fields of education, highways, public welfare, health and hospitals, natural resources (agriculture, fish and game, forestry and parks) and public safety. Variable *a* measures the money spent in relation to the population served by state services. Variable *b* measures spending in relation to economic resources. As such, it indicates the effort displayed by state and local governments in supporting the different fields of service. Variable *c* measures the relative success enjoyed by each field of service in competition with other services for government expenditures.[5] If the level of government spending actually reflects the quality or quantity of public services, then each of these spending measures should show positive relationships with service indicators.

Beside these measures of spending, 17 other independent variables were examined as having possible influence upon the nature of public services. After preliminary analysis, the following were selected for more thorough treatment:[6]

d) Federal aid, i.e., Federal payments as a percentage of state and local spending for each service
e) the number of state and local employees per 10,000 population
f) the average salary of state and local employees
g) the percentage of state and local general revenue originating at sources other than local governments prior to intergovernmental transfers
h) per capita personal income
i) population

Variable *d* measures a source of outside money that might influence the nature of services within each state. Variables *e* and *f* measure the size and rewards of administrative units. Presumably, these features might influence services independently of expenditures. Variable *g* measures the centralization in state-local relationships.[7] The degree of centralization may influence the nature of services provided, or the efficiency with which expenditures affect services. Variables *h* and *i* are economic measures that relate strongly with other measures of economic activity;[8] they indicate the base of resources from which state and local governments and private groups draw in order to provide services.

Coefficients of simple correlation (Pearson's *r*) indicate the strength of simple relationships between each measure of spending and the measures of services. Yet coefficients of simple correlation do not indicate if the spending measures have independent relationships with public services. The problem of independence would occur, for example, if variables *a–c* showed positive relationships with public services only because variables *d–i* have stronger positive relationships with both the measures of spending and the measures of services. Partial correlation techniques, controlling for variables *d–i*, will provide a test for the independence of relationships between spending and services.[9]

Sixty-eight variables measure various aspects of public service quality or quantity within each state. Some variables measure the amount

[5] See James A. Maxwell, *Financing State and Local Governments* (Washington, 1965), Chapter 2.

[6] Variables considered, but not retained were: percentage of per capita personal income paid in taxes to state and local governments; percentage of state and local general revenue originating at the state level prior to intergovernmental transfers; percentage of state and local general revenue allocated to the state level after tax collections and intergovernmental transfers; percentage of local general revenue received from the state; voter turnout in state elections; the David-Eisenberg measure of apportionment equity in state legislatures; a measure of party competition derived from Ranney's index of Democratic party strength; number of local governments per 10,000 population; percentage of population living in urban areas; percentage of labor force employed in manufacturing; and value added by manufacturing, per capita. Variables 2–4 of this list were dropped because they reflect the same phenomena as independent variable *g*. Variables 1, 5–8 were dropped because they fail to show strong relationships with either government expenditures or public services. Variables 9–11 were dropped because they reflect the same phenomena as independent variables *h* and *i*.

[7] Beside the state government, the principal non-local source of state-local revenue is the federal government. A high score on variable *g* indicates centralization because most federal contributions to local governments funnel through state agencies.

[8] See Harvey S. Perloff *et al*, *Regions, Resources and Economic Growth* (Baltimore, 1960), Chapters 1–3.

[9] For an illustration of this technique, see Dye, *op. cit.* Also see Hubert Blalock, *Social Statistics* (New York, 1960), Chapter 19.

of benefits or services provided per client. Some measure the units of service in relation to the total population of the state. Some measure the incidence of beneficiaries among the people likely to use a service. Other variables measure the rate at which a program is performed. Others assess services by the frequency with which the state population chooses to use programs. Finally, some assess services indirectly by measuring the continued existence of phenomena that government activities are designed to control. The Appendix describes each measure of service. Because of space limitations, they are denoted in the tables by short titles only.

Since part of the analysis employs data from 1957, prior to Alaskan and Hawaiian statehood, only 48 states are included.

II. FINDINGS: STATIC RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN EXPENDITURES AND SERVICES

The expenditure-service linkage does not appear to be strong. The coefficients of simple correlation reported in Table 1 show that 40 of the service measures (59 percent) have relationships with *any* of the expenditure measures

TABLE 1. COEFFICIENTS OF SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION BETWEEN MEASURES OF SPENDING AND SERVICES, 1962†

	Simple Correlation			*Partial Correlation*‡		
	Spending Measure:			Spending Measure:		
	a	*b*	*c*	*a*	*b*	*c*
Education						
teacher-pupil	41*	−01	−08	23	16	−02
BA teachers	00	08	29*	−05	03	29
MA teachers	42*	06	35*	24	27	35*
vocational ed	−20	33*	12	−05	−05	04
school lunch	−35*	37*	08	11	12	10
rehab process	−39*	−07	−07	−34*	−38*	−11
rehab experience	−54*	−15	−05	−38*	−43*	−04
attendance	09	−01	06	−02	−14	−06
school term	17	−21	01	−04	−06	09
consolidation	−22	−18	−11	−25	−20	−07
median ed	76*	21	27	37*	33*	37*
5th grade ed	62*	−01	13	44*	24	19
high school ed	81*	28*	30*	48*	43*	43*
college ed	66*	17	34*	20	27	36*
school completion	25	−30*	15	−16	−22	−23
exam success	65*	08	16	40*	20	17
MA ed	18	14	00	02	04	−03
Dr ed	39*	−03	25	17	17	28
college enroll	07	09	−05	−05	−04	−08
own state enroll	05	09	−05	−05	−02	−07
Highways						
total roads	41*	44*	47*	18	07	25
rural roads	−34*	−27	−18	07	−07	11
urban roads	43*	57*	57*	28	25	27
paved roads	−04	−21	−14	23	32*	26
4 & 6 lane roads	−25	−25	−27	−09	−13	−21
interstate miles	73*	59*	46*	37*	25	21

* Significant at the .05 level.

† For the definition of spending measures *a-c* see the text above; for the definition of service measures see the Appendix.

‡ With variables *d-i* controlled.

TABLE 1 (continued)

	Simple Correlation			*Partial Correlation*		
	Spending Measure:			Spending Measure:		
	a	*b*	*c*	*a*	*b*	*c*
interstate completion	77*	60*	56*	51*	43*	40*
interstate progress	−34*	−45*	−39*	−04	−01	−02
road safety	−40*	−55*	−47*	01	04	−11
Public welfare						
OAA recipients	−02	−07	−18	−13	−07	−11
MAA recipients	−08	−10	−14	−06	−07	−08
AFDC recipients	21	−07	02	24	27	29
AB recipients	00	−07	01	−05	−04	−03
APTD recipients	29*	17	17	26	23	26
OAA payment	36*	01	02	53*	50*	47*
AFDC payment	21	−19	−13	41*	35*	38*
AB payment	37*	−03	04	56*	52*	54*
APTD payment	18	−07	02	25	16	24
child welfare	08	14	06	13	14	09
Hospital & hospitals						
hospital beds	24	−16	04	06	−04	−07
hospital bassinets	00	−07	−33*	06	−03	−10
mental hospitals	07	−11	−04	03	04	−02
mental treatment	20	−15	−04	−03	−11	−16
mental handicap hosp	−11	−14	−45*	−13	−19	−28
physicians	40*	−11	12	−08	−11	−19
dentists	33*	23	33*	20	21	26
child health	19	05	14	16	16	14
white infants	08	−14	17	−16	−11	−08
nonwhite infants	04	−15	−15	−13	−16	−22
Natural resources						
extension agents	25	49*	35*	50*	52*	39*
ag researchers	62*	65*	54*	52*	49*	35*
soil conservation	−47*	−33*	−37*	−36*	−28	−30*
mapped conservation	−41*	−37*	−36*	−08*	−08	−10
ag conservation	−07	03	−06	13	17	04
parkland	43*	39*	27	20	15	03
park space	16	13	08	09	11	06
park visits	18	15	14	15	09	07
fish license	52*	60*	54*	42*	41*	34*
hunt license	49*	58*	48*	40*	40*	29
Public safety						
murder	26	10	11	−33*	−30*	−37*
rape	−37*	−28*	−23	−02	00	−05
robbery	−43*	−34*	−40*	−01	−02	−06
assault	−11	−21	−27	−18	−18	−32*
burglary	−51*	−48*	−43*	−22	−25	−29
larceny	−65*	−59*	−43*	−42*	−39*	−38*
auto theft	−67*	−60*	−54*	−38*	−38*	−41*
paroles	20	22	16	22	21	10
parole success	−12	−12	−16	−02	00	−11

strong enough to be statistically significant.[10] Yet there is a lower incidence of significant relationships between the service measures and all of the three expenditure measures. Of the 204 possible relationships between spending and services, only 78 (38 percent) are significant. Moreover, 37 of these relationships are negative! Only 41 (20 percent) of the simple relationships between spending and services are significant in the expected direction. Public officials may spend at high levels in the face of low service performance in the hope of elevating the level of services at some time in the future.

The relationship between spending and services appears even weaker when the influence of variable *d-i* are taken into consideration. Table 1 also reports coefficients of partial correlation between the measures of spending and service while controlling for measures pertaining to Federal aid, administration size and salary, state-local centralization and economic development. Only 23 (34 percent) of the service measures show significant partial correlations with any of the spending measures. Of the 204 possible relationships between the three spending measures and service indicators, 51 (25 percent) are significant, and 35 of them (17 percent) in the expected direction.

If government expenditures do not exert prevailing influence upon the quality or quantity of public services, what does explain the nature of services? For most of the service indicators considered here, the question must remain unanswered. For only 24 of the service indicators (35 percent) do the combination of a spending measure and variables *d-i* account for at least 50 percent of the interstate variation. These are the service indicators having a coefficient of multiple determination (R^2) of at least .50. The remaining 44 service indicators respond to elements not considered in the present study. Table 2 shows coefficients of partial correlation between the independent variables and each service indicator having an R^2 of at least .50. Measures of spending show significant, positive relationships with 15 of the 25 service indicators of Table 2. Only in the case of five service indicators, however, does a spending measure show a stronger positive coefficient of partial correlation than any of the other independent variables. Spending measures show their strongest positive relationships with payments for Old Age Assistance and Aid to the Blind, Agricultural Researchers, Proportion of Interstate Mileage Completed, and College Graduates. Public safety spending shows strong relationships with crimes of Larceny and Auto Theft, but the direction of the relationships suggests that high crime rates lead to spending, rather than that spending acts upon the crime rate.

Measures of administration size, state-local centralization, per capita personal income and population show some consistent relationships with the service indicators of Table 2. The findings pertaining to administration and personal income suggest that relatively wealthy states with large administrative crops (relative to population) are likely to be high producers of public services. The findings about population suggest that elements generating public services are most likely to occur in states with small populations. The findings about state-local centralization indicate that a *decentralized* system seems to work in behalf of service outputs. Aside from the measures of expenditures, it is only the measures of administrative size and state-local centralization that show the strongest relationships with several measures of service. Per capita personal income shows the strongest coefficient of partial correlation only with school lunch, and population fails to show the strongest coefficient of partial correlation with any of the service indicators.

There are several possible explanations for the general lack of close ties between current measures of government expenditures and public services. The magnitude of funds previously spent in accumulating capital facilities or in assembling a staff of a certain calibre might influence the capacity of current spending to stimulate service outputs. A state may score relatively high in certain types of highway mileage despite relatively low current spending. The market costs of services or products may vary significantly from one area to another. In the case of several programs, private expenditures may affect the service levels and result in weak relationships between government spending and the indicators considered here. Economies of large scale operations may confound the simple relationship between spending and services. Certain characteristics of a program's clientele or its political environment may also influence the efficiency with which money produces services. In the field of education, for example, the family background of students may be a critical ingredient in the quality of services. Where the environment

[10] Because the 48 states are not a random sample, the common tests for significance are not, strictly speaking applicable. They will be used, however, to provide an arbitrary indication of relationships that appear "sizable."

TABLE 2. COEFFICIENTS OF PARTIAL CORRELATION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND SELECTED SERVICE INDICATORS†

	Independent Variables								
	Spending measures			Fedl aid	Employees	Salary	Central.	Pers inc.	Population
	a	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*	*f*	*g*	*h*	*i*
Education									
teacher-pupil	23			−07	15	−21	−51*	25	−41*
teacher-pupil		16		−04	23	−16	−50*	26	−43*
teacher-pupil			−02	01	41*	−07	−48*	21	−47*
school lunch	11			−02	02	−23	17	−40*	11
school lunch		12		−02	03	−24	16	−20	12
school lunch			10	−01	15	−23	20	−39*	10
rehab experience	−38*			16	04	02	47*	12	−04
rehab experience		−43*		17	03	03	50*	−23	−06
median ed	37*			07	25	−01	−45*	15	−22
median ed		33*		10	35*	04	−45*	31*	−23
median ed			37*	08	63*	21	−41*	16	−29
5th grade ed	44*			08	−09	−16	−66*	32*	−44*
5th grade ed		24		14	10	−01	−62*	34*	−46*
5th grade ed			19	15	34*	13	−59*	27	−50*
high school ed	48*			11	29	−08	−49*	18	−27
high school ed		43*		14	40*	−02	−49*	39*	−28
high school ed			43*	13	71*	21	−42*	19	−35*
college ed	20			07	08	03	21	31*	05
college ed		27		07	08	01	18	38*	07
college ed			36*	03	35*	13	26	35*	05
exam success	40*			05	−05	−04	−58*	11	−37*
exam success		20		11	14	11	−54*	18	−40*
exam success			17	12	34*	24	−52*	08	−44*
Highways									
interstate miles	37*			24	46*	05	09	−13	00
interstate miles		25		29	52*	05	05	−02	−03
interstate miles			21	31*	58*	09	08	−09	−02
interstate completion	51*			09	16	−07	09	21	−32
interstate completion		43*		14	24	−05	05	35*	−34*
interstate completion			40*	17	37*	05	12	25	−31*
road safety	01			−31*	−43*	07	−19	32*	−09
road safety		04		−32*	−45*	07	−19	32*	−09
road safety			−11	−26	−46*	03	−23	31*	−11
Public welfare									
OAA recipients	−13			16	51*	−06	27	34*	−25
OAA recipients		−07		16	50*	−07	26	32*	−25
OAA recipients			−11	17	49*	−08	26	34*	−25
AFDC recipients	24			14	−23	40*	30*	38*	−03
AFDC recipients		27		14	−23	42*	28	41*	−04
AFDC recipients			29	12	−18	43*	31*	38*	−04
OAA payment	53*			−31*	19	26	−38*	−11	−17

* Significant at the .05 level.

† Selected are those combinations of a spending measure with variables *d*-*i* that account for at least 50 percent of the interstate variation in a service indicator; the partials shown represent the relationship between an independent variable and a service indicator while controlling for the influence of all other independent variable.

TABLE 2 (continued)

	Independent Variables								
	Spending measures			Fedl aid	Employees	Salary	Central	Pers inc.	Population
	a	*b*	*c*	*d*	*e*	*f*	*g*	*h*	*i*
OAA payment		50*		−31*	21	30*	−39*	−01	−16
OAA payment			47*	−34*	31*	33*	−35*	−13	−15
AFDC payment	41*			−36*	−06	46*	−43*	−10	−35*
AFDC payment		35*		−35*	−03	48*	−43*	−04	−34*
AFDC payment			38*	−38*	04	50*	−41*	−12	−35*
AB payment	56*			−17	15	23	−30*	21	−20
AB payment		52*		−16	18	27	−32*	29	−20
AB payment			54*	−22	29	31*	−28	18	−20
Health & hospitals									
physicians			−19	−25	−21	09	11	33*	15
Natural resources									
extension agents	50*			53*	24	−36*	−34*	−22	−09
extension agents		52*		57*	28	−32*	−37*	−05	−06
extension agents			39*	50*	45*	−26	−27	−21	−09
ag researchers	52*			38*	44*	−08	−24	−03	−48*
ag researchers		49*		41*	49*	00	−27	09	−45*
ag researchers			35*	34*	62*	05	−17	−07	−45*
fish license	42*			42*	18	24	−48*	−43*	−32*
fish license		41*		44*	22	30*	−49*	−31*	−29
fish license			34*	40*	36*	33*	−43*	−42*	−30*
hunt license	40*			41*	21	09	−36*	−26	−27
hunt license		40*		44*	25	15	−38*	−14	−25
hunt license			29	39*	39*	19	−31*	−26	−26
Public safety									
murder	−33*				05	42*	−50*	13	−41*
murder			−37*		−15	38*	−54*	14	−42*
larceny	−42*				−30*	−14	−38*	05	−03
larceny		−39*			−32*	−15	−37*	−21	−05
larceny			−38*		−45*	−27	−41*	00	−04
auto theft	−38*				−10	−08	−23	−06	05
auto theft		−38*			−11	−07	−22	−29	03
auto theft			−41		−30*	−19	−29	−08	05

supports favoritism in the hiring of personnel or in the choice of sites for new facilities, then the ratio between financial inputs and outputs in desired services may be less than where "professional" criteria prevail. Measures of such characteristics may add considerably to the present capacity to explain interstate variations in public services.

III. FINDINGS: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CHANGES IN SPENDING AND SERVICES

It is possible that changes in spending may exert great influence over changes in public services, despite the lack of strong relationships between current spending and the current level of services. Such phenomena as the level of private support for services, characteristics of a program's clientele or its political environment may remain stable over a period of several years so that increases in government spending can act upon the quality or quantity of public services.

In order to test the relationships between changes in expenditures and changes in public services, the analyses above were repeated using measures of 1957–62 percentage change in variables *a*–*i* and measures of 1957–62 percentage change for those service indicators

TABLE 6. RELATION OF LEVELS OF ASSESSMENT TO SUPPORT FOR DIFFERENT PROPOSITIONS

Proposition	Year	Correlation with Popular Vote	Assessment Value Property Vote
School Bonds	1960	−.05	−.02
Street Improvements	1963	−.17	−.01
Court Constructions	1963	−.17	−.01
Parks Improvement	1963	−.17	−.02
Cultural Center Construction	1963	−.20	−.01
Street Improvement	1964	−.13	.01
Cultural Center Construction	1964	−.17	−.01

According to Table 6 precinct assessment level is not a determining factor in bond elections. Both popular and property votes correlate negatively with assessment level but the relationships are not significant. This analysis is important for several reasons. First, we see that no category of property owners, regardless of size of holdings, votes as a bloc for or against bonds and no standard of public conduct can be deduced from voting tendencies of either large or small owners. More importantly, we have noted before that universal suffrage, as represented by the popular vote, is closely related to voting decisions of property owners. Therefore, we can conclude from the findings in Table 6 that since neither vote relates to assessment level, popular voting relates to property voting regardless of the amount of property holding in the precincts. These findings again suggest that institutional requirements which divide the electorate according to property ownership do not produce meaningful divisions in electoral responses. The belief that political decisions diverge according to propertied and non-propertied interests in an oversimplification of political motivations and it is doubtful that aspects of elections and voting perceived as undersirable can be excised simply by excluding the propertyless from the electorate.[10]

[10] Both popular and property voting exhibit curvilinear relationships with assessment level in that bond issues support is usually somewhat higher in both high and low assessment precincts than in middle range assessment precincts. In the 1960 school bond election the percentage of precincts in the 70 percent and above popular support category was: low assessment precincts, 73.2; high, 65.3; medium, 51.4 The relation is similar also for property voting. In both high and low assessment categories, 50 percent of the precincts were found in the 50 percent and above property vote support category in the 1963 Streets issue contrasted with only 40.4 percent of middle range precincts.

Following the advocates of a restricted franchise, a propertied electorate should possess greater expertise and sophistication in judging public policy than an electorate operating under universal suffrage. In the generality of elections we would expect to see this greater sophistication evidenced not only by greater consistency in types of electroal choices made through time but also by greater discrimination among choices within the same election. In Table 7, where bond elections are compared with one another, we find very high correspondence in popular and property voting for propositions offered at the same election, but little relationship between voting at different elections. Within a single year, 1963 for example, the correlations among both the popular and property votes for different proposals ranged from .85 to .92. The relationships between votes on proposals for different years, however, were considerably lower, ranging from .04 to .14 for the 1960 and 1963 votes. Even when the proposals are exactly the same, as they were in the 1963 and 1964 elections, the correlations among the same propositions at different elections are only moderately high, ranging from .50 to .61.

The consistency of voting within elections suggests a large amount of straight ticket voting. Apparently neither popular nor property voters discriminate very much in bond referenda even when quite different issues are involved (as they were in the New Orleans elections). However, between elections, the character of the relationships indicates that little consistency exists in policy selections over time. A vote for street repairs in one year, on the part of either electorate, does not guarantee

TABLE 7. RELATIONSHIP OF VOTES WITHIN ELECTIONS AND BETWEEN DIFFERENT ELECTIONS

	Within Elections		
	1960 Election	1963 Election	1964 Election
	Range of Correlations		
Popular Vote:		.88–.92	.88
Property Vote:		.85–.91	.77
	Between Elections		
	1960 Vote	1963 Vote	1964 Vote
1960			
Popular vote		.10–.14	.17–.23
Property vote		.04–.10	.21–.24
1963 Vote			
Popular vote	.10–.14	—	.57–.61
Property vote	.04–.10	—	.50–.56
1964 Vote			
Popular vote	.17–.23	.57–.61	—
Property vote	.21–.24	.50–.54	—

TABLE 5. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POPULAR AND PROPERTY VOTING IN HIGH AND LOW POPULAR VOTE PRECINCTS

Issue and Popular Support Level	Property Vote					
School Bonds (1960)	Below 40%	40–59%	60–79%	80–89%	90% and above	No. of Precincts
Highest Precincts (over 80%)	0	1	17	23	17	58
Lowest Precincts (below 60%)	3	22	8	1	1	35
Street Improvements (1963)	Below 40%	40–49%	50–69%	70–79%	80% and above	
Highest Precincts (over 70%)	1	2	11	14	10	38
Lowest Precincts (below 40%)	22	1	1	0	0	24
Cultural Center (1964)						
Highest Precincts (over 70%)	1	2	12	13	10	38
Lowest Precincts (below 40%)	15	3	0	0	0	18

at the same time displaying none of the costs in rationality and prudence in political attitude that critics have feared. The conclusions are comparative, of course, and are based on the fact that there are no overall differences between popular and property voting.

In Table 5 we have further investigated the relationship between the popular and the property vote by isolating two extreme groups of precincts. The significance of the relationships here is that even in extremely favorable or unfavorable vote precincts we continue to find a high degree of correspondence in the popular and the property vote. If differences were to be found in the two votes, we would expect them to show up more clearly in precincts which gave either very high or very low support to the bond issues. If for example, a precinct voted over 90 percent for bonds in the popular vote, we would expect to find, if property-based differences exist, that the property vote would be at least significantly less favorable to bonds.

Table 5 reinforces our earlier findings, showing that only very minor differences exist between popular and property votes. Although property voting lags somewhat behind popular voting in the highly favorable precincts, the trend definitely is toward a high degree of correspondence between the two. For example, in the school bond issue only 18 of the 58 precincts giving high popular support fell below the 80 percent level of support in the property vote. In the cultural center proposal, all 18 precincts giving low popular support gave equally low property vote support. Certainly differences exist between the precincts; the support continuum ranges from very low support to very high support. But the same sorts of variations are present in both popular and property votes. Furthermore, there is a high degree of correspondence between the two votes regardless of direction of support. Circumstances in each precinct or in individual areas of the city may predispose the voters to vote in a certain way, but the ownership of property itself is not a significant factor.

We next consider the possibility that large property owners may react differently from small property owners and that consideration of property voters as a single group may obscure contrasts with the popular vote. Certainly, divisions among members of the propertied class have been noted by political theorists and we would not expect large owners and small entrepreneurs necessarily to react the same. To determine what sorts of differences exist among property holders we have separated groups of precincts according to variations in the level of assessment.[9] In this way we are able to introduce a discrimination among kinds of property holdings according to levels of assessment, ranging in New Orleans from below $10,000 to a high of more than $8,000,000.

[9] Assessment levels were derived by selecting the greatest amount of money voted in individual precincts in any of the elections. Precincts were divided into 26 assessment level categories. This form of estimation was required since no assessment figures are maintained by the city on a precinct basis.

TABLE 3. DISTRIBUTION OF PRECINCTS IN BOND ISSUE SUPPORT CATEGORIES*

% Support	Schools 1960		Streets 1963		Cultural Center 1964	
	No. of Precincts		No. of Precincts		No. of Precincts	
	Popular Vote	Property Vote	Popular Vote	Property Vote	Popular Vote	Property Vote
0–9	1	2	1	4	0	1
10–19	0	0	0	9	0	3
20–29	0	2	5	17	1	13
30–39	5	3	18	52	17	50
40–49	4	21	84	97	87	95
50–59	25	48	118	67	128	84
60–69	100	93	54	32	47	40
70–79	125	86	27	25	25	18
80–89	49	42	8	10	11	9
Over 90	9	21	3	5	2	5
	318	318	318	318	318	318
Coefficient of Variation	15.6	20.9	22.4	34.2	20.7	29.3

* We have found it sufficient to use one proposal vote from each election because of the high correlation among proposals in the sam election. In all, our sample of proposals includes the school bond issue of 1960, four of the seven proposals in the 1963 election and two of the six in the 1964 election. We selected the proposals to give adequate representation for different kinds of issues.

property voters are united among themselves in a common purpose, either to spend lavishly or to choke off expenditures.

Neither the property nor the popular vote constitutes anything approaching a "class" vote. As a result, we could conclude that both groups are responding to motivations other than economic self-interest interpreted as either an increased tax burden by property holders or as free public facilities by the popular voters. Even if the property holders were to find that their self-interest were to be realized in favoring public projects for the benefit of all, regardless of cost to themselves, our data does not indicate that all property holders favor bonds. Neither are popular votes grouped only at high support levels. Regardless of how an economic interest is interpreted or postulated, we cannot point to well-defined patterns of voting based on property ownership.

Table 4 compares the property and popular voting within precincts by the use of coefficients of correlation. In election after election the two are rather highly correlated. Since the historic arguments against universal suffrage have concerned the damaging effects of popular voting as compared to property-restricted voting, the relatively close correspondence of popular and propertied voting seems quite significant.

Even though increased legitimacy and support for regimes could be anticipated with a broadened suffrage, the proponents of property restrictions have maintained that the costs, namely a lack of responsibility and restraint in government, would be too high. Much of the force of the argument evaporates, however, on the demonstration that popular voting corresponds quite closely to property voting; the two groups of voters approach the conduct of public affairs and view public policy in much the same fashion.

Viewed this way universal suffrage conveys important gains for the political system while

TABLE 4. CORRELATION OF POPULAR AND PROPERTY VOTING FOR SEVEN PROPOSALS

Proposals	Year	Coefficient of Correlation
School Bonds	1960	.70
Street Improvement	1963	.73
Court Construction	1963	.77
Park Improvement	1963	.74
Cultural Center Construction	1963	.77
Street Improvement	1964	.68
Cultural Center Construction	1964	.71

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE OF PRECINCTS IN BOND ISSUE APPROVAL AND VOTE CATEGORIES (N-318)

% Support	Schools 1960		Streets 1963		Cultural Center 1964	
	% of precincts		% of precincts		% of precincts	
	Popular Vote	Property Vote	Popular Vote	Property Vote	Popular Vote	Property Vote
Vetoed (Below 50%)	3.1%	8.8%	34.0%	56.3%	33.0%	50.9%
Approved (Above 50%)	96.9	91.2	66.0	43.7	67.0	49.1
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

them without their having to bear the costs of increased taxation.

The subject-matter of the different bond proposals has apparently had little effect on the way in which popular and property votes have gone. Elections included in Table 1 dating from 1932 have included a wide variety of issues such as street paving and maintenance, airport construction, police protection, public parks and playgrounds, a civic center, and a cemetery for indigents. Not all of these proposals we imagine, would benefit all voters in the same way. For example, we suppose that increased fire and police protection and better airport facilities would benefit property owners more, while public parks and playgrouds and certainly a paupers' cemetery would provide more appeal for propertyless voters. But the city-wide vote in the eight defeated proposals does not follow a simple self interest pattern. The five issues defeated by *both* property and popular votes included proposals for parks and playgrounds, an indigent cemetery, money for a cultural center, municipal auditorium maintenance, and a branch library. The three issues defeated by the property vote alone involved a park proposal, an incenerator system, and additional police and fire protection. Thus, while the property electorate has been slightly more discriminating and negative than the popular electorate, the direction of the additional discrimination indicates no consistent pattern of evaluation. The popular electorate, on the other hand, has been almost as discriminating but also has followed no consistent pattern of appraisal of issues according to a plausible theory of economic self-interest.

Long term policy decisions reveal few differences, but these necessarily overshadow more specific variations which may exist in voting in individual referenda. Viewed according to whether issues are approved or vetoed, Table 2 indicates that in all three proposals more popular than property vote precincts are found in the bond issue approval category. This initially appears to support the Kent-Adams thesis concerning high government spending under an unrestricted franchise. However, Kent believed that voting would reflect a clearly defined propertied and nonpropertied class conflict. Even though the precinct popular vote approves bonds with greater frequency than the property vote, no sharp cleavage of the sort that Kent envisioned is exhibited between the two votes. The conception of a class vote is blurred more particularly by Table 3 where the full range of responses in the popular and property vote is presented for the same three proposals. Although greater variation exists in the property vote, both the popular and the property votes are spread throughout the support continuum.

We observe that the popular vote exhibits considerable restraint in that in all proposals there are fewer popular vote than property vote precincts at the 80 and 90 percent and above levels of support; still others are scattered at the lowest levels of the popular support continuum. While it is true that greater variation exists in the property vote, it is not solely in the direction of opposition to the bond proposals. The property vote also provides examples of very high support by precincts. Some larger than average property owners are more reluctant than the average property voter to approve bond proposals, but other large property owners are clearly more eager than the average voter. To illustrate, in the proposal to issue bonds for street repairs in 1963, 13 precincts supported the proposals by less than 20 per cent favorable porperty vote while 15 other precincts voted more than 80 per cent property assessments in favor of bonds. What this means is that neither the popular not the

TABLE 1. SUCCESS OF REFERENDA PROPOSALS ACCORDING TO PROPERTY AND POPULAR VOTING, 1932–64

	%	N
Both passed	87.7	(57)
Popular vote passed, property vote failed	4.6	(3)
Popular vote failed, property vote passed	0.0	(0)
Both failed	7.7	(5)
	100.0	(65)

same manner as do real estate or home owners. Therefore, even though automobile owners are property holders in the strict sense, we felt that the amount of property involved was so small that this large group of voters could be considered essentially "propertyless" and their votes considered as the decisions of what would otherwise be an unrestricted electorate. Of course, the ideal situation would be to compare a strictly propertied vote with a strictly non-propertied vote. But in New Orleans this ideal setting does not exist and hence, it is necessary instead to utilize the conditions which are available to explore effects of these two votes.

Considerable justification and support for this procedure exists when we survey the actual effect that "automobile franchising" has had in creating a large body of bond election voters who without the automobile, could not vote in these elections. In 1963, for example, 168,250 automobile tax assessments were mailed to New Orleans residents as compared to 111,317 real estate notices.[7] Assuming that most real estate owners also own automobiles, the difference of 56,933 is a large group of people enfranchised through the automobile. Although in some cases more than one tax bill was sent to individuals owning two or more cars, the number of tax bills can be taken as a rough estimate of the total number of persons owning automobiles. The number enfranchised by automobile ownership alone (56,993) is about one-third as many persons as are registered to vote in the city of New Orleans, a little less than 200,000. Another effect may be observed in the comparison of precincts in which little property is voted, where enfranchisement clearly is by automobile ownership, and those in which really substantial amounts of property are owned and voted. In one precinct, Precinct 14 of Ward 14, over $8,000,000 in assessed property was voted in 1964 while in several precincts in working class wards the total amount voted by a comparable number of voters was less than $50,000. Some voters cast a property vote of considerable substance while others vote negligible amounts; the latter qualify clearly by the automobile assessment.

To conduct the study we have collected election returns from 318 precincts in New Orleans for three separate elections; these returns represent both a popular vote and a property vote in each instance. We also have a variety of other social and political information from these precincts to enable us to examine various aspects of the problem.[8]

II. POPULAR AND PROPERTY VOTING COMPARED

Given the distinctive virtues that the propertied franchise purports to contribute, we would expect to see major differences in the kinds of decisions made by propertied and popular voters. In the case of bond elections where the bonds must be redeemed through the taxes collected from property holders, the nineteenth century theories suggest that popular voters would tend to favor expenditures for public projects which would likely benefit

[7] Data obtained from New Orleans Board of Assessors.

[8] While the literature on bond and tax referenda contains no comparative studies of popular and property voters, certain other findings are relevant for the general theory. Perhaps the most common finding is a curvilinear relationship between social status (variously defined as income, class, and size and nature of property holding) and support of bond referenda. Greatest support is found among low status groups and highest status groups while lowest support occurs among middle status groups. The most explicit investigation of the problem occurs in James Q. Wilson and Edward C. Banfield, "Public Regardingness as a Value Premise in Voting Behavior," this REVIEW, 58 (December, 1964), 876–887, but see also: Robert H. Salisbury and Gordon Black, "Class and Party in Partisan and Non-Partisan Elections: The Case of Des Moines," this REVIEW, 57 (September, 1963), 584–593; James A. Norton. "Referenda Voting in a Metropolitan Area," *Western Political Quarterly*, 16 (March, 1963), 195–212; Alvin Boskoff and Harmon Zeigler, *Voting Patterns in a Local Election* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1964), ch. 3; Oliver P. Williams and Charles R. Adrian, *Four Cities: A Study in Comparative Policy Making* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), ch. 5.

a vigilant government, and a firm administration of justice, to counteract that tendency.[3]

More than fifty years after Kent spoke, many of the same implications about the suffrage can be drawn from the comments of such reform groups as the Tilden Commission, requested by the Governor of New York to inquire into the problems and prospects of local government. The Commission found that many of the evils of local government resulted from irresponsible spending and financing by local political officials responsible only to the popular electorate. The non-taxpayers, reported the Commission, made up the bulk of the "unreflecting vicious population" which cared little for the prudent conduct of government.[4] A recent statement of the theory by the Louisiana State Law Institute contains similar implications of the presence in property owners of a "stake in society," prudence in government and responsibility in the management of political affairs:

The property requirement is based on the close relationship between local improvements and the tax source for these local improvements. It has been considered a sufficient brake on local spending and indebtedness if the people who pay the tax bill have the power of deciding whether or not the tax is to be levied.[5]

All these statements imply predictions of voting under the unrestricted franchise. According to the advocates of restricted voting, popular voting results in: 1) irresponsibility and lack of prudence in the conduct of government; 2) the existence of a class vote; and 3) a lack of interest in government since the mass lack a "stake in society."

The questions raised by John Adams and Chancellor Kent about the effects of entrusting a capitalist society to a popular electorate and the fears they voiced concerning the character of the decisions made under universal suffrage have not been investigated by satisfactory empirical methods. Particularly, we are in the dark as to how decisions taken by a propertied franchise would differ from those made by an unrestricted franchise. Since the abolition of property qualifications have the popular voters indeed been less prudent in the conduct of government? Did John Adams prophesy correctly when he opined that to abandon the propertied franchise would be to violate his fundamental maxim of government: "never to trust the lamb to the custody of the Wolf."?

Whatever historical analyses of the consequences of property limitations are possible, i.e., comparison of periods when restrictive voting qualifications did and did not exist, there is a particular need for the study of such contemporary situations as may exist. Contemporary investigations not only can explore the relevance of other aspects of the current political context, but provide also the opportunity to utilize current empirical data. Contemporary analysis also furnishes a study in which property and popular voting can be compared during the same period of time and at work upon the same issues and problems of policy.

We are able to conduct such a study as a result of Louisiana's unusual system of voting for bond referenda. Originating in the Louisiana Constitution of 1890, the state system of voting for local bond elections provides that participation shall be restricted to property holders. Moreover, in each election the voter casts two ballots, one stating the amount of his property assessment and another counting as a single personal or popular vote. To pass, each proposal must receive both a majority of the popular and the property vote; less on either vote will defeat the issue.[6] The property vote corresponds to a vote reached by a property franchise while the popular vote corresponds generally to a vote reflecting an unrestricted franchise. Since the popular and the property votes occur simultaneously and refer to the same issues, we have an opportunity to examine their comparative effects under similar conditions.

Although the formal voting requirements restrict the election to property holders only, Louisiana bond referenda actually have developed into elections in which substantial universal suffrage and a property vote exist side by side. This has been accomplished by the widespread ownership of automobiles that becomes a means of qualifying a voter for participation without necessarily conveying a significant sense of "property-ness" to the individual. It is doubtful, for example, that property holders qualified to vote in bond elections solely through the ownerhsip of an automobile perceive or respond to issues in the

[3] James Kent, "Against Universal Suffrage," *The American Political Mind: Selections from the Literature of the United States*, Harry Warfal, Ralph Gabriel and Stanley Williams (eds.), (New York: American Book Company, 1947), I, pp. 261–262.

[4] "Report of the Tilden Commission," *Municipal Affairs* III (1899), 435–454.

[5] Louisiana State Law Institute, *Project of a Constitution for the State of Louisiana with Notes and Studies* (Baton Rouge: 1954), III, 315.

[6] Louisiana, *Constitution*, Art, 14. sec. 14a.

THE IMPACT OF UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE: A COMPARISON OF POPULAR AND PROPERTY VOTING*

KENNETH N. VINES AND HENRY ROBERT GLICK
State University of New York at Buffalo, Temple University

The attainment of universal suffrage over various forms of voting restrictions has been one of the major accomplishments in the development of modern democratic institutions. Struggles for the vote have had to overcome restrictions based on factors such as sex, race and tenure of property. While gaps in the exercise of the franchise still remain, formal restrictions on voting in the United States have been largely removed.

However, an important question, largely uninvestigated, concerns the "costs" of the universal franchise in terms of the quality of government and its impact upon policy decisions. Do the disadvantages of universal suffrage offset advantages said to be gained, particularly in Western nations, such as increased legitimization of decisions and stability of regimes? Many of the past and present opponents of the extension of voting have argued that the poor results to be expected from the impact of universal suffrage far outweigh the advantages. Clearly, the problem of "costs" is important, for it is a crucial element in the argument over democracy and the vote.

In this paper we will investigate the impact of universal suffrage by comparing its operation with that of a propertied vote in the same elections. Property restrictions on voting are important both for the major controversy over universal suffrage they have created and because such restrictions still survive as legally significant categories in the electoral institutions of some states. Evidently, institutional divisions based on property qualifications were created in anticipation of behavioral differences between the two groups of voters, The question of whether such divisions are meaningful in behavioral as well as in institutional terms remains for analysis.

I. INTRODUCTION

By 1856 the last of the states, South Carolina, had abolished the property qualification for voting and thus ended the debate over property and the franchise carried on with such vigor and eloquence in the state constitutional conventions of the early nineteenth century. With the disappearance of the property limitation on voting it appeared that popular democracy had triumphed and the advocates of a priority for property in the franchise had lost the argument.

But while the advocates of a propertied franchise lost the important battle they later manged a limited victory in a minor sector of the electoral system. In twenty-six of the states, the properties interests have succeeded in instituting and maintaining various property qualifications for referenda dealing with bonds and other matters related to local government finance.[1]

Throughout American political thought the structure of the argument over property limitations on voting has shown consistency in the kinds of statements and predictions that have been made. Present from the beginning of the American Republic the debate reached its finest flowering in the state constitutional conventions of Virginia, Massachusetts, and New York in the first part of the nineteenth century where it commanded the attention of such political eminents as Kent, Webster, Story, and Marshall.[2] Particularly indicative of property interest attitudes is the clear and incisive statement of Chancellor Kent at the New York Convention in 1821. Arguing to retain the state's general property qualifications, Kent stated that:

> The tendency of universal suffrage, is to jeopardize the rights of property, and the principles of liberty. There is a constant tendency in human society . . . in the poor to covet . . . the plunder of the rich; in the debtor to relax or avoid the obligation of contracts; in the indolent and profligate, to cast the whole burthens of society upon the industrious and the virtuous . . . . It requires

* We are particularly indebted to Professor Theodore J. Lowi of the University of Chicago for valuable comments on an earlier draft.

[1] Frank Starner, David Leuthold and John McCarty, *General Obligation Bond Financing by Local Governments: A Survey of State Controls* (Berkeley: Bureau of Public Administration, University of California, 1961).

[2] See the speeches cited by Alpheus Thomas Mason, *Free Government in the Making*, 3rd. Ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 404–440.

Education—welfare	
exam success	.905
5th grade ed	.892
school completion	.871
AFDC payment	.790
OAA payment	.750
teacher-pupil	.745
high school ed	.693
mental handicap hosp	.690
median ed	.686
AB payment	.651
murder	−.865
Highway—natural resource	
total roads	.835
interstate miles	.790
ag researchers	.768
hunt license	.744
extension agents	.738
hosp bassinets	.736
soil conservation	.615
interstate progress	−.629
road safety	−.720
rural roads	−.787
Public safety	
rape	.894
auto theft	.890
larceny	.877
burglary	.857
robbery	.809
child health	.705

Twelve of the remaining service indicators contribute weakly to these factors, and 29 others relate together in scattered factors that include from two to four indicators. The three principal factors include most of the indicators that show, by themselves, significant relationships with spending. As noted below, each of the principal factors show some significant relationships with spending. The variety of minor factors show only weak relationships with spending. Like the analysis of separate service indicators, factor analysis reveals services that appear to be linked with government spending. In not every case, however, are the linkages in the direction expected by those who see services dependent upon expenditures. Also, factor analysis reveals that many of the present service indicators show little relationship with government spending.

Because several ingredients in the major factors are not available for 1957, the factor analysis was not repeated in the consideration of changes in services.

For 1962, coefficients of simple correlation between the principal factors and the spending measures are:

	Educ—welf	Highways—nat resource	Publ safety
Education spending			
a	.59*		
b	−.03		
c	.10		
Welfare spending			
a	.12		
b	−.25		
c	−.20		
Highway spending			
a		.67*	
b		.70*	
c		.64*	
Natural resource spending			
a		.44*	
b		.53*	
c		.43*	
Public safety spending			
a			−.57*
b			−.51*
c			−.39*
Total spending			
a	.61*	.34*	−.39*
b	−.09	.59*	.08

* Significant at the .05 level.

dren recipients among people with incomes of less than $2,000 (AFDC recipients)
incidence of Aid to the Blind recipients among people with incomes of less than $2,000 (AB recipients)
incidence of Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled recipients among people with incomes of less than $2,000 (APTD recipients)
average payment per receipient of Old Age Assistance (OAA payment)
average payment per recipient of Aid to Families of Dependent Children (AFDC payment)
average payment per recipient of Aid to the Blind (AB payment)
average payment per recipient to Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD payment)
number of children per 10,000 child population receiving child welfare benefits (child welfare)

Health and hospitals

hospital beds per 10,000 population (hospital beds)
hospital bassinets per 10,000 population (hospital bassinets)
patients per 10,000 population in mental hospitals (mental hospitals)
net live releases from mental hospitals (mental treatment)
patients per 10,000 population in institutions for mental defectives and opileptics (mental handicap hospital)
number of physicians per 100,000 population (physicans)
number of dentists per 100,000 population (dentists)
number of residents per child disability (child health)
percentage of white infants surviving their first year (white infants)
percentage of nonwhite infants surviving their first year (nonwhite infants)

Natural resources

number of cooperative extension agents per 10,000 population (extension agents)
number of agricultural experiment station researchers per 10,000 population (ag researchers)
percentage of farmland in soil conservation districts (soil conservation)
percentage of land in soil conservation districts that is mapped (mapped conservation)
percentage of cropland in Agricultural Conservation Program (ag conservation)
acreage per capita of state parks (parkland)
acreage per visitor of state parks (park space)
visits to state parks per 10,000 population (park visits)
number of fishing licenses sold per 10,000 population (fish license)
number of hunting licenses sold per 10,000 population (hunt license)

Public safety [note: each of the figures pertaining to crime are inverted from their usual presentation to be consistent with the other service indicators. That is, high scores on the following indicators reflect low crime rates and high public service in the field of public safety.]
population per murder and nonnegligent manslaughter offenses (murder)
population per rape offense (rape)
population per robbery offense (robbery)
population per aggravated assault offense (assult)
population per burglary offense (burglary)
population per larceny offense (larceny)
population per auto theft offense (auto theft)
percentage of conditional releases from correctional institutions (paroles)
percentage of conditional releases *not returned* as violators (parole success)

The sources of these measures include Council of State Governments, *The Book of the States*; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States*; U.S. Office of Education, *Digest of Educational Statistics*; Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Rates in the United States*; U.S. Bureau of Prisons, *National Prisoner Statistics*; U.S. Bereau of Public Roads, *Annual Report*; Social Security Administration, *Social Security Bulletin: Annual Statistical Supplement*; U.S. Department of Agriculture, *Agricultural Statistics*; National Education Association, *Rankings of the States*; U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Agriculture*.

In gathering the data an effort was made to obtain measurements as close as possible to 1962 for the static analysis, and as close to 1957 for the analysis of change. In each case, it is assumed that the recorded data provide reasonably accurate indications of fact. It is recognized, however, that the quality of the data may occasionally disappoint the author's hopes. For comments on the quality of specific measurements, the reader is referred to the sources noted above.

APPENDIX II

The results of factor analysis tend to confirm the findings in the text. Three principal factors result from the analysis of 68 service indicators. Their names derive from the indicators having the highest loadings with each:

state to another; economies of scale may affect the spending-service linkage; or the nature of clientele and political environment may influence the spending-service relationship.

The present findings should temper expectations about the results of current government spending. By themselves, however, they do not stand as an argument against increases in government spending. The findings are the product of gross analysis, employing the large categories of education, highways, public welfare, health and hospitals, natural resources and public safety. The results do not mean that focused increases in spending will fail to improve particular services or institutions. Furthermore, the findings do not strike at the variety of reasons for increasing public expenditures that do not assume an early increase in services. Such reasons include the desire to keep salaries of public employees equivalent to people in comparable nongovernmental positions; and the desire to improve staff or physical plant for the sake of obtaining service improvements over the long range or for the sake of avoiding a deterioration of services. The data here only warn that gross levels of spending do not reflect service levels, and that gross increases in spending are not likely to produce early gross improvements in services.

APPENDIX I

Each of the following indicators of public service seems capable of responding to the expenditures of state and local governments. They are defined so that high scores reflect high quality or quantity of public service. The short titles of each indicator are given in parenthesis. It is these short titles that are used in the Tables.

Education

number of teachers per 100 pupils (teacher-pupil)
percentage of elementary teachers with at least the bachelors degree (B.A. teachers)
percentage of secondary teachers with at least the masters degree (M.A. teachers)
total enrollment in Federally-aided vocational education per 10,000 population (vocational ed)
percentage of school enrollment participating in the Federal school lunch program (school lunch)
number of persons in process of vocational rehabilitation per 10,000 population (rehab process)
number of persons experiencing vocational rehabilitation per 10,000 population (rehab experience)
average percentage of students attending daily in elementary and secondary schools (attendance)
length of school term (school term)
population per school district (consolidation)
median number of school years completed by persons 25 years and older (median ed)
percentage of persons 25 years and over with at least five years of school completed (5th grade ed)
percentage of persons 25 years and over with at at least four years of high school (high school ed)
percentage of persons 25 years and over with at least four years of college (college ed)
percentage of eighth graders who graduate from high school four years later (school completions)
percentage of selective service registrants passing mental examination (exam success)
earned masters degrees per 10,000 population conferred by all institutions of higher education (M.A. ed)
earned doctors degrees per 10,000 population conferred by all institutions of higher education (Dr. ed)
enrollment in institutions of higher education per 10,000 population (college enroll)
enrollment of native in their own state's institutions of higher education per 10,000 population (own state enroll)

Highways

mileage per capita of state-administered roads (total roads)
mileage per rural resident of state administered rural roads (rural roads)
mileage per urban resident of municipal roads (urban roads)
percentage of farms on improved (not dirt) roads (paved roads)
percentage of four or six lane miles among the Federally-aided mileage completed during 1963 (4&6 lane roads)
mileage per capita of interstate highways open to traffic by 1963 (interstate miles)
percentage of the designated interstate mileage completed by 1963 (interstate completion)
percentage of the designated interstate mileage completed or in progress by 1963 (interstate progress)
state residents per motor vehicle death (road safety)

Public welfare

incidence of Old Age Assistante recepients among people over 65 and with incomes of less than $2,000 (OAA recipients)
incidence of Medical Assistance for the Aged recipients among people over 65 and with incomes of less than $2,000 (MAA recipients)
incidence of Aid to Families of Dependent Chil-

TABLE 3 (continued)

	Simple Correlation			Partial Correlation‡		
	Spending Measure:			Spending Measure:		
	a	*b*	*c*	*a*	*b*	*c*
park space	25	14	−09	41*	32*	−26
park visits	16	19	−10	12	11	−24
fish license	−11	−04	−21	−06	01	−26
hunt license	15	21	−15	19	24	−18
Public safety						
murder	11	12	05	16	17	15
robbery	10	09	06	14	14	11
assault	01	07	−01	07	07	07
burglary	02	00	03	05	05	07
larceny	06	00	02	−01	−02	−07
auto theft	01	−01	−03	−01	−01	−05
paroles	−08	−07	−04	−08	−07	−02

where the data was available. The 1957–62 period was selected to take advantage of the data collected by the Census of Governments in those years. In general, both expenditures and service levels increased slowly during the period. Presumably, the five-year span includes some of the lag that may occur between changes in spending and changes in services. Table 3 reports coefficients of simple and partial correlation pertaining to changes in spending and services.

The analysis of change shows even fewer relationships between spending and services than the static analysis. Of the 45 service indicators for which measures of change are available, 14 (29 percent) show significant simple relationships with any measure of change in spending. Of the 135 possible relationships between changes in three measures of spending and services, 26 (19 percent) are significant. Twenty of the relationships (15 percent) are significant in the expected direction. When the influence of change in variables *d–i* is taken into account by partial correlation techniques, it is found that 11 (24 percent) of the service measures show significant relationships with any of the spending measures. Of the 135 possible relationships between measures of change in spending and services, 28 (21 percent) are significant. Twenty-one (16 percent) of the partial correlations are significant in the expected direction.

On the basis of the existing data, it is virtually impossible to assess the elements that do influence changes in public services. The coefficients of multiple determination derived from this analysis reveal that combinations of present independent variables explain 50 percent of the interstate variation for only three of the service indicators! It is possible that the five year time span built into the analysis is not long enough to allow changes in the independent variables to affect changes in public services. Or perhaps other elements subject to state by state measurement—beside those included in variables *a–i* are generally influential with respect to changes in services. Or perhaps marked changes in services typically result from the fortuitous combination of elements that do not lend themselves to state by state measurement. For example, changes in personnel within the executive or legislative branches of state government, or changes in local leadership may occur in ways that permit a sudden take-off of service levels.

IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In contrast to the assumptions of several authors, it is evident that the levels of state and local government spending do not exert pervasive influence upon the nature of public services. There are many weak relationships and some negative relationships between current spending and services, and between changes in spending and changes in services. There are several possible reasons for the lack of expected relationships between spending and services. The level of private spending or previous capitalization may affect the present measures of services enough to obscure some of the influence from current government spending; market costs may vary from one

TABLE 3. COEFFICIENTS OF SIMPLE AND PARTIAL CORRELATION BETWEEN MEASURES OF CHANGE IN SPENDING AND SERVICES, 1957–62†

	Simple Correlation			Partial Correlation‡		
	Spending Measure:			Spending Measure:		
	a	*b*	*c*	*a*	*b*	*c*
Education						
teacher-pupil	−01	−13	−03	−09	−15	03
vocational ed	−04	11	19	−11	−09	05
rehab process	−16	−19	−08	−21	−02	−02
rehab experience	−03	04	−24	−28	−27	−09
school completion	−14	−19	−21	−32*	−24	−20
exam success	−11	−23	−24	−21	−20	−27
MA ed	−07	−09	−11	−12	−11	−15
Dr ed	06	−11	−04	−09	−15	−07
college enroll	−12	−05	01	00	01	13
Highways						
total roads	30*	26	23	06	05	05
rural roads	08	11	00	−02	02	01
urban roads	03	06	03	28	27	22
4 & 6 lane roads	13	07	20	05	05	14
interstate miles	−36*	−35*	−36*	−49*	−48*	−46*
interstate completion	−43*	−41*	−42*	−50*	−49*	−47*
road safety	−02	13	09	33*	33*	33*
Public welfare						
OAA recipients	15	15	16	14	13	00
AFDC recipients	27	38*	39*	51*	53*	56*
AB recipients	12	19	31*	09	12	27
APTD recipients	−03	01	−02	12	13	−02
OAA payment	−01	23	16	01	29	17
AFDC payment	00	29*	38*	01	46*	53*
AB payment	−06	13	18	−03	18	18
APTD payment	30*	08	17	29	04	20
Health & hospitals						
hospital bassinets	32*	31*	28*	38*	37*	33*
mental hospitals	00	01	03	08	08	08
physicians	92*	86*	89*	94*	90*	92*
dentists	92*	86*	89*	94*	90*	93*
white infants	25	27	28*	25	26	28
nonwhite infants	17	19	20	14	16	16
Natural resources						
extension agents	−07	−05	28*	−05	−07	18
ag researchers	−03	04	−23	−05	−01	−18
soil conservation	−16	−23	05	−14	−20	08
parkland	38*	38*	−23	37*	35*	−05

* Significant at the .05 level.

† For the definition of the spending measures *a-c* see the text above; for the definition of service measures see the Appendix.

‡ With changes in variables *d-i* controlled.

tables 2, 3, and 4 are in no case significant at .05.

Finally, assuming contrary to what has been shown, that *HJ* is free of defects, an alternative theory might be offered to explain the author's data: to wit—that strong ego judges make "objective" decisions while weak ego judges make "subjective" ones. A breakdown of the data in *HJ* into these categories shows that, on the author's test,—consistency of data and hypothesis—we may claim as much for our psychological explanation of the behavior observed as can the author for his precedential belief explanation.[7] Thus we are left with the question: Hawaiian judges—what really moves them?

S. SIDNEY ULMER
University of Kentucky

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Ulmer's criticism of my Hawaiian judges study (HJ) is a timely one. It is also complex. Unfortunately, since *APSR* groundrules severely limit the length of reply, I am unable to address myself to more than a few of his points. The first of these concerns Ulmer's fears about the validity of HJ. His point is well taken and I will elaborate on some measures actually implemented during the execution of the study that I neglected to mention in the article in question. A second issue raised by Ulmer's commentary is more fundamental, and I am apprehensive that it augurs a behavioral revisionism originating with a founding father. But first things first.

Ulmer raises the question of the reactive effect of one part of a study design upon another. He observes, with good cause, that the Hawaiian judges' responses to the hypothetical case may have been conditioned by their previous responses to the role questionnaire. This has worried me as well (see pp. 136–137 of my *Political Behavioralism and Modern Jurisprudence*), so I took an additional step in the Hawaiian study to try to ameliorate the degree of influence that the role questionnaire might have. The questionnaire was divided into two parts, the hypothetical case being the second portion. The interviewers informed each judge of this and also told him that he would get the second part upon completion and collection of the first part by the interviewer. Thus, one can hope that a few days elapsed between the filling out of the judicial role section and the deciding of the hypothetical case. Of course, this is only a minimal time delay, but it may have helped reduce reaction. A future adjustment in this technique might be to give the role and attitude sets of questions to the judges without any mention of any latter part. Then, a year or so later, the researcher may return with a set of hypothetical cases for the judges to decide. I believe that this modification of design in the research strategy is quite feasible and would substantially reduce, if not eliminate, the reactive effect built into the design as reported in HJ originally.

It is good that Professor Ulmer brought this matter into the open. Still, I feel he misses the point that this was simply a research note designed to inform my colleagues of an attempted refinement of an earlier, coarser study. The entire tone of Ulmer's critique seems to me to manifest an insensitivity to the arduous process of the sharpening of social scientific instruments. But his tone is only one of many indicators that lead me to sense a strong anti-scientific bias in his analysis. I know this sounds odd, for Ulmer is widely known as a mover in the behavioral study of courts and judges—and this implies at least a sympathy for Matters-Scientific. However, a mere acquaintance with diverse statistical techniques and abstruse jargon is a far cry from understanding them and applying them properly. One wonders, for example, about the necessity of Ulmer's usage of the conventions of set theory in his critique. But let me be more specific on my anti-science charge.

(1) Ulmer states that HJ is of limited worth since only certain factors were selected for study and many other potentially influential factors were omitted from consideration. This is true, but what empirical study in the sciences does not do this? Isolation of a few variables is the very essence of such inquiry. No one with sympathy for Things-Scientific should fault him who limits the focus of his study in order to obtain as precise a measurement of interaction among only a few of the variables generally theorized to be germane and significant. To do so is to fault science primarily and the researcher only as a dupe.

(2) He also seems to imply that when a researcher opts to study the interaction of some factors over others that this manifests bias. In a sense, this is true too. His inference, if I am not mistaken, is that the researcher has a preference for how the research turns out. Isn't Ulmer implying that I have a vested interest in some theory on the importance of precedent and judicial role? I admit that I have a hunch that such factors may be operant in the "ju-

[7] A more detailed explanation of this "theory" and the data breakdown used are available on request.

case of conflict, inferences drawn from observations of behavior in actual decision-making situations would be preferred to those articulated by the judge himself in hypothetical situations, survey and interviewing methods are likely to serve in a validating or confirming role.

To move to the analysis provided raises more serious questions. Formally, the approach is to identify a set of judges with particular characteristics and predict a second set of judges with common attributes. In order to save space, I shall use the language of set theory to describe these procedures. In effect, a universal set, U, is defined as the Hawaiian Judges in the author's sample. Within the universal set three sub-sets are distinguished. Sub-set $A = \{a:a \in U$ and a has the property $P\}$. Element a is the Hawaiian Judge. The property P changes with each of the three hypotheses offered. Using subscripts to designate the number of the appropriate hypothesis, P_1 is "considers the existence of clear, directly relevant precedent to be the single most important factor in influencing judicial decisions . . . ";[4] the definition of P_2 and P_3 may be obtained similarly from hypotheses 2 and 3.

Sub-set B, is defined as $B = \{b:b \in U$ and b has the property $P\}$. In this case, the element b is a judge with the property P_a, P_b, or P_c. P_a is defined in hypothesis 1 as making objective decisions[5] or deciding consistently with precedent. P_b and P_c can be read similarly, from hypotheses 2 and 3. It is hypothesized, in each case, that the elements of sub-set A which fall in sub-set B will exceed the elements in A which do not fall in sub-set B. Or, to express it another way, the conjoint set $C = \{c:c \in A \cup B\} > \{A-C\}$. Should the presence of P_1, be determined by the presence of P_a or P_2 by P_b or P_3 by P_c, the author would be guilty of circularity. While this trap is avoided, a question remains as to the substantive success of the avoidance strategy as opposed to its formal or logical correctness. The identification of a judge with the property P_1, is based upon answers given by the judge to direct-survey questions. The determination of P_a, on the other hand, is based upon observed decision in a hypothetical case. We may ask whether the behavior of the judge (in deciding consistent with or in opposition to precedent) was influenced by the fact that he had informed the investigator of the value he placed on precedent prior to deciding the case furnished him. The avoidance strategy fails precisely to the extent to which such influence is operative.

An additional comment may be offered on methods. Tests of significance are eschewed in *HJ* because six of the twelve cells in the tables contain entries of four or less. Nevertheless, greater use of inferential statistics has been made than is conceded. It is suggested that only a "simple comparison of percentages" is made. But these percentages are compared in four cell tables and it is the cross products from these tables that are assessed. This is necessary since the judges who value precedent highly and do not value personal factors highly split between objective and subjective decisions four-two, seven-ten, and four-four. Only the first of these splits is consistent with the hypotheses offered. This finding must be related, therefore, to the decisions of those judges who do not value precedent highly and those who place great value on personal factors.

The differences in the cross products which result from such comparisons are in all three cases consistent with the hypotheses offered. The differences found, however, could be due to chance. Perhaps the recognition of this fact is responsible for the computation of significance coefficients even after conceding their inapplicability. But were this defect not present, the author's statement that such tests "demonstrate significance in the specific distribution in the tables" appears incorrect.

When Chi square is applied to a problem with one degree of freedom and the entry in any of the four cells is less than ten, Yates correction for continuity should be used. The appropriate formula[6] incorporating this correction is:

$$\chi^2 = \frac{N\left[\,|AD - BC| - \frac{N}{2}\right]^2}{(A+B)(B+D)(C+D)(C+A)}$$

Since each of the author's three tables contain cell entries of less than five and since four-cell tables such as these incorporate one degree of freedom, this formula is applicable to the author's data. Subsequent computations show that the differences in the cross products from

[4] *Op. cit.*, p. 679.

[5] Since objective decision is defined as a decision consistent with the requirement of precedent but contrary to the judge's own "enlightened" view, it is necessary to know whether all judges perceive the requirement of precedent in a given hypothetical case in similar terms. Although the author does not go into this question, consensual cognition must be assumed in his model. Such an assumption may be questioned.

[6] See: J. P. Guilford, *Fundamental Statistics in Psychology and Education* (New York: 1956), p. 237.

events are "strong" or "weak." In an operational setting, major shifts in power relationships are probably "strong" events and thus may lead to significant changes in compatibility relationships. Unless they are perceived as such by the relevant elements of the decision-making process, they cannot of course lead to readjustments of consensual patterns, since these are based on perception rather than actuality.

I also wonder why the application of the concept of consensus should erase the boundary between a single political system and its nonpolitical environment. As far as I know, analysts who have used the concept of consensus experienced no more difficulty in distinguishing between the political and nonpolitical than analysts who apply different organizing principles. For example, Rosenau was not unduly troubled when, in defining a penetrated system as one in which nonmembers of a national society participate authoritatively in its value allocation, he drew no clear distinction between "society" and the political system.

A brief remark on the "political science of adaptation." Here, as he has already demonstrated elsewhere, Rosenau shows his ability and readiness to perceive trends in the discipline, and I am flattered that he considers the concepts of compatibility and consensus suggestive enough to say that they are applicable to adaptive problems on the national as well as on the international level. Yet I wonder if Rosenau, in his zeal to act as spokesman for it, has not made exaggerated avant-garde claims for a field of inquiry whose "distinctive subject matter . . . is the interaction between a political actor and its external environment." Has there ever been an inquiry into political processes with a different subject matter?

WOLFRAM F. HANRIEDER
University of California, Santa Barbara

TO THE EDITOR:

In the September 1966 issue of the REVIEW, the author of an article on Hawaiian judges[1] places some emphasis on the acquisition of knowledge by direct inquiry. One of his stated aims is to get "direct information about . . . judicial attitudes and orientations."[2] Elsewhere, he has explicitly approved the view of Gordon Allport that the way to find out why people behave as they do is to ask them. Essentially the same posture is assumed in *HJ*. Since I believe the emphasis here overdone, I am moved to comment. A few remarks on other aspects of the article will also be offered.

In a 1955 study, Max Gluckman attempted to explain jucicial decision-making among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia. In seeking such explanation, Gluckman eliminated from consideration those motivating factors not manifested by the judge himself and those reasons not pleaded by the litigants to establish the validity of their claims. Taken this position at face value, Gluckman's reviewer found it "incredible . . . unless one is willing to reject out of hand virtually everything that is known about human motivation."[3]

The view expressed in *HJ* seems biased in the same direction as that of Gluckman. Indeed, it is more restrictive since the relevant manifestation is limited to the responses made by the judge to a small number of survey questions. Consequently, March's reaction to Gluckman is equally applicable here. The assumptions that what the judge believes is influential in his decisions is in fact the case and that if he has such information he will share it with the world, may be as questionable as those made by Gluckman. Personally, I am skeptical of the ability of individuals to explain their own decision-making processes. Freudian psychology teaches that what a judge says may be a confession. The determination of what he is confessing to, however, must be derived separately. The nature of the judge's role restricts severely the kinds of values he may articulate in explaining his behavior. In that regard citizen and judge are in quite distinct positions with citizen being much less circumscribed in articulating what moves him.

Moreover, a set of questions such as those put to the Hawaiian judges reflects a particular theory of the factors that determine decision. The questions used in *HJ* do not emphasize political considerations, the impact of interaction processes in collegial settings, and other sociological and psychological principles which behavioral science research has associated with human behavior. While the surveying and interviewing of judges may be a useful adjunct to other approaches, reliance cannot be placed upon that method alone for an understanding of judicial decision-making. Since in

[1] Theodore L. Becker, "A Survey Study of Hawaiian Judges: The Effect on Decisions of Judicial Role Variations," this REVIEW, 60 (Sept. 1966), 677–680.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 677.

[3] James G. March, "Sociological Jurisprudence Revisited, A Review (More or Less) of Max Gluckman," *Stanford Law Review*, 8 (1956), p. 505.

the suggestion that the distinction between the observer and his subject matter is being lost. On the contrary, I stress this distinction on the two occasions when mention is made of an "outside observer": (a) I quote Harold and Margaret Sprout in footnote 3 to illustrate the difference between the external-operational environment and the internal-psychological environment—the former being a "capability setting" that determines a policy's success or failure and that consists of the "factors which an outside observer judges to be relevant and significant in explaining an event or state of affairs." (b) In defining compatibility I apply this notion of an outside observer to underline the point that compatibility is a feasibility relationship between a goal and its operational environment which exists independently of a decision-maker's perception of it. His perception (based on his psychological environment) may suggest to him that the goal is feasible; the operational environment (assessed by an outside observer) may make it unattainable.

2) In my article, I define the concepts of compatibility and consensus as succinctly as possible. I find it hard to believe that Rosenau does not know what I mean by consensus. Rather, I think he means to say that quantifiable indicators of consensus are hard to come by, and that I have not attempted to "operationalize" the concept—which is ture. His questions about whether 10 percent, or 51 percent, or 100 percent agreement among the relevant decision-makers is "sufficient," and whether percentage differences have "different consequences," seem rather rhetorical if not facetious. It is Rosenau's assumption, not mine, that a "head count" of individual decisionmakers might provide a means of measuring consensus. It is at least conceivable that in some societies the relevant elements of a national decision-making process cannot be reduced to clearly identifiable individuals or be made quantifiable in some other way. In that case we may have to resort to more old-fashioned methods and try to assess existing degrees of consensus by examining the attitude and influence of political parties, interest groups, church organizations, mass media, public opinion, and so forth. After all, "it is not enough simply to assert that national leaders are those persons who wield influence in the national community. For . . . there are many levels of influence and in this sense every citizen can be regarded as influential." (James N. Rosenau, *National Leadership and Foreign Policy*, Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press, 1963, p. 5) One might also ask whether Rosenau—in spelling out his concept of a penetrated system—has himself adhered to very exacting standards for operationalizing a concept: how many nonmembers of a national society must participate in its value allocation to make the system penetrated? Ten? Fifty-one? A hundred?

3) Rosenau's First Law of Social Dynamics is certainly applicable to his criticism of my reformulation of the concept of a penetrated system. Here he did not see well at all: "Rather than delimiting such systems in some way, [Hanrieder] posits them as existing whenever decision-making processes are 'strongly affected by external events.' What might this mean? If the world is shrinking and interdependence is mounting, does it not mean all national systems are of the penetrated type?" I clearly state that the effect of external events on the decision-making process is *not* sufficient to make the system penetrated; it must also be able to command wide consensus in accommodating to these events. I considered this point so important that, in defining a penetrated system, I stressed these two necessary conditions by numbering them (1) and (2). There are many contemporary historical examples—Vietnam, for one—that illustrate the possibility that although the world may be shrinking, the impact of external events need not always elicit widespread willingness to adapt to them. Consequently, not all national systems are of the penetrated type or, in any case, they may be penetrated to a different degree.

4) This is not the time or place to discuss the old question of what is political or nonpolitical, but the issues raised here are important and one might wish that Rosenau—although impatient to get on with mapping out yet another trend in the discipline—had paused for a fuller explanation of his position. Developments in weapons technology may not be political in themselves, but the response they evoke in decision-making processes are surely political—not only on the "receiving" end (as a possible threat) but also on the initiating end (as an increment in power). Clearly, Rosenau's conception of an international system is different from mine, and part of our disagreement stems from these differing conceptions. To my way of thinking, capability patterns—coupled with motivational patterns of the major actors—are crucial elements in spelling out the attributes of an international system. Consequently, shifts in the power relationships among actors are important external events to which the decision-making process reacts one way or another—if these shifts are perceived a all. There is no easy answer to the question of which external

COMMUNICATIONS

TO THE EDITOR:

The organization and conduct of the APSA Business Meeting of last September 6, in Chicago's Pick-Congress Hotel, bordered on the grotesque. If this is the way serious conflicts of views among APSA members on practical issues are to be dealt with, why bother with the pretense of free discussion and enlightened majority choice?

1) Certain issues of professional ethics have given rise to strong feelings in a significant fraction of the APSA membership. Why was no time set aside for meaningful discussion of these issues?
2) In true academic form, the appointed committee's Interim Report on Ethical Problems of Political Scientists had managed to bring up almost every conceivable ethical issue but the ones at hand, and to conclude with wholly noncommittal recommendations; yet Question was called before anyone could catch his breath. Now, many colleagues must have communicated on certain issues of ethics to the President; why did he not on this occasion invite one of those concerned up to the rostrum before a vote was taken?
3) Why were all the microphones on the rostrum, none on the floor, with the result that in the beginning of the meeting (when the ethics report was adopted) many members present could hear only the voices from the rostrum?

Next year I trust time will be set aside for meaningful discussion of issues affecting our roles and responsibilities as professional political scientists.

And I trust we will find a way to defeat or rise above the ban on the expression of political principle by the APSA. Obviously the APSA is not a proper vehicle for electoral politics, but when it comes to the basic issues of ethics and politics it should not only be the right but the responsibility of APSA members, as such, to enlighten each other in dialogue and to enlighten the powers that be with unsolicited advice. APSA has till now been altogether too solicitous; I take the calling of Politics not to be apologia or technical servicing of monstrous government policies, but to clarify political alternatives and promote a more enlightened Polity. We were solemnly told at the meeting that our tax exemption might be at stake and that APSA members might become divided by controversy should we permit political positions to be adopted; I rather believe our creature comforts could be saved even through the ordeals of politics, and that our annual meetings could become far more interesting with issues of political responsibility out in the open.

If the APSA cannot be moved to place concern for politics above a more convenient concern with public and governmental relations, then surely we need a new Society for the Study of Political Problems, for those of us who want to get out from under the wings of our own establishment.

CHRISTIAN BAY

University of Alberta

TO THE EDITOR:

It is a tricky business to forecast the responses of an audience which holds such diverse viewpoints as does the readership of this REVIEW—and is so ready to express them individually rather than as members of a "school." Thus I cannot share Professor Rosenau's confidence that he can not only predict but also categorize the reactions of readers who may be critical of my article. I shall therefore limit my remarks to Rosenau's own objections rather than comment on those he attributes to a variety of methodological quarters. These people will in any event speak for themselves.

Being preoccupied with setting forth his thoughts on the emerging "political science of adaptation," Rosenau has confined himself to critical comments which, although sweeping, are so brief that they hardly require summary. In his view, 1) the distinction between the observer and his subject matter has been lost; 2) there is no clear-cut indication of what is meant by compatibility and consensus; 3) my reformulation of the concept of the penetrated system is not sufficiently delimited and hence is confused; 4) I have extended the concept of penetration to cover both political and nonpolitical phenomena, and the concepts of consensus and compatibility obscure the boundaries between political systems and erase the boundary between a single political system and its nonpolitical environment.

1) I am persuaded that Rosenau's First Law of Social Dynamics—that people see what they want to see (or fail to see what they don't want to see)—is probably correct. In his own case, at least, some of his remarks provide a good deal of evidence for its plausibility. Nothing of what I say in my article lends itself to

As I said during the hearings on NSSF:

. . . I appreciate (the) comments about the need to make clear, if not in the bill itself, at least in the report on this bill, that Congress intends to give a mandate for controversy to the National Social Science Foundation. I think if we do anything less than that, the Foundation will not fully realize the potential we hope for it. I think they are going to have to go into the sensitive areas mentioned. If the social sciences are going to be innovative and creative and original, as I think they must be in order to meet the problems of our day on the level of magnitude the problems demand they are going to have to, by definition, be controversial. And, I think if the Foundation starts out with the kind of legislative history we have made during these hearings, there is a better chance that they may do the kind of thing that you and I hope they can do.[39]

Mission-oriented Federal agencies are even less likely to support innovative research in the social sciences. Thomas L. Hughes, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, isolated the reason for this when he testified before our Subcommittee:

As the social sciences develop, it is particularly important that Government support not force them into an inflexible system inhibiting a variety of public and private initiatives. This can be avoided by deliberately fostering innovation, a function with a high risk but one which a foundation can better run than can an operating agency which must always keep its program supportive of its mission.[40]

Dr. Max F. Millikan, Director of the Center for International Studies, MIT, made the same point in his testimony when he said:

Operational agencies quite properly feel that given the limited funds available to them for research, priority must be given to activities at the applied end of the research spectrum where fairly quick payoffs to the achievement of immediate agency missions may be expected. The consequence of this is that the scholar or research center seeking government funds to finance research is under considerable pressure to focus his attention on applied or operational problems.[41]

[39] Fred R. Harris, hearings of the Subcommittee on Government Research, July 13, 1967.

[40] Thomas L. Hughes, "National Foundation for the Social Sciences," Part I, p. 130.

[41] Max F. Millikan, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 27, 1967.

A separate NSSF, as a new and additional source of funding for social science research, would tend to work against rigidity in social science thought. "It is often the case," Dr. Vincent Davis said:

. . . in the social sciences and in all other fields of scholarly endeavor that some one school of thought or approach will become extremely fashionable and therefore dominant from time to time. If there were to be only one primary centralized source of research support, that source would likely be dominated by the prevailing school of thought and all who did not wholly subscribe to this school would find it difficult to gain support for their work. Diversified sources of support provide a number of places where the dissenting minority groups can seek help. Diversified sources, therefore, represent within the scientific and scholarly world a crudely approximate equivalent to the checks and balances provided within our political system by having more than one political party. This is especially important if the social sciences are to produce the kind of "innovative, bold, original and controversial" thinking that Senator Harris has repeatedly called for.[42]

There is no question about the critical need for more knowledge on our many social and political problems. Conflicts and tensions are constantly threatening to puncture the elastic perimeters of our democracy. We must find new and better ways to resolve these conflicts and increase the pace of social progress. We must also find a better way to couple social science research and knowledge to our national and international programs and activities. I believe these goals can best be reached by giving the social sciences separate recognition and increased responsibility and prestige by establishing a new institution, a National Social Science Foundation.

We can serve no higher purpose than to increase our knowledge of man and the world he has created. In effect, to do so would be to fulfill the moral of Alexander Pope's famous words: "the proper study of mankind is man."

(EDITOR'S NOTE: The foregoing is a volunteered article by a distinguished public official on a topic of great interest for the profession. Other volunteered articles on this topic will be considered for publication.)

[42] Davis, op. cit.

Chairman: There is cooperation between ourselves and many agencies. I feel that there is again a difference in the following sense: it is not simply a sense of cooperating but it is also a question of having an integrated point of view, of having people in daily contact with each other who cover this range of points of view. Cooperation between agencies doesn't adequately cover that, and I believe that the social sciences are, in fact, I know that the social sciences are an integral part of science.[34]

In my judgment, at least, it is better in this case to be "separate but equal," if an "integrated point of view" means relegating social science to "second class citizenship" among the sciences as has distinctly been the case within NSF.

The need to support all aspects of social science research, both existing and potential, is perhaps the best possible argument for an NSSF. Under present circumstances only that social science most akin, by virtue of methodology, to the natural and physical sciences is eligible for NSF support.[35] Dr. James A. Robinson, Director, Mershon Center for Education in National Security and Mershon Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University, identified three approaches to political science research, only one of which is supported by NSF:

With all due respect to NSF, however, I think there are important reasons for establishing a separate NSSF. These reasons apply for several social sciences, but they have special pertinence to the field I know best—political science—so I shall illustrate them with that subject. Political science may be divided roughly into three parts: non-science, science, and policy. Some of our colleagues do not aspire to science in the narrow meaning of the word and in the usage associated with NSF. . . . The implication of this for political science is that research on *norms*, *science*, and *policy* ought to be integrated rather than separated. Colleagues ought to share in public support for their work on the basis of competence, not on the basis of what is available. Hence, it is regrettable that those concerned with norms are served by one foundation (Humanities), those concerned with science another (NSF), and those concerned with policy none at all.[36]

Though it is true that more social science research has been supported by NSF each year since 1958, the total is still miniscule, when compared with funds for other fields of science.[37] More money through NSF for social science is important, but so too is the new integral approach and the new emphasis on social science which only a new agency designed specifically for the support of research in these fields can give.

Dr. Warren E. Miller, Program Director, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan, and Executive Director, Inter-university Consortium for Political Research, identified the basic premise upon which the argument for innovation is made:

I would agree that if there is no change in perspective, that if we presume that all that is needed is doing what is now done only somewhat better, then there is no need for organizational innovation within the federal establishment. If, however, one has a different concept of the scale of research that is needed, an understanding of the institutional contexts that must be created for the research, a comprehension of the magnitude of the problems that the research is intended to confront, then I think the very least that can be suggested is a major innovation in the creation of support from the federal establishment.[38]

Most importantly the NSSF will promote the innovative thinking and research we urgently need if we are going to confront and solve the myriad social and political problems before us. In my opinion the National Science Foundation cannot afford to foster the innovative and original research which will penetrate to the root causes of our social and political problems, because under the best of circumstances social science research is only ten per cent of the NSF budget and that ten per cent may put in jeopardy the ninety per cent of its budget which is spent on the natural and physical sciences, which, in large part, tend to be less controversial in the short run. And yet, it is clear that, if the social sciences are to develop to their full potential, it is precisely that kind of research which will have to be supported with federal funds. If the Congress passes S. 836, and I believe that is inevitable, it will be with the understanding of the clearly-stated intention that the NSSF is not only authorized, but mandated, to support innovative research.

[34] Haworth, op. cit., p. 77.

[35] Haworth, op. cit., p. 94.

[36] James A. Robinson, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, July 12, 1967.

[37] "Federal Funds for Research, Development, and Other Activities, Fiscal Years 1965, 1966 and 1967," Volume XV, NSF 66-25 (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1967), p. 7.

[38] Warren E. Miller, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 6, 1967.

NSF has actually increased its support for research in these areas.[28] Moreover, Dr. Leland J. Haworth testified before our Subcommittee that it is his intention to continue to increase and expand NSF's support for such research.[29] Similar intentions were voiced by almost every witness who testified before our committee on behalf of the mission-oriented agencies of the federal government.[30]

The operating agencies cannot be concerned with long-range development of social science research capability. Their social science programs must support their missions, and, therefore, the health of the social sciences has been and will continue to be only incidental to their primary interests.

Dr. Kingsley Davis, Chairman of the International Population and Urban Research Committee, University of California, Berkeley, elaborated on the need for a new and separate social science agency when he said:

> My belief is that a separate social science foundation would have every reason to cooperate with other scientific agencies but that it would do so with the confidence and strength derived from controlling its own affairs. Other agencies would deal with it as an equal, not as a poor stepchild. It would not be merely a branch or division of a larger organization, the main purpose of which is natural or physical science.
>
> The existence of a social science foundation would indeed raise the issue of who would cultivate certain fields that naturally link various scientific levels, such as behavioral genetics, human demography, animal sociology. There are any number of specialties that involve both the social and the natural sciences, and many of these are at present rather poorly developed in spite of their great interest. In raising the issue of such interdisciplinary specialties, a social science foundation would not necessarily opt them for itself, but it would highlight their existence and help to push a sophisticated consideration of their social and behavioral aspects.[31]

To those who have argued that a separate social science foundation would divide the sciences into "science" and "social science," Dr. Fred Harvey Harrington, President, University of Wisconsin, has pointed out the important relationship between status and the unity of knowledge. He said:

> There are some who contend that the creation of a third foundation would destroy the unity of knowledge or impair the interrelationships of scholars in various fields. Quite the contrary, it would remove a source of irritation, improve interrelationships and interdisciplinary research efforts. There is no one so irrationally irritating at a family reunion as a poor relative. Raising the status and the funding of the social sciences would enhance the unity of knowledge.[32]

Moreover, science is already administered by different departments in universities, and indeed, is frequently found in different schools of the same university. This diversity of administrative control is not what has kept the sciences separated, nor could the fact of separation be overcome simply by placing all science under one administrative heading.

The creation of the Foundation would bring to the social sciences an infusion of money, prestige and recognition at the national level and a continuing committment to support these disciplines.

If no one rocks the boat, another argument goes, the poor relative will eventually achieve equal status within the existing structure. This position favors maintaining the status quo and assumes that the social sciences, which account for only ten per cent of the National Science Foundation's budget, will somehow become co-equal with the natural sciences, which receive the other ninety per cent.[33] Such gradual equalization by beefing up the social sciences in the NSF is simply not a realistic aspiration. It will not alter the reliance of the future of the social sciences on the forebearance of natural and physical scientists and their limited understanding and insights into the potentials of the social sciences. This "other science" position of the social sciences in NSF will persist if the unity of science theme is interpreted from natural or physical scientists' point of view. Some have argued that a separate foundation for the social sciences would preclude cooperation between the sciences and further isolate social science. But experience has shown that such cooperation can be effective as it has between the NSF and the National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities. On this point, Dr. Haworth said:

> Well, certainly there could be cooperation, Mr.

[28] Haworth, op. cit., p. 80.

[29] Haworth, op. cit., pp. 95–100.

[30] "National Foundation for the Social Sciences," Part I.

[31] Kingsley Davis, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 2, 1967.

[32] Fred Harvey Harrington, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 28, 1967.

[33] Haworth, op. cit., p. 81.

very potent and dynamic force in our national politics today. If anything, I think the social sciences may well help responsible political authority gain a better general view of our problems and a greater ability to control our problems.[26]

NATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

The convergence of the many issues related to the future of social science research and training has brought us to a time of decision concerning the relationships between the Federal Government and the social sciences. With these problems in mind, and joined by 20 other Senators, I introduced in the Senate of the United States a bill, S. 836, for the creation of a National Foundation for the Social Sciences to encourage and support research, scholarship and training in the behavioral and social sciences. It would provide proper recognition for the social sciences at the Federal level of government, expand the research effort to meet the growing need for new knowledge on social and political processes, advance social science research by strengthening institutions of higher learning and non-profit research organizations and foster exchange of information on social science research. It is not to be an operating agency, concerned with the day-to-day problems of mission-oriented agencies, but would, rather, be charged with the responsibility of funding wholly unclassified research and promoting scholarship and training in the social sciences. The proposed legislation is directed toward increasing research capability and manpower in the fields of political science, economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, law, social statistics, demography, geography, linguistics, international relations, communications and other social sciences.

Since June of 1966, the Subcommittee on Government Research has held sixteen days of hearings on the social sciences and heard testimony from more than ninety witnesses from the Federal Government, universities, professional societies and organizations, and other non-profit and private research institutions. All major disciplines in the social sciences and all geographical areas of the United States were represented.

Without exception everyone was in agreement with the basic purpose of the bill—to expand support of the social sciences and to promote scholarship, research and training in these fields. The overwhelming majority of the witnesses favored the approach of the bill—to establish a separate social science institution. Many scholars and other national figures who were not able to testify personally sent letters that strongly supported the bill. For example, Dr. Henry Steele Commager, Professor of History, Amherst College, wrote:

> I am tremendously impressed with your proposals for a National Foundation for the Social Sciences, and particularly with the safeguards which you have written into it against exploitation or misuse, or even the suspicion of these, by government or by any political body.[27]

Several changes in the bill have been recommended to the Subcommittee during the course of our hearings. Some have been accepted in principle, including: deletion of the section which authorized the Foundation to administer research funds transferred from other departments or agencies; addition of a clear mandate to support training and education in the social sciences as well as research; clarification of intention to coordinate NSSF activities with existing agencies; alteration of the section prohibiting research grants to former Federal employees for a two year period following termination of such employment; broadening of criteria for selection of members of the Board of Trustees; a declaration that it is the intent of Congress for the National Science Foundation and the National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities to continue their support for social science research; and addition of specific authority for long-term funding.

NSSF will provide a net increase in total funding for the social sciences because the basic Act would create a new authority and not transfer existing functions from other agencies. The social sciences would then have a strong legislative base and a Congressional mandate, something they have not had before.

Some have argued that a separate social science foundation would encourage existing agencies to decrease support for social science research and would, in fact, result in the diminution of available funds from the NSF and the mission-oriented agencies of the government. I believe this is a simplistic view of government. Though the recently created National Foundation for the Arts and Humanities shares legislative responsibility with NSF to provide project support in several fields, including history and linguistics, during the period that these two foundations have shared such jurisdiction,

[26] Don K. Price, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 20, 1967.

[27] Letter from Dr. Henry Steele Commager, Professor of History, Amherst College, to Senator Fred R. Harris, March 8, 1967.

Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz spoke of the dangers implicit in this disparity when he said:

I have tried to suggest what seems to be the point before the committee by reference to another classic and now very tired statement of H. G. Wells. You will remember that he said: 'Human history becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe.' My guess is that the text is still good; but time has changed the emphasis very much. I am not sure any longer, frankly, and I say it at the risk of being misunderstood, which side education is on, and it seems to me that it is rather the possibility that catastrophe may develop as a consequence of the disparate outcome in the race between two kinds of education: one in the physical sciences and the other in the social sciences. I do not believe there is exaggeration in suggesting the larger danger, that one of those, the advance in the physical sciences, may get so far out in front of the advance of the social sciences that we will have to consider the possibility of a catastrophe as a consequence.[22]

Dr. Joe B. Frantz, Professor of History, University of Texas, made much the same point in a different manner when he testified:

Now the last thing which we wish to do is to close the floodgate of scientific knowledge, but we have a crucial problem in bringing our environment forward to the point that it can absorb and understand what the scientist is turning loose all about us. For this reason. . . and I am quite evangelical on this—we need federal assistance in the social assessment of knowledge, to turn the raging flood into a controlled stream which can be handled and utilized to irrigate and cleanse the minds and spirits of harried men in a pell mell world.[23]

Moreover, policymakers are called upon to initiate action programs or make decisions about modern social problems with only limited basic knowledge. As Dr. Ross Stagner, Chairman of the Department of Psychology, Wayne State University, said:

The most deplorable feature of the present situation is the very low level of support now available for the behavioral and social sciences. The magnitude of the problems of urban life, crime, education, industrialization, the aged, and group conflicts needs no emphasis. It seems truly incredible that the expenditure of funds to obtain knowledge of prevention and correction of these problems is so microscopic.

We have been spending (justifiably) millions of dollars on urban renewal. But we have made little use of the expertise of economists, sociologists and psychologists with respect to planning for human welfare, not just for buildings. Again let me note that I do not suggest that social scientists should have final jurisdiction as to execution of such programs; I do, however, feel very strongly that the knowledge of social scientists ought to be given much higher consideration than it has. My main point, however, is that we simply have not investigated the problems of urban renewal from the viewpoint of neighborhood unity, of social supports for behavior codes, of communication networks, of leader-follower relations, and a mass of other important factors. There is still so much ignorance, and so much misinformation disguised as 'common sense,' that one can hardly be surprised at the unsatisfactory consequences of these programs.[24]

Dr. Gerald Holton, an astute observer and historian of science as well as a physicist, noted in our hearings that:

If it took the atomic bomb and Sputnik to insure adequate scientific research money, and by no means all scientists were or are happy with this unforeseen turn of events, we cannot fail to notice that the same situation is already upon us in the social sciences. The social science equivalent of the atomic bomb and Sputnik is with us right now, in terms of our domestic as well as our international problems. Some of these problems are obvious and stark and some are hidden and subtle. The list is long. It has been mentioned in these hearings again and again.[25]

Even before the recent urban riots, policymakers were beginning to feel a real sense of frustration as they searched for more knowledge and better methodologies with which to attack a broad range of modern social problems, foreign and domestic. There is a growing awareness that the search cannot be successful without greater Federal support and recognition for the social sciences. Don K. Price, Dean, John Fitzgerald Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, underscored this point when he said:

. . . I think that the social sciences have great room for potential development which has not been exploited and which will be in the great interest of the country if they are exploited. I do not think they imply any more danger of interfering with political authority or administrative discretion than the natural sciences, which are a

[22] W. Willard Wirtz, "National Foundation for the Social Sciences," Part I., 8–9.

[23] Joe B. Frantz, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, July 12, 1967.

[24] Ross Stagner, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, July 13, 1967.

[25] Holton, op. cit.

was less than that of a number of other single disciplines in the physical sciences.[15]

Private foundations, although capable of supporting the broader, innovative research needed, have severely limited funds. In the field of international studies and foreign area research, funds actually are diminishing: the Ford Foundation and some other private foundations have either reduced or eliminated financial support for such research, because of the passage of the International Education Act by the 89th Congress, even though the level of operational funding of this new Act is as yet undetermined.[16] Add to this the miniscule support of foreign area research by the Department of State which, as Dr. Harold Guetzkow, Co-Director of the International Relations Program, Northwestern University, has said, is a "fantastically low $129,000 . . . each year," a figure which, he said, "in my book, is pretty scandalous."[17]

Other private sources of support for social science research, such as the Social Science Research Council, are able to finance only a small percentage of the good social science research applications they receive. Dr. Austin Ranney, Chairman of the Committee on Governmental and Legal Processes, Social Science Research Council, stated in his testimony that under a five-year grant from the Ford Foundation, the Social Science Research Council has only approximately $60,000 a year to allocate to all research projects under the jurisdiction of the committee he heads, and that for the year 1967 they had to choose from 53 meritorious applications for research funds, totalling $590,595.[18]

Dr. Vincent Davis, Associate Professor in the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver and Executive Secretary of the International Studies Association, voiced the virtually unanimous view of political scientists concerning the level of Federal support when he said:

> We are starting from such a low base that almost any realistically foreseeable level of new financial support for the social sciences will still leave us short of adequacy for a number of years to come.[19]

The Senate Subcommittee on Government Research, of which I am Chairman, has held extensive hearings on the needs and promises of the social sciences and has found that, although significant and useful work is being done, there is much more which needs to be done and could be done if funds were available. Aside from the magnitude of modern social problems and the tremendous need to know more, pressures are mounting simply because of the present and projected increase in the number of students and Ph.D.'s granted in the social science disciplines. Dr. Gerald Holton, Department of Physics, Harvard University, has estimated:

> . . . that in the next thirty years there will be 10 to 20 times the number of people wanting to do basic research in the social sciences and that they will make a very good case for meaningful expenditures on the order of 20 to 50 times the amount of 1967 dollars.[20]

It can hardly be questioned, as Dr. Donald Hornig, Director of the Office of Science and Technology in the Executive Office of the President has stated, that the quality of education received by students is better in institutions where high quality research is being done.[21] Thus, if for no other reason than to improve the quality of education in the social sciences for the growing number of students in those disciplines, support for research and training in the social sciences must be dramatically increased.

But far more important to our country and to our world is the tremendous need for expanded basic knowledge about man and his relationships with other men, if we are to meet the enormous and growing problems of modern society. One facet of this need results from the dangerous imbalance between the development of the social sciences and the natural and physical sciences.

[15] Launor F. Carter, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 2, 1967.

[16] Gwendolen M. Carter, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 21, 1967.

[17] Guetzkow, op, cit.

[18] Austin Ranney, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, July 12, 1967.

[19] Vincent Davis, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 21, 1967.

[20] Gerald Holton, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 28, 1967.

[21] Donald F. Hornig, "Equitable Distribution of R & D Funds by Government Agencies," hearings before the Subcommittee on Government Research, Committee on Government Operations, U. S. Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session, July 11, 1967.

sciences, such support amounted to less than ten per cent of NSF's $222 million expenditure for basic research during Fiscal Year 1966, and of that amount, political science research received only $335, 650, a total of 17 grants, 8 of which were related to doctoral dissertations.[9]

The critically small amount of support political science receives from NSF is more evident when the size of the political science field is compared to other social science disciplines. Political scientists rank second only to economists in the number of U. S. higher education faculty members in the various fields of social science,[10] and in the number of members in the major American social science professional associations.[11]

When the amount of NSF support for political science is compared to that for anthropology, for example, the ratio is about one to ten in favor of anthropology, even though political science has two to three times as many active scholars as anthropology. Political science receives from NSF only one-third as much as does history and philosophy of science,[12] though political scientists outnumber historians of science by almost seven to one.

In the related discipline of law, of which political science is in some degree a descendant, there are virtually no funds available for research and training, particularly research and training in law as a social science.[13] Nor is there support for research in the important field of the social impact of taxation.[14]

During the last two decades the existing federal structure for the support of science in general has been oriented toward the natural and physical sciences and related disciplines. The payoff has been unquestionably great. It might even be said that the return from the investment is unparalleled by any other field in which heavy federal expenditures have been made. Yet, while the natural and physical sciences have been at the center of the stage, the social sciences have been left out in the cold and, at best, have received only intermittent and superficial attention from the federal science establishment. And, because the R&D budget is no longer rising at the rapid rate of the early post-Sputnik years but is, rather, leveling off, and because competition for funds is much keener, the social sciences with their vague legislative mandate are in a precarious position. The National Science Foundation, for example, will find it increasingly difficult to justify expanding their social science program if such support must compete for funds with the physical sciences.

An indication of the relative status of the social sciences in the National Science Foundation was noted by Dr. Launor F. Carter, Senior Vice President, Systems Development Corporation, who testified before the Senate Subcommittee on Government Research that:

> . . . the National Science Foundation lumps together all of the social sciences; that is to say, economics, political science, sociology, anthropology, social psychology, etc., into one category to arrive at the total of $29 million. But, in the physical sciences each science is treated separately; mathematics receives $45 million; physics, $50 million; chemistry, $40 million; astronomy, $24 million; etc. In other words the level of support of the social sciences considered collectively

[9] Leland J. Haworth, "National Foundation for Social Sciences," Hearings before the Subcommittee on Government Research, Committee on Government Operations, U. S. Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session, February 7, 8, and 16, 1967, Part I (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.), 1967, p. 105.

[10] The number of faculty members in the social sciences for the years 1962 to 1963 are as follows:

1. Economics	3,160
2. Political Science	2,870
3. Sociology	2,370
4. Anthropology	720

"Teaching Faculty in Higher Education, 1962–63; Primary Teaching Areas and Contract Salaries," Office of Education (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1964), p. 7.

[11] Figures on the size of the memberships of major social science associations as of September 1, 1967, were obtained by contacting the administrative offices of each society and are as follows:

1. American Economic Association	15,149
2. American Political Science Association	15,000
3. American Sociological Association	10,327
4. American Anthropological Association	6,700
5. History of Science Society	2,250

[12] Grants approved by NSF for fiscal year 1966 are as follows:

1. Anthropology	$3,981,890
2. History and Philosophy of Science	1,023,000
3. Political Science	335,650

Haworth, op. cit., p. 105.

[13] Wex S. Malone, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 21, 1967, and Myres S. McDougal, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 27, 1967.

[14] Coreen Gilb, "Full Opportunity and Social Accounting Act," testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, Committee on Government Operations, U. S. Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session, July 20, 1967.

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND THE PROPOSAL FOR A NATIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION

FRED R. HARRIS*
United States Senate

"Political scientists . . . are . . . ex-post-facto entrail watchers . . . after-the-event soothsayers," said the late Lucius Beebe.[1] Similarly, much of the general public has long felt that social scientists are not scientists at all[2] but deal in intuition and vague, unfounded generalizations, or are "proposition mongers," a threat to policymakers.[3]

These notions, together with the fact that social scientists work in sensitive, moral-charged subjects which frequently cause strong public reaction,[4] are partly responsible for the relatively small support the Federal Government has given to research and scholarship in the social sciences.

In 1965 basic research of all types funded by the Federal Government amounted to $1.69 billion, of which the social sciences received only $37 million, or 2.2 per cent. The estimated obligations for 1966 and 1967 were about the same, 2.5 per cent and 2.8 per cent. Nor is there much difference when Federal support for applied research is considered. For 1965, Federal social science expenditures for applied research amounted to only 2.8 per cent of the $3.16 billion the Federal Government spent for all types of applied research, and for 1966 and 1967, estimated expenditures, are only 3.9 per cent and 4.8 per cent.[5]

Even more revealing is the decline in the social science share of Federal research funds over the last thirty years. In 1938 the social sciences received 24 per cent of total government expenditures for research. By the early 1950's the percentage had diminished to about 8 per cent,[6] and for the last ten years "the share of the Federal research dollar (not including development) devoted to research in the social sciences and psychology has varied narrowly between 3½ per cent and 5 per cent."[7]

In addition to the imbalance of support between the natural and physical sciences and the social sciences, some disciplines, such as political science, receive only token support. Political science has only recently been added to those social sciences eligible to receive support from the National Science Foundation. Not until July 1, 1965, seven years after the Foundation began formal support of the social sciences, was a political science program begun by NSF. It was more than a year later, in August, 1966, before the Foundation appointed an Advisory Panel for political science,[8] though, to date, no director has been appointed for the political science program of NSF. While the Foundation and its outstanding Director, Dr. Leland J. Haworth, are certainly to be commended for the increased support and recognition being given to the social

* U. S. Senator (D-Oklahoma), Chairman, Subcommittee on Government Research of the U. S. Senate Committee on Government Operations.

[1] Lucius Beebe, "Cafe Society Revisited," *New York Herald Tribune*, April 19, 1964, Sunday Magazine, p. 12.

[2] Harold Guetzkow, "National Foundation for the Social Sciences," testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, Committee on Government Operations, U. S. Senate, 90th Congress, 1st Session, June 27, 1967.

[3] Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, June 2, 1967.

[4] Paul Bohannan, testimony before the Subcommittee on Government Research, July 12, 1967.

[5] "Federal Funds for Research, Development, and other Scientific Activities, Fiscal Years 1964, 1965, and 1966," Vol. XIV, National Science Foundation, NSF 66-25 (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1966), pp. 12 and 17.

[6] Kathleen Archibald, "Federal Interest and Investment in Social Science," *The Use of Social Science Research in Federal Domestic Programs*, Part I, a Staff Study for the Subcommittee on Research and Technical Programs, Committee on Government Operations, U. S. House of Representatives, 90th Congress, 1st Session (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.), p. 329.

[7] Henry W. Riecken, "Government-Science Relations, The Physical and Social Sciences Compared," *American Psychologist*, 22 (March, 1967).

[8] James D. Carroll, "Notes on the Support of Political Science Research Projects by the Division of Social Sciences of the National Science Foundation, Fiscal Years 1958–65," *The Use of Social Science Research in Federal Domestic Programs*, Part IV, pp. 88–89.

than those that emerge from propertied voting. There is little evidence of a greater desire to raid the public treasury at the expense of property owners and there is also little indication of a class vote in the lower income precincts with little or no property. Our findings also suggest that, contrary to the Kent-Adams thesis, the property and popular vote categories are not really useful divisions. The voters simply do not align in such a fashion as to lend support to Kent-type fears of universal suffrage.

New Orleans citizens are not visibly distressed about the property limitations on voting, due probably to the fact that most registered voters may vote if they wish and also because most bond issues have passed, thus preventing a crisis in the availability of public facilities. But beyond the immediate case of bond elections restricted suffrage raises broader questions concerning the exclusion of certain individuals from equal participation in government. It could be argued that if the excluded are seriously affected by adverse decisions of those in power, they may lose confidence in the regime and develop values tending to undermine the legitimacy of the established order. To those advocating restricted popular participation the price is worth it; established interests of the community must be preserved. But our findings show that the "irresponsible" element of the population, the popular voters, can be just as responsible and restrained as the property voters. Decisions made by the popular vote have no dire consequences for the community in general or for the specific economic interests of the dominants in the society. If there is no need to fear the decisions made by a popular vote, as illustrated by our data, then the advantages of universal suffrage measured in legitimacy for regimes and stability are doubly attractive.

for the study of these referenda and additional research is needed into non-partisan, non-candidate elections.[11]

Finally, more information on the comparative behaviors of propertied and popular voters in bond elections can be gained through a comparision of the turnouts in the two votes. Since each propertied voter votes the amount of his assessed valuation, it is possible to speak of a propertied vote turnout to mean the amount of property voted compared to the potential property that could be voted. Judging from the value perceptions of the Kent-Adam philosophy concerning the behavior of propertied and non-propertied voters, we might well expect quite different behaviors with respect to electoral turnout. With a "stake in society" we would expect that the property vote would produce a very high turnout since property owners would be led as a matter of course to participate in elections. With respect to property-less voting, moreover, we would expect more erratic behavior if the property theorists are to be believed. On the one hand we might watch for occasions on which popular voters would flock to the polls to endorse public expenditures for which they have little responsibility, but on the other hand we might predict also that popular voters would take little interest in electoral affairs as a result of their lack of stake in society.

On a city-wide basis property and popular vote turnouts compare as follows:

	1960 (School)	1963 (Average for all issues)	1964 (Average for all issues)
	%	%	%
Popular:	21.3	19.4	22.7
Property:	31.3	30.7	32.8

In all three elections property vote turnouts are significantly higher than popular votes. Both popular and property vote turnouts, however, rank considerably lower in turnout than other elections in New Orleans (presidential elections where the turnout ranges from 78% to 83% in recent years; gubernatorail elections where the range is from 73% to 80%; and school borad elections where the range is from 35% to 41%). It is clear that bond referenda are simply low-turnout elections, producing apathetic responses which lead to low participation on the part of both popular and propertied voters. Neither the popular vote nor the property vote produces turnouts within the range of participation in presidential, gubernatorial or school board elections. But it is equally clear that some of the voting prophecies made by the property theorists are, once again, not borne out. Although property vote turnout is higher than popular turnout, it is still so low that obviously a property stake in society has not led to responsible participation in electoral affairs; indeed, the propertied vote is almost as characteristically apathetic in bond referenda as is the popular vote. Also obvious is that popular voters have not rushed to the polls in great numbers to approve public expenditures. Both popular and property vote turnouts are within the same apathetic low turnout range, both encapsulated by a fundamentally low interest electoral situation.

III. CONCLUSION

In the previous pages we have carried forward the argument over property, democracy and the franchise, an issue of some importance in the development of democratic institutions. In addition to its importance as historic underpinnings for American politics the issue has continued to affect the manner in which some state electoral practices are institutionalized and to raise questions concerning the relevancy of the property and non-property categories in the exercise of the suffrage. By examining the operations of a popular and property vote we have evaluated the differences among property and popular voting and the impact of universal suffrage.

Our main question has concerned the significance of voting categories based on property ownership. Our finding is that they make a little difference, but not much—certainly not as much difference as property theorists have led us to expect. Using the property vote as a means of evaluation, we have found that universal suffrage, i.e. the popular vote, inflicts no damage even where the issues are most directly concerned with impact on propertied rights. In the context of New Orleans bond elections popular voting produces outcomes no worse

[11] The importance of newspapers in local elections was suggested and analyzed early in Harold F. Gosnell, *Machine Politics: Chicago Model* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937), ch. 8. In referenda involving issues such as the fluoridation controversy, opinion leadership such as newspaper endorsements are considered especially significant. See for example: John E. Mueller, "Politics of Fluoridation in Seven California Cities," *Western Political Quarterly* 19 (March, 1966), 54–67. The influence of other variables is suggested also in Henry Robert Glick, "Patterns of Voting in New Orleans Bond Elections," (unpublished master's thesis, Tulane University, 1965).

TABLE 8. CORRELATION OF POPULAR AND PROPERTY VOTE WITH SELECTED SOCIAL AND POLITICAL VARIABLES

	Schools, 1960		Streets, 1963		Cultural Center, 1964	
	Popular Vote	Property Vote	Popular Vote	Property Vote	Popular Vote	Property Vote
Republican Presidential Vote, 1960	−.03	−.06	−.03	−.07	−.06	−.08
Morrison Vote in Runoff, 1961*	.24	.18	.13	.14	.20	.15
% White Voter Registration	−.15	−.14	−.17	−.07	−.02	−.01
Socio-Economic Scale†	−.03	−.07	−.01	−.04	−.10	−.03
Median Education	−.04	−.18	−.09	−.03	−.06	−.03

* The Morrison vote refers to the vote in the gubernatorial primary cast for the reform, good-government mayor of New Orleans.

† The Socio-economic scale is constructed from a combination of median education and median dwelling rental figures for each precinct.

similar support at a later date. Therefore, contrary to the property qualification advocates, both groups of voters appear to be equally well (or poorly) qualified to decide on policy questions underlying bond elections. The institutional divisions resting on assumed differences between property and non-property voters seem to be artificial categories, but ones which have been maintained in many states for years, and nourished on traditional attitudes.

In Table 8 we compare the relationships of popular and property voting to several significant social and political variables. In voting studies such analyses have proved sensitive indicators of differences among patterns of voting. In New Orleans, for example, the Republican presidential vote in 1960 was correlated with socio-economic status .75 and related to median education level by a correlation of .76 while the Morrison vote was correlated −.71 with the percentage of white voter registration in the precincts. If popular and property voting produce significantly different support patterns, we would expect these differences to be reflected in different relationships with the matrix of social and political variables in Table 8.

It is clear, though, that unlike other elections voting in bond referenda is not significantly related to socio-economic or political variables in either popular or property voting. As a result we cannot point to any standard variables that differentiate popular from property voters and suggest that the two form disparate groups or share conflicting attitudes.

It is tempting to view bond referenda as examples of random behavior in the electoral system. A more reasonable explanation, however, is that none of our standard variables used in electoral analysis explain much of the variation which exists in electoral behavior in bond referenda. Given the strong linkages among the variables utilized in Table 8 and partisan choices in other elections, we might expect that either property or popular voting, which bear some resemblance in style and issue content to the national and local partisan positions, would show some correlation in Table 8. The fact that they do not indicates that both popular and property voting alike, fail to respond to the usual variables. This is a further example that the unrestricted electorate does not automatically align with existing partisan positions any more than does the property electorate. The low correlations with standard socioeconomic and political variables indicate that other factors are responsible for voting decisions. Opinion stimuli such as newspaper endoresements, information from other mass media and informal discussions among voters themselves may be important. These may be especially decisive in non-candidate, non-partisan elections where there is no opportunity for the voter to make a selection based on familiar personalities or party labels. Standard voting behavior models are not very useful

dicial process," but this is no more of a notion than that which various scientists had about the feasibility of an atomic bomb. Some preferred that such a device might not work well, knew that it would, and worked on the project anyway. If the concept of judicial role is a fruitless one, I hope to be the first one to demonstrate it. To imply ideological biases to the scientific researcher only on the basis of what factors he chooses to study, once again, seems tantamount to impugning scientific study.

(3) There are some internal inconsistencies in his statement that make the explanation of a judicial behavioral revisionism by Ulmer all the more plausible. First, he states that he believes in Freudian theory wherein people "confess" their true motives to others. On the other hand, he professes a lack of faith in methods of direct questioning of respondents through questionnaires. Can Ulmer believe sincerely that a psychiatrist's interpretation of response is less subject to error and bias and less dependent on the candor of the subject than the interpretations of questionnaire researchers and analysts? Furthermore, how can he doubt what judges tell researchers but believe what judges tell the public in their opinions about the basis for their votes? The judicial opinion, after all, is the data source relied upon by Ulmer to categorize the votes he analyzes in his own work. Strange that he would believe a public, individually signed, politically-oriented judicial statement, but disbelieve one made in private with assurances of anonymity.

I conclude with the thought that I have never claimed privy to any "explanation" of the judicial process in Hawaii or elsewhere. It is Professor Ulmer who offers to provide such upon request. But, then, that is only the final indicator of his confusion about the practice of social science. It is only one more indication of his reaction against the growing use of a whole arsenal of techniques capable of testing theory, whereas his own techniques are utterly incapable of doing so.

THEODORE L. BECKER
University of Hawaii

TO THE EDITOR:

In his article, "The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements" (this REVIEW, June, 1967, pp. 343–358) Professor Robert C. Tucker formulates a series of generalizations on the processes and causal factors of deradicalization of Marxist movements on the basis of his examination of the history of Soviet Communism after Stalin and the German Social Democratic Party around the turn of the century. When I review in my own mind the history of the Chinese Communist movement and regime, I find some of Professor Tucker's concepts and generalizations very illuminating but others difficult to apply.

Let us start by asking a basic question which looks simple but is actually difficult to answer in terms of Professor Tucker's categories: Can one regard the Chinese Communist movement in the period 1935–1946 as an historical instance of deradicalization in terms of the "symptoms" and "causal factors" suggested by him? During this period the Chinese Communists modified the tactical part of the ideology by stressing short-term objectives and non-radical means of attaining them. The CCP adopted the policy of establishing a united front against Japan which at first excluded Generalissimo Chiang and later included him. It replaced the policy of confiscating the land of landlords by a program of reducing rent and interest rates. It put forward the theory of New Democracy and gave outsiders the impression that the New Democratic society and "state form" would last for a long time. It advanced the policy of establishing a coalition government. In their informal remarks, Chinese Communist leaders gave certain hints that the CCP might come to power through peaceful means. They made conscious efforts to adapt Marxism-Leninism to Chinese conditions. These and many other facts support Professor Tucker's assertions about the first symptom.

But with regard to a second symptom, i.e., practice or pattern of action, the evidence points both ways. Reformist patterns of action were adopted in the base areas and within the Kuomintang territory, but revolutionary patterns were continued in the form of limited war behind the Japanese lines against both the Japanese and the Nationalist forces. Even here, however, one could define the transition from all-out war to limited war against the Kuomintang as a manifestation of deradicalization, although the over-all pattern of action was still more revolutionary than reformist.

True to Professor Tucker's description of a third symptom, there was a conflict within the movement over the question of deradicalization. But in contrast to the cases of the SPD and Soviet Communism, this attack came from the right wing rather than the left wing of the Chinese Communist movement. The struggle was between Mao Tse-tung and the minority of "right opportunists," notably Chang Kuo-tao and Wang Ming. The criticism of the Party Center's policy stemmed from a feeling that deradicalization in the form of coopera-

tion with the Kuomintang did not go far enough.

Finally, the CCP affirmed its ultimate goals. Mao declared in his famous speech, "On Coalition Government," in April, 1945: "We communists do not conceal our political views. Definitely and beyond all doubt, our future or maximum programme is to carry China forward to socialism and communism." Professor Tucker's discussion of the deradicalization of radical movements implies that in the process of deradicalization, the affirmation of the radical goals is hypocritical and has no operational consequences. But it can be argued that the continuing desire of the one-time radical movement to change the existing society is itself a necessary factor in the process of tactical deradicalization. If this desire is absent, the radical movement may adhere to its fundamental tenets without change and remain a permanent and insignificant minority as is the case with many fundamentalist religious sects.

Professor Tucker's formulation of two causal factors, i.e., "leadership change" and "worldly success," also leads us to conflicting conclusions. Just prior to the inception of the process of deradicalization, there was a change in leadership. Mao captured the party apparatus at the Tsun-yi meeting in early 1935. But in 1946 Mao himself inaugurated the process of reradicalization which, in spite of its fluctuations, is still going strong. At this point, one cannot help but think of the case of Tito's Yugoslavia in which a process of deradicalization was accompanied by continuity of leadership.

Professor Tucker's second causal factor, "worldly success," deserves more lenghty comment. To me, the most interesting statement made by Professor Tucker is the following one: "It appears to be the fate of radical movements that survive and flourish for long *without* remaking the world that they undergo eventually a process of deradicalization." But in the case of the Chinese Communist movement, the process of deradicalization was greatly accelerated during the Long March when the fortunes of the CCP were at a low ebb. In China, it was worldly failure rather than worldly success which led to a process of rapid deradicalization. This development shows, to use Professor Tucker's terminology and method, that "it appears to be the fate of radical movements that cannot survive and flourish after a period of attempting to remake the world by radical methods that they will undergo a process of deradicalization." Thus, the juxtaposition of the two cases examined by Professor Tucker to the case of the CCP in 1935 shows that two diametrically opposite conditions, i.e., worldly success and worldly failure, can produce a similar result, deradicalization. Moreover, a process of re-radicalization began after 1946 in the Chinese Communist movement in the form of open civil war which began after the CCP had survived and flourished under its deradicalized program. To put it simply, worldly success was followed not by deradicalization but by re-radicalization. This development suggests that under certain circumstances, radical movements that survive and flourish will undergo a process of re-radicalization. Thus, the juxtaposition of Professor Tucker's two cases to the case of the CCP after 1946 shows that a similar condition, i.e., worldly success, can lead to two diametrically opposite results: deradicalization on the one hand and re-radicalization on the other.

The attempt to apply Professor Tucker's concepts and generalization has thus led us to a dilemma. If one wants to uphold the universal applicability of Professor Tucker's theory, one must take the position thet the history of the Chinese Communist movement from 1935 to 1946 does not represent a case of deradicalization, despite the existence of some of the symptoms described by Professor Tucker. But if one admits that it represents a difierent type of deradicalization, i.e., a tactical change and a forced adjustment to political reality, three additional intellectual tasks must be undertaken. First, we must formulate concepts and generalizations applicable to this type of tactical deradicalization as distinguished from the genuine cases of deradicalization cited by Professor Tucker. Second, since these two different types belong to one general class of phenomena, i.e., deradicalization, we must formulate concepts and theories applicable to this class of phenomena as a whole. Third, if it is true that a process of genuine deradicalization or a decline in revolutionary commitment is usually preceded by deradicalization of a tactical nature forced by circumstances, we must raise a significant question as to the conditions under which the latter becomes or leads to the former.

To carry out these tasks, we would have to stress other variables which Professor Tucker mentions explicitly in his narrative or implies in his discussion but which he does not single out as "causal factors." I shall mention two of the most obvious ones. The first is the strength of the existing social order as perceived by the radicals or the one-time radicals. If the existing social order is perceived by the radicals as so strong that they cannot survive and flourish by the use of radical methods, the process of

deradicalization will set in. This variable must be taken into account to explain the deradicalization of the Chinese Communist movement in 1935. It also sheds some light on the contrast between the deradicalization of Soviet Communism and the radicalization of the Chinese Communist movement on the question of world revolution. On the one hand, the Soviet Union sees the United States as so strong militarily that she could not be challenged by revolutionary methods. On the other hand the Chinese Communists believe that she can eventually be defeated by a global strategy which is essentially a projection of their revolutionary strategy employed in the Chinese civil war.

The second variable which comes readily to mind is the presence or absence of a well-defined and stable political system in which a radical movement can find its place. This variable is implicitly recognized by Professor Tucker in his phrase, "stake in the *status quo*." In contrast to the SPD, the Chinese Communist movement in 1946 could see no stable and well-defined political system in which it could survive and flourish. Therefore, the deradicalization process could not be continued. At the present moment, the Soviet Union has a recognized and respected place in what she considers to be a relatively stable and well-defined international system whereas the Peking regime is an outcast and considers the international system as unstable and evil.

I have merely given two very simple examples for the purpose of illustrating the need to identify other important variables in a very complex situation besides the two "causal factors" mentioned explicitly by Professor Tucker. But the identification of additional variables and the discovery of two types of deradicalization merely mark the beginning of the far more difficult task of formulating a theory of deradicalization. The value of any concept or theory varies with its generality. The more generally applicable it is, the greater its explanatory power. Professor Tucker's concepts and generalizations derive much of their appeal from the universality claimed for them. But as we discover historical cases of deradicalization which do not fit the generalizations, we are forced to distinguish particular types of deradicalization. If we then proceed to compare the different sociopolitical contexts from which the different types of deradicalization emerged, we discover additional variables which must be taken into account. As we proceed to construct a typology of many different types of deradicalization, compare the many different socio-political contexts, and discover many more variables, we obtain propositions of a decreasing order of generality and lower level of abstraction. By moving closer and closer to the uniqueness of history, we shall be able to explain the individual cases more adequately, but in the process our concepts and generalizations will have lost much of their explanatory power. Thus, the task of formulating a theory of deradicalization will not be complete until we can formulate a set of propositions which can explain all types of deradicalization and which, with the addition of specified variables, can be used to differentiate one type of deradicalization from another. These difficult intellectual tasks must be performed in the construction of theories of this type. These are the problems which we must resolve in order to pursue further Professor Tucker's germinal ideas.

TANG TSOU

University of Chicago

TO THE EDITOR:

In their article, "Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam" (this REVIEW, June 1967) Sidney Verba and his associates quote from their original Stanford report as follows: "The American public is clearly concerned about Vietnam. . . . But their opinions appear to be moderate and *responsible*. . . . They reject those solutions that require *irresponsible* abandonment of our commitments." (emphasis added)

The authors are certainly entitled to their own opinion, but it should not be interjected into what purports to be a purely descriptive presentation of scientific findings. There is nothing in the authors' data to indicate that a "moderate" (i.e., middle ground) opinion which advocates maintaining the present level of military involvement is "responsible," while an opinion which advocates withdrawal as an immediate policy objective is "irresponsible." Indeed, nothing in the measurement of an opinion distribution provides us with evidence for labeling one opinion more or less responsible than another unless the concept of "responsibility" itself were operationalized and given an empirical meaning pertinent to the data—something the authors do not do.

Those of us who believe it is possible to arrive at scientific, value-free findings—and this, I know, includes Verba and his associates—would do well to choose our terms with more care.

MICHAEL PARENTI

Sarah Lawrence College

To the Editor:

Mr. Parenti is right. Whether one considers a position on Vietnam "responsible" or "irresponsible" depends upon one's values.

But Mr. Parenti is quoting our "original Stanford report" which, as we point out in our article, was a policy-oriented document into which we thought it not inappropriate to inject our own opinion.

And let us be precise about what our opinion was. The pattern of public attitudes we found and to which we applied the term "responsible" was not one that advocated maintaining the level of military commitment at that time. Rather, we found majorities in favor of a reduction of the war and a negotiated American withdrawal—through negotiations with the Vietcong, through free elections even if the Vietcong won, through U.N. supervision, or through the formation of a coalition government with the Vietcong. On the other hand, majorities rejected alternatives that called for sudden withdrawal with no conditions attached. In the original report quoted in the Review article (but not in the body of the article itself) we labeled that pattern of public opinion "responsible."

That is our opinion. Mr. Parenti may agree or disagree. It is not a scientific finding. We did not present it as such.

Sidney Verba, Richard A. Brody, Edwin B. Parker, Norman H. Nie, Nelson W. Polsby, Paul Ekman, and Gordon Black

To the Editor:

In his review of Alfred de Grazia *et al.*, *Congress: The First Branch* (this Review, September 1967, p. 777), Nicholas Masters calls some of my statements (in my essay on "Check and Balance Today: What Does It Mean for Congress and Congressmen?") "nonsense" and "ridiculous." May I return the courtesy by suggesting that Mr. Masters has demonstrated that either he is or I am extraordinarily ignorant (or that he is extraordinarily unimaginative and unable to read clearly). Unlike Mr. Masters, however, I shall try to demonstrate why I use the abusive terms I do; he is content merely to use them—generally a misfortune in reviewing!

He quotes what he calls the most ridiculous statement in the book. My statement is based upon the value judgment that there is danger that the Congress be overwhelmed by the bureaucracy and the specialists and that this danger should be reduced. (Mr. Master's inattentiveness is suggested by his general assertion in a preceding column that the book is based upon "the notion that the Executive Branch, including the entire bureaucracy, is a monolithic force, dominated by a central figure"; yet my paper, like several others—mine perhaps more explicitly—makes the meaning of check and balance today dependent upon protection from the specialist, the expert, the bureaucrat, as much as or more from the President.) This judgment is based on the hypothesis that Congressional staff are, like other people, influenced by their immediate primary groups, including those with whom they dwell. The statement, to translate it out of context, says merely "some attention should be called to the danger that Congressional staff may be over-influenced in those instances where they live with a group of bureaucrats; one way to call attention to such a danger is to propose regulations making it somewhat difficult." Mr. Masters, to be sure, has snatched the statement out of context to make it sound like some horrendous threat or absurdity—but unless he is really unable to read, or prepared to assert that primary group theory is not relevant to Congressional staff, although the proposal may be erroneous or unnecessary (a matter for study) it is not ridiculous nonsense.

To put the matter in terms of vivid illustrations: (1) Has Mr. Masters ever lived with a bunch of employees, properly indoctrinated, of the Strategic Air Command and seen them influence their associates? I think they would do the same thing, even more, with Congressional staff. (2) Does he have any recollection of the missionary enthusiasm some New Deal agencies used to have and which was generally manifested by their employees? Does he seriously believe that this enthusiasm did not over-influence some Congressional staff who lived with those people?

Lewis A. Dexter

Belmont, Massachusetts

To the Editor:

In our Communication appearing on p. 761 of the September 1967 issue of the Review, the following 11 words should be deleted from the second-to-last paragraph: "A cycle is virtually certain with more than ten individuals."

Richard Niemi and Herbert Weisberg

BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTES

BOOK REVIEWS

Gross, The Managing of Organizations. ROBERT PRESTHUS 1106
Grodzins, The American System. ROSCOE C. MARTIN 1108
Knorr, On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age. *Brodie*, Escalation and the Nuclear Option. JOHN E. MUELLER 1109
Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations. HANS J. MORGENTHAU 1110
Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest and Change. A. F. K. ORGANSKI 1112
Organski, The Stages of Political Development. YOUNG W. KIHL 1113
Dye, Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States. JAMES A. ROBINSON 1113
Grimes, The Puritan Ethic and Woman Suffrage. VICTORIA SCHUCK 1115
Lewis, Politics in West Africa. WILLIAM G. FLEMING 1115
Cooper, et al., Governments and the University. *Rourke and Brooks*, The Managerial Revolution in Higher Education. J. W. PELTASON 1116

BOOK NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY 1118
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 1128
FOREIGN POLITICAL SYSTEMS 1143
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1171

BOOK REVIEWS

The Managing of Organizations. By Bertram M. Gross. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. 2 vols., Pp. xxviii, 971. $25.00.)

One must honor the time and effort which have gone into this encyclopedic work on administration in its many forms. Using almost a thousand pages, Professor Gross attempts, with consummate eclecticism, to synthesize both the methods and the substance of social science as these relate to the managing of organizations. Written in a provocative and lucid style, the analysis ranges through the rise of the administrative state, the emergence of administration as a focus of attention, people in organizations, organizational purposes and objectives, and ends with some normative judgments about administrative imperialism, tensions between opposing conceptions of the best ways to study it, and the directions administrative science should take in order to insure survival, wisdom, and an international community.

The section on the "gospel of efficiency" and the "new pioneers" is especially useful, providing an excellent overview of the historical evolution of administrative thought in the United States. That the resistance to Taylorism came from higher management as well as from blue-collar workmen shows again that everyone finds change threatening. Equally suggestive is the section dealing with the organization's environment and its diversified client groups. Multiple constraints impinge upon the organization, and its efforts to accommodate them provide a useful framework for conceptualizing organizational behavior. The unexpected consequences of co-optation are seen in the danger that organizations may find themselves the instruments of such "outside" interests. Such a focus helps us overcome any tendency to view organizations only in their internal context, a perspective which usually overestimates their autonomy and neglects the political role which their leaders necessarily play.

Perhaps the main thrust of Professor Gross' work is suggested by the space given to discrete areas of the field. Regarding, for example, the "organizations without people" v. the "people without organizations" dichotomy, we find 114 pages under the latter rubric contrasted with 300 under the former. Both areas are of course touched upon elsewhere but one feels the author is somewhat more comfortable with the "management science" side of organizational life than with its "human relations" aspects.

A related characteristic of the analysis is an extensive use of economic constructs and language. A section on the purposes of organization, for example, is replete with economic symbols: output-input values; internal pricing systems; output mix; product characteristics; efficiency ratios; quality facets, etc. While Gross carefully notes that organizations have many goals, "efficiency" and "rationality" are central among them and considerable time is spent discussing their various meanings. These concepts, however, are not always tightly integrated into the analysis. They are presented well and clearly, but their significance for understanding and explaining management processes is not always made clear, and perhaps especially in the chapters on "Output: Operations and Functions" and "Efficiency."

Although my own approach to organizations may be too centered on political and sociological questions of authority, hierarchy, and power, this emphasis upon the language of economics often seems strained. It may be germane to private management, which has the purpose and the performance measures required to make at least some economic constructs viable. In the public sphere, however, it seems to reflect mainly an inapposite management-consultant *legerdemain*, if only because public government really isn't very "efficient" and perhaps cannot be, given the welfare and warfare purposes that dominate it. The preoccupation of public administrators with "management" techniques may reflect their inferiority feelings *vis-à-vis* private business more than the adaptability of such techniques to government operations. One is reminded of the much-bruited costing expertise of MacNamara's "whiz-kids" or an ironic Bureau of the Budget pamphlet (1964) called *War on Waste*. Contrast these with the Defense Department's recent 10 billion dollar underestimate of the costs of the Vietnam War or the Comptroller General's annual catalogue of the Department's overbuying, gold-plating, excessive stock-piling, etc.

The tendency to impute too much rationality to administrative processes is also apparent in the conclusion that a "realistic model" of decision making may now be set forth. It seems, on the contrary, that there has been some disenchantment with decision making models because they are often unable, even with the help of computer simulation, to comprehend

enough of the variables and alternative solutions related to problems of any magnitude to make possible very imposing levels of rationality. Indeed, so-called decision "theory" really lacks the most significant ingredients of theory in its failure to differentiate relevant variables in terms of their relative weight and "causal" associations. The result is usually some highly abstract set of rules admonishing the decider to determine what his problem is, scale his values, consider several alternative solutions, trace out their consequences, etc. So far it has proved difficult to go much beyond this simplistic model.

Regarding power within organizations, Professor Gross is, I submit, unconvincing in arguing so categorically that such power is not centralized. "Large-scale organization itself," he maintains, "inevitably results in the dispersion of intra-organizational authority and power among many centers, rather than in their concentration at any one point" (p. 69). Michels' "Achilles Heel," he believes, is his failure to "penetrate sufficiently into the internal operations of organizations." It is of course a matter of judgment whether Michels "penetrated sufficiently" into such, but the fact remains that the burden of his analysis deals with the conditions of internal governance in political party organizations. Such conditions, he found, culminate in rule by the few. Marx and Mills are briefly mentioned as being similarly wrong, despite the fact that their formulations relate to social classes and the international arena rather than to the intra-organizational sphere. It is surely true, as Gross points out, that specialization has brought some dispersal of intra-organizational influence, yet decisions involving the major allocations of organizational resources remain in the hands of hierarchical elites. The specialist's role is often one of rationalizing the policy determinations of his line masters.

A similar mystique characterizes a section devoted to "exploding fallacies." Gross believes for example, that the manager is not the man on top; boards of directors, legislators, etc. will always be found above him. Yet professional managers in a variety of administrative settings, we are often told, are responsible to their boards in only a formal way. But isn't one's answer to this question vitally a matter of his level of analysis? If one generalizes at the level of intra-organizational relations, managers are often at the top. Item: a persistent theme in current criticism of the State Department is Dean Rusk's failure to exercise a decisive role in internal departmental management. There is apparently an unusual power vacuum at the top. Critics also maintain that the least used words at State are "I disagree." If power is really atomized within organizations, as Professor Gross maintains, why should this condition persist?

Gross also insists that authority and power in organizations do not flow from the top downward. One could equally maintain that the opposite is the rule, a condition for which several thousands years of hierarchy in organizational relationships provide impressive evidence. Indeed, organization *is* the differential allocation of power and authority. *Herrschaft* is the essence of bureaucratic relationships. As Max Weber put it, "all administration means domination" (*On Law in Economy and Society*, p. 334).

The great value of these two volumes is in providing a compendium of much of what is known today about administration. The major relevant areas of development, knowledge, fact and fiction in the social sciences are mentioned, interpreted briefly, and tied to some aspect of administration. We learn again about Gulick's POSDCORB, Weber's categories of authority, Taylor's contributions to work methods, Simon's "satisficing" man, Barnard's wise observations regarding authority and status, Maslow's need hierarchy, Mayo and the Western Electric research, Orwell's *1984*, Follett's "law of the situation," etc. A good bibliography of "Research Studies in Organizational Behavior" is appended.

Yet the author aimed to do more: to achieve an "action-theory marriage" between the "art and wisdom of seasoned administrators" and the major questions asked by scholars and, presumably, the findings of relevant research. His role as public servant, management consultant, teacher, and writer in the field provides all the gains that varied experience can bring to this aspiration. Nevertheless, one cannot say that he has brought a new synthesis to the field. There is no systematic working theory of administration running throughout these almost 1,000 pages, to which the mass of empirical observations and information is harnessed. There is no unifying central theme or nest of hypotheses which might give us a seminal new generalization. The function of theory is to order facts and to explain relationships between them, but valuable as the present work is as a synthesis of knowledge about the field, it lacks any selective apparatus which might have restructured its mass of data to set administration in a new context. We have instead a *taxonomy* of administrative, economic, and political variables which, in the end, do not and cannot tell us which adminis-

tratively-relevant variables are most crucial and how they affect each other. Such a theoretical perspective would require the one-eyedness of a Veblen, a Weber, a Marx, or a Homans who, while using a similarly broad compass, ruthlessly ordered their data to the elucidation of a crucial hypothesis.

The broad substantive drift of the analysis is matched by its methodological eclecticism. "Every situation is unique . . ." (p. 10). But surely if this is true, systematic research with the hope of building generalization is futile. Yet, generalizations are said to be valuable, and the work of Merton is mentioned to support the search for them. Regarding tensions between behavioral and rationalist bases of knowledge, the author has "one foot planted in each camp" (p. 27). Administrative knowledge rests on many disciplines and stems from many sources. The novel holds special promise: "The literature of greatest significance for the understanding of administration . . . [is] found mainly in the work of the greatest dramatists and novelists, such as Shakespeare, Tolstoy, Dostoevski, and Mann" (pp. 209, 210). No supporting documentation is offered for this claim other than citations from two book reviews which argue similarly. In all sincerity one wishes that someone would give us an analysis in which the lessons of literature for administration are set down in some systematic form for the improvement of both practice and teaching of administration. On the other hand, if such wisdom is not transmittable, we might as well forget about it.

Despite these strictures, Professor Gross' work is of permanent value. He has set down much of the best thought and research about administration in clear and evocative language. The complexity of organizational life has been fully documented. A major check-list covering almost every aspect of administration is now available. Students and practitioners who digest this material will know a great deal about the managing of organizations.

Finally, the handsome production job done by the Free Press should be mentioned; the binding, type, and layout of these volumes are elegant indeed.

ROBERT PRESTHUS
York University

The American System. By MORTON GRODZINS. Edited by Daniel J. Elazar. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1966. Pp. xviii, 404.)

Normally a reviewer is expected to proceed direct to his chore. The circumstances here, however, are not normal, for this is a posthumous publication. It will help to know how the book came to be produced. As early as 1958, the editor informs us (p. viii), Morton Grodzins conceived this work and laid out its general plan. At his death in 1964 the volume was still unfinished. The task of completing it fell to Grodzins' sometime student and longtime friend, Daniel Elazar. On examining the author's materials, Elazar found a few chapters in virtually final form, a number of articles that either were designed for or lent themselves to inclusion in the book, several fragments in the form of lecture notes or abridged manuscripts, and, fortunately, a detailed outline of the book Grodzins had planned (p. ix). From these materials, Elazar fashioned *The American System.*

The author early set down the plan and purpose of his work in explicit terms. He conceived it as organized in three major segments. The first addresses the questions *what* and *how*? The central proposition explored in these early chapters, as stated by the author (p. 13), is this: "All levels of government in the United States significantly participate in all activities of government." A second major body of material shifts the emphasis from *what* to *why*? Why does the system operate the way it does (p. 14)? The chief explanation is found in the American party system. The third principal question asked is *with what result* (p. 15)? One acquainted with Grodzins' optimism is quite prepared to hear the answer; with results that, given the complexities of the American system and the society it serves, are surprisingly satisfactory.

The book is devoted to elaboration of the issues suggested by these major questions and to exploration of the many ancillary ideas to which the central concepts gave rise. To one reader, who confesses to general sympathy with the views expressed and argued, Grodzins' analysis is almost uniformly persuasive. One is familiar by this time with the author's "marble cake" conception of the federal system and with his doctrine of shared powers and responsibilities in the American practice of federalism, though it is useful to have his interpretations restated in their present context. That same reader found the book's highlights in Chapter 7, "Local Is as Local Does," which comes through as a perceptive comment on the notion of localness; in Chapter 10, which relates American parties to the federal system more expertly than I have seen done elsewhere; and in Chapter 12, where centralization and decentralization are examined and placed in proper perspective. Nowhere is the author's fresh, imaginative, inquiring mind more in evidence than in these sections.

Morton Grodzins, a professional to the core,

would not wish his reviewer to gloss over what seem to be imperfections. The chapters written by Grodzins expressly for this book are excellent by anybody's standards; the parts that were prepared for other purposes and other audiences, however, seem uneven and not always clearly related to their present surroundings. The variety in origins, and more particularly the span of time covered by the writing, likewise cause portions of the book to suffer from lack of contemporaneity. The editor has attempted to bring the volume into focus through numerous notes and emendations, with what must be judged less than complete success. Finally, it must be recorded that the book suffers from some little repetition. Examples are found on pages 57, 88, and 375, where the same passage from a supreme court case is found with closely comparable introductory comments; and on pages 272 and 377–8, where the same quotation appears in virtually identical contexts. The editor speaks of the author's "concern for perfection," observing that "always he felt that the work needed 'just a bit more polishing'" (pp. viii and ix). Morton Grodzins would surely have written a tighter book had not its completion been (as the editor puts it) removed from his hands.

Let these critical comments not obscure the value of this book. As to form, Professor Elazar undertook an extraordinarily difficult task: that of weaving the materials, some of them fragmentary in character, some dated, left by his friend and teacher into a systematic whole. Given the circumstances, he has done this job well. As to substance, it is my opinion that Morton Grodzins' views of federalism were as sound and as closely reasoned as those of any scholar of his generation. The author and his editor have combined to produce a thoughtful and imaginative book on American federalism—the best in my judgment that has appeared in some years.

ROSCOE C. MARTIN
Syracuse University

On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age. By KLAUS KNORR. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. x, 185. $5.00.)

Escalation and the Nuclear Option. By BERNARD BRODIE. (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. 151. $4.50.)

These two books have a number of similarities—besides price, size, and publisher. Both attempt to cope intellectually with the impact of nuclear weapons on military and political calculations, both have been written by experienced practitioners in the field, and both abound in carefully formulated insights.

Klaus Knorr's book is the broader of the two in subject matter. He attempts to assess the value of military power under current conditions when nuclear weapons seem to be dominating all considerations. Somewhat clumsily applying an expected utility framework (probabilities are mixed in with costs as "risks" rather than inserted as continually recurring factors affecting all calculations of gain and cost), Professor Knorr argues that both the use and the threat to use national military force has generally decreased in value. This has come about largely because the danger that nuclear weapons may become involved has caused the costs of such use to become "grossly disproportionate to any rational objects of foreign policy." However, the value of military force in the "essentially defensive purpose of deterrence"—a "use" of a different sort apparently—may have risen. This eventuality has had, in his view, numerous and far-reaching consequences in the conduct of diplomacy, in the relations between states of various sizes, and in the development of international norms of behavior. The book is often best (and most provocative) when changes not particularly linked to the development of nuclear weapons are being discussed: the diminished value Professor Knorr sees to have come to be associated with territorial conquest, the decline in the legitimacy of most kinds of war, the restraints posed by international community and world opinion.

Bernard Brodie's theme is much more specific. He is largely concerned with the recent emphasis placed by American policy makers on preparing NATO to fight a large scale conventional war in Europe. In a view which has been partly developed in previous essays and reviews, Professor Brodie argues that such preparation is principally directed at breathtakingly improbable eventualities—a Soviet conventional invasion of Western Europe or the process leading to "accidental" war—and in addition is debilitating to the alliance since it tends to weaken in European eyes American determination to defend the continent, and may, at the extreme, reduce the deterrent effect of American nuclear capability.

The argument sometimes—as in the discussion of accidental war—suffers from a certain fleshlessness imposed it seems by clearance complications and discontinuities resulting from Professor Brodie's move from RAND to UCLA. Nevertheless the case is impressively presented, again and again illustrating the

author's ability to hack through argumentative shrubbery exposing to view the reality previously obscured. Ultimately, of course, a personal decision on the NATO debate rests on a series of subjective estimates of a number of imponderables: how much one is willing to pay in alliance strain for increased "flexibility" in Europe, for example, or how one feels the probabilities of major war alter when one prepares for minor war.

Curiously, while both books stress the differences nuclear weapons have made in the international environment, some of their observations can be used to reinforce the view that in many ways the world would not really be very much different had these weapons never been invented. Both authors are impressed by the restraint shown by the great powers in the nuclear era regarding major war, Professor Brodie convincingly arguing that Soviet behavior has been characterized by "extreme military caution." What needs to be added is that a similar characterization could be made for Soviet actions *before* World War II as well. Thus the caution antedates the technological change.

Furthermore, the books note that the major powers basically favor the status quo and are unable to visualize any gains worth the costs of a major war. In this, the nuclear world resembles more the world of 1815 than of 1918. A horrible war was fought, those who sought to upset the status quo were thoroughly and unambiguously defeated and, most importantly, were willing to accept reduced status. The powers most able to start another war were those most content with the world that emerged from the last one and thus entertained no intention of letting things so deteriorate that they must pay again the tremendous cost to maintain it. It is this memory of the horrors of the last war which today, as in the 19th century, probably forms the major deterrent for the victorious powers. The Russian slogan is inclined to be "we must never let it happen again" rather than "we must never experience something even worse."

This argument—together with the observation that the Soviets have always approached cautiously the subject of war with other great powers—helps to explain the restraint Professor Brodie finds in Soviet behavior in the early years of the "nuclear era" when a) the U. S. had very few bombs and b) Soviet Military thinking seemed to discount the importance of the new weapon.

(If there is a specific impact of nuclear weapons, then, it may not be because they increase *even more* the costs of a major war, but rather because they make it possible for the tremendous destruction to occur in a short period of time. This reduces presumably the rationality of hopes—like those held by the Japanese in 1941—that the war can be terminated before it escalates to an intolerable level.)

If these thoughts are valid, they suggest that part of the reason nuclear weapons are found by Professor Knorr to be in some sense "useless" is because they are irrelevant.

JOHN E. MUELLER
University of Rochester

Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations. By RAYMOND ARON. (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1966. Pp. xi, 820. $10.00.)

The intellectual historian of a future age, looking back on the America of the first two decades following the Second World War, can not help but wonder what accounted for the sudden search, undertaken by hundreds of academics and supported by millions of foundation money, after precision, certainty, and predictability in a field such as foreign policy, whose very nature has always appeared to be hostile to such qualities. He might particularly marvel at the persistence of these efforts in the face of persistent and, so it may seem to him, preordained failure. And he might well conclude that three basic factors are responsible for this extraordinary phenomenon: the American folklore of politics which conceives of the political world not in terms of intractable conflicts but of technical problems susceptible to rational solution; the sudden confrontation of this folklore with a hostile international world which could no longer be evaded; the risk of total destruction implicit in the failure to bring this world under rational control. Thus the search for a pervasive theory of international relations might present itself in retrospect as the Utopian quest for a rational substitute for the traditional manipulation of political forces with its attendant ambiguities, uncertainties, and risks. The results of the search will then appear to the historian not as theoretical propositions discovering the truth about reality, but as ideological disguises, rationalizations, and justifications which give the appearance of precision, calculability, and predictability to a field of knowledge which is still as imprecise, incalculable, and unpredictable as it has always been.

This search for a pervasive theory of international relations, which performs a social function within the American context, has become fashionable abroad, where it performs no

such function. The new book by Raymond Aron is a case in point. Aron presents his thoughts on the current problems of international politics within an ambitious conceptual and theoretical framework. He divides the book into four parts: theory, elaborating concepts and systems; sociology, analyzing determinants and constants; history, dealing with the global system in the thermonuclear age; and praxeology, discussing antimonies of diplomatic-strategic conduct. He has elucidated his theoretical propositions in an article, "What is a Theory of International Relations?" in the *Journal of International Affairs* (vol. XXI, no. 2, 1967).

Yet perusing Aron's substantive propositions without reference to the conceptual organization and theoretical framework, one realizes that these substantive propositions have only a very tenuous relation to the theoretical concepts and framework. They are the result of the author's practical judgment; they owe little to the theoretical concepts and framework. The substance of the book is very much in the tradition of *Century of Total War* and *On War*, works which did not use the conceptual and theoretical apparatus of the present book. In other words, this apparatus is essentially the frosting on the cake, a tribute to intellectual fashion rather than a contribution to the advancement of theoretical knowledge. Thus the book must be judged by its substance rather than by its theoretical appearance.

The substance of the book is indeed superb. It impresses by the comprehensiveness of the issues, theoretical and practical, it deals with, by the brilliance and elegance of both argumentation and presentation, and by the general soundness and frequent profundity of its judgments. This is political analysis of the very first order. It must be said, because it cannot always be said of books of this kind, that the book is a joy to read, and the literary and intellectual qualities of the French original have been faithfully preserved in the translation. What sets this book apart is the breadth and depth of its intellectual culture. Mr. Aron is not a technician or a specialist; he is a historian and a political analyst, and the book testifies to it.

Take as one example among many the chapter "On the Strategy of Deterrence." A whole literature, generally technical and frequently esoteric, has dealt with this problem, and many authors have concluded from the novelty of the nuclear instruments that the issue itself is novel and that traditional categories, such as the balance of power, are irrelevant to it. Mr. Aron starts out by stating that "Deterrence, a mode of relation between two persons or two collectivities, is as old as humanity." And he asks, "Does deterrence, regarded as the supreme concept of diplomatic-strategy in the thermonuclear age, belong to the traditonal theoretical and practical categories of international politics?" He answers that question in the positive: "The difficulty of integrating the realities of the thermonuclear age into classical theory exists only for those who fail to distinguish resources, military strength and power, and identify power politics with the politics of military action." The whole chapter is a marvel of lucidity and good sense.

However, strangely enough, the chapter and others as well leave the reader somehow dissatisfied. He has witnessed a brilliant and stimulating exposition of the problem and now he wants to know where we stand and where we go from here? He will be disappointed. For Mr. Aron has the disconcerting habit of raising fundamental questions without answering them. Thus Mr. Aron asks:

> In order to maintain a "plausible first strike" capacity, should not the United States maintain a certain counterforce capability and improve its civil defense? Lacking this plausible first-strike capacity, ought not the United States to acquire more weapons applicable in limited wars, either conventional weapons or tactical atomic weapons? Should the objective be the stabilization of mutual deterrence at the strategic level, even though this entails reinforcement with weapons adapted to limited warfare, or on the contrary, should it be the maintenance of an effective threat at a higher level?

If these questions are worth raising, they are also worth answering, but we are left without answers.

This deficiency is not accidental but has a philosophic root. Mr. Aron reveals his philosophy in his polemics against "political realism," as practiced by Reinhold Niebuhr, George Kennan, and myself. He finds the main weakness of that school in that it is a reaction to a preceding one; hence, according to him, it is an ideology rather than a theory. If the argument were valid it would indeed dispose of all political philosophy. For all political philosophy is "standortgebunden," that is, it arises out of a concrete political situation with which it tries to come intellectually to terms in a new and meaningful fashion. Because it does this, it is bound to be used by certain groups within the political situation as a rationalization and justification of a particular political position,

that is, as ideology. Political philosophy is by its very nature "committed" and hence susceptible to ideological misuse. Mr. Aron may escape this liability, but he pays for this immunity with a lack of that ultimate relevance that sets political analysis apart from political philosophy.

HANS J. MORGENTHAU
The University of Chicago

Modernization: Protest and Change. BY S. N. EISENSTADT. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966. Pp. ix, 166. $4.95, cloth; $2.50, paper.)

This latest book by S. N. Eisenstadt will be considered a welcome addition to the expanding theoretical literature on national development. The central focus is on the relationship between the development of patterns of protest and modernization. Very roughly the author suggests the following: the process of national modernization begins with the weakening and disorganization of established patterns of behavior and the erosion of established commitments. It begins, in other words, with what Karl Deutsch has (perhaps somewhat misleadingly) dubbed social mobilization. Thus disorganization is part of modernization. A second central element of modernization, according to Eisenstadt, is the movement of protest and the orientation toward change which are made acute by the misery of those caught in the social disorganization, i.e., caught between the erosion of one set of commitments and the establishment of new patterns of feeling and behavior. Social mobilization, however, may lead not to growth but in the opposite direction. The direction that change will take in each specific case depends of course upon a large number of important variables, for example, the degree to which protests manage to be heard, the orientation of the elites toward change, the depth and scope of the protest, the realism of the demands, and the timing and sequence of modernization patterns.

The material in the book is organized in such a way as to offer a natural division into three parts. The first part contains an essay on the fundamental characteristics of modernization, an essay on the role that dislocation and assimilation play in the process of growth, and a third chapter on the role and function of institutions in absorbing change. A second part of this volume includes two long discussions which seek to apply the theory developed in part one to specific cases of modernization. The cases studied include nations that modernized in the first phase of modernization (i.e., Western European nations in Europe and overseas, and Japan) and nations that have or are still seeking to modernize in the second wave of modernization, i.e., most of the new nations. The third portion of the book contains a comparative analysis of the settings within which national decay and national growth occur.

In passing, I should like to express my disappointment that political modernization has not received more attention in this book, particularly in view of the fact that the author promised it special attention in the preface. On the other hand, I should like to register my approval of the fact that the author insists not only in specific places but throughout the book that modernity is at its core the ability to change and that no better measure of the modernity of a system exists than the capacity of that system to change.

Minor comments aside, what interested me most in this book was the discussion of split level modernization which in one way or another can be found throughout this book. By split level modernization Mr. Eisenstadt means modernization that first of all has been imposed from above, and often from the outside, as it was, for example, in all the colonial cases. Second, by split level modernization he means modernization where the motive power for change comes from different groups among the broader elites who desire different kinds of modernization. Third, the governing elite often has inconsistent desires itself in regard to modernization. While favoring strictly limited modernization for such purposes as increases in national power or riches, it does not want to see the major social and political consequences of sustained modernization. As a result, the elites of modernizing countries often attempt to limit and suppress the consequences of their policies. These attempts are not successful in the long run, but they tend to shape the pattern of modernization. At least in part they have made for a slower, more spasmodic expansion of the modern sector punctuated by major eruptions. A crucial result has been a weak and imperfect integration of much of the nation into the modern sector. It seems to me that this is a useful model for those interested in the present pattern of development in a major fraction of the nations of the world today.

The reader versed in the literature on national development will find little that is entirely new to him in this little volume. But problems are stated in a fresh and suggestive way, the author has a number of new ideas and useful insights, and he does have a different angle of vision. This reviewer has found very

worthwhile what he has read of Professor Eisenstadt's work in the area of development. This book is no exception.

A. F. K. ORGANSKI
The University of Michigan

The Stages of Political Development. By A. F. K. ORGANSKI. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1965. Pp. xiii, 229.)

Political development is a new concept referring to the dynamic process of nation-building and modernization in which many states, both developed and emerging, are engaged. In this timely work Professor Organski launches an ambitious project of constructing a paradigm to study different patterns and experiences of political development in the modern era.

The central theme of the book is clearly and simply stated. Modern nations since the sixteenth century have undergone four distinctive stages of political development: stages of (1) the politics of primitive unification, (2) the politics of industrialization, (3) the politics of national welfare, and (4) the politics of abundance. Since all countries must proceed according to this pattern and cannot skip any stage, they must be at any given historical moment in one of these four stages. Today only the U.S. has entered the final stage of political development, and the U.S.S.R. is trying to fulfill its task in stage three and preparing for entry into stage four. The other west European countries plus Japan are comfortably situated in stage three, while the bulk of developing and underdeveloped countries are hovering in stage one or two.

As soon as the modern state graduates from stage one, during which the primary function of government is "the creation of national unity," it will soon find itself involved in the colossal battle of economic development and political modernization. The scope of governmental function, Professor Organski believes, is largely conditioned by the necessity to manage the economy. Thus, in stage two government tries to promote economic modernization by way of facilitating "a shift of political power from the hands of the traditional elite to the industrial managers," permitting "the accumulation of capital . . . by holding down mass consumption," and forcing "a large-scale migration of people from country to city" (pp. 10–11). In stages three and four the primary function of government is, respectively, "to protect the people from the hardships of industrial life" by means of the welfare state policy, and "to cushion the adjustments of social reorganization . . . to make an automated economy politically responsible" (pp. 12–14).

For setting up a conceptual framework for the study of political development, the author must be congratulated for his originality and creativeness. But the reason why he chose only a four-fold scheme (and not a three or five for example) has not been explained, nor has the basis for assigning countries to different developmental patterns been presented. Furthermore, his whole concept of political development is influenced by a similar pattern of economic progress developed by W.W. Rostow. As in his earlier work (*World Politics*, 1958), Professor Organski, according to this reviewer, gives undue emphasis to the economic and industrial factor in political development. There is a sense of monocausality and an air of economic determinism prevailing throughout the entire book. For example, the three interesting sub-systems of bourgeois, Stalinist, and fascist politics, which the author says are the three patterns of political development in stage two, are characterized not as attributes of a political system but as "three alternative ways of dealing with industrialization" (p. 57).

The author is imaginative in describing the state of affairs that prevails in different stages of political development. For example, he coins the term 'syncratic' politics in reference to political practices of compromise and bargaining in the process of industrializing society. Although one wishes that he had avoided some repetition, his argument seems basically sound and sustained by his deductive method of reasoning. It will be interesting to test Organski's proposition by means of an inductive method, with the help of empirical data and statistical facts, which the author regretfully does not at all employ in the present study.

For a long time students of international relations have felt the need to develop a framework which will establish a linkage between the study of comparative politics and that of international system. Judged from this standpoint Organski's work may be regarded as a pioneering work in trying to lay the bridge between two interrelated yet mutually exclusive subfields in political science.

YOUNG W. KIHL
Juniata College

Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States. By THOMAS R. DYE. (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1966. Pp. xv, 314. $5.00.)

Professor Dye's excellent book is another from the admirable series of empirical studies of American institutions, processes, and policies

edited by Aaron Wildavsky. Its thesis is that characteristics of political systems (e.g., division of two-party control, interparty competition, voter participation, and legislative malapportionment) predict less of the variation among the 50 states' policies (e.g., education, welfare, highways, taxation and revenues, and regulation of public morality) than does economic development (i.e., urbanization, industrialization, wealth, and education). This study happily joins two streams of research—that emanating from the hypotheses developed and tested from experience among the 50 states by V. O. Key, Duane Lockard, Richard Dawson and me, John Fenton, David Derge, Herbert Jacob, and Richard Hofferbert with certain themes in recent transnational research by S. M. Lipset, Robert Alford, Lyle Shannon, and Phillips Cutright.

The intellectual history of this topic extends over a twenty year period. In *Southern Politics*, Key observed that states with bifactional rivalries in the dominant party were more favorable to the interests of the "have-nots" than states with multifactional rivalries. To explain the apparent association between intraparty competition and policy, he hypothesized that bifactional parties in one-party states resemble competitive parties in two-party states. Identifiable and reasonably permanent factions contend with each other for party (and state) control by promising have-nots larger welfare and other social programs. Because the winning factions in legislative and gubernatorial elections usually can be identified in the next election, it is to their interest to fulfill their campaign promises with the expectation of being rewarded with victory again. In contrast, the several factions in the fragmented parties are less permanent, coalitions are more often reforming, and hence the winners in one contest are difficult to identify, reward and punish in the next. Consequently, the demand to fulfill commitments to greater welfare efforts is less in multifactional than in bifactional systems.

Lockard extended Key's theorizing to predict that two-party states are more liberal than one-party states in tax and welfare programs. He compared 3 competitive and 3 one-party states in New England with results that coincided with predictions about 6 policies. Fenton similarly compared 6 states in the Middle West and reached similar conclusions. Dawson and I undertook to use more states (46) and more welfare and related policies (6 and 9) and to test the hypotheses at 3 different times (1941, 1950, 1961). Moreover, we introduced "competing hypotheses" to see whether partisanship is as strong a factor as economic capability. Our results differed from Lockard's and Fenton's: we concluded that economic capacity is more closely related to variations in welfare policies than are party competition and other political variables. Owing to different indexes among the several studies, however, one was entitled to suspend judgment between the claims of "economics" and of "politics."

Thanks to Dye's extensive efforts, I believe judgment may now be rendered with persuasiveness if not conclusiveness. ". . . correlation analysis reveals that these system characteristics have relatively little *independent* effect on policy outcome in the states. Economic development shapes both political systems and policy outcomes, and most of the association that occurs between system characteristics and policy outcomes can be attributed to the influence of economic development. Differences in the policy choices of states with different types of political systems turn out to be largely a product of differing socioeconomic levels rather than a direct product of political variables. Levels of urbanization, industrialization, income, and education appear to be more influential in shaping policy outcomes than political system characteristics" (p. 293). What lends credence to Dye's interpretation is the comprehensive basis on which it is founded: 50 states (not 46 or 6); 4 measures of economic development (not 2); 4 political system characteristics (not 2); 3 measures of each political system characteristic (not 1 or 2); 5 sets of policy outcomes (not 1) and several measures for each set so that more than 90 different outcomes are described and analyzed. The time base is a single period, the early 1960's.

If one were asking for more, he would like similar analysis for one or two earlier periods, but replication of this study after 1970 will serve just as well for establishing trends and identifying conditions underlying them. Dye's lucid and careful analyses deserve continuing updating and application to values other than the five most important ones he has selected. On its face, this brilliant effort appears to have been pretty much a one-man job. I hope that Dye or his students or others will keep us current with the factors and relationships so inclusively presented in this important book. And I also hope that universities and other research institutions will prize this stream of analysis highly enough to support replication in the future.

JAMES A. ROBINSON
The Ohio State University

The Puritan Ethic and Woman Suffrage. By Alan P. Grimes. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. xiii, 159. $4.75.)

It has become a cliché to ascribe the origin and adoption of woman suffrage in the United States to the egalitarianism of the western frontier and to affix to that movement the label of liberal reform. In a concise and well-written monograph based on the records of state legislatures and Congress and on voting behavior, combined with a reexamination of the ideas of the suffrage movement, the author demonstrates that women achieved the vote in the west, not as an outgrowth of equality but rather as a "by-product" of the struggles for power to continue or to impose Puritan strictures principally behind the frontier. Instead of being part of the liberal tradition, woman suffrage in the west reflected a strong conservatism, a way of preserving the status quo, and indeed of maintaining inequalities. The nineteenth amendment enacted in a thrust of patriotic fervor just after World War I, was in reality the same old Puritanism in disguise writ large.

To sustain his thesis, Grimes begins with the first enactment of full equality of suffrage which occurred in the territorial legislatures of Wyoming and Utah during the winter of 1869–70. In Wyoming, the earliest support for woman suffrage was almost fortuitous. But once made law, woman suffrage was championed by the community building interests (Republican) as a device to ensure more order and sobriety and a balance against the weight of gun-happy, lawless transients. In Utah, the Mormon hierarchy approved woman suffrage for two reasons: as a hedge against congressional prohibition of polygamy and as a new supply of voters to outvote the fortune-seeking "gentiles" averse to the Mormon's established, pious and sober society. Both Wyoming and Utah (notwithstanding an interim of federal disapproval) carried woman suffrage into their state constitutions in the 1890's.

In spite of the mounting campaigns of the suffragettes, the nineteenth century saw adoptions of woman suffrage in only two other states, Idaho and Colorado. The major parties gave tacit approval, but the author demonstrates that particularly in Colorado, responsibility goes to the Populists who needed the votes of like-minded women. In the many other contests where suffrage per se was the goal, the battles were lost over differing social views. The women and their supporters—Protestant churches, the WCTU, and third parties—could not overcome the opposition of major party leaders and their allies—wets, new immigrants, and male status-seekers.

The author clinches his argument in an analysis of the winning of the western states finally in 1910–14. In this period, woman suffrage, along with the direct primary and direct elections, became a political mechanism to save the social status of the Progressives by solidifying their political power. Suffragists and Progressives alike sought a resurgence of values symbolized by the word Puritanism in opposition to the values symbolized by the boss, the ignorant foreigner, and the saloon. Woman suffrage was closely paralleled to victories for direct legislation and prohibition in western states and became associated with racism and nativism, presaging the eighteenth amendment and national origins act of the 'twenties. In effect, it contributed "not so much to expand the base of political power as to change its locus" to the white Protestant Anglo-Saxons.

This is a significant book. The author succeeds in removing woman suffrage from the realm of historical conjecture. He does not overlook the fact that some political and social equalities eventuated from woman suffrage. He performs a service in discriminating the origins of feminism in the eastern United States with equalitarian ideas of abolition, for instance, from its western version related to Puritanism. What one seems to miss is a more satisfying definition of the philosophical characteristics of Puritanism which Grimes specifically does not equate with Calvinism, and why it should have proved to be the pervading influence in the history of the movement.

Victoria Schuck
Mount Holyoke College

Politics in West Africa. By W. Arthur Lewis. (Toronto & New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. 90. $3.50.)

This essay, originally delivered as the 1965 Whidden Lectures at McMaster University, should be required reading of every African student and most African politicians. Only such an eminent man of colour and distinguished scholar as W. Arthur Lewis could hope to reach the hearts and minds of those responsible for the future of democracy in Africa. His writing is direct and relatively unencumbered by abstract models or jargon. While the conceptual baggage is minimal, the theoretical and practical implications of his thesis make it profitable perusing for the African specialist and the political scientist alike. It should not be read for information,

but rather for its creative interpretation, biting criticism, and salutary suggestions.

There are painful truths for all in this short work. Lewis writes, "As for our political scientists, they fall all over themselves to demonstrate that democracy is suitable only for Europeans and North Americans, and in the sacred names of 'charisma,' 'modernization' and 'national unity' call upon us to admire any demagogue who, aided by a loud voice and a bunch of hooligans, captures the state and supresses his rivals" (pp. 89–90). For the African leaders themselves harsh rebukes: "... most of the new politicians have no commitment to democracy; have never experienced democracy, and know neither its philosophy nor its history.... To survive, these politicians feel that they have to destroy the independence of the farmers, the unions, the churches, the universities, and all the other social institutions, by bringing them under party control. They make a desert of democracy, and then call it social peace" (pp. 32, 44). For the Africanophiles and phobes some interesting asides: "Experience suggests that the main effect of people persuading themselves that Africans are different from other people is that they abandon normal standards of decent human behaviour and end by thinking that anything is good enough for Africa, even though they would not for one moment consider it for Europe or North America.... The idea that ... something will emerge that is universally or uniquely African seems highly improbable—whether it be 'negritude' or the 'African personality' or some distinctly African political system" (pp. 35, 36). And, finally, for everyone: "The history of democracy is a history of the efforts of good men to hold bad men in check, and this is a process which West Africa will have just as much difficulty in learning as men in any other part of the world.... Besides, West Africa has its share of good men ..." (pp. 33, 34).

However, this is not a collection of aphorisms, but is a well thought out and studied attack on the single-party system and its philosophy. The first two-thirds of the work are devoted to a discussion and interpretation of the recent political history of twelve West African states. According to Lewis, the intense pluralism and economic underdevelopment of the area make it difficult for any class to become dominant or for strong central leaders to emerge naturally. He credits the systematic elimination of opposition and the growth of one-party systems to a simple love for power on the part of some rogues and to a deeper conviction of some sincere statesmen. The serious arguments are examined in detail.

First, as a development economist, Lewis finds that the one-party system is irrelevant to the economic problems in West Africa. It does not accelerate growth or manage the tensions arising from rapid social change. It may actually create instability by channelling diverse streams of hostility against the leaders. The presupposition that an opposition provides an entree for foreign influence is rejected since government parties may also sell out to alien powers.

The main problem as the author defines it, as do most other analysts, is the unification of the country, the building of the nation. The natural pluralistic cleavages should be reflected in a multi-party system which represents the different regions and interests of the country. A federal distribution of powers should be institutionalized to prevent the poorer areas from over-taxing the richer and the parties must learn to tolerate each other and to form coalitions to control the central government. The single-party system, Lewis asserts, has not served as a mechanism of conciliation and coalition in West Africa—although he admits it would be possible to do so in the style adopted by President Nyerere of Tanzania. But this exception is qualified by emphasizing the lack of strong traditional political systems and the even distribution of poverty throughout that East African nation.

The remaining third of the book consists of an examination of the plural society in West Africa with suggestions for the building of democracy through instruments of representation and coalition. Citing examples from the American Congressional committee system, coalition theories of Duverger and Riker, and predicting the destruction of civil rule in Nigeria, Lewis concludes by damning the Western style of 'zero-sum' politics bequeathed to Africa.

One can only hope that the publisher will bring out this simple, brilliant analysis in a cheap paper edition for wide distribution throughout Africa. Tragically, it may already be too late.

WILLIAM G. FLEMING
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Governments and the University. By WILLIAM MANSFIELD COOPER, WILLIAM G. DAVIS, ALPHONSE-MARIE PARENT, THOMAS R. MCCONNELL. (Toronto, Canada: Macmillan Company of Canada Limited and New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966.. Pp. x, 92. $3.25.)

The Managerial Revolution in Higher Education. By Francis E. Rourke & Glenn E. Brooks. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 184. $8.00.)

Political scientists who are also members of the academic community will be especially interested in these two volumes that focus on governmental-university relations and the internal management of universities. *Governments and the University* consists of lectures by an English academic administrator, Vice Chancellor William Mansfield Cooper of the University of Manchester; a Canadian academic administrator, Vice-Rector Alphonse-Marie Parent of Laval University; a Canadian governmental official, William G. Davis, Minister of Education and Minister of University Affairs of the Province of Ontario; and an American professor, Thomas R. McConnell of the University of California, Berkeley. These lectures make it clear that the character of university-governmental relations does not substantially vary among the three nations, despite a variety of institutional relations, and also that how one views the issues is colored by his responsibilities. University authorities, although reconciled to the fact that governmental authorities will be increasingly involved in the affairs of universities, view the trend with some apprehension. Despite similarities, it is clear that English universities have more independence from governmental authorities than do their American counterparts. Sir William Cooper tells of his experience in appearing before the Public Accounts Committee of the House of Commons to explain why a radio-telescope built by his University with public funds had cost more than estimated. "No one," he said, "could meet the committee without respecting the probity, integrity, and sincerity of its members, and their determination to see that public monies were well spent, but few if any amongst them were capable of determining what 'well spent' meant in a scientific context. Little men moving in a world manifestly beyond their comprehension." Undoubtedly there are American college presidents who are equally presumptuous, but it is doubtful if any would dare to express so publicly his intellectual contempt for members of a congressional committee. In America, at least, university authorities do not ordinarily feel it wise to call stupid those who vote the funds on which universities depend.

The Honorable William G. David, speaking from the perspective of a representative of the public, argues persuasively that even if universities were independently wealthy and had no need to rely on public funds, the public would still have valid reasons to be concerned with university affairs. Now that higher education has become a secular religion and universities have become major dispensers of the world's values, it is unlikely that university administrators and faculties will be able to ignore public wishes with as much ease as in the past. There may be a lesson for university people in the political ineffectiveness of the medical men's cries that they alone are competent to determine how medical care shall be financed and organized and to whom it will be made available and on what terms.

For my own tastes, I prefer to avoid such imprecise labels as "the university" and "the government." These categories are more often than not camouflages to legitimize the claims of more specialized concerns. Sometimes the clash between "governmental accountability" and "university autonomy" amounts to a dispute as to whether the third assistant in the department of finance or the head of the department of theatre is to decide whether or not to spend $100,000 for lighting in a new theatre; sometimes it refers to a dispute between the staff of a state coordinating committee and the faculty and administrators of Up-and-Coming University over the right of UCU to inaugurate a new Ph.D. program. Sometimes "university autonomy" means that a weak department is trying to tell students and administrators that no one has any right to inquire into what they are doing or how they are doing it; sometimes it means that a university administrator is trying to defend an unpopular professor or football coach from outside pressures.

Francis E. Rourke and Glenn E. Brooks, in *The Managerial Revolution in Higher Education*, provide hard data and careful analysis of recent trends in university management. This useful and suggestive study is improperly titled and Rourke and Brooks, in places, appear to believe that there has been a revolution in the management of institutions of higher education even though their own evidence and their own conclusions point to the contrary view. True, within the last decade the larger universities have adopted such features as program budgeting, computer-based informational systems, bureaus of space analysis, institutes of institutional and instructional research, and have moved to adopt formulized rationales to support their requests for funds. Yet, as Rourke and Brooks point out, the central decisions of universities—who shall

teach what to whom and how—today are decided by the same people and in the same fashion as they were prior to the "management revolution." Support dollar formulae, faculty-student FTE's, performance budgeting, computer print-outs, are now part of the environment of central administrators. The discourse between these administrators and coordinating committees and departments of finance now takes place in the language of the management sciences. But at the departmental level where the real business of the university takes place, life goes on as before. Nor is there any evidence that the "management revolution" has altered the internal power relations between administrators and faculty members. Any advantage that superior information about university affairs may give to administrators has certainly been more than offset by the faculty members' access to outside grants and to the capacity of professors to pick up and move any time they wish. And also as Rourke and Brooks point out, despite the claim that the growing size and complexity of universities would lead to the development of a new kind of "men of power" within the universities in the form of management experts, so far, prestige universities continue to recruit their key administrators from among the ranks of the academicians. University administration may require knowledge of management sciences, but the fastest way to get there remains scholarly publication.

Rourke and Brooks speculate that the faculty, in contrast to the member of the faculty, has lost its impact on university policies and they attribute this decline in influence to the retention of the town-meeting mode of faculty government. They predict that unless the faculty develops representative institutions, control over university policy will be left entirely in the hands of business-oriented administrators. Yet it is difficult to support such a prediction from the evidence they produce. Moreover, I would guess that there are other factors that will have more impact on the internal politics of our universities than the adoption of newer management techniques. For example, the events at Berkeley, and whether future incidents will align students and faculty against administrators, or faculty and administrators against students, seem to me much more significant than whether computers are more extensively utilized or performance budgeting adopted. Within the university as within any free society, politics determines administration, not vice versa.

J. W. PELTASON
University of California, Irvine

NOTES

POLITICAL THEORY, HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT, AND METHODOLOGY

Benjamin Constant et sa Doctrine. By PAUL BASTID. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1966. Vol. I, pp. 5–485; Vol. II, Pp. 495–1112.)

It is very appropriate in this bicentennial year of the birth of Benjamin Constant that the most exhaustive study of his political theory since Edouard Laboulaye's effort a century ago should have appeared in 1966. It has been undertaken by Paul Bastid, who published in 1939 a thorough analysis of the political ideas of Abbé Sieyès, the thinker having probably the greatest influence on Constant next to Montesquieu.

Bastid's two volumes are solidly based not only on printed works but also on such recently available sources as the *Oeuvres manuscrites de 1810*, containing the original text of Constant's *Principes de Politique, applicables à tous les gouvernements représentatifs* and the *Fragments d'un ouvrage abandonné sur la possibilité d'une constitution républicaine dans un grand pays.* Although, as Pozzo Di Borgo observed in 1964 in his edition of Constant's *Ecrits et Discours Politiques*, these unpublished manuscripts have not added too much to what was already known about his political theory, we now realize from a study of these documents that brochures like his hastily written masterpiece of 1814—*De l'Esprit de Conquête de l'Usurpation dans leurs rapports avec la civilisation européenne*—had been conceived and drafted as early as 1800–1806.

Bastid marshals the evidence to prove, therefore, that Constant was right when he wrote in 1829 in the preface to his *Mélanges de Littérature et de Politique* that he had consistently "defended for forty years the same principle—liberty in everything, in religion, in philosophy, in literature, in industry, in politics." But the legend of Constant as the political opportunist, created by Sainte-Beuve in the Nineteenth Century and perpetuated by Henri Guillemin recently in ours

remains so powerful that Bastid's first volume is devoted to a political biography of Constant—*L'Homme et le Citoyen*—during the Directory, the Consulate, the first Restoration, the Hundred Days, and the second Restoration. He concludes from this detailed study of his life that Constant's "thought remains as firm as his conduct is equivocal and uncertain" but it is going too far to say that his "political action was always consistent with his doctrines."

Constant's ideas—philosophical, religious, literary, political, economic, and social—are the subject of Bastid's second volume—*L'Oeuvre et les Idées*. The most important part deals with "the central theme of the political writings: the individual and his liberty." Bastid correctly criticizes those, like Faguet, who viewed Constant's individualism and liberalism in egoistic terms. To use the words of Sartori in his *Democratic Theory*, for Constant "liberalism meant the rule of law and the constitutional state."

In Constant's system "there are two dogmas equally dangerous—the one, divine right and the other, unlimited popular sovereignty," which must be "circumscribed by justice and the rights of individuals." Liberty is defined as the "triumph of individuality as much over a government which seeks to rule by despotic methods as over the masses who wish to render the minority a slave to the majority." In Constant's view, Rousseau only had the "feeling for liberty but not the theory"; in fact, his "*Social Contract*, so often invoked in favor of liberty" was instead "the most vicious auxiliary of every kind of despotism."

Bastid gives an interesting but incomplete analysis of the contrast Constant drew between ancient and modern liberty; military and commercial societies; and traditional absolutism and postrevolutionary dictatorship. It would have been enhanced if he had referred to the distinction drawn by Sir Isaiah Berlin between negative and positive freedom in his *Two Concepts of Liberty* and to the difference between liberal and totalitarian democracy examined by J. L. Talmon in his *The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy*. As Plamenatz points out, "to us Constant often sounds as if he were speaking of Hitler's Germany" instead of Napoleonic France.

As Sismondi observed, Constant "in politics created many more doctrines than those called the Doctrinaires," like Royer-Collard and Guizot. But, as Bastid concludes, Constant's political views were closer to those of Tocqueville, long before whom Constant had said that the desire for symmetry and uniformity "had never met with more favor than in a revolution made in the name of the rights and liberties of men." In fact, in the history of French Liberalism Constant remains the most profound thinker between Montesquieu and Tocqueville and we are greatly in Bastid's debt for his monumental effort in restoring him to his rightful place.

These volumes suffer from the lack of footnotes and an index and there are some significant omissions in the bibliography, such as Lothar Gall, *Benjamin Constant. Sein Politische Ideenwelt und der Deutsche Vormärz* (1965) and Antonio Zanfarino, *La Liberta dei Moderni nel Constitutionalismo di Benjamin Constant* (1961).

Finally, the influence of Constant on American Transcendentalist circles, including Orestes Brownson and George Ripley, is not mentioned and it requires more attention than William Girard gave to it in 1916. But what is most needed now is a full treatment of Constant's political theory in English, which this reviewer hopes to provide with his forthcoming book on *Benjamin Constant's Constitutional Politics*.—GUY H. DODGE, *Brown University*.

The Sociological Tradition. BY ROBERT A. NISBET. (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1966. Pp. xii, 349. $7.95.)

Apparently the social sciences go through similar stages of development or change but at different times and at a varied pace. Not so long ago many sociologists took a dim view of political science, contending that it was not very scientific and overly concerned with the history of ideas and philosophy and formal institutions. Today, we find that behaviorism rules political science and that economists and mathematicians will soon overthrow the behaviorists while sociologists seem to be rediscovering predecessors, their basic concepts and the historical development of societies and ideas. Witness the new concern for cross-national and historical studies; and witness, too, the rapidly increasing number of critiques and commentaries on the history of sociological theory. Gouldner's *Enter Plato*, Martindale's *The Nature and Types of Sociological Theory*, a new edition of Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, Bendix's *Max Weber*, various studies of Simmel, Durkheim, Pareto and anthologies of several American greats including Cooley and G. H. Mead and a proliferation of textbooks on the history of social thought. Now we have another volume of appreciation of the greats and their ideas: Robert A. Nisbet's *The Sociological Tradition*.

Nisbet's study is not a textbook either in content or appearance; on the contrary it is both a beautifully written and appreciative examination of "the sociological tradition" and a very handsomely-produced book. Instead of writing a purely chronological essay or organizing his material into several complex and partially

overlapping schools of thought or theories, Nisbet has chosen to follow the suggestion of Lovejoy and shape the sociological tradition in terms of certain basic "unit-ideas." These unit-ideas include "community," "authority," "status," "sacred," and "alienation." Such unit-ideas continue to form the basis of current sociology even if disguised in the garb of technical jargon and empirical research. The sociological tradition or the development of these unit-ideas took place primarily during the period of 1830–1890, or what Nisbet calls the "Golden Age of Sociology." The theorists mainly responsible were Weber, Durkheim, Simmel, Marx, Tocqueville, and to a lesser extent Le Play, Comte, Toennies, Taine, de Coulanges. Each of these unit-ideas is considered in a single chapter. My count shows that Weber, Simmel, and Durkheim are considered to have made major contributions in the development of all five unit-ideas, while Tocqueville and Marx had important things to say on four. Marx apparently had little to offer on the "sacred" while Tocqueville had little to contribute to the use of "community," the most important of the unit-ideas.

What seems particularly interesting about the sociological tradition and these men, according to Nisbet, is the fact that they were all reacting against the effects of the Industrial Revolution, Capitalism, and the democratic movements of the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Nisbet claims that the basic unit-ideas as developed by Weber, Durkheim, and Simmel, especially, are deeply conservative in a philosophic sense. These men were liberals in everyday politics but their analytical schemes, questions, and concepts reflect a concern for order, community, tradition, and the sacred, all conservative preoccupations. These conservative responses were engendered by a conflict between two social orders—the feudal and democratic capitalism. Nisbet's examination of these men and their ideas is a most sympathetic one, as we might expect from the author of *Power and Community*. While he asserts that present day sociology is intimately connected to the early statements, he does not illustrate or demonstrate that connection in any detail; but readers of sociology could easily supply many of the links themselves.

One interesting omission in the analysis is the name of Pareto. He certainly responded to the conflicts between feudalism, capitalism and democracy but unlike his fellow theorists took the side of capitalism and the antidemocrats. Apparently Pareto was a political but not a philosophic conservative. And, obviously, Nisbet does not credit him with having made contributions to the unit-ideas.

Nisbet's quiet and elegant observations make good reading but he does leave us with one very disquieting conjecture at the end of the book: he wonders whether our inheritance of the great unit-ideas is about exhausted. Their relevance to a new world is questioned. We are no longer, at least in the West, confronted by a conflict between a social system characterized by communal-traditional ties and one in which secular norms prevail; instead the conflict is over and we live in a secular world. How can concepts and theories formulated to deal with that conflict cope with the victory of one side? Nisbet doubts that they can but ends with a cautious hope that perhaps some unrecognized genius is this very day building new tools that will one day enable us to see ourselves as the Webers, Durkheims, and de Tocquevilles did in theirs.—WILLIAM MITCHELL, *University of Oregon*.

Political Anthropology. EDITED BY MARC J. SWARTZ, VICTOR W. TURNER, AND ARTHUR TUDEN. (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1966. Pp. viii, 309. $8.95.)

In reviewing the anthropological literature on "primitive" political systems, David Easton has indicated that "if there is any central problem with which the discipline [of anthropology] is confronted, we can find it in the failure to develop an adequate type of conceptualism of or broad theoretical orientation to politics." Although the number of political studies by anthropologists has increased enormously in the nine years since Easton's critique was written, a systematic theoretical framework for the anthropological study of politics is yet to appear. *Political Anthropology* seeks to move in this direction.

Anthropologists have turned with increasing sophistication "away from their earlier preoccupation with taxonomy, structure, and function of political systems to a growing concern with the study of political processes." It is the aim of *Political Anthropology* to explore these new winds of change and to offer a conceptual framework for the diachronic analysis of political systems. In the Introduction, the editors seek to construct out of dialogue "between anthropology and other disciplines concerned with comparative politics" a conceptual framework of general applicability, one which will allow "recognition of diversity of political systems." Although "system" is here used, Swartz, Turner, and Tuden reject the concept of the political system as characterized by an "absolute or rigid quality." As an organizing concept, they take the "political field," stating that for political anthropology, the unit of space is no longer the isolated "society," but rather has come to be the political "field." While *field* is not explicitly defined, it is suggested that what has been called

a political field "is not necessarily a closely integrated system, but a spatial-temporal continuum with some systematic features" (p. 30). Elsewhere we are told that the study of politics "is the study of the *processes* involved in determining and implementing public goals and in the differential achievement and use of power by the members of the group concerned with those goals"—and that "the groups within which these processes occur are important because they constitute the 'field' of political activity." If this seems to involve some confusion, we are then informed that the important point is that "since politics is the study of certain kinds of processes, it is essential to center our attention on these processes rather than on the groups or fields within which they occur" (p. 8).

The basic concepts of the Swartz-Turner-Tuden framework are derived largely from the works of Easton and Parsons. These concepts—support, legitimacy, power, etc.—are then related to the diachronic analysis of the political field, the examination of "changes in the relationships between significant parts of the preliminary situation . . . over time, in a succession of phases." These phases tend to occur in a patterned sequence. The unit of political action, essentially oriented to conflict, is termed a "political phase development."

In the preliminary phase of the processual pattern, the groups and persons who will occupy leading roles in the anticipated struggle attempt to maximize support in mobilization of political capital, (a) to build up their ranks and resources and (b) to deplete those of their anticipated adversary. The second phase, the encounter or "showdown," is initiated when one of the major parties, feeling itself to have acquired decisive advantage, precipitates a crisis. This takes dichotomous form as the field as a whole becomes an arena in which the contenders are arrayed in two factions. Countervailing tendencies, however, act to inhibit the development of radical cleavage, and adjustment or redressive mechanisms are brought into play. These mechanisms for conflict resolution may range, as Turner states, from "personal and informal arbitration to formal and legal machinery, and, to resolve certain kinds of crisis, to the performance of public ritual." With the restoration of peace (leading either to rapprochement or final schism), "the nature and intensity of the relations between the parts, and the structure of the total field, will have changed."

The phase development model of conflict resolution is presented as a device for the study of changing political systems. It does not, however, meet Easton's demand for a broader orientation to politics, nor does it provide theoretical guidance as a conceptual framework for the various papers included in the volume, as evidenced by the lack of congruence between the papers and the model. Although apparently not the fault of the contributors, the concepts and processual model simply disappear in the pages beyond the introductory chapter. The papers themselves vary considerably in their potential interest to political scientists. Some seem barely to rise above ethnographic minutia. Others, however, notably the papers by Nicholas, Swartz, Cohen, Turner, and Fried, should be of particular theoretical interest to those in comparative politics, especially those concerned with the problems of conflict and conflict resolution.—ROBERT L. HARDGRAVE, JR., *University of Texas.*

Empirische Wahlforschung: Konzeptionen und Methoden im internationalen Vergleich. BY NILS DIEDERICH, (Köln und Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965. Pp. xii, 240. DM 24.50.)

This eighth volume in the *Staat und Politik* series represents a summary of the basic approaches and methods of the major existing schools of elections behavior research, and a running comparison of their respective findings and methodologies. Each approach is examined according to the extent to which it grows out of and promotes understanding of the processes of democratic politics in mass society, which is posited by Diederich as the ultimate relevance of electoral behavior studies and which gives every school its basic orientation.

Following a chapter that generally describes elections analysis in terms of democratic research, each of the major contributing schools is given a separate chapter. French electoral studies and the particular contributions of André Siegfried and "electoral geography" are the subject of Chapter Two. This is followed by examination of the American contribution, especially in the behavioral study of politics, in the multiplying uses of statistical correlations, and through the methodological advances of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan. British elections analysis, and specifically the work of David Butler and the Nuffield College group, are the subject of Chapter Four, followed by a short chapter dealing with the increasing significance in the use of electoral statistics in West Germany. There is a bibliography that includes major studies in several languages of electoral and other empirical phenomena.—EDWARD L. PINNEY, *Washington & Lee University.*

Basic Tactics. BY MAO TSE-TUNG. Translated and with an introduction by Stuart R. Schram. Foreword by Brigadier General Samuel B.

Griffith II, USMC (Ret.). (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. viii, 149. $4.95.)

The production graphs are up again, and another cultural victory has been won on the guerrilla-literature-in-translation front. The heroes of the battle are Dr. Stuart R. Schram, author of the recent political biography, *Mao Tse-tung*, and, in lesser degree, General Samuel B. Griffith, one-time commander of the First Marine Raiders on Guadalcanal and himself a translator both of Mao Tse-tung and of the ancient Chinese military philosopher, Sun Tzu, who so influenced that Communist leader.

Chi-ch'u chan-shu (*Basic Tactics*), the text with which this pair concern themselves, is ascribed to Mao Tse-tung, a transcript of a series of lectures delivered in 1938 at the Anti-Japanese Military-Political University at Yenan. Although the Chinese Communists have not published the text, a copy exists in Taiwan, and Schram has worked from a hand-written replica of that booklet deposited in the Harvard-Yenching Library.

While its authorship alone would commend *Basic Tactics* (hitherto untranslated either in or out of Peking) to Western attention, the pamphlet is made doubly significant by the specificity of its discussion of guerrilla organization, operations, logistics, intelligence, and related topics. Too often Peking's translations on politico-military affairs, like much of the official *Selected Works* of Mao, are concerned with cosmic topics such as the pattern of world history, with the tactics of revolutionary warfare apparently being left to such as Che Guevara. That propaganda does not reflect reality may be seen in the existence of such little-known Chinese treatises as *Basic Tactics* (or similar documents translated fifteen years ago by Gene Z. Hanrahan in a mimeographed collection, *Chinese Communist Guerrilla Tactics*, which included writings by Chu Teh, Hsiao K'o, Kuo Hua-jo, and others). Nor are details such as those provided in *Basic Tactics* of interest only to professional military officers. By a feedback process, knowledge of operational techniques may throw light on larger strategic policy analogs. A few illustrations suffice:

Topics covered in *Basic Tactics* (BT)	Strategic generalization
1) Ruses and strategems (e.g., BT, 60, 84, 102)	Manipulation of the opponent's information set in a context of dyadic strategic interaction
2) Correspondence network of a guerrilla unit (BT, 111–114)	Information organization and flow
3) Tactical retrograde maneuvers (BT, 59–63)	Optimization strategy in a differential game evasion problem

In his introduction, Schram comments on the somewhat rudimentary nature of the presentation in *Basic Tactics*. Unfortunately, a similar charge might be made against the 50-page foreword and introduction to this important essay. The discussion is a potpourri of political history, speculation on the future of Chinese Communism, and—where the discussion touches military operations—routine observations on the fluid, ambiguous, complex character of guerrilla warfare. Both Schram and Griffith offer the now-customary general comparison of Maoist tactics with those of Sun Tzu and other traditional Chinese sources but fail to offer adequate identification and analysis. No attempt is made to relate Mao's *Basic Tactics* to such analogs as the Viet Minh manual on partisan warfare first published in French in the *Bulletin Militaire* of June-August 1955. No recognition is granted to the growing body of literature by D. B. Bobrow and others which attempts to place Chinese Communist strategy in a systematic behavioral context.

Western students of war, politics, and power can only be grateful to Schram for discovering and providing a first English translation of a Chinese Communist work which provides potentially deep insights into the Maoist strategic system. Interpretation, however, remains largely a task for the future.—SCOTT A. BOORMAN, *Harvard College*.

Armed Force as Power: The Theory of War Reconsidered. By WENDELL J. COATS. (New York: Exposition Press, 1966. Pp. 432. $10.00.)

Armed Force as Power was originally a Georgetown University doctoral dissertation. Now it is a judicious, sage, erudite essay, which is a singular credit to the policy of detaching officers for academic studies, establishing its author as an important military historian and critic whom students of traditional political thought and international relations will also find stimulating. To show how force functions as a political instrument Coats isolates its manifestation in selected concepts, i.e., battle, war, peace, strategy, tactics, and justice. He does not prescribe; the use of force is a *prudential art* and a theorist only suggests principles and dilemmas. More clearly than most contemporary civilian "military intellectuals," the general grasps the relevant political and philosophical considerations.

Coats reconsiders Clausewitz's theory of war, a typical achievement of the nineteenth century—a century which distinguished a variety of social

activities for systematic analysis. It should be emphasized, now that interdisciplinary studies have become too fashionable, that Clausewitz's labors were immensely rewarding. Knowing that every war had had a political element, he still saw that the military dimension could not be mastered until it was conceptually isolated. He did this, unfortunately, by distinguishing between the political object of war—"to impose our will upon the enemy"—and the purpose of military action—"to destroy or disarm him." Ultimately a paradox ensued; from the soldier's perspective the political aim could be "something not belonging to the war itself." In its "absolute" or "pure" form war was simply unlimited force. Thus, although there might be good political reason for the eighteenth century general to limit war, the practice did not make military sense. For good reason Liddell Hart condemned Clausewitz's influence as pernicious, encouraging more intense decisive wars which created obstacles for subsequent firm peace settlements. Victory is not always a substitute for a treaty both parties will accept.

Delbrueck, the West's greatest military historian, criticized Clausewitz's basic assumptions. War and politics were linked historically because they were logically inseparable. He distinguished two types of war, each requiring appropriate military and political actions: limited, when we deny the foe specific objects, and total, when we demand unconditional surrender. The practical significance of this formulation became obvious in 1917; Delbrueck insisted that particular offensives would fail unless the Allies understood the limited German war aims, but "everyone who counted" thought he was confounding war with politics.

Coats refashions the argument impressively, though one wishes he could have concentrated on primary sources. (When will someone translate Delbrueck?) He traces Clausewitz's confusion to a failure to separate war and battle, treating both as *acts* of force. Hobbes and Grotius knew better; war is a political condition, a state of anticipation over time where acts of force (battle) can be expected. This makes clear the context in which Clausewitz is relevant; in battle military considerations are paramount because there we do aim to destroy an enemy army. War, however, must be governed by politics.

Important strategic consequences flow from this view and Coats illustrates the governing considerations in historic campaigns. The successful soldier is sensitive to the reciprocal effect of military and political actions in shaping the will of each protagonist to fight harder or make peace. The concluding chapter assesses contemporary doctrines of limited war and indicates that we overemphasize technology and mistakenly equate politics with deterrence. Instead of making the enemy yield, deterrence sometimes induces him to make more military effort than he originally intended. Vietnam?

A valuable feature of this book is its discussion of the idea of "just war"—virtually forgotten since the French Revolution. It is no accident that Coats makes political contact with theologians here. He may be unaware of it, but the Christians first talked about limited war because in contrast to the Greeks and Romans they knew *they* could undertake unjust wars.

One can find shortcomings but do they matter? His discussion of primitive war suffers seriously because he overlooks Turney-High, the most prominent authority. He obviously overvalues technological considerations despite his concern for politics. Finally, the Clausewitz discussion would have been more useful if he had consulted Liddell Hart and had recognized that the concept of "absolute war" partly trapped Clausewitz because he used a Weberian ideal construct for an intellectual problem where other conceptual forms were more appropriate—a lesson, alas, many contemporary social scientists still have to learn.—DAVID C. RAPOPORT, *University of California at Los Angeles.*

Nomos IX: Equality. EDITED BY J. ROLAND PENNOCK AND JOHN W. CHAPMAN. (New York: Atherton Press, 1967. Pp. xii, 313. $6.50.)

The word equality is often used in the arenas of political rhetoric and political ideology, but too seldom has it been placed in the glaring light of careful scholarly analysis. This volume, the ninth yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, attempts to do just that through eighteen essays. The essays are grouped into three sections, "Concepts of Equality," which primarily deals with definitional problems, "Egalitarian Implications and Consequences of Belief Systems," which should appeal to the historian of political thought, and "Political and Legal Equality," which is sort of a catchall.

All the authors in the first section agree that the term equality needs very careful definition. Two of them, Hugo Adam Bedau and Richard E. Flathman, are concerned with such definition separate from normative content. The other authors in this section, notably Stanley I. Benn, John Plamenatz, and George E. G. Catlin, attempt to develop more explicitly normative definitions. Bedau's definition, "*Persons have (received) an equal distribution, equal rights, etc., if and only if they have (received) the same distribution, treatment, rights, etc,*" (p. 7., emphasis in the

original), can be contrasted with Benn's attempt to establish a principle of equal consideration of interests as a patently normative proposition. All the authors with the possible exception of Flathman would, I think, accept Bedau's definition. But they are bothered by the problem of applying the abstract principles to real situations; and all, but Benn in particular, view the problem of equality as a segment of the problem of social justice. This section may disappoint some political philosophers who would like to see more space devoted to precise definitional considerations and a more careful delineation of normative and empirical propositions.

The second section considers the idea of equality in Christianity, the Middle Ages, Judaism, Hinduism, and Existentialism. This mixed bag is the most uneven part of the book, varying from Paul E. Sigmund's excellent essay on Medieval Christian thought, through Sanford A. Lakoff's rather mediocre history of Christian equality, to Herbert Spiegelberg's weak discussion of existentialism. The major weakness in Lakoff's essay is the all too common one of attempting too much in too little space. What results is a cursory survey of selected aspects of the Christian notion of equality and its effect on Western political thought. Although he generally selects well, I miss a consideration of *Philemon* or the *Apocrypha;* on balance, the essay could serve well as an introduction to the problem of equality in Christian thought. Spiegelberg's essay, though, raises a host of problems, only a few of which can be discussed here. First, he must be praised for recognizing the relevance of existentialism to the problem of equality. But, even though he sets himself the limited task of collecting "some of the relevant evidence and discussing its significance critically and reconstructively," he fails to achieve his own goals. He pulls together a few passages from Sartre, de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty which indicate some concern with equality. Unfortunately, he fails to deal, for example, with Sartre's political works such as *Sartre on Cuba* (1961), which indicate a passionate concern for equality. The problem for the analyst is to attempt to deduce from the wide variety of Sartre's writings a theory of equality. Spiegelberg makes no attempt even to collect a minimum of the data from Sartre, let alone the other existentialists. One of the reasons may be found in his implication that he is not at home with literary analysis, a skill that is essential to any student of existentialism. In Spiegelberg's "reconstructive" discussion of existentialist equality, one finds a few interesting hints at a normative theory, but existentialism as a philosophy seems to have disappeared altogether.

The third section contains a wide variety of short articles dealing with equality in international law, the United Nations, comparative law, criminal law, and politics. Although all the articles are sound scholarly works, only one seems to merit special attention. In "A Brief Discourse on the Origin of Political Equality," Carl J. Friedrich imaginatively explores the problem of the degree of political inequality necessary in any political system. In doing so, he saves the volume from committing the grievous error of completely ignoring the recent literature on elites. But Friedrich's main point is to attempt to discover the origin of the drive for equality. He claims to have found it in ". . . . situations and constellations in which *disbelief* prevails concerning any manifest innate qualities justifying political inequality" (p. 220, emphasis in the original). As an hypothesis this conclusion merits further consideration for the light it might shed on the development of ideological movements and belief systems, but as yet Friedrich has failed to explore it fully enough to be convincing.

Although generally this is a strong collection, there are certain flaws that must be mentioned. First, there is no representative of an anti-equalitarian viewpoint. Second, the literature on elites is only mentioned once. Third, although belief systems are discussed at length there is no systematic consideration of equality in contemporary belief systems. The literature on equality has been surprisingly weak until recent years. This volume will not only add significantly to the growing list of titles, but it will do much to begin the task of clarifying the conceptual muddle that surrounds so many terms in political philosophy.—LYMAN TOWER SARGENT, *University of Missouri at St. Louis.*

The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique. BY PETER BACHRACH. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967. Pp. xiv, 109.)

In the course of this essay Peter Bachrach remarks (p. 62) that, "The capacity to think philosophically lends itself to discerning fine distinctions in substance and approach, and thus opens an inexhaustible source for disagreement and argument." Bachrach demonstrates his capacity to think philosophically by discerning a distinction between alternative definitions of democracy, on the one hand, as a political method for maximizing popular access to power, popular sovereignty and political equality, and on the other as an ideal of widespread participation in political decisions as the central means for maximizing human dignity by "enhancing the self-esteem and development of the individual" (p. 94). Bachrach classifies a very large number of contemporary political theorists—Schumpeter, Truman, Mills, Berle, Lasswell, Kornhauser,

Sartori, Plamenatz, and Dahl—as elitist because they unidealistically consider only the first of these dimensions of democracy and not the second. These theorists reveal their unconcern with popular participation to Bachrach in a number of ways, in particular by their attention (which Bachrach grants is empirically justified) to the fact that most people in the western democracies are not highly politicized and by their inattention to the possibilities (if any) for increased popular participation in the decison-making of large-scale entities in the private sector.

Bachrach scores a number of shrewd points, more or less at random, against theories that rely heavily upon political elites for maintenance of basic conditions for democracy, instancing the indifferent performance of many elite groups during the heyday of Joseph McCarthy. But on the whole, empirical considerations are introduced ad hoc, and clothe Bachrach's argument rather thinly.

The basic method of the book is the introduction of a few short quotations from a theorist tending to show his preoccupation with the role of elites in democracy. Bachrach then interposes observations about internal contradictions or other purported inadequacies in the theorist's approach, and then passes on to the next theorist. The final chapter is an attempt to lay out systematically Bachrach's own "two dimensional" position, which is supposed to escape all the difficulties found in the works of our shattered idols.

But it does not seem to me that Bachrach makes a particularly strong case for his position. To strengthen his case, he would have to adopt the very means-ends perspective he rejects, and demonstrate the empirical connections between the democratic goals he posits and various political methods for achieving them. The outcome might still be a considerable dissatisfaction with the extent of political participation in western democracies, but I doubt that he would be quite so hard on theorists who find it useful to distinguish and describe political systems on some grounds other than those embodied in his preferred (but largely unproven) method for enhancing the self-esteem of the individual.—NELSON W. POLSBY, *University of California, Berkeley.*

Ironies of History, Essays on Contemporary Communism. By ISAAC DEUTSCHER. (London & New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. 278. $5.75.)

Few can remain objective about Isaac Deutscher as a political essayist. Within the confines of a single page he can infuriate a reader, yet leave him full of insights; he can hold him spellbound with his prose, yet jar him into violent disagreement with his conclusions. Deutscher is at once a stimulant and an irritant. Though an exile of communism, he is a devout Marxist. A convinced believer in the Marxian timetable of history, he is a pessimist of the present, but an optimist of the near future. In sympathy with the fundamental goals of the Russian Revolution, he is repelled by Stalinism, yet confident that sooner than later the working class will wrest control from the party leadership and will assert its political and economic rights. Residing in England he is appreciative of the political freedom found in the Western world, yet a harsh critic of capitalism and Western cold war politics. This basic outlook governs all his writing and provides a unity to the third collection of his essays (written over a ten year period) to appear in book form.

Deutscher's comments on contemporary political events, which make up half of the book's contents, have suffered most with the passage of time. When they originally appeared, they were of interest mainly because Deutscher's viewpoint is so different from that of most Sovietologists. In re-reading them, however, we see the historian turned journalist dealing with events as they happened (Khrushchev's "secret speech," de-Stalinization, the turmoil raging within the communist bloc, Khrushchev's over-throw), but lacking the perspective of time and the availability of facts to give depth and accuracy to the analysis. For example, few analysts today believe with Deutscher that Khrushchev's secret speech, a detailed but circumspectively worded account of Stalin's crimes, delivered at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 was an impromptu performance (p. 4). And few will accept Deutscher's statement written in 1965 that "major decisions of policy are taken not by Khrushchev alone and not even by the eleven members of the Presidium but by the Central Committee which consisted of 125 members (or 225 if alternate members are included)," (p. 39) which was simply not true of the Central Committee.

Deutscher's Marxist orientation consistently drives him to espouse the cause of the working class, even when it is absent. In wrestling with the old but consistently troublesome question of how a revolution could be considered socialist when the working class was not involved, Deutscher, in his long essay, "Maoism—Its Origins and Outlook," attacks even an ideologically friendly writer as the late C. Wright Mills for concluding that it is not the working class but the revolutionary intelligentsia who is the real historic agency of socialism. Not so, says Deutscher, splitting a fine hair, the revolutionary intelligentsia acts merely as a "substitute." "Even in such nations [as China] the working

class remains the chief 'agency' of socialism in the sense that fully fledged socialism cannot be attained without industrialization, without the growth of the working class and its self-assertion against any post-revolutionary bureaucracy, in a word, without the real, social and political ascendancy of the 'proletariat' in post-capitalist society" (p.111). The fact that this "self-assertion" has been consistently delayed in Soviet Russia is a recurring complaint that appears in most of his essays. His belief that it will take place soon never falters.

Of greater interest than his political commentaries are Deutscher's biographical, historical, and literary essays, to which the second half of the book is devoted. He rehabilitates Marshal Konstanty Rokossovsky, at that time a member of the Polish Politburo and Defense Minister, who ironically was ousted as a Stalinist during the Polish October uprising of 1956, as an *anti-Stalinist* of much longer standing than Gomulka. A protege of the purged Tukhachevsky, Rokossovsky spent four years in forced labor camps until Stalin's need for experienced tacticians brought about his release in the summer of 1941. In a review article of George Kennan's *Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin*, Deutscher briefly, but pithily, analyzes the impact of Allied intervention during the civil war—a controversial question to this day. "Unpremeditated, unconcerted, and relatively feeble though it was, its impact on a starving, exhausted and disorganized Russia was devastating" (p. 230). His analysis, incidentally, is contrary to Kennan's. In his literary criticism Deutscher is highly negative towards Pasternak's *Doctor Zhivago* because he rejects the revolution, stern with Ehrenburg, "not so much that he lacked the character to resist Stalinism, but that he submitted to it so completely and even zealously that he thereby corrupted his own work and nearly destroyed himself as a novelist and poet," (p. 271) and highly encouraged by Yevtushenko's *Precocious Autobiography* for its frankness and courage.

"A curious tangle of right and wrong ideas," Deutscher's verdict of Kennan's work applies to his own as well. His essays are immensely readable and charged with ideas, but always colored by his orientation which is simultaneously his advantage and disadvantage.—HENRY W. MORTON, *Queens College of the City University of N.Y.*

Science and the University. ED. BY BOYD R. KEENAN. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. x, 207. $5.95.)

The Politics of Research. BY RICHARD J. BARBER. (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1966. Pp. vi, 167. $4.50.)

These volumes are not unrepresentative of the rivulet of publications on government policies toward science and technology issuing from academic, commercial, and author-subsidized presses. One is a collection of papers in which genuine light alternates with that glossy optimism or generic dullness that are the protective coloration of so many administrators; while the other falls in the unmuffled tradition of populist dissent, unfortunately it is not less dull for being less sound.

If its opinions were presented with verve and illustrated with meaningful anecdote and evidence, *The Politics of Research* would fit comfortably on a shelf beside Ralph Lapp, Robert Jungk, Seymour Melman, H.L. Nieburg and other sometimes useful partisans more concerned to convict the leaders of our scientific affairs than to give them a fair trial. As it stands, it belongs to the larger and less useful company of books fabricated by the repetition and misuse of a few thin facts. Thus, the breathless revelation that the Federal government either spent $15 billion on research and development in 1965 or more than $15 billion in 1966 is imparted at least 16 times in 118 pages of text and four times in ten pages of tables. Indeed, the National Science Foundation's milk and water statistics on R&D expenditures provide Barber's main factual nourishment. But miscalculations, misstatements, or misconstructions of these statistics appear on pp. 17, 23, 24, 38, 41, 43, and 73, and other patent errors or misstatements on pp. 48, 57, 58, 66, 78, and 115.

All told, it is difficult to regard *The Politics of Research* as a triumph of either scholarship or argument. And this is regrettable, because though Barber's argument may prove to be wrong at key points, this can only be established after a better case has been made for it.

He believes that government R&D expenditures have been concentrated in too few companies, universities, and regions; not enough have been spent on basic research, the social sciences, or civilian technology; and—a refrain familiar on Capitol Hill, where Barber became interested in the subject—R&D planning and coordination are sadly deficient. Small companies have been diddled out of their share of R&D funds; the government has unwisely given to private interests patents and copyrights on ideas and materials developed with public funds, and has relied excessively on private contractors instead of strengthening its own R&D capacity. R&D allocations should better represent "a set of priorities that embodies our social preferences." To promote such priorities, the Bureau of the Budget should annually prepare a comprehensive analysis of proposed R&D expenditures by

function; each functional budget should be reviewed on a government-wide basis by at least one Congressional committee; and a Department of Science should be created to absorb and enlarge the functions of the National Science Foundation and related agencies. R&D contracting should be removed from the three armed services and given to a new agency reporting to the Secretary of Defense; massive R&D contracts should be broken up and awarded to many more contractors; and an Inventions Development Agency should be formed to stimulate new civilian technology based upon government-owned patents.

Most of these proposals are already in general circulation and it is unlikely that all are equally sensible or misguided. What we need is not to assert how wise (or foolish) they may be, but to subject them to fair and hard-headed evaluation. In short, Barber should start where he now finishes.

The papers edited by Boyd Keenan (who has just moved to the University of Illinois' Chicago campus) in *Science and the University* were originally given in April 1965 at a symposium marking the initiation of Purdue's new program in science and public policy. The principal luminaries of current government policy toward university science, Donald Hornig, Leland Haworth, Frederick Seitz, and Harvey Brooks, are represented, as are three of their most important public critics, Alvin Weinberg, Philip Abelson, and Edward Teller; Indiana Congressmen Roush and Brademas and delegates from two of the region's largest laboratories, William Harris of Battelle and Albert Crewe of Argonne, speak for the Midwest; encouragement is brought from the borderlands by Beardsley Graham of Spindletop and James Triolo of the Graduate Research Center of the Southwest; and the whole is introduced and concluded by that impeccable international academic intelligencer Eric Ashby.

An instrument that affords transitory men transitory truths does not suffice for certain speakers who inhabit more vainglorious realms. According to Crewe, science has "transformed" almost all fields of human endeavor; "if we do not have the knowledge to solve a particular problem, then soon . . . we *shall* possess that knowledge . . ." (Vietnam, death, and taxes depart!) Of course, science is the new savior not only of man but of the economy. Triolo echoes Lloyd Berkner's refrain that "the Ph.D." (in Sanskrit, too?) is "the key" to economic growth and employment "so that we may count at least 100 persons of high skills unemployed in the future for each Ph.D. we fail to educate today." The reed of truth in Seitz's assertion that "the strength of our society is now very largely based on the practical fruits of fundamental science" can hardly withstand the weight of gold he would put on it; and Hornig makes a similar careful error.

As Keenan observes, the university came under sharp attack during the symposium for neglecting its unique function of undergraduate education for a competitive role in research that other establishments were well qualified to conduct. Graham bluntly advises universities "to get back into the business of education and leave ingenuity and cleverness to other organizations"; Seitz acknowledges that government research funds have "had the effect in many universities of removing many of the most distinguished faculty members farther away from the undergraduate student"; Haworth suggests that future federal assistance "will have to be less research-oriented and more concerned with the combined teaching-research function of the college and university."

But the most trenchant criticism of scientific research and education at our great universities comes from Teller and Weinberg. In his committee's 1945 contribution to *Science—The Endless Frontier*, Isaiah Bowman wrote that "applied research invariably drives out pure." Teller argues that this situation has now "been turned upside down . . . the present fashion at all our universities . . . 'puts in the doghouse' anyone who is interested in applications and focuses completely on the pursuit of pure science." As a consequence, the best science graduates forsake application and the nation has failed to reap sufficient industrial and practical returns from its large R&D expenditures.

In his paper "But Is the Teacher Also a Citizen?" which is worth the price of this volume, Weinberg observes that the contemporary distinction between pure and applied science is more pronounced than it was to Newton, Pasteur, Maxwell, Kelvin, Poincaré or von Neumann. Rejecting the problems of society for those of the intellect, university science is driven continually "toward greater purity and remoteness." Unfortunately, the world is not pure and society requires not interminable research but action even on intractable problems. Where research scientists who have initiated major curricula reforms would breed a generation of specialists in their own image, society requires students who are broadly and flexibly trained. "Our society is not a university. . . . If the university takes undergraduate education seriously, and does not look upon it simply as attenuated professional education, the university community will be forced to broaden its outlook. The university professor would . . . surely be obliged to relate his narrow professional interest to the rest of the world. And in the process, as he becomes part of the inter-

disciplinary real world, the teacher ought once more to become a citizen." —HAROLD ORLANS, *The Brookings Institution.*

Guide to Reference Materials in Political Science. A Selective Bibliography, Vol. I. By LUBOMYR R. WYNAR. (Denver, Col.: Bibliographic Institute, 1966. Pp. 318.)

Dr. Wynar's bibliographical work is intended for practical guidance in the rapidly growing literature of political science and related disciplines. The first volume includes four major subdivisions:

I. Social Science General Reference Sources
II. Political Science General Reference Sources
III. Political Theory
IV Ideology.

The volume on hand reflects a broad scope and variety of literature, ranging from bibliographical works, encyclopedias, and monographs to standard works of political science and related disciplines. The author has listed side by side American, British, German, and French publications, and occasionally also Italian, Soviet, Latin American, and Indian publications. The annotations accompanying the individual listings are very helpful, especially as regards foreign publications.

About one-third of this volume is dedicated to general reference sources, which are conscientiously subdivided in disciplines related to political science. This approach betrays the author's broadmindedness, and it underlines the current trend of interdisciplinary studies. On the other hand, it might raise the question whether such extensive listings in the neighboring disciplines are really necessary in a guide that is a selective bibliography. A political scientist might possibly dispense with such entries as "Child Development Abstracts and Bibliography," or "Business Periodicals Index," but instead, he might prefer, for example, a more complete bibliography on Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism, and other "Pan-" movements under the categories "Political Theory" and "Ideology." Also, one may wonder whether the topics "Babylonia," "China," "Egypt," and "India" should be grouped together with the topic "American Political Theory" under the heading "Special Subjects," within the section of "Political Theory."

On the whole, however, this *Guide* represents a truly pioneering work of its kind, and it provides a handy world-wide source of reference materials to political science and related disciplines.—IHOR KAMENETSKY, *Central Michigan University.*

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Metropolitan Transportation Politics and the New York Region. By JAMESON W. DOIG. (New York: Columbia Univerity Press, 1966. Pp. vi, 327. $7.50.)

The Metropolitan Transportation Problem, rev. ed. By WILFRED OWEN. (Washington, D.C.; The Brookings Institution, 1966. Pp. xiii, 266. $6.00.)

The reissue of Wilfred Owen's book *The Metropolitan Transportation Problem* is a welcome step. This is unquestionably the classic in the field, and its first edition (1956) has had a profound influence on the approaches that are being taken in Washington and at the state and local levels to this important urban problem. His basic thesis, analysis, and conclusions remain essentially unchanged; they are still sound and relevant. Regrettably, despite progress, the accomplishment of his recommendations seems still to be far off. The problem is all the more urgent in 1967 than in 1956.

Owen's basic thesis is that we must attack the problem of transportation more from the demand side, an aspect that has been neglected. Only if demand is controlled and channeled through strong metropolitan land-use planning, can a viable transportation system be economically developed. To regard it simply as a supply problem, in which transportation facilities are provided to meet whatever demands arise out of our unplanned metropolitan areas, is a hopeless objective. In addition, he points out that urban transportation must be organized as a "system," i.e., it must be fully coordinated, preferably in a single institution, and that it must be metropolitan in scope.

The author feels that municipal governments must be relieved of the burdens of subsidizing transportation, and that if the above objectives can be met, it is feasible to make it self-supporting. On the question of rail transit vs. highways, he states first that this is an unrealistic dichotomy, but makes his position clear that in most metropolitan areas there is likely to be little feasible role for rail transit because of its inherent inflexibility. For those cities that already have a rail transit system, it should be retained and improved, since it is cheaper to do this than to replace it with a roads-oriented approach. How-

ever, he adds that all metropolitan areas must develop a full expressway system to serve adequately the needs of our auto-oriented economy.

Ten years after its first appearance, Owens' book remains an important contribution. While his conclusions remain sound, and indeed have become widely accepted in principle, the work is subject to two criticisms. First, in both editions, the work relies somewhat too heavily on New York examples, which are atypical of the American transportation scene. The other problem is that this new edition is not really that. Readers seeking an up-to-date discussion of transportation developments in the nation will be disappointed because there has not been a full-scale research effort to draw on the vast new developments since 1956. Most of the illustrations are pre-1956, which means that they largely ignore the important structural and programmatic changes that have occurred in transit at the national, state, and local levels since that time.

Metropolitan Transportation Politics and the New York Region by Jameson W. Doig focuses on the politics of transportation at the local, regional, and state levels. It is an in-depth study of the period 1951-58, with particular attention being given to the efforts of the Metropolitan Rapid Transit Commission to develop an integrated program for the New York-New Jersey area. It is followed by a brief summation of the events through 1965.

The book is thus primarily a case study of functional decision-making in what is undoubtedly the most complex and fragmented metropolitan area in the world.

The author finds that political controversy in the transportation field tends to revolve around two coalitions, those of "roads" and "rails," including both public and private groups. The roads coalition is dominant at the beginning of the period studied, and while that period is marked by efforts to consolidate the loose-knit rail coalition and to increase its relative power, the roads coalition remains the most potent force in 1965 as the study ends.

During the period 1951–58, efforts are made by regional actors to find regional and comprehensive solutions, i.e., to accomplish some first steps toward the kinds of solutions Wilfred Owen prescribes. Following their complete failure the second period is one in which the states step in and achieve some positive but fragmented solutions to the immediate problems, and in which most efforts at "regional" and "comprehensive" solutions are abandoned. The author attributes this failure to powerful opposition from the roads coalition, to the fragmentation of government, and to the unwillingness or inability of the only "chief executives" of the metropolitan area—the state governors—to face the issue squarely and take the necessary steps to right the balance. Thus, the study serves as an interesting case example of the problems Owen points up and of the difficulties of achieving the kinds of solutions he proposes.

The story is a discouraging one. New York, more than any other city in America, is dependent upon rail transport, but during the period studied by Professor Doig, the competing political forces in the region succeeded in preventing any truly comprehensive approaches. The political structure seemed almost to be rigged to prevent such solutions.

Since its publication, however, New York State has taken significant legislative action to rationalize the decision-making process, at least in New York City, and to reduce the degree of competition between rails and roads. In taking these steps, New York has begun to follow the lead taken in recent years in such metropolitan areas as Philadelphia, Boston, San Francisco, Washington, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, and Los Angeles. While none of these has yet fully achieved Owen's model, nor are they likely to in the foreseeable future, there has nonetheless been substantial progress in creating the necessary structures and opposing political forces to assure at least some semblance of comprehensiveness and balance.

Professor Doig's study is valuable in identifying the political impediments to achievement of program innovations in our fragmented urban areas. All of these are present in the New York area in their most extreme form. Such studies fill a real need for empirical research into the ways that metropolitan areas confront the urban problems that simply cannot be handled at the municipal level. They also illustrate the heavy dependence these areas still have on the often unresponsive state political systems, despite the growing role of the national government in urban affairs.—FRANK C. COLCORD, JR. *Massachusetts Institute of Technology.*

Politics and the Regulatory Agencies. By WILLIAM L. CARY. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1967. Pp. 149. $5.95.)

United States Merchant Shipping Policies and Politics. By SAMUEL A. LAWRENCE. (Washington, D.C.; The Brookings Institution, 1966. Pp. xiii, 405. $8.75.)

These two books are useful additions to the literature on administrative regulation, one offering an overview of the political relationships of six prominent independent agencies, the other an intensive analysis of regulatory and promo-

tional activities in a single, less visible, policy area. Despite some obvious differences in scope and approach, a comparison of the two is instructive. The experiences described illustrate the rich diversity of regulatory relationships, while the commentaries betray an impulse to generalize from single cases. The discrepancy may help to explain why even good books in this area can improve our understanding of administrative regulation yet fail to contribute directly to a more accurate conceptualization of the regulatory process.

Professor Cary served as Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission from 1961 through 1964. *Politics and the Regulatory Agencies* is derived from his Cooley Lectures at the University of Michigan in spring of 1966, which may account for its mixed blessings of fluid prose and diffuse organization. The theme is agency viability in a political context, and the discussion is shaped by two questions posed in the opening pages: what political forces are at work on the regulatory commissions, and what reasonable standards of effective performance should the commissions be expected to meet?

The degree of sophistication with which Cary approaches the first of these questions is indicated by his treatment of primitive notions regarding the "independence" of the regulatory commissions. For a crude characterization of the status of these regulatory agencies, Cary prefers the figure of a stepchild "whose custody is contested by both Congress and the Executive, but without very much affection from either one." Having substituted a more accurate but no less gross characterization, Cary explores some of the subtleties it obscures, distinguishing between agency independence and the personal independence of its individual members, and between the use of independence as a descriptive term and as a functional myth. The myth helped to secure enactment of regulatory legislation which Congress might otherwise have rejected, and continues to provide a shelter to which agencies can repair when confronted with politically-oriented "suggestions" from the White House or Congress.

The problem of defining a workable zone of agency independence is the dominant concern of the chapters on the White House and Congress. Through reference to a set of hypothetical and genuine cases, Cary endeavors to describe a line separating improper interference from legitimate guidance and oversight. Acknowledging the difficulty of generalizing at the margin, Cary is inclined to reject arguments favoring increased Presidential control—on grounds that they are politically infeasible and philosophically incompatible with the pluralism characteristic of American economic policy. He is also critical of the present extent and undiscriminating use of Congressional power. But Cary's brief for a substantial measure of agency autonomy does not reflect the administrative lawyer's common concern for insulating quasi-judicial functions; it derives from his conclusion that in general neither the President nor the Congress stands to benefit politically from a regulatory agency's dynamic performance. The White House is primarily interested in avoiding or correcting unsavory administration, the Congress in particular policies or actions to which its constituents object. In the absence of some widely perceived crisis of administration or policy, these interests will exert a "conservatizing" influence on the commissions.

Given a political context in which there is little incentive for the White House to concern itself with invigorating and coordinating the activities of the regulatory agencies, it is not surprising that Cary is sceptical of the Hector-Minow proposals for concentrating policy-making responsibilities in a single executive responsible to the President. However, the main force of his criticism is directed at the assumed incompatibility of judicial and policy-making functions: "The interaction of informal administrative decisions, formal cases, and rule making is both fruitful and necessary. . . . Mr. Hector's own examples of the CAB's procedures provide an argument not for separation of functions but against the overjudicialization of the administrative process." Professor Cary's thorough rebuttal of the case for separation of functions is among the most convincing passages of the book.

What should we ask of the regulatory agencies? According to Cary, the avoidance of scandal or controversy is expecting too little, although it is frequently sufficient to satisfy the President and Congress. Conversely, the maintenance of consistent momentum is expecting too much, although this would appear to be the implicit standard of critics who have characterized the development of regulatory agencies in terms of a life cycle moving rapidly from youthful vigor to senility. Cary prefers the metaphor of ebb and flow, and does not presume that the agencies can play Canute against the tides of industry resistance, congressional jealousy, presidential indifference, and public apathy. He suggests that a realistic standard of effective performance should measure an agency's ability to capitalize on the occasional convergence of circumstances affording an opportunity for innovation.

The chapter on agency vitality is perhaps most revealing of the strong and weak points of Cary's analysis. He is at his best when concentrating on

obstacles to vigorous administration, including: (1) the concept of a balanced commission, which is coincident with perceptions of regulatory agencies as judicial bodies, and most acute where conflicting interests are sharply defined and accurately reflected in the composition of the agency (e.g., producer and consumer interests on the FPC); (2) a tendency toward overjudicialization, with decision of cases displacing concern with national policy, and (3) the "claim" that an agency has become the captive of industry. Again displaying that appreciation for subtlety which is one of the book's many virtues, Professor Cary observes that allegations of capture are often made more damaging by their failure to discriminate among lack of initiative in developing new programs, sympathy for an industry whose problems are the agency's daily concern, and lack of personal independence on the part of individual commissioners (who may have been appointed to a balanced commission for the very reason that they were acknowledged "captives" of a particular viewpoint). These problems have been frequently discussed in the literature on regulatory administration, but seldom with so skillful a blending of the practitioner's experience and the scholar's perspective.

Although the SEC figures prominently in the discussion, Cary's analysis of obstacles to administrative vitality draws extensively from the experience of other agencies. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of his suggested remedies. Cary gives an illuminating account of the rejuvenating devices employed by the SEC (with emphasis on the Special Study of Securities Markets completed in 1963), but he does not show that these devices would be appropriate for the variety of agencies with which he is ostensibly concerned. In his discussion of techniques for preserving agency vitality and in the chapter on the tactics of "Shepherding an Agency-Sponsored Bill through Congress," *Politics and the Regulatory Agencies* becomes politics and the SEC. Indeed, the clear narrowing of focus in these passages suggests the most serious weakness of the book as a whole. Cary's analysis is informed by the experience of the SEC, and the SEC enjoys substantial advantages in terms of the level of consensus supporting its mission, and the attitude of its clientele toward regulation. These advantages are acknowledged by Cary, but the central role of the SEC nevertheless softens his treatment of certain problems more vexing to other regulatory agencies, including potentially conflicting responsibilities for promotion and regulation, conflicting objectives among the major interests subject to regulation, and the absence of incentive for self-regulation.

Samuel Lawrence's detailed analysis of *United States Merchant Shipping Policies and Politics* offers a sharp contrast to the format of the Cary book. Concentrating on a single program in a book nearly thrice the length of Cary's, Lawrence has an opportunity to examine the substance of merchant marine policy as well as the political context in which it has been administered. The opportunity has been fully realized: Lawrence combines lucid history with persuasive policy evaluation and perceptive political analysis. Among the refinements permitted by Lawrence's sharply focused study is a penetrating analysis of congressional committee roles, suggesting—to give but one example—that the peripheral status of the House Merchant Marine Committee has contributed significantly to its excessive caution.

The pitfalls of generalizing from the experience of a single agency are forcefully demonstrated by a few comparisons between the SEC and the several agencies responsible for guiding U. S. merchant marine policy. Given certain characteristics associated with the SEC—a relatively clear and current legislative mandate, substantial consensus regarding agency objectives, and the absence of industry dependence on governmental subsidy—a good case can be made for agency independence. Given certain characteristics of the merchant marine program—an extraordinarily complex, ambiguous, and dated mandate, lack of consensus within government and among industry segments regarding program objectives, dependence of the best organized elements of both industry and labor on governmental subsidy, and widely dispersed administrative responsibilities creating a strong incentive for coordination—a good case can be made for executive control.

While remedies projected from the limited experience of the SEC or merchant marine often contradict one another, many of the obstacles to agency vitality which Cary has abstracted from the experience of six different agencies play an equally important part in Lawrence's analysis of merchant marine politics: (1) the dominant concern of all parties with maintaining the program's public and political acceptability, which in the absence of public controversy amounts to avoiding scandal and conserving a rigid structure of accommodations; (2) episodic presidential initiatives generally frustrated by the continuing but narrow interests of congressional committees, protected under pressure by Congress' instinctive defense of its regulatory stepchildren (seen most recently in defeat of the President's effort to incorporate the Maritime Administration in a newly created Department of Transportation), and (3) the avoidance of

policy rationalization by identifying regulation with adjudicatory procedures and promotion with administrative activities, when in practice both programs draw upon both processes.

Despite its virtual invisibility to the general public, the U. S. merchant marine program has been subject to intensive scrutiny by a variety of individuals and groups representing both public and private sectors. Although their diagnoses and proposed remedies vary, it is commonly recognized that the program has failed to meet modest standards of effective performance—most emphatically including Professor Cary's measure of success in capitalizing on opportunities for innovation. In summarizing the program's deficiencies of policy and administration, Lawrence stresses the ambiguity of its 1936 charter, the discrepancy between prewar objectives and postwar environment, and the substitution of proliferated indirect aids for reevaluation of the direct subsidy program which was intended to provide a clear focus for broad policy determinations. He shares Cary's premise that the major political obstacles to program reorientation ultimately depend upon its isolation from the mainstream of national concern. But where Cary argues that numerous and varied pressures will contribute to agency responsiveness, Lawrence demonstrates that these forces may simply produce a more complicated form of inertia; where Cary's focus on the SEC accentuates the promise of special studies as a means of keeping Congress informed and the agency alert, Lawrence's analysis of the merchant marine program underlines the conditions which may prevent that promise from being fulfilled. Yet their assumptions are not so far apart as these specific comparisons may suggest, for as Lawrence points out, the lethargy of the merchant marine program is uncommonly dependent upon public ignorance (as distinguished from apathy): the industry's political support "rests on so narrow a base that it might be swept away by a shift in the political wind."—JOHN E. MOORE, *University of California, Santa Barbara.*

The Struggle for Equality. By BERT E. SWANSON. (New York: Hobbs, Dorman and Company, 1966. Pp. 146. $4.00.)

School desegregation no longer occupies the center stage in the continuing drama of race relations in this country. Our attention has shifted in large part to the issues of "black power" and urban rioting—issues that more immediately impinge on the wish for racial harmony, if not racial justice. Still, as this brief monograph on the unresolved New York City school integration controversy indicates, the basic structure of race relations changes very little, even when the realm of conflict moves from the schools to the streets or to some other locus. The participants described by Swanson and the nature of their participation seem to be standard ingredients of all racial controversies—indeed, of liberal-conservative controversies in general.

First, there are the "have-nots," who, with their allies, seek redress from some aspect of their inferior status. Underlying their actions is a wish to affect their environment—to overcome the sense, and reality, of powerlessness in their lives. This is true whether the specific goal is increased school integration (as a means of upgrading education for Negroes), or an impovement in the material level of living, or the eradication of alleged police tyranny, and whether the tactic is lobbying for new or amended governmental action, or boycotting, or looting, or fighting the police.

In opposition are the bulk of the "haves." Most acknowledge some justice in the aims of the "have-nots." But they are unwilling to support measures necessary to achieve these aims, when these measures might threaten the comfortable and insulated conditions of their existence. Swanson illustrates this in his description of the resistance mobilized against specific proposals for ending *de facto* segregation in New York City. Further illustration can be found in the widespread opposition to many anti-poverty programs in this country.

Between the "haves" and the "have-nots" are those in government who see themselves as mediating between pressure groups. Governmental officials, such as school administrators and policy-makers in New York City, have been publicly committed to aiding the cause of Negro advancement for some time. But when opposition to specific measures is strong—as shown by a boycott of schools involving 275,000 white pupils—officials shrink from translating this commitment into the kinds of meaningful action that might really end racial and class disadvantages in our society.

Swanson's description of school integration problems in New York serves as a fine model of this continuing political struggle between the "have-nots" and the "haves." The cast of characters is well delineated—even to the point of insightful portrayal of the cleavages *within* contending sides on the questions of specific goals and tactics. The relationship of various interest groups to the core of decision-making power is also clearly spelled out, as is the sequence of events in the New York case.

But the book's value beyond the purely descriptive level is questionable. For example, the author is weak in specifying conditions under which the balance of pressures on decision-

makers will tip one way or the other—toward satisfying demands of civil rights advocates or toward protecting whites from these demands. He mentions some of the variables important in the New York situation, but he avoids any real attempt to tie these variables together in a prediction model. He is also far from convincing in a major conclusion that resistance to change would have been minimized if opposing factions had been included in school planning sessions from the beginning. As it was, plans were formulated initially through negotiations between Negro leaders and school officials, and this reviewer suggests that inclusion of anti-integration white leaders at the start might have immobilized school officials from making even the few steps toward integration that were undertaken.

As the above comments indicate, Swanson has succeeded in contributing another interesting, but incomplete case study to the race relations literature. He is willing to treat his book as merely exploratory. But one might wish, at this point in time, that we could move beyond the descriptive and exploratory. Perhaps a more valuable book could have resulted if the author had chosen to delay publication until he could more conclusively answer this question: How can sufficient change be brought about through the political process so that the "have-nots" will not feel compelled to resort to violence and destruction in order to gain "equality."—M. RICHARD CRAMER, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

Freedom and the Court: Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States. By HENRY J. ABRAHAM. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. x, 335. $7.50.)

With demonstrations occurring in many cities of the United States frequently accompanied by lawlessness and violence, with the burning and sacking of a considerable portion of the city of Detroit fresh in the minds of citizens, attention has been directed not only toward the securing of constitutional rights to all but also to the limitation of the exercise of rights when they conflict with the rights of others and the action of the state. The question is also asked, what has been the role of the Supreme Court of the United States in determining limits to be placed on individual action when it conflicts with the interest of the community? Professor Abraham's volume goes far toward answering these questions.

"There can be no compromise in securing equal and exact justice for all." So said Lydon B. Johnson in 1964. Equal justice has not yet been secured for all, but Professor Abraham's volume points out the efforts the Supreme Court has made to secure equal justice to all and the degree of success it has had.

All too frequently the rights of the individual conflict with those of the community. When this occurs it is the duty of the Court to resolve the differences. According to Professor Abraham, the Court has done its work reasonably well during the past two decades. There is no doubt that this requires considerable work in this day and time. In the 1935–36 term of court only 2 of 160 written decisions concerned basic freedoms while in the 1965–66 term the number was 54 out of 120.

How has the Supreme Court gone about meeting this difficult responsibility? In the early pages of his book, Professor Abraham considers a "double standard" that has been set up by the Court—a "double standard" based in general on the premise that the least favored in life should be the most favored at law. The acceptance of this view has made the Court willing to give a more searching judicial inquiry to those incidents involving members of this group. This has been done because these persons are seriously restricted in their use of political processes. Also, as Justice Frankfurter has remarked, the litigant is frequently "not a very nice person." In addition, many citizens are not aware of their rights and liberties, although I would venture an opinion that citizens today are more aware of their rights, both substantive and procedural, than at any other time in our nation's history.

After introductory chapters and a consideration of the Court's definitions of the broad meaning of due process of law, the author in three succeeding chapters gives a detailed and critical account of the Court's work in three important fields. These are the fields of expression and communication, religion, and the vexing problem of race.

Having first established the importance of the preservation of our rights and liberties, the volume becomes an analysis of line drawing or the establishment of limits upon the exercise of individual rights. Unwilling to accept the absolutist approach of Justice Black and others, Professor Abraham approves the action of the Court in establishing reasonable, understandable and generous limits to the exercise of these rights. For instance, the author points out that "democratic society has the right to maintain concurrently both freedom of expression and national security."

The proper branch of the government to determine conflicts which result from the establishment of limits upon the freedom of the individual is the Supreme Court. It the reader should ask why, the answer would be that the Court is the most competent body to do this and also because "all too easily do the legislative and executive

branches yield to the politically expedient and the popular."

With the use of background material, comments by those on and off the bench, and an analysis of the most important decisions, the work of the Court is commended and criticized. The author's analysis shows that it is not easy to draw pre-conceived limits upon the exercise of rights but that the establishment of lines comes case by case. The job has been a difficult one but the author concludes that on the whole it has been done well. Line drawing within the broad meaning of due process of law will always be difficult because of the ambiguity of the term. In the area of expression, limits must be established whether based on the clear and present danger rule or that of clear and present danger plus imminence. In the field of religion, difficulties arise because of the delicate and emotional nature of religion. With respect to race, line drawing should, in theory at least, be easier, but the practical application of Court limits has been most troublesome because of sentiment and prejudice. Yet, Professor Abraham concludes that the Court has on the whole done its work well and has remained true to its acquired role as our national conscience.

This volume will prove to be of real value in the classroom. The reader is impressed by the information and analysis that has been crowded within its covers. However, he also has a strong feeling that the author could have used three or four times the number of pages in doing justice to the subject. Its value is that it not only gives information and conclusions but that it gives perspective to the work of the Court in the field of civil rights.—ROBERT S. RANKIN, *Duke University.*

Benchmarks. By HENRY J. FRIENDLY. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967. Pp. viii, 324. $7.95.)

These occasional papers of Judge Henry Friendly of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit amply indicate that the tradition and distinction of that bench continues unabated. A fitting successor to the Hands, Swan and Clark, Judge Friendly demonstrates exquisite style, mastery of legal niceties, catholic interests and sympathy for the behavioral sciences and other fields, all yoked to an impressive statesmanship or sense of the practical.

It would be extraordinary if these qualities were all present in all these variegated papers—and unflawed. These are offerings prepared under diverse circumstances for divergent purposes. Basically they fall into four major divisions: (1) reflections on judging, especially the relative merits of legislative as against court initiative; (2) the heart of Judge Friendly's well-known 1962 lectures on administrative agencies, together with recent assessment of half a decade's progress; (3) consideration of federal-state problems raised by the Erie and Miranda decisions; (4) tributes to Friendly's legal and judicial mentors—Holmes, Cardozo, Frankfurter, and Hand. Only in the last category do the essays fall short of demanding reprinting. Duplication is on the whole avoided, although the third retelling of the familiar Holmes reaction to a Brandeis summer course on economics is a trifle wearying.

The first two groups of papers are the most relevant to the political scientist, as well as the most successful essays. Evaluation of the process of judging by an appellate judge rooted in the jurisprudential literature of the time is rare. Judge Friendly candidly discusses the possibilities of creativity and the degree of freedom available to the judge. He argues the inherent advantage of legislative rule-making power, which can above all choose arbitrarily from equally plausible formulations where a court cannot. Some of his comments on the extent to which appellate courts must throw out lawyers' briefs and decide cases on their merits are particularly interesting. His litany of legislation which at the same time preempts the field from the judiciary, but is so poorly drafted as to answer few questions, is amusing as well as instructive.

His call for greater exercise of rule-making authority by administrative agencies, a greater emphasis on policy rather than adjudication, together with greater Congressional legislative support for the agencies was the heart of his 1962 lectures, his solution to the malaise of those times. Looking back over the events since, he finds the administrative agencies have improved—not merely survived public criticism—but almost exclusively through an infusion of able personnel. Alone among the agencies, he finds the NLRB has lost some ground in these years.

The two essays on criminal law seem to me to miss the mark. They are elegant enough, and the analysis of the logical and legal contradictions involved in the notion of "incorporation" of the Bill of Rights is penetrating. It might have been more effective as an argument in the late 1940's—although the Judge might well regard this comment as adherence to the "domino method of constitutional adjudication" he condemns.

In discussing *Miranda* he seems more wedded to narrow legalism and rather more willing to use cliched emotionalisms then one might have expected. There is no effort to cope with the egalitarian arguments on criminal procedure, nothing of the toughness of thought of the Katzenbach-Bazelon exchange on the issue. His view of federal interference with state courts

is the standard one and no effort is made to combat either the argument of Attorney Fortas in the Gideon case that the "interminable process of exclusion and inclusion" was a *greater* incursion on state procedure because of its unpredictability or Justice Douglas' notion that the revolution in counsel requirements was brought about because of a threatened flooding of courts caused by evanescent doctrines of due process. Especially in light of his views on generalized non-ad hoc rules in other domains, at least discussion of these propositions would seem in order.

Be that as it may, page for page this is a most profitable volume. Indispensable reading for any student of administrative law, it is also useful for less specialized political scientists as well. I sleep better knowing American courts can still attract men of Judge Friendly's caliber.—SAMUEL KRISLOV, *University of Minnesota.*

Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United States. BY GEORGE F. BREAK. (Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, Studies of Government Finance, 1967. Pp. xv, 273. $6.75.)

The current revival enjoyed by the field of political economy has been associated with a spate of articles, monographs, and books. Until the publication of *Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United States*, however, no single broad-gauged survey of fiscal federalism has existed. George Break has touched on and examined in moderate depth an imposing array of fiscal problems presented by our multi-jurisdictional political system.

The author's information-issue or descriptive-problematic approach is organized around four topical chapters that constitute the core of the study: tax coordination, functional grants-in-aid, unconditional grants, and metropolitan problems. The spin-offs from each of these broad topics are extensive and are replete with well-digested tabular data and thoughtfully mature analysis. The author grinds few, if any, personal axes. There is no "one best way" for resolving intergovernmental fiscal ills. For example, the currently popular unconditional grant (Heller tax-sharing) idea is examined dispassionately and the state-by-state effects of five different possible distribution formulas are identified and evaluated.

For political scientists and governmental officials with more than a passing interest in political economy this is a must book. Its breadth is greater although its theoretical punch is less than Musgrave's editing of *Essays in Fiscal Federalism*. Similarly, its solid and extensive data base makes it less free-wheeling and less normative than Heller's *New Dimensions of Political Economy*. Political scientists and administrators concerned with federalism and intergovernmental relations should also consult this volume. It will not provide solutions to immediate problems but it should sharpen their perceptions of basic economic and political problems with which they must contend.

One note of forewarning to prospective readers: the economic rather than the political component is the fulcrum on which the bulk of Break's analysis turns. This is perhaps most prominent in his discussion of functional grants-in-aid (Chapter III). Such grants are first justified on the hallowed economic grounds of spillover benefits and thereby become "optimizing grants" (p. 77). To anyone familiar with the politics of grant-in-aid enactments and expansions such "optimizing" carries a ring of unreality.

The confrontation of economics with political realities and normative preferences is admirably demonstrated in the final chapter of the book. This portion contains the digest of discussions at a two-day conference held by Brookings and for which Break's essay served as an outstanding background paper. Thirty participants—economists, political scientists, and public officials—wrestled with many of the issues posed by Break. Needless to say, full accord was not reached but the group did "counsel patience and frantic work on the part of all."—DEIL S. WRIGHT, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

Public Finance in Democratic Process, Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice. BY JAMES M. BUCHANAN. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967. Pp. x, 307. $7.75.)

Surely Buchanan is right that "scholars need to pay more attention to the working out of rules or institutions" from which collective decisions emerge (p. 300), and surely political theorists could greatly strengthen analyses of political institutions by intelligent use of some of the economist's ways of thinking and constructing theory about institutions for social choice. This book, not quite a model of economic thinking on the topic (nor of economic writing—simple ideas clothed in prolix and ambiguous language throughout), does present theory and empirical research relevant to students of policy processes generally as well as to experts in public finance.

Buchanan has a unique approach. He is not analyzing the politics of budgeting and taxation, not dealing with the effects of alternative political institutions on governmental revenue and expenditure decisions. The book is instead a discussion of two aspects of *individual* decisions—decisions about public goods and expenditures, given an existing mode of taxation (Part I), and decisions about future methods of taxation (Part II). Buchanan argues in justification of this

focus that "the individual citizen must, ultimately," make decisions about public expenditures (p. 4). A more convincing rationale and one more fruitful to theory, might simply assert the usefulness of studying the pattern of collective decisions that would result (under certain assumptions) *if* individual citizens made such decisions directly, without intervention by leaders.

Some topics are likely to be closer to a political scientist's interests than others. Buchanan argues that it is easier to obtain collective decisions for public goods that are funded by existing taxes than it is to get approval for policies requiring change in taxes (Ch. 5)—change increases uncertainty and raises decision costs (only individuals' information costs are mentioned). Public spending is larger and taxation smaller than they would be in the absence of the public debt and currency-creation alternatives to taxation (Ch. 8). Some methods of taxation (e.g., withholding) produce a fiscal "illusion" of nonpayment for public goods (Ch. 10) and lead to "nonoptimal" levels of public expenditure.

Separating decisions on taxation and expenditures produces irrationality in individual choice (Ch. 7). There is no treatment of issues raised in recent literature on the subject, no mention of Lindblom's work, for example. This is of course a limitation imposed by Buchanan's approach. He is not just analyzing fiscal decisions from the individual's point of view, he is analyzing them as if they were made directly by individuals. Aside from a brief argument to the effect that simple majority rule focuses attention on the median individual (Ch. 11), real-world institutions for aggregating preferences in collective decision-making are virtually ignored. (Buchanan actually does not quite ignore these institutions. He makes unanalyzed statements about them from time to time in the book.)

The analysis of individual decisions about methods of taxation (which comprise the "constitutional" framework for future public goods decisions) is founded on the assumption that the individual cannot predict "with any degree of accuracy" (p. 219) his own future fiscal position. Therefore, his own private interest will dictate that he favor a set of tax institutions that seems generally fair and just. To state it more bluntly than Buchanan does, because the individual is assumed not to know whether he will be rich or poor in the future, he will not be concerned about distributional effects of different future taxes and will want only to establish a tax structure that will be fair to him no matter what his personal economic status, hence fair to all.

Buchanan summarizes (Ch. 13) some interesting published and unpublished research (the latter by doctoral candidates at the University of Virginia) that scholars of the policy process should look at—e.g., empirical findings that proposals for government spending secure approval more often (in referendum elections and in legislatures) when explicit references to tax cost are not attached to the proposals. In a section discussing research on individuals' tax information and preferences, there is no reference to results of the Survey Research Center's election studies (e.g., *The American Voter*, p. 196).—RUFUS P. BROWNING, *Michigan State University.*

The Government of Associations. ED. BY WILLIAM A. GLASER AND DAVID L. SILLS. (Totowa, N.J.: The Bedminster Press, Inc., 1966. Pp. vii, 264.)

This book is a collection of 47 articles dealing with the subject of voluntary associations. The editors have done an extremely thorough job in that virtually all of the published literature relating to voluntary associations is included here. Consequently, it is extremely difficult to provide a critical evaluation, for to do so would require the reviewer to retrace the steps of the editors and work with a decade of behavioral science literature. Nevertheless, it is certainly true that such a collection of essays has been needed for some time and should find a receptive audience among political scientists. Unfortunately, very few political scientists are included among the contributors to the volume. This is largely due to the fact that political scientists have neglected the study of voluntary associations. On the other hand, there are some indications that political scientists are becoming interested in the empirical study of voluntary associations, and some of their work might have been included in the book. I am thinking especially of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's *Civic Culture*, which contains a chapter on organizational membership and civic competence. Since the Almond-Verba study includes data from five nations, it would have been a helpful addition. Most of the essays are drawn from American voluntary associations. There is one section dealing with voluntary associations in other societies, but it is limited to an essay on Japan and one on France. Neither essay is comparative.

It is unfair to the editors to castigate them for what they excluded, rather than to praise them for what they included. The essays are organized into four general sections and 14 subsections. The first section, consisting of an overview of voluntary associations, contains a crucial introductory comment by the editors. Addressing themselves to the question of why some societies have few voluntary associations whereas others have many, they conclude that the flourishing of voluntary associations depends

largely upon societal characteristics. These characteristics are: (1) A tradition of limited central power, (2) the absence of a tradition of governmental control of private organizations, (3) a value system which accepts the responsibility of community service, (4) a value system which is optimistic in that it assumes that man's condition can be improved by collective activity, (5) the existence of upper and middle classes who have enough time and money for association activity. Granted that these generalizations are primarily intuitive, they seem to be suggestive of fruitful avenues of comparative research. Indeed, the Almond and Verba data are supportive of these generalizations. Voluntary association membership is greatest in the United States (a majority of respondents belonged to at least one organization). Next come Great Britain and Germany, where a substantial minority belong. Finally, less than one-third of the Italian and Mexican respondents belong to voluntary associations. Further, participation in voluntary associations increases with education in all societies, thus supporting the notion of a link between the class structure and activity in associations.

A truly comparative analysis would have been helpful also in that it might have removed some of the ambiguities which exist between the introductory essay by the editors and some of the data reported in the book. For example, in the editors' essay we read that the social conditions in the United States have "resulted in the strong tradition of voluntary service association activity" (p. 3). Yet, the first article included in the second section (Voluntary Associations and Their Environment), written by Charles R. Wright and Herbert H. Hyman, reports two-thirds of the respondents in a national sample belong to no voluntary associations. They thus conclude that "these findings hardly warrant the impression that Americans are a nation of joiners" (p. 32). Reconciling this conclusion with the earlier statement of the editors and with the Almond-Verba findings is a problem which might have been explored. An immediate answer is that the Wright and Hyman survey excluded union membership, where the Almond and Verba survey did not. When trade union membership is subtracted from the Almond-Verba total, the two studies are virtually identical in their findings.

Part three consists of three essays on the nature of leadership and seems unusually sparse in view of the relatively high volume of literature available on the subject. In contrast, part four (Problems of Government) includes about two-thirds of the essays in the book. Part four is not only the most inclusive section, it is also the most valuable one. It is not possible here to comment on each of the individual contributions. Most useful for political scientists are Sills' essay on goal succession, Gusfield's study of the Women's Christian Temperance Union, and Lipset's well-known study of the international typographical union.

One might raise the question of the general utility of any study of voluntary associations for political scientists if one takes some of the findings in the book literally. For example, Murray Hausknecht's essay reports that four per cent of a national sample belonged to "political and pressure" organizations. If so few people are active in pressure groups, why do political scientists bother to study them? The answer is that such a categorization of organizations is unrealistic. Among the other kinds of associations classified are veterans, military, patriotic, civic and service, church and religious, economic, occupational, and professional. Each of these kinds of associations has at one time or another engaged in "pressure politics." Studying the internal dynamics of such organizations would be a useful task for political scientists to undertake.—HARMON ZEIGLER, *University of Oregon.*

Party Loyalty Among Congressmen. By DAVID R. MAYHEW. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966, Pp. xiv, 189. $4.50.)

If, as is often said, parties are important instruments whereby mass publics can have some measure of control over public policy, it is important to know what difference it makes to have one party in office rather than another. When parties are "responsible" it is easy to identify a governing party's record; it is the same thing as the government's record. It is schoolboy knowledge, however, that in the United States members of both parties are found on both sides of most legislative issues. Schoolboy knowledge also includes some basics about the "tendencies" of each party on most major public policy issues, but such knowledge is rarely precise even for the schoolboy's teachers.

We do not know very clearly what to expect from a Democratic or Republican majority. We know that there are differences between Northern and Southern Democrats and between Eastern and Midwestern Republicans, and that Congressmen can buck their party when it is in the interest of their constituents, but we do not know much about what sorts of constituencies produce given votes regardless of the party of their Congressman or what kinds of constituencies are most likely to produce party votes on given issues. It is to this general problem that this book is addressed, and it provides an extremely valuable contribution to our understanding of what to

expect from different kinds of Republican and Democratic legislators on various issues.

Professor Mayhew addresses the problem by identifying four sets of issues, and "interested" and "indifferent" Congressmen on each. The issues are those between 1947 and 1962 regarding the farmer, the city, the worker, and the West, and the interested Congressmen are those from districts which are defined as having a particular stake in the outcome. Party pressures are operationalized by identifying the votes of party leaders. The votes of party leaders and of interested and indifferent Congressmen from each party are analyzed regarding the question of who can be expected to vote for or against given issues and regarding their indices of cohesion and likeness.

The major conclusions are that on all four issues the Democrats supported the relevant programs, with the interested Democrats being most cohesively in favor of them, and that the Republicans opposed them, with the interested Republicans being less cohesive in support of their party than their indifferent colleagues. Northern Democrats were considerably more regular than their Southern colleagues in supporting programs they were indifferent to, and Southern Democrats were more like Republicans than Northern Democrats on city and labor, but not farm and Western issues. Consequently, farm and Western programs were easier to pass than city and labor programs.

Another interesting point is that the districts which are indifferent on all four issues usually elect Republicans. The evidence reinforces the viewpoint that while all Congressmen are more or less representative of their districts, Democrats are the party of the multiple special interests and Republicans are by and large negative on such interests unless their district gives them special reason to be for them. It also reinforces the viewpoint that who wins in indifferent districts is more important for a given legislative program than what happens in the interested districts.

These arguments are well researched and supported by illustrative quotes from the Congressional Record. It would have been useful for the author to have included an appendix which listed all of the districts, which issues they were "interested" in and what parties had represented them. It would also have been instructive for Professor Mayhew to speculate on what other issues could be handled in this way.

Indeed, the results are striking enough to suggest that more sophisticated quantitative analysis would have been profitable. Such analysis might have permitted a calculation of who must be elected in order to pass given legislation. The data are treated as nominal when ordinal or interval scales would have been possible. For example, districts are "interested" in farm issues if they had more than ten per cent of their 1950 population in agriculture, when with such a measure it would have been possible to have an interval scale of "interest" in agriculture. Similarly, the issues might have been scaled, giving an ordinal measure of the difficulty of passing a given proposal, or they could have been given scores based on the percentage of the House in favor of them, for an interval measure.

Correlating the measure of interest in agriculture with that of the percentage of farm issues voted for would have permitted an assessment of the proportion of the variation in farm policy votes explained by the number of farmers in the districts. The same kind of analysis would have been possible for urban and labor districts although less clearly so for Western districts. Such a figure would be useful to our understanding of representation. Such a figure coupled with a cumulative scale might permit some calculation of how large a Democratic majority is necessary to pass a proposal that has a given scalar level of difficulty.

Were such an analysis to be successful, it would be one of the most important steps yet taken toward an understanding of the mystifying relationship between Congressmen and their constituents. Even without such analysis, Professor Mayhew has made an important contribution to that understanding. This in an original, imaginative, well-conceived and well-executed study of one of the most crucial and yet most elusive problems of the study of democratic political systems, the linkage between elected officials and their constituents.—WILLIAM R. KEECH, *University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.*

Ballots and Bandwagons. By RALPH G. MARTIN. (New York: Rand McNally and Co., 1964. Pp. 480. $5.95.)

Students of the American presidency have had no shortage of first rate biographies of the nation's first citizens nor has there been a paucity of good analytical materials about the duties and powers of the President and his relationships with his Party, the Congress, his Administration and the Public.

Until recently, however, little systematic work has been done on presidential elections per se. The David, Moos, and Goldman volumes on *Presidential Nominating Politics, 1952*, the David, Goldman, and Bain, *Politics of National Party Conventions* (1960), and the collection of essays on *The National Convention, 1960*, edited by the late Paul Tillett, are all landmark studies of the processes, personalities, and performances at the National Conventions.

The financing of presidential campaigns is

given extensive treatment in Alexander Heard's definitive work on political finance, *The Cost of Democracy*, and in Herbert Alexander's series of Citizens Research Foundation publications in this field. Ogden and Peterson, *Electing the President, 1964*, analyzed the electoral process as seen through the eyes of those responsible for the administrative management of the entire campaign.

But none of the above has dealt as ably with the nominating convention, as an eminently important human drama, as has Ralph G. Martin in his *Ballots and Bandwagons*. Martin's exhaustive research and superb writing skill enable the author to place clearly before his readers the background planning, strategies and tactics, personalities, power drives, color and excitement of five nominating conventions: the Republican Conventions of 1900, 1912 and 1920, and the Democratic Conventions of 1932 and 1956.

This book is far more than an interesting anecdotal account of these conventions. It is a searching examination of motives and manipulations. It clearly demonstrates basic lessons of politics and principles which should be a part of every undergraduate Parties course and of every course on the Presidency.

Illustrations of the critical importance of key "candidate" speeches, contested delegate votes, and careless diction are skillfully woven into a text full of humor and pathos. Moreover, Martin has given the reader a fairer and more accurate description of important political relationships (such as Hanna and McKinley) than do many professional journals or textbooks.

Martin illustrates:

1. Political leaders seldom tolerate receiving the "bad news" from subordinates. Often campaign workers thus fail to pass on important negative reports from the field. (Theodore Roosevelt in 1912).
2. Political leaders of both parties have often been willing to lose an election to avoid losing control of the Party. (Boies Penrose in 1912.)
3. One unguarded word or one particularly poor speaking performance can prove extremely damaging and sometimes fatal to an aspiring candidate. (La Follette's New York Periodical Publishers speech in 1912; Hubert Humphrey's speech before the Political Science Association meeting of 1965; Taft's statement "Even a rat in a corner will fight," 1912; Theodore Roosevelt's legislative recall of judicial decision speech, 1912.)
4. The thin veneer of civilization can quickly disappear in heated political conventions. (The Missouri ball-bat Convention of 1912.)
5. The price of articulating one's morality can be very high. (Theodore Rossevelt in 1912 and General Leonard A. Wood in 1920.)
6. The American President, although often "made" by a strong, behind-the-scenes personality, must establish clearly his leadership after the nomination and election (as Roosevelt had to do with Louis Howe) or suffer severe repercussions (as Harding did because of Daugherty).
7. The new world of television-politics, particularly in the setting of the national convention, requires far more attention to detail and timing if disaster before a national audience is to be avoided. (In 1956, for example, teleprompter scripts were ready only minutes before air time at the Democratic National Convention.)

Martin, whose order of chronological events sometimes gets confused, generally succeeds well in covering his own biases as a Democratic Party leader. One bias he does not attempt to hide is his admiration of the thousands of volunteers who are "the special people of the world who are tied together by the tightest thing there is—a dedication so deep that they deprive themselves of family, friends, love, sleep, time, memory . . . people who think more of America than themselves, those people who ultimately are the ones who make Democracy work."

If there is any striking omission, it is the lack of attention given to the platforms in the five conventions covered. Regardless of this weakness, however, *Ballots and Bandwagons* could be extremely useful and enjoyable collateral reading for any basic American Government course. It should be required reading for any Parties or Presidency courses in which the instructor seriously desires to give his students a vicarious appreciation of and an empathy with political party leaders and presidential and vice presidential candidates and nominees.—ARTHUR L. PETERSON, *The American Institute for Foreign Trade.*

Presidential Greatness: The Image and the Man From George Washington to the Present. By THOMAS A. BAILEY. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966. Pp. xi, 368. $3.95, paper.)

They Also Ran: The Story of the Men Who Were Defeated for the Presidency. By IRVING STONE. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1966. Pp. xi, 434. $5.95.)

The question, "What makes a President great?" has long fascinated students of the office. Thomas A. Bailey, a distinguished historian, has addressed himself to the subject, and the result

is a book remarkably perceptive and informed, sparkling with wit, and graceful in style.

To be President of the United States is to invite comparison with other Presidents. The Presidential "rating game" is almost as old as the office; anyone can play it and it can be done in a variety of arenas. We see historians and biographers making their judgments of Presidential performance, poll-takings by Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., Gutzon Borglum choosing four from among the Presidents to commemorate in the granite busts of Mt. Rushmore, New York University making selections for its Hall of Fame, the allocation of national holidays.

Mr. Bailey leads us through the maze of factors which seem to govern the ratings, acquaints us with the ground rules, and the idiosyncracies of the raters. He describes the many imponderables, the role of luck, and the tendency of judgments to undergo revision. He moves sure-footedly through all this maze, and does not flinch from making his own hard judgments concerning the factors that count most in raising a President to greatness. Above all, he must build a striking record of success in the nation's domestic affairs. "The basic obligation of the Executive," Bailey writes, "is to manage the bread-and-butter concerns of tens of millions of fellow-Americans." He acknowledges that in recent decades these concerns have reached increasingly into foreign affairs. Of eleven "Great" or "Near Great" Presidents, in Bailey's own ratings, only two served in time of economic panic; the rest enjoyed reigns of prosperity.

A reliable indicator is what Bailey calls "the abuse-in-office test." The greater the President, the more he is vilified by at least a substantial minority of his people. The absence of criticism or outcry signifies that little that is important is being done. Among recent Presidents, the press conference has emerged as a respected test of competence. The spectacles of a President answering off the top of his head questions on complex subjects, often put artfully, gives the onlooker a revealing closeup of the Chief Executive without the interventions of speech writers, idea men and subject matter experts. Stressful times and the President's creative responses to them are a dependable route to greatness. The rock-bottom test is the President's impact on history, both in the short run and the long run, on his own time, and on the more removed ears of history. Bailey finds no particular correlation between eminence and popularity. "Generally speaking," he writes, "the most eminent Executives have not been unduly popular."

Presidents are also open to comparison with the men they defeated for the office. Are the men who won, in the main, superior to those who lost? Is the popular judgment, which has not been faring well lately in political science research, shown to be competent in the choices it makes to fill the Presidency? These issues are presented quite starkly in *They Also Ran*, by Irving Stone, the popular biographer. His book first appeared in 1943, and this reissue adds chapters on the losers since that day. Mr. Stone's book is based on light research and is not in the same league with that of Mr. Bailey, who has brought together the fullest bibliography this reviewer has yet seen on the Presidency.

Mr. Stone finds that the popular voters have done a better job of choosing in the second half of the Presidency, compared with the first half. In the era since Rutherford Hayes, where, in contrast to the earlier period, the voter has been aided by an ever more capable communications system and the enlargement of his own political rights and effectiveness, Mr. Stone finds that voters have been discerning in nine elections, derelict in four, with one contest a dead heat. In some elections popular judgments which Stone rates as wise, were determined by narrow margins. Lincoln did not get a majority of all the votes cast; Cleveland defeated Blaine by only a few thousand margin which threw him New York's electoral vote. The most grievous errors, in the author's judgment, were the rejections of Cass for Taylor, Seymour for Grant, Davis for Coolidge, and Stevenson for Eisenhower, at least in the second election of 1956.

Mr. Stone's criteria for judging Presidents and "also-rans" harmonize well with the trend of Professor Bailey's analysis. Stone prefers the Presidential aspirant who is an activist in his approach to affairs, is constructive and effective in dealing with the problems of the day. In general, the "liberal"-inclined Presidential candidates are preferred to the "conservative"-inclined. The author brings to his subject his gifts of readability, and remarkable skill at selecting apt detail, and of making matters of some complexity simple. The comparison of Presidential winners and losers deserves to be taken up by political scientists and to have applied to it the most sophisticated analytical techniques of the profession. LOUIS W. KOENIG, *New York University.*

The Tweed Ring. By ALEXANDER B. CALLOW, JR. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 351. $7.00.)

Most Americans know something about the Tweed Ring in a vague sort of way. Now they can get the whole story in a carefully documented, well-written account. Callow has listed a terrific number of sources, most of which I have seen—if the material was available in the magnificent archives of the New York Public Library, university libraries and special collections, dur-

ing the time I was trying to discover what was special about New York many years ago—some of which I never heard of, and some that I had found, after a rapid inspection, wouldn't help very much.

Nevertheless, Callow has done an excellent, painstaking job of winnowing a real story out of all these materials. He tells enough about the early Tammany which came into existence to explain that it gained authority only gradually before the Civil War, and for long periods, it was torn by internal dissensions as was the larger "Democratic" party organization of which it came to be the ruling force. Before 1857, when Tweed became a member of the Board of Supervisors, most of the power in New York politics was wielded by luminaries of the Anglo-Saxon Protestant monied aristocracy. But the techniques of political machine control were already being invented, developed, and systematized. In 1959, Tweed moved ahead to get the power to name the Election Inspectors; in 1861, he was elected Chairman of the New York County Democratic Committee, in 1863, Chairman of the General Committee of Tammany Hall, and, later in the year, Grand Sachem. In the next three years, Tweed and his lieutenants, Sweeney, Connally and Hall, reunited the scattered fragments of the Tammany Democratic organization, reduced Fernando Wood's Mozart Hall to impotence, and the Tweed Ring was firmly established in power.

For five years, from 1866 to 1871, the Ring was firmly imbedded in power. It controlled elections, used the patronage shamelessly, extorted pay-offs and rebates from law-breakers, contractors, and recipients of favors. It stole millions of dollars (how many millions? some said 200; others 300). The leaders of the Ring lived in baronial castles and mansions, spent money lavishly on themselves. They also helped the poor, whose ranks were swollen with Irish, German, and miscellaneous other immigrants. To the Yankee Protestants, whether informers or crooks, the immigrant classes and the poor were stupid, corrupt, and alien. Callow, like D. G. Thompson, in 1897, takes note of all the measures Tweed took to "recognize" the poor and to give them a share in the government—the right to vote, hold jobs, and get some redress for their grievances. But, unlike Thompson, he doesn't condone the corruption. He acknowledges merit in Thomas Nast, the *Harper's Weekly* cartoonist, and the *New York Times*, whose campaigns brought down the House of Tweed. He respects the decent reformers—but he cannot avoid making some acid comments on the financial and industrial interests who shared in the spoils and pretended to be opposed to corruption in politics.

Callow explodes one myth—that Tilden destroyed the Tweed Ring. The eminent and wealthy New York statesman, who was not elected Governor until after Tweed's downfall, did nothing to prevent Tweed's Tammany from taking over the state, which he might have done in the sixties. I thought he might have given more attention to affairs in Washington, which in Tweed's time had reached what one historian called *"the nadir of national disgrace."* On the other hand, this is an artistic work. The author can't be expected to put in everything. What he has produced is a story—a tragedy, if you will.

Some reviewers have said there is a lesson here. They are not very clear about what it is. My own view is that chronicles about bosses and machines should teach us to frustrate evil when it is growing. For a city, I see no hope but an intelligent, humane, moral, and democratic fusion society—such as we once had in New York under LaGuardia's leadership—and which they tell me prevails now under Lindsay. On the other hand, as scholars from the time of Merriam and Buttenheim to Goodman and Palmieri have observed, we may have to alter the structure of "the city" if such a government is to be able to function.—Roy V. Peel, *San Fernando Valley State College.*

In the Nation: 1932–1966. By Arthur Krock. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966. Pp. xvii, 455. $7.95.)

This is a collection of about 175 of Arthur Krock's columns, culled from three decades of close observation of the national scene from his vantage point in the Washington bureau of *The New York Times*. The essays are organized on the basis of the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Presidencies. The author has supplied introductions to each of the major sections, and Tom Wicker has written an appreciation of one of his most distinguished predecessors in the *Times* bureau.

It has long been difficult to assess Arthur Krock's contribution to Washington journalism, and this collection makes the task no easier. For years he waxed in turn grave, analytical, portentous, mildly sardonic, slightly hectoring, and even humorous, as in his marvellous "Tale of One Thousandth and Second Night" of how Lyndon the Compassionate, the Beneficent, the Well Publicized, in the days of Kennedy the King, befriended a poor camel driver of Karachi. There were few memorable feats of journalism, analysis, or prophecy during all these years, but Krock did win exclusive interviews, both of which are printed here, from Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. Some columns border on the eloquent, as in Krock's report of Roosevelt's death, and he writes with a magisterial style that easily commands attention. Yet the book lacks focus and

direction because the author, for all his sharp intelligence, lacks a set of coherent values or organizing principles that would enable him to see his men and events as part of a broader and more meaningful pattern.

The main quality that holds his book together, indeed, is the author's blandly tendentious style. He irritated Roosevelt and other Presidents by the Olympian and slightly disdainful tone in which he threw his digs and jabs. Thus in 1941, when Roosevelt haters were whispering that the President would suspend the elections of 1942, Krock (in a column not included here) solemnly examined the question of whether it was practically possible for Roosevelt to take such a step; he should have demolished the silly rumor. Krock's seeming lack of deep, strongly held political values may also have accounted for the blind eye he turned for years toward the developing problem of civil rights in America; here again he dealt with many peripheral issues but ignored the central and persisting ones.

This book is carelessly edited, with a number of errors. The criteria by which the columns were selected are not stated. There is no index. A full study of Arthur Krock, using his correspondence as well as his columns, would tell us a good deal about the battle of Washington in recent decades, the role of the press, the public relations of Presidents. This is no substitute for such a book.—JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, *Williams College.*

The Intruders: The Invasion of Privacy by Government and Industry. By SENATOR EDWARD V. LONG (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. viii, 230. $5.95.)

The focus of this study of the "invasion of privacy by government and industry" is upon the new science of eavesdropping, particularly the use of wire tapping by law enforcement officials. The author, Senator Edward V. Long of Missouri, is chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure. In that capacity he has been a steadfast foe of activities by government agencies that intrude on individual privacy.

From Long's account, the national agencies most often involved in bugging and wire tapping are the F.B.I. and the Internal Revenue Service. Wire tapping in national security cases was first authorized by President Franklin D. Roosevelt prior to World War II. Although still used heavily in that area, it has also found extensive employment in recent years in the drive against organized crime and in the detection of fraud on the part of taxpayers.

The legal status of wire tapping today is unsatisfactory from the point of view of both its supporters and opponents. The law does not prohibit wire tapping, although the Federal Communications Act of 1934 does forbid the public disclosure of information obtained in this way. The Supreme Court has never found wire tapping *per se* to be unconstitutional. What the courts do not allow is the use of wire-tap evidence against defendants in criminal cases, since this would be a disclosure of the kind prohibited by the Federal Communications Act.

Nevertheless, executive agencies tap away. Perhaps the most egregious practice in which the government has been caught is the interception of phone conversations between defendants and their attorneys, or in the case of the Internal Revenue Service, the bugging of a room in which alleged tax evaders were closeted with their lawyers.

The book deals briefly with several other areas in which problems of privacy have arisen, including the use of "mail covers" by the Post Office Departemt, the establishment of a central data bank, and the use of questionnaires on captive audiences. From the social scientist's point of view, some of Long's strictures on the invasion of privacy represented by centralized information systems and inquisitive questionnaires come perilously close to home.

Like any well-socialized legislator, Long is a great deal more sensitive in invasions of privacy by executive officials than he is to similar activities by congressional committees. He is highly critical of efforts by the State Department to keep tabs on an official accused of leaking information from personnel files to a congressional committee, but betrays no concern over the invasion of privacy such leaks may well represent for the affected employees.

Long concludes his book with what seems to be an eminently sensible design for improving existing practices with regard to wire tapping. Understandably enough, the book is tailored for broad popular consumption. It is written in a breezy style with relentless superficiality in the treatment of its subject. The scholar with a serious interest in the problem of privacy would do well to repair to the invaluable source from which the book is drawn, the hearings of Senator Long's Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure.—FRANCIS E. ROURKE, *Johns Hopkins University.*

FOREIGN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914–1935. By TREVOR WILSON. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966. Pp. 416. $7.50.)

This is a provocative study of the politics of breakup. On the eve of the First World War there were 261 Liberals in the House of Commons, a Liberal government in power, and a long tradition of governing success on which to draw. By 1935, when Wilson's account ends, the party in Parliament had faded to 21 MPs without the faintest hope of achieving office or influencing policy. It had, in the author's words, "exhausted all avenues to revival." The recent Liberal "revival," it might be added, still produced only twelve MPs in the 1966 election, the same number as in 1945. The story of how this once great governing party and its tradition petered out in the space of a few short years has been the subject of many books and much polemic. None of the previous efforts, however, compares in depth with Wilson's fascinating account. His evidence is convincingly mustered and economically presented, his analysis reasoned and firm, his treatment of the principal actors fair and perceptive.

The general outline of the narrative is a familiar one: the weakness of Liberal governments in the early years of the First World War, the vacillations of Asquith and the ruthless conniving of Lloyd George, the Liberal catastrophe in the coupon election of 1918, the internal strife and schisms of the twenties, the ill-fated parliamentary support of the MacDonald governments, the depths of despair reached in the thirties. What is different, and compelling, is how Wilson goes about explaining and interpreting each turn of the screw. He has chosen not to write a history of party politics in these two decades, but of the Liberal party in these politics, from the inside looking out. This requires both empathy and critical objectivity. A measure of Wilson's success is that the reader gets the sense of being at the center of the party's decisional agonies without losing his grasp of the overall context in which they are embedded. While his chief aim is to construct a coherent narrative, in doing so Wilson demonstrates that political scientists have no monopoly on the skillful use of electoral and organizational analysis, or of the psychology of political leadership. These he uses sparingly and in *ad hoc* fashion. But it is no good pillorying historians for "having no theory" if they have insight and contribute to our understanding of general problems (in this case, how a seemingly viable political party in a stable democracy undergoes rapid disintegration).

What killed the Liberal Party? More than anything else, Wilson argues, it was the First World War and the Liberals' uncertain response to it. Nearly half of his book is devoted to a close examination of the events of 1914–18. While admitting that in the years immediately prior to Sarajevo the party had hit a patch of troubles, he refuses to credit the interpretation that by then it was inherently incapable of adjusting either to industrial society, the changing international economy, or the challenge of Labour. What it could not survive was having to lead Britain to war and directing a wartime administration based on the negation of traditional Liberal principles. No other issue was so guaranteed to tear apart the diverse groups and leaders that made up the prewar party; none was so successful in enabling the Conservative and Labour parties—for quite different reasons—to emerge with new strength in 1918.

Once the party's giant weakness became apparent in these years, it was a comparatively easy thing for its enemies, and for some of its own misguided leaders, to take full advantage of the confused and rudderless state of Liberalism to advance their own power. Though no determinist, Wilson believes that by 1918 the Liberals had painted themselves into an impossible corner, from which none of their leaders could, and none of their rivals wished, to extricate them in the following years. For this reason the events after 1924 are presented hurriedly and cryptically, and the maneuvers of Samuelites and Simonites made to look like intramural games between the survivors of Pompei.

Political parties are made and unmade by men as well as events and forces, and Wilson's account shows the extent to which the Liberals were badly served by their leaders in this period. His picture of Asquith is the familiar one of the high-minded man of inaction, personally endearing and capable of moments of insight, but hopelessly ill-equipped to understand a nation at war, the true nature of the Conservative Party, or Lloyd George. Wilson essays a more controversial, but to my mind convincing, interpretation of Lloyd George, who more than anyone else set the seal on the Liberal Party. He acknowledges him as the undoubted architect of wartime victory and as one of the few men of ideas (if not ideals) the party ever had. He analyzes in full detail the long string of pitiless plays that brought Lloyd George to power in 1916, his shabby treatment of colleagues, and his mercurial attachment to Liberal principles. Yet in his summing up, as in his presentation of events, Wilson pictures the man as essentially deficient in political judgment

and self-knowledge, missing countless opportunities to advance both his own and his party's cause. "We err," he concludes, "in calling Lloyd George a Machiavellian, if we mean a man of deep purpose and ruthless practice. At times he came nearer the Machiavell of the Elizabethan stage, who revelled in intrigue for its own sake and indulged in duplicity so palpable that only the exigencies of plot caused anyone to be deceived by him. Frequently [his] political manoeuvrings suggested that he knew neither his ultimate objective nor the means of attaining it. And if he was often unscrupulous and disloyal, these qualities were so apparent that they defeated their own ends."

This book is highly recommended for students of political pathology, a subject no less important today than "development."—JAMES B. CHRISTOPH, *Indiana University.*

Wirtschaft und Politik in Deutschland. WERNER KALTEFLEITER. (Cologne: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1966. Pp. 170. 29DM.)

West Germany: Politics of Non-Planning. HANS-JOACHIM ARNDT. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966. Pp. xxiii, 162. $3.95, paper.)

It is a common-place to say that West German democracy is a result of the economic miracle, just as it is generally accepted that the demise of the first German Republic was a result of the depression. Some observers call the West German system a "good weather"-democracy. Kaltefleiter's paperback is a scholarly examination of this thesis. He compares political election and survey data with economic data, such as unemployment statistics and growth rates. The author, a political scientist at the University of Cologne, attributes the rise of political stability to economic stability and minimizes the impact of institutional arrangements, such as the five-percent-clause and the constructive vote-of-no-confidence. He concludes that the possibilities for party fragmentation and radicalization have not diminished. He believes that certain institutional reforms, such as electoral reform, are still worthwhile, despite the fundamental relation between economic and political stability.

If the stability of the political system is dependent upon steady economic growth, the politics of the economy become extremely important. It is here that Arndt's excellent pilot study is very useful. One of Arndt's theses is that political power in Germany has been inadequate to force economic measures which step on the toes of powerful economic groups. His interdisciplinary study of economic practice and policy in Germany provides the first detailed analysis available in English of the economic measures undertaken in recent years by the West German Government, and places them in a broad historical perspective.

Arndt gives major attention to the problem of broad macroeconomic planning based on cooperation and integration, effective by mutual consent and contract, rather than by force and coercion. In his preliminary appraisal, he makes it very clear that macro-economic planning is primarily a political, not a technological issue, and this opens the way for a thorough discussion of the entire subject of the politics of nonplanning. Arndt's presentation includes a stimulating and impressive form of social-psychological inquiry into certain shared attitudes and values of the various generations of politicians, labor leaders, and, most importantly, businessmen. Despite broad differences between the generations it is clear that there exists a philosophy of German business which gives the German business elite an overwhelming leadership role in German society and its political institutions. While it is clear that the new "Grand Coalition" government will not carry on "social market economy" policies quite as dogmatically as heretofore, it is evident from Arndt's analysis that even a purely Social Democratic government would not easily cross the Rubicon of national planning.

Yet, despite the ideology and slogans of nonplanning, there has been a great amount of government intervention and guidance in economic affairs in Germany, especially in the major aspects of growth policy: management of demand and maintenance of competitiveness and fostering of output potential by policies promoting high investment and foreign trade. Unfortunately, the examples of Nazi Germany and East Germany lead to misunderstandings of economic planning, which is seen as a system of controls and coercion. This misconception seriously hampers the debate on the issue in the Federal Republic. It is to be regretted that Arndt's book will apparently not appear in German, for the new generation of German managers could profit from it.

The books by Arndt and Kaltefleiter both contain excellent notes, bibliographies, and statistical information. For the student of German politics they are also testimony to the increasing originality and profundity of young German social scientists.—CHARLES R. FOSTER, *Washington, D.C.*

Revolutionary Hamburg: Labor Politics in the Early Weimar Republic. BY RICHARD A. COMFORT. (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1966. Pp. x, 226. $6.00.)

The author states that this monograph can best be described as "social history—the history of a

social class and the development of its role in politics" (p. viii). The social class involved is the labor movement in one city, Hamburg, during the early period of the Weimar Republic (until 1924). It is a study of the intense factionalism and constant internecine combat that hopelessly divided the forces of labor during this traumatic period of German history and which "destroyed the effectiveness of organized labor as a political force" (p. 130). The forces of labor were divided into two broader "camps," the majority force, the "right," consisting of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the (socialist) Free Trade Unions (ADGB); the designation "left opposition" is used by Comfort to refer "to the entire spectrum of left-wing opposition to the majority positions of the SPD and the ADGB"—the Independent Socialists (USPD), the German Communist Party (KPD), and the leftist opposition in the trade unions, including the workers' council movement. The author is critical of what might be called the "organizational conservatism" of the SPD and union officials who, according to Comfort, lost touch with a sizable and important segment of the working class, namely the industrial workers who were expanding rapidly in numbers during this period. The SPD and the ADGB represented primarily the "labor aristocracy," the skilled craft workers. The SPD was not successful in winning over the men who represented the newly important industrial trades who drifted instead to the USPD and, later, to the KPD; the ADBG *was* successful in winning this group at first, but was unable to hold them, due to a refusal to make organizational reforms (in the direction of more intra-union democracy) or to integrate the new labor leadership into the union hierarchy. The shifting fortunes of the parties of the left (SPD, USPD, KPD) in Hamburg during this period can be understood to a considerable extent, according to Comfort, by the political behavior of the "alienated" younger industrial workers, whom the SPD failed to integrate politically. Whether the SPD *could* have successfully done so is, the author admits, an open question; the point he makes is that the party (and more especially the trade unions) did not really try: the SPD was limited by the eagerness with which they sought "acceptance" by the traditional economic elite in Hamburg and also by the party's participation in the national government; the unions were restricted by the organizational conservatism of the union hierarchy. In this failure, the author places more blame on the unions than on the SPD.

Most of the book is taken up with a chronology of Hamburg labor politics during the early Weimar period and the author does a competent job (based on solid research) in sorting out the enormous confusion of the times—the aftermath of revolution following the war, riots and demonstrations, economic crisis, uprisings on the right and the left, strains between the Hamburg and Berlin governments. Political scientists, however, will probably be more interested in the two chapters which describe the social background characteristics of leaders and members of the SPD, USPD, KPD, and the Free Trade Unions; reasonably adequate data, however, were available only for social democratic and union officials. The author makes imaginative use of data sources and presents a fascinating brief account of the political socialization (although he does not use this term) of some communist officials, based on court trial records of these leaders. The author also includes a chapter analyzing the sources of electoral support of the parties of the left in Hamburg during this period, using aggregate election returns on a district basis. Comfort acknowledges that his use of statistical techniques leaves much to be desired, pleading lack of funds and time. The author is aware of the research potential of this kind of quantitative analysis of German politics and is generally conversant with the political science literature. The study would have been greatly strengthened had the author been more analytical and less descriptive in the first two-thirds of the book, where he periodically commented on, but did not adequately come to grips with, such problems as factionalism in political parties and trade unions, the organizational conservatism of the SPD and the unions, the beginnings of the transformation of the SPD from a "workers' party" into a "people's party," and the "respective roles" (i.e., division of labor) between the SPD and the trade unions with regard to the integration of the working class politically and socially. It goes without saying that the book would have been more valuable had it treated the entire Weimar period. In general, the book is an informative case study and a welcome contribution to the politics of the German left.—WILLIAM E. WRIGHT, *University of Georgia.*

Private Interests and Public Policy: The Experience of the French Economic and Social Council. By J. E. S. HAYWARD. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1966. Pp. vi, 215. $2.75.)

A growing number of books dealing with the political economy of France that are written for a British audience begin, as this one does, on an off-note of half amazement and half confession. "The French may perhaps, after all, have something to teach us about the machinery of government" (p. v). It may be hard to imagine, yet some day Americans might find themselves making similar statements. The marriage between politics

and economics, analyzed by Dahl and Lindblom (*Politics, Economics, and Welfare*), apparently has proceeded further and been more successful in France than in other western countries. Thus we may indeed be able to learn from our French friends.

Mr. Hayward is concerned with what the French call "the concerted economy." This concept involves a distinctive orientation toward the formulation of public policy. It stresses "the interdependence of the government and the interest groups and the interpenetration of 'public' and 'private' decision-making characteristic of a mixed economy in which an increasing measure of state intervention has to be reconciled with an increasing measure of interest group intervention in all spheres of social activity" (pp. 3,4).

The concerted economy also involves a set of institutions which tend to break down the standard distinctions between political parties and interest groups, geographical and functional representation, and legislative and consultative bodies. One such institution, which provides the focus for this study, is the Economic and Social Council.

The book is divided into four substantive chapters that deal with the origins, the organization, the impact, and the future of the Economic and Social Council (the ESC). The idea of a council which would represent occupational groups can be found in various strains of French thought, e.g., Saint Simon, Proudhon, and the Social Catholics. The author stresses, with considerable justification, that the Facist influence was secondary and ephemeral. The formal and informal organization of the ESC is hard for the uninitiated to comprehend, since it is both complex and constantly changing. In this book it is discussed with about as much clarity as one could expect. In an interesting section devoted to the voting behavior of ESC groups, the author concludes that the most significant pattern at the moment is the apparent alliance between farmer and business groups.

The impact of any institution is exceedingly difficult to calculate, but in the case of the ESC the volatility of French politics adds additional barriers. One is thus confined to rather broad generalities. In the discussions of 1945–1946 the ESC figured prominently. It was intended to be an important institution of the Fourth Republic, but the author notes that it was usually ignored. Under the Fifth Republic the ESC has been alternately blessed and threatened. Debré showed a keen interest in making the Council a technical advisor to the Government. During the last few years, however, the Council has been of more service to the Government's opposition. Since the Bayeux speech of 1946, General de Gaulle has been talking about combining the ESC and the Senate. This and other proposals for reorganizing the ESC are discussed in the final chapter.

The study is inconclusive and contributes no new suggestions regrading the problems and possibilities of assimilating a functionally based deliberative body into the traditional parliamentary system. Still, it adds to our descriptive knowledge; and it provides a reasonably fair survey of the literature. There is no bibliography, however. The American student of the mixed economy could profit from a reading of this and other good studies of the French experience. We have been too slow in discovering this literature.—JOHN T. BATCHELDER, *University of Iowa.*

The French Prefectoral Corps, BY NICHOLAS RICHARDSON. *1814–1830*. Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 263. $9.50.)

This book deals with the French prefectoral corps during the period 1814–1830 from the point of view of personnel administration. It describes how Restoration prefects were recruited, promoted, transferred, and dismissed and compares them in these respects with the Napoleonic prefects as well as with Restoration subprefects and other subordinate personnel. The change from what Richardson calls the "monolithic military dictatorship" of Napoleon to the oligarchic parliamentary regime of the Restoration (with its 90,000 eligible voters) involved, as far as the prefectoral corps was concerned, three major changes: (1) the politicization of the prefectoral role, the prefect now having to contend with, as his major preoccupations, the winning of elections and the survival of frequent ministerial crises; (2) increased instability of tenure within the individual prefectures and within the corps, resulting from the difficulties of coping with these new hazards; and (3) the large influx of noblemen into the prefectoral corps, deriving from, among other things the new requirements of dynastic loyalty.

In the prefectoral system of the Restoration, there were no formal requirements for entry to the corps and none for promotion within it; there was, as yet, no hierarchy of ranks or of prefectures for career purposes. There was, moreover, a notable gap between the prefects and their subordinates, the subprefects. Prefects were more likely than subprefects to be noblemen and to be outsiders in the districts they administered: they were far more liable to transfer and dismissal. Subprefects tended to be local influentials and to remain in their native locality despite changes in regime and ministry: they seemed to have been chosen for their family's local standing,

an asset they would lose, if transferred. The prime requirement for appointment at both the prefectoral and subprefectoral levels, however, was the same: family background and connections. Without an appropriate genealogy as support from the past and a set of patrons as support from the present, it was difficult, if not impossible, to obtain an appointment; once obtained, to hold on to it; and once lost, to secure a pension.

Explorations into the intricacies of Restoration politics and society allow Richardson to establish that the distinctive traits of the Restoration prefectoral corps derived from its having been based on a service nobility. For a brief period, 1815–1830, the provincial nobility of France, the rural squirearchy, occupied the machinery of the state in the service of their legitimate monarch. As prefects, the legitimist nobility could serve their king, and also re-establish their right and duty to govern. After 1830, this connection of the nobility with responsibility and reality was lost, together with the legitimist principle, the service ideal, and power within the machinery of the state.

This is a well-written, carefully and richly detailed monograph, which assumes a more than nodding acquaintance with nineteenth century French history. A chart of "Ministries and Ministers of the Interior, April 1814–July 1830," on page 207, will help to refresh the reader's recollection of Restoration cabinet crises and thus assist him in relating those broader events to the vicissitudes of prefectoral personnel management of the period. ROBERT C. FRIED, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

The Searchers: Conflict and Communism in an Italian Town. By BELDEN PAULSON, WITH ATHOS RICCI. (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1966. Pp. vii, 360. $6.95.)

In this volume Belden Paulson and Athos Ricci undertake to explain why the majority of citizens in Castelfuoco, a pseudonym for a medieval hill town 30 miles from Rome, have supported and continue to support the Communist Party. But in their attempt to probe into the origin, exercise, and meaning of Communism they frequently go beyond Castelfuoco to explain present-day Communism in all of Italy.

The authors approach their research task by employing a variety of materials. The most important source of data is attitudinal material gathered through tape-recorded interviews with samples of the local citizenry. An attempt is made to detail the perceptions of some of Castelfuoco's "central characters" as selected by Ricci, a lifelong resident of the town and himself a former member of its Communist Party. Interviews are conducted with forty of these "central characters" who presumably "made" local history or typify members of important historical groups: old aristocracy, Fascists, Communist idealists, Communist practitioners of power, churchmen, Christian Democrats, bourgeois, youth, and representatives of the old rural civilization. Additional interviews are conducted with a set of "supporting actors," who are representative of local interests, and also with an anonymous two hundred of the three thousand local voters compiled by picking every fifteenth voter from the electoral lists.

The bulk of the book is composed of selected interviews which are utilized to form chapters in combination with largely excellent historical introductions. Hence we have Geppone Bostoncini, a former Blackshirt, speaking about Fascism, and Spartaco Lotta, a Communist idealist, on the role of the party, etc. This combination of historical and attitudinal data is handled most satisfactorily in the chapters concerned with the end of La Civiltá Contadina, the decline of the aristocracy, the coming of Fascism, and the advent of post-war Communism. Particularly insightful is the chapter entitled: "The Politics of the New Status Quo: The Communist Organization Men."

But in their attempt to give the reader a unique insight into the human condition of their respondents the authors commit several fundamental errors. First, and most crucial, the authors give little or no structure to their open-ended interviews: important dimensions related to hypotheses are not isolated beforehand and then systematically followed up. Instead of incisively employing the depth interview technique as does for example, Robert Lane in *Political Ideology*, Paulson and Ricci have each respondent (and some are resplendent), be he youth, priest, or bourgeois, give his own highly personal view of the world that is his Communist governed village. This procedure leads to repetition, confusion, and, most frequently, irrelevancies. At best these reports are fascinating insights into the respondent's definition of situation and his web of group affiliations. At their worst the interviews descend to the level of detailed descriptions of sex orgies among the degenerate aristocracy or rebel priests.

The logical conclusion of this poor research design and procedure is compounded when the authors become so infatuated with the responses that they fail to analyze them. At no time do they present one chart or table which might aid any reader interested in the percentage of the total sample who hold a particular attitude. Moreover, no information is presented regarding the voting behavior or party affiliations of the total sample. Hence it is impossible to tell how many respondents have changed their affiliations, e.g., how many former Fascists now vote Communist.

In their last chapter, "The Search for Commitment," Paulson and Ricci make an attempt to impose some theoretical framework on the interview material. There the argument is built around the extremely crude concept of "Searching." We are told that the people of Castelfuoco are Communists because they are searching for a way out of the *status quo* and toward a new order. Such severe problems as poverty, the failure of the church, incompetent government, and uncertain status positions are offered as reasons for the disenchantment which forms the precondition for searching. The people vote for the Communists because the other parties are less viable: the Christian Democrats are seen by the inhabitants as corrupt opportunists; the Neo-Fascists do not win because they represent a traumatic connection with the Mussolini regime, and the Socialists are simply ineffective. In short, the Communist Party is the only articulate promoter of the new order.

While the foregoing argument undoubtedly has much validity, the reader cannot help but be uneasy since Paulson and Ricci nowhere give an operational definition of "Searching." This omission renders any attempt systematically to test their hypotheses virtually impossible, which in turn severely reduces the scientific utility of the whole enterprise.

Paulson and Ricci are obviously sensitive and concerned observers of Italian society and politics and therefore it is regrettable that they do not attempt to structure their study along more theoretically fruitful lines. Because they do not, *The Searchers* at no point approaches the theoretical sophistication of other studies concerned with similar phenomena, such as Banfield's *Moral Basis of a Backward Society* or Cantril's *The Politics of Dispair*.—TIMOTHY M. HENNESSEY, *Michigan State University.*

Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism. By ADAM BROMKE. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967. Pp. x, 316. $9.95.)

Western political scientists specializing in the treacherous subject of the communist systems, hindered in their research by the unavailability of hard data and often unprepared because of their area oriented training to utilize more sophisticated modern tools of inquiry, gravitate in their writings toward either a historical interpretation of politics or toward political journalism concentrating not on the inner-working and dynamism of the system, but speculating on the personalities of various leaders and shifts of power among them. Professor Bromke is an exception only to the degree that he skillfully combines political historicism with political journalism.

The last two hundred years of Polish politics, including the present communist phase, can best be understood, Bromke argues, within the framework of oscillation between political idealism and political realism. The political idealism is defined as a moralistic interpretation of international relations in which Poland's absolute independence is viewed not only as practically desirable by the nation itself, but above all as just in accordance with the universally recognized standards of morality. Hence Poland's freedom has to be attained despite sacrifices, including constant, often hopeless but always bloody armed struggles against oppression, with the assumed assistance, on moral grounds, from the Western nations who share the Poles' ideas of the morality of freedom and self-determination.

The political realism has adopted a more pragmatic attitude, advocating certain reconciliation with the existing system of the international structure, denying validity to the moral stand and concentrating instead on an attempt to improve Poland's internal and external position within the framework of the immediately obtainable possibilities.

The oscillation between idealism and realism has resulted from Poland's extremely disadvantageous geographic location between two strong and vigorously expansionist nations—Germany and Russia, which at times have cooperated in the partitions of the country and at times have viewed it as the battle-ground between themselves. As long as Poland was powerful enough to wage war on two fronts, until the seventeenth century, the external events affected only to a degree its internal development. Once its strength was lost Poland's foreign policy became inseparably mixed with her domestic affairs. The idealists have argued a fight to the death with both opponents and alliances with the West—France, England, or the United States; the realists, accommodation with Russia, but significantly not with Germany, and a course of "organic reform" designed to improve the internal social and economic position. Few nations have debated their foreign policy with such passion and in such depth as the Poles.

On balance, in the last two hundred years, the philosophy of political idealism held sway over the Polish mentality as exemplified by the series of eighteenth and nineteenth century uprisings against the occupation by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. There were individual statesmen who carried the torch of political realism and there was an important period of "organic reform" after the disastrous anti-Russian uprising in 1863. This *enrichissez vous* and *laissez-faire* attitude contributed considerably to Poland's social and economic modernization. The dominance of

idealism revived just before the 1st World War and persisted, according to Professor Bromke, through Poland's twenty years of independence, 1918–1939, and the underground fight against the German occupation, 1939–1945, to be finally and perhaps forever crushed by the staggering World War II losses culminating in a blood bath of yet another disastrous uprising—the Warsaw Rising of 1944—and aggrandized by what many Poles considered to be Western treachery at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam.

After the war the sorrowful and beaten nation embraced realism as the only possibility of survival, led by the communists—the realists *par excellence*, disturbed only briefly by the dying pangs of idealism in the form of the anti-communist armed struggle of the nationalist diehards and the political opposition of Mikotajczyk's pro-Western and prodemocratic Peasant Party.

The communist-sponsored realism did not succeed any more than the previous "realistic" orientations for the simple reason that Stalinist Russia was not interested in the promotion of a viable, independent Poland existing within its orbit of influence any more than its Tsarist progenitor. Professor Bromke's realist hero, the immediate post-war first secretary of the communist party, Gomulka, paid for his "unrealistic national realism" with a purge from his office and a sojourn in jail for many years. Stalin was not about to diminish his power by engaging in yet another philosophical nicety à la Tito. "The Soviet Communists like their tsarist predecessors were not really interested in cooperating with the Poles. They treated Poland simply as a Russian dependency" (p. 85).

The true victory of realism came about in 1956, when the Soviet empire, shaken by Stalin's death and the resulting struggle for power in its top leadership, permitted Poland to undergo a peaceful revolution bringing Gomulka back into political control and to obtain the maximum degree of independence from the Soviet dominance possible within the existing international force alignment.

From then on Professor Bromke switches to what I have called earlier political journalism. He analyzes with painstaking care the public pronouncements of the leading Polish politicians, spiced sometimes with the less reliable, but nevertheless intellectually juicy political gossip, in relationship to their stand on political realism. His band of political "pragmatists" include not only Gomulka and his communist entourage, split into liberal and the hard "partisan" groups, but also such anomalies of Polish politics as the leaders of the two minor parties, the United Peasant Party and the Democratic Party, the communist supported progressive catholics of Pax, lead by a pre-war fascist and the opposition of the small, but vocal catholic ZNAK group, which no doubt speaks for the masses. The discussion of the last two groups and Pax's splinter derivatives is done with special care and intellectual verve. In the final analysis, Bromke claims, Poland rose from the ashes and became viable and strong again through the happy synthesis of political realism and political idealism; idealism of Gomulka's communism with his realistic assessment of Polish nationalism, idealism of catholicism with the realistic acceptance of communist rule, but above all the idealistic-realist nationalism of the desire by the Polish people to prove that "Poland will not perish, as long as we are alive" (a verse from the Polish National Anthem).

The professional reader will in vain search in *Poland's Politics* for the system analysis, the multi-factor analysis of the decision-making process or public policy formulation, and in that sense the book is a disappointment. It is basically a work of a historian in which events are fitted, often with great skill and considerable careful documentation, not devoid however of intelligent speculation, into a historiographic framework. Bromke's thesis, that the communists are as much a part of Polish tradition as other previous realist groups is challenging and polemically stimulating. Bromke's greatest contribution lies in the forceful illustration, even if only by the example of the author's approach to his subject, that Poles are prone to justify their political actions on historical grounds as much as Americans tend to use the moral coverage. And as such *Poland's Politics* is a must for the serious student of Polish political culture.—Jaroslaw A. Piekalkiewicz, *The University of Kansas.*

Politics of Socialist Agriculture in Poland: 1945–1960. By Andrzej Korbonski. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965. Pp. xii, 330. $7.50.)

The title of this book is somewhat ironic. As Korbonski convincingly demonstrates, there has been very little "socialism" in Polish Communist agricultural policy. The brief effort at Stalinist-type collectivization, begun in 1949, was essentially played out well before Gomulka's virtual invitation to liquidate the collective farms in 1956.

Much of the book is a history of the peasant movement as a political force in Poland. The author gives a good capsule summary of peasant Party politics in the interwar and wartime periods, showing that the disgrace of much of the prewar elite left the People's Party (PSL) as the only truly popular political force in postwar Poland. This summary is useful background for the subsequent analysis of the processes by which the Communists gained a monopoly of power.

The tragic fate of PSL and its leader Mikotajczyk are portrayed in rather less heroic colors than one usually finds in most previous Western accounts.

By contrast, Gomulka is given much (perhaps too much) credit for his realistic assessment of the possibilities of social and economic change in the village. Korbonski's well documented account of the intra-Communist Party debates on collectivization throws additional light on the profound differences between the "domestic" and "Moscow" elements within the PUWP. Gomulka, perhaps the archetype of "domesticism" in the People's Democracies in the early postwar period, is depicted as an outright opponent of collectivization right up to the time of his ouster in 1948. His public utterances made it appear that the "Polish road to socialism" might not necessarily include collectivization at all. Korbonski seems to give too much credence to these public statements, implying at times that Gomulka's stand was more than merely tactical.

In any case, the catastrophic failure of collective farming in Poland soon provided ample empirical support for Gomulka's position, whatever his real motives. For a number of reasons—political, economic, geographic, and socio-psychological (not all of which are satisfactorily illuminated by the author)—the "Muscovites" were unable to replicate their cherished Soviet model. Korbonski's analysis of Gomulka's post-1956 agricultrual policies is very nicely done. While giving due attention to the relative moderation and *laissez-faire*-ism of these policies as they affected the individual peasant, he also notes the apparently firm commitment of Gomulka to the eventual socialization of Polish agriculture. Few Western commentators have given proper attention to this long-term commitment. In this and many other respects the book is admirably perceptive and well balanced.

Nevertheless, the book has its weaknesses. Like many other works on Communist politics, it limits its focus largely to the level of high policy. Not nearly enough attention is given to the effects of national policy at the local level. The reader may feel keenly the lack of a detailed treatment of the actual practices of collectivization and the operations of the collective farms themselves.

The occasional attempts at comparative analysis, especially with Soviet patterns, are sometimes rather superficial. For example, the distinction between Polish and Soviet handling of the "kulaks" ignores significant Soviet experiences during the 'twenties. Also, the author might have done much more with the question of comparative farm-machinery policies, particularly the similarities and differences between the Soviet MTS and the Polish POM. (Might Gomulka's experience have influenced Khrushchev's decision to abolish the MTS?) Similarly, the analysis of Gomulka's long-term program of socialization might perhaps have benefited from a comparison with the so-called "Leninist Cooperative Plan" in the USSR during the 'twenties.

Finally, it is unfortunate that Korbonski was unable to cite a few of the more recent developments in Polish agriculture, such as the increasing age level of the farm operator and the apparent general stagnation of crop yields. Clearly the existing small private farm is not the answer to Poland's agricultural problems.

On the whole, these weaknesses are minor indeed. Dr. Korbonski has made a worthwhile contribution to our understanding of the politics of Communist ruling systems.—ROBERT F. MILLER, *SUNY, Stonybrook.*

Soviet Agriculture and Peasant Affairs. ED. BY ROY D. LAIRD. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1963. Pp. xi, 335. $7.00.)

Soviet Agriculture: The Permanent Crisis. ED. BY ROY D. LAIRD AND EDWARD L. CROWLEY. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. Pp. 209. $7.00.)

Both volumes under review comprise papers delivered at conferences on Soviet agriculture, one at the University of Kansas in September 1962, the other at the Munich Institute for the Study of the USSR in February 1964. The majority of articles in both books are appraisals of agricultural performance. This is particularly true of the Munich collection in which plans are compared to actualities and Soviet hopes are juxtaposed to foreboding predictions: the virgin land project (disastrous), chemical fertilizers (problematical), peasant incomes (increasing slightly), the output of foodstuffs (goals beyond reach, prognosis poor). Papers delivered at the Kansas conference are more general, e.g., "The Soviet Apporoach to the Good Earth," "Low and High Yield Crops in the USSR," and "Soviet Statistics of Agricultural Output." In sum and substance, the extent of the Soviet agricultural crisis is persuasively documented.

Often stated, ill defined, but never proven, is the thesis of both volumes that the permanent crisis in Soviet agriculture stems from a "fundamental flaw" in the Soviet political system: (1) the contradiction between the Party's commitments to direct control when the prerequisite of productive agriculture is operational autonomy, and (2) the contradiction between the Party's commitment to collectivist values; particularly the "new Soviet man," when only individualistic incentives will give the peasant a stake in the system. The agricultural crisis is, then, rooted

in the conflict between Party and peasantry values.

As was true in many of Khrushchev's plans, professor Laird's introductions promise more than is delivered:

> Agriculture is far more than a matter of farming technique. It is a way of life. If one is to have the best opportunity to understand the nature and problems of Soviet agriculture, not only are the analyses of the agronomist required, but also those of the anthropologist, the economist, the historian, the political scientist, and the sociologists. (*Soviet Agriculture and Peasant Affairs*, p. vii.)

Unfortunately, agriculture as *a way of life* is nowhere defined as a conceptual approach. From various papers and conference comments, it would appear that the notion refers to a value orientation—a set of shared attitudes which differentiates the peasantry from proletariat, rural from industrial life, and most important, the peasant from *apparatchiki*. With two exceptions—A.E. Gaev's "The Kolkhozy and Kolkhoz Worker in Soviet Literature" in the Munich collection, and Demitri B. Shumkin's excellent paper, "Current Characteristics and Problems of the Soviet Rural Population," in the Kansas volume—no concerted effort is made to define the distinctive character of Soviet agriculture as a way of life. An interdisciplinary approach might profitably focus on such key variables as how peasant values are formed, maintained despite Party efforts to transform them, and change over time. If Party-peasant values are in conflict, how is this conflict articulated and politically manifested? Without such data, and Shumkin's articles proves they can be collected, how credible is the volumes' underlying theme that the permanent crisis in Soviet agriculture is unsolvable within the boundaries of the political system? While not impugning the competence of the papers in demonstrating the extent of the agricultural crisis, the issue of contention is this—the Soviet agricultural problem is political, yet no concerted effort is made to analyze the politics of Soviet agriculture.

Without a theory of the Soviet political system it is impossible to collect, sift, and organize data on Soviet political behavior. Without such data it proves impossible either systematically to analyze the decision-making process or to build theory. This dilemma, not unique to Soviet studies, is unsolvable without the self-conscious effort of scholars to break the contradiction—to place their analysis in an explicit theoretical framework, demark the boundaries of the political arena, and determine the style of interaction between political actors. Admittedly, this is no small task. Anything less, however, reduces the significance of the contribution to our understanding of Soviet agriculture and politics.

While these remarks relate to political science generally, and to Soviet studies in particular, the criticism is specifically applicable to the volumes under review. In a lead article to the Kansas collection, Howard Swearer's paper, "Agricultural Administration under Khrushchev," raises the pertinent questions and advances a tentative framework for analyzing Soviet agriculture in the context of the Soviet political system. Synoptically, the Soviet Union is portrayed as a bureaucracy writ large. The Soviet political process is one of bureaucratic infighting in which the *dramatis personae* are the subunits of the total bureaucracy, where the executive has extensvie powers as a result of control over strategic points in the bureaucracy, and in which the sub-units lack bases of independent support in the population. Despite our sparse knowledge of the decision-making process. Swearer concludes that "recent administrative reforms in agriculture are difficult to understand without postulating that, in part at least, the leadership has been attempting to adjust interests among several competing bureaucracies, each group presenting its case as that best suited to meet national goals" (p. 14).

Obviously rudimentary, this analytical framework could lead to a theory of "bureaucratic pressure groups" and a conflict theory of Soviet politics. Regrettably, neither the potential strengths nor weaknesses were tested in either volume.—MILTON G. LODGE, *University of Iowa.*

Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957–1964. By CARL A. LINDEN. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 270. $7.50.)

Some time has passed since the late Victor A. Kravchenko justly regretted "the profound ignorance among alleged 'experts on Soviet Russia' about the nature and organization of power in the U.S.S.R."* Nevertheless, few political scientists have proved sufficiently gifted to capture and transmit a sense of the vital political process in the upper circles of Soviet society. Despite the revelations of former insiders such as Kravchenko and Walter G. Krivitsky, as well as the notably predictive analyses of the European observers Franz Borkenau, Isaac Deutscher, Ernst Kux, Boris Meissner, and Boris I. Nicolaevsky, most of our academics have until now been unmindful of the cardinal importance of *la politique* on the Soviet scene. The preoccupation of the vast majority of American Sovietologists with institutional and ideological themes may be largely explicable in terms of their engrossment by individual disciplines such as public administration, political theory, or, it would even appear, farm economy. It is breadth of intellect, and fore-

* *I Chose Freedom. The Personal and Political Life of a Soviet Official* (New York: Scribner's, 1946), p. 471.

most a historically-grounded understanding of power and process as a clash of subjective desires which shapes and is shaped by the environment, that distinguish the enduring writings of Borkenau *et al.* from those professorial treatises on Soviet government which are elegantly geometric in exposition but require periodic revision of concept rather than mere detail.

Carl A. Linden admirably succeeds in conveying a sense of the Soviet political process in this brilliant interpretation of first-rank importance. Using as his methodological tool a scrutiny of the public utterances of leaders, against the background of history, Dr. Linden examines the character of Khrushchev's direction of policy. The main theme is accordingly stormy dispute over policy alternatives which confront the handful of figures who run the dictatorship. The range of choice in decision-making is shown to be much broader than might be expected of politicians who never tire of mouthing deterministic verbiage. Dr. Linden gets behind the wordy facade of legitimation and lays bare the not-so-unique spectacle of practical men trying to cope with practical problems. Indeed, the cynical manipulations of doctrine which are graphically illustrated usefully remind us that Communist ideology is ambiguous and must be interpreted before it gains operational significance. Moreover, the weighty evidence of Khrushchev's improvisations, and conflict-bound immobilism in policy-making, tend to cast doubt on the soundness of trying to distinguish between Communist "grand design" and the living reality called "tactics."

Still another virtue of this impressive study is how it lucidly traces the interaction between domestic and foreign policy. We see how the leaders of different schools of thought conveniently fabricate images of the outer world which accord with the ambitions of divergent interests in the power structure. In short, there is no static definition of "national interest," but arbitrary estimates which must somehow be harmonized with a view toward the changing configurations of power at home and abroad. Here the essential comparability of policy-making in Moscow and Washington is striking. It is a matter for further investigation in which city ideological interests are more regarded as a basis of statecraft.

As Dr. Linden says, differences are likely to arise over particulars in his study. The root of the cleavage between reforming and orthodox tendencies in the elite might have been located in varying appraisals of the society's cohesiveness, with innovative rulers less fearful of promoting the growth of centrifugal forces below. The adverse effects of the Cuban failure on Khrushchev's personal prestige in early 1963 may be slightly overstated insofar as the premier apparently instigated controversial decisions to allocate millions of rubles to build new poultry factories (January 8, 1963), revamp industrial planning (January 11, 1963), and oust the chief of the General Staff (March 1963). Also, the descriptions of Brezhnev as a Khrushchev "protégé" in 1960 and "ally" in 1963 might have been justified by recalling that in the meantime Brezhnev had deplored "anger" in politics, and that suggested misgivings about his original patron.

Such minor reservations can in no way detract from the great value of this highly sophisticated analysis, which merits the closest attention by interested scholars.—SIDNEY I. PLOSS, *The George Washington University.*

The Mongolian People's Republic. By ROBERT A. RUPEN. (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1966. Pp. 74. $2.00.)

For a good time there has been a need for a fairly short paperback on this little known country often referred to by its historical and geographical name of Outer Mongolia, but which has been called officially the Mongolian People's Republic since 1924; actually, it was the first of the People's Republics, all the others having been created since World War II. From this point of view Professor Rupen's booklet is very welcome, especially as the author has written many articles on the subject in recent years and also published a book, *Mongols of the Twentieth Century* (Bloomington, Ind., 1964), which contains many important documents.

However, the study before us is Volume II of a series entitled *Integration and Community Building Among the Fourteen Communist Party-States*, edited by Jan F. Triska, who assures us in his preface that "the symposium is not planned to be yet another collection of writings about Communist countries." The author is therefore forced to present his material and, partly his interpretations, under the same prescribed sub-headings in more than one chapter (The Belief System; the Social System; Degree of Integration with Other Systems). Though it is not the author's fault, in a short, tightly conceived work of this kind, given the limited approach, the impression of a certain artificiality in the design could not be avoided since a good number of facts, aspects, and also some qualifications had to be omitted.

The Mongolian People's Republic is in many ways *sui generis*, not only due to its large size, sparse population of about one million, isolated yet exposed geographical position between the two giants, Russia and China, but also due to its special long-standing relationship with Soviet Russia. Some of the vicissitudes of this relationship are discussed. Without Soviet advice, help,

and pressure the radical political, social, economic, and cultural changes could not have been carried out. The Russians must have had great difficulties in finding the human "instruments" to execute their policies, especially those which reflected major policy changes in the Soviet Union. In the all-important economic sector of livestock, progress has been slow and difficult. The elite, which runs the affairs of the country, is still very limited in number. In view of the fact that interpretations of developments in Mongolia have to rely nearly exclusively on Soviet Russian sources and visits on the spot are severely limited as to time and scope, our knowledge of the attitudes of the Mongols themselves will consist mainly of individual inferences and impressions, a factor which will remain a drawback of any study of the country.

Rupen mentions that there has been a certain relaxation toward the use of the old Mongolian script which was officially replaced by the cyrillic script in the 1940's. Personal information confirms that a number of educated Mongols correspond with each other in the old script.

In recent years the Mongols have been able to establish relations with some other countries. Rupen mentions Mongolia's membership of the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance (CEMA) as "a new device for binding the M.P.R. even closer to the Soviet Union." It could be added that Czechoslovakia and East Germany have also been active, and presumably still are, in establishing industrial plants; a number of Czechs work at Darkahn, north of the capital Ulan Bator. Poles have been able to organize several scientific research projects, not only the Joint Polish-Mongolian paleontological expedition, but also others for which, according to information obtained, permission was granted more readily than to others, allegedly including Russians.

Chinese aid in loans and laborers, which reached its peak in the late 1950's, and which Rupen discusses in its main outlines, has been by now radically reduced. It was interesting to notice, in 1965, that the showcases in front of the Chinese Embassy in Ulan Bator contained only photographs relating to China's military strength whereas those of East European diplomatic missions were confined to economic and cultural activities.

Recent developments in the Sino-Soviet Conflict, together with a Chinese claim to the M.P.R. as "lost territory," have enhanced Mongolia's strategic key position in Asia. From the point of view of the scholar who is also interested in other aspects of the country, this does unfortunately not promise greater facilities for obtaining reliable data.—GERARD M. FRITERS, *Laval University, Quebec.*

The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization. By KAMEL S. ABU JABER. (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966. Pp. xvi, 218. $6.50.)

This book is an important study of the Ba'th party, written by a student of Middle East politics who can claim familiarity with the region. Dr. Abu Jaber was born and raised in Jordan before coming to the United States for his education. We, therefore, have the benefit of a "dual perspective," as the blurb on the jacket states.

As Philip Hitti indicates in the Foreword to this book, the Ba'th is one of very few organizations in the Arab world which can be given the designation of party. Its effective appeal to Arab intellectuals, its accession to power in Syria and for a while in Iraq, and its contributions to the ideology of Arab nationalism combine to underline the need for a good understanding of the Ba'th. Considering the limitations inherent in a study of this subject, Abu Jaber's book does a commendable job of presenting the history, ideology and organization of the party. But limitations there certainly are, and this is by no means a comprehensive or final history of the Ba'th, nor does the author claim it to be such.

One important limitation is the lack of an adequate analysis of the reasons and motives which have impelled certain intellectuals to join the Ba'th party, whereas other intellectuals, who have had similar backgrounds, have apparently been able to satisfy their search for identity and self-expression by joining other, even antagonistic, movements or parties. Perhaps one way to probe this question is to ask how the party came into being. The author is not entirely clear on this point. In one place (p. 19), he attributes the emergence of the Ba'th to the impact of Western civilization on the traditional societies of the area, and the desire to see the conditions in the Arab world improved. Later (p. 149) we are told that the party came about as a reaction to Communist gains in the Arab world. It may well be that both these factors are important. But we are still in the dark as to why this situation would engender a Ba'th party as opposed to a Moslem or a Syrian organization, for example.

Professor Abu Jaber gives an excellent picture of the in-fighting and splits which have plagued the Ba'th. Two issues have been most important. One pertains to the function of the party, especially once Arab unity is realized. The party, as the author points out, was unable to present a viable program for unification, despite its strong advocacy of a unified Arab world. This was to prove quite costly, not only for the party but for the Arab nationalist cause generally.

The other important issue is the party's stand

on socialism. The reader is not quite certain just how important socialism is to the Ba'th. There is little doubt that the Ba'th, as the author argues, is primarily a nationalist party. But the very history of the party and the various polemics and splits within the Ba'th may be taken as a negation of the statement that "the Socialist aspect of the party is ancillary to its nationalism" (p. 147). Indeed, the author himself states that "the principal concern of this book is to examine the scope and substance of that brand of Arab socialism advocated by the Ba'th party . . . " (p. 8). Besides, Michel Aflaq himself talked of the idea of socialism as an eternal axiomatic truth, and argued that Arab nationalism, without socialism, ceases to exist. (*Fi sabil al-ba'th*, 1959, pp. 96, 233.)

The book would have benefited from a closer scrutiny of the references in the footnotes and one or two passages which are not clear. For example, Naji and Lusian are not the surnames but the first names of Allush and George (pp. 186, 187). The paragraph on pp. 63–64 is confusing in that it is not clear whether it is the National or the Regional command that is being referred to.

There are three appendixes, the most useful pertaining to the decisions of the sixth national convention of the Ba'th, held in 1963. A bibliographic essay is beneficial, particularly concerning Arabic sources.—MICHAEL W. SULEIMAN, *Kansas State University.*

Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition. ED. BY RALPH BRAIBANTI. (Durham. N. C.: Duke University Press, 1966. Pp. xx, 733. $17.50.)

Administrative Problems in Pakistan. ED. BY GUTHRIE S. BIRKHEAD. (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 223. $5.00.)

Revolution in Pakistan. BY HERBERT FELDMAN. (London: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. x, 242. $6.50.)

The story of the British in India covers a period of over three centuries—starting with the traders of the East India Company, continuing with the development of a highly qualified British ruling elite belonging to the Indian Civil Service (ICS), and closing with the Indianization of the Service, the independence of India, and the withdrawal of the British. Less than 800 British members of this ruling elite controlled almost 400 million Indians. In his contribution to *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition*, Bernard Cohn skillfully surveys their recruitment and training from 1600–1860.

Hugh Tinker carries the account forward to the years of British withdrawal and differentiates the structure of this imperial heritage in India, Ceylon, Burma, and Malaya. This and other chapters clearly demonstrate that elite cadres are still in command today.

Ralph Braibanti presents abundant evidence that such is the case in Pakistan. Its elite cadres not only continue to occupy the older strategic posts, they have moved into key new posts: the chairmanships of public corporations and directorships of training institutions. He concludes that the elite cadre concept is stronger than ever; its opponents are in retreat, and Pakistan's politicization is sedated and controlled by institutional devices.

David Potter finds that in India (as in Pakistan) the old ICS dominates the Union (central) administration, while the younger Indian Administrative Service (IAS) holds key state and district posts and has moved into public corporations. Potter argues, not too convincingly, that the elite cadre in India is accountable to and controlled by non-bureaucratic political institutions.

James Guyot tells how the British control of Burma was less effective; their civil servants were less respected; they brought few benefits and undermined existing institutions that had served the Burmese well. The country was less impoverished, more literate, and more politicized than its neighbors to the west. In World War II the British lost status by fleeing as the Japanese occupied the country. When independence was granted in 1948, all British officers were given notice. The break with the past was abrupt. The indigenous political elite, according to Guyot, "then harassed the Civil Service until both elites were displaced by the Burmese army" which "set out to solve the problem of politics by casting out parliamentary democracy and attempting to establish a totalitarian system. . . ."

By contrast, careful preparation smoothed the transition to independence in Ceylon (related by Sir Charles Collins). After 1937 only Ceylonese were recruited into the Civil Service. Local self government and education were well advanced prior to the formal transfer of power. Robert Kearney explained the recent civil service reforms, trade unionism, and the explosive language controversy in Ceylon.

Robert Tilman's account of bureaucratic development in Malaya describes the rapid "Malayanization" of the services, the peaceful and friendly transfer of power, and the use of Whitley Councils. Malaya is not an "administered" state, "for there are elected and appointed politicians who guide the government just as much as does the bureaucracy."

Merrill Goodall ("Administrative Change in Nepal") describes the frustrations of administrative advisers in a country that was not a part of the British imperial tradition. The monarch and

palace secretariat, supported by the police and the army, constitute the center of power. A separate "government secretariat" and a sizable (and competitive) foreign aid community also play active supporting roles.

As Braibanti admits, no consistent research design was imposed on the writers of this volume. The countries are not given uniform treatment nor are uniform data available. A focus is provided (except for Nepal) by the British ICS elite cadre heritage and the nature of political development since independence. The book is packed with significant data and well footnoted throughout.

Administrative Problems in Pakistan is a modest volume by six American professors—all of whom have served with the Administrative Staff College in Lahore.

Lawrence Ziring focuses on Basic Democracies —the four tiered system of local councils established by President Ayub Khan in 1959. He considers their organization, the lack of real authority at the lower levels where action is needed, the promising rural programs in East Pakistan, the frustrations of the neglected urban dwellers, and the ominous signs that President Ayub may be considering the development of a one party state.

Since the higher bureaucracy plays the dominant role in the Pakistani government and the elected assemblies a "rather inconsequential role," A. Lee Fritschler argues that the bureaucracy should take the initiative in developing procedures that will permit business and other nonbureaucratic groups to participate in the policy formation process.

George Platt examines the major obstacles to a more productive agriculture, among them: the absence of a satisfactory credit or marketing system; the lack of rural education; and the generalist civil service which discriminates against the agricultural expert and whose administrators are shifted too much ever to become committed to any particular agricultural program. Platt describes some of the efforts to overcome these obstacles: Agricultural Development Corporations, the Water and Power Development Authorities, and the Academies for Rural Development. He shares Ziring's enthusiasm for East Pakistan's development centers, but is critical of the lack of imagination and planning in the higher echelons of the agricultural establishment.

West Pakistan today has the largest irrigation works in the world, yet large supplies of both surface and ground water are unused, and salt accretion and waterlogging take 100,000 acres of land out of cultivation each year. Thus the West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority devotes its major energies to irrigation and reclamation. Guthrie Birkhead gives the reader a close and most interesting look at the problems of this new (1959) and thriving public corporation.

For contrast, Raymond Miller focuses on a public corporation that dates from 1886: the Karachi Port Trust. It has been plagued with tradition, inertia, congestion from poor planning, slowdowns and work stoppages, elitism, the absence of middle management, pilferage, village and tribal rivalries among labor groups, and cumbersome procedures. In spite of it all, the Karachi Port Trust has been a fantastically valuable asset for Pakistan and manages to get its work done with comparative efficiency.

Finally, Albert Gorvine suggests that "administrative reform, to be successful, must be associated with a significant political, social, or economic reform which in effect 'cracks the power structure' of the bureaucracy." Citing many examples, he concludes that the Civil Service of Pakistan is still in control, screening out any reforms which might affect it adversely. Gorvine anticipates, however, that political and economic developments will ultimately result in administrative reforms.

Herbert Feldman's *Revolution in Pakistan* is a study of the 44 months of martial law administration (October 1958 to June 1962). Drawing heavily on newspapers and official publications, he considers economic reforms, land reforms, agriculture, reform in the public services and in politics, social reform, Basic Democracies, family laws, foreign policy, relations with India, the Constitution of 1962, and other matters. With so many topics it lacks depth; the author skims hastily over one subject and goes on to the next. It is, nevertheless, useful for one seeking a quick review of the topics mentioned above.

Feldman concludes that President Ayub Khan did not go far enough, that in carrying out his policies he was too conciliatory. The institution of Basic Democracies is described as "premature." The declaration of martial law was really "a simple reversion to paternalism" as practiced by the British a century before.

The first of these three books will appeal to South Asia specialists, all but the avant-garde in comparative government circles, and social scientists who study bureaucratic elites. The second book will interest public administrators with a developmental orientation. The third book is appropriate for the general reader who has a special interest in Pakistan or military rule.—HENRY F. GOODNOW, *University of Colorado.*

India's Roots of Democracy: A Sociological Analysis of Rural India's Experience in Planned Development Since Independence. BY CARL

C. Taylor, Douglas Ensminger, Helen W. Johnson and Jean Joyce. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. xii, 694. $10.00.)

This study of national policy and performance in Indian rural development—only indirectly is it concerned with the basic problem of "grass-roots" perception of such development—begins with eight chapters which constitute an introduction of uneven quality to selected aspects of Indian history and social organization. This section is apparently intended to familiarize the expected audience of "planners and directors of development programmes" (p. viii) with some of the problems and exotic features of Indian society. For anyone familiar with India, most of these chapters are superficial, but the authors do bring together some useful materials on population structure and the economic condition of the Indian people around 1950, when the planning process got underway in India.

One might take specific exception, however, to the book's treatment of caste and the joint family. The authors insist too strongly upon the dysfunctional aspects of Indian social structure for development, but they never make a case based on hard evidence. They generally fail to take into account the flexibility of Indian society and the extent to which the joint family, in particular, has adapted to urban and industrial conditions. Indeed, it appears that joint families have been made *more* viable by the practice of sending younger brothers to work in the city, where they can earn money which can be utilized toward the support of the rest of the family.

The middle ten chapters of the book are considerably more valuable. They set down at some length the aims and accomplishments of planning for rural India in several fields: agricultural practices, land reform, cooperatives, rural industries, local government, education, health, and social services. The authors have a tendency to review these programs uncritically and to accept at face value the declarations of every study team or planning group involved in the development field, but it is useful to have all of these statements gathered in one place. This utility is somewhat flawed for the academic reader, however, by the absence of adequate footnotes.

If the middle section is concrete in its treatment of the values of the planners and their achievements in structuring programs, the final section consisting of nine chapters is disappointing. The authors are unable to come to grips with the problem of motivating the peasant. In their desire to identify themselves as "sociological scientists"—their term—they substitute too many pretentious generalizations drawn from the literature of social psychology for a practical set of ideas about ways of "catalyzing an upward socio-economic cycle" in India. Only in the last chapter, after nearly two hundred pages of pseudo-behavioral insights, do they admit that we still do not know much about the basic motivations of the Indian villager.

In the last section, too, the authors offer some minor prescriptions for changes in the emphases and organization of the rural development program. They advocate more concern with two way communications processes and the development of an administrative structure which can galvanize "team" efforts—in contrast to the present fragmented and over-bureaucratized system of administration. Such suggestions are not novel and do not warrant the muddy prose which precedes them, but they may point to the real problem with this book.

Given the concern of the authors with problems of involving the peasant in the development process, they are notably wary of saying anything meaningful about political life in India. In particular, they pay little attention to the role performed by practicing politicians as agents of social mobilization and upward communication. Like tourists visiting an exhibition of ancient artifacts, the authors are aware of the *formal* features of *panchayati raj*, but they are almost embarrassingly silent about the developmental implications of political conflicts as they manifest themselves at every level of Indian society. Typically, while they dwell at great length on the national goals enunciated in the Five Year Plans, they do not even mention the politics of planning nor do the authors recognize the discreet retreats from earlier policy stands made by national leaders in matters like cooperative farming because of political pressures from below.

The resultant appearance of naivete may, however, reflect the practical position of the authors. They have all been involved with technical assistance programs through various governmental agencies and foundations. Some observers have suggested that Douglas Ensminger's role as Ford Foundation representative in India has given him a very influential place in the planning system; this practical experience is not reflected, unfortunately, in the present study.

The ultimate difficulty is that professional advice-givers are not always in a position to provide valuable insights into how programs really operate. To be politic, it becomes necessary to overlook some obvious defects and to hedge criticisms with a more than equal dose of praise. Because the authors weave an unsteady course between repeating the platitudes of the Indian government and trying to expose to public view some of the real difficulties of administration and

motivation in village India, the product of their effort is often unsatisfying. Until more systematic studies are available connecting national goals to local perceptions and motivations, however, we may still find value in this non-official technical assistance handbook, despite the fact that it too often settles for homily instead of trying to identify the grit of the system.—DONALD B. ROSENTHAL, *State University of New York, Buffalo.*

The Development of an Interest Group: The Philippine Medical Association. By ROBERT STAUFFER. (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 192. P 12.00.)

In view of the importance attached to associational development by such scholars as Almond, Banfield, and others and the general recognition of the urban-rural, national-local, modern-traditional gap in the social and political life of the new states, case studies of interest groups are clearly to be welcomed. Properly chosen and carefully analyzed, such cases can tell us much about the political system of which they are a part and can contribute to a better theoretical understanding of the developmental process. It is with these objectives in mind that Robert Stauffer has conceived this analysis of the Philippine Medical Association. In his words, he has chosen to study a "single Philippine interest group from the point of view of using its changing response to the political community and its developing internal organization as indexes of change in the larger political system" (p. 6).

Stauffer's main findings are divided into two categories: the development of internal PMA organization and the changing patterns of PMA-government relationships. Internally, power is concentrated in the President and Executive Council, with the legislative body, the House of Delegates, serving a primarily legitimizing function. The last two decades have witnessed a considerable diffusion of political power within the PMA, once tightly controlled by government physicians working in Manila but now more broadly representative of private practitioners and provincial doctors as well. The election of leaders is highly competitive and heavily dependent on personal loyalties and alliances, an often-noted characteristic of Filipino political behavior in general. Voting blocs based on institutional loyalties are also numerous (and to some extent overlapping), including Manila vs. the provinces, government vs. private doctors, and University of Santo Tomas vs. University of the Philippines graduates.

In its relationships with elected officials, the PMA has moved away from a reliance on personalistic ties toward more impersonal and formal lobbying techniques. Where a decade ago the PMA relied heavily on its President's influence with the President of the Philippines and on the presence of physicians in Congress, it now makes more extensive use of such formal proceedings as Congressional committee hearings to present its views. The latter method, Stauffer argues, has been somewhat more successful, although the overall record of PMA influence with the President and Congress seems, on the basis of the evidence, to be only fair. In their relationships with administrators, the Association's leaders continue to use, and are very dependent upon, ties of personal friendship, particularly between the PMA President and the Secretary of Health. Stauffer concludes that the PMA in the post-independence era has become a much stronger organization, more influenced in its internal politics by private as opposed to government doctors (and thus more autonomous of the government), more nationally- (as opposed to Manila-) oriented, more systematic and impersonal in its relationships with the government, and more effective in its communications with the public, changes which reflect parallel developments in the political process as a whole.

At least two serious criticisms of the book should be made. The first is methodological, and relates to Stauffer's rather extreme reliance on interviews with present and past PMA officials. Surely for an organization as old and as highly developed as the PMA more quantifiable data, e.g., voting records for the annual national conventions, are available to test his hypotheses. Without such data, much of the argument is inconclusive, most notably the discussion of political blocs and shifting patterns of influence within the organization (Ch. 5, esp. pp. 59–71). A perhaps more fundamental criticism is the "so what" question, that is, what is the relevance of a study of the Philippine Medical Association for a deeper understanding of Philippine politics and/or the problems of associational development in general? In his conclusion, for example, Stauffer asserts that "the fact that the Association has been able to build a national network of provincial chapters suggests that organization skills are developing rapidly in the Philippines . . ." (p. 150). On the contrary, it would seem to this reviewer that medical associations in new states, consisting as they do of highly trained, highly modernized individuals, are likely to be unrepresentative of interest group activity in general. Analysis of such an atypical interest group, while containing useful information and some interesting insights about political leadership in the Philippines, is of only limited utility to the student of political development. What is needed (and what we do not yet have) are more broadly comparative (either within one country or crossnational) in-

terest group studies which can suggest the range and importance of the various types of groups and the conditions under which they do or do not develop. R. WILLIAM LIDDLE, *The Ohio State University.*

Japanese Political Style: An Introduction to the Government and Politics of Modern Japan. BY WARREN M. TSUNEISHI. (New York: Harper's, 1966. Pp. viii, 226. $2.75, paper.)

The sub-title of this short text tells what it is. The title itself indicates Dr. Tsuneishi's approach. In general content and organization this is another addition to the growing set of mini-texts in comparative government, and should be compared with those of Professors Burks, McNelly, and Langdon. What makes Dr. Tsuneishi's work somewhat different is a point of view which becomes explicit only on the last page: " . . . the significance of the Japanese political experience of the past century lies precisely in the fact that apparently contradictory eastern and western approaches to the fundamental problems of government have been harmonized with surprising success. In particular, Japan has been able to adapt western parliamentary democracy to an eastern mold, and she has thus provided a government system capable of dealing successfully with the first problem of politics: the responsible use of power. . . . western democracy need not be copied entire but may be successfully adapted without complete denaturation to accord with national conditions and needs."

Lest this sound too syrupy, it should be noted that Dr. Tsuneishi eulogizes Japan no more than American texts eulogize the United States. Indeed, an outstanding feature of *Japanese Political Style* is its incorporation of the opinions of, and the research being conducted by, Japanese social scientists, especially in the areas of voting behavior, public opinion, and corruption. Nor does Dr. Tsuneishi pursue his conclusion blinkered by a narrow notion of government. His short chapter on "Political Economy" offers the conclusion "that the [financial and industrial] interest groups constitute an organic part of the government mechanism, with the political parties serving as middlemen." (Plural on parties in original.) A case study of the 1960 Security Treaty struggle, a sensitive discussion of the position of the Emperor and popular attitudes toward him, a summary of how the constitutional controversy around Article IX ("no war") became a political issue and was thereby gradually resolved, an examination of the process of Cabinet formation, a brief sketch of the budget-making process, an analysis of the two major parties' internal situation, and other interesting sections supplement—and over-shadow—descriptions of the "functions and powers" of the various organs of government. There is much information here, it is readable, and it is presented fully and honestly enough that a careful reader could even draw conclusions different from those of Dr. Tsuneishi himself (though this reviewer does not).

The major weakness of this book plagues *all* attempts to write textbooks on the government and politics of non-Western nations: we simply do not know enough. Not much can be done about it, in the short run. If one needs a text on Japanese politics, he must be aware that the standards of evidence underlying conclusions reached in any of them are simply not very high.

All this aside, there are still a surprising number of minor factual errors and of highly debatable judgments passed off as fact within these 226 pages. (Fujiyama Aiichiro was not appointed to the Cabinet in the early 1950s, and was not a favorite of ex-Prime Minister Yoshida, contrary to p. 49; all of Japan's best universities are not state operated, contrary to p. 72; participation of the Liberal-Democratic Party in budget policy-making is not "from time to time" and "formal," contrary to p. 85; and so on.) Moreover, although Dr. Tsuneishi's study is more up-to-date than the texts of Burks and McNelly, to say nothing of those by Professors Yanaga or Quigley and Turner, this book has already fallen somewhat behind the rapid pace of political changes in Japan. For example, the *Komeito* (a religiously-based political party with voter support and Diet strength equal to or greater than the Democratic Socialists' today) is dismissed here as a "fringe group." The ruling, Liberal-Democratic Party (which obtained less than one-half of the popular vote in the January, 1967, general elections) is predicted here to remain in power indefinitely, barring some major "catastrophe."

But even with these minor defects, Dr. Tsuneishi has given us a highly readable, informative, sympathetic, and useful introduction to politics and government in Japan.—MICHAEL LEISERSON, *Tokyo.*

Communist China in World Politics. BY HAROLD HINTON. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966. Pp. xiii, 506. $7.50.)

After a decade of intensive cultivation and extensive fertilization by universities, foundations, and governmental agencies, the field of Communist Chinese studies is gradually bearing fruit. It has attracted a rapidly growing body of scholars with impressive linguistic skills and solid training in the various substantive disciplines. They have brought into the field their particular talents and specialized knowledge. They have endeavored in their own way to over-

come the serious difficulties presented by the limited amount of factual information available and to achieve originality in their work. The blooming of empirical theories in the social sciences has enabled some of them to link seemingly unique and superficially insignificant facts about China to basic concepts and generalizations on human behavior developed in the western world. The persistent and energetic search for fresh, detailed, and reliable information through interviews with refugees and in published or reproduced source materials, some not easily obtainable, has made it possible for others to undertake microscopic studies of industrializing, modernizing urban areas or of specialized agencies and activities of the regime.

But whatever the research, the availability of factual information and source material is decisive for its success; and depending on the nature of the subject, skill in examining esoteric communication or "kremlinology" is more or less essential, while the degree of theoretical sophistication in the analysis of the data varies with the preference, interests, and approach of the individual scholar. The limitations imposed by the lack of data, particularly stringent in the study of the foreign policy and political-military strategy of Communist China, can be more easily overcome by scholars associated with government research agencies or government-sponsored research organizations. In such environments, open or classified source materials are more readily available, and the art of analyzing esoteric communication and intelligence research is developed to perfection in day-to-day activities. Thus, they have given us many of the better writings on the foreign policy of Communist China.

This book by Harold Hinton of the Institute of Defense Analyses falls into this category. Its coverage is comprehensive, ranging from a discussion of the roots of Peking's foreign policy to the relations between China and sub-Sahara Africa. A vast body of the best published works on specialized subjects, the major newspapers, research memoranda, memoirs, Peking's and Moscow's official publications, etc., has been consulted and fairly effectively used. Complex historical events are clearly and concisely described; particularly impressive is the chapter on the Sino-Indian border. The volume is evidently the product of a scholar who has followed the events closely over a number of years from the vantage point of Washington. It is an informative general survey which is highly useful as a text or a general reference work both for scholars and laymen.

Hinton relies almost exclusively on the method of "kremlinology." He rejects theories of social and political action as "vague and pretentious." Thus, he deprives himself of the opportunity to adopt an approach which has made the writings on Chinese politics of G. William Skinner, John W. Lewis, Franz Schurmann, Chalmers Johnson, and Ezra Vogel, novel, stimulating, and provocative. Nor does he attempt to provide a broad, general, systematic interpretation of Peking's foreign policy. There is a section on the rise of the Chinese Communist movement, but the significance of this revolutionary experience and strategy of the Chinese Communist Party for understanding Peking's international behavior is not adequately discussed. In a "postscript" chapter dated October 1, 1965, Lin Piao's important article of September 3, 1965, on People's War is not mentioned.

Hinton has striven after originality in his analysis and interpretation rather than after judicious and balanced judgment such as A. Doak Barnett provided in his *Communist China and Asia*. He comes to conclusions, sometimes credible, sometimes merely plausible, and at other times so startling and highly speculative as to stretch one's imagination to the breaking point. In his analysis of the origin of the Korean War, he rightly stresses the North Korean interest in bringing about reunification through full-scale invasion. But in discussing the respective roles of the Soviet Union and Communist China, he argues for an interpretation diametrically opposite to the generally accepted view of Allan S. Whiting in *China Crosses the Yalu* that the Soviet Union played the primary role in planning the attack while China lacked direct responsibility for its initiation or outcome. According to Hinton, it was probably Mao who at the Moscow conference urged a reluctant Stalin to reverse his earlier decision and give the North Koreans the permission and logistical support necessary for a formal invasion. This is a plausible interpretation, but it is offered with less supporting evidence than Whiting's. Less plausible is Hinton's view that after Eisenhower threatened in February, 1953, to extend the war to the Chinese mainland and to use nuclear weapons, Stalin was prepared to take drastic military action of some sort in support of Communist China because he intended a preemptive attack against Yugoslavia (the primary evidence given by Hinton consists of an article in *Pravda* and a *New York Times* report that the Yugoslav government was seeking western collaboration in defense), and that he "was therefore killed on the initiative of elements in Soviet military high command and civilian leadership." Hinton also ventures the theory that Khrushchev decided in 1964 to knock out China's nuclear installations with a missile strike and that his colleagues removed him to prevent him from carry-

ing out his plan. On the basis of these and other interpretations as well as through a series of inferences, he draws the conclusion that "the American containment of the CPR, and in particular the denial of Taiwan to the CPR, has been a major factor . . . in fact in bringing down both Stalin and Khrushchev." Hinton's speculation may turn out to be correct, but a more cautious man would wait for more evidence before formally expounding his views and linking them with American policy. One may perhaps suggest that in the field of scholarship a respect for the limits imposed by the method used and the evidence available is analogous to a recognition of the limits of power in statecraft.

Yet in spite of these lapses, the great bulk of the book is based on a wealth of materials and solid research. It is a valuable contribution to the growing body of literature on Communist China.—TANG TSOU, *University of Chicago.*

Student Nationalism in China, 1927–1937. BY JOHN ISRAEL. (Stanford Cal.: Stanford University Press, 1966. Pp. ix, 253. $7.50.)

The explosive force of student nationalism—most recently seen in the frenetic behavior of Mao's zealous young Red Guards—has had a long, and at times profound, influence on modern China's political development. John Israel's fascinating account of the Chinese student movement in the decade 1927–37 makes a substantial contribution to our understanding of the role of student political activity during this crucial period. It also provides new insight and background for interpreting later developments.

In broad outline, Israel sets out to examine the "changes in the quality of the party-student relationship" over the ten years from Chiang Kai-shek's victorious Northern Expedition, which brought the Kuomintang to power as a national government, to the outbreak of war against Japan in 1937. He asks why these changes occurred and how they affected the course of political history.

Noting the contribution of intellectual discontent—born of nearly a century of imperialist humiliation, ideological bankruptcy, and inept and rapacious warlord rule—to the Kuomintang's triumph in 1927, the present study traces the attempts of the Nanking government to harness and control the volatile, erratic student radicals in its service. It suggests that from the start this task was complicated, if not rendered ultimately impossible, by Chiang Kai-shek's break with the Communists, which brought the Kuomintang under conservative control and deprived it of much revolutionary appeal. "Having turned against the social revolution in April 1927, the Kuomintang had to base its appeal to the younger generation on its reputation as *the* nationalist party of China."

Japanese aggression, beginning with the Mukden Incident in 1931, presented the frail, new Kuomintang regime with a thorny dilemma. It could either attempt to honor its nationalist (i.e., anti-imperialist) reputation by immediate, full-scale armed resistance (for which China was woefully unprepared) or it could try to appease Japan, at least temporarily, while simultaneously striving to build up China's strength and to eliminate the major sources of national disunity—the Communist revolutionaries and dissident warlords. A commitment to the first alternative would have threatened military disaster. However, election of the second was to lead almost inevitably to the alienation of impatient patriotic elements, including much of the younger generation, and to a suppression of the student nationalism which the Kuomintang had once fostered.

From mid-1932 to mid-1935 a combination of circumstances temporarily dampened the fire of student discontent. "Increasingly settled conditions in the economy and education, a temporary lull in Japanese aggression, and the absence of the radical leaders who had been purged by the White Terror" helped keep student political activity in check. However, the Kuomintang did not succeed in winning back the younger generation despite a variety of efforts to inspire and discipline it ranging from the imaginative rural reconstruction program to the New Life Movement, and even the militaristic Regeneration Society (popularly known as the Blueshirts). The immediate consequences of this failure might have been worse had not Communist efforts also been hamstrung by conflicting goals and inopportune tactics.

In the face of renewed Japanese pressures in 1935 and Nanking's continued appearance of humiliating impotence and obsession with Communist-suppression, the latent force of student nationalism burst forth again across the land. The December Ninth Movement of that year saw the beginning of a decisive trend toward the left among student groups. From that time on "Communist techniques shaped raw nationalism into a purposeful political force." In the Sian Incident and subsequent Kuomintang-Communist United Front against Japan the student movement became the pawn of the two dominant political parties, torn apart and purposefully led to serve their particularistic interests. Subsequently, the Kuomintang's failure to provide a sufficient revolutionary appeal and outlet for student nationalism—which had proved to be an increasingly powerful force in mass mobilization—helped pave the way for Mao Tse-tung's victory.

Professor Israel's analysis is both well written

and impressively documented—two qualities not often found in the same volume. Although he modestly describes it as a "pioneering effort" rather than a "definitive" work, *Student Nationalism in China, 1927–37* is the product of nearly a decade of research and thought on the subject. It is solidly based on an investigation of the principal relevant documentary collections in the United States (the Hoover and Harvard libraries in particular), Japan, and Taiwan (including the Kuomintang Archives and the Bureau of Investigation collection). In addition to the written record, important information has been gleaned from interviews—in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and elsewhere—with actual participants in the student demonstrations of the 1920's and '30's. To be sure, as Israel notes, "much information remains hidden in libraries and archives on the Chinese mainland, and in the memories and memoirs of thousands of men there and abroad." However, it is doubtful that access to these sources would significantly alter the validity of the general interpretation, although it undoubtedly would help fill in gaps and clarify details.

Despite his wealth of information, the author has managed, by and large, to produce a crisp, light, and concise narrative. The style is flowing and interest is enhanced by colorful descriptions of key events, such as the violent student attack on Foreign Minister Wang Cheng-t'ing following the Mukden Incident. Recollections of eyewitnesses are often employed to add detail and enrich the content.

Although the analysis is perceptive and generally balanced, this reviewer would question—if not quarrel with—a few points. The account appears to be a bit uneven in its geographic coverage, emphasizing developments in Peiping and Shanghai—admittedly the scene of most of the action—but sometimes, perhaps, neglecting the student role in such places as Canton, Wuhan, Nanking, and Szechuan. Occasionally, inferences are drawn from dubious evidence. For example, one wonders whether a Japanese source published in 1941 is the best evidence that could be found for "anti-Japanese bias" in Chinese educational policy in the early 1930's (p. 49). Discussion of the Communist role in the initial stages of the December Ninth Movement tends to be somewhat rambling and disorganized and the attempt to minimize Communist influence seems overdrawn and less than convincing.

Perhaps stronger exception should be taken to Israel's treatment of Communist tactics under the "United Front from below." It is easy, in hindsight, to condemn the CCP leadership for "inept" action in not immediately adopting a broad united front policy after the Mukden Incident to maximize student appeal. However, this criticism ignores several other important considerations: The Comintern, not the CCP, was ultimately responsible for the policy and the Chinese leadership was not entirely free to deviate from it. Moreover, a fair evaluation of the policy would have to weight the value of student appeal—theoretically maximized by an anti-imperialist "United Front from above"—against the value of peasant appeal—maximized, at the time, by a more exclusive policy of social and economic revolution. The lack of peasant receptivity to the anti-imperialist issue even in the "exposed" province of Hopei is shown to persist as late as January 1936 (pp. 135–37). Given the situation in China before August 1935 (when both the Comintern and CCP shifted to a "United Front from above"), criticism of Communist "militancy and exclusiveness" for failing to maximize student support, as well as the loss of sympathy occasioned by "the Red Army's continued insurrection during a period of foreign aggression" (p. 85), seems both unfair and a distortion of existing priorities. One should not forget that it took a large-scale Japanese invasion of China Proper in 1937 and prolonged occupation of large areas to make anti-imperialism a burning issue for the peasantry. This, in turn, enabled the erstwhile student demonstrators to make use of the experience gained in such operations as the December Ninth Movement to assist the CCP to take over the wartime Border Area governments later called "Liberated Areas." Even after the shift to a broad United Front, the CCP never espoused the "unconditional unity" advocated by one student leader—for which, Israel sadly notes (p. 141), he was expelled from the Party.

It is hoped that these relatively minor criticisms of points in Israel's analysis will not obscure the very substantial overall contribution made by his book. As suggested above, it not only provides new historical insights, but furnishes a valuable background for later developments. Thus, students of today's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution will find some interesting phenomena for comparison and contrast. Take, for example, the experience of the anti-imperialist "rural crusade" launched by student activists from Peiping and Tientsin in the wake of the December Ninth Movement of 1935–1937:

> About five hundred students made the pilgrimage, walking in long columns across the frozen countryside of northern Hopei during the first three weeks of January. . . . Patriotic songs, didactic plays, and impassioned speeches in a babel of dialects filled the air of winter-bound villages. Students distributed an impressive array of propaganda written in simple vernacular. . . . But the North China peasant's traditional suspiciousness and lethargy were not easily overcome.

The villagers proved stubbornly unresponsive and heard the students out in an atmosphere of "frigid curiosity"—a reception perhaps not unlike

that given Mao's Red Guard evangelists in many rural areas during the winter of 1966–67.—WM. F. DORRILL, *The RAND Corporation.*

The Korean Communist Movement 1918–1948. BY DAE-SOOK SUH. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp. xix, 404. $12.50.)

As polycentric tendencies in the communist world become increasingly manifest, more and more scholars turn their attention away from the Soviet Union to other communist nations. The recent declaration of the North Korean regime that it would pursue an independent policy in the face of the Sino-Soviet dispute is another testimony to the existence of a variety of communist nations, whose relations with Moscow and Peking change from time to time. Viewed against this background, Dr. Suh's book, one of the Studies of the East Asian Institute of Columbia University, is a timely effort to illuminate the interplay between domestic and foreign forces in the formation and development of a communist movement.

The main objective of this study is "to demythologize the history of communism in Korea" by challenging the claim of present North Korean leaders that they played a central role in the modern history of their country and that they came to power only after decades of revolutionary struggle under the leadership of Kim Il-sŏng. Suh's approach is basically historical. The book is chronologically divided into five parts, beginning with the origins of the Korean communist movement and ending with Kim Il-sŏng's seizure of power in North Korea. In each part a vast array of hitherto obscure facts are carefully dissected and analyzed to depict the nature, scope, and direction of the communist movement.

Suh shows that the Korean communist movement first originated and developed abroad among Korean immigrants in the Russian Maritime Province and Manchuria following the Bolshevik Revolution. However, the movement quickly degenerated into factional strife between the Irkutsk and Shanghai groups. Failing to achieve unity in spite of the Comintern attempt, both factions soon established their own rival groups in Korea. To further weaken the movement, another group of communists, students returning from Japan, appeared on the scene. These three groups nonetheless participated in the founding of the Korean Communist Party (KCP) in April 1925. Yet they suffered so many defeats that the KCP's autonomy was brought to an end by 1931.

From 1931 to 1945 the communist movement lacked any central leadership or organization. Those communists who remained in the country engaged in only sporadic propaganda activities while Korean communists abroad struggled under the tutelage of foreign communist parties without much accomplishment. Thus, the Korean communist movement from its inception to the eve of the liberation was marked by a series of failures. Throughout the book Suh suggests various reasons for the failures of the old communists: the factional strife; the shortage of funds; the constant change in the organization and leadership; the lack of training in the basic ideological discipline of communism; the strategic blunders; the efficiency of the Japanese police; and the indecision, ineptitude, and ignorance of the Comintern.

The last part of the book focuses on the rise of Kim Il-sŏng in the North following the liberation. Suh evaluates the alleged facts concerning Kim's obscure background to substantiate his thesis that Kim was alien to the old communist movement. Kim's success in seizing and consolidating the power in the North was explained by strategic blunders of the old communists, who were concentrating their post-liberation activities in Seoul only to suffer another, alas the last, defeat. The conclusion of the book is obvious: the failures of the old communists paved the path to power for a new group of communists led by Kim Il-sŏng, who, contrary to their claim, were unrelated to the original communist movement in Korea.

Suh's book is the first major work on Korean communism and, in this reviewer's opinion, will remain a standard work on the subject. It makes an extensive yet careful use of hitherto untapped sources in Japanese, Korean, Chinese, Russian, and English. It clarifies many obscure points on the Korean communist movement, especially on Kim's revolutionary background. It also evaluates the significance of the communist movement from various perspectives: its contribution to the literary and intellectual movement; its role in the national independence movement; and its relationships with foreign elements—the JCP, the CCP, and the Comintern. The unique strength of this work lies in its meticulous research, scholarly detachment, and dispassionate analysis. Many works on Korea by Korean writers, communist or anti-communist, suffer from partisan distortions and exaggerations. Suh's work sets a high standard of scholarship in the field of Korean politics.—SAMUEL S. KIM, *Monmouth College.*

Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America. BY ARTHUR P. WHITAKER AND DAVID C. JORDAN. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1966. Pp. ix, 229. $6.95.)

The study of nationalism, while among the older concerns of traditional political science, has continued to attract attention in recent years, as

witness the contributions of Emerson, Deutsch, and the 1964 publication of Snyder's compilation, *The Dynamics of Nationalism*. Belatedly, students of Latin America are turning to the subject. From 1959 to 1964 a continuing study at the University of Pennsylvania was directed by Arthur P. Whitaker, distinguished dean of Latin American historians. He has co-authored the present volume with Professor Jordan, a participant in the undertaking. The result is stimulating yet disappointing, provocative yet puzzling. Adopting politics as their central theme, "for nationalism is an essentially political concept," the authors first analyze nationalism as a concept and a mobilizing force for change. The first two chapters, primarily the work of Whitaker, present a sketchy summation of earlier comments on nationalism, including the obvious warning that problems of definition are substantial. The reader is asked to be content "with broad and general definitions, such as those given in a dictionary: 'National spirit or aspirations; devotion to the interests of one's nation; desire for national advancement or independence.' "

A dictionary definition for the central theme of a book, I would submit, is inadequate. No one questions the conceptual problems inherent in the definition of any such term, but that does not excuse the authors from making the effort. The absence of a precise statement is rendered more serious by the terminology which subsequently characterizes different manifestations of nationalism. At an early juncture (p. 14) a five-fold classification is preferred, with nationalism being traditional-rural, old bourgeois, new bourgeois, populistic, and Nasserist. Yet this is largely forgotten in later pages, although it might have been fruitful to apply this taxonomy in a systematic fashion during discussions of individual countries. Instead, there is an unending variety of adjectives describing forms of nationalism, including the following: benign or aggressive, nostalgic or dynamic, left wing or right wing, ideological or pragmatic, populist or comprehensive, revolutionary, evolutionary, defensive, restrained and progressive, catholic, polycentric, and canonical. The impression is given that every significant political movement in Latin America is predominantly nationalistic, and that this is the overriding consideration.

It is this, perhaps, which proves the most troublesome implication of the work. For it suggests that there is nothing but nationalistic sentiment in Latin America; while in a broad sense this may be true, it is difficult to concede that nationalism is the *only* meaningful force, and that it must be the central concept in any understanding of the politics of the area. To be sure, nowhere do the authors make this explicit claim, and one individual reading of the volume may have inferred too much. However, there is a definite feeling that one is reading a compendium of Latin American nationalisms—decidedly in the plural—and that there is little else. Nationalism, however defined and whatever its configurations and permutations, is but one of many diverse attitudinal factors in contemporary Latin America. When it is suggested, in the concluding chapter, that the objectives of nationalism include modernization, social justice, independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity, effective occupation of national territory, national unity, and national defense, it can only be wondered what could possibly remain.

If the preceding appears unduly critical, this is in part a function of the expectations with which the volume was approached. Certainly it is a useful and frequently insightful book, but it is far from definitive. The country chapters are sound, while Whitaker's analysis of Argentine nationalisms is brilliant and Jordan is particularly good on Mexico. The description of "defensive nationalism" in the cases of Colombia and Peru is more sanguine than it might be, although knowledgeable. The chapter on "continental nationalism" examines an important set of attitudes which has been too little studied, and the correlation of nationalism with problems of modernization has intuitive wisdom. The book is more useful than Gerhard Masur's recent *Nationalism in Latin America*, especially in analyzing the wide range of nationalisms and their multi-faceted implications. Moreover, the serious student will need to consider the research questions raised by the authors in the final chapter. The political scientist will find this work less suggestive heuristically than the more sociologically-oriented writings of Silvert on the same subject. But despite reservations expressed, there is much insight in the historical analysis of Whitaker and Jordan, and it deserives a careful if critical reading.—JOHN D. MARTZ, *University of North Carolina.*

Elites in Latin America. ED. BY SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET AND ALDO SOLARI. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967. Pp. xii, 531. $9.50.)

Now that the great debate over which is the true motor of history, great men or classes, has dissipated somewhat, the time seems ripe for more detailed and careful consideration of the many insights and hypotheses left by such debate. However, it seems there are great difficulties in carrying the work of these pathbreaking sociologists beyond the point where they left it. These difficulties can be seen more clearly in elite studies than in any others. Social scientists, armed with modern techniques, have been stopped short by the near impossibility of getting more than a

few background characteristics of men occupying "those positions in society which are the summits of key social structures." Perhaps it is because of these difficulties that the term elite has increasingly been used to refer to any leadership position in society, no matter how low this position is in the total pyramid. This being the case, elite analysts have almost naturally drifted toward the consideration of broad issues such as social, economic, and political development. A basic assumption here is that "one of the requisites for development is a competent elite, motivated to modernize their society" (p. viii). Such is the theme of *Elites in Latin America*.

The first chapter, by Lipset, "Values, Education and Entrepreneurship," is a skillful threading of more than 200 relevant pieces of work about elites. What comes out of this bibliographic essay by a seasoned social scientist is in fact a condensed set of hypotheses about the social and political development of Latin America. The basic argument revolves around the controversy of structural versus cultural factors of development. To the favorite examples of the structuralists (South vs. North U. S. and North vs. South Brazil) Lipset brings the case of French vs. English Canada to conclude that " . . . structure and values are clearly interrelated. Structure such as plantation systems combined with a racially based hierarchy is functionally tied to a given set of 'aristocratic values', and antipathetic to an emphasis on achievement, universalism, and hard work. But any value system derived from given sets of historical experience institutionalized in religious systems, family structures, class relations, and education will affect the pace and even direction and content of social and economic change" (p. 12). He then goes on to review specifically the relationship between values and entrepreneurial behavior.

The conclusion of his search is that Latin American entrepreneurs are bound by family particularisms, lack of national interest or institutional development, traditional attitudes toward money, and the like. These values are, of course, powerful limiting factors to economic development in Latin America. However, as one looks toward other key roles in Latin America one realizes that businessmen, "and particularly those involved in large-scale enterprise, tend to be the carriers of modern 'values'." This statement is substantiated by a review of works written about the *pensadores* (intellectuals), educators and other key roles. But since some change has taken place in Latin America a dynamic factor must exist. This factor is the deviants, marginal men such as immigrants who "may be outside of many of the networks of the nation and freer to engage in entrepreneurial activity" (p. 23). Considerable data exist showing that foreigners are obviously over-represented in entrepreneurial positions in many Latin American nations (in contrast to the U. S. or other protestant countries). The problem is, of course, that many of these deviants seem to come from countries which are Catholic, and thus particularistic, ascriptive, and diffuse. Why, then, do these people behave so differently? This question is not adequately answered in the book.

But then, what hope for development has Latin America? Lipset suggests three avenues: nationalism, educational reforms, and social revolution. These avenues, of course, are not mutually exclusive, but the road to be taken will depend on which elite group directs the process. Almost all chapters in the book give, in one way or another, an answer to this question. The answer, unfortunately, is not very optimistic. Cardozo (Ch. 3: "The Industrial Elite") tells us that "the permeability of the traditional dominant classes and the special circumstances in which the industrialization is taking place in Latin America, make it difficult, if not impossible, for industrialists and businessmen to play the same dynamic role that they have sometimes taken up elsewhere . . . " (p. 113). Ratinoff (Ch. 2: "The New Urban Groups: The Middle Classes") persuasively argues that the sort of reforms that the middle sectors are likely to implement have already exhausted their possibilities for spurring basic changes. We are also told that "the so-called *politicos* have less influence within the national political system than their public role indicates" (Scott, Ch. 4: "Political Elites and Political Modernization," p. 120). Horowitz (Ch. 5: "The Military Elites") tells us that the idealistic goals of national salvation and redemption, so dear to Latin American men of arms, are being undermined by U. S. influence in such a way that "the concept of development as an instrument of national interest has given way to development as an instrument of American (U. S.) interest" (p. 175). As for the intellectual, we are told by Bonilla in his penetrating essay (Ch. 7: "Cultural Elites") that he "has by and large never abandoned his middle-class roots. His political rebelliousness and protest, even his acts of insurgency and terror, are forays from a private world of submissiveness to the heavily sentimentalized bourgeois concerns with family life and social decorum as well as material comfort" (p. 249).

The chapters on the university (Ch. 10: Ribeiro: "Universities and Social Development"; Ch. 11, Scherz-Garcia: "Relations Between Public and Private Universities"; Ch. 12, Walker: "Political Socialization in Universities"; and Ch. 13, Soares: "Intellectual Identity and Political Ideology among University Students") show that

there is little hope for change coming from higher learning institutions. The same, though much more clearly shown by the analysis of Gouveia (Ch. 15: "Education and Development: Opinions of Secondary Schoolteachers"), may be said of the ever-expanding (Ch. 14, Solari: "Secondary Education and the Development of Elites") secondary schools which, if anything, help to preserve the traditional-religious, ascriptive, particularistic, and diffuse values that hamper change and development.

The chapter on the workers (Ch. 8, Landsberger: "The Labor Elite: Is it Revolutionary") shows that labor leaders have lost their revolutionary fervor and ideological sensitivity, in favor of more mundane aims. Finally, if it is true that substantial change has taken place in the rural areas as a consequence of peasant movements, it is also true—as Quijano tells us (Ch. 9: "Contemporary Peasant Movements")—that "what seems to be clear is that the future success of peasant movements depends entirely on the success of other forces with similar objectives, that by their own means they are not capable of modifying the national situation and even have difficulty in making short-range reforms work" (p. 334). But as we just saw, there is little hope that the "other forces" will spur change. In contrast, the excellent analysis of Vallier (Ch. 6: "Religious Elites: Differentiations and Developments in Roman Catholics") tells us of the various tendencies within the church and gives at least some hope for change coming from the "pastors" and "pluralists," the growing and more liberal of the priest groups. Ironically, at the end we are left with the thin hope that the only group from which some change is to be expected is—of all the elites! —the Catholic elite, the one which, according to Lipset, is the principal one responsible for the present value system, inadequate for development, of Latin America. What, then, is to be done? This question, of course, cannot be answered by a book such as this, wherein each author isolates a group and, logically, is left bewildered by its impotency. A less fragmented analysis could, perhaps, thread the seeds of change found in each of these groups, and then a more optimistic alternative may emerge.—José A. Silva Michelena, *Centro de Estudios del Desarollo.*

A Village Economy: Land and People of Huecorio. By Michael Belshaw. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. xxiv, 421. $10.00.)

This study of a small rural Mexican community on Lake Pátzcuaro, about three miles from the city of the same name in Central Mexico, is an example of the newly developing "behavioral economics." The author is a professor of economics, but also had considerable training in anthropology. He and his assistants not only consulted statistics collected by governmental and other agencies, but also "went into the field," became acquainted with the people and their situation, and got to know at first hand a considerable range of customs as well as those having to do with the economy. On the other hand, the report does not pretend to be a study of the total culture such as an ethnologist would carry out.

Huecorio in 1962 had a population of 844 primarily dependent upon the cultivation and grazing of an insufficient amount of land. Chicken raising was also important. The average household income was the equivalent of $657, with a range from $173 to $2,092. However, as the author points out, the local buying power of the peso is much higher than its equivalent in the United States; therefore, the dollar equivalents should be multiplied by about three in order to give a realistic idea of living standards. The total amount of land in the community area amounts to 1,426.2 acres, of which only 914.6 acres are arable —slightly more than one acre per person.

Politically the community is a part of the municipality of Pátzcuaro and a local chief and four ward chiefs are elected in Huecorio itself. However, various ostensibly nonpolitical organizations and individuals exert a good deal of influence.

Although the Mexican government has offered the Huecorio people land in other parts of the country, up to the time of the study they had not accepted it and did "not want to leave home." A few men have worked in the United States as *braceros* in order to earn money, but apparently most would not care to live permanently in our country, not because of ill treatment here, but because the customs are different. Nonetheless, the people are entering the modern world. About 85% of male adults are literate and about 63% of the females. The older social stratification has mostly melted away and wants for better housing, sanitation, and manufactured consumers' goods are increasing.

The author has the opinion that the community should not be part of the municipality of Pátzcuaro, but should have paid officials and a decision-making body of its own. Thus, leadership which is now shunned could develop.

The book is an interesting attempt to collect and analyze data on economics of a type not familiar to most economists of modern countries. It could have been improved if the author had given at the start a comprehensive sociocultural sketch of the community and its people. Those familiar with the region know that most of the people are probably Indians or at least have some Indian ancestry. But the reader is not told this; are there any mestizos or mixed-bloods? What

survivals of aboriginal economics are there? Much work is on a family basis, but what is the typical family like? And so on. I am afraid that many readers will have trouble visualizing these people whose economics the author has so skillfully dug up and analyzed.—JOHN P. GILLIN, *University of Pittsburgh.*

Political Parties and Political Development. ED BY JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA AND MYRON WEINER. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 487. $8.50.)

The editors introduce this collection with the conviction that "parties are the outgrowth of a development process" as well as that parties are "an independent institutional force affecting political development itself", and a "hope that the following discussions will help to clarify" both phenomena. Over 400 pages later they conclude: "we do not know yet which types of parties or party systems will prove capable of dealing with the central tasks or crises of political development . . . ."

Despite this somewhat pessimistic conclusion, reflecting the frustrations of the discipline at the results of developmental-comparative research, this volume should be judged by the twelve scholarly contributions which make up the heart of the book. Each author attempts to deal with the two theoretical convictions with which the editors introduce the work. And since they have free play to present their own interpretations about particular societies, interesting insights, new formulations, even specific hypotheses emerge which can only enrich research designs which in the future will get down to the serious work of empirical exploration and verification.

Each chapter is a unique interpretive effort, valuable because the author has summarized his own perspectives on the central questions of the volume. Hans Daalder seeks to discover generalizations relevant to the emergence of parties in Europe, which he says at the outset is "an exercise in the impossible." Nevertheless, he writes a highly suggestive paper in which he weaves together the different elite settings, the different patterns of socio-economic change and cleavage, and the different cultural traditions as explanations for the emergence of parties assuming different roles with different degrees of "permeation" of the society. William Chambers restates his now familiar theory of the factors associated with the rise of American parties in the 1790's, specifying what seem to him to be the conditions in American political development which explain the appearance of our pragmatic and accommodationist early parties, which brought new order to our government. The article by the late Morton Grodzins disputes Chamber's theory in part, maintaining that "the parties were primarily vehicles through which other moderating factors made themselves felt." Our parties accentuate conflict, rather than resolve it, he contends. Dankwart Rustow writes a fascinating piece on Turkey's unique party development, using the concept of "rhythm of diastole and systole, of expansion and contraction" as a framework for his discussion. Giovanni Sartori presents a new taxonomic approach to party systems and then develops a theory of the "mechanical tendencies" of systems which are "multipolar, polarized and centrifugal," using the Italian case as an example. It is a tightly-reasoned model of the consequences of such a center-based system with anti-system parties maintaining a significant and irresponsible oppositionist status within the system. His discussion of the meaning of "peripheral turnover" and his argument for manipulative control and revision of such a system are intriguing. He feels that "the developmental role of Western parties is a comparatively minor one . . . ."

The article of the late Otto Kirchheimer is probably most useful for its theoretical exploration of the changing characteristics of the old bourgeois and mass integration parties in Europe primarily after World War II. The forces leading to the phenomenon of the "catch all party" in Europe recently are emphasized. Immanuel Wallerstein discusses the decline and transformation of the party in single-party African states, identifying three stages in this decline, and indicating that ideological specificity, national isolation, and the organizational recruitment and mobilization strategies of the parties are critical. Leonard Binder's discussion of Egypt narrates the factors explaining the successive emergence of the Liberation Rally, the National Union, and the Socialist Union and the purposes and strategies of the power elite in permitting or ordering their creation. Empirical evidence is presented to demonstrate the achievement of elite objectives. Stein Rokkan has a very enlightening article in which he shows by reference to the analysis being done in Norway how one can document a variety of phenomena, such as the spread of partisan competitiveness over time from the central to the peripheral localities, as well as the levels of class polarization by region and community. His presentation is particularly useful for those interested in developing paradigms for cross national analysis.

While Rupert Emerson asserts that parties are vital as agencies for political socialization in Africa, he points to the divisiveness of tribalism, the disjunction between government and party (the former created by colonial regimes and the latter created by indigenous nationalists) and the obstacles to national consensus as major im-

pediments to the development of competitive party systems. Turning to Latin America, Robert Scott develops the thesis that the environmental conditions and crisis patterns in these less developed countries are such that a type of party structure has emerged—a "personalistic following" "not intimately related to public power"—which cannot perform the critical integrative functions which need to be performed. He concludes that the function of Latin America's party system in the developmental process "is largely negative." Finally, Lucien Pye discusses Asian party systems and poses the basic dilemma for these societies—"they can neither get along well without parties nor work well with them." He presents an incisive analysis of the environmental factors inhibiting the development of modern competitive *party systems* while encouraging the formation of *parties* with their own operational styles.

No student of comparative parties should overlook this book. True, the articles are special studies and not really additive theoretically. One even gets the feeling that the "party" phenomena examined are structurally and functionally so different that we are comparing "peanuts and apples." True also that the concepts utilized are often unclear and the operationalization of key variables left to the imagination of the reader. There is no systematic empirical analysis attempted. Finally, the authors do not even agree that parties are central to the development process or that a comparative study with this orientation is feasible. Nevertheless, for those committed to a study of the relevance or irrelevance of systemic or cultural conditions for understanding party behavior, these contributions are significant theoretical starting points. In addition, the editors have discussed the four key development crises at length and presented a new party typology, which subsequently some day may provide the foundations for a useful model for analysis.—SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD, *University of Michigan.*

Dreams and Deeds: Achievement Motivation in Nigeria. BY ROBERT A. LEVINE WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF EUGENE STRANGMAN AND LEONARD UNTERBERGER. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966. Pp. 123. $3.95.)

The title of this book suggests a large dose of Freud and a whiff of McClelland. The study, in fact, does not use psychoanalytic techniques, but it does borrow heavily from David C. McClelland in both theory and method.

The authors present a comparative analysis of achievement motivation amongst Nigeria's three major tribal groups: the Ibo, Yoruba, and Hausa. They focus on the status mobility system as the first independent variable in a causal chain which results in the molding of personality characteristics including achievement motivation. According to their analysis, the status mobility system of the Hausa rewards loyalty and obedience to highborn persons who may become powerful office holders. The mobility system of the Ibo rewards people who make money and encourages "enterprise, diligence and independent efforts on a man's own behalf." The status mobility system of the Yoruba encourages both sets of characteristics, but to a lesser degree. From the differences in the mobility systems, the authors predict that the largest proportion of individuals with high achievement motivation will occur among the Ibo the lowest among the Hausa, with the Yoruba in between. Their predictions are supported by research which includes a content analysis of written reports of dreams made by school boys in the fifth and sixth forms, and adult responses to questions on a survey conducted by Lloyd A. Free.

The book is short and deals with a limited topic, but it is a model of excellent reporting on research. Rather than simply presenting a theory and testing it, the authors systematically evaluate a wide range of rival theories which might also explain their findings. In the same spirit, they use several sources of data quite different from their own, arguing that if the same results emerge from many different methods, the findings must be accurate. The high quality of reporting is, however, marred by inadequate proofreading. Usually the errors are trivial, but on page 58, 50 is divided into 20 to yield 35% rather than 40%. If the error is in calculation, not in reporting the raw figures, the authors' discussion of the table is in error, though not seriously.

A more substantitive criticism involves what appears to be conceptual confusion regarding the variable "achievement motivation." Borrowing from McClelland, the authors define *n* Achievement as "a latent disposition to compete with a standard of excellence." Yet the assumption is made that *n* Achievement is a "dimension inconsistent with strong obedience values," and "closely linked to self-reliance and individualism as personal attributes." This assumption is raised to the status of an operational definition of achievement aspiration when, in establishing coding categories for their second content analysis, the authors specify self-reliance as part of the criteria for identifying "Achievement Motifs."

Findings presented by the authors demonstrate that in Nigeria groups high on obedience values are low on self-reliance and low on *n* Achievement. Their assumptions are thus supported in their case study as well as in earlier studies. Yet we would probably find that in communist countries achievement values and obedience values occur

together frequently, and that in traditional nomadic cultures many individuals combine high self-reliance with low achievement motivation. With a strong argument remaining for logical and empirical distinctions among *n* Achievement, obedience and self-reliance, it seems premature to merge them into one concept in either theory or method. In this study, the merger does little harm. This reviewer turns purist only because we need a body of country and area studies to build comprehensive and valid comparative theories. Therefore, authors capable of executing studies as good as this one should be especially careful to employ variable definitions which are applicable to all existing social systems.—TRUDI MILLER LUCAS, *State University of New York at Buffalo.*

African Law: Adaptation and Development. EDITED BY LEO AND HILDA KUPER. (University of California Press, 1966. Pp. viii, 275. $7.50.)

Even the best revolutions have to come to an end, and as the initial enthusiasm and revolutionary fervor fade, the energies and imaginations of its new leadership must turn to confront the need for order and stability. The editors of this volume have characterized the problems confronting the newly independent States of Africa as "adaptation and development"—the inevitability of modernization in Africa and the increasing irrelevancy of much of the past which is its inexorable concomitant. Thus Professor Anthony Allott describes the impact of the search for the "Africanization" of court procedures in terms of the paradox that:

> It now seems to be taken for granted that African courts, and the African style of adjudication, are to disappear from Africa (p. 231).

Prof. Allott's essay on "The Future of African Law" is by far the most valuable treatment of the specifically legal concerns of post-independence Africa. It is to be regretted that he did not, in his concise review of the problems and areas of policy conflict necessitating decision, explore the growth of African constitutional ideas and principles. This aside, however, his treatment of the problems for decision in terms of the polarity of modernity and tradition, is in sharp contrast to the stress on the past pervasive throughout the book.

One of the conceptual frameworks within which policy decisions can be made by the new African leadership is obviously in terms of the polarity between modernity and tradition. Pragmatically viewed, the problem is reduced to a question of design. The problem for decision is whether the structure of government of the future will be molded in the forms of the past, or whether the shapes of the past are irrelevant to the decision process of the future. While this approach does not explain everything, it does provide an opportunity for the decision-makers of today to evaluate and express their assumptions towards African history, and how much it symbolizes for the future of Africa.

One of the less contentious yet significant areas of decision lies in the realm of judicial function of the State. As Professor Allott points out, the new governments in Africa have three tasks, to 1) modernize their legal systems in line with current economic and social needs, 2) unify their legal systems, 3) Africanize their legal systems. Whether these goals are potentially conflicting or can be reconciled is a matter for resolution, presumably on a trial and error basis, by each state. In any event, the purpose of the essays collected in this volume is to focus on the problems for resolution, and the complexities confronting decisionmakers. The value of the essays, then, must be determined, both in terms of their utility for decision-makers and in terms of the depth of the conceptual framework for grappling with complexities which they disclose. Unfortunately, while there are exceptions, notably Prof. Gluckman's polished analysis of the concept of the "reasonable man" in Barotse Jurisprudence, and "Land Law in the Making," by Philip and Iona Mayer, many of the essays reveal too heavy an investment in the past to be of great guidance to the scholar or administrator concerned with the present. Anyone in search of elucidation concerning the nature of the legal problems and techniques developed for their resolution in Africa since independence, will have to look elsewhere.

The stress on "law" and society creates the suspicion that, to the Editors at any rate, society adapts to law as much as law adapts to society. There is no other way to understand the remark of the Editors, Professors Leo and Hilda Kuper, that:

> Further difficulties in assessing the consequences of a theory of law arise from the complex relations between a theory of law and its practise. According to Anderson, it is impossible to discuss Islamic law, in any context, with clarity or precision without making a clearcut distinction between a theory of law and its theological concepts, on the one hand, and the realities of that law, as it has evolved in history and is administered in practise on the other. "The theory is rigid, monolithic, uncompromising; the facts are often much more flexible, syncretic, and equivocal" (p. 14).

The only response to this would be to suggest that *a priori* theories of law be discarded—compelling an attempt to develop a theory more relevant to perceived reality, and more descriptive of the system as it operates. The literature of legal realism has accomplished much in the past thirty years, and the lessons of the Realists are crucial to an understanding of the nature and function of law in society. The failure of too many

of the essays to reveal any overall understanding of the function of law, its limitations, and the complexities and problems which must be taken into consideration during an arduous process of adaptation, constitute acute limitations on its value as a manual for reformers.

In conclusion, the stress on Africanization, at the expense of modernization, leaves an overall impression of the contributors looking back to a time rapidly passing into memory rather than undertaking to solve problems of more immediate currency.—MICHAEL KATZ, *University of North Carolina Law School.*

The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa. The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873–1964. BY ROBERT I. ROTBERG. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. Pp. xviii, 362. $8.75.)

Dr. Rotberg's book is not what its title implies; it neither analyzes the growth of nationalism in, nor narrates the history of, Malawi and Zambia. Rather, it lists in chronological sequence a series of incidents which occurred in those two former British colonies and which revealed African dissatisfaction with white rule. To this extent, it is consistently interesting for those with no knowledge of the two countries, while offering a certain amount of new data not to be found in the books and articles of Gann, Shepperson, Hall, and Van Velsen.

Future scholars will therefore find in Rotberg assorted useful information to help them account for the rise of nationalism in Central Africa. Rotberg himself, however, only minimally illuminates this process. His book gives no indication that he has considered the problem of social change; there is no conceptual framework within which isolated protest movements are shown to be related to each other, and to the ultimate emergence of an organized nationalist political party. Indeed, the lack of any methodological technique is unmistakeably signalled in his failure even to define the concept of nationalism. He means by this term, he says, "a redress of grievances" (p. 2)—no more, no less.

Similarly, there is little indication that Rotberg has heeded Gluckman's warning that, "Unless the historian knows something of tribal politics and organization, he cannot even evaluate the records left by travellers, missionaries and others." Rotberg's bibliography conspicuously excludes most of the indispenasble monographs written by social anthropoligists for the Institute for Social Research (formerly Rhodes-Livingstone Institute) over the last three decades.

Unaware of or uninterested in tribal structures and politics, Rotberg fails to account for the varied responses by different tribes to early white missionaries, commercial agents, and administrators. Lacking a framework by which to determine which manifestations of anti-white sentiment may legitimately be included in a book on the phenomenon of nationalism, he was free to include in or exclude from it such episodes as he fancied. Rotberg thus offers some fascinating material on religious expressions of black dissatisfaction with white rule. But he does not explain why certain peoples were more susceptible than others to such forms of protest; he does not explain the relationship of messianic cults to the mainstream of political nationalism; and he does not explain why he excludes such obviously critical political-religious movements as Alice Lenshina's Lumpa Church. For the Lumpa sect, he directs us to an article he has written elsewhere (p. 273), but he fails even to summarize its role in the development of African political self-consciousness.

Moreover, while Rotberg's whims lead him to edify us with such dubiously relevant data as Livingstone's explorations in Central Africa and Dr. Banda's grades when he graduated from a Tennessee medical college, they lead him to ignore almost totally the critical role of trade unions in the drive toward self-government in Northern Rhodesia. Without the active cooperation of the African Mine Workers Union on the Copperbelt, U.N.I.P.'s campaign for independence would have followed a very different course. Yet there was no trade union movement at all in Nyasaland, but the Malawi Congress Party achieved power before U.N.I.P. did. Here, Northern Rhodesian white settlers and mineworkers, about whom Rotberg does write, were clearly a crucial factor in tempering the influence of the African trade unions. But so, surely, were the vastly powerful mining concerns which, quite extraordinarily, are never mentioned at all.

Under Dr. Banda, independent Malawi has been transformed into Africa's closest equivalent of a Latin American banana republic, while Zambia, under the humane and decent Kenneth Kaunda, remains an economic colony of the copper companies, the aim of his government being merely the Africanization of colonial structures. It is Rotberg's quintessential failure that these developments were wholly predictable before independence, yet no one could deduce as much from his book.—GERALD L. CAPLAN, *School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.*

South Africa, A Study in Conflict. BY T. L. VAN DEN BERGHE. (Middleton, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1965. Pp. x., 371. $8.95.)

South Africa is a country which defies easy placement within the analytic categories commonly used in American social science. Its politi-

cal system, while not unique, is a curious amalgam, with a white settlers' democracy (involving some 20% of the population) ruling as a colonial power over the rest of the population. Economically, it is "at once an underdeveloped colonial area and an industrial power." It is a highly stratified society based on four colour castes within which both objective and subjective characteristics of class differ markedly. Despite the rigidity of the stratification system the society is acutely conflict ridden since three of the four colour castes regard the stratification system as illegitimate. Conflict is the key to both the descriptive and theoretical understanding of the South African situation. It is the great merit of this excellent study by van den Berghe that it provides for the first time a tightly organized conceptual framework for handling the mass of descriptive material available on South Africa. It is, in fact, the first systematic, sociological study of the South African social and political system.

This is not its only merit. The study provides a wealth of comment, directly pertinent to the problems of comparative analysis. It is particularly important in pointing to some of the limitations involved in the comparative application of the structural-functional approach. The crucial question that South Africa poses for the functionalist model of society is, as van den Berghe points out, how is it possible for a society in a state of "acute disequilibrium to continue to exist for long periods without showing any tendency towards adaptive change"? He suggests that the functionalist model of society as characterized by a high degree of "integration, normative consensus and equilibrium" needs considerable modification since the South African case shows that a society can exist despite a very high degree of tension and disequilibrium.

South Africa is a clear-cut exception to the functionalist prerequisite of value consensus as a crucial source of social integration and maintenance. In the South African case maintenance and integration of the society depends on "political coercion and economic inter-dependenec." To call the latter functional equivalents of consensus would reduce the term to meaninglessness.

Nor is it possible in the South African case to speak of a "dominant" as opposed to a "deviant" sub-culture. These concepts, van den Berghe argues, do not apply to the pluralist society (one which is "compartmentalized into quasi-independent sub-systems each of which has a set of homologous institutions and only specific points of contact with the others") which we find in South Africa. This is a different and perhaps more efficient use of the term pluralism which is usually applied to de Tocqueville's description of a society based on value consensus within a framework in which different interests compete and bargain. South Africa as an example of a pluralist society is "low both on 'mechanical' and 'organic' solidarity": the country has neither the "organic solidarity of complementary parts nor the mechanical solidarity of self-sufficient parts united by adherence to a common system of values and norms."

What, then, makes this society hang together? Van den Berghe lays stress on the tremendous dependence on the white economy of the Africans at starvation or near starvation level. Whatever integration there is takes place at the level of the economic division of labour.

This is not to say that structural-functional analysis is irrelevant to the South African case. Once one has analyzed the pluralistic features of the society and eliminated the need for consensus as a prerequisite for the maintenance of the society, and once one has also eliminated the notion of a tendency towards "equilibrium" in the society, functional analysis, particularly as dealt with by Merton, remains useful.

Van den Berghe's discussion of the "South African Dilemma," which he contrasts with Myrdal's analysis of "The American Dilemma," is a particularly fruitful application of functional analysis. The white group in South Africa is also beset by internal value conflicts. There is in the white-value framework a strong attachment to "frontier individualism, egalitarianism and love of freedom (or, at least, impatience with authority in the Africana ideology)." There is, also, "the nineteenth century British ideology of individualism, liberalism, democracy and fair-play, together with Christian values, which contributed to shaping the outlook of English South Africans." However, white racialism conflicts with these values. Since, however, racial prejudice is "functionally necessary to his (the white South African's) self respect and ego integrity," the whites resolved this dilemma not by dispensing with either set of values but by delimiting their applicability. The discriminatory applies to the non-whites and the egalitarian applies to the whites. This moral schizophrenia is ably documented by van den Berghe.

The central focus of the study is naturally the conflict between and within the colour-castes which have both integrative and disintegrative effects. In this respect van den Berghe's work complements theoretical studies of conflict such as those by Simmel and Coser. The degree to which conflict binds the antagonists is of crucial importance in South Africa. While the effects of conflict *between* the white and non-white colour castes are having the obvious effect of increasing solidarity *within* the castes (thus, for instance,

resulting in greater solidarity among the Africans and a greater acceptance by them of the doctrines of black racialism), it is perhaps more important to focus on the links established between the castes by the fact of conflict. Conflict implies relationship and interaction and thus provides linkages between groups which may either decrease or increase antagonism and tension. Conflict then becomes the focus for the understanding not only of perceptions and motivations but also of forms of associations and institutions and the patterns of norms and values developed within a conflict society.

Van den Berghe's major contribution from a theoretical standpoint is his ability to link conflict quite comfortably to the functionalist and pluralist frameworks of analysis. He does this by astutely combining analysis in terms of consequence with analysis making use of the Hegelian-Marxian notion that change is "an internally generated process of conflict and contradiction between opposites." (Van den Berghe sees this as a useful analytical tool, not as a positive description of reality.) This permits him to avoid any tendency to view coercion as a source of equilibrium and stabilization. Instead, it makes him sensitive to patterns of action and reaction which are constantly at work even within a society which seems on the surface stable and unchangeable.—MAGNUS GUNTHER, *York University.*

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

International Financial Aid. By WOLFGANG C. FRIEDMANN, GEORGE KALMANOFF, AND ROBERT F. MEAGHER. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. xiv, 498. $13.75.)

Aid for Development: An Economic Study. By H. J. P. ARNOLD. (Chester Springs, Pa.: Dufour Editions, 1966. Pp. 256. $5.00.)

These two books conform nicely to popular stereotypes of American and British social science. The first volume is the product of prolonged teamwork by scholars working on a Columbia University Law School project with the assistance of a number of scholars in other countries; the second is the handiwork of an individual writer, working largely alone. The Americans made considerable use of field studies in the underdeveloped countries, as well as official and unofficial sources in the donor countries; the British writer depended upon a relatively smaller number of sources published for the most part in Great Britain, and on selected interviews in the United States and Europe. There is a much greater solidity to the economic data presented in the American volume, whereas its English counterpart displays the somewhat greater flexibility that an essentially personal project provides. In comprehensiveness, as well as length, the American volume offers much more to the reader, but it is also somewhat more forbidding in the manner of its presentation.

Friedmann and his associates have prepared something approaching an encyclopedia of economic aid. They carefully present and differentiate the range and extent of aid offered through national, multilateral, and private sources. The book is especially valuable for its freedom from conventional sources and ideas, and its attention to such new developments as international consortia and other multilateral activities and procedures. Although the work is essentially an economic analysis, it considers political and social factors as well, at least as obstacles to progress. In the selected country studies, these issues are treated quite differently, however, Mr. Meagher's discussions of Senegal, Sudan, India, and Thailand being somewhat more concerned than the other sections with political and administrative considerations. The country studies are supplemented by case histories of loan projects of various types, of which the best and most comprehensive is an examination of highway programs in Thailand. The volume also pays some attention to technical assistance, favoring a broad conception of the role of technology in development, and urging the need for improving the processes involved, without giving any precise suggestions as to how this end might be accomplished. The principal weakness of this book is the absence of a comprehensive or systematic effort to treat noneconomic factors in development assistance.

Arnold's book is the work of an enthusiast, resembling a Victorian clergyman's writing about antiquarian finds: generally competent and informative but essentially descriptive. Like the American book, it makes a serious effort to provide up-to-date figures about the dimensions of aid offered by Western donors, China, the Soviet Union, the Eastern bloc, international organizations, and private agencies. It supplements the author's 1959 study by introducing new facts, largely in the original context. Unfortunately the most useful parts of the book are precisely those most likely to become dated, apart from a good discussion of the equal irrelevance of Western, Soviet, Chinese, and Japanese experience in approaching the problems of the underdeveloped countries (pp. 26–32).

Perhaps the greatest weakness in the presentation arises from Mr. Arnold's search for ideology; although he never quite finds it in the air pro-

grams of either East or West, he persists in believing in its existence. Thus the "bloc" appears as a unity, especially in its contrast with the generosity and long-range perspectives of the West. Arnold interprets both Soviet and Chinese activity in much more ideological terms, for example, than does Marshall Goldman in his analytical study, *Soviet Foreign Aid*. The French aid program is also made to appear ideological, even when, as Arnold believes, the French are seeking to reduce the erstwhile colonial dependence on the "French way of doing things," a conclusion for which he offers no evidence (p. 104). But the most unfortunate consequences of his ideological assumptions are in the description of American aid, which he interprets as being essentially a cold-war effort. Other political and diplomatic purposes of U. S. aid are grouped together as "humanitarian" and dismissed as relatively unimportant. This interpretation is understandable, given the author's dependence on the Kennedy administration's interpretations, the Clay Committee's unfortunate rationale of 1962, and the arguments presented annually for Congressional delectation. Thus he sees a great change in U. S. aid policies with the coming of the Kennedy administration, which he believes reorganized the Agency for International Development in order "to make it easy for the leaders of the less developed countries to pursue the correct channels of approach in seeking U. S. assistance" (p. 73). He finds reassuring the supposedly newly-found U. S. patience in waiting out the Communist initiatives in Tanzania, even suggesting (p. 11) that a few years earlier the U. S. would "doubtless have shown its concern by rushing in with promises of increased aid." A few years earlier, in fact, the United States had displayed almost identical degrees of patience in Ghana and Guinea, where Communist aid initiatives were not greeted by competitive giving from Washington.

Mr. Arnold offers few recommendations that are not generally accepted by students and practitioners of foreign aid. Similarly, the recommendations and conclusions offered by Friedmann and his colleagues contain few surprises, although they are often in sharp contrast with recent developments in the United States. The authors call for more grant-like aid, more attention to technical assistance broadly conceived, a less doctrinaire approach to private enterprise, and the "untying" of aid from donor country purchases. The reliance on cold-war ideology as a rationale for aid comes in for well-deserved criticism in both volumes, as does the recent decline in effort in the U. S. and other industrialized countries.

None of the economic conclusions in either volume is startling. The authors cannot be faulted for this fact. They rightly argue that continuity, not novelty, and persistence, not dogmatism, are the necessary components for success in stimulating economic development. But neither of these volumes reaches far enough beyond the economics of foreign aid to provide much insight into its present inadequacy.—JOHN D. MONTGOMERY, *Harvard University*.

Foreign Aid in International Politics. By JOHN D. MONTGOMERY. (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967. Pp. 118 $4.50, cloth; $1.95, paper.)

Un Administration of Economic and Social Programs. ED. BY GERARD J. MANGONE. (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1966. Pp. xiii, 291. $6.95.)

Not so long ago it was generally assumed that the states which emerged from former colonial territories were intrinsically viable. Whatever doubts may have existed were promptly overwhelmed by the heady enthusiasm of new-found independence. The last decade, however, taught a bitter, contrary lesson. While the international boundaries of new states remained on the whole stable, their political systems demonstrated a singular lack of long term persistence. Unrest, riots, coups, even revolutions have apparently become endemic to political processes in most of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, demonstrating regularly and dramatically that the capacities of political control are severely limited while political demands are formidable and accelerate rapidly. It should be clear by now that the viability of most independent states depends significantly upon external inputs. In any case both Professors Montgomery and Mangone must endorse this conclusion, for their recent works share this focus.

John Montgomery's *Foreign Aid in International Politics*, part of Prentice-Hall's "America's Role in World Affairs Series," is apparently designed to be a clear and definitive but introductory statement. Accordingly, he organizes his presentation by positing three "roles" for our external assistance program. *Diplomatic Aid* serves to create and perpetuate an American presence in other regions; *compensatory aid* repays past favors and sustains current privileges; and *strategic aid* stimulates those conditions which are favorable to a world order and at the same time enhance the security of the United States.

In order to carry out these foreign policy objectives, the United States government relies on three major instruments: the transfer of capital resources, the training of indigenous human resources, and the support of nation-building. These instruments in turn are integrated into alternative

tactics. The tactics of stability are inputs which stimulate the forces of order within a country, the tactics of development are designed to accelerate economic growth, and the tactics of reform concentrate on programs and projects which "involve the effort to influence the direction of change, either by introducing reforms or by discouraging tendencies considered harmful to the purposes of the aid program." The concluding portions of the book are addressed to the problems of assessment and suggest discernible trends.

Central to the entire presentation is the conclusion that "the elements of possible success in foreign aid may be classified according to purposes even if they cannot always be precisely measured." Here indeed lies the problem. The troubling fact remains that, when applied to specific newly independent states, these "purposes" may actually be contradictory. For instance, short term diplomatic advantages to the U. S., while actually legitimate objectives of national policy, may undermine the precarious viability of the recipient's political system, and thus be dysfunctional to the strategic goals of foreign aid. Professor Montgomery freely concedes this. Unfortunately, this is not quite enough. We simply cannot leave it at that and still claim that an evaluation of the program is meaningful, let alone significant. The United States does not have unlimited resources, and, even if it did, the exigencies of domestic politics would not permit unrestrained external transfer. Foreign aid must necessarily operate under market conditions where supply is extremely scarce and demand nearly insatiable. Thus priorities are imperative. Somehow, somewhere, in the State Department, or at universities, we must develop a calculus which reveals with some accuracy the comparative price a recipient must pay in the viability of its political system for its support of the United States in the councils of nations, for granting military bases, or for entering into formal treaty relationships. In turn we must develop a hierarchy of goals which reveals just how important political stability and international order are to American national interest.

Turning to the trends in our foreign aid program, the author observes that recent years have witnessed the emergence of new rationales: "development of new forms of aid and . . . tightening standards of fiscal management." This is perfectly true. Yet what seems more significant, at least to this reviewer, is that after all these years *political* marginal analysis has made so little progress and we are still evaluating the program in terms of such *economic* indicators as increments in gross national product, growth in industrial capacity, or marginal rates of saving. Given the political character of goals posited by Professor Montgomery, the improvements made still seem to miss the point.

Whereas Professor Montgomery's primary concern is American foreign aid, Gerard Mangone had edited a book which concentrates on the technical assistance programs of the United Nations and its affiliates. Specific contributions focus upon the role of the Secretariat, the Economic and Social Council, the General Assembly, the Regional Economic Commissions, and the Resident Representative. The studies show clearly that it has become extremely difficult to evolve an overall rational program when so many entities are now participating in the process. The rivalries among the United Nations and Specialized Agencies, the desires of developing states to decide for themselves what assistance they want, the reluctance of the donor nations to release funds without retaining a considerable say in the allocation of these resources, the growing pressure from regional commissions for an increased role, all add up to confusion. Techniques, agencies, and institutions have been created and adapted pragmatically and with varying degrees of success.

Each contribution is limited to the internal process of coordination. Only the chapter on the Resident Representative considers in some detail the relationship to the governments of member states. None devotes major attention to the problems of coordination between the various levels of program administration. This does not impair the competence of the studies—they are indeed careful and thorough efforts. It does, however, in my view, detract from their significance. More important, these studies avoid the more perplexing normative problems. To be sure, a clear statement of tables of organization and operating procedures is of some help in understanding the administration of a program. Yet a most crucial question of international technical assistance is whether the criteria for such an effort should be *world* health, *international* labor, and *human* welfare or alternatively it should be designed to fit neatly into the specific national priorities of the recipients. And, clearly, the most fundamental question of international cooperation remains whether the emergence of viable and self-conscious nation states is after all functional to its objectives.—ALEXINE L. ATHERTON, *University of Pennsylvania.*

The Challenge of Foreign Aid: Policies, Problems, and Possibilities. By JACOB J. KAPLAN. (New York, Washington, and London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp. xxviii, 405. $8.50.)

When an ex-bureaucrat decides to write a book, he is usually well advised to stick to what he knows best—personal experiences, anecdotes,

the worm's-eye view of day-to-day administration. Scholarly documentation matters little in such a book, and a valuable service is performed by sharing experiences with outsiders, such as academics. Unfortunately, Jacob Kaplan has attempted the kind of detached, broadly conceived, analytical approach to foreign aid that is better left to the academics. Instead of trying to detach himself from twenty years of involvement in aid administration, he should have capitalized on it by writing a personal memoir. The nice thing about books written by men of experience, however, is that they are always useful—if not because of what they say then because of who wrote them.

In one sense this book is depressing. Relative to other foreign aid literature Kaplan's book is especially good in ways that one would not expect. Broad scope, analytical sophistication, and healthy skepticism should be the earmarks of academic writing when compared to works based on experience. Yet, when we compare *The Challenge of Foreign Aid* to academic writing on foreign aid, we find that Kaplan uses a broader concept of "foreign aid," is more aware of the link between foreign aid and foreign policy, is more aware of the "substitution effect" and all of its ramifications, and has a more skeptical attitude toward both scholarly and official writings than most academics. Because so much nonsense has been written about foreign aid, the ex-bureaucrat has been able to beat the academics at their own game.

There are some major weaknesses in this book which diminish its utility to both scholars and policy makers. The first weakness is the simplistic concept of the foreign policy making process that underlies most of the discussion. The "public" is treated as a monolithic rational being with a single will. Policy making is seen as a process in which "Congress" and "the public" engage in rational calculations of the "national interest," based on information furnished by the executive branch. If foreign aid lacks domestic support, it is because the program has not been adequately "explained," "clarified," or "justified" to Congress and the public (cf. pp. xiii–xxviii, 246, 393). Roger Hilsman's view of policy making as politics, Aaron Wildavsky's concept of budgets and bargaining, Gabriel Almond's description of an aphathetic, ignorant public—all conflict with the implicit assumptions of this book. Instead of Hilsman's inevitable "untidiness and turmoil," Kaplan depicts a utopia in which the prerequisites for an effective aid program abroad are also the preconditions for support at home (cf. p. 393). I suggest that the reader stop and think about this as it relates to expensive vs. cheap programs, loans vs. grants, surplus food vs. money, and long term financing vs. annual appropriations!

A second weakness stems from careless and abundant use of the concept of "national interest" (cf. pp. 107–221, 249, 321). Writing as if this term had a self-revealing definition, Kaplan argues forcefully for an aid program that is in the "national interest"—whatever that is. "It is indefensible," he tells us, "to deploy U. S. foreign aid resources as though they had no relation to the nation's international concerns" (p. 249). No one, of course, has ever disputed this. The real debate is over what constitutes the "nation's international concerns." Many students of American foreign policy might agree with Kaplan that aid should serve the national interest; yet they might disagree with his definition. For example, Kaplan cites the withholding of aid from Brazil while such "unstable" and "demogogic" characters as Quadros and Goulart were in power and the subsequent massive injection of aid after the military coup as an example of aid in the "national interest" (pp. 210–214). This reviewer is not prepared to accept as self-evident truth the proposition that using aid to support military coups in Latin America is in the American national interest.

This book shares a third weakness with most other books on foreign aid—a failure to clarify the relation between aid and influence. For Kaplan and most other writers on aid, to "use" aid as an instrument of influence means to "give" aid. Thus, he notes that nations in which there is much American private investment receive relatively little aid, and he concludes that this shows that the United States does not allocate its aid funds so as to further the interests of its private investors (p. 179). Precisely the opposite conclusion can and should be drawn, however. For twenty years American private investors have been exhorting the government to withhold aid funds from areas where they might compete with private capital. Official policy statements have repeatedly committed the government to comply with this exhortation. The empirical evidence seems to indicate that the U. S. has indeed shaped its aid distribution policy so as to help its private investors; that is, it has used "non-aid" to influence foreign investment climates. When will we ever see that withholding aid is as important as giving it in the wielding of influence!

The fourth weakness suffices to remove this book from high priority on anyone's reading list. The turgid bureaucratic prose makes reading the book an endurance contest. I cannot recommend this book to the general reader because of the many misleading half-truths, the important hidden assumptions, and the lack of documentation. The foreign aid specialist who has a lot of time

will probably be able to separate the wheat from the chaff, however. The book is unique in criticizing the aid program for not having been "fulsome enough" (p. 74). This intriguing observation, however, is apparently due to archaic diction rather than to extreme subtlety.—DAVID BALDWIN, *Dartmouth College.*

De Gaulle and the World: The Foreign Policy of the Fifth French Republic. By W. W. KULSKI. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966. Pp. xvi, 428. $8.50.)

This is the first full-scale study of French foreign policy since de Gaulle's "second coming" in 1958. It is a long and fairly detailed exposition, without a thesis or a particularly evident point of view. Professor Kulski has written a balanced account of the main lines of Gaullist foreign policy and the sources of its strength and weakness. He draws for most of his analysis upon a vast array of commentary by other writers, as well as upon the familiar primary and secondary sources for de Gaulle's words and acts. If the book has no central argument, it surely does not lack a sharp critical edge in its evaluation of both Gaullist policy and that policy's reception by other powers. Kulski's book, while hardly an apologia for de Gaulle, is nonetheless an excellent "lecture" to Americans on what de Gaulle represents of worth to Frenchmen, to Europeans, and to much of the "Third World." It is one of the most conscientious and fair-minded efforts at answering the question raised so often by scholars, journalists and policy makers concerning de Gaulle's policies: why does a clearly second-rank power strive so desperately for world power status in an international environment for which it is so poorly equipped?

To answer this question Professor Kulski is absolutely right to begin with the basic relationship underlying both foreign and domestic policies in France today. This is that vital link de Gaulle summed up by the "*vous et moi*" he cried out to the French over the air waves in one of his famous direct appeals for support during the Algerian crisis. French foreign policy is indeed the product of an equation composed of the "Charismatic Leader" and "His People," the titles of Kulski's first two chapters. Although I strongly object to the idea of charisma applied to a leadership that is so obviously subject to repeated, formal, and, indeed, recently tenuous, renewals of popular support, I must say that Professor Kulski's synthesis of de Gaulle's thought on world politics, his analysis of the man's authority *vis à vis* the French and the enduring qualities of what might be called France's foreign policy personality, are all very convincing. They are especially worth reflection on the part of those prone to dismissing de Gaulle as simply a European nationalist of the old school.

It is the trauma of France's defeat and occupation in World War II that Kulski isolates as the origin of both the Gaullist "therapeutic myth" of a victorious France and the related myth of a France in "pursuit-as-usual" of traditional rank among the powers. These myths were responsible for the bond of loyalty between de Gaulle and his people and they explain why Frenchmen continue to react so positively to Gaullist leadership. Following this introductory analysis there is a detailed examination of all the important lines of French foreign policy, from the independent nuclear deterrent to the championing of the "Third World," and passing through the various "swing" policies toward Germany, Russia, and China that de Gaulle has employed as "pivots" for maneuver against his allies. These chapters are interesting and sound, though they are all over-loaded with lengthy quotations, many of which are familiar to even the casual student. Moreover, there is a tantalizing refusal to identify in the text the source of many quotations, thus obliging the reader to turn continually to the footnotes at the back and making, thereby, the going even slower than it is in this volume heavy with excised citations.

The only real disappointment is the absence of a genuine conclusion. For although the two page concluding chapter is judicious, I found it vastly out of scale with the abundant body of analysis that came before. Professor Kulski's strong implication at the end is that all will not necessarily change once de Gaulle is gone. For this reviewer such an implication called to mind a conclusion that seems latent throughout this useful book and that well deserves emphasis. To a very large degree Gaullist foreign policy is just traditional French foreign policy dressed in fancy clothes and employing broadly dramatic gestures. This being said, the probability is strong that it will continue after de Gaulle, perhaps in more somber garb and with more sober movements. What is important to know then is less the outline of familiar French goals in world politics and more the degree of energy and will to pursue these goals that will be employed by de Gaulle's successors. Here the primacy of domestic politics is clear and Kulski rightly ties the future of France's world role to the stability and direction of her internal political life. Although he shies away from giving us much to reflect upon in this regard, Kulski's skillful analysis of domestic factors throughout the book encourages the reader to venture an answer to the *après de Gaulle* question on his own. This exercise in itself makes this study well worth reading.—NICHOLAS WAHL, *Princeton University.*

Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience. By KENNETH N. WALTZ. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967. Pp. xiii, 331. $3.95, paper.)

Professor Waltz, now of Brandeis University, has made not only a controversial but also a more imaginative and durable contribution to the study of comparative politics and international relations than the paperback format of *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics* might suggest. To be precise, his contribution is at the important and fascinating intersection of comparative politics and international relations. Professor Waltz, previously known mainly for his insightful study of international relations, is also knowledgeable in analyzing the American and British political systems. The work is the product of substantial research time, some of which was profitably spent in Britain. More striking, however, is Waltz's exhibition of intellectual boldness, critical verve, and incisive writing.

The book is organized in what amount to two separate modes of presentation. The first set of five chapters, following an introduction, analyzes in topical order the political processes and governmental structures of the United States and Great Britain. Anglo-American comparisons are made under each topical heading; for example, "prime ministers and president," "bipartisan foreign policy," or "parties and appointments." Each of the following four chapters presents a national case study of the functioning of the given political system in relation to a particular policy. The British system is thus studied as it met the problem of postwar military policy, particularly nuclear weapons, and the problem of joining an integrated western continental Europe. The American system is studied in its responses to foreign aid and to the general military involvements characterizing the whole period of the cold war and especially its less cold phases. The case studies are intended to support theses developed in the earlier part of the book. Yet they could stand apart because of their inherent interest and because of the fresh and realistic style in which Waltz presents the policy issues.

Waltz seeks in both parts of his book to establish two theses. The first is the superiority of the American to the British political system in dealing with foreign policy (and domestic policy as well). The second, admittedly dealt with only indirectly, is the foreign policy capability of Western democratic governments in competition with authoritarian states. Like the author, let us concentrate on the first thesis. Has Waltz, as he appears to believe in his concluding chapter, demonstrated the superiority of the American system? More significantly, *can* he or anyone else demonstrate such a phenomenon? In rigorous scientific terms, of course, the answer is no. Waltz, despite his useful citation of quantitative data, is much too sophisticated to claim that he has proved the point by evidence of the kind demanded by our most statistically-minded colleagues. Indeed, Waltz does not even argue that his case studies are chosen to be representative according to any scientific canon. Demonstration in this area plainly has to be impressionistic, and Waltz's effort should be judged by the less exact standard of our conventional research. Even by that standard, however, the superiority of one system to another may be non-demonstrable. Success or failure in developing and supporting a foreign policy is not only hard to define; it is also hard to attribute to the virtues or vices of a political system when there are so many obviously important independent variables, besides the political system, to which success or failure is attributable. Moreover, the whole question of the superiority of the American or the British system is hardly worth asking if one accepts, as I believe one should, that a given constitutional and general political system developed by a nation over a considerable period has a strong claim to be more clearly functional for that nation than any other general system would be. Neither the American nor British system would then be thought superior in any comparative sense.

In rejecting so relativist a view, Waltz is playing an established game but, as he notes, on the opposite side from the old players. The tradition among political scientists on both sides of the Atlantic has been to favor the British system on almost every count: parliamentary-cabinet system over separation of powers, responsible parties over loose brokerage parties, and high-status career service (notably in diplomacy) over American partisan appointments. Having dissented from this Anglophile position and asserted instead the suitability of American political arrangements for American circumstances, I now find it odd to have to dispute a view that assures us of the superiority of the American system. In Waltz's comparison, Britain suffers on many counts. The parliamentary-cabinet system, with responsible parties, works against prime ministerial success in foreign policy-making. The career service is less open to innovative personalities than the American. And so on. These views, it must be emphasized, are not now peculiarly Waltz's. They are part of the new mood of self-criticism, even self-laceration, shared by many Englishmen during the national malaise of the 1960's. The mood will probably pass, but in the meantime, while Britain is still losing status in the world, its once over-praised political institutions are targets along with everything else.—LEON D. EPSTEIN, *University of Wisconsin.*

The Nation is Burdened: American Foreign Policy in a Changing World. By Roger D. Masters. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967. Pp. vii, 319. $6.95.)

A recurrent lament among students of modern diplomatic history is that, to their detriment, nations have departed from the "balance of power" principle and that policy-makers have forsaken that basic axiom of statecraft—dedication to the "national interest." Recent American foreign policy has been "burdened," we are told in the work before us, because these tested diplomatic concepts have too often been ignored.

An Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University, whose principal field is political philosophy, Masters disclaims any special competence to undertake a critique of American foreign policy. It is a judicious disclaimer. At a number of points in his treatment, the lack of background will be evident to the knowledgeable reader; the documentation is sparse, frequently consisting of a single (and often controversial) source; the layman or beginning student is likely to find the lack of relevant factual data an impediment to understanding.

Yet Masters exhibits an incisive critical capacity. His analysis of the inadequacies of postwar American foreign policy is, more often than not, cogent and persuasive. Precisely because he is not steeped in prevailing orthodoxies, he can and does scrutinize conventional policy assumptions that have too seldom been examined (or re-examined) with desired objectivity.

Nearly all significant dimensions of America's relations with the outside world—from the formulation of external goals and the impact of philosophical traditions upon national attitudes, to the problem of nuclear proliferation, the NATO crisis, and Red China's accession to the ranks of the nuclear powers—are examined. And in virtually every case, Masters concludes that the effectiveness of American policies is blunted by antiquated ideas, by inertia, by irrelevant ideological slogans, and by a distorted sense of national purpose.

His remedy for these failings—the central theme of his book—is for officials in Washington to adopt, and the American public to support, the principles of "balance of power" and pursuit of the "national interest" as basic strategies in dealing with the challenges posed by a turbulent international environment. Perhaps because he is not writing in his own field of expertise, Masters seems unaware that his thesis is a hearty perennial in the literature of international relations; for almost twenty years, the President and his advisers have been urged to "return" to traditional concepts like balance of power and national interest. It is surely a reasonable assumption by now that, if they have not done so, the explanation must be sought in something other than deafness or a failure of will.

What policy-makers and specialists will miss in Masters' account is a thorough and rigorous appraisal of what "balance of power" has meant historically; of what its relevance is today—in an era vastly different from nineteenth century Europe; of what the conditions have been in earlier periods, and are today, that make the principle viable as a guide for national policy. A no less searching examination is required for the companion doctrine of "national interest" before it can be accepted as among the eternal verities of diplomacy.

For toward any concrete problem that "burdens" the American nation in its foreign relations—from the war in Vietnam, to the Arab-Israeli dispute, to revolutionary upheaval in Latin America—there are as many conflicting versions of the "national interest" as there are available policy alternatives. With such abstractions, there is always a temptation—which Masters' analysis seldom resists—for these ideas to degenerate into little more than incantations and nostrums. Policy dilemmas and ambiguities, the assumption seems to be, will dissolve to the extent that they are repeated. Or, when they are not viewed as nostrums, they frequently are identified with the policy recommendations made by the author. By a process that is almost never explained, pursuing the "national interest" becomes in effect accepting the author's policy proposals. "Neutralizing" Southeast Asia, for example, might well be the best way to bring stability to that troubled region; but beginning the search for a solution that is in the "national interest" (as hawks and doves alike would agree) may or may not lead to adoption of a neutralization scheme. Similarly, in countless other instances—dealing with de Gaulle's France, or better American relations with the Arab world, or revitalizing the United Nations—it is far from clear what light concepts like balance of power or national interest throw on these complex problems.

In brief, it is a pity that the principles relied upon by Masters to lighten the "burden" of American foreign policy were not subjected to the same perceptive scrutiny which the nation's recent diplomatic record received. Until they are, Masters need not be surprised at reluctance in the State Department to adopt his views.—Cecil V. Crabb, jr., *Vassar College.*

The Polaris Missile Strike: A General Economics Systems Analysis. By Robert E. Kuenne. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966. Pp. x, 434. $8.00.)

Professor Kuenne's study of the Fleet Ballistic Missile System will be of interest to many political scientists. Those specializing in United States foreign and security policy will find his conclusion, that "we are overbuilding missile submarines" (p. 393) provocative, to say the least. Those interested in the application of mathematical techniques to contemporary policy issues will find this readable example of quantified analysis instructive.

While the distinction between systems analysis and operations research is far from clear, this study is probably of the latter genre despite the author's characterization in the title. The author takes as given what a systems analyst would have to consider variable, namely, deterrence means an "invulnerable second-strike retaliatory capacity against Soviet *population centers*" (p. 30, author's emphasis). To define deterrence as assured destruction capabilities is legitimate and certainly simplifies computational problems, but it also changes the study from what is usually meant by systems analysis—an examination of alternative goals as well as alternative means, into a complex but much lower order maximization problem. Consequently, unless one is willing to accept or at least tolerate the author's concept of finite deterrence, there is little point in reading the book. If, however, one can accept this concept, the rest of the argument proceeds easily. The author develops a set of probability models which include submarine vulnerability, navigation and guidance error, launch reliability, missile range, missile interception, command and control error, and accurate Soviet "hunches" about the location of our fleet—to mention only the major variables. He then determines the probable fatalities in the 95 largest Soviet cities (their aggregate population is 45.7 million), under four sets of parameter estimates: (1) most favorable, (2) reasonable, (3) unfavorable, and (4) extremely unfavorable.

In the most favorable case, a fleet of 16 submarines on station would totally destroy the 95 target cities. Under extremely unfavorable conditions, it takes slightly more than 30 to accomplish the same awful task. Since the unfavorable conditions take into account future defensive possibilities presently beyond the state of the art, the author prefers the second category, reasonable conditions, as the basis for strategic planning. Using "reasonable" assumptions, an attack by 15 submarines will produce 95 per cent fatalities. Interestingly, under no conditions is it necessary to deploy more than ten submarines to produce a 50 per cent casualty rate—23 million dead! At this point it is well to remind the reader there may not be 23 million survivors to target should a polaris attack be ordered *after* a retaliatory blow by our other assured distruction forces (Titan, Minuteman, B-52, B-111). Polaris submarines account for a rather small fraction of our total strategic megatonnage. The author concludes by suggesting we consider stationing only 15 missile submarines (military worth equals .979 under most favorable conditions, .954 under reasonable conditions, .847 under unfavorable conditions, and .594 under extremely unfavorable conditions) and invest the difference in attack submarines to protect them.

The author is explicit and self-conscious about his exclusion of policy and political variables which might alter the requirements for deterrence in specific real world situations. However, he is not immune from criticism as long as he bills his work as a systems analysis. Elegance and rigor in determining the relationships among included variables do not justify failure to include all relevant variables—for example, a policy decision to use Polaris in a "damage limiting" role. Yet the very weakness of the study as a policy or systems analysis are its strengths as an operations analysis. His treatment of planning and technological uncertainties is carefully and impressively handled by testing results for their sensitivity to shifts in major parameters. And his modest claims for his conclusions as "hypotheses to stir discussion among the experts in submarine warfare [rather] than . . . encapsulated policy recommendations . . . " (p. 374) anticipates the kinds of criticisms this reviewer has made as does his invitation for criticism of both his assumptions and analysis. But the critical assumption of the entire analysis is the very one most subject to challenge. On the other hand, his straightforwardness about the other limitations of his analysis make the study exemplary of the kind a decision-maker wants *after* he has decided on finite deterrence.

The book is a major contribution to the small body of systematic and well documented reasoning and analysis of assured destruction capabilities. It is fraught with policy implications—for arms control and nuclear proliferation as well as for deterrence, force structure planning, and weapon systems deployment. The author's self-imposed restraints have prevented him from elaborating them, however. This reviewer hopes Professor Kuenne plans future contributions to deterrence analysis which include more policy variables, even at the cost of mathematical precision.—JOHN C. RIES, *University of California, Los Angeles.*

Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace. By Y. HARKABI. (New York: Donald Davey & Co., 1966. [Israel Programme for Scientific Translations] Pp. 279. $7.50.)

This compendium of nuclear strategy greatly alleviates a dearth of introductory material for national security policy studies—an increasingly popular topic in political science curricula. In scope, selection, and synthesis it surpasses for textbook purposes its only real competitor, Morton Halperin's still-useful, but more simplistic and less thorough, *Contemporary Military Strategy*.

A work devoted to this somewhat arcane specialty might too easily ignore the less exotic ranges of the spectrum of warfare. Far from having made war "unthinkable," the existence of nuclear weapons—while reducing the likelihood of central war between major powers and diminishing the general level of violence from the excesses of the two World Wars—holds up a psychological umbrella under which local wars blaze which formerly would have been extinguished by a Great Power fire brigade, and in whose shadow minor military forces can stalemate great armies. Perceiving this, Harkabi has set his topic of emphasis against its proper background, Raymond Aron's "polymorphism of conflict."

Although the author distinguishes between the work of "strategy analysts" and that of "peace researchers," this unnatural bifurcation only reflects a transient immaturity of those callings. The disparate emphases do indeed exist for most war/peace professionals, but all the good ones on either bench recognize that the two vectors of thrust are as complementary and mutually indispensable as the rails we still occasionally ride until monorail trains are perfected. *Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace* fulfills the promise of its title not merely by giving "equal time" to arms control and disarmament, but by indicating forcefully that these considerations are a fully integral part of nuclear strategy.

Ever since a few denizens of the "think factories" got around to examining the premises of a successful deterrence it has been well understood that this is pre-eminently a psychological phenomenon. Image-formation, tacit bargaining, signalling and communication, education-of-the-enemy, involuntary incentives to attack, and similar abstract mental constructs receive from Gen. Harkabi their full due of attention.

Some re-orientation of mental modes is required before one can quell his intuition and accede to the idea that American security can be fostered by a significant improvement in the impregnability of an opponent's fighting posture. Yet, such are the ironic subtleties to which profound strategic analysis of a situation can lead, and of which Harkabi happily takes cognizance. Consider, for example, whether the instability of the nuclear balance would not be aggravated, to the detriment of the United States, if the Soviets thought they owned only a vulnerable strategic striking force which could never be relied on to survive an American first-strike.

But enough of laud! This Israeli Strategic Research director's own nation provides a graphic and up-to-date illustration of the outstanding failure of his book—which is identical with the failure of the strategical thinkers' profession as a whole. Israel's exemplary execution in June 1967 of an audacious initiative cannot be faulted—for as long as they kept that initiative. To their prompt disadvantage, however, they heeded the precedent of 1951 and, like all Western statesmen since, failed to challenge the principle, "Engage in combat for no purpose beyond winning a cease-fire," established when Malik and Gromyko, learning of the ghastly effects on the Chinese army of Operation Killer then in progress, proposed an armistice in Korea. By all accounts, the occupation of Amman, Damascus, and even Cairo was well within the capacity of the victorious Israeli forces, but was forsaken for reasons of higher politics. Despite the shrieking kilowatts of the Egyptian radio, this stunning accomplishment could scarcely have failed to signify to the Arab masses the true dimensions of their armies' defeat, thereby interring the radicals' plans for a "second round." Moreover, it is difficult to picture the Arab governments, thus trussed, refusing to concede diplomatic recognition or to negotiate that elusive permanent peace settlement. "Accept with alacrity whenever a defeated foe offers a cease-fire," has become the enervating corollary to Malik's maxim.

For, despite a widespread, self-conscious awareness that war and politics are neighbors on the same continuum, neither the eminent strategists Harkabi has consulted nor any others seem fully to have absorbed certain implications of the continued ubiquity of organized conflict. Defeat on the battlefield, alienation of friends, embitterment of the diplomatic discourse, and escalation toward Armageddon, among other hazards and costs of war in these times, are all risked without a clear comprehension of what arms, once taken up, ought to accomplish before they are again laid down. Unless preservation or restoration of the political *status quo ante* is by itself worth this gamble, the authors of our theories of limited war—pre-occupied almost exclusively with buttressing the limitations, while ignoring the considerable damage done to the international environment by maladroit, extended, or indecisive wars—have neglected to begin the theory which can guide our political leadership toward an understanding of the specific, restrained functions warfare by nature can fulfill as an instrument of national policy.—JOHN V. HILBERG, *University of Connecticut.*

Disarmament and World Economic Interdependence. Ed. by Emile Benoit. (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, and New York: Columbia University Press, 1967. Pp. 260. $8.00.)

The United States in a Disarmed World. By Arnold Wolfers, Robert E. Osgood, Paul Y. Hammond, Laurence W. Martin, Robert W. Tucker, Charles Burton Marshall, and Livingston T. Merchant. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1966. Pp. xi, 236. $8.50.)

Both of these collections of articles are concerned with disarmament. Beyond that, however, the two books could hardly be more dissimilar.

The volume by Arnold Wolfers and his collaborators emerged from a study undertaken for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of the "Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World" submitted by the United States to the Geneva Disarmament Conference in April, 1962. An important feature of that plan is that each stage in the reduction of national military establishments is to be accompanied by increasing emphasis on international peacekeeping forces. In contrast the Soviet plan assumes that the abolition of armaments is sufficient to insure a peaceful international order. Each of the chapters considers the political consequences that might arise were the three-stage American proposal implemented.

The initial essay by Wolfers examines the relationship between disarmament, peacekeeping forces, and the national interest. He suggests that the establishment of strong international peacekeeping forces may *increase*, rather than decrease, the need for national security forces. More specifically, he points to three sources of threat to the United States in a disarmed world: Sino-Soviet subversive war; the end of American influence over allies in the Far East and Europe; and a threat from the "Third World" over issues which may divide the world along a north-south axis. Reference to the first of these potential threats is a recurring theme in these papers, but at least one of the contributors (Robert Tucker) suggests that perhaps the problem of indirect aggression has been exaggerated. As to the second point, Wolfers does not point out that a failure to implement effective control over the spread of nuclear weapons may also have the result of decreasing American influence over its allies.

Robert Osgood addresses his chapter to the role of military power in a disarming world, and he concludes that were a stable order to emerge in that kind of environment, it would be because a new system of alliances resulted in a military equilibrium. Paul Hammond's essay on nonmilitary instruments of policy in a disarmed world warns against optimism about their usefulness for American policy.

The other four papers also tend to be critical of the Outline. From somewhat different perspectives, Laurence Martin, Robert Tucker, Charles Burton Marshall, and Livingston Merchant suggest that the American proposal, while far more realistic than its Soviet counterpart, flows from some assumptions about the nature of international conflict which may well be untenable. They are particularly critical (as are most of the contributors to this volume) of the view that international peacekeeping forces can in fact prove effective substitutes for national forces in maintaining the right of political independence. This assessment may not be wholly unwarranted; recent events in the Middle East suggest that international peacekeeping forces whose presence depends upon the consent of one or both belligerents may fall short of insuring either peace or security.

In summary, the dominant view in these essays is not inconsistent with Professor Marshall's conclusion that the Outline "may promote an aura of abstract good intentions for United States policy. Its usefulness with respect to the credibility of United States policy is another matter" (p. 191).

The articles in Emile Benoit's volume were originally prepared by authors from the United States, United Kindgom, Norway, France, Germany, Holland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary for the Conference on Economic Aspects of World Disarmament and Interdependence. Whereas the Johns Hopkins volume is narrowly focused, essayish, and generally pessimistic about the political consequences of the American disarmament proposal, *Disarmament and World Economic Interdependence* is eclectic, empirical, and the authors tend to stress the advantages of arms reduction. The articles are diverse in scope, central concepts, and method. For example, Arthur Brown and Olav Bjerkholt consider the economic impact of disarmament on the United Kingdom and Norway; John Hoagland and John Teeple examine the economics of regional arms races in a paper that is particularly timely in view of the recent Arab-Israeli war; and Benoit and Harold Lubell present an impressive global survey of the economic burdens of national defense. In method the articles range from a perceptive essay by Alexander Eckstein on "Arms Control and the Vulnerability of Communist China's Economy to External Pressures and Inducements," to Johan Galtung's interesting cross-national (Norway, France, Poland) survey of public attitudes on the economic effect of disarmament. Many present quantitative data (and even some mathematical models) in support of their conclusions.

Space does not permit even a brief discription of every article. Suffice it to say that there is general agreement that the economic benefits of arms reduction or disarmament are likely to be substantial. Several chapters stress that the widespread problems of poverty and economic development, which are increasingly likely to become sources of international political conflict, are unlikely to be resolved unless a substantial portion of the resources presently allocated to armaments are used for economic aid. But, it we can generalize from Galtung's opinion data, it is far from self-evident that such a reallocation would in fact follow any arms reduction. Moreover, although there is a general consensus that economic advantages will accrue from arms control, most of the contributors acknowledge that disarmament is primarily a political rather than an economic issue, and that the perceived imperatives of politics will usually dominate the calculus of economics. This thesis emerges clearly in papers on China (Eckstein), the Soviet Union (Morris Bernstein), and others.

Both books under review suffer from a fault that is apparently endemic to symposium volumes—neither includes a strong introductory or concluding essay which attempts to tie the various papers together. Owing to the greater diversity in its chapters, this omission is particularly regrettable in the case of Professor Benoit's volume.—Ole R. Holsti, *The University of British Columbia.*

Voices Prophesying War, 1763–1984. By I. F. Clarke. London: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. x, 254. $10.00.)

The author has collected some 700 books and articles prophesying war since 1763 when an anonymous writer produced a story entitled "The Reign of George VI." In a war from 1900 to 1925 this heroic monarch is said to have enhanced the glory of Britain by the conquest of France and most of the rest of Europe utilizing military and naval instruments and tactics of the 18th century. A few writings of the next century, especially in England and France during the Napoleonic period indicated the strong sentiment of nationalism, the acceptance of war as the normal means to achieve national glory and security, and the mutual fear and antagonism of these two countries, as well as the inability of the writers to conceive of future war as different from war of the past.

There were a few exceptions. After the Montgolfiers' balloon ascent in 1783 and Robert Fulton's demonstration of torpedoes and submarines in 1803 some engravers pictured a future French invasion of England by great "aerostatic machines" carrying 3000 men, or by great windmill driven barges after torpedoes and submarines had destroyed the British fleet. The utilization of steam for navigation led to further fears of invasion in the 1840's. The advances of science and technology in the 19th century, though it generally induced confidence in the increasing capability of man to conquer nature and the inevitability of progress toward human welfare, caused some anxiety about future war. Victor Hugo predicted in 1864 that the invention of aircraft would put an end to war, but until 1871 most of the writers on future war "took it for granted that the next war would be fought more or less after the style of the last and that war would continue to be conducted in a relatively restrained and humane manner" (p. 3).

A new period in this literature was initiated by the anonymous publication in Blackwood's Magazine, May 1871, of an article entitled "The Battle of Dorking." It was written by Lieut. Col. Sir George Tomkyns Chesney and told of the invasion and conquest of England by Germany utilizing the military efficiency it had demonstrated in the recent Franco-Prussian war. The article caused a sensation in England, went through numerous reprintings, was translated into French, German, Italian and other languages, inspired commentaries by civilian and military writers, and stimulated a vast literature predicting future war, generally between Britain and France. Naval rivalry developed between these countries in the 1880's and in the next two decades a channel tunnel was seriously proposed, steam driven iron clads were introduced, France allied itself with Russia, and conflicting claims developed in Africa. After the rise of German sea power in the 1890's the Anglo-French entente of 1903 and the development of the airplane and submarine, Germany became the enemy of England, and, as the alliance systems developed, writers of all countries foresaw war between the triple alliance and the triple entente.

Before 1914 most writers continued to assume that war was inevitable, that it was necessary for national defense, that the new technology would make it short, and that "our" side would win by superior fortitude and tactics. Few foresaw the character of World War I, least of all the military men. Ivan Bloch, the Polish banker, foresaw in 1897 the destructiveness of modern weapons and the stalemate of vast entrenched armies, H. G. Wells predicted the atomic bomb in 1913, Sir Arthur Conan Doyle foresaw the destructiveness of submarine warfare in July, 1914, and pacifists like Bertha Von Suttner (*Lay Down Your Arms*, 1892) and Norman Angell, (*The Great Illusion*, 1910) followed Victor Hugo in believing that war had become costly beyond any possible economic or political gains and, therefore, irrational. Much of

the writing, however, was by professionals or patriots who justified Bernard Shaw's comment to the publisher of *"The New Battle of Dorking,"* by an anonymous writer in 1900 describing the coming French invasion of England. Shaw asked, "Who wrote it?" and added "Only a professional soldier could be so ignorant of warfare." The author proved to be Col. F. N. Maude (pp. 137, 233).

After World War I, and even more after World War II, the tone of war prophesying changed. It was no longer nationalistic propaganda but realistic accounts of the sad state of the human race after the next war. "War itself and not an enemy nation is the target of attack" (p. 162). Alfred Noyes (*The Last Man*, 1940), Aldous Huxley (*Ape and Essence*, 1948), and George Orwell (*Nineteen Eighty-four*, 1949), were typical, in foreseeing the destruction of man as a species or of the human spirit if war continued. The nineteenth century optimism foreseeing continuous human progress through science and technology had ended. According to Dr. G. B. Chisholm, former director of the World Health Organization, "The system and situation (seeking security by national power) represents an extensive malfunctioning of human minds which is very dangerous. . . . The transcendence of world values over local and national values is overdue and essential to survival. Its delay is in the most literal sense, endangering all mankind" (pp. 180, 207).

Though not very well organized, the book assembles an important body of data indicating the changes of opinion about war under the influence of changing conditions of international politics and technology, and the relative unreliability of that opinion in predicting the character of the next war. It includes a chronological list of books and articles prophesying war since 1763 and a bibliography of books about war since 1770 which, surprisingly, omits the 19th century treatises of Jomini, Clausewitz, and Mahan and the work of Lewis Richardson, who initiated the application of scientific method to the study of war in the 1930's.—QUINCY WRIGHT, *University of Virginia.*

Latin America in World Politics. By NORMAN A. BAILEY. (New York: Walker and Co., 1967. Pp. xx, 250. $7.50.)

This book purports to be a response to the paucity of realistic analyses of the inter-American system, at once a text and an original treatise. This is a difficult combination, and regrettably it does not come off.

Setting the stage for his main theme, the author argues that the "quasi-anarchic" international system is given some order through the arrangement of all states into a hierarchical structure of "paramounts," "clients," and "floaters" (neutrals). The paramounts are those states which "are not . . . dominated as to foreign policy formulation by any other," as measured by their ability "to maintain autonomous action." The few paramounts exercise hegemony over the many clients, which are states that, at a minimum, must follow the general foreign policy orientation of their paramount and, at worse, are tightly regulated even in their domestic affairs.

The choice of terms alone, as well as much of the later substantive analysis, would clearly seem to imply that, except for the floaters, the world is divided into a series of satellite systems, on the order of the Soviet bloc under Stalin. Now, as a sophisticated description of the international system this simply will not do, and the author knows it. So he attempts to wriggle free by fudging his concepts. The paramount-client relationship, we are told, may sometimes involve nothing more than "a loose arrangement extending only to the foreign policy sphere, and perhaps, even there, only to an agreement not to impede the policy initiatives of the paramount." Elsewhere he goes even further, noting that paramounts need clients (for support) as well as vice-versa, which gives the clients a certain power: "As many examples of clients influencing the foreign policies of paramounts may be adduced . . . as of paramounts influencing their clients." By thus seeking to cover himself against the charge, to put it mildly, of oversimplification, the author succeeds only in emptying his hypotheses of rigor and meaning.

Still, once we get to the main body of the book, an analysis of the inter-American system, the prevailing themes are of power, dominance, and hierarchy. The OAS is described as an organization of clients, designed by the United States to institutionalize the "Pax Americana" and more effectively to control the hemisphere. Several chapters on the operation of the system are in this vein, stressing the ordinate-subordinate relationship between the United States and Latin America. Such an approach, while serving as a useful corrective to official panegyrics, nonetheless is oversimplified.

Few will find it enlightening to learn that the United States is the predominant power in the Western Hemisphere and, as such, exercises strong influence in Latin America. Nonetheless, the pattern of inter-state relationships in the hemisphere is complex, and is not adequately described by the paramount-client metaphor, unless so qualified with more-or-losses (as it is by the author) as to end up saying very little. It is highly instructive, for example, that even the two hemispheric states that have been *most* subject to U. S. power and pressure, Cuba and the Domin-

ican Republic, can hardly be described as docile American satellites.

As for the OAS, it should be remembered that the impetus for its establishment came more from Latin America than the United States and that the system has lasted as long as it has because it is thought to serve Latin American as well as North American interests. The existence of the organization is seen to exert a restraining influence on the United States, and in fact it usually, though obviously not invariably, has. Precisely because the utility of the OAS to the United States is diminished to the degree it is perceived to be under Washington's control, the United States has normally played a moderate broker's role in inter-American decision-making processes, seeking consensus rather than coerced support.

Another major drawback of the book is the constant intrusion of the author's generally conservative values, all the more annoying in that they are foisted on the unsuspecting student in the guise of empirical analysis. This is particularly evident in the author's cold-warriorism. The Guatemalan and Cuban revolutions and the continuing unrest in Latin America are primarily interpreted as "Soviet challenges" to the hemisphere, to which the Latin Americans have regrettably failed to respond properly, in part because of U. S. vacillations ("a loss of faith in the ability of the paramount to defend its own interests and offer protection to its clients"), and in part because of the Latin American "patron-peon psychology." Hardly anywhere does the author indicate he is aware of the polycentric nature of communism today and the genuine differences in the hemisphere over the causes and nature of, let alone the proper response to, radical movements.

As a text the book has some fairly useful discussions of Latin American politics, inter-American conflicts, and the process of regional integration. However, these are marred throughout by poor organization and lack of focus, pedestrian and unanalytical descriptive passages, and the author's penchant for unsupported, inaccurate and frequently ideologically-biased generalizations.—JEROME SLATER, *SUNY, Buffalo.*

The Inter-American System. By GORDON CONNELL-SMITH. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966. Pp. xix, 376. $8.75.)

Some books are valuable because they either uncover new factual material or provide a significantly new perspective. Others make a contribution by filling gaps through the bringing together of previously dispersed, although available, material. This volume falls into the latter category. There is little new here but it is significantly better than the existing general works on inter-American relations.

The volume is basically a political history of the development of cooperation in the Western Hemisphere. The book begins by tracing inter-American relations through the end of World War II. This historical summary, which takes up over 40 per cent of the book, is interspersed with comments attempting to point out the significance of various actions and events. On the whole the section is well done. Then follow chapters on "Inter-American Relations Since the End of the Second World War," "The Organization of American States," "The OAS and the Peace and Security of the Hemisphere," and "The OAS and Other Fields of Inter-American Co-operation." The final chapter attempts to draw some general conclusions and this is followed by a postscript on the Dominican crisis of April 1965 which was attached in July of 1965 to update the manuscript and to prove that those events were simply an extension of the author's predictions (which they more or less were). This last section might have profited from an opportunity to see some of the other evaluations of those events.

The author feels that the inter-American system was originally promoted by the United States to secure Latin American acceptance of the U. S. policy of restricting extra-continental influence in the Western Hemisphere. Gordon Connell-Smith feels that inter-American cooperation has clearly served U. S. interests more than those of Latin America. The organizational efforts have given the U. S. political support in providing a deterrent to possible armed attacks and also have been occasionally helpful in countering communist subversion within the hemisphere. The U. S. uses the organization to try to make its hegemony acceptable to Latin America and to bolster the North American self-image as that of a moral nation interested in cooperation rather than domination. The effectiveness of the inter-American system is generally limited to minor disturbances and, the author points out, it has shown much more readiness to fight communism than the far "more formidable threat to democratic institutions in the hemisphere" from the Right. He is certainly correct in reminding the reader that whatever policy the U. S. follows is intervention in some form but that most Latin Americans do not protest if it is a form with which they agree, such as economic aid. The author is very critical of the United States' "conversion" to the promotion of social change in Latin America on the grounds that this runs counter to the long-time U. S. connections with the conservative interests in Latin America. The University of Hull professor feels that the Good Neighbor Policy succeeded because great social

experimentation was taking place in the U. S. at the time. He claims that the Johnson administration has shown few signs of being prepared for anything like a new deal for the poor in the United States today: therefore the Alliance for Progress will fail. The author also claims that the U. S. welcomed the overthrow of the Goulart administration primarily due to his foreign policy stance.

Throughout the book there is a tendency to interrupt the narrative to draw conclusions which have little evidence to support them. Partly this may be a natural outgrowth of trying to compress a complex subject into less than 350 pages. This volume also serves to expose many of the problems of political histories. The author ideally should have devoted more consideration to alternative actions before criticizing and perhaps set up some standards against which to judge the use of power. At one point in the book he seems to accept the inevitability that the U. S. will dominate the hemisphere and then proceeds to criticize it for dominating. The crux of the question is the form the power should take. A more systematic approach utilizing some of the theoretical approaches to the behavior of states might well have yielded more useful conclusions and brought a clearer definition of the issues.

Nevertheless, as a general history of the inter-American system with particular emphasis on the last ten years, the book is well worth reading. Although the author's sources occasionally may be questioned, the book is well-researched, tightly written, and provocative. It must be accepted as a standard work on inter-American relations.—MICHAEL FRANCIS, *University of Notre Dame.*

La Organización de los Estados Americanos. (O. E. A.) 2nd edition. BY FELIX FERNANDEZ-SHAW. (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1963. Pp. 989. Pesetas 350.)

La Integración de Centroamérica. BY FELIX FERNANDEZ-SHAW. (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1965. Pp. 1086. Pesetas 450.)

Panamá y Sus Relaciones Centroamericanas. BY FELIX FERNANDEZ-SHAW. (Madrid: Ediciones Cultura Hispánica, 1964. Pp. 329. Pesetas 350.)

To publish three volumes totalling some 2,400 pages within three years would be quite an achievement, even if there were no exact correspondence between quantity and quality. Actually, the author of the three books under review is qualified also by practical experience to deal with the problems of Central and South America, being in the Foreign Service of Spain and having been in active diplomatic duty in the area. In fact, the first (1959) edition of his work on the Organization of American States was a pioneer study not only in the Spanish but also in the English literature. The late J. M. Yepes of Colombia had published in the Thirties a study on *Panaméricanisme* and, with Pereira da Silva, a comparative *Commentaire du Pacte de la Société des Nations et des Statuts de l'Union Panaméricaine* (as the O.A.S. was called at that time). The two standard works on the O.A.S. in English (by Ch. G. Fenwick and by Ann and A. J. Thomas) appeared in the same year as the present second edition of Dr. Fernandez-Shaw's *O.E.A.* It differs from these in the large space given to source material (almost one third of the book) which makes it into a very useful reference work. The documents include not only the Charter of Bogota and the Rio Treaty but also the Pact of Bogota (1948), the Declaration of Punta del Este and other important Declarations and Resolutions, ratification charts, lists of the regular, special and technical Inter-American Conferences and minister meetings and of the decisions taken by them, and a 14 page bibliography. More space is also allotted to the historical background from the Hispano-American through the Pan-American to the Inter-American periods (1826 to 1889 to 1948). The latter year in which the Charter of the O.A.S. was adopted is certainly of historical importance; however, the period of Inter-Americanism can more properly be considered to have started with Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy. The bulk of the volume is devoted to this period and it is in this part that the author deals with the Charter of Bogota and its legal, political and ideological nature, the structure of the Organization and the Pact of Bogota concerning the Pacific Settlement of Disputes, while the Rio Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance is somewhat briefly and incongruously discussed within the framework of the historical background. As Spaniard the author has added an Epilogue on the relations between the "mother country" and the O.A.S. His proposals for the future of these relations are modest: recognition of an observer status for Spain in the Organization and of a diplomatic observer at the Pan-American Union as well as contacts between Spanish and O.A.S. organs. He realizes, as J. L. Kunz has pointed out, that Spain can approach Latin America no longer *ratione imperii* but only *imperio rationis.*

The size of the book on the *Integration of Central America,* too, is due to the inclusion in the main body of the work of long lists of the meetings of the various Central American bodies and of the even longer texts of the relevant regional documents. It is most comprehensive and a true reference work. Its three main chapters deal with the political, economic, and cultural integration of the area, which has progressed much further than that of Latin America in general. While the

Common Market for South America is still in the beginning stages, its Central American counterpart became fully integrated within and without and is a success. The new Charter of San Salvador of 1962 which entered into force in 1965 provides for a more elaborate structure of the Organization of Central American States than did the Act of 1951 and this integration process is going on as evidenced in particular by the efforts to transform this regional organization into a "Central American Community." In October, 1965, a draft charter for such a community presented by Guatemala was submitted to the members of the Organization by its Foreign Ministers Conference.

The third book under review on *Panama and its Central American Relations* forms a natural link between the first two, for Panama is a member of the O.A.S. but not of the O.D.E.C.A., although geographically it is considered part of Central America. Almost half of the book is taken up by documents, including some not strictly related to the subject–such as the Economic Convention of Bogota (1948) and the Charter of Quito (1948). The text itself does not deal with all the relations between Panama and the Central American States but only with Panama and the political, economic, and cultural integration of Central America. As for the political integration, Dr. Fernandez-Shaw concludes that the first Charter of O.D.E.C.A. served as the baptism while the second had the role of confirmation. It is doubtful, however, whether the relations have developed much beyond the conception stage.

All in all, the books under review, in particular the first two, are an achievement and it is to be hoped that a third edition of the work on the O.A.S. will come out soon. Judging from past experience, it should be imminent.—SALO ENGEL, *The University of Tennessee.*

The Evolution of International Organizations. ED. BY EVAN LUARD. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966. Pp. 342.)

This book, as its editor declares, is not a history of international organizations, but a "series of case studies . . . designed to consider the changes that have taken place in the structure of some of the most important organizations so far in existence; and to assess . . . the factors that have mainly influenced or inhibited change during their evolution" (p. 7). The volume includes chapters on the following "organizations": "The League of Nations," by F. P. Walters; "The General Assembly of the United Nations," by Geoffrey Goodwin; "The Security Council," by Inis L. Claude, Jr; "The United Nations Secretariat," by Sydney D. Bailey; "The Administrative Committee on Coordination," by Martin Hill (dealing with the coordination of the specialized agencies); "United Nations Peace Forces," by Evan Luard; "The International Labour Organisation," by John McMahon; "The International Monetary Fund," by W. M. Scammell; "The World Bank," by Andrew Shonfield; "The Economic Organs of the United Nations," by Ralph Townley (covering principally the regional economic commissions and the various programs and agencies under ECOSOC); and "The European Economic Community," by John Pinder. An introduction by the editor on the process of change in international organizations, and some concluding generalizations based on the experiences reviewed, complete the collection.

All of the chapter subjects are thus fruit from the same basket, but they are not all fruit of the same species. They do not therefore form an integrated comparative study that can be reviewed as a unit. This is not necessarily in criticism of the book. Mr. Luard fairly characterizes it as "a preliminary essay in the neglected sociology of international institutions: a study of the mechanics of change within international organizations" (p. 8). In this sense, it is an interesting and useful survey of internal developments, especially with respect to methods of operation in the institutions chosen, many of which are unfamiliar even to most political scientists.

The patterns of change vary considerably according to the nature and functions of the agency under scrutiny; but the processes of change, and the factors inhibiting or promoting it, do not in the end turn out to be essentially different from those applicable to change in political institutions of national and less-than-national scope. Thus, Luard finds among the chief causes of change: alterations in the political composition of the membership; changing needs to be met; the personal influence of officials; the activating interest of individual governments; and, "perhaps ultimately more important than any other," the attitude of governments in general about the purposes such organizations may procure for them (p. 310).

Space allows only a few chapters to be noted individually. Those on the General Assembly and Security Council are two of the most interesting analyses, which seem especially well balanced in contrast to the chapter on UN Peace Forces—the weakest in the book. For one thing, the chapter on Peace Forces does not deal with a continuing institution, as do all the others. Rather, it contrasts the concept of international military sanctions to enforce the peace (which never developed as an international institution) with experience of both the League and the UN in actually establishing a limited number of non-

sanctions military forces. To fit the theme of the book, however, the editor finds first "a fairly clear course of development," that is partly at least "the result of a gradual development and crystallization of thought about the nature and scope of such forces . . ." (p. 138). But later he concedes (more accurately, in my view) that any pattern found "derives in part from the chance characteristics of the particular situations encountered" (p. 176). The chapter, moreover, is marred by some curious errors of fact: it was *not* "easier to establish a peace force . . . in 1964 than in 1960" (p. 171); Canada was very much a part of the Congo Force (p. 160); France has regularly paid her UNEF assessments (p. 152). It also has some highly dubious interpretations, such as that the Uniting for Peace resolution constituted "a major revision of the constitutional structure of the UN . . . which alone made possible the accomplishment of some future peacekeeping operations" (p. 147).

Chapters on the Administrative Committee on Coordination and on the economic organs of the UN, both of which give valuable perspective to a wide array of related agencies, would be even more interesting if they dealt more adequately with some of the external political factors that influenced the developments covered. Limitations of space were undoubtedly frustrating in this respect; but another restraining influence may have been the fact that these two chapters were written by members of the Secretariat.

The chapter on the European Economic Community differentiates it, as a supranational organization, from the international agencies studied in the other chapters; but justifies its inclusion to provide useful lessons in assessing when it may become possible for the latter to evolve to the supranational level. Unfortunately, the experience of the EEC seems to show, first, that its effective degree of supranationality was much less than appeared to be the case before the 1965 "crisis"; and secondly, that existing international organizations lack all the prerequisites for developing into supranational institutions.—RUTH B. RUSSELL, *Columbia University*.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

TRANSFER OF NEWS AND NOTES SECTION

Beginning with the last quarter of 1967 the information previously published in the News and Notes section of the REVIEW will be circulated as part of a newsletter prepared by the Washington Office and mailed periodically to every individual member of the American Political Science Association.

The sixty-fourth Annual Meeting of the Association will be held September 3–7, 1968 at the Washington-Hilton Hotel, Washington, D.C.

NOMINATIONS

The Association's Committee on Nominations invites all members to propose candidates for the elective offices of the Association: President-elect; three Vice Presidents; Secretary; Treasurer; and eight Council members for two-year terms.

Suggestions and supporting statements may be sent to any member of the Committee: Aaron B. Wildavsky, University of California, Berkeley, Chairman; Richard F. Fenno, Jr., University of Rochester; Robert E. Ward, University of Michigan; Harry Eckstein, Princeton University; Leon D. Epstein, University of Wisconsin; and William S. Livingston, University of Texas.

The sooner suggestions are received the better; to be considered at all they must arrive by March 1, 1968.

SIXTY-THIRD ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

Minutes of the Council Meeting

The Council of the American Political Science Association met at 9:10 A.M., September 5, 1967, at the Pick-Congress Hotel in Chicago, with President Robert Dahl presiding. The following officers, members of the Council, nominees for election in 1967, and former presidents of the Association were present: William Anderson, M. Margaret Ball, Marver Bernstein, William Buchanan, Holbert Carroll, H. Paul Castleberry, Robert A. Dahl, James C. Davies, Alex N. Dragnich, David Easton, Harry Eckstein, Heinz Eulau, Merle Fainsod, Carl J. Friedrich, Samuel Hendel, Charles O. Jones, Max M. Kampelman, Herbert Kaufman, Evron M. Kirkpatrick, Merle Kling, Robert E. Lane, Avery Leiserson, Harvey C. Mansfield, Charles McClelland, Wallace Mendelson, Alfred C. Meyer, Jack W. Peltason, Clara Penniman, Paul L. Puryear, Laurence I. Radway, Austin Ranney, William H. Riker, Victor G. Rosenblum, Clinton Rossiter, Glendon Schubert, Kenneth N. Waltz, Daniel Wit.

The Editor of the REVIEW, Professor Austin Ranney, presented his report. There was discussion of the large backlog of manuscripts for the REVIEW, of the relation of national to regional journals, and of the possibility of publishing additional periodicals divided by subject matter. A motion was unanimously passed that a Committee be appointed by the President of the Association to study these matters and report to the Council at next year's meeting. The Editor announced that Robert Lane had resigned from the

Editorial Board. A motion was unanimously passed that Fred Greenstein replace Professor Lane.

The Chairman of the Program Committee for 1967, Professor Harry Eckstein, gave his report. There was some discussion of the omission of the question of Viet Nam from the program for the meeting. It was pointed out, however, that panels on violence and revolution are part of the program. The Executive Director added that, if requested, the Association would try to arrange facilities for meetings on special topics.

The Executive Director, Dr. Evron Kirkpatrick, then gave his report. He mentioned that for the first time the Executive Director's Report was printed in the Final Program of the meeting. A motion was unanimously passed encouraging the Executive Director to continue this practice. Dr. Kirkpatrick reported that the Political Science Directory would be published sometime during the fall and also that the Association will maintain a directory of retired professors who wish to make known their availability for temporary teaching positions. Dr. Kirkpatrick then reported that the Helen Dwight Reid Award Committee had decided to make no award this year because of the small number of theses submitted The Executive Committee, however, authorized next year's Committee to receive theses for both 1966 and 1967 and to make two awards if it should wish to. The price of panel papers was discussed It was decided that the costs of the reproduction and sale of papers should be examined in order to see if there can be a reduction in the price of papers.

In submitting his report, the Treasurer, Dr. Max M. Kampelman, indicated that the Association was in fine financial condition. The projected budget for 1967–68 was unanimously approved by the Council. The Council unanimously authorized the Executive Director on behalf of the Council to express appreciation for the grants and gifts received from a number of donors.

Marver Bernstein, Chairman of the Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities, reviewed the Committee's report. With the permission of the Council, the Chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Oregon spoke before the Council and asked that: (1) a staff director be appointed who would systematically ascertain the feelings of a wide range of political scientists about the ethical standards of the profession, (2) that there be appointed to the Bernstein Committee additional members who would represent conflicting points of view and, (3) that specific attention be paid to the responsibilities *of* government *to* political scientists.

The seven recommendations of the Bernstein Committee were then discussed at length. In the discussion, it was emphasized that openness concerning the sources and conditions of support for research is a fundamental responsibility of scholars. The Committee was encouraged to define the standards and methods that will serve to implement the principle of full disclosure.

The motion was unanimously adopted that, having discussed and seriously considered the report of its Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities, the Council (a) commends the Committee for its efforts to date and encourages the Committee to continue its work and to prepare a report early enough in 1968 to permit its full consideration by the Council prior to its next meeting, (b) agrees with the Committee that the general principles of its first three recommendations should be incorporated in its final report, (c) joins with the Committee in requesting the Executive Director, the Editor of the REVIEW, and officers of the Association to follow its 4th and 5th recommendations, (d) favorably acts on the Committee's 6th recommendation and directs the Executive Committee to plan and execute details for implementing the recommendation, and (e) adopts the Committee's 7th recommendation.

An amendment was moved advising the Bernstein Committee to consider recommendations indicating both the responsibilities of political scientists with respect to government or other research support and the responsibilities of government or other research supporters toward maintaining the freedom of social scientists in their research. Because it was felt that the mandate of the Committee was already sufficiently broad, the motion was tabled.

After unanimously passing a motion that the Council accept the report of the Executive Committee as printed in the June, 1967, issue of *The American Political Science Review*, the Council turned to resolutions submitted by members of the Association.

Since the whole question of the future relations of officers, staff members, and members of the Association to any other organization is now under consideration by the Bernstein Committee, the Council accepted a motion recommending the rejection of the Clarke resolution with respect to the outside activities of elected or staff officers of the APSA.

The resolution submitted by George Carey, forbidding elected officials of the Association using their positions to advance their personal views on policy, and the resolution by A. Lee Fritschler *et al.*, requiring that officers and staff of the Association apprise the President and the Council of the receipt of any governmental funds, were referred to the Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities.

The resolution by Samuel Hendel, condemning

certain activities of the House Unamerican Activities Committee, and the resolution of William J. Parente, on racial and urban problems, were next considered. President Dahl ruled these resolutions out of order as being in conflict with Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution of the Association. Dr. Hendel appealed this ruling. The appeal was not carried.

The Council adjourned at 5:45 P.M.

KENNETH N. WALTZ
Secretary

Minutes of the Annual Business Meeting

The Annual Business Meeting of the American Political Science Association was called to order by President Robert A. Dahl at 4:45 P.M., September 6, 1967.

President Dahl thanked the officers and staff of the Association, the members of the Council, and the members of other committees for their cooperation during his term of office. He drew special attention to the imaginative work done by the Chairman of the Program Committee and emphasized the importance of the Committee on Professional Standards and Responsibilities to the future of the profession. He then asked the Chairman of that Committee, Professor Marver Bernstein, to summarize its report.

After the reading of the secretary's minutes of the Council's meeting, Professor Clinton Rossiter moved the adoption of the motion on the Bernstein report that had previously been accepted by the Council, but specified that such adoption would not preclude the consideration of resolutions previously submitted to the Council. The motion was carried. Professor Samuel Hendel, noting that his resolution had been found unconstitutional by the Council, spoke for the substance of the resolution and proposed that consideration be given—during the next year—to an amendment to the Constitution that would make the maintenance of academic freedom in the broadest sense a purpose of the Association. On a motion that Hendel's resolution be accepted, the constitutional question notwithstanding, President Dahl again ruled the resolution unconstitutional. A motion to overturn the ruling of the chair was defeated. Professor Robert Clarke then moved the adoption of his resolution; the motion was defeated.

The Editor of the REVIEW, the Treasurer, and the Executive Director, whose reports were available to the membership, made brief remarks. The Chairman of the Nominating Committee, Professor Gwendolen Carter, proposed the following officers for 1967–68:

President Elect: David Easton, University of Chicago

Vice Presidents: Stephen K. Bailey (Syracuse University), Harvey C. Mansfield (Columbia University), Jack W. Peltason (University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana)

Secretary: Harvey Glickman, Haverford College

Treasurer: Max M. Kampelman, Washington, D. C.

Members of the Council for two years: Holbert N. Carroll (University of Pittsburgh), Charles O. Jones (University of Arizona), Merle Kling (Washington University, St. Louis), Roy C. Macridis (Brandeis University), Paul L. Puryear (Fisk University), Robert A. Scalapino (University of California, Berkeley), Glendon Schubert (University of North Carolina), Daniel Wit (Northern Illinois University)

No nominations were made from the floor, and the new officers were overwhelmingly elected.

Professor Dahl then turned the gavel over to the new President, Merle Fainsod, who at 7:00 P.M. declared the meeting adjourned.

KENNETH N. WALTZ
Secretary

ARTICLES ACCEPTED FOR FUTURE PUBLICATION*

March, 1968

Roger W. Benjamin and John H. Kautsky, "Communism and Economic Development"

Thomas W. Casstevens, "A Theorem about Voting"

Robert Eyestone and Heinz Eulau, "City Councils and Policy Outcomes"

Paul Y. Hammond, "Risk Distribution, Rationalization, and Legitimization in Defense Policymaking"

J. Woodford Howard, Jr., "On the Fluidity of Judicial Choice"

M. Kent Jennings, "The Transmission of Political Values from Parent to Child"

Henry F. Kaiser, "A Measure of the Quality of Legislative Apportionment"

* Production exigencies may occasionally necessitate publication of articles in issues other than those given in this listing.

Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey, "The 'Intensity' Problem and Democratic Theory"
Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the United States House of Representatives"
William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, "A Theory of the Calculus of Voting"
Roberta S. Sigel, "School Children's Political Image of President Kennedy"
David M. Wood, "Majority v. Opposition in the National Assembly of the Fifth Republic: A Guttman Scale Analysis"
Aristide R. Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Tropical Africa"

June, 1968

Charles R. Adrian and Charles Press, "Decision Costs in Coalition Formation"
Robert Alford, "Voting Turnout in American Cities"
Steven J. Brams, "Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems"
S. E. Finer, "Pareto and Pluto-Democracy"
Carl J. Friedrich, "Some Thoughts on the Relation of Political Theory to Anthropology"
Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Organization Theory and the Explanation of Important Characteristics of Congress"
Dean Jaros, Herbert Hirsch, and Fred Fleron, "The Malevolent Leader: Political Socialization in an American Sub-culture"
Charles O. Jones, "The Minority Party and Policy-Making in the House of Representatives"
Fred Kort, "A Nonlinear Model for the Analysis of Judicial Decisions"
Lewis Lipsitz, "If, as Verba Says, the State Functions as a Religion, What Are We to Do to Save Our Souls?"
Richard M. Merelman, "On the Neo-Elitist Critique of Community Power"
Bruce M. Russett, "Commentary on Brams' Measuring the Concentration of Power in Political Systems"
Michael J. Shapiro, "The House and the Federal Role: A Computer Simulation of Roll-Call Voting"

September, 1968

Richard Ashcraft, "Locke's State of Nature: Historical Fact or Moral Fiction?"
Edward N. Beiser, "The Reapportionment Cases: A Comparative Analysis of State and Federal Judicial Behavior"
Moshe M. Czudnowski, "A Salience Dimension for the Study of Political Culture" Jerome M. Gilison, "Soviet Elections as a Measure of Dissent: The Missing One Percent"
A. James Gregor, "Political Sciences and the Uses of Functional Analysis"
Kenneth P. Langton and M. Kent Jennings, "Political Socialization and the High School Civics Curriculum in the United States"
Michael Leiserson, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Explanation Based on the Theory of Games"
Milton G. Lodge, "Soviet Elite Attitudes in the Post-Stalin Era"
Martin C. Needler, "Political Development and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin America"
Robert A. Schoenberger, "Conservatism, Personality and Political Extremism"
Joel J. Schwartz and William R. Keech, "Group Influence on the Policy Process in the Soviet Union"
J. David Singer, Bruce M. Russett, and Melvin Small, "National Political Units in the Twentieth Century: A Standardized List"
Jack E. Vincent, "National Attributes as Predictors of Delegate Attitudes at the United Nations"
Raymond E. Wolfinger and Fred I. Greenstein, "The Repeal of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting"



INDEX TO VOLUME LXI

Abbott, David W. Note on Wright, Theodore Paul, Jr., *American Support for Free Elections Abroad*..... 563
The ABC of Communism. Bukharin N. and Preobrazhensky, E. Noted by Meyer, Alfred G..... 170
Abraham, Henry J. *Freedom and the Court: Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States*. Noted by Rankin, Robert S..... 1133
Abu Jaber, Kamel S. *The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization*. Noted by Suleiman, Michael W..... 1153
Academic Ideology and the Study of Adjudication. Schubert, Glendon..... 106
The Accountability and Audit of Governments: A Comparative Study. Normanton, E. L. Noted by Burkhead, Jesse..... 195
Adloff, Richard and Thompson, Virginia. *The Malagasy Republic: Madagascar Today*. Noted by Potholm, Christian P..... 212
Administrative Problems in Pakistan. Birkhead, Guthrie S., Ed. Noted by Goodnow, Henry F..... 1154
African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy. McKay, Vernon, Ed. Noted by Finlay, David J..... 839
African Law: Adaptation and Development. Kuper, Leo and Hilda, Ed. Noted by Katz, Michael..... 1168
African Socialism. Brockway, Fenner. Noted by Friedland, William H..... 822
African Trade Unions. Davies, Ioan. Noted by Friedland, William H..... 822
Africa's Golden Road. Armah, Kwesi. Noted by Weinstein, Brian..... 210
Africa's Search for Identity. Ferkiss, Victor C. Noted by Weinstein, Brian..... 210
The Age of Keynes. Lekachman, Robert. Reviewed by Yohe, William P..... 175
Agriculture Under Communism. Walston, Lord. Noted by Laird, Roy D..... 207
Aid for Development: An Economic Study. Arnold, H. J. P. Noted by Montgomery, John D..... 1171
Air Transport Policy and National Security: A Political, Economic, and Military Analysis. Thayer, Frederick C. Jr. Noted by Johns, Claude J. Jr..... 213
Alexander, Herbert E. *Financing the 1964 Election*. Noted by Bone, Hugh A..... 189
Alger, Chadwick. Note on Landy, E. A., *The Effectiveness of International Supervision: Thirty Years of I. L. O. Experience*..... 840
Almond, Gabriel A. Review of Moore, Barrington, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*..... 768
Altmeyer, Arthur J. *The Formative Years of Social Security*. Noted by Christenson, Reo M..... 187
Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States. Schlesinger, Joseph A. Reviewed by Prewitt, Kenneth..... 767
Ambler, John S. Note on Paxton, Robert O., *Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officers Corps under Marshal Pétain*..... 813
Ambler, John Steward. *The French Army in Politics, 1945–1962*. Noted by Bode, Ken A..... 201
American Federalism: A View from the States. Elazar, Daniel J. Noted by Fesler, James W..... 805
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: CONGRESS
Measurement Identity in the Longitudinal Analysis of Legislative Voting. Clausen, Aage R..... 1020
Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives. Peabody, Robert L..... 675
Party, Region and the Dimensions of Conflict in the House of Representatives, 1949–1954. Marwell, Gerald..... 380
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and Religion. Carroll, William A..... 657
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: ELECTIONS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR
Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification. Parenti, Michael..... 717
The Impact of Universal Suffrage: A Comparison of Popular and Property Voting. Vines, Kenneth N. and Glick, Henry Robert..... 1078
Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's "Expected" Loss of Seats. Hinckley, Barbara..... 694
The Measurement of Inter-Party Competition and Systemic Stability. Pfeiffer, David G. 457
Politicians' Beliefs about Voters. Kingdon, John W..... 137
Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First. Kelley, Stanley, Jr., Ayres, Richard E., and Bowen, William G..... 359
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: FOREIGN POLICY
Compatibility, Consensus, and an Emerging Political Science of Adaptation. Rosenau, James N..... 983
Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and In-

ternal Dimensions of Foreign Policy. Hanreider Wolfram F..... 971
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: INTEREST GROUPS
Bar Politics, Judicial Selection and the Representation of Social Interests. Watson, Richard A., Downing, Rondal G. and Spiegel, Frederick C..... 54
A Note on Legislative Research: Labor Representation in Rhode Island. Goodman, Jay S..... 468
Protest Participation among Southern Negro College Students. Orbell, John M..... 446
Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities. Lineberry, Robert L. and Fowler, Edmund P..... 701
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION
The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy. Easton, David and Dennis, Jack..... 25
Peer Group and School and the Political Socialization Process. Langton, Kenneth P..... 751
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: PUBLIC OPINION
Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam. Verba, Sidney, Brody, Richard A., Parker, Edwin B., Nie, Norman H., Polsby, Nelson W., Ekman, Paul and Black, Gordon S..... 317
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: STATE GOVERNMENT
Dimensions of Modernization in the American States. Crittenden, John..... 989
Government Expenditures and Public Services in the American States. Sharkansky, Ira... 1066
The American Jury. Kalven, Harry, Jr. and Zeisel, Hans. Reviewed by Beaney, William..... 770
The American People and China. Steele, A. T. Noted by Harris, Louis..... 219
American Support for Free Elections Abroad. Wright, Theodore Paul, Jr. Noted by Abbott, David W..... 563
The American System. Grodzins, Morton. Reviewed by Martin, Roscoe C..... 1108
Anabtawi, Samir N. Note on Hirst, David, *Oil and Public Opinion in the Middle East*..... 558
Ancients and Moderns: Essays on the Tradition of Political Philosophy. Cropsey, Joseph, Ed. Noted by Kendall, Wilmoore. 783
Anderson, Arnold C. and Bowman, Mary Jean, Ed. *Education and Economic Development*. Reviewed by Carter, Gwendolen M..... 497
Anderson, Stanley V. *Canadian Ombudsman Proposals*. Noted by Rowat, Donald C... 811
Annexation in Virginia: The Use of the Judicial Process for Readjusting City-County Boundaries. Bain, Chester W. Noted by Moss, Warner..... 806
Annihilation and Utopia: The Principles of International Politics. Harris, Errol E. Noted by Burns, Richard Dean..... 556
Anton, Thomas J. *The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois*. Noted by Sharkansky, Ira..... 807
The Anzus Treaty Alliance. Starke, J. G. Noted by Gordon, Bernard K..... 835
Approaches to Organizational Design. Thompson, James D., Ed. Noted by Golembiewski, Robert T..... 792
Aptheker, Herbert, Ed. *Marxism and Alienation: A Symposium*. Noted by Litt, Edgar..... 508
The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization. Abu Jaber, Kamel S. Noted by Suleiman, Michael W. 1153
The Arab Cold War, 1958–1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics. Kerr, Malcolm. Noted by Ramazani, Rouhollah K..... 223
Ardrey, Robert. *The Territorial Imperative. A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations*. Reviewed by Davies, James C..... 162
Area Studies and the Library. Tsien, Tsuen-Hsuin and Winger, Howard W., Ed. Book Note..... 213
Arfa, Hassan. *The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study*. Noted by Rupen, Robert A..... 831
Armah, Kwesi. *Africa's Golden Road*. Noted by Weinstein, Brian..... 210
Armed Force as Power: The Theory of War Reconsidered. Coats, Wendell J. Noted by Rapoport, David C..... 1122
Arms and Influence. Schelling, Thomas C. Reviewed by Martin, Laurence W..... 766
Arnaud, P., Bastid, P., Battiffol, H., Chapman, J. W., Cotta, S., de Jouvenel, B., Polin, R., Treves, R. and Sternberger, D. *L'Idee de Philosophie Politique: Annales de Philosophie Politique-6*. Noted by Watkins, Frederick M..... 786
Arndt, Joachim. *West Germany: Politics of Non-Planning*. Noted by Foster, Charles R..... 1144
Arnold, H. J. P. *Aid for Development: An Economic Study*. Noted by Montgomery, John D..... 1171
Aron. Raymond. *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*. Reviewed by Morgenthau, Hans J..... 1110
Aron, Robert. *An Explanation of DeGaulle*. Noted by Diamant, Alfred..... 197
Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody. LaFave, Wayne R. Reviewed by Beaney, William..... 770
Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from

the British Imperial Tradition. Braibanti, Ralph, Ed. Noted by Goodnow, Henry F. 1154
Aspects of Political Development. Pye, Lucian W. Noted by Pinney, Edward L. 208
Atherton, Aleyine, Ed. Note on Mangone, Gerard J., Ed. *UN Administration of Economic and Social Programs* 1172
Atherton, Aleyine L. Note on Montgomery, John D., *Foreign Aid in International Politics* 1172
Atomic Energy in France Under the Fourth Republic. Scheinman, Lawrence. Noted by Kramish, Arnold 812
An Attempt to Simulate the Outbreak of World War I. Hermann, Charles F. and Hermann, Margaret G. 400
Aus Naechster Naehe—Lebenserinnerungen 1884–1927. Brecht, Arnold. Reviewed by Friedrich, Carl J. 163
Auschwitz. A Report on the Proceedings Against Robert Karl Mulka and Others Before the Court at Frankfurt. Naumann, Bernd. Noted by Gimbel, John 814
Austin, Dennis. *Britain and South Africa.* Noted by Stultz, Newell M. 825
Avtorkhanov, Abdurakhman. *The Communist Party Apparatus.* Noted by Sullivant, Robert S. 816
Ayres, Richard E., Bowen, William G. and Kelley, Stanley, Jr. *Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First* 359

Bachrach, Peter. *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique.* Noted by Polsby, Nelson W. 1124
Bacon, Elizabeth E. *Central Asians under Russian Rule.* Noted by Pierce, Richard A. 832
Bailey, Norman A. *Latin America in World Politics.* Noted by Slater, Jerome 1182
Bailey, Thomas A. *Presidential Greatness: The Image and the Man From George Washington to the Present.* Noted by Koenig, Louis W. 1139
Bain, Chester W. *Annexation in Virginia: The Use of the Judicial Process for Readjusting City-County Boundaries.* Noted by Moss, Warner 806
Baker, James K. and Davis, John A., Eds. *Southern Africa in Transition.* Noted by Stultz, Newell M. 825
Baldwin, David. Note on Koh, Byung Chul, *The United Nations Administrative Tribunal* 561
Baldwin, David. Note on Kaplan, Jacob J., *The Challenge of Foreign Aid: Policies, Problems and Possibilities* 1173
Ballots and Bandwagons. Martin, Ralph G. Noted by Peterson, Arthur L. 1138
Banfield, Edward and Meyerson, Martin. *Boston: The Job Ahead.* Noted by Long, Norton 515
Bar Politics, Judicial Selection and the Representation of Social Interests. Watson, Richard A., Downing, Rondal G. and Spiegel, Frederick C. 54
Barber, Richard J. *The Politics of Research.* Noted by Orlans, Harold 1126
Bargaining in a Three-Person Game. Riker, William H. 642
Barton, Weldon V. Note on Phillips, Cabell, *The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession* 794
Basic Tactics. Tse-Tung, Mao. Noted by Boorman, Scott A. 1121
Bastid, Paul. *Benjamin Constant et sa Doctrine.* Noted by Dodge, Guy H. 1118
Bastid, P., Battiffol, H., Chapman, J. W., Cotta, S., de Jouvenel, B., Polin, R., Treves, R., Sternberger, D. and Arnaud, P. *L'Idee de Philosophie Politique: Annales de Philosophie Politique-6.* Noted by Watkins, Frederick M. 786
Batchelder, John T. Note on Hayward, J.E.S., *Private Interests and Public Policy: The Experience of the French Economic and Social Council* 1145
Bates, Margaret L. Note on Carter, Gwendolen M., Ed., *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States* 823
Battiffol, H., Chapman, J. W., Cotta, S., de Jouvenel, B., Polin, R., Treves, R., Sternberger, D., Arnaud, P. and Bastid, P. *L'Idee de Philosophie Politique: Annales de Philosophie Politique-6.* Noted by Watkins, Frederick M. 786
Bay, Christian. Communication 1096
Beaney, William. Review of Kalven, Harry, Jr. and Zeisel, Hans, *The American Jury.* 770
Beaney, William. Review of LaFave, Wayne R., *Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody* 770
Beaney, William. Review of Newman, Donald J., *Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial* 770
Beaufre, Andre. *Deterrence and Strategy.* Noted by Johns, Claude J., Jr. 213
Becker, Theodore L. Communication 480
Becker, Theodore L. Communication 1100
Bedrohung und Bewährung: Führung und Bevölkerung in der Berlin-Krise. Shell, Kurt L. Reviewed by Merritt, Richard L. 486
Beer, Samuel H. Note on Dowse, Robert E., *Left in the Centre: The Independent Labour Party, 1893–1940* 530
Behavior in Public Places. Goffman, Erving. Noted by Merelman, Richard M. 500
Belshaw, Michael. *A Village Economy: Land*

and People of Huecorio. Noted by Gillin, John P. ... 1165
Benchmarks, Friendly, Henry J. Noted by Krislov, Samuel ... 1134
Benedict, Burton. *Mauritius: Problems of a Plural Society*. Noted by Potholm, Christian P. ... 212
Benjamin Constant et sa Doctrine. Bastid, Paul. Noted by Dodge, Guy H. ... 1118
Benoit, Emile Ed. *Disarmament and World Economic Interdependence*. Noted by Holsti, Ole R. ... 1180
Berg, Elias. *Democracy and the Majority Principle: A Study in Twelve Contemporary Political Theories*. Noted by Thorson, Thomas Landon ... 176
Berlin-Bestand und Möglichkeiten. Storbeck, Dietrich. Noted by Merritt, Richard L. ... 534
Bernstein, Richard J. *John Dewey*. Noted by Ebenstein, William ... 502
Béteille, André. *Caste, Class, and Power: Changing Patterns of Stratification in a Tanjore Village*. Noted by Pinney, Edward L. ... 208
Betts, George C. Note on Gerson, Louis L., *The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy* ... 522
Beutel, Frederick K. *Democracy or the Scientific Method in Law and Policy Making*. Noted by Makielski, S. J., Jr. ... 178
Beyle, Thad L. Note on Salinger, Pierre, *With Kennedy* ... 795
Bird, Agnes and Buchanan, William. *Money as a Campaign Resource: Tennessee Democratic Senatorial Primaries, 1948–1964*. Noted by Wise, Sidney ... 190
Birkhead, Guthrie S., Ed. *Administrative Problems in Pakistan*. Noted by Goodnow, Henry F. ... 1154
Birkhead, Guthrie S. Note on Braibanti, Ralph, *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan. A Critique of Sources, Conditions, and Issues, with Appended Documents* ... 194
Black, Gordon, Verba, Sidney, Brody, Richard A., Parker, Edwin B., Nie, Norman H., Polsby, Nelson W. and Ekman, Paul. Communication ... 1104
Black, Gordon S., Verba, Sidney, Brody, Richard A., Parker, Edwin B., Nie, Norman H., Polsby, Nelson W. and Ekman, Paul. *Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam* ... 317
Blalock, Hubert M. *Causal Inferences, Closed Populations, and Measures of Association* ... 130
Block, William J. Note on Shover, John L., *Cornbelt Rebellion: The Farmers' Holiday Association* ... 521
Bluhm, William T. Note on Easton, David, Ed., *Varieties of Political Theory* ... 784
Bode, Ken A. Note on Ambler, John Steward, *The French Army in Politics, 1945–1962* ... 201
Bolton, Roger E. *Defense Purchases and Regional Growth*. Noted by Tybout, Richard A. ... 193
Bone, Hugh A., Note on Alexander, Herbert E., *Financing the 1964 Election* ... 189
Boorman, Scott A. Note on Tse-Tung, Mao, *Basic Tactics* ... 1121
Bornet, Vaughn Davis. *Labor Politics in a Democratic Republic: Moderation, Division, and Disruption in the Presidential Election of 1928*. Noted by Silva, Ruth C. 804
Boston: The Job Ahead. Meyerson, Martin and Banfield, Edward. Noted by Long, Norton ... 515
Bottomore, T. B. *Elites and Society*. Noted by Seligman, Lester ... 787
Boulding, Kenneth E. Note on Halle, Louis J., *The Society of Man* ... 843
Bowman, Mary Jean and Anderson, Arnold C., Ed. *Education and Economic Development*. Reviewed by Carter, Gwendolen M. 497
Bowen, William G., Kelley, Stanley, Jr. and Ayres, Richard E. *Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First* ... 359
Bowman, R. Lewis. Note on Choukas, Michael, *Propaganda Comes of Age* ... 179
Bradley, Phillips. Note on Hoshi, Bhuwan L. and Rose, Leo D., *Democratic Innovations in Nepal* ... 547
Braibanti, Ralph. *Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan. A Critique of Sources, Conditions, and Issues, with Appended Documents*. Noted by Birkhead, Guthrie S. ... 194
Braibanti, Ralph., Ed. *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition*. Noted by Goodnow, Henry F. ... 1154
Brakeman, Louis F. Note on Brown, J. F., *The New Eastern Europe: The Khrushchev Era and After* ... 817
Braunthal, Gerard. Note on Ritter, Gerard, *The German Problem: Basic Questions of German Political Life, Past and Present* 533
Braunthal, Gerard. Note on Merkl, Peter H., *Germany: Yesterday and Tomorrow* .. 533
Braunthal, Gerard. Note on Hartmann, Frederick H., *Germany Between East and West: The Reunification Problem* ... 533
Break, George F. *Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United States*. Noted by Wright, Deil S. ... 1135
Brecht, Arnold. *Aus Naechster Nache-Lebenserinnerungen 1884–1927*. Reviewed

by Friedrich, Carl J..... 163
Britain and South Africa. Austin, Dennis. Noted by Stultz, Newell M..... 825
Brockway, Fenner. *African Socialism.* Noted by Friedland, William H..... 822
Brody, Richard A., Parker, Edwin B., Nie, Norman H., Polsby, Nelson W., Ekman, Paul, Black, Gordon and Verba, Sidney. Communication..... 1104
Brody, Richard A., Parker, Edwin B., Nie, Norman H., Polsby, Nelson W., Ekman, Paul, Black, Gordon S. and Verba, Sidney. *Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam*..... 317
Bromke, Adam. *Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism.* Noted by Piekalkiewicz, Jaroslaw A..... 1147
Brooks, Glenn E. and Rourke, Francis E. *The Managerial Revolution in Higher Revolution.* Reviewed by Peltason, J. W. 1116
Brotz, Howard, Ed. *Negro Social and Political Thought: 1850–1920.* Noted by Reed, Adolph..... 512
Brown, Bernard E. Note on Michelat, Guy and Thomas, Jean-Pierre H., *Dimensions du Nationalisme: Enquete Par Questionnaire*..... 814
Brown, Emily Clark. *Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations.* Noted by Sorenson, Jay B..... 206
Brown, J. F. *The New Eastern Europe: The Khrushchev Era and After.* Noted by Brakeman, Louis F..... 817
Brown, Keith C., Ed. *Hobbes Studies.* Noted by Jaffe, Erwin A..... 172
Brown, MacAlister. Note on Cleveland, Harlan, *The Obligations of Power: American Diplomacy in the Search for Peace*.... 844
Browning, Rufus P. Note on Buchanan, James M., *Public Finance to Democratic Process, Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice*..... 1133
Buchanan, James M. *Public Finance to Democratic Process, Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice.* Noted by Browning, Rufus P..... 1135
Buchanan, William and Bird, Agnes. *Money as a Campaign Resource: Tennessee Democratic Senatorial Primaries, 1948–1964.* Noted by Wise, Sidney..... 190
Bukharin, N. and Preobrazhensky, E. *The ABC of Communism.* Noted by Meyer, Alfred G..... 170
Burke, Fred G. and Yeager, Rodger. Note on Lofchie, Michael F., *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution*..... 827
Burkhead, Jesse. Note on Normanton, E. L., *The Accountability and Audit of Governments: A Comparative Study*..... 195
Burks, Ardath W. Note on Passin, Herbert, Ed., *The United States and Japan*..... 559
Burns, James MacGregor. Note on Krock, Arthur, *In the Nation: 1932–1966*..... 1141
Burns, Richard Dean. Note on Harris, Errol E., *Annihilation and Utopia: The Principles of International Politics*..... 556

Callow, Alexander B., Jr. *The Tweed Ring.* Noted by Peel, Roy V..... 1140
Camer, Richard. Note on Swanson, Bert E., *The Struggle for Equality*..... 1132
Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren E. and Stokes, Donald E. Reviewed by Prothro, James W. *Elections and the Political Order.* Reviewed by Prothro, James W..... 485
Canadian Ombudsman Proposals. Anderson, Stanley V. Noted by Rowat, Donald C.. 811
Caplan, Gerald L. Note on Rotberg, Robert I., *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa. The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873–1964*..... 1169
Caraley, Demetrios. Note on Davis, Vincent, *Postwar Defense Policy and the U. S. Navy, 1943–1946*..... 799
Caraley, Demetrios. *The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process.* Noted by Smith, Jean Edward..... 528
Carlin, Jerome E. *Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar.* Noted by McKean, Dayton D..... 190
Carroll, William A. *The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and Religion*..... 657
Carter, Gwendolen M., Ed. *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States.* Noted by Bates, Margaret L..... 823
Carter, Gwendolen. M. Review of Anderson, Arnold C. and Bowman, Mary Jean, Ed., *Education and Economic Development*..... 497
Carter, Gwendolen M. Review of Cowan, Gray L., O'Connell, James and Scanlon, David G., Ed., *Education and Nation-Building in Africa*..... 497
Carter, Gwendolen M. Review of Ikejiani, Okechukwu, Ed., *Education in Nigeria* 497
Cary, William L. *Politics and the Regulatory Agencies.* Noted by Moore, John E..... 1129
Cassinelli, C. W. *Free Activities and Interpersonal Relations.* Noted by Oppenheim, Felix E..... 178
Caste, Class, and Power: Changing Patterns of Stratification in a Tanjore Village. Béteille, André. Noted by Pinney, Edward L..... 208
Causal Inferences. Closed Populations and Measures of Association. Blalock, Hu-

bert M..... 130
Central Asians under Russian Rule. A Study in Culture Change. Bacon, Elizabeth E. Noted by Pierce, Richard A..... 832
The Challenge of Foreign Aid: Policies, Problems, and Possibilities. Kaplan, Jacob J. Noted by Baldwin, David..... 1173
Chammah, Albert M. and Rapoport, Anatol. *Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation.* Noted by Shubik, Martin..... 173
Chapman, J. W., Cotta, S., de Jouvenel, B., Polin, R., Treves, R., Sternberger, D., Arnaud, P., Bastid, P., and Battiffol, H. *L'Idée de Philosophie Politique: Annales de Philosophie Politique-6.* Noted by Watkins, Frederick M..... 786
Chapman, John W. and Pennock, J. Roland. *Nomos IX: Equality.* Noted by Sargent, Lyman, Tower..... 1123
Chen, Yung Ping. *Chinese Political Thought: Mao Tse-Tung and Liu Shao-Chi.* Noted by Schram, Stuart R..... 786
The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy. Easton, David and Dennis, Jack..... 25
China and the World: An Analysis of Communist China's Foreign Policy. Dutt, Vidya Prakash. Noted by Leng, Shao-chuan..... 218
Chinese Political Thought: Mao Tse-Tung and Liu Shao-Chi. Chen, Yung Ping. Noted by Schram, Stuart R..... 786
Choukas, Michael. *Propaganda Comes of Age.* Noted by Bowman, R. Lewis..... 179
Christenson, Reo M. Note on Altmeyer, Arthur J., *The Formative Years of Social Security*..... 187
Christoph, James B. Note on Rose, Richard, Ed., *Studies in British Politics: A Reader in Political Sociology*..... 202
Christoph, James B. Note on Wilson, Trevor, *The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914–1935*..... 1143
Church and State in Latin America. A History of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations. Mecham, J. Lloyd. Rev. Ed. Noted by Helguera, J. Leon..... 550
Ciria, Alberto. Note on Hillon, Robert Paul, *Mexican Marxist: Vicente Lombardo Toledano*..... 548
Ciria, Alberto. Note on Padgett, L. Vincent, *The Mexican Political System*..... 548
The City in the Future of Democracy. Dahl, Robert A..... 953
Clarke, I. F. *Voices Prophesying War, 1763–1984.* Noted by Wright, Quincy..... 1181
Class Struggle and Socialist Justice: The Case of Czechoslovakia. Ulč, Otto..... 727
Clausen, Aage R. *Measurement Identity in the Longitudinal Analysis of Legislative Voting*..... 1020
Cleveland, Harlan. *The Obligations of Power: American Diplomacy in the Search for Peace.* Noted by Brown, MacAlister..... 844
Cleveland, James C. *We Propose: A Modern Congress.* Reviewed by Masters, Nicholas A..... 775
Clinard, Marshall B. *Slums and Community Development: Experiments in Self-Help.* Noted by Hunter, David R..... 186
Clute, Robert E. Note on Frankel, Charles, *The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs: American Educational and Cultural Policy Abroad*..... 224
Cnudde, Charles F. Note on Goldman, Ralph M., *The Democratic Party in American Politics*..... 525
Cnudde, Charles F. Note on Hargrove, Erwin C., *Presidential Leadership*..... 525
Cnudde, Charles F. Note on Holtzman, Abraham, *Interest Groups and Lobbying* 525
Cnudde, Charles F. Note on Sindler, Allan P., *Political Parties in the United States*... 525
Cnudde, Charles F. and McCrone, Donald J. *Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model*..... 72
Coats, Wendell J. *Armed Force as Power: The Theory of War Reconsidered.* Noted by Rapoport, David, C..... 1122
Cohen, Arthur A. *The Communism of Mao Tse-Tung. Noted by Spector, Stanley*..... 828
Cohen, Mark I. and Hahn, Lorna. *Morocco: Old Land, New Nation.* Noted by Zartman, I. William..... 544
Colcord, Frank C., Jr. Note on Doig, Jameson, W., *Metropolitan Transportation Politics and the New York Region*.... 1128
Colcord, Frank C., Jr. Note on Owen, Wilfred, *The Metropolitan Transportation Problem*, rev. ed..... 1128
The Colonizer and the Colonized. Memmi, Albert. Noted by Roberts, James W. 557
Colton, Joel. *Léon Blum: Humanist in Politics.* Reviewed by Ehrmann, Henry W..... 495
Comfort, Richard. *Revolutionary Hamburg: Labour Politics in the Early Weimar Republic.* Noted by Wright, William E. 1144
Comintern and Peasant in East-Europe 1919–1930. Jackson, George D. Noted by Piekalkiewicz, Jaroslaw..... 539
Communication by Bruce L. R. Smith..... 150
Communication by Bruce M. Russett..... 149
Communication by Christian Bay..... 1096
Communication by David Easton..... 759

Communication by Frederick L. Schuman. 149
Communication by Harmon Zeigler..... 480
Communication by Herbert Weisberg and Richard Niemi..... 1104
Communication by Jack Dennis..... 759
Communication by Jay S. Goodman..... 153
Communication by Lewis A. Dexter..... 1104
Communication by Lewis A. Froman..... 479
Communication by Louis Fisher, Jr..... 759
Communication by Michael Parenti..... 1103
Communication by Otto Davis, M. A. H. Dempster, and Arron Wildavsky..... 152
Communication by Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg..... 761
Communication by Thomas Landon Thorson..... 478
Communication by S. Sidney Ulmer..... 1098
Communication by Sidney Verba, Richard A. Brody, Edwin B. Parker, Norman H. Nie, Nelson W. Polsby, Paul Ekman and Gordon Black..... 1104
Communication by Tang Tsou..... 1101
Communication by Theodore L. Becker... 1100
Communication by Wolfram F. Hanreider 1096
Communism in Finland: A History and Interpretation. Hodgson, John H. Noted by Rintala, Marvin..... 819
The Communism of Mao Tse-Tung. Cohen, Arthur A. Noted by Spector, Stanley. 828
Communist China and Arms Control. Halperin, Morton H. and Perkins, Dwight H. Noted by Leng, Shao-chuan..... 218
Communist China in World Politics. Hinton, Harold. Noted by Tsou, Tang..... 1158
The Communist Controversy in Washington—From the New Deal to McCarthy. Latham, Earl. Reviewed by Fellman, David..... 160
The Communist Party Apparatus. Avtorkhanov, Abdurakhman. Noted by Sullivant, Robert S..... 816
The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951–1963. Hindley, Donald. Noted by Mendel, Douglas, Jr..... 545
COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT
An End to European Integration? Inglehart, Ronald..... 91
Class Struggle and Socialist Justice: The Case of Czechoslovakia. Ulč, Otto..... 727
Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis. Nye, J. S..... 417
Mass Movement and Democracy: Sokagakkai in Japanese Politics. White, James W.... 744
Political Dualism and Italian Communism. Tarrow, Sidney G..... 39
Political Recruitment: The Case of Japanese Prefectural Assemblymen. Kim, Young C. 1036
Socio-economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1968. Soares, Glaucio and Hamblin, Robert L..... 1053
Comparative Politics and Political Theory. Essays Written in Honor of Charles Baskervil Robson. Pinney, Edward L., Ed. Noted by Leiserson, Avery..... 499
Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy. Hanreider, Wolfram F..... 971
Compatibility, Consensus, and an Emerging Political Science of Adaptation. Rosenau, James N..... 983
Competition and Cooperation: The Emergence of a National Trade Association. Galambos, Louis. Reviewed by Garceau, Oliver..... 498
The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought. Russett, Cynthia Eagle. Noted by Garvey, Gerald..... 784
Congress and Lobbies: Image and Reality. Scott, Andrew M. and Hunt, Margaret A. Noted by Davidson, Roger H..... 185
Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform. Davidson, Roger H., Kovenock, David M. and O'Leary, Michael K. Reviewed by Masters, Nicholas A..... 775
Congress: The First Branch of Government. DeGrazia, Alfred et al. Reviewed by Masters, Nicholas A..... 775
Congressman and the Electorate: Elections for the U. S. House and the President, 1920–1964. Cummings, Milton C. Noted by Jones, Charles O..... 793
Connell-Smith, Gordon. *The Inter-American System.* Noted by Francis, Michael. 1183
Connor, Paul W. *Poor Richard's Politicks: Benjamin Franklin and His New American Order.* Noted by Mitchell, Stephen R. 790
The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and Religion. Carroll, William A..... 657
Constructive Typology and Social Theory. McKinney, John C. Noted by Mitchell, William C..... 506
Contemporary French Political Thought. Pierce, Roy. Noted by Kelly, George Armstrong..... 504
Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren E., Stokes, Donald E., and Campbell, Angus. *Elections and the Political Order.* Reviewed by Prothro, James W..... 485
Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial. Newman, Donald J. Reviewed by Beaney, William..... 770
Coogan, Timothy Patrick. *Ireland Since the Rising.* Noted by Hayden, Eustace M... 204
Cooper, William Mansfield, Davis, William G., Parent, Alphonse-Marie, and McConnell, Thomas R. *Governments and the University.* Reviewed by Peltason, J. W. 1116

Cornbelt Rebellion: The Farmers' Holiday Association. Shover, John L. Noted by Block, William J..... 521
Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis. Nye, J. S..... 417
Corson, John J. and Paul, R. Shale. *Men Near the Top: Filling Key Posts in the Federal Service.* Noted by Jennings, M. Kent..... 796
Cotta, S., de Jouvenel, B., Polin, R., Treves, R., Sternberger, D., Arnaud, P., Bastid, P., Battiffol, H. and Chapman, J. W. *L'Idee de Philosophie Politique: Annales de Philosophie Politique-6.* Noted by Watkins, Frederick M..... 786
Cowan, L. Gray, O'Connell, James and Scanlon, David G., Ed., *Education and Nation-Building in Africa.* Reviewed by Carter, Gwendolen M..... 497
Crabb, Cecil V., Jr. Note on Masters, Roger D., *The National is Burdened: American Foreign Policy in a Changing World*..... 1177
Crankshaw, Edward. *Khrushchev: A Career.* Noted by Rush, Myron..... 199
Crassweller, Robert D. *Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator.* Noted by Gil, Federico G..... 196
Creating Political Order. The Party-States of West Africa. Zolberg, Aristide R. Noted by Glickman, Harvey..... 820
Crittenden, John. *Dimensions of Modernization in the American States*..... 989
Croan, Melvin. Note on Hangen, Welles *The Muted Revolution: East Germany's Challenge to Russia and the West*..... 536
Crook, David and Isabel. *The First Years of Yangyi Commune.* Noted by Kovenock, Paul..... 541
Crook, Isabel and David. *The First Years of Yangyi Commune.* Noted by Kovenock, Paul..... 541
Cropsey, Joseph, Ed. *Ancients and Moderns: Essays on the Tradition of Political Philosophy.* Noted by Kendall, Wilmoore 783
Crowley, Edward L. and Laird, Roy D., Ed. *Soviet Agriculture: The Permanent Crisis.* Noted by Lodge, Milton G..... 1150
Cummings, Milton C. *Congressmen and the Electorate: Elections for the U. S. House and the President, 1920–1964.* Noted by Jones, Charles O..... 793
Cummings, Milton C., Jr., Ed. *The National Elections of 1964.* Noted by Kessel, John H..... 182

Dahl, Robert A., Ed. *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies.* Reviewed by Eckstein, Harry..... 159
Dahl, Robert A. *The City in the Future of Democracy*..... 953
Danielson, Wayne A. Note on Merritt, Richard L., *Symbols of American Community, 1735–1775*..... 790
Davidson, Roger H., Kovenock, David M. and O'Leary, Michael K. *Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform.* Reviewed by Masters, Nicholas A..... 775
Davidson, Roger H. Note on Hunt, Margaret A. and Scott, Andrew M., *Congress and Lobbies: Image and Reality*..... 185
Davies, Ioan. *African Trade Unions.* Noted by Friedland, William H..... 822
Davies, James C. Review of Ardrey, Robert, *The Territorial Imperative. A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations*..... 162
Davis, John A. and Baker, James K., Eds. *Southern Africa in Transition.* Noted by Stultz, Newell M..... 825
Davis, Otto, Dempster, M. A. H. and Wildavsky, Aaron. Communication..... 152
Davis, Vincent. *Postwar Defense Policy and the U. S. Navy, 1943–1946.* Noted by Caraley, Demetrios..... 799
Davis, William G., Parent, Alphonse-Marie, McConnell, Thomas R. and Cooper, William Mansfield, *Governments and the University.* Reviewed by Peltason, J. W..... 1116
Deakin, James. *The Lobbyists.* Noted by Holtzman, Abraham..... 527
Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam. Thompson, Sir Robert. Reviewed by McAlister, John T., Jr..... 773
The Defendant's Rights Under English Law. Fellman, David. Noted by Irish, Marian D..... 203
Defense Purchases and Regional Growth. Bolton, Roger E. Noted by Tybout, Richard A..... 193
DeGaulle and the World: The Foreign Policy of the Fifth French Republic. Kulski, W. W. Noted by Wahl, Nicholas..... 1175
DeGaulle: Implacable Ally. Macridis, Roy C. Noted by Diamant, Alfred..... 197
DeGrazia, Alfred et al. *Congress: The First Branch of Government.* Reviewed by Masters, Nicholas A..... 775
de Grazia, Alfred., Ed. *The Velikovsky Affair: The Warfare of Science and Scientism.* Noted by Orbell, John M..... 180
de Jouvenel, B., Polin, R., Treves, R., Sternberger, D., Arnaud, P., Bastid, P., Battiffol, H., Chapman, J. W. and Cotta, S. *L'Idee de Philosophie Politique: Annales de Philosophie Politique-6.* Noted by Watkins, Frederick M..... 786

Democracy and the Majority Principle: A Study in Twelve Contemporary Political Theories. Berg, Elias. Noted by Thorson, Thomas Landon..... 176
Democracy or the Scientific Method in Law and Policy Making. Beutel, Frederick K. Noted by Makielski, S. J., Jr..... 178
Democratic Innovations in Nepal. Joshi, Bhuwan L. and Rose, Leo E. Noted by Bradley, Phillips..... 547
The Democratic Party in American Politics. Goldman, Ralph M. Noted by Cnudde, Charles F..... 525
Dempster, M. A. H., Wildavsky, Aaron and Davis, Otto. Communication..... 152
Dennis, Jack. Communication..... 759
Dennis, Jack and Easton, David. *The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms*.... 25
The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements. Tucker, Robert C..... 343
Deterrence and Strategy. Beaufre, Andre. Noted by Johns, Claude J., Jr..... 213
Deutscher, Isaac. *Ironies of History, Essays on Contemporary Communism.* Noted by Norton, Henry W..... 1125
The Development of an Interest Group: The Philippine Medical Association. Stauffer, Robert. Noted by Liddle, R. William.. 1157
Dexter, Lewis A. Communication..... 1104
Diamant, Alfred. Note on Aron, Robert, *An Explanation of DeGaulle*..... 197
Diamont, Alfred. Note on Macridis, Roy C., *DeGaulle: Implacable Ally*..... 197
Diederich, Nils. *Empirische Wahlforschung: Konceptionen und Methoden im internationalen Vergleich.* Noted by Pinney, Edward L..... 1121
Dilemmas of Democratic Politics in India. Halappa, G. S., Ed. Noted by Range, Willard..... 209
Dimensions du Nationalisme: Enquête Par Questionnaire. Michelat, Guy and Thomas, Jean-Pierre H. Noted by Brown, Bernard E..... 814
The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia. Gordon, Bernard K. Noted by Joiner, Charles A..... 216
Dimensions of Modernization in the American States. Crittenden, John..... 989
Dinerstein, Herbert S. Note on Okinshevich, Leo, Comp., *Latin America in Soviet Writings, A Bibliography*, Volume 1: 1917–1958, Volume II: 1959–1964..... 551
Dinerstein, Herbert S. *Soviet Policy in Latin America*..... 80
Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians. Jacobson, Harold K. and Stein, Eric. Noted by Skolnikoff, Eugene..... 833
Dirty Politics. Felknor, Bruce L. Noted by Hennessy, Bernard C..... 804
Disarmament and World Economic Interdependence. Benoit, Emile. Ed. Noted by Holsti, Ole R..... 1180
Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science. 846
Doctrines of Imperialism. Thornton, A. P. Noted by Roberts, James W..... 557
Dodge, Guy H. Note on Bastid, Paul, *Benjamin Constant et sa Doctrine*..... 1118
Doig, Jameson W. *Metropolitan Transportation Politics and the New York Region.* Noted by Colcord, Frank C. Jr..... 1128
Dorrill, William F. Note on Wu, Yuan-Li, *The Economy of Communist China—An Introduction*..... 541
Dowd, Douglas F. *Thorstein Veblen.* Noted by Roucek, Joseph S..... 503
Downing, Rondal G., Spiegel, Frederick C. and Watson, Richard A. *Bar Politics, Judicial Selection and the Representation of Social Interests*..... 54
Dowse, Robert E. *Left in the Centre: The Independent Labour Party, 1893–1940.* Noted by Beer, Samuel H..... 530
The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914–1935. Wilson, Trevor. Noted by Christoph, James B..... 1143
Dreams and Deeds: Achievement Motivation in Nigeria. LeVine, Robert A. Noted by Lucas, Trudi Miller..... 1167
Dumont, René. *False Start in Africa.* Noted by Rooks, Charles S..... 553
Dunbar, Leslie W. *A Republic of Equals.* Noted by Grimes, Alan P..... 177
Dutt, Vidya Prakash. *China and the World: An Analysis of Communist China's Foreign Policy.* Noted by Deng, Shao-chuan 218
Dyck, Harvey L. *Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926–1933: A Study in Diplomatic Instability* Noted by Rosenbaum, Kurt..... 836
Dye, Thomas R. *Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States.* Reviewed by Robinson, James A..... 1113

Easton, David. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life.* Reviewed by Gross, Bertram M..... 157
Easton, David, Ed. *Varieties of Political Theory.* Noted by Bluhm, William T.... 784
Easton, David. Communication..... 759
Easton, David and Dennis, Jack. *The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms*.... 25
Ebenstein, William. Note on Bernstein, Richard J., *John Dewey*..... 502
Eckstein, Harry. Review of Dahl, Robert A., Ed., *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*..... 159

Economic Advice and Presidential Leadership: The Council of Economic Advisors. Flash, Edward S. Noted by Lowi, Theodore..... 523
The Economy of Communist China—An Introduction. Wu, Yuan-Li. Noted by Dorrill, William F..... 541
Edelman, Murray and Fleming, R. W. *The Politics of Wage-Price Decisions: A Four-Country Analysis.* Noted by Joseph, Myron L..... 205
Edinger, Lewis J. and Searing, Donald D. *Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry*..... 428
Editor's Announcement: Discontinuation of Bibliographies..... 155
Education and Economic Development. Anderson, Arnold C. and Bowman, Mary Jean, Ed. Reviewed by Carter, Gwendolen M..... 497
Education and Nation-Building in Africa. Cowan, L. Gray, O'Connell, James and Scanlon, David G., Ed. Reviewed by Carter, Gwendolen M..... 497
Education in Nigeria. Ikejiani, Okechukwu, Ed. Reviewed by Carter, Gwendolen M.. 497
The Effectiveness of International Supervision: Thirty Years of I.L.O. Experience. Landy, E. A. Noted by Alger, Chadwick F..... 840
Ehrmann, Henry W. Note on Ziebura, Gilbert, *Léon Blum: Theorie und Praxis einer sozialistischen Politik Band I: 1872 bis 1934*..... 495
Ehrmann, Henry W. Review of Colton, Joel, *Léon Blum: Humanist in Politics*.... 495
Eisenstadt, S. N. *Modernization.* Reviewed by Organski, A. F. K..... 1112
Ekirch, Arthur A., Jr. *Ideas, Ideals, and American Diplomacy.* Noted by Range, Willard..... 555
Ekman, Paul, Black, Gordon, Verba, Sidney, Brody, Richard A., Parker, Edwin B., Nie, Norman H. and Polsby, Nelson W. Communication..... 1104
Ekman, Paul, Black, Gordon S., Verba, Sidney, Brody, Richard A., Parker, Edwin B., Nie, Norman H., and Polsby, Nelson W. *Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam*..... 317
Elazar, Daniel J. *American Federalism: A View from the States.* Noted by Fesler, James W..... 805
Eldersveld, Samuel J. Note on LaPalombara, Joseph and Weiner, Myron, Ed., *Political Parties and Political Development*..... 1166
Elections and the Political Order. Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren E. and Stokes, Donald E. Reviewed by Prothro, James W..... 485
Elites and Society. Bottomore, T. B. Noted by Seligman, Lester..... 787
Elites in Latin America. Lipset, Seymour Martin and Solari, Aldo. Noted by Michelena, José A. Silva..... 1163
Empirische Wahlforschung: Konzeptionen und Methoden im internationalen Vergleich. Diederich, Nils. Noted by Pinney, Edward L..... 1121
An End to European Integration? Inglehart, Ronald..... 91
Engel, Salo. Note on Fernandez-Shaw, Felix, *La Organizacion de los Estados Americanos*..... 1184
Engel, Salo. Note on Fernandez-Shaw, Felix, *La Integracion de Centroamerica*..... 1184
Engel, Salo. Note on Fernandez-Shaw, Felix, *Panama y Sus Relationes Centroamericanos*..... 1184
Ensminger, Douglas, Johnson, Helen W., Joyce, Jean and Taylor, Carl C. *India's Roots of Democracy: A Sociological Analysis of Rural India's Experience in Planned Development Since Independence.* Noted by Rosenthal Donald B..... 1155
Epstein, Leon D. Note on Waltz, Kenneth N., *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience*..... 1176
Epstein, Leon D. Note on Runciman, W. G., *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*..... 532
Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification. Parenti, Michael..... 717
Eulau, Heinz. Review of Lenski, Gerhard E., *Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification*..... 482
Evans, F. T. and Howard, H. T. *Outlook on Space.* Noted by Svarlien, Oscar..... 225
The Evolution of Internal Organizations. Luard, Evan, Ed. Noted by Russell, Ruth B..... 1185
Expanding Liberties, Freedom's Gains in Postwar America. Konvitz, Milton R. Noted by Latham, Earl..... 802
An Explanation of DeGaulle. Aron, Robert. Noted by Diamant, Alfred..... 197

False Start in Africa. Dumont, René. Noted by Rooks, Charles S..... 553
Fall, Bernard B. *Viet-Nam Witness.* Noted by Joiner, Charles A..... 216
Feaver, George A. Note on Walzer, Michael, *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics*..... 169
Federal Tax Policy. Pechman, Joseph A. Noted by Flash, Edward S., Jr..... 525

Feldman, Herbert. *Revolution in Pakistan.* Noted by Goodnow, Henry F..... 1154
Felknor, Bruce L. *Dirty Politics.* Noted by Hennessy, Bernard C..... 804
Fellman, David. *The Defendant's Rights Under English Law.* Noted by Irish, Marian D..... 203
Fellman, David. Review of Latham, Earl, *The Communist Controversy in Washington—From the New Deal to McCarthy*..... 160
Fenno, Richard F., Jr. Note on Pressman, Jefferey L., *House vs. Senate: Conflict in the Appropriations Process*..... 184
Fenno, Richard F., Jr. *The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress.* Reviewed by Robinson, James A... 764
Fenton, John H. *Midwest Politics.* Noted by Francis, Wayne L..... 183
Ferkiss, Victor C. *Africa's Search for Identity.* Noted by Weinstein, Brian..... 210
Fernandez,-Shaw, Felix. *Panama y Sus Relaciones Centroamericanos.* Noted by Engel, Salo..... 1184
Fernandez-Shaw, Felix. *La Integracion de Centroamerica.* Noted by Engel, Salo..... 1184
Fernandez-Shaw, Felix. *La Organizacion de los Estados Americanos.* Noted by Engel, Salo..... 1184
Fesler, James W. Note on Elazar, Daniel J., *American Federalism: A View from the States*..... 305
Financing the 1964 Election. Alexander, Herbert E. Noted by Bone, Hugh A..... 189
Finlay, David J. Note on McKay, Vernon, Ed., *African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy*..... 839
The First Years of Yangyi Commune. Crook, Isabel and David. Noted by Kovenock, Paul..... 541
Fisher, Louis, Jr. Communication..... 759
Fitch, Bob and Oppenheimer, Mary. *Ghana: End of an Illusion.* Noted by Skurnik, W. A. E..... 827
Flash, Edward S. *Economic Advice and Presidential Leadership: The Council of Economic Advisors.* Noted by Lowi, Theodore..... 523
Flash, Edward S., Jr. Note on Pechman, Joseph A. *Federal Tax Policy*..... 525
Fleming, R. W. and Edelman, Murray. *The Politics of Wage-Price Decisions: A Four-Country Analysis.* Noted by Joseph, Myron L..... 205
Fleming, William G. Review of Lewis, Arthur W., *Politics in West Africa*..... 1115
Fliess, Peter J. *Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity.* Reviewed by Russett, Bruce M..... 167
Francis, Michael. Note on Connell-Smith, Gordon, *The Inter-American System*..... 1183
Francis, Wayne L. Note on Fenton, John H., *Midwest Politics*..... 183
Frankel, Charles. *The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs: American Educational and Cultural Policy Abroad.* Noted by Clute, Robert E..... 224
Free Activities and Interpersonal Relations. Cassinelli, C. W. Noted by Oppenheim, Felix E..... 178
Freedom and the Court: Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States. Abraham, Henry J. Noted by Rankin, Robert S..... 1133
The French Army in Politics, 1945–1962. Ambler, John Steward. Noted by Bode, Ken A..... 201
The French Prefectoral Corps, 1814–1830. Richardson, Nicholas. Noted by Fried, Robert C..... 1146
Fried, Robert C. Note on Richardson, Nicholas, *The French Prefectoral Corps, 1814–1830*..... 1146
Friedland, William H. Note on Brockway, Fenner, *African Socialism*..... 822
Friedland, William H. Note on Davies, Ioan, *Africa n Trade Unions*..... 822
Friedmann, Wolfgang, Kalmanoff, George and Meagher, Robert F. *International Financial Aid.* Noted by Montgomery, John D..... 1171
Friedrich, Carl J. Review of Brecht, Arnold, *Aus Naechster Naehe-Lebenserinnerungen 1884–1927*..... 163
Friendly, Henry J. *Benchmarks.* Noted by Krislov, Samuel..... 1134
Friters, Gerard M. Note on Rupen, Robert A., *The Mongolian People's Republic*..... 1152
Froman, Lewis A. Communication..... 479
Froman, Lewis A. Note on Levin, Murray B., *Kennedy Campaigning: The System and the Style as Practiced by Senator Edward Kennedy*..... 519
Foltz, William J. Note on Zartman, I. William, *International Relations in the New Africa*..... 552
Foreign Aid in International Politics. Montgomery, John D. Noted by Atherton, Aleyine L..... 1172
Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience. Waltz, Kenneth N. Noted by Epstein, Leon D... 1176
The Foreign Policy of African States: Ideological Bases, Present Realities, Future Prospects. Thiam, Doudou. Noted by Rooks, Charles S..... 553
The Formative Years of Social Security. Altmeyer, Arthur J. Noted by Christenson, Reo M..... 187
Foster, Charles R. Note on Arndt, Joachim.

West Germany: Politics of Non-Planning.. 1144
Foster, Charles R. Note on Kaltefleiter, Werner, *Wirtschaft und Politik in Deutschland*..... 1144
Foster, Charles R. Review of Loewenberg, Gerhard, *Parliament in the German Political System*..... 771
Fowler, Edmund P. and Lineberry, Robert L. *Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities*..... 701

Gable, Richard W. Note on Horowitz, Louis Irving, *Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification*..... 542
Galambos, Louis. *Competition and Cooperation: The Emergence of a National Trade Association*. Reviewed by Garceau, Oliver 498
Garceau, Oliver. Review of Galambos, Louis, *Competition and Cooperation: The Emergence of a National Trade Association*..... 498
Garvey, Gerald. Note on Russett, Cynthia Eagle, *The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought*..... 784
Gellhorn, Walter. *Ombudsmen and Others*. Noted by Kass, Benny L..... 810
Gellhorn, Walter, *When Americans Complain*. Noted by Kass, Benny L..... 810
George Norris: Gentle Knight of American Democracy. Zucker, Norman L. Noted by Shannon, W. Wayne..... 520
Gerberding, Edward A. Note on Kolodziej, Edward A., *The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945–1963*..... 798
The German Problem: Basic Questions of German Political Life, Past and Present. Ritter, Gerhard. Noted by Braunthal, Gerard..... 533
Germany Between East and West: The Reunification Problem. Hartmann, Frederick H. Noted by Braunthal, Gerard..... 533
Germany: Yesterday and Tomorrow. Merkl, Peter H. Noted by Braunthal, Gerard.... 533
Gerson, Louis L. *The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy*. Noted by Betts, George C..... 522
Ghana: End of an Illusion. Fitch, Bob and Oppenheimer, Mary. Noted by Skurnik, W. A. E..... 827
Gibean, Victor H., Jr. Note on Masur, Gerhard, *Nationalism in Latin America: Diversity and Unity*..... 551
Gil, Federico G. Note on Crassweller, Robert D., *Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator*..... 196
Gillison, Jerome M. Note on Parry, Albert, *The New Class Divided: Russian Science and Technology Versus Communism*..... 537
Gillin, John P. Note on Belshaw, Michael, A *Village Economy: Land and People of Huecorio*..... 1165
Gilpin, Robert. Note on Smith, Bruce L. R., *The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation*..... 191
Gimbel, John. Note on Naumann, Bernd, Auschwitz. *A Report on the Proceedings Against Robert Karl Mulka and Others Before the Court at Frankfurt*..... 814
Glaser, William A. and Sills, David L., Ed. *The Government of Associations*. Noted by Ziegler, Harmon..... 1136
Glick, Henry Robert and Vines, Kenneth N. *The Impact of Universal Suffrage: A Comparison of Popular and Property Voting*..... 1078
Glickman, Harvey. Note on Zolberg, Aristid e R., *Creating Political Order. The Party States of West Africa*..... 820
Goffman, Erving. *Behavior in Public Places*. Noted by Merelman, Richard M.. 500
Goldman, Ralph M. *The Democratic Party in American Politics*. Noted by Cnudde, Charles F..... 525
Goldsmith, M M. *Hobbes's Science of Politics*. Noted by Jaffe, Erwin A..... 172
Golembiewski, Robert T. Note on Thompson, James D., Ed., *Approaches to Organizational Design*..... 792
Goodman, Jay S. Communication..... 153
Goodman, Jay S. *A Note on Legislative Research: Labor Representation in Rhode Island*..... 468
Goodnow, Henry F. Note on Birkhead, Guthrie S., Ed., *Administrative Problems in Pakistan*..... 1154
Goodnow, Henry F. Note on Braibanti, Ralph, Ed. *Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition*..... 1154
Goodnow Henry F. Note on Feldman, Herbert *Revolution in Pakistan*..... 1154
Gordon, Bernard K. Note on Starke, J. G., *The Anzus Treaty Alliance*..... 835
Gordon, Bernard K. *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia*. Noted by Joiner, Charles A..... 216
Gordon, David C. *The Passing of French Algeria*. Noted by Moore, Clement H.. 826
Gotshalk, D. W. *Human Aims in Modern Perspective*. Noted by Hughes, Delos D... 511
Governing Soil Conservation: Thirty Years of the New Decentralization. Morgan, Robert J. Noted by Parks, W. Robert..... 522
Government Expenditures and Public Services in the American States. Sharkansky, Ira..... 1066
The Government of Associations. Glaser,

William A. and Sills, David L., Ed. Noted by Zeigler, Harmon..... 1136
Governments and the University. Cooper, William Mansfield, Davis, William G., Parent, Alphonse-Marie, and McConnell, Thomas R. Reviewed by Peltason, J. W.. 1116
Graham, George A. Note on Martin, Roscoe, C., Ed. *Public Administration and Democracy: Essays Honoring Paul H. Appleby*..... 514
Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan Reform. Smallwood, Frank. Noted by Sharpe, L. J..... 531
The Greek Civil War, 1944–1949. O'Ballance, Edgar. Noted by Gyorgy, Andrew..... 215
Greenleaf, W. H. *Oakeshott's Philosophical Politics.* Noted by Hamburger, Joseph... 782
Greenstein, Fred I. *The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush*..... 629
Greer, Scott. *Urban Renewal and American Cities.* Noted by Seasholes, Bradbury.... 517
Gregor, A. James. *A Survey of Marxism: Problems in Philosophy and the Theory of History.* Noted by Meyer, Alfred G..... 170
Grimes, Alan P. Note on Dunbar, Leslie W., *A Republic of Equals*..... 177
Grimes, Alan P. *The Puritan Ethic and Woman Suffrage.* Reviewed by Schuck, Victoria..... 1115
Grodzins, Morton. *The American System.* Reviewed by Martin, Roscoe C..... 1108
Gross, Bertram M. *The Managing of Organizations.* Reviewed by Presthus, Robert.. 1106
Gross, Bertram M. Note on Easton, David, *A Systems Analyis of Political Life*..... 157
Guide to Latin American Studies. Sable, Martin, Ed. Book Note..... 552
Guide to Reference Materials in Political Science: A Selective Bibliography, Vol. 1. Mynar, Lubomyr R. Noted by Kamenetsky, Ihor..... 1128
Gunther, Magnus. Note on van den Berghe, T. L., *South Africa, A Study in Conflict*... 1169
Gwyn, W. B. *The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine From Its Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution.* Noted by Nash, A. E. Keir..... 514
Gyorgy, Andrew. Note on O'Ballance, Edgar, *The Greek Civil War, 1944–1949*... 215

Hafner, Donald L. Review of Rossiter, Clinton. *1787: The Grand Convention*..... 491
Halappa, G. S., Ed. *Dilemmas of Democratic Politics in India.* Noted by Range, Willard..... 209
Halle, Louis J. *The Society of Man.* Noted by Boulding, Kenneth E..... 843
Hallowell, John H. Note on Williamson, Rene de Visme, *Independence and Involvement: A Christian Reorientation in Political Science*..... 788
Halperin, Morton H. and Perkins, Dwight H. *Communist China and Arms Control.* Noted by Leng, Shao-chuan..... 218
Halpern, A. M. *Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents.* Noted by Pentony, DeVere E..... 221
Hamblin, Robert L. and Soares, Glaucio. *Socioeconomic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1962*..... 1053
Hamburger, Joseph. Note on Greenleaf, W. H., *Oakeshott's Philosophical Politics*.. 782
Hammond, Paul Y., Martin, Laurence W., Tucker, Robert W., Marshall, Charles Burton, Merchant, Livingston T., Wolfers, Arnold and Osgood, Robert E., *The United States in a Disarmed World.* Noted by Holsti, Ole R..... 1180
Handlin, Mary and Oscar, Ed. *The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.* Noted by Mirkin, Harris..... 789
Handlin, Oscar and Mary, Ed. *The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.* Noted by Mirkin, Harris..... 789
Hangen, Welles. *The Muted Revolution: East Germany's Challenge to Russia and the West.* Noted by Croan, Melvin..... 536
Hanreider, Wolfram F. Communication.... 1096
Hanreider, Wolfram F. *Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy*..... 971
Hardgrave, Robert L., Jr. Note on Swartz, Marc J., Turner, Victor W., and Tuden, Arthur., Ed., *Political Anthropology*..... 1120
Hargrove, Erwin C. *Presidential Leadership.* Noted by Cnudde, Charles F..... 525
Harkabi, Y. *Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace.* Noted by Hilberg, John V..... 1178
Harris, Errol E. *Annihilation and Utopia: The Principles of International Politics.* Noted by Burns, Richard Dean..... 556
Harris, Fred R. *Political Science and the Proposal for a National Science Foundation*..... 1088
Harris, Louis. Note on Steele. A. T., *The American People and China*..... 219
Hartmann, Frederick H. *Germany Between East and West: The Reunification Problem.* Noted by Braunthal, Gerard..... 533
Hartmann, Frederick H. Note on Stillman, Edmund and Pfaff, William, *Power and Impotence: The Failure of America's Foreign Policy*..... 842

Hawkins, Brett W. *Nashville Metro: The Politics of City-County Consolidation.* Noted by Sofen, Edward..... 516
Hayden, Eustace M. Note on Coogan, Timothy, Patrick. *Ireland Since the Rising*... 204
Hayward, J. E. S. *Private Interests and Public Policy: The Experience of the French Economic and Social Council.* Noted by Batchelder, John T..... 1145
Helguera, J. Leon. Note on Mecham, J. Lloyd, Rev. Ed., *Church and State in Latin America. A History of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations*..... 550
Henderson, K. D. D. *Sudan Republic.* Noted by Potholm, Christian P..... 212
Hennessey, Timothy M. Note on Paulson, Belden, with Ricci, Athos, *The Searchers: Conflict and Communism in an Italian Town*..... 1147
Hennessy, Bernard C. Note on Felknor, Bruce L., *Dirty Politics*..... 804
Hahn, Lorna and Cohen, Mark I. *Morocco: Old Land, New Nation.* Noted by Zartman, I. William..... 544
Hermann, Charles F. and Hermann, Margaret G. *An Attempt to Simulate the Outbreak of World War I*..... 400
Hermann, Margaret G. and Hermann, Charles F. *An Attempt to Simulate the Outbreak of World War I*..... 400
Heyerdahl, Carl L. *In Memoriam*..... 891
Hilberg, John V. Note on Harkabi, Y., *Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace*..... 1178
Hillon, Robert Paul. *Mexican Marxist: Vicente Lombardo Toledano.* Noted by Ciria, Alberto..... 548
Hinckley, Barbara. *Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's "Expected" Loss of Seats* 694
Hindley, Donald. *The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951–1963.* Noted by Mendel, Douglas, Jr..... 545
Hinton, Harold. *Communist China in World Politics.* Noted by Tsou, Tang..... 1158
Hirst, David. *Oil and Public Opinion in the Middle East.* Noted by Anabtawi, Samir N..... 558
The History of Treaties and International Politics. Toscano, Mario. Noted by Wright, Quincy..... 561
Hobbes Studies. Brown, Keith C., Ed. Noted Jaffe, Erwin A..... 172
Hobbes's Science of Politics. Goldsmith, M. M. Noted by Jaffe, Erwin A..... 172
Hodgson, John H. *Communism in Finland: A History and Interpretation.* Noted by Rintala, Marvin..... 819
Holsti, Ole R. Note on Benoit, Emile, Ed., *Disarmament and World Economic Interdependence*..... 1180
Holsti, Ole R. Note on Wolfers, Arnold, Osgood, Robert E., Hammon, Paul Y., Martin, Laurence W., Tucker, Robert W., Marshall, Charles Burton, and Merchant, Livingston T., *The United States in a Disarmed World*..... 1180
Holtzman, Abraham. *Interest Groups and Lobbying.* Noted by Cnudde, Charles F... 525
Holtzman, Abraham. Note on Deakin, James, *The Lobbyists*..... 527
Horelick, Arnold L. and Rush, Myron. *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy.* Noted by Marshall, Charles Burton.... 836
Hornbeck, Stanley Kuhl. *In Memoriam*... 236
Horowitz, Louis Irving. *Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification.* Noted by Gable, Richard W..... 542
House vs. Senate: Conflict in the Appropriations Process. Pressman, Jefferey L. Noted by Fenno, Richard F., Jr..... 184
How to Argue with a Conservative. Staebler, Neil and Ross, Douglas. Noted by Leary, Paul..... 501
How to Win an Election: The Art of Political Victory. Shadegg, Stephen C. Noted by Kelley, Stanley, Jr..... 518
Howard, H. T. and Evans, F. T. *Outlook on Space.* Noted by Svarlien, Oscar..... 225
Howe, Irving, Ed. *The Radical Papers,* Noted by Leary, Paul..... 501
Hughes, Delos D. Note on Gotshalk, D. W., *Human Aims in Modern Perspective*..... 511
Hughes, Delos D. Note on Macpherson, C. B., *The Real World of Democracy*.... 511
Human Aims in Modern Perspective. Gotshalk, D. W. Noted by Hughes, Delos D. 511
Hunt, Margaret A. and Scott, Andrew M. *Congress and Lobbies: Image and Reality.* Noted by Davidson, Roger H..... 185
Hunter, David R. Note on Clinard, Marshall B., *Slums and Community Development: Experiments in Self-Help*..... 186
The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy. Gerson, Louis L. Noted by Betts, George C..... 522

Ideas, Ideals, and American Diplomacy. Ekirch, Arthur A., Jr. Noted by Range, Willard..... 555
L'Idee de Philosophie Politique: Annales de Philosophie Politique-6. Arnaud, P., Bastid, P., Batiffol, H., Chapman, J. W., Cotta, S., de Jouvenel, B., Polin, R., Trevesn, R. and Sternberger, D. Noted by Watkins, Frederick M..... 786
Ideology and Organization in Communist China. Schurman, Franz. Reviewed by

Lewis, John W. ... 168
The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement. Kantor, Harry. Noted by Lewis, Paul. ... 549
Ikejiani, Okeuchkwu, Ed. *Education in Nigeria.* Reviewed by Carter, Gwendolen M. ... 497
The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush. Greenstein, Fred I. ... 629
The Impact of Universal Suffrage: A Comparison of Popular and Property Voting. Vines, Kenneth N., and Glick, Henry Robert. ... 1078
Independence and Involvement: A Christian Reorientation in Political Science. Williamson, Rene de Visme. Noted by Hallowell, John H. ... 788
In Memoriam
Heyerdahl, Carl L. ... 891
Hornbeck, Stanley Kuhl. ... 236
Leek, John Halvor. ... 891
Mander, Linden Alfred. ... 891
Martin, William R. ... 236
Odegard, Peter H. ... 235
Puget, Henry. ... 578
In the Nation: 1932–1966. Krock, Arthur. Noted by Burns, James MacGregor. ... 1141
India's Roots of Democracy: A Sociological Analysis of Rural India's Experience in Planned Development Since Independence. Taylor, Carl C., Ensminger, Douglas, Johnson, Helen W. and Joyce, Jean. Noted by Rosenthal, Donald B. ... 1155
Inglehart, Ronald. *An End to European Integration?* ... 91
La Integracion de Centroamerica. Fernandez-Shaw, Felix. Noted by Engel, Salo. ... 1184
The Inter-American System. Connell-Smith, Gordon. Noted by Francis, Michael. ... 1183
Interest Groups and Lobbying. Holtzman, Abraham. Noted by Cnudde, Charles F. 525
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United States. Break, George F. Noted by Wright, Deil S. ... 1135
International Financial Aid. Friedmann, Wolfgang, Kalmanoff, George and Meagher, Robert F. Noted by Montgomery, John D. ... 1171
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
An Attempt to Simulate the Outbreak of World War I. Hermann, Charles F. and Hermann, Margaret G. ... 400
Some Comments on Russell's "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations." Mueller, John E. ... 146
Soviet Policy in Latin America. Dinerstein, Herbert S. ... 80
International Relations in the New Africa. Zartman, I. William. Noted by Foltz, William J. ... 552
Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's "Expected" Loss of Seats. Hinckley, Barbara. ... 694
In the Name of Science. Nieburg, H. L. Noted by Lyons, Gene M. ... 797
The Intruders: The Invasion of Privacy by Government and Industry. Long, Edward V., Senator. Noted by Rourke, Francis E. 1142
Ireland Since the Rising. Coogan, Timothy Patrick. Noted by Hayden, Eustace M. ... 204
Irish, Marian D. Note on Fellman, David, *The Defendant's Rights Under English Law* ... 203
Ironies of History, Essays on Contemporary Communism. Deusscher, Isaac. Noted by Morton, Henry W. ... 1125
Israel, John. *Student Nationalism in China, 1927–1937.* Noted by Kim, Samuel S. ... 1160

Jackson, George D. *Comintern and Peasant in East-Europe 1919–1930.* Noted by Piekalkiewicz, Jaroslaw. ... 539
Jacob, Herbert and Vines, Kenneth N., Eds. *Politics in the American States, A Comparative Analysis.* Reviewed by Lockard, Duane. ... 165
Jacobson, Harold K. and Stein, Eric. *Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians.* Noted by Skolnikoff, Eugene. ... 833
Jaffe, Erwin A. Note on Brown, Keith C., Ed., *Hobbes Studies* ... 172
Jaffe, Erwin A. Note on Goldsmith, M. M., *Hobbes's Science of Politics* ... 172
Japanese Political Style: An Introduction to the Government and Politics of Modern Japan. Tsuneishi, Warren M. Noted by Leiserson, Michael. ... 1158
Jenks, Wilfred C. *Space Law.* Noted by White, Irwin L. ... 841
Jennings, M. Kent. Note on Corson, John J. and Paul, R. Shale, *Men Near the Top: Filling Key Posts in the Federal Service* 796
John Dewey. Bernstein, Richard J. Noted by Ebenstein, William. ... 502
Johns, Claude J., Jr. Note on Thayer, Frederick C., Jr., *Air Transport Policy and National Security: A Political, Economic, and Military Analysis* ... 213
Johns, Claude J., Jr. Note on Beaufre, Andre, *Deterrence and Strategy* ... 213
Johnson, Helen W., Joyce, Jean, Taylor, Carl C. and Ensminger, Douglas. *India's Roots of Democracy: A Sociological Analysis of Rural India's Experience in Planned Development Since Independence.* Noted by Rosenthal, Donald B. ... 1155
Joiner, Charles A. Note on Fall, Bernard B.,

Viet-Nam Witness..... 216
Joiner, Charles A. Note on Gordon, Bernard K., *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia*..... 216
Joiner, Charles A. Note on Lacouture, Jean, *Vietnam: Between Two Truces*..... 216
Jones, Charles O. Note on Cummings, Milton C., *Congressmen and the Electorate: Elections for the U. S. House and the President, 1920–1964*..... 793
Jordan, David C. and Whitaker, Arthur P. *Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America*. Noted by Martz, John D..... 1162
Joseph, Myron L. Note on Edelman, Murray and Fleming, R. W., *The Politics of Wage-Price Decisions: A Four-Country Analysis*..... 205
Joshi, Bhuwan L. and Rose, Leo D. *Democratic Innovations in Nepal*. Noted by Bradley, Phillips..... 547
Joyce, Jean, Taylor, Carl C., Ensminger, Douglas and Johnson, Helen W. *India's Roots of Democracy: A Sociological Analysis of Rural India's Experience in Planned Development Since Independence*. Noted by Rosenthal, Donald B..... 1155
Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research. Schubert, Glendon R. Reviewed by Westin, Alan F..... 765
The Judicial Mind: Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946–1963. Schubert, Glendon R. Reviewed by Westin, Alan F..... 763

Kain, J. F., Wohl, M. and Meyer, J. R. *The Urban Transportation Problem*. Noted by Onstine, B. W..... 809
Kalmanoff, George, Meagher, Robert F., and Friedmann, Wolfgang. *International Financial Aid*. Noted by Montgomery, John D..... 1171
Kaltefleiter, Werner, *Wirtschaft und Politik In Deutschland*. Noted by Foster, Charles R..... 1144
Kalven, Harry Jr. and Zeisel, Hans. *The American Jury*. Reviewed by Beaney, William..... 770
Kamenetsky, Ihor. Note on Mynar, Lubomyr R., *Guide to Reference Materials in Political Science: A Selective Bibliography*, Vol. I..... 1128
Kantor, Harry. *The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement*. Noted by Lewis, Paul..... 549
Kaplan, Jacob J. *The Challenge of Foreign Aid: Politics, Problems, and Possibilities*. Noted by Baldwin, David..... 1173
Kapur, Harish. *Soviet Russia and Asia. 1917–1927: A Study of Soviet Policy Towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan*. Noted by Rupen, Robert A..... 831
Kariel, Henry S. *The Political Relevance of Behavioral and Existential Psychology*.... 334
Kass, Benny L. Note on Gellhorn, Walter, *When Americans Complain*..... 810
Kass, Benny L. Note on Gellhorn, Walter, *Ombudsmen and Others*..... 810
Katz, Michael. Note on Kuper, Leo and Hilda, Ed. *African Law: Adaptation and Development*..... 1168
Keech, William R. Note on Mayhew, David R., *Party Loyalty Among Congressmen*... 1137
Keenan, Boyd R., Ed. *Science and the University*. Noted by Orlans, Harold..... 1126
Kelley, Stanley, Jr. Note on Shadegg, Stephen C., *How to Win an Election: The Art of Political Victory*..... 518
Kelly, George Armstrong. Note on Pierce, Roy, *Contemporary French Political Thought*..... 504
Kelley, Stanley, Jr., Ayres, Richard E., and Bowen, William G. *Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First*..... 359
Kendall, Wilmoore. Note on Cropsey, Joseph, Ed., *Ancients and Moderns: Essays on the Tradition of Political Philosophy*..... 783
Kennedy Campaigning: The System and the Style as Practiced by Senator Edward Kennedy. Levin, Murray B. Noted by Froman, Lewis A..... 519
Kerr, Malcolm. *The Arab Cold War, 1958–1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics*. Noted by Ramazani, Rouhollah K..... 223
Kessel, John H. Note on Cummings, Milton C., Jr., Ed., *The National Elections of 1964*..... 182
Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957–1964. Linden, Carl A. Noted by Ploss, Sidney I..... 1151
Khrushchev: A Career. Crankshaw, Edward. Noted by Rush, Myron..... 199
Kihl, Young W. Review of Organski, A. F. K., *The Stages of Political Development*..... 1113
Kim, Samuel S. Note on Israel, John, *Student Nationalism in China, 1927–1937*.... 1160
Kim, Samuel S. Note on Suh, Dae-sook, *The Korean Communist Movement 1918–1948* 1162
Kim. Young C. *Political Recruitment: The Case of Japanese Prefectural Assemblymen* 1036
Kingdon, John W. *Politicians' Beliefs about Voters*..... 137
Knorr, Klaus. *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age*. Reviewed by Mueller. John E..... 1109
Koenig, Louis W. Note on Bailey, Thomas A., *Presidential Greatness: The Image and*

the Man from George Washington to the Present..... 1139
Koenig, Louis W. Note on Stone, Irving, *They Also Ran: The Story of the Men Who Where Defeated for the Presidency*..... 1139
Koh, Byung Chul. *The United Nations Administrative Tribunal*. Noted by Baldwin, David..... 561
Kolaja, Jiri. *Workers' Councils: The Yugoslav Experience*. Noted by Neal, Fred Warner..... 817
Kolodziej, Edward A. *The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945–1963*. Noted by Gerberding, William P..... 798
Konvitz, Milton R. *Expanding Liberties, Freedom's Gains in Postwar America*. Noted by Latham, Earl..... 802
Korbonski, Andrzrj. *Politics of Socialist Agriculture in Poland; 1945–1960*. Noted by Miller, Robert F..... 1149
The Korean Communist Movement 1918–1948. Suh, Dae-sook. Noted by Kim, Samuel S..... 1162
Kovenock, David M., O'Leary, Michael K. and Davidson, Roger H. *Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform*. Reviewed by Masters, Nicholas A..... 775
Kovenock, Paul. Note on Crook, Isabel and David, *The First Years of Yangyi Commune*..... 541
Kramish, Arnold. Note on Scheinman, Lawrence, *Atomic Energy in France Under the Fourth Republic*..... 812
Krislov, Samuel. Note on Friendly, Henry J., *Benchmarks*..... 1134
Krock, Arthur. *In the Nation: 1932–1966*. Noted by Burns, James MacGregor..... 1141
Kuenne, Robert E. *The Polaris Missile Strike: A General Economics Systems Analysis*. Noted by Ries, John C..... 1177
Kulski, W. W. *De Gaulle and the World: The Foreign Policy of the Fifth French Republic*. Noted by Wahl, Nicholas..... 1175
Kumar, Girja. *Politics, International Relations and Law: Scope, Methodology and Classification*. Book Note..... 226
Kuper, Hilda and Leo, Ed. *African Law: Adaptation and Development*. Noted by Katz, Michael..... 1168
Kuper, Leo and Hilda, Ed. *African Law: Adaptation and Development*. Noted by Katz, Michael..... 1168
The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study. Arfa, Hassan. Noted by Rupen, Robert A..... 831

Labor Politics in a Democratic Republic: Moderation, Division, and Disruption in the Presidential Election of 1928. Bornet, Vaughn Davis. Noted by Silva, Ruth C. 804
Lacouture, Jean. *Vietnam: Between Two Truces*. Noted by Joiner, Charles A..... 216
Laird, Roy D. Note on Walston, Lord, *Agriculture Under Communism*..... 207
Laird, Roy D., Ed. *Soviet Agriculture and Peasant Affairs*. Noted by Lodge, Milton G..... 1150
Laird, Roy D. and Crowley, Edward L., Ed. *Soviet Agriculture: The Permanent Crisis*. Noted by Lodge, Milton G..... 1150
Landy, E. A. *The Effectiveness of International Supervision: Thirty Years of I. L. O. Experience*. Noted by Alger, Chadwick F..... 840
Landynski, Jacob W. *Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A Study in Constitutional Interpretation*. Noted by Miles, E. W..... 803
Langdon, Frank. Note on Packard, George R., III, *Protest in Tokyo; The Security Treaty Crisis*..... 540
Langton, Kenneth P. *Peer Group and School and the Political Socialization Process*..... 751
LaPalombara, Joseph, and Weiner, Myron, Ed. *Political Parties and Political Development*. Noted by Eldersveld, Samuel J. 1166
Latham, Earl. *The Communist Controversy in Washington—From the New Deal to McCarthy*. Reviewed by Fellman, David 160
Latham, Earl. Note on Konvitz, Milton R., *Expanding Liberties, Freedom's Gains in Postwar America*..... 802
Latin America in Soviet Writings, A Bibliography, Volume I: 1917–1958, Volume II: 1959–1964. Okinshevich, Leo, Comp. Noted by Dinerstein, Herbert S..... 551
Latin America in World Politics. Bailey, Norman A. Noted by Slater, Jerome..... 1182
Lawrence, Samuel A. *United States Merchant Shipping Policies and Politics*. Noted by Moore, John E..... 1129
Lawyers', Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar. Carlin, Jerome E. Noted by McKean, Dayton D..... 190
Leach, Richard H. Note on Milne, R. S., *Political Parties in New Zealand*..... 200
Leach, Richard H. Note on West, Katharine, *Power in the Liberal Party: A Study in Australian Politics*..... 200
Leary, Paul. Note on Howe, Irving, Ed., *The Radical Papers*..... 501
Leary, Paul. Note on Staebler, Neil and Ross, Douglas, *How to Argue with a Conservative*..... 501
Leek, John Halvor. *In Memoriam*..... 891
LaFave, Wayne R. *Arrest: The Decision to Take a Suspect into Custody*. Reviewed by Beaney, William..... 770

Leiserson, Avery. Note on Pinney, Edward L., Ed., *Comparative Politics and Political Theory. Essays Written in Honor of Charles Baskervil Robson*..... 499
Leiserson, Michael. Note on Tsuneishi, Warren M., *Japanese Political Style: An Introduction to the Government and Politics of Modern Japan*..... 1158
Left in the Centre: The Independent Labour Party, 1893–1940. Dowse, Robert E. Noted by Beer, Samuel H..... 530
Lekachman, Robert. *The Age of Keynes*. Reviewed by Yohe, William P..... 175
Leng, Shao-chuan. Note on Dutt, Vidya Prakash, *China and the World: An Analysis of Communist China's Foreign Policy* 218
Leng, Shao-chuan. Note on Halperin, Morton H. and Perkins, Dwight H., *Communist China and Arms Control*..... 218
Lenski, Gerhard E. *Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification*. Reviewed by Eulau, Heinz..... 482
Léon Blum: Humanist in Politics. Colton, Joel. Reviewed by Ehrmann, Henry W. 495
Léon Blum: Theorie und Praxis einer sozialistischen Politik Band I: 1872 bis 1934. Ziebura, Gilbert. Noted by Ehrmann, Henry W..... 495
Levin, Murray B. *Kennedy Campaigning: The System and the Style as Practiced by Senator Edward Kennedy*. Noted by Froman, Lewis A..... 519
LeVine, Robert A. *Dreams and Deeds: Achievement Motivation in Nigeria*. Noted by Lucas, Trudi Miller..... 1167
Le Vine, Victor T. Note on Morgenthau, Ruth S., *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa*..... 821
Levy, Marion J., Jr. *Modernization and the Structure of Societies: A Setting for International Affairs*. Reviewed by Riggs, Fred W..... 488
Lewis, John W. Review of Schurman, Franz, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*..... 168
Lewis, Paul. Note on Kantor, Harry, *The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement*..... 549
Lewis, W. Arthur. *Politics in West Africa*. Reviewed by Fleming, William G..... 1115
Linden, Carl A. *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership 1957–1964*. Noted by Ploss, Sidney I..... 1151
Liddle, R. William. Note on Stauffer, Robert, *The Development of an Interest Group: The Philippine Medical Association*..... 1157
Lineberry, Robert L. and Fowler, Edmund P. *Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities*..... 701
Lipset, Seymour Martin and Solari, Aldo. *Elites in Latin America*. Noted by Michelena, José A. Silva..... 1163
Litt, Edgar. Note on Aptheker, Herbert, Ed., *Marxism and Alienation: A Symposium*..... 508
The Lobbyists. Deakin, James. Noted by Holtzman, Abraham..... 527
Lockard, Duane. Review of Jacob, Herbert and Vines, Kenneth N., Eds. *Politics in the American States. A Comparative Analysis*..... 165
Lodge, Milton G. Note on Laird, Roy D., Ed., *Soviet Agriculture and Peasant Affairs*..... 1150
Lodge, Milton G. Note on Laird, Roy D. and Crowley, Edward L., Ed. *Soviet Agriculture: The Permanent Crisis*..... 1150
Loewenberg, Gerhard. *Parliament in the German Political System*. Reviewed by Foster, Charles R..... 771
Loewenstein, Karl. *Max Weber's Political Ideas in the Perspective of Our Time*. Noted by Secher, H. P..... 505
Lofchie, Michael F. *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution*. Noted by Burke, Fred G. and Yeager, Rodger..... 827
Long, Edward V., Sen. *The Intruders: The Invasion of Privacy by Government and Industry*. Noted by Rourke, Francis E..... 1142
Long, Norton. Note on Meyerson, Martin and Banfield, Edward, *Boston: The Job Ahead*..... 515
Lowi, Theodore. Note on Flash, Edward S., *Economic Advice and Presidential Leadership: The Council of Economic Advisors* 523
Lowi, Theodore. *The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism*..... 5
Luard, Evan, Ed. *The Evolution of International Organizations*. Noted by Russell. Ruth B..... 1185
Lucas, Trudi Miller. Note on LeVine, Robert A., *Dreams and Deeds: Achievement Motivation in Nigeria*..... 1167
Lyons, Gene M. Note on Nieburg, H. L., *In the Name of Science*..... 797

McAlister, John T., Jr. Review of Thompson, Sir Robert, *Defeating Communist Insurgency Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam*..... 773
McCleery, Richard. Note on Wallace, Samuel E., *Skid Row as a Way of Life* 809
McConnell, Thomas R., Cooper, William Mansfield, Davis, William G. and Parent, Alphonse-Marie. *Governments and the University*. Reviewed by Peltason, J. W. 1116
McCrone, Donald J. and Cnudde, Charles

F. *Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model*..... 72
McKay, Vernon, Ed. *African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy*. Noted by Finlay, David J..... 839
McKean, Dayton D. Note on Carlin, Jerome E., *Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar*..... 190
McKinney, John C. *Constructive Typology and Social Theory*. Noted by Mitchell, William C..... 506
Mackintosh, John P. et al. *Nigerian Government and Politics*. Noted by Sklar, Richard L..... 211
McLane, Charles B. *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: an Exploration of Eastern Policy Under Lenin and Stalin*. Reviewed by Robinson, Thomas W..... 492
MacMahon, Arthur W. Note on Odegard, Peter H., *Political Power and Social Change*..... 781
Macridis, Roy C. *DeGaulle: Implacable Ally*. Noted by Diamont, Alfred..... 197
Macpherson, C. B. *The Real World of Democracy*. Noted by Hughes, Delos D. 511
McVey, Ruth. *The Rise of Indonesian Communism*. Noted by Mendel, Douglas, Jr. 545
Makielski, S. J., Jr. Note on Beutel, Frederick K., *Democracy or the Scientific Method in Law and Policy Making*..... 178
The Making of United States Foreign Policy. Sapin, Burton M. Noted by Ransom, Harry Howe..... 800
The Malagasy Republic: Madagascar Today. Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Richard. Noted by Potholm, Christian P..... 212
The Managerial Revolution in Higher Education. Rourke, Francis E. & Brooks, Glenn E. Reviewed by Peltason, J. W. 1116
The Managing of Organizations. Gross, Bertram M. Reviewed by Presthus, Robert..... 1106
Mander, Linden Alfred. *In Memoriam*.... 891
Mangone, Gerard J., Ed. *UN Administration of Economic and Social Programs*. Noted by Atherton, Aleyine L..... 1172
Marshall, Charles Burton. Note on Horelick, Arnold L. and Rush, Myron, *Strategic Power and Foreign Policy*..... 836
Marshall, Charles Burton, Merchant, Livingston T., Wolfers, Arnold, Osgood, Robert E., Hammond, Paul Y. Martin, Laurence W. and Tucker, Robert W. *The United States in a Disarmed World*. Noted by Holsti, Ole R..... 1180
Martin, Laurence W. Review of Schelling, Thomas C., *Arms and Influence*..... 766
Martin, Laurence W., Tucker, Robert W., Marshall, Charles Burton, Merchant, Livingston T., Wolfers, Arnold, Osgood, Robert E. and Hammond, Paul Y. *The United States in a Disarmed World*. Noted by Holsti, Ole R..... 1180
Martin, Ralph G. *Ballots and Bandwagons*. Noted by Peterson, Arthur L..... 1138
Martin, Roscoe C., Ed. *Public Administration and Democracy: Essays Honoring Paul H. Appleby*. Noted by Graham, George A..... 514
Martin, Roscoe C. Review of Grodzins, Morton, *The American System*..... 1108
Martin, William R. *In Memoriam*..... 236
Martz, John D. Note on Whitaker, Arthur P. and Jordan, David C., *Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America*..... 1162
Marwell, Gerald. *Party, Region and the Dimensions of Conflict in the House of Representatives, 1949–1954*..... 380
Marxism and Alienation: A Symposium. Aptheker, Herbert, Ed. Noted by Litt, Edgar..... 508
Mass Movement and Democracy: Sokagakkai in Japanese Politics. White, James W. 744
Master Directory for Latin America. Sable, Martin, Ed. Book Note..... 552
Masters, Roger D. *The National is Burdened: American Foreign Policy in a Changing World*. Noted by Crabb, Cecil V., Jr..... 1177
Masur, Gerhard. *Nationalism in Latin America: Diversity and Unity*. Noted by Gibean, Victor H., Jr..... 551
Masters, Nicholas A. Review of Cleveland, James C., *We Propose: A Modern Congress*..... 775
Masters, Nicholas A. Review of Davidson, Roger H., Kovenock, David M. and O'Leary, Michael K., *Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform*..... 775
Masters, Nicholas A. Review of DeGrazia, Alfred, et al, *Congress: The First Branch of Government*..... 775
Matthews, Donald R. and Prothro, James W. *Negroes and the New Southern Politics*. Reviewed by Price, Hugh Douglas..... 779
Mauritius: Problems of a Plural Society. Benedict, Burton. Noted by Potholm, Christian P..... 212
Max Weber's Political Ideas in the Perspective of Our Time. Loewenstein, Karl. Noted by Secher, H. P..... 505
Mayhew, David R. *Party Loyalty Among Congressmen*. Noted by Keech, William R..... 1137
Meagher Robert F. Friedmann, Wolfgang and Kalmanoff, George. *International Financial Aid*. Noted by Montgomery,

John D..... 1171
The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine From Its Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution. Gwyn, W. B. Noted by Nash, A. E. Keir..... 514
Measurement Identity in the Longitudinal Analysis of Legislative Voting. Clausen, Aage R..... 1020
The Measurement of Inter-Party Competition and Systemic Stability. Pfeiffer, David G..... 457
Mecham, J. Lloyd, Rev. Ed. *Church and State in Latin America. A History of Politico-Ecclesiastical Relations.* Noted by Helguera, J. Leon..... 550
Meller, Norman. *Representational Role Types: A Research Note*..... 474
Memmi, Albert. *The Colonizer and the Colonized.* Noted by Roberts, James W.. 557
Mendel, Douglas, Jr. Note on Hindley, Donald, *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951–1963*..... 545
Mendel, Douglas, Jr. Note on McVey, Ruth, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* 545
Men Near the Top: Filling Key Posts in the Federal Service. Corson, John J. and Paul, R. Shale. Noted by Jennings, M. Kent 796
Merchant, Livingston T., Ed. *Neighbors Taken for Granted: Canada and the United States.* Noted by Wagner, J. Richard.... 222
Merchant, Livingston T., Wolfers, Arnold, Osgood, Robert E., Hammond, Paul Y. Martin, Laurence, Tucker, Robert W. and Marshall, Charles Burton. *The United States in a Disarmed World.* Noted by Holsti, Ole R..... 1180
Merelman, Richard M. Note on Goffman, Erving, *Behavior in Public Places*..... 500
Merkl, Peter H. *Germany: Yesterday and Tomorrow.* Noted by Braunthal, Gerard 533
Merritt, Richard L. Note on Storbeck, Dietrich, *Berlin—Bestand und Möglichkeiten*..... 534
Merritt, Richard L. Review of Shell, Kurt L., *Bedrohung und Bewährung: Führung und Bevölkerung in der Berlin-Krise*..... 486
Merritt, Richard L. *Symbols of American Community, 1735–1775.* Noted by Danielson, Wayne A..... 790
METHODOLOGY
Academic Ideology and the Study of Adjudication. Schubert, Glendon..... 106
Causal Inferences, Closed Populations and Measures of Association. Blalock, Hubert M..... 130
The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush. Greenstein, Fred I..... 629
Representational Role Types: A Research Note. Meller, Norman..... 474
Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry. Edinger, Lewis J. and Searing, Donald D..... 428
Metropolitan Transportation Politics and the New York Region. Doig, Jameson W. Noted by Colcord, Frank C., Jr..... 1128
The Metropolitan Transportation Problem, rev. ed. Owen, Wilfred. Noted by Colcord, Frank C., Jr..... 1128
Mexican Marxist: Vicente Lombardo Toledano. Hillon, Robert Paul. Noted by Ciria, Alberto..... 548
The Mexican Political System. Padgett, L. Vincent. Noted by Ciria, Alberto..... 548
Meyer, Alfred G. Note on Bukharin, N. and Preobrazhensky, E., *The ABC of Communism*..... 170
Meyer, Alfred G. Note on Gregor, A. James, *A Survey of Marxism: Problems in Philosophy and the Theory of History*.... 170
Meyer, J. R., Kain, J. F. and Wohl, M. *The Urban Transportation Problem.* Noted by Onstine, B. W..... 809
Meyerson, Martin and Banfield, Edward. *Boston: The Job Ahead* Noted by Long, Norton..... 515
Michelat, Guy and Thomas, Jean-Pierre H. *Dimensions du Nationalisme: Enquête Par Questionnaire.* Noted by Brown, Bernard H. E..... 814
Michelana, José A. Silva. Note on Lipset Seymour Martin and Solari, Aldo, *Elites in Latin America*..... 1163
Midwest Politics. Fenton, John H. Noted by Francis, Wayne L..... 183
Miles, E. W. Note on Landynski, Jacob W., *Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A Study in Constitutional Interpretation* 803
Miller, Robert F. Note on Korbonski, Andrzej, *Politics of Socialist Agriculture in Poland; 1945–1960*..... 1149
Miller, Warren E., Stokes, Donald E., Campbell, Angus and Converse, Philip E. *Elections and the Political Order.* Reviewed by Prothro, James W..... 485
Milne, R. S. *Political Parties in New Zealand* Noted by Leach, Richard H..... 200
Mirkin, Harris. Note on Handlin, Oscar and Mary, Ed., *The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780*..... 789
Mitchell, Stephen R. Note on Connor, Paul W., *Poor Richard's Politicks: Benjamin Franklin and His New American Order*.. 790
Mitchell, William C. Note on McKinney, John C., *Constructive Typology and Social Theory*..... 506
Mitchell, William. Note on Nisbet, Robert

A., *The Sociological Tradition*..... 1119
Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth. Weiner, Myron, Ed. Noted by Rummel, R. J..... 833
Modernization and the Structure of Societies: A Setting for International Affairs. Levy, Marion J., Jr. Reviewed by Riggs, Fred W..... 488
Modernization: Protest and Change. Eisenstadt, S. N. Reviewed by Organski, A. F. K..... 1112
Money and Politics in California: Democratic Senatorial Primary, 1964. Owens, John R. Noted by Wise, Sidney..... 190
Money as a Campaign Resource: Tennessee Democratic Senatorial Primaries, 1948–1964. Buchanan, William and Bird, Agnes. Noted by Wise, Sidney..... 190
The Mongolian People's Republic. Rupen, Robert A. Noted by Friters, Gerard M. 1152
Montgomery, John D. *Foreign Aid in International Politics.* Noted by Atherton, Aleyine L..... 1172
Montgomery, John D. Note on Arnold, H. J. P., *Aid for Development: An Economic Study*..... 1171
Montgomery, John D. Note on Friedmann, Wolfgang, Kalmanoff, George and Meather, Robert F., *International Financial Aid*..... 1171
Moore, Barrington, Jr. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World.* Reviewed by Almond, Gabriel A. 768
Moore, Clement H. Note on Gordon, David C., *The Passing of French Algeria*..... 826
Moore, John E. Note on Cary, William L., *Politics and the Regulatory Agencies*..... 1129
Moore, John E. Note on Lawrence, Samuel A., *United States Merchant Shipping Policies and Politics*..... 1129
Morality and the Law. Stumpf, Samuel Enoch. Noted by Steamer, Robert J.... 510
Morgan, Robert J. *Governing Soil Conservation: Thirty Years of the New Decentralization.* Noted by Parks, W. Robert... 522
Morgenthau, Hans J. Review of Aron, Raymond, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations*..... 1110
Morgenthau, Ruth S. *Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa.* Noted by Le Vine, Victor T..... 821
Morocco: Old Land, New Nation. Cohen, Mark I. and Hahn, Lorna. Noted by Zartman, I. William..... 544
Morton, Henry W. Note on Deutscher, Isaac, *Ironies of History, Essays on Contemporary Communism*..... 1125
Moss, Warner, Note on Bain, Chester W., *Annexation in Virginia: The Use of the Judicial Process for Readjusting City-County Boundaries*..... 806
Mueller, John E. Review of Knorr, Klaus, *On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age*..... 1109
Mueller, John E. *Some Comments on Russett's "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations."*..... 146
The Muted Revolution: East Germany's Challenge to Russia and the West. Hangen, Welles. Noted by Croan, Melvin..... 536
Mynar, Lubomyr R. *Guide to Reference Materials in Political Science: A Selective Bibliography*, Vol. I. Noted by Kamenetsky, Ihor..... 1128

Nash, A. E. Keir. Note on Gwyn, W. B., *The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the Doctrine From Its Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution*..... 514
Nashville Metro: The Politics of City-County Consolidation. Hawkins, Brett W. Noted by Sofen, Edward..... 516
The National Elections of 1964. Cummings, Milton C., Jr., Ed. Noted by Kessel, John H..... 182
Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World: (The Middle East and North Africa). Sharabi, Hisham. Noted by Ramazani, Rouhollah K..... 223
Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America. Whitaker, Arthur P. and Jordan, David C. Noted by Martz, John D..... 1162
Nationalism in Latin America: Diversity and Unity. Masur, Gerhard. Noted by Gibean, Victor H., Jr..... 551
National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States. Carter, Gwendolen M., Ed. Noted by Bates, Margaret L..... 823
The Nation is Burdened: American Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Masters, Roger D. Noted by Crabb, Cecil V., Jr. 1177
Naumann, Bernd. *Auschwitz. A Report on the Proceedings Against Robert Karl Mulka and Others Before the Court at Frankfurt.* Noted by Gimbel, John..... 814
Neal, Fred Warner. Note on Kolaja, Jiri, *Workers' Councils: The Yugoslav Experience*..... 817
The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs: American Educational and Cultural Policy Abroad. Frankel, Charles. Noted by Clute, Robert E..... 224
Negroes and the New Southern Politics. Matthews, Donald R. and Prothro, James W. Reviewed by Price, Hugh Douglas..... 779
Negro Social and Political Thought: 1850–1920. Brotz, Howard, Ed. Noted by

Reed, Adolph..... 512
Neighbors Taken For Granted: Canada and the United States. Merchant, Livingston T., Ed. Noted by Wagner, J. Richard... 222
Neubauer, Deane E. *Some Conditions of Democracy*..... 1002
Neumann, Sigmund. *Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Age of International Civil War.* (2nd Ed.) Noted by Tucker, Robert C..... 507
Neuchterlein, Donald D. *Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia.* Noted by Pauker, Guy J..... 830
Nevada; The Great Rotten Borough, 1859–1964. Ostrander Gilman. Noted by Pearl, Stanley A..... 808
The New Class Divided: Russian Science and Technology Versus Communism. Parry, Albert. Noted by Gilison, Jerome M.... 537
The New Eastern Europe: The Khrushchev Era and After. Brown, J. F. Noted by Brakeman, Louis F..... 817
Newman, Donald J. *Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or Innocence Without Trial.* Reviewed by Beaney, William..... 770
The New York Times Annual Indexes, 1868–74. Book Note..... 194
News and Notes.....227, 569, 875
Nie, Norman H., Polsby, Nelson W., Ekman, Paul, Black, Gordon, Verba, Sidney, Brody, Richard A., and Parker, Edwin B. Communication..... 1104
Nie, Norman H., Polsby, Nelson W., Ekman, Paul, Black, Gordon S., Verba, Sidney, Brody, Richard A., and Parker, Edwin B. *Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam*..... 317
Nieburg, H. L. *In the Name of Science.* Noted by Lyons, Gene M..... 797
Niemi, Richard G. and Herbert F. Weisberg. Communication..... 761
Niemi, Richard and Weisberg, Herbert. Communication..... 1104
Nigerian Government and Politics. Mackintosh, John P. Noted by Sklar, Richard L. 211
Nisbet, Robert A. *The Sociological Tradition.* Noted by Mitchell, William..... 1119
Nomos IX: Equality. Pennock, J. Roland. and Chapman, John W. Noted by Sargent, Lyman Tower..... 1123
Normanton, E. L. *The Accountability and Audit of Governments: A Comparative Study.* Noted by Burkhead, Jesse..... 195
A Note on Legislative Research: Labor Representation in Rhode Island. Goodman, Jay S..... 468
Noyes, P. H. *Organization and Revolution: Working-Class Associations in the German Revolutions of 1848–1849.* Noted by Robson, Charles B 535
Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace. Harkabi, Y. Noted by Hilberg, John V..... 1178
Nuquist, Andrew E. and Nuquist, Edith W. *Vermont State Government and Administration: An Historical and Descriptive Study of the Living Past.* Noted by Ross, Russell M..... 529
Nuquist, Edith W. and Nuquist, Andrew E. *Vermont State Government and Administration: An Historical and Descriptive Study of the Living Past.* Noted by Ross, Russell M..... 529
Nye, J. S. *Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis*..... 417

Oakeshott's Philosophical Politics. Greenleaf, W. H. Noted by Hamburger, Joseph.... 782
O'Ballance, Edgar. *The Greek Civil War, 1944–1949.* Noted by Gyorgy, Andrew 215
The Obligations of Power: American Diplomacy in the Search for Peace. Cleveland, Harlan. Noted by Brown, MacAlister..... 844
O'Connell, James, Scanlon, David G. and Cowan, Gray L., Ed. *Education and Nation-Building in Africa.* Reviewed by Carter, Gwendolen M..... 497
Odegard, Peter H. *In Memoriam*..... 235
Odegard, Peter H. *Political Power and Social Change.* Noted by MacMahon, Arthur W..... 781
Oil and Public Opinion in the Middle East. Hirst, David. Noted by Anabtawi, Samir N..... 558
Okinshevich, Leo, Comp., *Latin America in Soviet Writings, A Bibliography.* Volume I: 1917–1958, Volume II: 1959–1964 Noted by Dinerstein, Herbert S..... 551
O'Leary, Michael K., Davidson, Roger H. and Kovenock, David M. *Congress in Crisis: Politics and Congressional Reform.* Reviewed by Masters, Nicholas A..... 775
Ombudsmen and Others. Gellhorn, Walter. Noted by Kass, Benny L..... 810
Onstine, B. W. Note on Meyer, J. R., Kain, J. F. and Wohl, M., *The Urban Transportation Problem*..... 809
On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age. Knorr, Klaus. Reviewed by Mueller, John E..... 1109
Oppenheim, A. N. *Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement.* Noted by Scoble, Harry M..... 791
Oppenheim, Felix E. Note on Cassinelli, C. W., *Free Activities and Interpersonal Relations*..... 178
Oppenheimer, Mary and Fitch, Bob. *Ghana: End of an Illusion.* Noted by Skurnik, W. A. E..... 827
Orbell, John M. Note on de Grazia, Alfred,

Ed., *The Velikovsky Affair: The Warfare of Science and Scientism*..... 180
Orbell, John M. *Protest Participation among Southern Negro College Students*..... 446
La Organizacion de los Estados Americanos. Fernandez-Shaw, Felix. Noted by Engel, Salo..... 1184
Organization and Revolution: Working-Class Associations in the German Revolutions of 1848–1849. Noyes, P. H. Noted by Robson, Charles B..... 535
Organski, A. F. K. Note on Scott, Andrew M., *The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration*..... 554
Organski, A. F. K. Review of Eisenstadt, S. N., *Modernization*..... 1112
Organski, A. F. K. *The Stages of Political Development.* Reviewed by Kihl, Young W..... 1113
Orlans, Harold. Note on Barber, Richard J., *The Politics of Research*..... 1126
Orlans, Harold. Note on Keenan, Boyd R., Ed., *Science and the University*..... 1126
Osgood, Robert E., Hammond, Paul Y., Martin, Laurence W., Tucker, Robert W., Marshall, Charles Burton, Merchant, Livingston T. and Wolfers, Arnold. *The United States in a Disarmed World.* Noted by Holsti, Ole R..... 1180
Ostrander, Gilman. *Nevada: The Great Rotten Borough, 1859–1964.* Noted by Pearl, Stanley A..... 808
Outlook on Space. Evans, F. T. and Howard, H. T. Noted by Svarlien, Oscar..... 225
Owen, Wilfred. *The Metropolitan Transportation Problem*, rev. ed. Noted by Colcord, Frank C., Jr..... 1128
Owens, John R. *Money and Politics in California: Democratic Senatorial Primary, 1964.* Noted by Wise, Sidney..... 190

Packard, George R., III. *Protest in Tokyo; The Security Treaty Crisis.* Noted by Langdon, Frank..... 540
Padgett, L. Vincent. *The Mexican Political System.* Noted by Ciria, Alberto..... 548
Palmer, Norman D. *South Asia and United States Policy.* Noted by Trager, Frank N. 217
Panama y Sus Relaciones Centroamericanos. Fernandez-Shaw, Felix. Noted by Engel, Salo..... 1184
Parent, Alphonse-Marie, McConnell, Thomas R., Cooper, William Mansfield and Davis, William G. *Governments and the University.* Reviewed by Peltason, J. W..... 1116
Parenti, Michael. Communication..... 1103
Parenti, Michael. *Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification*..... 717
Parker, Edwin B., Nie, Norman H. Polsby, Nelson W., Ekman Paul, Black, Gordon, Verba, Sidney and Brody, Richard A. Communication..... 1104
Parker, Edwin B., Nie, Norman H., Polsby, Nelson W., Ekman, Paul, Black, Gordon S., Verba, Sidney and Brody, Richard A. *Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam* 317
Parks, W. Robert. Note on Morgan, Robert J., *Governing Soil Conservation: Thirty Years of the New Decentralization* 522
Parliament in the German Political System. Loewenberg, Gerhard. Reviewed by Foster, Charles R..... 771
Parry, Albert. *The New Class Divided: Russian Science and Technology Versus Communism.* Noted by Gilison, Jerome M... 537
Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives. Peabody, Robert L..... 675
Party Loyalty Among Congressmen, Mayhew, David R. Noted by Keech, Wiliam R..... 1137
Party, Region and the Dimensions of Conflict in the House of Representatives, 1949–1954. Marwell, Gerald..... 380
Passin, Herbert, Ed. *The United States and Japan.* Noted by Burks, Ardath W..... 559
The Passing of French Algeria. Gordon, David C. Noted by Moore, Clement H. 826
Pauker, Guy J. Note on Neuchterlein, Donald D., *Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia*..... 830
Paul, R. Shale and Corson, John J. *Men Near the Top: Filling Key Posts in the Federal Service.* Noted by Jennings, M. Kent..... 796
Paulson, Belden, with Ricci, Athos. *The Searchers: Conflict and Communism in an Italian Town.* Noted by Hennessey, Timothy M..... 1147
Paxton, Robert O. *Parades and Politics at Vichy: The French Officers Corps under Marshal Pétain.* Noted by Ambler, John S..... 813
Peabody, Robert L. *Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives*..... 675
Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations. Aron, Raymond. Reviewed by Morgenthau, Hans J..... 1110
Pearl, Stanley A. Note on Ostrander, Gilman, *Nevada: The Great Rotten Borough, 1859–1964*..... 808
Pechman, Joseph A. *Federal Tax Policy.* Noted by Flash, Edward S., Jr..... 525
Pennock, J. Roland and Chapman, John W. *Nomos IX: Equality.* Noted by Sargent, Lyman Tower..... 1123
Peel, Roy V. Note on Callow, Alexander B., Jr., *The Tweed Ring*..... 1140

Peer Group and School and the Political Socialization Process. Langton, Kenneth P. 751
Peltason, J. W. Review of Copper, William Mansfield, David, William G., Parent, Alphonse-Marie, and McConnell, Thomas R., *Governments and the University*..... 1116
The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia: A Background Book. Wheeler, Geoffrey. Noted by Rupen, Robert A..... 831
Penrose, E. F. *The Revolution in International Relations.* Noted by Sondermann, Fred A..... 838
Pentony, DeVere E. Note on Halpern, A. M., Ed. *Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents*..... 221
Periodicals for Latin American Economic Development, Trade and Investment: An Annotated Bibliography. Sable, Martin, Comp. Book Note..... 552
Perkins, Dwight H. and Halperin, Morton H. *Communist China and Arms Control.* Noted by Leng, Shao-chuan..... 218
Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Age of International Civil War. (2nd. Ed.) Neumann, Sigmund. Noted by Tucker, Robert C..... 507
Peterson, Arthur L. Note on Martin, Ralph G., *Ballots and Bandwagons*..... 1138
Pfaff, William and Stillman, Edmund. *Power and Impotence: The Failure of America's Foreign Policy.* Noted by Hartmann, Frederick H..... 842
Pfeiffer, David G. *The Measurement of Inter-Party Competition and Systemic Stability* 457
Phillips, Cabell. *The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession.* Noted by Barton, Weldon V..... 794
Piekalkiewicz, Jaroslaw A. Note on Bromke, Adam, *Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism*..... 1147
Piekalkiewicz, Jaroslaw. Note on Jackson, George D., *Comintern and Peasant in East-Europe 1919–1930*..... 539
Pierce, Richard A. Note on Bacon, Elizabeth E., *Central Asians under Russian Rule*..... 832
Pierce, Roy. *Contemporary French Political Thought.* Noted by Kelly, George Armstrong..... 504
Pike, Douglas. *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.* Reviewed by Rupen, Robert A..... 493
Pinney, Edward L., Ed. *Comparative Politics and Political Theory. Essays Written in Honor of Charles Baskervil Robson.* Noted by Leiserson, Avery..... 499
Pinney, Edward L. Note on Béteille, André, *Caste, Class, and Power: Changing Patterns of Stratification in a Tanjore Village.* 208
Pinney, Edward L. Note on Diederich, Nils, *Empirische Wahlforschung: Konzeptionen und Methoden im internationalen Vergleich*..... 1121
Pinney, Edward L. Note on Pye, Lucian W., *Aspects of Political Development*..... 208
Ploss, Sidney I. Note on Linden, Carl A., *Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership, 1957–1964*..... 1151
Poland's Politics: Idealism vs. Realism. Bromke, Adam. Noted by Piekalkiewicz, Jaroslaw A..... 1148
The Polaris Missile Strike: A General Economics Systems Analysis. Kuenne, Robert E. Noted by Ries, John C..... 1177
Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents. Halpern, A. M. Noted by Pentony, DeVere E..... 221
Polin, R., Treves, R., Sternberger, D., Arnaud, P., Bastid, P., Battiffol, H., Chapman, J. W., Cotta, S., and de Jouvenel, B. *L'Idee de Philosophie Politique: Annales de Philosophie Politique-6.* Noted by Watkins, Frederick M..... 786
Political Anthropology. Swartz, Marc J., Turner, Victor W. and Tuden, Arthur, Ed. Noted by Hardgrave, Robert L., Jr. 1120
Political Dualism and Italian Communism. Tarrow, Sidney G..... 39
Political Oppositions in Western Democracies. Dahl, Robert A., Ed., Reviewed by Eckstein, Harry..... 159
Political Parties and Political Development. LaPalombara, Joseph, and Weiner, Myron., Ed. Noted by Eldersveld, Samuel J..... 1166
Political Parties in French-Speaking West Africa. Morgenthau, Ruth S. Noted by Le Vine, Victor T..... 821
Political Parties in New Zealand. Milne, R. S. Noted by Leach, Richard H..... 200
Political Parties in the United States. Sindler, Allan P. Noted by Cnudde, Carles F.... 525
Political Power and Social Change. Odegard, Peter H. Noted by MacMahon, Arthur W..... 781
Political Recruitment: The Case of Japanese Prefectural Assemblymen. Kim, Young C. 1036
The Political Relevance of Behavioral and Existential Psychology. Kariel, Henry S. 334
Political Science and the Proposal for a National Science Foundation. Harris, Fred R. 1088
Political Systems: Some Sociological Approaches. Wiseman, H. V. Noted by Verba, Sidney..... 529
POLITICAL THEORY
Bargaining in a Three-Person Game. Riker, William H..... 642

The City in the Future of Democracy. Dahl, Robert A..... 953
The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements. Tucker, Robert C..... 343
The Political Relevance of Behavioral and Existential Psychology. Kariel, Henry S. 334
The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism. Lowi, Theodore..... 5
Representative Bureaucracy: A Reassessment. Subramaniam, V..... 1010
Some Conditions of Democracy. Neubauer, Deane E..... 1002
Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model. McCrone, Donald J. and Cnudde, Charles F..... 72
Politicians' Beliefs about Voters. Kingdon, John W..... 137
Politics and the Regulatory Agencies. Cary, William L. Noted by Moore, John E..... 1129
Politics, Economics, and the Public: Policy Outcomes in the American States. Dye, Thomas R. Reviewed by Robinson, James A..... 1113
Politics, International Relations and Law: Scope, Methodology and Classification. Kumar, Girja. Book Note..... 226
Politics in the American States, A Comparative Analysis. Jacob, Herbert and Vines, Kenneth N., Eds., Reviewed by Lockard, Duane..... 165
Politics in West Africa. Lewis, W. Arthur. Reviewed by Fleming, William G..... 1115
The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process. Caraley, Demetrios. Noted by Smith, Jean Edward..... 528
The Politics of Research. Barber, Richard J. Noted by Orlans, Harold..... 1126
Politics of Socialist Agriculture in Poland: 1945–1960. Korbonski, Andrzej. Noted by Miller, Robert F..... 1149
The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois. Anton, Thomas J. Noted by Sharkansky, Ira..... 807
The Politics of Wage-Price Decisions: A Four-Country Analysis. Edelman, Murray and Fleming, R. W. Noted by Joseph, Myron L..... 205
Polsby, Nelson W. Note on Bachrach, Peter, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique*..... 1124
Polsby, Nelson W. Review of Young, James Sterling, *The Washington Community 1880–1928*..... 164
Polsby, Nelson W., Ekman Paul, Black, Gordon, Verba, Sidney, Brody, Richard A., Parker, Edwin B. and Nie, Norman H. Communication..... 1104
Polsby, Nelson W., Ekman, Paul, Black, Gordon S., Verba, Sidney, Brody, Richard A., Parker, Edwin B. and Nie, Norman H. *Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam*..... 317
Poor Richard's Politicks: Benjamin Franklin and His New American Order. Connor, Paul W. Noted by Mitchell, Stephen R. 790
The Popular Sources of Political Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. Haddlin, Oscar and Mary, Ed. Noted by Mirkin, Harris..... 789
Postwar Defense Policy and the U. S. Navy, 1943–1946. Davis, Vincent. Noted by Caraley, Demetrios..... 799
Potholm, Christian P. Note on Benedict, Burton, *Mauritius: Problems of a Plural Society*..... 212
Potholm, Christian P. Note on Henderson, K. D. D., *Sudan Republic*..... 212
Power and Impotence: The Failure of America's Foreign Policy. Stillman, Edmund and Pfaff, William. Noted by Hartmann, Frederick H..... 842
Power and Privilege: A Theory of Social Stratification. Lenski, Gerhard E. Reviewed by Eulau, Heinz..... 482
Power in the Liberal Party: A Study in Australian Politics. West, Katharine. Noted by Leach, Richard H..... 200
The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress. Fenno, Richard F., Jr. Reviewed by Robinson, James A..... 764
Preobrazhensky, E. and Bukharin, N. *The ABC of Communism.* Noted by Meyer, Alfred G..... 170
Presidential Greatness: The Image and the Man From George Washington to the Present. Bailey, Thomas A. Noted by Koenig, Louis W..... 1139
Presidential Leadership. Hargrove, Erwin C. Noted by Cnudde, Charles F..... 525
Pressman, Jefferey L. *House vs. Senate: Conflict in the Appropriations Process.* Noted by Fenno, Richard F., Jr..... 184
Presthus, Robert. Review of Gross, Bertram M., *The Managing of Organizations*..... 1106
Prewitt, Kenneth. Review of Schlesinger, Joseph A., *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States*..... 767
Price, Hugh Douglas. Review of Matthews, Donald R. and Prothro, James W., *Negroes and the New Southern Politics*..... 779
Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation. Rapoport, Anatol and Chammah, Albert M. Noted by Shubik, Martin..... 173
Private Interests and Public Policy: The Experience of the French Economic and Social

Council. Hayward, J. E. S. Noted by Batchelder, John T. ... 1145
Professional Conferences ... 227, 570
Propaganda Comes of Age. Choukas, Michael. Noted by Bowman, R. Lewis ... 179
Protest in Tokyo; The Security Treaty Crisis. Packard, George R., III. Noted by Langdon, Frank ... 540
Protest Participation among Southern Negro College Students. Orbell, John M. ... 446
Prothro, James W. and Matthews, Donald R. Negroes and the New Southern Politics. Reviewed by Price, Hugh Douglas ... 779
Prothro, James W. Review of Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E., Miller, Warren E. and Stokes, Donald E., *Elections and the Political Order* ... 485
The Psychology of Power. Sampson, Ronald V. Noted by Rogow, Arnold A. ... 181
Public Administration and Democracy: Essays Honoring Paul H. Appleby. Martin, Roscoe C., Ed. Noted by Graham, George A. ... 514
Public Finance to Democratic Process, Fiscal Institutions and Individual Choice. Buchanan, James M. Noted by Browning, Rufus P. ... 1135
Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam. Verba, Sidney, Brody, Richard A., Parker, Edwin B., Nie, Norman H., Polsby, Nelson W., Ekman, Paul and Black, Gordon S. ... 317
The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism. Lowi, Theodore ... 5
Puget, Henry. *In Memoriam* ... 578
The Puritan Ethic and Woman Suffrage. Grimes, Alan P. Reviewed by Schuck, Victoria ... 1115
Pye, Lucian W. *Aspects of Political Development.* Noted by Pinney. Edward L. ... 208

Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement. Oppenheim, A. N. Noted by Scoble, Harry M. ... 791

The Radical Papers. Howe, Irving, Ed. Noted by Leary, Paul ... 501
Ramazani, Rouhollah, K. Note on Kerr, Malcolm, *The Arab Cold War, 1958–1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics* ... 223
Ramazani, Rouhollah K. Note on Sharabi, Hisham, *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World: (The Middle East and North Africa)* ... 223
The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation. Smith, Bruce L. R. Noted by Gilpin, Robert ... 191
Range, Willard. Note on Ekirch, Arthur A., Jr., *Ideas, Ideals, and American Diplomacy* ... 555
Range, Willard. Note on Halappa, G. S., Ed., *Dilemmas of Democratic Politics in India* ... 209
Rankin, Robert S. Note on Abraham, Henry J., *Freedom and the Court: Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States* ... 1133
Ransom, Harry Howe. Note on Sapin, Burton M., *The Making of United States Foreign Policy* ... 800
Rapoport, Anatol. *Two-Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas.* Noted by Shubik, Martin ... 173
Rapoport, Anatol and Chammah, Albert M. *Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation.* Noted by Shubik, Martin ... 173
Rapoport, David C. Note on Coats, Wendell J., *Armed Force as Power: The Theory of War Reconsidered* ... 1122
Rasmussen, Jorgen S. *The Relations of the Profumo Rebels with Their Local Parties.* Noted by Stern, Larry N. ... 815
The Real World of Democracy. Macpherson, C. B. Noted by Hughes, Delos D. ... 511
Reed, Adolph. Note on Brotz, Howard, Ed., *Negro Social and Political Thought: 1850–1920* ... 512
Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities. Lineberry, Robert L. and Fowler, Edmund P. ... 701
Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First. Kelley, Stanley, Jr., Ayres, Richard E., and Bowen, William G. ... 359
The Relations of the Profumo Rebels with Their Local Parties. Rasmussen, Jorgen S. Noted by Stern, Larry N. ... 815
Relative Deprivation and Social Justice. Runciman, W. G. Noted by Epstein, Leon D. ... 532
Representational Role Types: A Research Note. Meller, Norman ... 474
Representative Bureaucracy: A Reassessment. Subramaniam, V. ... 1010
A Republic of Equals. Dunbar, Leslie W., Noted by Grimes, Alan P. ... 177
Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan. A Critique of Sources, Conditions, and Issues, with Appended Documents. Braibanti, Ralph. Noted by Birkhead, Guthrie S. ... 194
The Revolution in International Relations. Penrose, E. F. Noted by Sondermann, Fred A. ... 838
Revolution in Pakistan. Feldman, Herbert. Noted by Goodnow, Henry F. ... 1154
The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration. Scott, Andrew M. Noted by Organski, A. F. K. ... 554
The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the

Origins of Radical Politics. Walzer, Michael. Noted by Feaver, George A..... 169
Revolutionary Hamburg: Labour Politics in the Early Weimar Republic. Comfort, Richard A. Noted by Wright, William E.. 1144
Ricci, Athos, with Paulson, Belden. *The Searchers: Conflict and Communism in an Italian Town.* Noted by Hennessey, Timothy M..... 1147
Richardson, Nicholas. *The French Prefectoral Corps, 1814–1830.* Noted by Fried, Robert C..... 1146
Ries, John C. Note on Kuenne, Robert E., *The Polaris Missile Strike: A General Economics Systems Analysis*..... 1177
Riggs, Fred W. Review of Levy, Marion J., Jr., *Modernization and the Structure of Societies: A Setting for International Affairs*..... 488
Riker, William H. *Bargaining in a Three-Person Game*..... 642
Rintala, Marvin. Note on Hodgson, John H., *Communism in Finland: A History and Interpretation*..... 819
The Rise of Indonesian Communism. McVey, Ruth. Noted by Mendel, Douglas, Jr..... 545
The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa. The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873–1964. Rotberg, Robert I. Noted by Caplan, Gerald L..... 1169
Ritter, Gerard. *The German Problem: Basic Questions of German Political Life, Past and Present.* Noted by Braunthal, Gerard. 533
Roberts, James W. Note on Thornton, A. P., *Doctrines of Imperialism*..... 557
Roberts, James W. Note on Memmi, Robert, *The Colonizer and the Colonized*... 557
Robinson, James A. Review of Dye, Thomas R., *Politics, Economics, and the Public; Policy Outcomes in the American States*... 1113
Robinson, James A. Review of Fenno, Richard F., Jr., *The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress*..... 764
Robinson, Thomas W. Review of McLane, Charles B., *Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: an Exploration of Eastern Policy Under Lenin and Stalin*..... 492
Robson, Charles B. Note on Noyes, P. H., *Organization and Revolution: Working-Class Associations in the German Revolutions of 1848–1849*..... 535
Rogow, Arnold A. Note on Sampson, Ronald V., *The Psychology of Power*..... 181
Rooks, Charles S. Note on Dumont, René, *False Start in Africa*..... 553
Rooks, Charles S. Note on Thiam, Doudou, *The Foreign Policy of Africa States: Ideological Bases, Present Realities, Future Prospects*..... 553
Rose, Leo D., and Joshi, Bhuwan L. *Democratic Innovations in Nepal.* Noted by Bradley, Phillips..... 547
Rose, Richard, Ed., *Studies in British Politics: A Reader in Political Sociology.* Noted by Christoph, James B..... 202
Rosenau, James N. *Compatibility, Consensus, and an Emerging Political Science of Adaptation*..... 983
Rosenbaum, Kurt. Note on Dyck, Harvey L., *Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926–1933: A Study in Diplomatic Instability*..... 836
Rosenthal, Donald B. Note on Taylor, Carl C., Ensminger, Douglas, Johnson, Helen W. and Joyce, Jean, *India's Roots of Democracy: A Sociological Analysis of Rural India's Experience in Planned Development Since Independence*..... 1155
Ross, Douglas, and Staebler, Neil. *How to Argue with a Conservative.* Noted by Leary, Paul..... 501
Ross, Russell M. Note on Nuquist, Andrew E. and Nuquist, Edith W., *Vermont State Government and Administration: An Historical and Descriptive Study of the Living Past*..... 529
Rossiter, Clinton. *1787: The Grand Convention.* Reviewed by Hafner, Donald L..... 491
Rotberg, Robert I. *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa. The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873–1964.* Noted by Caplan, Gerald L..... 1169
Roucek, Joseph S. Note on Dowd, Douglas F., *Thorstein Veblen*..... 503
Rourke, Francis E. & Brooks, Glenn E. *The Managerial Revolution in Higher Education.* Reviewed by Peltason, J. W... 1116
Rourke, Francis E. Note on Long, Edward V., Sen., *The Intruders: The Invasion of Privacy by Government and Industry*..... 1142
Rowat, Donald C. Note on Anderson, Stanley V., *Canadian Ombudsman Proposals*.. 811
The Rule of Law in European Integration: The Path of the Schuman Plan. Scheingold, Stuart. Noted by Stambuk, George..... 560
Rummel, R. J. Note on Weiner, Myron, Ed., *Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth*.. 833
Runciman, W. G. *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice.* Noted by Epstein, Leon D. 532
Rupen, Robert A. *The Mongolian People's Republic.* Noted by Friters, Gerard M.... 1152
Rupen, Robert A. Note on Arfa, Hassan, *The Kurds: An Historical and Political Study*..... 831
Rupen, Robert A. Note on Kapur, Harish, *Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917–1927: A Study of Soviet Policy Towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan*..... 831

Rupen, Robert A. Note on Wheeler, Geoffrey, *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia: A Background Book*..... 831
Rupen, Robert A. Review of Pike, Douglas, *Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam*..... 493
Rush, Myron and Horelick, Arnold L. *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy*. Noted by Marshall, Charles Burton..... 836
Rush, Myron. Note on Crankshaw, Edward, *Khrushchev: A Career*..... 199
Russell, Ruth B. Note on Luard, Evan, Ed., *The Evolution of International Organizations*..... 1185
Russett, Bruce M. Communication..... 149
Russett, Bruce M. Review of Fliess, Peter J., *Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity*..... 167
Russett, Cynthia Eagle. *The Concept of Equilibrium in American Social Thought*. Noted by Garvey, Gerald..... 784

Sable, Martin, Comp. *Periodicals for Latin American Economic Development, Trade and Investment: An Annotated Bibliography*. Book Note..... 552
Sable, Martin, Ed. *Guide to Latin American Studies*. Book Note..... 552
Sable, Martin, Ed. *Master Directory for Latin America*. Book Note..... 552
Salinger, Pierre. *With Kennedy*. Note by Beyle, Thad L..... 795
Sampson, Ronald V. *The Psychology of Power*. Noted by Rogow, Arnold A..... 181
Sapin, Burton M. *The Making of United States Foreign Policy*. Noted by Ransom, Harry Howe..... 800
Sargent, Lyman Tower. Note on Pennock, J. Roland, and Chapman, John W., *Nomos IX: Equality*..... 1123
Scanlon, David G., Cowan, Gray L. and O'Connell, James, Ed. *Education and Nation-Building in Africa*. Reviewed by Carter, Gwendolen M..... 497
Schelling, Thomas C. *Arms and Influence*. Reviewed by Martin, Laurence W..... 766
Scheinman, Lawrence. *Atomic Energy in France Under the Fourth Republic*. Noted by Kramish, Arnold..... 812
Schlesinger, Joseph A. *Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States*. Reviewed by Prewitt, Kenneth..... 767
Schram, Stuart R. Note on Chen, Yung Ping, *Chinese Political Thought: Mao Tse-Tung and Liu, Chao-Chi*..... 786
Schubert, Glendon. *Academic Ideology and the Study of Adjudication*..... 106
Schubert, Glendon R. *Judicial Behavior: A Reader in Theory and Research*. Reviewed by Westin, Alan F..... 765
Schubert, Glendon R. *The Judicial Mind; Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946–1963*. Reviewed by Westin, Alan F..... 763
Schuck, Victoria. Review of Grimes, Alan P., *The Puritan Ethic and Woman Suffrage*..... 1115
Schurman, Franz. *Ideology and Organization in Communist China*. Reviewed by Lewis, John W..... 168
Scoble, Harry M. Note on Oppenheim, A. N., *Questionnaire Design and Attitude Measurement*..... 791
Scott, Andrew M. *The Revolution in Statecraft: Informal Penetration*. Noted by Organski, A. F. K..... 554
Scheingold, Stuart. *The Rule of Law in European Integration: The Path of the Schuman Plan*. Noted by Stambuk, George..... 560
Schuman, Frederick L. Communication..... 149
Scott, Andrew M. and Hunt, Margaret A. *Congress and Lobbies: Image and Reality*. Noted by Davidson, Roger H..... 185
Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court: A Study in Constitutional Interpretation. Ladynski, Jacob W. Noted by Miles, E. W..... 803
The Searchers: Conflict and Communism in an Italian Town. Paulson, Belden, with Ricci, Athos. Noted by Hennessey, Timothy M..... 1147
Searing, Donald D. and Edinger, Lewis J. *Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry*..... 428
Seasholes, Bradbury. Note on Greer, Scott, *Urban Renewal and American Cities*..... 517
Secher, H. P. Note on Loewenstein, Karl, *Max Weber's Political Ideas in the Perspective of Our Time*..... 505
Seligman, Lester. Note on Bottomore, T. B., *Elites and Society*..... 787
1787: The Grand Convention. Rossiter, Clinton. Reviewed by Hafner, Donald L..... 491
Shadegg, Stephen C. *How to Win an Election: The Art of Political Victory*. Noted by Kelley, Stanley, Jr..... 518
Shannon, W. Wayne. Note on Zucker, Norman L., *George Norris: Gentle Knight of American Democracy*..... 520
Sharabi, Hisham. *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World: (The Middle East and North Africa.)*. Noted by Ramazani, Rouhollah K..... 223
Sharkansky, Ira. *Government Expenditures and Public Services in the American States*..... 1066

Sharkansky, Ira. Note on Anton, Thomas J., *The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois*..... 807
Sharpe, L. J. Note on Smallwood, Frank, *Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan Reform*..... 531
Shell, Kurt L. *Bedrohung und Bewährung: Führung und Bevölkerung in der Berlin-Krise*. Reviewed by Merritt, Richard L... 486
Shover, John L. *Cornbelt Rebellion: The Farmers' Holiday Association*. Noted by Block, William J..... 521
Shubik, Martin. Note on Rapoport, Anatol, *Two-Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas*..... 173
Shubik, Martin. Note on Rapoport, Anatol and Chammah, Albert M., *Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation*..... 173
Sills, David L. and Glaser, William S., Ed. *The Government of Associations*. Noted by Zeigler, Harmon..... 1136
Silva, Ruth C. Note on Bornet, Vaughn Davis, *Labor Politics in a Democratic Republic: Moderation, Division, and Disruption in the Presidential Election of 1928*... 804
Sindler, Allan P. *Political Parties in the United States*. Noted by Cnudde, Charles F..... 525
Skid Row as a Way of Life. Wallace, Samuel E. Noted by McCleery, Richard..... 809
Sklar, Richard L. Note on Mackintosh, John P., *Nigerian Government and Politics*..... 211
Skolnikoff, Eugene. Note on Jacobson, Harold K. and Stein, Eric, *Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians*..... 833
Skurnik, W. A. E. Note on Firch, Bob and Oppenheimer, Mary, *Ghana: End of an Illusion*..... 827
Slater, Jerome. Note on Bailey, Norman A., *Latin America in World Politics*..... 1182
Slums and Community Development: Experiments in Self-Help. Clinard, Marshall B. Noted by Hunter, David R..... 186
Smallwood, Frank. *Greater London: The Politics of Metropolitan Reform*. Noted by Sharpe, L. J..... 531
Smith, Jean Edward. Note on Caraley, Demetrios, *The Politics of Military Unification: A Study of Conflict and the Policy Process*..... 528
Smith, Bruce L. R. Communication..... 150
Smith, Bruce L. R. *The RAND Corporation: Case Study of a Nonprofit Advisory Corporation*. Noted by Gilpin, Robert..... 191
Snyder, Glenn H. *Stockpiling Strategic Materials: Politics and National Defense*. Noted by Williams, Alden..... 192
Soares, Glaucio and Hamblin, Robert L. *Socioeconomic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952*..... 1053
Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry. Edinger, Lewis J. and Searing, Donald D..... 428
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Moore, Barrington, Jr. Reviewed by Almond, Gabriel A..... 768
The Society of Man. Halle, Louis J. Noted by Boulding, Kenneth E..... 843
Socio-economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952. Soares, Glaucio and Hamblin, Robert L..... 1053
The Sociological Tradition. Nisbet, Robert A. Noted by Mitchell, William..... 1119
Sofen, Edward. Note on Hawkins, Brett W., *Nashville Metro: The Politics of City-County Consolidation*..... 516
Solari, Aldo and Lipset, Seymour Martin. *Elites in Latin America*. Noted by Michelena, José A. Silva..... 1163
Some Comments on Russett's "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations." Mueller, John E..... 146
Some Conditions of Democracy. Neubauer, Deane E..... 1002
Sondermann, Fred A. Note on Penrose, E. F., *The Revolution in International Relations*..... 838
Sorenson, Jay B. Note on Brown, Emily Clark, *Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations*..... 206
South Africa, A Study in Conflict. van den Berghe, T. L. Noted by Gunther, Magnus 1169
South Asia and United States Policy. Palmer, Norman D. Noted by Trager, Frank N... 217
Southern Africa in Transition. Davis, John A. and Baker, James K., Eds. Noted by Stultz, Newell M..... 825
Soviet Agriculture and Peasant Affairs. Laird, Roy D., Ed. Noted by Lodge, Milton G..... 1150
Soviet Agriculture: The Permanent Crisis. Laird, Roy D. and Crowley, Edward L., Ed. Noted by Lodge, Milton G..... 1150
Soviet Policy in Latin America. Dinerstein, Herbert S..... 80
Soviet Russia and Asia, 1917–1927: A Study of Soviet Policy Towards Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan, Kapur, Harish. Noted by Rupen, Robert A..... 831
Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia: an Exploration of Eastern Policy Under Lenin and Stalin. McLane, Charles B. Reviewed by Robinson, Thomas W..... 492
Soviet Trade Unions and Labor Relations. Brown, Emily Clark. Noted by Sorenson, Jay B..... 206

Space Law. Jenks, Wilfred C. Noted by White, Irwin L. ... 841
Spector, Stanley. Note on Cohen, Arthur A., *The Communism of Mao-Tse Tung*. ... 828
Spiegel, Frederick C., Watson, Richard A., and Downing, Rondal G. *Bar Politics, Judicial Selection and the Representation of Social Interests*. ... 54
Staebler, Neil and Ross, Douglas. *How to Argue with a Conservative*. Noted by Leary, Paul. ... 501
Staff Changes. ... 574
The Stages of Political Development. Organski, A. F. K. Reviewed by Kihl, Young W. ... 1113
Stambuk, George. Note on Scheingold, Stuart, *The Rule of Law in European Integration: The Path of the Schuman Plan*. ... 560
Starke, J. G. *The Anzus Treaty Alliance*. Noted by Gordon, Bernard K. ... 835
Statistical Abstract of Latin America. 1965. Book Note. ... 552
Stauffer, Robert. *The Development of an Interest Group: The Philippine Medical Association*. Noted by Liddle, R. William. ... 1157
Steamer, Robert J. Note on Stumpf, Samuel Enoch, *Morality and the Law*. ... 510
Steele, A. T. *The American People and China*. Noted by Harris, Louis. ... 219
Stein, Eric and Jacobson, Harold K. *Diplomats, Scientists, and Politicians*. Noted by Skolnikoff, Eugene. ... 833
Stern, Larry N. Note on Rasmussen, Jorgen S., *The Relations of the Profumo Rebels with Their Local Parties*. ... 815
Sternberger, D., Arnaud, P., Bastid, P., Battiffol, H., Chapman, J. W., Cotta, S., de Jouvenel, B., Polin, R. and Treves, R. *L'Idee de Philosophie Politique: Annales de Philosophie Politique-6*. Noted by Watkins, Frederick M. ... 786
Stillman, Edmund and Pfaff, William. *Power and Impotence: The Failure of America's Foreign Policy*. Noted by Hartmann, Frederick H. ... 842
Stockpiling Strategic Materials: Politics and National Defense. Snyder, Glenn H. Noted by Williams, Alden. ... 192
Stokes, Donald E., Campbell, Angus, Converse, Philip E. and Miller, Warren E. *Elections and the Political Order*. Reviewed by Prothro, James W. ... 485
Stone, Irving. *They Also Ran: The Story of the Men Who Were Defeated for the Presidency*. Noted by Koenig, Louis W. ... 1139
Storbeck, Dietrich. *Berlin—Bestand und Möglichkeiten*. Noted by Merritt, Richard L. ... 534
Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy. Horelick, Arnold L. and Rush, Myron. Noted by Marshall, Charles Burton. ... 836
The Struggle for Equality. Swanson, Bert E. Noted by Camer, Richard. ... 1132
Student Nationalism in China, 1927–1937. Israel, John. Noted by Kim, Samuel S. ... 1160
Studies in British Politics: A Reader in Political Sociology. Rose, Richard, Ed. Noted by Christoph, James B. ... 202
Stultz, Newell M. Note on Davis, John A. and Baker, James K., *Southern Africa in Transition*. ... 825
Stultz, Newell M. Note on Austin, Dennis, *Britain and South Africa*. ... 825
Stumpf, Samuel Enoch. *Morality and the Law*. Noted by Steamer, Robert J. ... 510
Subramaniam, V. *Representative Bureaucracy: A Reassessment*. ... 1010
Sudan Republic. Henderson, K. D. D. Noted by Potholm, Christian P. ... 212
Suh, Dae-sook. *The Korean Communist Movement 1918–1948*. Noted by Kim, Samuel S. ... 1162
Suleiman, Michael W. Note on Abu Jaber, Kamel S., *The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization*. ... 1153
Sullivant, Robert S. Note on Avtorkhanov, Abdurakhman, *The Communist Party Apparatus*. ... 816
A Survey of Marxism: Problems in Philosophy and the Theory of History. Gregor, A. James. Noted by Meyer, Alfred G. ... 170
Svarlien, Oscar. Note on Evans, F. T. and Howard, H. T., *Outlook on Space*. ... 225
Swanson, Bert E. *The Struggle for Equality*. Noted by Camer, Richard. ... 1132
Swartz, Marc J., Turner, Victor W. and Tuden, Arthur, Ed. *Political Anthropology*. Noted by Hardgrave, Robert L., Jr. ... 1120
Symbols of American Community, 1735–1775. Merritt, Richard L. Noted by Danielson, Wayne A. ... 790
A Systems Analysis of Political Life. Easton, David. Reviewed by Gross, Bertram M. ... 157

Tarrow, Sidney G. *Political Dualism and Italian Communism*. ... 39
Taylor, Carl C., Ensminger, Douglas, Johnson, Helen W. and Jouce, Jean. *India's Road of Democracy: A Sociological Analysis of Rural India's Experience in Planned Development Since Independence*. Noted by Rosenthal, Donald B. ... 1155
The Territorial Imperative. A Personal Inquiry into the Animal Origins of Property and Nations. Ardrey, Robert. Reviewed by Davis, James C. ... 162
Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia. Neuchterlein, Donald D. Noted by Pauker, Guy J. ... 830

Thayer, Frederick C. Jr. *Air Transport Policy and National Security: A Political, Economic, and Military Analysis.* Noted by Johns, Claude J., Jr. ... 213
The Theory of Democratic Elitism: A Critique. Bachrach, Peter. Noted by Polsby, Nelson W. ... 1124
They Also Ran: The Story of the Men Who Were Defeated for the Presidency. Stone, Irving. Noted by Koenig, Louis W. ... 1139
Thiam, Doudou. *The Foreign Policy of African States: Ideological Bases, Present Realities, Future Prospects.* Noted by Rooks, Charles S. ... 553
Thomas, Jean-Pierre H. and Michelat, Guy. *Dimensions du Nationalisme: Enquête Par Questionnaire.* Noted by Brown, Bernard E. ... 814
Thompson, James D., Ed. *Approaches to Organizational Design.* Noted by Golembiewski, Robert T. ... 792
Thompson, Sir Robert. *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam.* Reviewed by McAlister, John T., Jr. ... 773
Thompson, Virginia and Adloff, Richard. *The Malagasy Republic: Madagascar Today.* Noted by Potholm, Christian P. ... 212
Thorson, Thomas Landon. Communication. 478
Thornton, A. P. *Doctrines of Imperialism.* Noted by Roberts, James W. ... 557
Thorson, Thomas Landon. Note on Berg, Elias, *Democracy and the Majority Principle: A Study in Twelve Contemporary Political Theories* ... 176
Thorstein Veblen. Dowd, Douglas F. Noted by Roucek, Joseph S. ... 503
Three Worlds of Development: The Theory and Practice of International Stratification. Horowitz, Louis Irving. Noted by Gable, Richard W. ... 542
Thucydides and the Politics of Bipolarity. Fliess, Peter J. Reviewed by Russett, Bruce M. ... 167
Toscano, Mario. *The History of Treaties and International Politics.* Noted by Wright, Quincy ... 561
Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model. McGrone, Donald J. and Cnudde, Charles F. ... 72
Trager, Frank N. Note on Palmer, Norman D., *South Asia and United States Policy* ... 217
Treves, R., Sternberger, D., Arnaud, P., Bastid, P., Battiffol, H. Chapman, J. W., Cotta, S., de Jouvenel, B., and Polin, R. *L'Idee de Philosophie Politique: Annales de Philosophie Politique-6.* Noted by Watkins, Frederick M. ... 786
Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator. Crassweller, Robert D. Noted by Gil, Federico G. ... 196
The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession. Phillips, Cabell. Noted by Barton, Weldon V. ... 794
Tse-Tung, Mao. *Basic Tactics.* Noted by Boorman, Scott A. ... 1121
Tsien, Tsuen-Hsuin and Winger, Howard W., Ed. *Area Studies and the Library.* Book Note ... 213
Tsou, Tang. Communication ... 1101
Tsou, Tang. Note on Hinton, Harold, *Communist China in World Politics* ... 1158
Tsuneishi, Warren M. *Japanese Political Style: An Introduction to the Government and Politics of Modern Japan.* Noted by Leiserson, Michael ... 1158
Tucker, Robert C. *The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements* ... 343
Tucker, Robert C. Note on Neumann, Sigmund, *Permanent Revolution: Totalitarianism in the Age of International Civil War.* (2nd. Ed.) ... 507
Tucker, Robert W., Marshall, Charles Burton, Merchant, Livingston T., Wolfers, Arnold, Osgood, Robert E., Hammond, Paul Y. and Martin, Laurence W. *The United States in a Disarmed World.* Noted by Holsti, Ole R. ... 1180
Tuden, Arthur, Swartz, Marc J. and Turner, Victor W., Ed. *Political Anthropology.* Noted by Hardgrave, Robert L., Jr. ... 1120
Turner, Victor W., Tuden, Arthur and Swartz, Marc J., Ed. *Political Anthropology.* Noted by Hardgrave, Robert L., Jr. .. 1120
The Tweed Ring. Callow, Alexander B., Jr. Noted by Peel, Roy V. ... 1140
Two-Person Game Theory: The Essential Ideas. Rapoport, Anatol. Noted by Shubik, Martin ... 173
Tybout, Richard A. Note on Bolton, Roger E., *Defense Purchases and Regional Growth* ... 193

Ulč, Otto. *Class Struggle and Socialist Justice: The Case of Czechoslovakia* ... 727
Ulmer, S. Sidney. Communication ... 1098
UN Administration of Economic and Social Programs. Mangone, Gerard J., Ed. Noted by Atherton, Aleyine L. ... 1172
The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945–1963. Kolodziej, Edward A. Noted by Gerberding, William P. ... 798
The United Nations Administrative Tribunal. Koh, Byung Chul. Noted by Baldwin, David ... 561
The United States and Japan. Passin, Herbertt, Ed. Noted by Burks, Ardath W. ... 559

The United States in a Disarmed World. Wolfers, Arnold, Osgood, Robert E., Hammond, Paul Y., Martin, Laurence W., Tucker, Robert W., Marshall, Charles Burton and Merchant, Livingston T. Noted by Holsti, Ole R. 1180
United States Merchant Shipping Policies and Politics. Lawrence, Samuel A. Noted by Moore, John E. 1129
Urban Renewal and American Cities. Greer, Scott. Noted by Seasholes, Bradbury. 517
The Urban Transportation Problem. Meyer, J. R., Kain, J. F. and Wohl, M. Noted by Onstine, B. W. 809

van den Berghe, T. L. *South Africa, A Study in Conflict.* Noted by Gunther, Magnus. . 1169
Varieties of Political Theory. Easton, David, Ed. Noted by Bluhm, William T. 784
The Velikovsky Affair: The Warfare of Science and Scientism. De Grazia, Alfred, Ed. Noted by Orbell, John M. 180
Verba, Sidney, Brody, Richard A., Parker, Edwin B., Nie, Norman H., Polsby, Nelson W., Ekman, Paul and Black, Gordon. Communication 1104
Verba, Sidney, Brody, Richard A., Parker, Edwin B., Nie, Norman H., Polsby, Nelson W., Ekman, Paul and Black, Gordon S. *Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam* 317
Verba, Sidney. Note on Wiseman, H. V., *Political Systems: Some Sociological Approaches* 529
Vermont State Government and Administration: An Historical and Descriptive Study of the Living Past. Nuquist, Andrew E. and Nuquist, Edith W. Noted by Ross, Russell M. 529
Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. Pike, Douglas. Reviewed by Rupen, Robert A. 493
Vietnam: Between Two Truces. Lacouture, Jean. Noted by Joiner, Charles A. 216
Viet-Nam Witness. Fall, Bernard B. Noted by Joiner, Charles A. 216
A Village Economy: Land and People of Huecorio. Belshaw, Michael. Noted by Gillin, John P. 1165
Vines, Kenneth N. and Glick, Henry Robert. *The Impact of Universal Suffrage: A Comparison of Popular and Property Voting* 1078
Vines, Kenneth N. and Jacob, Herbert, Eds. *Politics in the American States, A Comparative Analysis.* Reviewed by Lockard, Duane 165
Voices Prophesying War, 1763–1984. Clarke, I. F. Noted by Wright, Quincy 1181

Wagner, J. Richard. Note on Merchant, Livingston T., Ed., *Neighbors Taken For Granted: Canada and the United States* 222
Wahl, Nicholas. Note on Kulski, W. W., *De Gaulle and the World: The Foreign Policy of the Fifth French Republic* 1175
Wallace, Samuel E. *Skid Row as a Way of Life.* Noted by McCleery, Richard 809
Walston, Lord. *Agriculture Under Communism.* Noted by Laird, Roy D. 207
Waltz, Kenneth N. *Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience.* Noted by Epstein, Leon D. 1176
Walzer, Michael. *The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics.* Noted by Feaver, George A. 169
The Washington Community 1800–1828. Young, James Sterling. Reviewed by Polsby, Nelson W. 164
Watkins, Frederick M. Note on Arnaud, P. Bastid, P., Battiffol, H., Chapman, J. W., Cotta, S., de Jouvenel, B., Polin, R., Treves, R. and Sternberger, D., *L'Idee de Philosophie Politique: Annales de Philosophie Politique—6* 786
Watson, Richard A., Downing, Rondal G., and Spiegel, Frederick C. *Bar Politics, Judicial Selection and the Representation of Social Interests* 54
Weimar Germany and Soviet Russia, 1926–1933: A Study in Diplomatic Instability. Dyck, Harvey L. Noted by Rosenbaum, Kurt 836
Weiner, Myron and LaPalombara, Joseph, Ed. *Political Parties and Political Development.* Noted by Eldersveld, Samuel J. 1166
Weiner, Myron, Ed. *Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth.* Noted by Rummel, R. J. 833
Weinstein, Brian. Note on Armah, Kwesi, *Africa's Golden Road* 210
Weinstein, Brian. Note on Ferkiss, Victor C., *Africa's Search for Identity* 210
Weisberg, Herbert F. and Niemi, Richard G. Communication 761
Weisberg, Herbert and Niemi, Richard. Communication 1104
We Propose: A Modern Congress. Cleveland, James C. Reviewed by Masters, Nicholas A. 775
West, Katharine. *Power in the Liberal Party: A Study in Australian Politics.* Noted by Leach, Richard H. 200
West Germany: Politics of Non-Planning. Arndt, Joachim. Noted by Foster, Charles R. 1144
Westin, Alan F. Review of Schubert, Glendon R., *Judicial Behavior: A Reader in*

Theory and Research..... 765
Westin, Alan F. Review of Schubert, Glendon R., *The Judicial Mind: Attitudes and Ideologies of Supreme Court Justices, 1946–1963*..... 763
Wheeler, Geoffrey. *The Peoples of Soviet Central Asia: A Background Book*. Noted by Rupen, Robert A..... 831
When Americans Complain. Gellhorn, Walter. Noted by Kass, Benny L..... 810
Whitaker, Arthur P. and Jordan, David C. *Nationalism in Contemporary Latin America*. Noted by Martz, John D..... 1162
White, Irwin L. Note on Jenks, Wilfred C., *Space Law*..... 841
White, James W. *Mass Movement and Democracy: Sokagakkai in Japanese Politics*. 744
Wildavsky, Aaron, Davis, Otto and Dempster, M. A. H. Communication..... 152
Williams, Alden. Note on Snyder, Glenn H., *Stockpiling Strategic Materials: Politics and National Defense*..... 192
Williamson, Rene de Visme. *Independence and Involvement: A Christian Reorientation in Political Science*. Noted by Hallowell, John H..... 788
Wilson, Trevor. *The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914–1935*. Noted by Christoph, James B..... 1143
Winger, Howard W. and Tsien, Tsuen-Hsuin, Ed. *Area Studies and the Library*. Book Note..... 213
Wirtschaft und Politik in Deutschland. Kaltefleiter, Werner. Noted by Foster, Charles R..... 1144
Wise, Sidney. Note on Buchanan, William and Bird, Agnes, *Money as Campaign Resource: Tennessee Democratic Senatorial Primaries, 1948–1964*..... 190
Wise, Sidney. Note on Owens, John R., *Money and Politics in California: Democratic Senatorial Primary, 1964*..... 190
Wiseman, H. V. *Political Systems: Some Sociological Approaches*. Noted by Verba, Sidney..... 529
With Kennedy, Salinger, Pierre. Noted by Beyle, Thad L..... 795
Wohl, M., Meyer, J. R. and Kain, J. F. *The Urban Transportation Problem*. Noted by Onstine, B. W..... 809
Wolfers, Arnold, Osgood, Robert E., Hammond, Paul Y., Martin, Laurence W., Tucker, Robert W., Marshall, Charles Burton and Merchant, Livingston T. *The United States in a Disarmed World*. Noted by Holsti, Ole R..... 1180
Workers' Councils: The Yugoslav Experience. Kolaja, Jiri. Noted by Neal, Fred Warner 817
Wright, Deil S. Note on Break, George F., *Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in the United States*..... 1135
Wright, Quincy. Note on Clarke, I. F., *Voices Prophesying War, 1763–1984*..... 1181
Wright, Quincy, Note on Toscano, Mario, *The History of Treaties and International Politics*..... 561
Wright, Theodore Paul, Jr. *American Support for Free Elections Abroad*. Noted by Abbott, David W..... 563
Wright, William E. Note on Comfort, Richard, *Revolutionary Hamburg: Labour Politics in the Early Weimar Republic*..... 1144
Wu, Yuan-Li. *The Economy of Communist China—An Introduction*. Noted by Dorrill, William F..... 541

Yeager, Rodger and Burke, Fred G. Note on Lofchie, Michael F., *Zanzibar: Background to Revolution*..... 827
Yohe, William P. Review of Lekachman, Robert, *The Age of Keynes*..... 175
Young, James Sterling. *The Washington Community 1800–1828*. Reviewed by Polsby, Nelson W..... 164

Zanzibar: Background to Revolution. Lofchie, Michael F. Noted by Burke, Fred G. and Yeager, Rodger..... 827
Zartman, I. William. *International Relations in the New Africa*. Noted by Foltz, William J..... 552
Zartman, I. William. Note on Cohen, Mark I. and Hahn, Lorna. *Morocco: Old Land, New Nation*..... 554
Zeigler, Harmon. Communication..... 480
Zeigler, Harmon. Note on Glaser, William S. and Sills, David L., Ed., *The Government of Associations*..... 1136
Zeisel, Hans and Kalven, Harry, Jr. *The American Jury*. Reviewed by Beaney, William..... 770
Ziebura, Gilbert. *Leon Blum: Theorie und Praxis einer sozialistischen Politik Band I: 1872–1934*. Noted by Ehrmann, Henry W..... 495
Zolberg, Aristide R. *Creating Political Order. The Party-States of West Africa*. Noted by Glickman, Harvey..... 820
Zucker, Norman L. *George Norris: Gentle Knight of American Democracy*. Noted by Shannon, W. Wayne..... 520

CENTRAL LIBRARY, UNIVERSITY

The American Political Science Review

BOARD OF EDITORS

Ausin Ranney, Managing Editor, University of Wisconsin
Fred I. Greenstein, Wesleyan University
Harvey C. Mansfield, Columbia University
Warren E. Miller, University of Michigan
Walter F. Murphy, Princeton University
J. Roland Pennock, Swarthmore College
John E. Turner, University of Minnesota
Vernon Van Dyke, University of Iowa
Myron Weiner, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

VOLUME LXI
1967

Copyright, 1967, by
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

GEORGE BANTA COMPANY, INC.
MENASHA, WISCONSIN

CONTENTS

Number 1—March, 1967

The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism. *Theodore Lowi* 5
The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy. *David Easton and Jack Dennis* 25
Political Dualism and Italian Communism. *Sidney G. Tarrow* 39
Bar Politics, Judicial Selection and the Representation of Social Interests. *Richard A. Watson, Rondal G. Downing, and Frederick C. Spiegel* 54
Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model. *Donald J. McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde* 72
Soviet Policy in Latin America. *Herbert S. Dinerstein* 80
An End to European Integration? *Ronald Inglehart* 91
Academic Ideology and the Study of Adjudication. *Glendon Schubert* 106
Research Notes
Causal Inferences, Closed Populations, and Measures of Association. *Hubert M. Blalock* 130
Politicians' Beliefs about Voters. *John W. Kingdon* 137
Some Comments on Russett's "Discovering Voting Groups in the United Nations." *John E. Mueller* 146
Communications to the Editor 149
Book Reviews and Notes. *Donald R. Matthews (acting ed.)* 154
News and Notes. *Leo B. Lott (ed.)* 227

Number 2—June, 1967

Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam. *Sidney Verba, Richard A. Brody, Edwin B. Parker, Norman H. Nie, Nelson W. Polsby, Paul Ekman and Gordon S. Black* 317
The Political Relevance of Behavioral and Existential Psychology. *Henry S. Kariel* 334
The Deradicalization of Marxist Movements. *Robert C. Tucker* 343
Registration and Voting: Putting First Things First. *Stanley Kelley, Jr., Richard E. Ayres, and William G. Bowen* 359
Party, Region and the Dimensions of Conflict in the House of Representatives, 1949–1954. *Gerald Marwell* 380
An Attempt to Simulate the Outbreak of World War I. *Charles F. Hermann and Margaret G. Hermann* 400
Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis. *J. S. Nye* 417
Social Background in Elite Analysis: A Methodological Inquiry. *Lewis J. Edinger and Donald D. Searing* 428
Protest Participation among Southern Negro College Students. *John M. Orbell* 446
Research Notes
The Measurement of Inter-Party Competition and Systemic Stability. *David G. Pfeiffer* 457
A Note on Legislative Research: Labor Representation in Rhode Island. *Jay S. Goodman* ... 468
Representational Role Types: A Research Note. *Norman Meller* 474
Communications to the Editor 478
Book Reviews and Notes. *Donald R. Matthews (acting ed.)* 481
Report of the Executive Committee 565
News and Notes. *Leo B. Lott (ed.)* 569

Number 3—September, 1967

The Impact of Personality on Politics: An Attempt to Clear Away Underbrush. *Fred I. Greenstein* 629
Bargaining in a Three-Person Game. *William H. Riker* 642
The Constitution, the Supreme Court, and Religion. *William A. Carroll* 657
Party Leadership Change in the United States House of Representatives. *Robert L. Peabody* 675
Interpreting House Midterm Elections: Toward a Measurement of the In-Party's "Expected" Loss of Seats. *Barbara Hinckley* 694
Reformism and Public Policies in American Cities. *Robert L. Lineberry* and *Edmund P. Fowler* ... 701
Ethnic Politics and the Persistence of Ethnic Identification. *Michael Parenti* 717
Class Struggle and Socialist Justice: The Case of Czechoslovakia. *Otto Ulč* 727
Mass Movement and Democracy: Sokagakkai in Japanese Politics. *James W. White* 744
Peer Group and School and the Political Socialization Process. *Kenneth P. Langton* 751

Communications to the Editor 759
Book Reviews and Notes. *James W. Prothro (ed.)* 762
Doctoral Dissertations in Political Science. *Walter E. Beach (comp.)* 846
News and Notes. *Leo B. Lott (ed.)* 875

NUMBER 4—DECEMBER, 1967

The City in the Future of Democracy. *Robert A. Dahl* 953
Compatibility and Consensus: A Proposal for the Conceptual Linkage of External and Internal Dimensions of Foreign Policy. *Wolfram F. Hanrieder* 971
Compatibility, Consensus, and an Emerging Political Science of Adaptation. *James N. Rosenau* 983
Dimensions of Modernization in the American States. *John Crittenden* 989
Some Conditions of Democracy. *Deane E. Neubauer* 1002
Representative Bureaucracy: A Reassessment. *V. Subramaniam* 1010
Measurement Identity in the Longitudinal Analysis of Legislative Voting. *Aage R. Clausen* 1020
Political Recruitment: The Case of Japanese Prefectural Assemblymen. *Young C. Kim* 1036
Socio-economic Variables and Voting for the Radical Left: Chile, 1952. *Glaucio Soares and Robert L. Hamblin* 1053
RESEARCH NOTES
Government Expenditures and Public Services in the American States. *Ira Sharkansky* 1066
The Impact of Universal Suffrage: A Comparison of Popular and Property Voting. *Kenneth N. Vines and Henry Robert Glick* 1078
The State of the Profession. Political Science and the Proposal for a National Social Science Foundation. *Fred R. Harris* 1088
Communications to the Editor 1096
Book Reviews and Notes. *James W. Prothro (ed.)* 1105
Announcements 1187
Index to Volume LXI. *Mary H. Grossman* 1191

OFFICERS OF THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

President
ROBERT A. DAHL
Yale University

President-Elect
MERLE FAINSOD
Harvard University

Vice Presidents

ROBERT LANE
Yale University

AVERY LEISERSON
Vanderbilt University

RICHARD SNYDER
University of California

Secretary
KENNETH WALTZ
Brandeis University

Treasurer
MAX M. KAMPELMAN
Washington, D.C.

Executive Director
EVRON M. KIRKPATRICK
1527 New Hampshire Avenue
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

Associate Director
DONALD G. TACHERON

Managing Editor, APSR
AUSTIN RANNEY
University of Wisconsin

COUNCIL

Above-named Officers *ex officiis*

JAMES C. DAVIES
University of Oregon
ALEX M. DRAGNICH
Vanderbilt University
HEINZ EULAU
Stanford University
SAMUEL HENDEL
City College of the City University of New York
WALLACE MENDELSON
University of Texas
LAURENCE I. RADWAY
Dartmouth College
WILLIAM H. RIKER
University of Rochester
VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM
Northwestern University

M. MARGARET BALL
Duke University
WILLIAM BUCHANAN
Washington and Lee University
H. PAUL CASTLEBERRY
Washington State University
HERBERT KAUFMAN
Yale University
CHARLES A. MCCLELLAND
University of Southern California
ALFRED G. MEYER
University of Michigan
CLARA PENNIMAN
University of Wisconsin
CLINTON ROSSITER
Cornell University

FORMER PRESIDENTS

FRANK J. GOODNOW
ALBERT SHAW
FREDERIC N. JUDSON
JAMES BRYCE
A. LAWRENCE LOWELL
WOODROW WILSON
SIMEON E. BALDWIN
ALBERT BUSHNELL HART
W. W. WILLOUGHBY
JOHN BASSETT MOORE
ERNST FREUND
JESSE MACY
MUNROE SMITH
HENRY JONES FORD
PAUL S. REINSCH
LEO S. ROWE
WILLIAM A. DUNNING
HARRY A. GARFIELD
JAMES W. GARNER
CHARLES E. MERRIAM

CHARLES A. BEARD
WILLIAM B. MUNRO
JESSE S. REEVES
JOHN A. FAIRLIE
BENJAMIN F. SHAMBAUGH
EDWARD S. CORWIN
WILLIAM F. WILLOUGHBY
ISIDOR LOEB
WALTER J. SHEPARD
FRANCIS W. COKER
ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE
THOMAS REED POWELL
CLARENCE A. DYKSTRA
CHARLES GROVE HAINES
ROBERT C. BROOKS
FREDERIC A. OGG
WILLIAM ANDERSON
ROBERT E. CUSHMAN
LEONARD D. WHITE
JOHN M. GAUS
WALTER F. DODD

ARTHUR W. MACMAHON
HENRY R. SPENCER
QUINCY WRIGHT
JAMES K. POLLOCK
PETER H. ODEGARD
LUTHER H. GULICK
PENDLETON HERRING
RALPH J. BUNCHE
CHARLES MCKINLEY
HAROLD D. LASSWELL
E. E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER
V. O. KEY, JR.
R. TAYLOR COLE
CARL B. SWISHER
EMMETTE S. REDFORD
CHARLES S. HYNEMAN
CARL J. FRIEDRICH
C. HERMAN PRITCHETT
DAVID B. TRUMAN
GABRIEL A. ALMOND

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

announces the

REGISTRY OF RETIRED PROFESSORS

The Association, in response to requests from members, has established a Registry of Retired Professors which will be operated in conjunction with the existing Personnel Service of the Association.

The Registry will serve as an information exchange for those retired professors who are willing to teach one or more courses on a one-semester or one-year basis, and those institutions desiring to make such appointments. Any retired professor wishing to be listed in the Registry should contact the Association to receive an application form. Departmental chairmen wishing to inquire about the availability of retired professors in a certain specialty or geographic area should write specifying their requirements. The Registry will be conducted on an individual referral basis, with announcements being sent to retired professors as inquiries are received.

Correspondence should be addressed to:

Director, Registry of Retired Professors

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

harper torchbooks

Just published

C. E. BLACK

The Dynamics of Modernization

A Study in Comparative History

"This is one of the shortest books I have seen on political and social change, both in the developed and in the developing countries, and it is the best. . . . vastly learned but simply written; hard-headed but compassionate."—KARL W. DEUTSCH. ". . . the freshest and most stimulating book on the general problem of development that I have read in a long time."—ROBERT L. HEILBRONER TB/1321 $1.60

EUGENE C. BLACK, Editor

European Political History, 1815-1870

Aspects of Liberalism

The contributors: Asa Briggs, Irene Collins, John Gallagher, Raymond Grew, R. Max Hartwell, Douglas Johnson, Robert A. Kann, Lewis B. Namier, Ronald Robinson, Franz Schnabel, A. J. P. Taylor, and Theodore Zeldin. TB/1331 $2.45

LOUIS D. BRANDEIS

Other People's Money

and How the Bankers Use It

Edited with an Introduction by Richard M. Abrams.

"Primarily valuable for what it tells us about the antitrust movement in the progressive era. . . . But even for our time, now a half century later, it has a refreshing pertinence that can be obscured only by a wilful reluctance to test fundamentals."—RICHARD M. ABRAMS *TB/3081 $1.95

WALTER LAQUEUR & GEORGE L. MOSSE, Editors

Literature and Politics in the 20th Century

Vol. 5, *Journal of Contemporary History*

The contributors: Bernard Bergonzi, François Bondy, Anthony Burgess, Francis L. Carsten, Gordon Craig, James Gilbert, Dan Jacobson, Walter Laqueur, A. G. Lehmann, Stephen Lutman, Maurice Nadeau, Harry Pross, Nicole Racine, Jonah Raskin, Richard Rees, and Edward Seidensticker. TB/1328 $1.95

ROY C. MACRIDIS, Editor

Political Parties

Contemporary Trends and Ideas

The contributors: Isaiah Berlin, James B. Christoph, Henry W. Ehrmann, Rupert Emerson, Leon D. Epstein, Avery Leiserson, Seymour M. Lipset, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard Rose. TB/1322 $2.45

RICHARD B. MORRIS

Fair Trial

Fourteen Who Stood Accused, from Anne Hutchinson to Alger Hiss

New Preface by the Author.

"Tightly packed dramatic accounts of fourteen American criminal trials . . . in an authentic setting of the relevant political, religious or social climate . . . [The author] carries vividly into the courtroom the historical sweep of events."—BERNARD BOTEIN. "A valuable study of our developing but still imperfect judicial system."—*The New Republic* TB/1335 $2.95

JOHN P. ROCHE, *Editor*

American Political Thought

From Jefferson to Progressivism

The contributors: Chester McArthur Destler, Carter Goodrich, A. Whitney Griswold, Louis Hartz, Robert G. McCloskey, Marvin Meyers, H. Wayne Morgan, Allan Nevins, David W. Noble, and John P. Roche. TB/1332 $2.45

HUGH SETON-WATSON

Eastern Europe Between the Wars, 1918-1941

"This is the most comprehensive, as well as the most level-headed book yet written on the marchlands of Europe which lie between Russia and Germany, the zone of awakening nationalities. . . . Of great importance."—A. J. P. TAYLOR. "Probably the one indispensable volume for those who wish to discuss eastern European affairs with some competence."—HANS KOHN TB/1330 $2.95

CHARLES I. SCHOTTLAND, Editor

The Welfare State

"Whatever its beginnings, the Welfare State is here to stay. . . . our citizenry should understand the Welfare State, its background, its present status, and the differing points of view regarding it."—CHARLES I. SCHOTTLAND TB/1323 $2.75

* *American Perspectives series,* edited by Bernard Wishy and William E. Leuchtenburg.

150th ANNIVERSARY

Complete catalog of Harper Torchbooks [597 volumes now in print] available on request from Dept. 51, HARPER & ROW, *Publishers,* 49 E. 33rd St., New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

THE SOVIET ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY, 1927-1932

LOREN R. GRAHAM

Dealing with the crucial years for the Soviet Academy of Sciences, the period of the first five year plan, this book describes how the Academy was transformed and how it in turn transformed Russian society. It also tells of the eventually successful effort of the Communist Party to gain control of the Academy, which as late as 1928 did not have a single academician who was a Party member. *Studies of the Russian Institute, Columbia University.* *$6.50*

POLITICAL PROTEST IN THE CONGO

The Parti Solidaire Africain During the Struggle for Independence

HERBERT WEISS

Drawing upon personal observations as well as official documents, Herbert Weiss presents the first detailed study of the PSA, a party that has played a crucial role in Congolese politics. He describes the growth of political parties in the Congo between 1957 and 1960, gives a history of the PSA, and discusses the evolution of anti-colonial protest in the Kwango-Kwilu area of the Congo. *2 maps. $8.50*

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROUSSEAU

ROGER D. MASTERS

In this thorough analysis of *Emile*, the *First* and *Second Discourses*, and the *Social Contract*, Professor Masters relies primarily on the texts themselves, to expose Rousseau's "system" as Rousseau himself envisioned it. The commentary is arranged so that chapters on each of Rousseau's major writings can be consulted separately.

$12.50

Princeton University Press

Cambridge Studies



in the History and Theory of Politics

This new series published by Cambridge University Press will include both original works of political history and political philosophy and modern critical editions of major texts in political thought. The program will concentrate on texts which are now not readily available but which should be of central importance for students and specialists in ancient, medieval and modern political thought.

The editors of the series are Maurice Cowling, G. R. Elton, Elie Kedourie, J. R. Pole and Walter Ullmann. In addition to the titles shown on this and the opposite page, the editors expect to include editions of works by Constant, Comte, Turgot, Montesquieu and Condorcet.

First books in the series:

1867: Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution. The Passing of the Second Reform Bill.
MAURICE COWLING — Published $13.50

Liberty, Equality, Fraternity by JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN
Edited with introduction and notes by R. J. WHITE
January $7.50

The Conscience of the State in North America
E. R. NORMAN — February

The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx
SHLOMO AVINERI — Spring

Forthcoming:

Political Tracts of the Masters of the University of Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century.
Translated and edited with an Introduction by WALTER ULLMANN.

Franco Gallia by FRANCIS HOTMAN.
An English edition with introduction and notes by J. H. M. SALMON.

Cambridge Studies



in the History and Theory of Politics

Forthcoming (continued from opposite page):

Vindiciae Contra Tyrannos.
An English edition with introduction and notes by MICHAEL WALZER.

Political Tracts from the Revolt of the Netherlands. Translated and edited with an introduction by E. H. KOSSMANN and A. F. MELLINK.

The Theory of Mixed Monarchy. A volume of tracts to include *A Fuller Answer* by Charles Herle, *Conscience Satisfied* by Henry Ferne, and *A Treatise of Monarchie* by Philip Hunton. Edited with introductions and notes by B. S. MANNING.

The Soveraigne Power of Parliaments and Kingdoms
by WILLIAM PRYNNE.
Edited with introduction and notes by WILLIAM M. LAMONT.

The Political Works of James Harrington.
Edited with introduction and notes by J. G. A. POCOCK.

Plato Redivivus by HENRY NEVILLE and **An Essay Upon the Constitution of the Roman Government** by WALTER MOYLE.
Edited with introduction and notes by CAROLINE ROBBINS.

The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy by WILLIAM PALEY.
Edited by J. M. Dunn.

A Selection of Kant's Political Writings. Translated by H. B. NISBET; edited with introduction and notes by H. S. REISS.

The Social and Political Culture of Man. Selections from the works of Herder. Translated and edited with introduction and notes by F. M. BARNARD.

On the Limits and Powers of the State by W. VON HUMBOLDT.
An English edition with introduction and notes by J. W. BURROW.

A Selection from Lord Salisbury's Articles in the 'Quarterly Review.'
Edited with introduction and notes by PAUL SMITH.

Russian Marxism at the Crossroads: Vladimir Akimov on the First Party Schism 1898-1903. An English edition of *A Short History of the Social Democratic Movement and The Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party.* Translated and edited with introduction and notes by JONATHAN FRANKEL.

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022



PRAEGER Books that matter

HISTORY OF THE INTERNATIONAL
JULIUS BRAUNTHAL

Volume I: 1864-1914. Translated by Henry Collins and Kenneth Mitchell. "The work of a distinguished social historian who is himself a veteran of the great age of Austro-Marxism and has been personally acquainted with most of the leading figures of European Social Democracy over the past half century. . . . He brings out the underground filiation running from the extreme wing of the French Revolution, via the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848 to the Communism of Lenin's day."—*The New York Review of Books. 406 pp., photogs., appendixes, bibliog., indexes.* $11.00

Volume II: 1914-1943. Translated by John Clark. The author discusses the collapse of Socialist ideals at the outbreak of World War I, the establishment of the Comintern, Lenin's destruction of Socialist unity, and Trotsky's Fourth International. He demonstrates that the implacable hostility between Bolshevism and Social Democracy was a crucial factor in the Left's inability to resist the rise of Fascism."A lucid, sympathetic account."—C. M. Woodhouse, *The Observer* (London). *ca. 600 pp., photogs., appendixes, bibliog., indexes.* $17.50

CAMBODIA
The Search for Security

MICHAEL LEIFER. In this study of Prince Sihanouk's attempts to maintain the neutrality he considers essential to Cambodia's security, Professor Leifer surveys independent Cambodia's history and domestic politics. He shows how Sihanouk, through his shifting foreign policy, has brilliantly preserved Cambodia's precarious existence and kept his country out of the devastating war being fought at its borders. *219 pp., index.* $6.00

LENIN—THE MAN, THE THEORIST, THE LEADER
A Reappraisal

Edited by LEONARD SCHAPIRO and PETER REDDAWAY. Twelve distinguished British Sovietologists reassess Lenin the man, the philosopher, the revolutionary, in the light of the latest findings in Soviet and other sources. Among the contributors: John Keep, John Erickson, Alec Nove, and the editors. *Published in association with the Hoover Institution. 320 pp., bibliog., index.* $7.50

BURDEN OF EMPIRE
An Appraisal of Western Colonialism in Africa South of the Sahara

L. H. GANN and PETER DUIGNAN. In this carefully documented re-examination of the major assumptions concerning the colonial period in Africa, the authors outline the various theories on Western Imperialism in Africa and point out how far these assumptions are compatible with actual events. *Published for the Hoover Institution. 448 pp., maps, bibliog., index.* $8.50

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER 111 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003

CQ SUPPLEMENTARY TEXTBOOKS

FOR SPRING 1968

POLITICS IN AMERICA 1945-1966

. . . a basic handbook of election campaigns, results, issues and laws now updated to cover through 1966
June 1967, 132 pages, 8-1/2" x 11", paper $2.50

CANDIDATES 1968

Public Records of Prominent Prospects for Presidency or Vice Presidency
Brooke - Chafee - Evans - Ford - Hatfield - Humphrey - Javits - Johnson - Robert Kennedy - Kirk - Lindsay - Love - Morton - Nixon - Percy - Reagan - Rhodes - Rockefeller - Romney - Shafer - Tower - Volpe - Wallace
September 1967, 132 pages, 8-1/2" x 11", paper $2.00

REVOLUTION IN CIVIL RIGHTS

Third Edition - Revised and Updated
June 1967, 124 pages, 8-1/2" x 11", paper $2.50

CRIME AND JUSTICE IN AMERICA

. . . includes reports on Right of Privacy, Police, Prison, Federal Activity and Text of Recommendations of President's Commission
August 1967, 80 pages, 8-1/2" x 11", paper $2.50

CQ GUIDE TO CURRENT AMERICAN GOVERNMENT **Special Election Issue**

. . . recent significant developments in American government
Spring 1968 edition in print late January 1968
About 120 pages, 8-1/2" x 11", paper $2.00

LEGISLATORS AND THE LOBBYISTS

August 1965, 80 pages, 8-1/2" x 11", paper $2.50

REPRESENTATION AND APPORTIONMENT

August 1966, 96 pages, 8-1/2" x 11", paper $2.50

FEDERAL ROLE IN EDUCATION

April 1967 (revised 2nd edition)
68 pages, 8-1/2" x 11", paper $2.50

Examination copies available to faculty members upon request

EDUCATION DEPARTMENT

CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SERVICE

1735 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006

The Strategy of World Order:

A set of Materials, edited by Richard A. Falk, Princeton University, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, Rutgers Law School. World Law Fund, 1966. Four-volume set, paperbound, $10.00; hardcover, $14.00. Volumes I and II, $2.50 each. Volumes III and IV, $3.50 each. 2,296 pp.

Vol. I:
Toward a Theory of War Prevention
Foreword by Harold D. Lasswell

Vol. II:
International Law
Foreword by Wolfgang Friedman

Vol. III:
The United Nations
Foreword by Oscar Schacter

Vol. IV:
Disarmament and Economic Development
Foreword by J. David Singer

"There now exists an excellent set of teaching books—not on international law, not on the United Nations, not on war prevention, or disarmament, but rather on the overall, interrelated strategy of world order." *Michigan Law Review*

Vol. V:
Regionalism and World Order

Vol. VI:
The Role of the Individual and World Order

Projected for 1968 publication. Research for Volumes V and VI supported by The Carnegie Corporation.

The World Law Fund, 11 West 42nd Street, New York City 10036

General Politics Quarterly

of Political Arts and Science

For political scientists, practical politicians, lawyers, public officials and employees, armed forces personnel, economists, administrators, and others who are active in public affairs and concerned with public policy from the local to the world-wide spheres.

Associate Editors

Rita Kapoor Bricksin, Saint Ambrose College
Elijah Ben-Zion Kaminsky, Arizona State University
John B. McConaughy, University of South Carolina
John R. Schmidhauser, University of Iowa
John E. Westburg, Saint Ambrose College
Urban Whitaker, San Francisco State College

Please include stamped return envelope with manuscript submissions.

GENERAL POLITICS, QUARTERLY
Of Political Arts and Science

1-year subscription - $3.50 — 2-year subscription - $5.50
3-year subscription - $6.00

Published by JOHN WESTBURG & ASSOCIATES
Conesville, Iowa 52739
Publishers of the North American Mentor Magazine

more than 100 major adoptions!

". . . a great deal of careful planning has gone into this work; the result—a useful, readable, and lively text." Jerome G. Kerwin

THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC:
An Introduction to American National Government

By MARTIN DIAMOND
and WINSTON M. FISK,
both of Claremont Men's College,
and HERBERT GARFINKEL,
Michigan State University

A wide-ranging and comprehensive examination of the American political order blending constitutional, legal, and institutional analyses with modern behavioral research. Called ". . . perceptive and imaginative . . ." by Clinton Rossiter, this introductory political science text provides a concise, factual account of the essential structure, functions, regulations, and powers of the American government.

The authors examine the processes of government to reveal the fundamental premises which they embody and to illustrate the direct relationship between political behavior and the constitutional structure. The 15 chapters stress the compatibility of the democratic and republican elements of the American system and emphasize that from the outset the Constitution supplied an essentially democratic frame for government.

Enough material is given in the book for a complete one-semester course. When supplemented with outside readings, *The Democratic Republic* supplies the framework for a longer course.

"The scholarship imbedded and embodied in this book is profound, probative, literate, and convincing. It is a delight . . ."—Victor G. Rosenblum, Northwestern University. *572 pages. $7.50.*

Write for examination copies.

Important new books in Political Science from RAND McNALLY

ENEMIES IN POLITICS
By DAVID J. FINLAY, *University of Oregon,*
OLE R. HOLSTI, *Univ. of British Columbia,*
and RICHARD R. FAGEN, *Stanford University*

This book provides a theoretical and empirical discussion of the ways in which enemies are defined in politics and the functional relationship of conflict at the national and international levels. Includes three case histories, with the late John Foster Dulles, the Castro government, and Ghana as their subjects. *264 pages. $2.50 paper, $7.50 cloth.*

INTERNATIONAL REGIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM:
A Study in Political Ecology
By BRUCE M. RUSSETT, *Yale University*

This book explores some of the relationships between political systems and their social and physical environments. The author applies a methodology of new computational techniques using factor analysis. *320 pages. c. $6.50.*

MOVING THE SPHINX:
Government and Slum Housing in America
By LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN
University of Wisconsin

Develops general concepts and considerations about slum housing and goes on to discuss those housing programs which have directly attacked the problem of the slums in which the American poor live and have lived. *c. 250 pages. January 1968.*

A METHODOLOGICAL PRIMER FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS
By R. T. GOLEMBIEWSKI
University of Georgia
W. WELSH, and W. CROTTY
Northwestern University

Develops specific methodological guidelines for empirical research in political science, shows how these can be applied, measures various disciplinary areas of interest against the guidelines, and sketches the integrative approach by tying empirical analysis to the ethical concerns of political scientists. *640 pages. Spring.*

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY The College Department, Box 7600 · Chicago, Ill., 60680

Robert A. Dahl's new American Government text

PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES:

Conflict and Consent

"... the volume as a whole is truly outstanding ... the chapters on conflict represent not only a new departure in texts but also a splendid analysis in their own right. . ."

Aaron Wildavsky

"... this is a superb book which will be enormously useful to students and teachers alike... a valuable contribution to the political theory of the American system."

Austin Ranney

A clearly written, smoothly organized basic text introduces students to an original political philosophy of American government and shows how and why a pluralist democracy emerged on the American continent.

Organized around an historical analysis of conflict and consensus within a pluralist democracy, it discusses our political institutions and how they contribute to that democracy, examines our democracy as it functions in conflict, and finally assesses the influence which an individual can have on a pluralistic structure of government.

The author analyzes the purposes behind the establishment of our political institutions, then traces their evolution to the present. He integrates the theories and findings of behaviorally oriented studies wherever relevant, refers to traditional sources, and quotes extensively from classical writings. His development of pluralist democracy in the presence of conflict gives an innovative dimension to the book and is supported by case studies and analyses. Intensive examinations of specific cases illustrate or explain theoretical problems, problems of political action, or functions of institutions.

Dahl's use of personal references and frequent asides aids in promoting a rapport and involvement on the part of the reader. He encourages personal analysis by offering penetrating questions about the formation, principles and applications of pluralist democracy. *471 pages. $7.50.*

New

RAND McNALLY Series on the Organization Sciences

Edited by ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI
University of Georgia

EMPATHY AND IDEOLOGY:
Aspects of Administrative Innovation
Edited by CHARLES PRESS
Michigan State University,
and ALAN ARIAN, *Tel Aviv University*
Here is a highly interesting collection of generalized and specific readings on problems and issues of administrative innovation. *276 pages. $3.50 paper, $6.00 cloth.*

ORGANIZING MEN AND POWER
By ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI
University of Georgia
Utilizing a broad range of materials from recent management experience, this book formulates an unorthodox model of line-staff functions which challenges traditional theories. *288 pages. $3.50 paper, $6.00 cloth.*

THE PROFESSIONAL IN THE ORGANIZATION
By MARK ABRAHAMSON
Illinois Institute of Technology
Concentrates on the professional as a member of an organization, dealing with organizational structure and control, norms, the management of strains, and socialization of future professionals. *168 pages. $2.95 paper, $7.00 cloth.*

MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION DEMANDS
Edited by ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI
and FRANK K. GIBSON
both of the University of Georgia
The 30 managerially related articles contained in this book portray demands to which managers must respond, develop specific analytical tools for understanding and describing these demands, and suggest ways by which managers can improve their effectiveness. *464 pages.*

ELECTRONIC DATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT
Edited by GEOFFREY Y. CORNOG,
ELLIS L. SCOTT, JAMES B. KENNEY,
and JOHN J. CONNELLY
The papers in this volume introduce government executives to EDP as it can be applied to law enforcement, tax and fiscal systems and educational systems. *Spring.*

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY The College Department, Box 7600 · Chicago, Ill. 60680

RAND McNALLY Public Affairs Series

Edited by ROBERT A. GOLDWIN
Kenyon College

New:

LEFT, RIGHT, CENTER
Essays on Liberalism and Conservatism in the United States

Authoritative spokesmen with opposing viewpoints discuss the controversies of liberal and conservative politics. *160 pages. $1.50 paper.*

REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION
January, $1.50 paper.

HIGHER EDUCATION, *January, $1.50 paper.*

A NATION OF CITIES, *January, $1.50 paper.*

Recently published books in the series:

POLITICAL PARTIES
Seven essays describe the sense of confusion and dissatisfaction shared by observers of the American political process. *158 pages. $1.50 paper.*

WHY FOREIGN AID?
Facts, theories, pros, and cons of foreign aid programs presented through eight essays. *140 pages. $1.50 paper.*

AMERICA ARMED:
Essays on United States Military Policy

Six essays in this volume treat the "unthinkable"—thermonuclear war. *140 pages. $1.50 paper.*

A NATION OF STATES:
Essays on the American Federal System

An examination of the federal system as it appears in civil rights, the farm program and welfare programs. *148 pages. $1.50 paper.*

100 YEARS OF EMANCIPATION
Treats the question of why slavery problems still exist 100 years after the Emancipation Proclamation. *217 pages. $1.95 paper.*

Write for examination copies.

American Politics Research Series

Edited by AARON WILDAVSKY
University of California, Berkeley

New:

A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE ISSUES IN THE FIFTY STATES
By WAYNE FRANCIS, *University of Washington*

This new book gives a clear, insightful picture of the nature of political conflict in the state legislatures, with an eye toward the implications of such conflict for actual policy. It identifies the major issues in the fifty states and classifies these issues into twenty policy areas. The major findings in this study are based on a legislator survey, correlational analysis, a classification scheme for legislative issues, and, to some extent, coalition reasoning. *c. 250 pages.* January.

Other books in series:

POWER IN COMMITTEES:
An Experiment in the Government Process
By JAMES DAVID BARBER, *Yale University*

An empirical study of the exercise of power in the decision-making process. *189 pages. $5.00.*

SOCIAL INSECURITY:
The Politics of Welfare
By GILBERT Y. STEINER
The Brookings Institution

A critical examination of the role of politics in the making of American public assistance policy. *270 pages. $6.00.*

POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE PUBLIC:
Policy Outcomes in the American States
By THOMAS R. DYE, *University of Georgia*

A systematic inquiry into the forces shaping public policy in the American states. *325 pages. $6.00.*

AMBITION AND POLITICS:
Political Careers in the United States
By JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER
Michigan State University

Demonstrates how the structure of political opportunities in the United States controls the behavior of politicians by directing their ambitions. *226 pages. $6.00.*

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY The College Department, Box 7600 · Chicago, Ill., 60680

Studies in Political Change Series

Edited by MYRON WEINER
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

New:

CULTURAL PLURALISM AND NATIONALIST POLITICS IN GUYANA

By LEO A. DESPRES
Western Reserve University

The author's field research analyzes the cultural dimensions of nationalist politics in British Guiana (now Guyana) and their development during the closing years of colonial rule (1960-61). Emphasizing the integration of the major Guyanese ethnic groups—Anglo-Saxon, Portugese, East Indian, Creole and Afro-Guyanese—into a modern society, Despres discusses the nationalist movement with special reference to the sociocultural system in which it grew. *240 pages.*

Recently published titles:

CREATING POLITICAL ORDER:
The Party-States of West Africa
By ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, *Univ. of Chicago*
Features an intensive analysis of the origins, structure, and future of one-party regimes as illustrated by Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the Ivory Coast, and Senegal. *168 pages. $2.50 paper.*

SONS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT:
Elite Youth in Panama and Costa Rica
By DANIEL GOLDRICH, *University of Oregon*
Shows how the direction of future national politics will be affected in Panama and Costa Rica by the thinking of the sons of incumbent elites who presently stand to inherit the establishment. *139 pages. $2.50 paper.*

PUBLIC LIBERTIES IN THE NEW STATES
By DAVID H. BAYLEY, *University of Denver*
This book discusses the current status of important civil liberties in emerging nations and analyzes the factors which have developed or curtailed these freedoms. *152 pages. $2.50 paper.*

Write for examination copies.

Books in

International Relations

INDEPENDENT BLACK AFRICA:
The Politics of Freedom
Edited by WILLIAM JOHN HANNA
The American University
This collection of readings covers the history and problems behind black Africa's struggle for independence; it is designed for courses in African politics. *651 pages. $8.50.*

THE FUNCTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
By WILLIAM D. COPLIN, *Wayne State Univ.*
Here is an introduction to the role of international law in the contemporary world which employs analogies with democratic legal systems and applies a game theory concept to international bargaining. *312 pages. $3.50 paper.*

HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Edited by J. DAVID SINGER
University of Michigan
A collection of articles and excerpts written by outstanding sociologists and psychologists which relates behavioral sciences to international relations. *466 pages. $9.00.*

COMPONENTS OF DEFENSE POLICY
Edited by DAVIS B. BOBROW
Princeton University
These readings set boundaries and catalog problems of defense analysis within the social-science context. *445 pages. $6.50.*

TOWARD A STRATEGY OF PEACE
Edited by WALTER C. CLEMENS, Jr.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
A dozen scholars and public officials examine the obstacles to peace, emphasizing the interrelationships of domestic and international affairs. *264 pages. $3.50 paper.*

BEYOND THE COLD WAR
Edited by ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, *Kenyon College*
Future world politics are discussed by eleven authorities who stress global strategy, disarmament, war policy, and economic and political problems. *235 pages. $6.00.*

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY The College Department, Box 7600 · Chicago, Ill., 60680

Additional RAND McNALLY titles in Political Science

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM:
A New View of Government in the United States
By MORTON GRODZINS
late of the University of Chicago
Edited by DANIEL J. ELAZAR
403 pages. $6.00.

THE POLITY:
Selected Articles by Norton E. Long
Edited by CHARLES PRESS, *Mich. State Univ.*
247 pages. $5.50.

INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
Edited by S. SIDNEY ULMER, *Mich. State Univ.*
465 pages. $4.75.

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:
Readings in Institutions, Processes, Behavior
Edited by R. T. GOLEMBIEWSKI, F. K. GIBSON, and G. Y. CORNOG
all of the University of Georgia
544 pages. $6.50 paper.

BEHAVIOR AND ORGANIZATION:
O & M and the Small Group
By ROBERT T. GOLEMBIEWSKI
University of Georgia
258 pages. $5.00.

POLITICAL BEHAVIORALISM AND MODERN JURISPRUDENCE
A Working Theory and Study in Judicial Decision-Making
By THEODORE L. BECKER, *Univ. of Hawaii*
177 pages. $2.50 paper. $5.00 cloth.

JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR:
A Reader in Theory and Research
Edited by GLENDON SCHUBERT
Michigan State University
603 pages. $9.50.

DEMOCRACY IN THE FIFTY STATES
Edited by CHARLES PRESS, *Mich. State Univ.* and OLIVER P. WILLIAMS, *University of Penna.*
528 pages. $6.50 paper.

Write for examination copies.

DEMOCRACY IN URBAN AMERICA:
Readings on Government and Politics
Edited by OLIVER P. WILLIAMS
University of Pennsylvania
and CHARLES PRESS, *Michigan State Univ.*
473 pages. $4.50 paper.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION:
How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?
By LESTER W. MILBRATH
State University of New York at Buffalo
195 pages. $1.75 paper. $3.50 cloth.

THE WASHINGTON LOBBYISTS
By LESTER W. MILBRATH
State University of New York at Buffalo
431 pages. $6.50.

POLITICAL PARTIES:
A Behavioral Analysis
By SAMUEL J. ELDERSVELD
University of Michigan
613 pages. $8.00.

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Edited by ROBERT L. PEABODY
The Johns Hopkins University
and NELSON W. POLSBY, *Wesleyan Univ.*
392 pages. $3.50 paper. $6.50 cloth.

THE PRESIDENT:
Roles and Powers
Edited by DAVID E. HAIGHT and LARRY D. JOHNSTON
both of Hunter College
400 pages. $3.75 paper.

CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR CONSTITUENCIES
By LEWIS A. FROMAN, Jr.
University of California, Irvine
127 pages. $1.75 paper.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
Edited by JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER
State University of Iowa
544 pages. $8.50.

HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Edited by LEO STRAUSS and JOSEPH CROPSEY
both of the University of Chicago
790 pages. $8.50.

THE CITY AND MAN
By LEO STRAUSS, *University of Chicago*
245 pages. $6.50.

RAND McNALLY & COMPANY The College Department, Box 7600 · Chicago, Ill. 60680

JUST PUBLISHED

METROPOLIS IN CRISIS:

Social and Political Perspectives

Edited by: Jeffrey K. Hadden—Case Western Reserve University
Louis H. Masotti—Case Western Reserve University
Calvin J. Larson—Purdue University

This stimulating collection of 43 readings pursues three basic themes:

1. The origins, processes, and consequences of urbanization.
2. The impact of ideology on the political nature and physical shape of the urban environment.
3. The nature of the political processes by which cities adapt and innovate to meet problems.

Sept./c. 550 pages/c. $7.50

PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC MANAGEMENT:

Cases and Learning Designs

Edited by Robert T. Golembiewski—University of Georgia

This unique approach to Public Administration contains 13 cases selected to illustrate some managerially-relevant process. Each case is preceded by a "learning design," i.e., suggested ways of using the case to highlight what is known about managerial processes and behavior.

Sept./c. 400 pages/c. $4.75 paper

PUBLIC BUDGETING AND FINANCE:

Readings in Theory and Practice

Edited by Robert T. Golembiewski

An extraordinarily comprehensive collection of readings (47) emphasizing behavioral materials relevant to budgeting as well as technical and institutional features.

Oct./c. 600 pages/c. $8.50



F. E. PEACOCK PUBLISHERS, INC.

401 West Irving Park Road, Itasca, Illinois 60143

New Books in Political Science from the New Publisher: Pegasus



The Politics of Poverty

by *John C. Donovan,* Bowdoin College

What is the political controversy over the War on Poverty? This book about the drafting of the Economic Opportunity Act explores the implications of the words "maximum feasible participation" in the role the poor themselves should play in the community action programs of urban neighborhoods. What has happened to Lyndon Johnson's own domestic power stakes in the poverty program, given America's twenty billion dollar a year involvement in an escalated Vietnam war? Mr. Donovan shows how Johnson's preoccupation with Vietnam blinded him to the political nature of his own reform program at home, blurred his vision and thus distorted the nation's priorities.

160 pages, clothbound $5.75, paperbound $1.45

Vietnam Triangle: Moscow, Peking, Hanoi

by *Donald Zagoria,* Hunter College

A leading authority on the communist world explains why Russia, China and North Vietnam have different interests in the war and different hopes for its final outcome. VIETNAM TRIANGLE goes far to clarify common misunderstandings about the war in Southeast Asia. It gives us a framework for reasonable discussion about America's role in Vietnam and a fresh perspective for a more effective United States policy towards that conflict.

288 pages, clothbound $6.95, paperbound $1.95

The War Myth

by *Donald A. Wells,* Washington State College

Is war justified as a response to international anarchy? Mr. Wells traces the traditional Western arguments—philosophical, theological and institutional —in favor of resort to war. He makes an eloquent plea for semantic clarity in a subject long obscured by irrelevant distinctions. Convinced that the problem of war and peace is one of semantic confusion, the author disperses the verbal fog that envelops the "war system" and relates the problem to the myths of Communism, the "domino theory" and the "free world."

288 pages, clothbound $6.95, paperbound $1.75

NOW AT YOUR BOOKSELLERS



Division of Western Publishing Company, Inc.

Just Published


Teachers College Press

Series in Social Studies Sources • Erling M. Hunt, Series Editor

CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT

Readings in Executive-Legislative Relations

SELECTED BY WALTER EARL TRAVIS



Perhaps one of the most fascinating facets of the presidential form of government is the relationship between the chief executive and congress. A study of this controversial problem can provide both student and layman with an explicit illustration of the complexities and dynamics of the governmental process. CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT offers just this.

Dr. Travis has compiled a selection of fifteen pertinent readings by prominent politicians, political scientists, and political specialists—each of whom examines a different theme. An assessment of President Lyndon B. Johnson's relations with Congress is made in the concluding section of the book.

Paper, $2.50—Cloth, $5.75

Teachers College Press
Teachers College, Columbia University
525 W. 120th St.
New York, N. Y. 10027

CRISIS IN PRINT

Desegregation and the Press in Tennessee

Public opinion and editorial reaction to the 1954 Supreme Court decision.
By HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM. $7.50

AND PROMISES TO KEEP

The Southern Conference for Human Welfare, 1938–1948

The popular-front organization created by early Southern liberals to cure the South's economic and social ills.
By THOMAS A. KRUEGER. $6.50

NASHVILLE METRO

The Politics of City-County Consolidation

"A realistic analysis of how to make consolidation politically palatable."— Public Management. By BRETT W. HAWKINS. $5.00

SECTIONAL STRESS AND PARTY STRENGTH

A Computer Analysis of Roll-Call Voting Patterns in the United States House of Representatives, 1836–1860

"A veritable data bank upon which future historians will gratefully draw for many years."—Professor David Donald, The Johns Hopkins University.

"Methodological significance transcending the subject matter."—Professor Lee Benson, University of Pennsylvania.

An historical analysis of the forces of party cohesion and sectionalism at work in the 24th through the 36th congresses—forces which predisposed the nation for Secession and Civil War. By THOMAS B. ALEXANDER. $10.00

Vanderbilt University Press **Nashville • Tennessee • 37203**

From ST. MARTIN'S

The New Urbanization

Editors: Scott Greer and David Minar, *Northwestern University*, Dennis McElrath, *University of California, Santa Cruz*, Peter Orleans, *U.C.L.A.*

A useful collection of articles by leading scholars offering a unique presentation of the problems of urbanization in modern society.

Contributors: Van Hoey, McElrath, Barringer, Mack, Moskos, Bell, Moses, Williamson, Sakumoto, Nohara, James, Greer, Orleans, Gilbert, Minar, Masotti, Holden, Friesema, Tiebout, Long.

January 1968 About 450 pp. $10.00 tent.

Political Theory

ITS NATURE AND USES

George Kateb, *Amherst College*

This latest study in *St. Martin's Series in American Politics* is a general presentation of what political theory and the role of the political theorist is. The author discusses how the political theorist generalizes from what he observes of political practices and how he sets about making use of the works of classical political theorists when called upon to do so. (Other books in the Series: *The Convention and the Constitution, The New Congress, Political Parties in the United States,* and *The Modern Presidency.*)

Spring 1968 128 pp. $1.75 tent.

Announcing

New Approaches to International Relations

Editor: Morton Kaplan, *The University of Chicago*

Contributors: Wohlstetter, Golden, Kahn, Deutsch, Alker, Burns, Guetskow, Galtung, North, Falk, Hsi-sheng Chi, Franke, Reinken.

Fall 1968 500 pp. $10.00 tent.



College Department
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS
175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010

Political Science Titles of Special

THE KOREAN DECISION, June 24-30, 1950
By Glenn D. Paige, *University of Hawaii*
Introduction by Richard C. Snyder

The Korean Decision is a full-scale, thoroughly documented reconstruction of the United States' decision to intervene in Korea in 1950. The implications and conclusions set forth in this study will shed light on recent American decisions in Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Vietnam. It will also provide valuable lessons for future decision-makers and provoke fresh thoughts about a number of recurrent issues.

February, 1968 416 pages (approx.) cloth, $6.95 tent.
paperbound text edition, $3.95 tent.

FOREIGN POLICY DECISION MAKING
An Approach to the Study of International Politics
Edited by Richard C. Snyder, *Northwestern University*,
H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin

The intellectual foundations and strategies for a science of international politics are examined by the editors through a study of the decision making process. Drawing on the work and methods of scholars outside the field of political science, this book provides new concepts and approaches for study in this field.

1962 288 pages $6.50

DOMESTIC SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY
Edited by James N. Rosenau, *Rutgers University*
Foreword by Samuel P. Hayes

Recognizing the significance of internal institutions, politics, and social dynamics in the formulation and conduct of foreign policy, this distinguished volume provides the first multi-disciplinary approach to an important area of investigation. The ten previously unpublished studies in the volume are by Bernard C. Cohen, Johan Galtung, Scott Greer, Theodore J. Lowi, Herbert McClosky, Lester W. Milbrath, Warren E. Miller, Milton J. Rosenberg, Kenneth N. Waltz, and Professor Rosenau.

1967 356 pages $8.50

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
A Reinterpretation of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers
By Paul Eidelberg, *North Carolina State University, Raleigh*
Foreword by Herbert Storing

A study of the nature of American political institutions and the purposes they were intended to serve, this book presents a philosophical reconstruction of the debates of the Constitutional Convention and offers a critique of the Constitution. The author analyzes the Constitution's role in many present day controversies including civil rights, reapportionment, presidential power and the scope of congressional authority.

February, 1968 256 pages (approx.) cloth, $6.95 tent.
paperbound text edition, $2.95 tent.

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Interest from The Free Press



QUANTITATIVE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS:
Insights and Evidence
Edited by J. David Singer, *University of Michigan*
Preface by Heinz Eulau

The first book-length presentation of data-based studies touching all areas of international politics, this book contains ten articles that demonstrate how the rigorous methodology of the behavioral disciplines can be brought to bear on the raw information of world politics. The contributors are James N. Rosenau, Chadwick F. Alger, Dina A. Zinnes, Robert C. North, Ole R. Holsti, Richard A. Brody, Charles A. McClelland, Rudolph J. Rummel, Michael Haas, J. David Singer, Melvin Small, Hayward Alker, Jr., Donald Puchala, and Bruce M. Russett.

January, 1968 416 pages (approx.) $10.95 tent.

PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS: Cross-National Perspectives
Edited, with an Introduction, by Seymour M. Lipset, *Harvard University*, and Stein Rokkan, *University of Bergen, Norway*
Preface by Heinz Eulau

Party Systems and Voter Alignments is the most exhaustive international report to date on voting patterns and the social basis of party support. The eleven original contributions deal with a series of central questions in the sociology of politics and present important data on the ways in which major political tendencies have evolved in the contemporary world. The papers analyze party systems and voter alignments in most of the Western European countries, Scandinavia, the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Brazil, Japan, and West Africa.

November, 1967 576 pages (approx.) $9.95

IDEOLOGY AND DISCONTENT
Edited by David E. Apter, *University of California, Berkeley*
Preface by Heinz Eulau

Ideology and Discontent presents a fresh appraisal of the concept of ideology in the light of contemporary social change and recent political events. The contributors compare the role of ideology in the new, developing nations with its place in the already advanced, industrialized countries.

". . . a lively, readable, and enlightening volume."

—Daniel Lerner, The American Journal of Sociology

1964 342 pages $9.95

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ANALYSIS
Edited by James C. Charlesworth, *University of Pennsylvania*

Twenty distinguished authorities discuss and evaluate the major contemporary methodologies in political science research in seventeen papers, more than half of which were written especially for this volume. The methodologies discussed are behavioralism, functional analysis, the quantitative approach, systems theory, decision-making theory, game theory, communications theory, and political-development theory.

1967 480 pages cloth, $8.50
paperbound text edition, $3.95

THE FREE PRESS
A Division of The Macmillan Company
866 Third Avenue, New York 10022

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS IN A REVOLUTIONARY AGE

W. W. KULSKI, Duke University

A highly successful text which analyzes the ideological conflicts, discordant national interests and the social and economic factors that underlie today's revolutionary transformations. Close attention is given to the problems of the underdeveloped nations—the "Third World"—and their role in today's power struggle. *"Of the perhaps dozen books on the subject that this reviewer has read in the past year, this is by far the most knowledgeable and useful. It can be recommended for student, intellectual and technician alike."*—America

650 Pages **$7.25**

THE MAKING OF FOREIGN POLICY: EAST AND WEST

KURT LONDON, George Washington University

The author scans the policy machinery of the main protagonists of the East-West conflict—United States, Russia, China, Great Britain and France. Special emphasis is given to the vital roles of intelligence and propaganda in the making and implementation of policy, and the agencies and media are carefully defined.

368 Pages **Paperbound** **$1.95**

THE SOVIET ECONOMY SINCE STALIN

HARRY SCHWARTZ

Russia's current economic difficulties and the reasons for them are analyzed by the *New York Times'* specialist on Russian affairs. The continuing problem of Soviet agriculture and the ouster of Khrushchev are given close attention.

256 Pages **Paperbound** **$1.95**

THE ASIANS: Their Heritage and Their Destiny

PAUL THOMAS WELTY

This comprehensive introduction to contemporary Asia probes historical backgrounds, political and social institutions, religions, and economic systems. Valuable supplementary reading for all courses touching on modern Asia.

350 Pages **Revised Edition** **Paperbound** **$1.95**

THE INTEGRATION OF POLITICAL COMMUNITIES

KARL W. DEUTSCH, Yale University; PHILIP E. JACOB, HENRY TEUNE, JAMES V. TOSCANO, WILLIAM C. WHEATON, University of Pennsylvania

Integrated political behavior at the metropolitan and international levels is explored in ten essays based on empirical studies in a wide range of fields, including communications, international tensions, planning and regional science, local government, social structure, social psychology and cultural anthropology.


314 Pages **Paperbound** **$1.95**

J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY College Department, East Washington Square, Philadelphia, Pa. 19105


17 92

American Association of Law Libraries

INDEX TO FOREIGN LEGAL PERIODICALS AND COLLECTIONS OF ESSAYS



An Index to the
Legal Periodical Literature
of the World Outside
the Common Law Sphere



indexes by subject, author and geographical name articles and book reviews in more than 300 of the world's most outstanding legal periodicals and collections of essays


3 quarterly issues and Annual Cumulative Volume each year and 3-year Cumulations

published since 1960 under the direction of the Committee on Foreign Law Indexing of the American Association of Law Libraries

Price:	Cumulation I (1960-1962):	$50.00
	Cumulation II (1963-1965):	$60.00
	Vol. 7 (1966):	$40.00
	Annual subscription:	$40.00

Order from:

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF LAW LIBRARIES
c/o William D. Murphy
2900 Prudential Plaza, Chicago, Illinois 60601



Available in the Spring . . .

WORLD POLITICS

Second Edition, Revised

by A. F. K. ORGANSKI, *University of Michigan*

Knopf, Spring 1968; about 544 pages; $8.50

A revision of a successful basic text for the international relations course, presenting a general theory of international political development and international power. For this edition, Professor Organski has provided important new material on national growth and nation-building and on the present and potential effects of nuclear weapons on world politics.

WESTERN INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC REALM

by THOMAS R. ADAM, *New York University*

Random House, October 1967; PS 61; 256 pages; $2.95 paperbound

A timely examination of the political, economic and strategic interests of the major Western nations in the southwest pacific region of Oceania.

SUEZ: Ten Years Later

by PETER CALVOCORESSI, *Sussex University*

Pantheon, October 1967; PS 62; 160 pages; $1.95 paperbound

The Arab-Israeli War of 1956 examined in the perspective of ten years. Material is included from candid and illuminating interviews with President Nasser, David Ben-Gurion, Abba Eban, Christian Pineau, Moshe Dayan, and a number of scholars and journalists.

BEYOND VIETNAM: The United States and Asia

by EDWIN O. REISCHAUER, *Harvard University*


A Vintage Book, November 1967; V192; 256 pages; $1.65 paperbound

THE ARROGANCE OF POWER

by J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT

A Vintage Book, V378; 288 pages; $1.65 paperbound

RANDOM HOUSE, Inc. ALFRED A. KNOPF, Inc.



THE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE INTER-WAR YEARS 1919-1939

by WILLIAM J. NEWMAN, *Boston University*
Random House, January 1968; PS 60; 256 pages; $2.65 paperbound

The concept of balance of power studied in depth through analysis of the balance established by the 1925 Locarno treaties, and its gradual collapse with Hitler's rise to power.

THE MIGHT OF NATIONS: World Politics in Our Time
Revised Edition

by JOHN G. STOESSINGER, *Hunter College of the City University of New York*
Foreward by ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE
Random House; 460 pages; $6.95

Revised and updated, this edition retains the quality and perception for which the first edition won the Bancroft Prize in International Relations.

For your professional Library . . .

THE AMBIGUOUS CONSENSUS: A Study of Local Government in France


by MARK KESSELMAN, *Columbia University*
Knopf, August 1967; 224 pages; $5.95

An unusual study of French local government from the political, as opposed to sociological or administrative viewpoint. The power and prestige of the mayor of the French commune is contrasted with party splintering and ideological cleavages on the national level.

The College Department 501 Madison Avenue New York 10022

PRAEGER

Announcing the paperback publication of Raymond Aron's masterpiece



PEACE AND WAR

A Theory of International Relations

Raymond Aron

"A more impressive discussion of the nature of war has not been written since Clausewitz."—Golo Mann

"It is curious that a century dominated by international conflict should be so lacking in theories of international affairs. Now this deficiency has been remedied by Raymond Aron in his profound, civilized, brilliant and difficult work: PEACE AND WAR.... Henceforth, international theorizing will require reference to Aron.... This volume is indispensable for the specialist." — Henry A. Kissinger, *The New York Times Book Review*. 838 pages.

U-640/$4.95

POLITICAL PARTIES IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES

LEON D. EPSTEIN. Professor Epstein's major new book is the first to examine the American party system in the perspective of the historical development of parties in Europe—and the first to compare in detail party politics and power in the U. S. and Europe. His exhaustive analysis includes discussion of such factors as party organization, suffrage extension, mass membership, and federalism. ca. 448 pp. U-636/ca. $3.50

INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

PIERRE RENOUVIN and JEAN-BAPTISTE DUROSELLE. "A learned and systematic contribution to the historical sociology of international relations. No other text like it is available in America."—Stanley Hoffmann, *Professor of Government, Harvard University*. "This brilliant book is valuable for its sound historical analysis of international relations and for the insights of historical scholarship applied to the subject."—*Library Journal*. 444 pp.

A Praeger Paperbound Text/$3.95

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION AND ELECTIONS

Parties and Voting in Great Britain

PETER G. J. PULZER. This concise, thorough, and well-written book — an ideal text for British politics, comparative government, and American parties courses — makes possible for the first time a true comparison of the party systems of the U. S. and the U. K. Incorporating the latest research on political behavior in Great Britain, with special emphasis on work that has important parallels in the U. S., Dr. Pulzer provides a lucid analysis of all major developments from early suffrage extensions to the current "one man, one vote" controversy. January. 168 pp. U-644/$1.95

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER

111 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003

Problems in Political Science

Here are the first three volumes in a newly published Heath paperbound series designed to encourage critical thinking about political values, realities, and policies. This series, edited by Neal Riemer, fills the need for well-organized books of significant readings for use in introductory Political Science courses.

Geared to the "problems approach" of teaching, each volume offers both readings that raise fundamental questions on provocative political issues and articles aimed at answering the queries posed or presenting alternative approaches to the problem.


Each of the texts summarizes the general issue involved, briefly discusses selected approaches to the problem, and features a carefully compiled, annotated bibliography.

THE REPRESENTATIVE: Trustee? Delegate? Partisan? Politico?
Neal Riemer — 116 pages — $1.50

WESTERN EUROPE: What Path to Integration?
Carol Edler Baumann — 156 pages — $1.50

FREE SPEECH AND POLITICAL PROTEST
Marvin R. Summers — 136 pages — $1.50

D. C. Heath and Company
A DIVISION OF RAYTHEON EDUCATION COMPANY



Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

ALLYN AND BACON, INC.
new titles available now for your courses . . .

★ GOVERNING THE AMERICAN NATION

by **Richard H. Leach,** Duke University. Presents an analytic description of the foundations, structures and organizational processes and problems of the national government. Emphasizing change as the chief characteristic of government, the book becomes a springboard for discussions of problems which arise through change. Results of recent research in both substance and methodology are incorporated.
1967 6 x 9 723 pp. list $8.95.

★ RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES

by **Norman John Powell,** City College of The City University of New York. Offers a comprehensive study of bureaucracy and responsibility in the context of developing American public service and society. The book progresses from terms of reference for viewing American bureaucracy, through examination of the governmental bureaucracy as a thing of constant growth and change, to the instruments whereby the bureaucrat in the United States is simultaneously thrust into action and also held in check.
1967 5⅝ x 8⅜ paperbound est. 224 pp. list $3.95.

★ INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

by **William C. Havard** and **David R. Mayhew,** both of the University of Massachusetts. Gives the student vivid insight into American Governmental processes.
1967 5⅝ x 8⅜ paperbound 622 pp. list $5.50.

★ POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

by **William J. Crotty,** Northwestern University; **Donald M. Freeman,** University of Arizona; and **Douglas S. Gatlin,** Florida Atlantic University. Designed to bring to the student the diversity of materials relevant to the understanding of political parties, this text makes available the most rewarding research yet undertaken in this area.
1966 5⅝ x 8⅜ paperbound 630 pp. list $6.25.

★ AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: BEHAVIOR AND CONTROVERSY

by **Lewis Lipsitz,** University of North Carolina. Includes selected readings in the major substantive and institutional areas of American government. The selections are taken from works of academic scholars and controversial spokesmen of various political positions.
1967 5⅝ x 8⅜ paperbound 678 pp. list $5.50.

★ THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE: FROM BURGESS TO BEHAVIORALISM

by **Albert Somit,** State University of New York at Buffalo; and **Joseph Tanenhaus,** University of Iowa.
$5.95.

Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 470 Atlantic Ave., Boston, Mass. 02210

ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE

A STRATEGY OF PEACE IN A CHANGING WORLD

One of America's most distinguished political scientists presents a collection of articles, papers and lectures on the subject of world peace. Based on a conviction that American democracy cannot survive in a militaristic world, this book is an eloquent appeal for rational solutions to one of mankind's most critical problems. $7.95

GEORGE SIMEON MWASE
Edited by
Robert I. Rotberg

STRIKE A BLOW AND DIE

A Narrative of Race Relations in Colonial Africa. This fascinating document contains the only biography, by a fellow African, of John Chilembwe, Malawi's first revolutionary. The book provides much significant information about the rebellion of 1915, the conspiracy leading up to it, and conditions in Nyasaland during the period. *Center for International Affairs.* $4.95

JAMES HOLT

CONGRESSIONAL INSURGENTS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM, 1909-1916

Battles over the Payne Aldrich tariff, military preparedness, the power of speaker Cannon, the 1912 and 1916 elections, and Wilson's New Freedom provide background for Mr. Holt's new answer to the question, "What happened to progressivism in the Republican party?" *Harvard Historical Monographs, 60.* $5.50

PHILIP C. F. BANKWITZ

MAXIME WEYGAND AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN MODERN FRANCE

Between the two world wars a deep mistrust developed between the French government and its military command, culminating in June 1940 in the insubordination of the Army leaders. Mr. Bankwitz examines this process and relates it to situations in other Western societies today. *Harvard Historical Studies, 81.* $10.00

In Canada/Saunders of Toronto, Ltd.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Enemies and Friends

THE UNITED FRONT IN CHINESE COMMUNIST HISTORY

Lyman P. Van Slyke. Traces the theory and practice of an important instrument of Chinese Communist political strategy, with emphasis upon three important manifestations: the Kuomintang-Communist alliance of the 1920's, the military alliance against Japan in 1937-45, and the Party's post-1949 campaigns to transform China's society and economy. $8.50

The China White Paper August 1949

With a New Introduction by Lyman P. Van Slyke. Reissue of the original State Department publication, with an extensive index prepared for this edition. A 400-page summary of American China policy down to the summer of 1949 and over 600 pages of official documents, formerly highly classified.

Paper, 2 vols., $5.95 a set; cloth, 1 vol., $15.00

Capitalism and Nationalism in Prewar Japan

THE IDEOLOGY OF THE BUSINESS ELITE, 1868-1941

Byron K. Marshall. A study of how the new elite of Japanese business leaders justified their acquisition of considerable political as well as economic power as Japan became more highly industrialized. Includes a discussion of the influence of the West on the formation of business ideology. $5.75

Islam and Imperialism in Senegal

SINE-SALOUM, 1847-1914


Martin A. Klein. This study, concentrating on the Serer states of Senegal during a period of transition, is one of the most detailed histories yet written of the processes of political change in Africa. One of the very few works in English based on local French West African archives and making extensive use of oral tradition. *Hoover Institution Publications.* $7.95

Essays in the Theory of Society

Ralf Dahrendorf. These ten essays by Europe's leading sociological theorist deal with important issues on the borderline between sociology and social philosophy, and demonstrate the author's deep insight into history and political analysis. $8.50

Order from your bookstore, please

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS



PAPERBACKS ESPECIALLY RECOMMENDED

THE DOCTRINE OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT

by Austin Ranney. "The intellectual materials examined are intrinsically so interesting and exciting that it is a sheer delight to rediscover them." E. E. Schattschneider, *The Annals.* 176 pages. $1.25.

FOUR THEORIES OF THE PRESS

by Fred S. Siebert, Theodore Peterson, and Wilbur Schramm. A probing analysis of the Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility, and Soviet Communist concepts of what the press should be and do. ". . . offers a wealth of thought and factual information."—*Journalism Quarterly.* 153 pages. $1.25.

MEXICAN GOVERNMENT IN TRANSITION

by Robert E. Scott. "Indispensable and comprehensive analysis of how the political system operates, brought up to date by an epilogue. Begins with Revolution of 1910, covers physical and social setting, people, political party system, and much more."—*Latin American Report.* 345 pages. $2.25.

JOHN LOCKE AND THE DOCTRINE OF MAJORITY-RULE


by Willmoore Kendall. "A highly important, perhaps a revolutionary book . . . bound to remain a landmark in the study of Locke's political philosophy."—*American Journal of Sociology.* 141 pages. $1.25.

ONE WORLD

by Wendell L. Willkie, with an introduction by Donald Bruce Johnson. A new edition of Willkie's prophetic book with its perceptive observations that still are valid today. "It is one of the most absorbing books I have read in years, full of humor, shrewd observation, a thousand and one facts you and I never heard but should have."—*William L. Shirer.* 206 pages. $1.75.



Is German Antidemocratic Nationalism Dead?



You can find the answer in

Beyond Eagle and Swastika:

German Nationalism Since 1945

By Kurt P. Tauber

"This monumental work contains the fullest and most authoritative account of German rightist groups in any language. With singular determination, Kurt P. Tauber, associate professor of political science at Williams College, has charted a path through some 400 groups, 140 separate youth movements, 300 newspapers and scores of 'Nationalist' books. . . . these volumes (one of text and one of references) are indispensable for charting a course through German politics."—GEORGE L. MOSSE, N.Y. *Times Book Review*

1,648 pp. *With 150 photos, appendixes, notes, bibliography, indexes* Two vols. $35.00



WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY PRESS
100 Riverview Center
Middletown, Connecticut 06457

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND PARLIAMENTARY STUDIES

The quarterly Journal is devoted to studies in comparative constitutional law and problems and prospects of democratic governments in India and abroad. It is intended to serve as an independent forum of discussion in depth on problems of parliamentary procedure and legislative institutions. The basic object of the Journal as of the Institute sponsoring it is to disseminate democratic values and foster popular understanding of parliamentary institutions at different levels.

Besides Case Studies, Book Reviews and detailed notes on Constitutional and Parliamentary Developments during the quarter, the April-June 1967 issue of the Journal contains exclusive articles on PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES IN ITALY by *Francesco Cosentino*, Secretary-General, Italian Parliament; THE OMBUDSMAN IN CALIFORNIA by *Jesse M. Unruh*, Speaker, State of California; AMERICAN INFLUENCES ON THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION by *Professor M. Abel;* STATES UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL EMERGENCY by *Professor M. V. Pylee;* ROLE OF PARLIAMENT DURING THE EMERGENCY by *P. Parmeshwara Rao;* POWERS AND POSITION OF RAJYA SABHA by *S. S. Bhalerao*, Joint Secretary, Rajya Sabha.

IN THE NEXT ISSUE

Andre de Bloney, Secretary-General, Inter-Parliamentary Union on "THE INTER-PARLIAMENTARY UNION AND PATTERNS OF WORLD-WIDE PARLIAMENTARY COOPERATION".

Edward Gough Whitlam, Leader of the Federal Opposition in Australia on "SOME ASPECTS OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM IN AUSTRALIA".

N. N. Mallya, Joint Secretary in-charge of Financial Committees of Parliament on "PARLIAMENTARY SURVEILLANCE OF ADMINISTRATION—THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL COMMITTEES".

Phyllis I. Dalton, Assistant State Librarian, California and Chairman, Research Section, National Legislative Conference (U.S.A.) on "LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH AND INFORMATIONAL SERVICES".

Surinder Suri of Guilford College, Greensboro (N. Carolina) on "POLITICAL LIFE CYCLE OF LOK SABHA MEMBERS".

B. B. Tewari, Deputy Secretary, Lok Sabha on "PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS".

Also

A detailed analysis of Golaknath's case, a survey of research in the field of constitutional law and parliamentary affairs in various Universities *and* book reviews, notes and comments.

Annual Subscription	Rs. 15/- or $5.50 or £2.00
Single Copy	Rs. 4/- or $1.50 or £0.11s

The Institute of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies

18, Vithalbhai Patel House, Rafi Marg, New Delhi-1.

New

Political Institutions and Social Change in Continental Europe in the Nineteenth Century

Eugene N. Anderson *and* **Pauline R. Anderson.** To understand the complex stirrings of society in the last century, the authors have concentrated their attention on nineteenth-century institutions, emphasizing particularly central and local governments, political parties, and bureaucracies. Their comparison of constitutions, statutes, observers' reports, and other documents reveals clearly the several stages of conflict between the Old Regime and the new industrial society that was displacing it. **$10.00**

The Concept of Representation

Hanna F. Pitkin. Mrs. Pitkin combines conceptual analysis, as developed in modern linguistic philosophy, and the more traditional tools of political theory in this incisive study; she argues that while representation always means basically the making present of something that is nevertheless not present, this paradoxical idea takes different forms in different contexts. "A distinguished book. It will not soon, if ever, be displaced as the best treatment of its subject."—J. Roland Pennock **$7.50**

The Origins of the National Health Service

The Medical Services of the New Poor Law, 1834–1871

Ruth G. Hodgkinson. This work is a comprehensive study of the growth of the new Poor Law into Britain's state medical services. Many of the enactments of the twentieth-century welfare state grew out of the omissions of the Poor Law. Thoroughly grounded in a wealth of contemporary sources, the volume is unlikely ever to be superseded. **$17.50**

The Rise of Fascism

F. L. Carsten. Professor Carsten indicates how violence and racialism and political extremism could suddenly flourish in civilized countries such as Italy, Germany and Austria. He examines the origins and development of fascist movements and the social upheavals and economic depression following the First World War, which provided a ready-made opportunity for leaders with the mass appeal of Mussolini or Hitler. **$6.50**

Friends, Guests and Colleagues

The Mu-Fu System in the Late Ch'ing Period

Kenneth E. Folsom. Chinese historical studies too often tend to be impersonal analyses which fail to reflect the intensely human quality of Chinese society. This study probes beneath the surface of nineteenth-century China into the realm of human relationships as manifested in the *mu-fu* system. Of ancient origin, this unofficial and extremely personal institution, which evolved from the conflict between the administrative needs of the imperial government and the philosophical and personal commitments of Confucian scholar-officials, reached its fullest development during the Ch'ing dynasty and was an essential factor in China's struggle to modernize. **$5.50**

Whig Organization in the General Election of 1790

Selections from the Blair Adam Papers

Edited by **Donald E. Ginter.** The documents in this volume are letters to and from William Adam, political manager of the Whig opposition in the general election of 1790. The letters indicate the scope and quality of Whig activity, and reveal that Adam and the Duke of Portland were the leading figures in coordinating the resources of the opposition. The author demonstrates that the beginnings of modern British political parties can be dated at around 1790. **$8.00**



from California

University of California Press
Berkeley 94720

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

STATEGIES OF AMERICAN ELECTORAL POLITICS

SECOND EDITION

NELSON W. POLSBY AND AARON B. WILDAVSKY

Presidential Elections—first published in 1964—was widely reviewed and praised for its searching appraisal of the process of electing a President. For the second edition, it has been thoroughly revised and brought up to date. Professors Polsby and Wildavsky have added a chapter which examines the unique characteristics of the Goldwater candidacy, its pre-convention and convention tactics, and the Johnson-Goldwater campaign and its consequences. New material has been added on the selection of a Vice-President, the possible future effects of new laws and court decisions concerning the Presidency, the Electoral College, and elections.

The exceptionally useful features of the first edition have been retained: the analysis of the most persistent components of the political system; the strategies employed by candidates for nomination and election; and the many proposals for improving the party system, the Electoral College, and the nominating conventions. The authors also consider the significance of free elections for the democratic process. There are two appendices, bibliography and an index.

1968. 320 pp. Paper. $2.50.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

COLLEGE DEPARTMENT • 597 FIFTH AVENUE • NEW YORK

POLITICAL PARTIES AND DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES

KAY LAWSON

A concise and thorough discussion of the two-party system in the United States, this text is designed for courses in American government and political parties. The author examines the origin, development, and present nature of America's two-party system, how it compares with the party systems of other countries, the ways in which the parties compete for support and power, the success or failure of United States parties in fulfilling democratic ideals, the extent of reform needed, and an up-to-date analysis of the changes occurring within the two parties.

1968. About 250 pp. Paper $2.25

CONTENTS: Preface; Introduction; Part One: THE PARTIES/The Origin of Political Parties in the United States; The Functions of Political Parties in a Democracy; The Two-Party System; The Two-Party System Reconsidered; Party Leadership and Organization. Part Two: THE CONTEXT / The Electoral Framework; The American Voter; Political Parties and Pressure Groups; Pressure Groups: Labor, Business, and Agriculture; Pressure Groups: Partisanship and Representation. Part Three: THE PARTIES AT WORK / Nominations; Campaigns; Parties in Government; Other Parties: A Comparison; Party Reform: Desirability and Feasibility; Index.

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

COLLEGE DEPARTMENT • 597 FIFTH AVENUE • NEW YORK

DECADE OF DECISION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION, 1954-1964

G. Theodore Mitau. This text, designed for courses in constitutional law, American government, and the judiciary, examines the landmark Supreme Court decisions of the past ten years. The author discusses the meaning, immediate impact, and long-range effects of decisions in six major areas: desegregation, reapportionment, prayer in the public schools, right of the defendant, freedom to demonstrate, and freedom of association and travel. *1967 256 pp. Paper $2.95.*

ONE MAN, ONE VOTE: WMCA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL REPRESENTATION

Calvin B. T. Lee. This book, an ideal text for any course which touches on reapportionment or constitutional law, gives a detailed "inside" and in-depth account of one of the six reapportionment cases of 1964. The history of the case, initiated and carried to the Supreme Court by a popular radio station in New York City, is revealed through newspaper articles and editorials, radio broadcasts, legal briefs, court transcripts, letters, and the personal recollections of those involved. *1967 208 pp. Paper $1.95.*

PRESSURE GROUPS IN AMERICAN POLITICS

H. R. Mahood. This collection of readings by distinguished writers and essays by the author introduces the student to the important role played by pressure groups in public policy-making. It presents both a theoretical and factual framework for a "group" basis of politics—viewing politics as the activity of different groups in conflict. *1967 304 pp. Paper $2.75.*

DEMOCRACY AND ELITISM: TWO ESSAYS WITH SELECTED READINGS

Harry Girvetz. For courses on the "isms" and political philosophy, this book presents an informative symposium on democracy and elitism. Two essays by the author presenting reasoned definitions of democracy and elitism are followed by readings which document and expand points made in the essays. *1967 349 pp. Paper $3.50*

FRANCE, GERMANY, AND THE WESTERN ALLIANCE: A STUDY OF ELITE ATTITUDES ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND WORLD POLITICS

Karl W. Deutsch, Lewis J. Edinger, Roy C. Macridis, and Richard L. Merritt. This study, for courses in international politics or foreign relations, summarizes and discusses elite opinions on such questions as the future of NATO and the Western Alliance, arms control and disarmament, the reunification of Germany, and France after De Gaulle. *1967 324 pp. Paper $2.95.*

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

COLLEGE DEPARTMENT · 597 FIFTH AVENUE · NEW YORK

McGRAW-HILL BOOKS

CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE: Toward Empirical Theory

Edited by ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. *Off press*

What is the relevance of the heritage of political theory for modern political science? Addressing themselves to this question in the main Plenary Session of the 1966 American Political Science Association meeting were the following contributors: GABRIEL A. ALMOND, ROBERT A. DAHL, KARL DEUTSCH, HARRY ECKSTEIN, HEINZ EULAU, ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, LUCIAN W. PYE, EDWARD SHILS, and HERBERT A. SIMON.

GOVERNING URBAN AMERICA, Third Edition

CHARLES R. ADRIAN, University of California, Riverside; and CHARLES PRESS, Michigan State University. *Available March*

This thorough revision presents a realistic introduction to urban government emphasizing the political process rather than institutions.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, Ninth Edition

JOHN H. FERGUSON, The Pennsylvania State University; and DEAN E. McHENRY, University of California, Santa Cruz. 768 pages/$8.95

THE AMERICAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, Ninth Edition

JOHN H. FERGUSON and DEAN E. McHENRY. 672 pages/$8.50

VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: Readings in Public Opinion and Propaganda, Second Edition

REO M. CHRISTENSON, Miami University; and ROBERT O. McWILLIAMS, Eastern Michigan University. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.* 640 pages/$7.95 (clothbound), $5.95 (soft-cover)

While most of the material is by journalists, editors, critics and historians, outstanding social scientists are represented as well.

INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE, Second Edition

CARLTON CLYMER RODEE, TOTTON JAMES ANDERSON, and CARL QUIMBY CRISTOL; all of the University of Southern California. *McGraw-Hill Series in Political Science.* 704 pages/$8.95

This completely up-dated revision of the leading introductory test provides traditional and comprehensive coverage of contemporary political forces and political theory.

SERIES IN FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

JOSEPH P. HARRIS, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley, Series Editor

ROWLAND EGGER, *The President of the United States*

JOSEPH P. HARRIS, *Congress and the Legislative Process*

CHARLES R. ADRIAN, *Governing Our Fifty States and Their Communities, Second Edition*

HUGH A. BONE and AUSTIN RANNEY, *Politics and Voters, Second Edition*

H. FRANK WAY, *Liberty in the Balance, Second Edition*

CHARLES O. LERCHE, *America in World Affairs, Second Edition*

C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, *The American Constitutional System, Second Edition*

ANDREW HACKER, *The Study of Politics*

JOHN J. CORSON and JOSEPH P. HARRIS, *Public Administration in Modern Society*

Each series volume: $3.75 (clothbound), $1.60 (soft-cover)

McGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY

330 West 42nd Street, New York, New York 10036

The Negro in Virginia Politics, 1902-1965

By ANDREW BUNI

Associate Professor of History, Mary Washington College of the University of Virginia. ix, 296 pp., tables, index. 6 x 9¼. L.C. 67-21659. $6.00

For this, the first book to study the Negro's role in Virginia politics in the twentieth century, the author has interviewed extensively leading Negro political leaders and collected information, neglected until now as source material, from the state's Negro newspapers. The participation of the Negroes in the political life of the state is seen chiefly through their own eyes.

After the adoption of the state constitution in 1902, Negroes were disfranchised by such means as the white primary, literacy tests, blank paper registration forms, and the poll tax. Opposed by the Democratic party, later disowned by the Republicans in an effort to regain political strength, the Negro became politically indifferent during the long years before World War II.

Finally, in the 1960's, mainly as a result of the elimination of the poll tax, the enactment of strong federal voting rights bills, and growing militancy among Negroes, the political importance of the Negro increased significantly. Now it is recognized that his vote, as in the victory of President Johnson in Virginia in 1964 and of Governor Mills Godwin in 1965, may be decisive in elections.

Mathematical Applications in Political Science, III

Edited by JOSEPH L. BERND

Chairman of the Department of Political Science, Virginia Polytechnic Institute. xiv, 119 pp., 6 x 9¼. L.C. 67-28023. $5.00

This volume is devoted to original research in new mathematical and statistical solutions to problems in the theory and practice of politics. The papers collected here were chosen to illustrate the use of logical-deductive models involving mathematics and the testing of hypotheses derived from the models and the use of empirical-inductive models in statistical applications. Working with these two varieties of behavioral political research, the authors establish more refined methods for measuring and understanding predictive values and policy formulation.

Three of the five papers printed here were presented at the third of the summer conferences on Mathematical Applications in Political Science which was held at Blacksburg, Virginia, in 1966.

University Press of Virginia Charlottesville



For winter and spring classes

WORLD TENSIONS: Conflict and Accommodation

ELTON ATWATER, KENT FORSTER, *and* JAN S. PRYBYLA, *all of The Pennsylvania State University*. An introductory, social science approach to world affairs, this is a lucid presentation of the principal sources—and various means of resolving—international tension and conflict. Instructor's manual available.

July 1967 396 pages illustrated paperback $3.95

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, Second Edition

VERNON VAN DYKE, *The University of Iowa*. Topical rather than historical, this reasoned analysis of behavior of states in their relations with one another draws not only on diplomatic history, but on psychology, economics, and political theory as well.

April 1966 527 pages $6.50

SOURCES IN MODERN EAST ASIAN HISTORY AND POLITICS

Edited by THEODORE McNELLY, *University of Maryland*. Source materials and readings on the recent history, politics, ideologies, and international relations of China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam—designed to supplement, and correlated with, standard textbooks.

May 1967 422 pages illustrated paperback $3.95

THE ART OF DIPLOMACY: The American Experience

THOMAS A. BAILEY, *Stanford University*. A compendium of the principles that have guided and misguided the conduct of diplomacy, each accompanied by brief illustrations from the American experience, and recounted in a pungent and witty style.

January 1968 288 pages paperback $2.95 (tent.)

PRESIDENTIAL GREATNESS: The Image and the Man from George Washington to the Present

Also by THOMAS A. BAILEY. The widely acclaimed book by one of America's most distinguished scholars.

September 1966 368 pages paperback college edition $3.95

THE SUPREME COURT AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, Second Edition

GEORGE W. SPICER, *University of Virginia*. The long-awaited revision of Spicer's brief, incisive analysis of the Supreme Court as a guardian of American civil liberties.

February 1967 280 pages paperback $2.45

Appleton-Century-Crofts
Division of Meredith Corporation
440 PARK AVENUE SOUTH, NEW YORK 10016

Due in spring

ACC

POLITICS IN TRANSITIONAL SOCIETIES: The Challenge of Change in Asia, Africa, and Latin America

Edited by HARVEY G. KEBSCHULL, *North Carolina State University at Raleigh.* Analytical and descriptive selections, accompanied by Dr. Kebschull's extensive introductory notes, survey the political environment, processes, institutions, groups, ideologies, international relations, and major problems in what are referred to as the "developing areas."

March 1968 496 pages illustrated paperback $4.95 (tent.)

FROM UNDERDEVELOPMENT TO AFFLUENCE: Western, Soviet, and Chinese Views

Edited by HARRY G. SHAFFER, *University of Kansas; and* JAN S. PRYBYLA, *The Pennsylvania State University.* Presenting ideological divergent points of view on the problem of economic development, this volume includes the non-Marxist as well as the Chinese Communist position.

June 1968 416 pages illustrated paperback $4.95 (tent.)

CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, Third Edition

Edited by ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, *National Historical Publications Commission; and* ROBERT F. CUSHMAN, *New York University.* Completely revised, reset, and reorganized. The most thoroughgoing and up-to-date casebook on the market.

May 1968 1104 pages $10.00 (tent.)

CASES IN CIVIL LIBERTIES

Edited by ROBERT F. CUSHMAN, *New York University.* An inexpensive paperback version of the second part of Cushman and Cushman's *Cases in Constitutional Law, Third Edition.*

May 1968 500 pages paperback $4.95 (tent.)

(REMEMBER: Two annual Cushman supplements—*1964-1966* and *1966-1967*—are already in print. Each $.95.)

THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE: Selected Writings

Edited by ISAAC KRAMNICH, *Brandeis University.*

June 1968 Crofts Classics 128 pages paperback $.50

Appleton-Century-Crofts
Division of Meredith Corporation
440 PARK AVENUE SOUTH, NEW YORK 10016

STUDIES IN TRADE LIBERALIZATION

Problems and Prospects for the Industrial Countries

By BELA BALASSA AND ASSOCIATES

How would an Atlantic Free Trade agreement affect U.S. trade, foreign investment, and employment? How would the Common Market be affected if its members were to abandon their discrimination against U.S. imports? And what would be the effects of greater economic intergration between Canada and the U.S.? It is to such questions that the authors address themselves in considering the implications of alternative approaches to trade liberalization among the major industrial nations. $11.50

THE ORIGIN OF FORCED LABOR IN THE SOVIET STATE, 1917-1921

Documents and Materials

By JAMES BUNYAN

After holding out to the Russian masses a tempting vision of a workers' state free from oppression, the Russian Communist regime lost no time introducing a brutal system of labor regimentation. This volume makes available in translation a select body of Russian documents which portray the evolution of Soviet policies toward labor during the early years of Communist rule. $10.00

THE ORIGINS OF THE PACT OF STEEL

By MARIO TOSCANO

The diplomatic maneuverings that led up to the military alliance signed by Germany and Italy in May, 1939—the Pact of Steel—were lengthy and tortuous. Originally published as *Le Origini Diplomatiche del Patto d'Acciaio*, this study by one of the world's foremost diplomatic historians provides illuminating insights into the origins of World War II. $11.00

UNCERTAIN MANDATE

Politics of the U.N. Congo Operation

By ERNEST W. LEFEVER

In this challenging study of the United Nations peace-making mission in the Congo, Professor Lefever suggests that the U.N. intervention both intensified and prolonged the Congo crisis. He concludes that the "Internationalization" of the crisis not only failed to keep the cold war out of the Congo, but assured the involvement of the great powers in the Congo's internal affairs. $7.50

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

Baltimore, Maryland 21218

QUEBEC CONFRONTS CANADA

By EDWARD M. CORBETT

What is the substance of French-Canadian complaints against English Canada? In this first book-length study of Canada's most crucial internal problem, Dr. Corbett analyzes the ferment within the French-speaking population of Quebec and sets the development of French-Canadian nationalism in historical perspective. $8.95

SOCIETY, POLITICS, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

A Quantitative Approach

By IRMA ADELMAN and CYNTHIA TAFT MORRIS

The authors apply the new technique of factor analysis to socio-political aspects of economic growth in seventy-four underdeveloped countries. Their conclusions have wide-ranging implications for development policy and for our foreign aid program. $8.95

SOVIET POLITICAL THOUGHT

An Anthology

Selected, Translated, and Edited by MICHAEL JAWORSKYJ

This first comprehensive anthology of writings by Soviet political theorists, philosophers, historians, economists, and sociologists illustrates the history of Soviet intellectual thought from the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 to the Twenty-Second Party Congress of 1961. Each section is prefaced by an introductory essay, and the whole is introduced by a discussion of the ideological dicta of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin on which Soviet thinking is largely based. $15.00

PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT IN IRAN

By GEORGE B. BALDWIN

Major economic planning was attempted in Iran after the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry. A member of the Harvard Advisory Group in Iran from 1958 to 1961, Mr. Baldwin witnessed Iran's successful economic development—which, ironically, did not proceed along lines laid down by the economic planners. $6.95

THE JOHNS HOPKINS PRESS

Baltimore, Maryland 21218

. . . featuring a variety of topics of current interest
Allyn and Bacon, Inc.

★ READINGS IN COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

by **Nimrod Raphaeli,** The Hebrew University. Deals with the various dimensions of comparative administration, ranging from theories and models to development and local administration. The articles treat both individual countries and groups of countries on a comparative basis. Material presented probes beneath the formal administrative organizations and into the broader context of the social sciences: politics, sociology, economics, anthropology. Contributors include both theoreticians and practitioners.
1967 5⅝ x 8⅜ paperbound 490 pp. list $6.50.

★ BASIC ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by **Peter A. Toma,** University of Arizona; and **Andrew Gyorgy,** George Washington University. A unique collection of readings organized around sixteen topics covering the basic aspects in the advancing field of international studies. Emphasizes the scope and method of international relations, international politics, organization and law through concepts and clash of issues. Selections from forty-five authors offer diverse viewpoints.
1967 5⅝ x 8⅜ paperbound 576 pp. list $5.50.

★ WORLD POLITICS: THE WRITINGS OF THEORISTS AND PRACTITIONERS, CLASSICAL AND MODERN

by **Arend Lijphart,** University of California, Berkeley. Brings together writings by outstanding classic and contemporary political theorists and by political practitioners who can speak authoritatively on world affairs. Concepts and problems in International Relations are analyzed by acknowledged experts in political science. The selections consist of provocative articles, chapters and speeches—the majority in their entirety—presenting differing interpretations of controversial issues.
1966 5⅝ x 8⅜ paperbound 448 pp. list $4.95.

★ APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF PARTY ORGANIZATION

Edited by **William J. Crotty,** Northwestern University.
1968 5⅝ x 8⅜ paperbound est. 424 pp.

★ EUROPEAN POLITICAL PROCESSES: ESSAYS AND READINGS

by **Lawrence K. Albinski** and **Henry S. Petit,** both of The Pennsylvania State University.
1967 5⅝ x 8⅜ paperbound 488 pp. list $5.00.

Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 470 Atlantic Ave., Boston, Mass. 02210



You mean I can get $50,000 of TIAA Life insurance for less than $100?

That's what an Assistant Professor asked us when he heard about TIAA's low life insurance costs.

It's true. At his age 30 the annual premium for a 20-Year Home Protection policy providing $50,000 initial amount of insurance is $159.00. The first year dividend, based on our current dividend scale, is $61.00, making a net payment of $98.00. Dividends, of course, are not guaranteed.

The Home Protection plan is level premium Term insurance providing its largest amount of protection initially, reducing by schedule each year to recognize decreasing insurance needs. This is just one example of the many low-cost TIAA plans available. If you need more protection for your family, ask us to mail you a personal illustration with figures for a policy issued at your age. We'll also send the Life Insurance Guide describing other TIAA policies.

ELIGIBILITY FOR TIAA INSURANCE is limited to faculty and staff members of colleges, universities, private schools, and other nonprofit educational or scientific institutions that qualify for **TIAA** services.

tiaa

TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ASSOCIATION a G
730 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017

Please mail the new Life Insurance Guide and a personal illustration.

Name_____ Your Date of Birth_____

Address_____ ZIP_____

Dependents' Ages_____

Nonprofit Employer_____
college, university, or other educational or scientific institution

Oxford University Press

Democratic Representation

REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS

By ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., *The George Washington University.* Representation considered as an essential component of democratic theory and institutions is given a critical appraisal in this study. The book is a definitive treatment of reapportionment rulings in courts and legislatures stemming from the Supreme Court decision in Baker v. Carr (1962). Among the topics discussed are: the feasibility of judicial implementation of principles of representation; the adequacy of the "adversary method" of litigation for problems of representation; the "one man-one vote" principle; the need to place reapportionment analysis in the context of basic theories of representation; and the role of computers in representation and districting.

Summer 1968 500 pp. text edition, prob. $7.50

The Judicial Process

AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND FRANCE

SECOND EDITION

By HENRY J. ABRAHAM, *University of Pennsylvania.* This valuable text, revised and enlarged to include the most recent data available, examines the operation of judicial processes here and abroad. Emphasis is on the American judiciary, especially the Supreme Court, but there is also an extensive comparative analysis of the Court systems of Great Britain, Wales, and France, with notes on the U.S.S.R. Bibliographies, index.

Spring 1968 450 pp. paper prob. $2.75

The Politics of Science

READINGS IN SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND GOVERNMENT

Edited by WILLIAM R. NELSON, *United States Air Force Academy.* The twenty-seven readings in this collection explore the relationships of science and the federal government in the United States, including the political environment of governmental scientific activities and the impact of science upon the American political system. Represented in the work are the observations of such authorities as Don K. Price, Vannevar Bush, Oskar Morgenstern, and Robert Gilpin.

February 1968 500 pp. paper $3.95

The Government of Modern Britain

By FRANK STACEY, *Swansea University.* This detailed, comprehensive text covers most aspects of central government, including such recent matters as the powers of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration under the 1967 Act. Reading guides follow each chapter.

1967 400 pp. text figures cloth $7.20 paper $4.50

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Oxford University Press

Anglo-American Criminal Justice

By DELMAR KARLEN, *New York University; with* GEOFFREY SAWER, *The Australian National University, and* EDWARD M. WISE, *Wayne State University.* This book compares the workings of criminal justice in England and the United States and provides a concise, valuable guide to contemporary criminal procedure in each country. The first part analyses institutions, dealing with the police, the prosecution, the defense, the courts, and the prison system. The second part traces chronologically the several stages of a criminal case. Law in action, as well as law in the books, is discussed, and points at which England and America can learn from each other are explored.

1967 228 pp. cloth prob. $5.75 paper $1.95

Freedom and the Court

CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES

By HENRY J. ABRAHAM, *University of Pennsylvania.* "An outstanding study of the relationship between individual freedom and the rights of the community in a democratic society. It fills a need and is written with the usual excellence which characterizes Professor Abraham's work."—ELI E. NOBLEMAN, American University.

1967 352 pp. cloth $7.50 paper $2.75

The Notion of the State

AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL THEORY

By ALEXANDER PASSERIN D'ENTREVES, *University of Turin.* This is a concise analytical survey of the different concepts of the State. It is a thoughtful probing of the foundations of authority, of why we obey the laws of the State. The author takes into account the views of such influential American political scientists as Arthur Bentley, David Truman, and David Easton who, in his analysis, ultimately explain the State as a system based on force-relations. In contrast, the author attempts to show that much more is explained and understood if the State is considered in terms of both law and human value.

1967 248 pp. cloth $5.60 paper $2.95

British Cabinet Government

By KARL LOEWENSTEIN, *Amherst College. Translated from the German by* ROGER EVANS. Placing the unique British system in its international and historical perspective, this book gives an authentic and vivid picture of how British parliamentarianism has continued to develop and progress through the centuries. Part One surveys the political evolution of what is known today as the British Constitution, and Part Two gives a picture of the present evolved from these historical beginnings. The author demonstrates that the adaptability of the Constitution is the secret of the present enviable system and the working guarantee of British politics.

1967 224 pp. paper $2.50

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Oxford University Press

The Nature and Function of International Organization

SECOND EDITION

By STEPHEN S. GOODSPEED, *University of California, Santa Barbara*

1967 736 pp. illus. $7.50

A History of War and Peace, 1939-1965

By WILFRID KNAPP, *Oxford University*

1967 672 pp. trade edition $10.00 text edition $7.50

India and Ceylon

UNITY AND DIVERSITY

A Symposium edited by PHILIP MASON, *Institute of Race Relations, London*

1967 336 pp. cloth $6.50 paper $2.50

South-East Asia

RACE, CULTURE, AND NATION

By GUY HUNTER, *Institute of Race Relations, London*

1966 208 pp. cloth $4.50 paper $1.95

The Impact of the Russian Revolution

THE INFLUENCE OF BOLSHEVISM ON THE WORLD OUTSIDE RUSSIA

Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London

1967 350 pp. cloth $7.50 paper $2.50

The Politics of the Third World

By J. D. B. MILLER, *Australian National University*

1967 144 pp. cloth $3.75 paper $1.50

Elements of Democratic Government

FOURTH EDITION

By J. A. CORRY, *Queen's University, and* HENRY J. ABRAHAM, *University of Pennsylvania*

1964 842 pp. $7.75

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Oxford University Press

Afrikaner and African Nationalism

SOUTH AFRICAN PARALLELS AND PARAMETERS

By EDWIN S. MUNGER, *California Institute of Technology.* Professor Munger contrasts the two principal types of nationalism found in South Africa, comparing their development, demonstrating their distinctive features and differences, and showing how they are reacting to each other and to foreign pressures. The account starts with a brief chapter describing the two nationalisms, goes on to lack of unity, non-nationalist minority groups, class aspects and communications in both Afrikaner and African nationalism, and traces Afrikaner nationalism to full development and African nationalism to its present intermediate stage. *Map.* Published for the Institute of Race Relations. $4.00

Principles of Public International Law

By IAN BROWNLIE, *Wadham College, Oxford.* Designed to provide a convenient work of reference, this book is a treatment of Public International Law which emphasizes the technical aspects and major issues of legal principle. All major topics are covered, including the nature, creation and transfer of territorial sovereignty, the law of the sea, the law of treaties, and admissibility of claims. Careful account has been taken of recent developments in the subject. $10.10

Union of Burma

A STUDY OF THE FIRST YEARS OF INDEPENDENCE

FOURTH EDITION

By HUGH TINKER, *University of London.* This is the fourth edition of what is recognized as the standard work on Burma since independence. It is mainly concerned with the vital years 1948-62, when, under the leadership of the Prime Minister, U Nu, a remarkable attempt was made to create a social democracy. The study, first based upon a year's field work at the University of Rangoon, has been brought up to date by incorporating later material. *2 maps.* Published for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. $8.00

Parliamentary Procedure in India

By A. R. MUKHERJEA. This standard work, first published in 1958, has now been thoroughly revised and brought up to date in an eagerly awaited second edition which includes fresh material on such topics as motions of no-confidence in the Upper House, the calling of attention to matters of urgent public importance, the personal and pecuniary interest of members, and other matters. A new chapter has also been added on the system of committees, committees on public undertakings, and the powers and duties of the Comptroller and Auditor-General in relation to autonomous bodies. $7.95

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Oxford University Press

William Henry Seward

By GLYNDON G. VAN DEUSEN, *University of Rochester.* "Historians will welcome this important, judicious, and well-written biography. A new study of Seward has been badly needed, and no scholar was better qualified to write it than Glyndon G. Van Deusen."—DON E. FEHRENBACHER, Stanford University. "Fulfills the high expectations of those who have read his biographies of Weed and Greeley . . . brilliant."—DAVID ELLIS, Hamilton College. *16 pages of halftones.* $12.50

The American Party Systems

STAGES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Edited by WILLIAM NISBET CHAMBERS *and* WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, *both of Washington University.* What historical conditions have favored or discouraged the development of competitive politics in the United States? What have been the scope and limits of the influence of the party systems on the American political process and on American political development as a whole? These and many other questions are explicitly discussed in ten studies by leading historians and political scientists in this original contribution to the understanding of party politics. *Cloth,* $6.75 *Paper,* $2.50

The Conservative Tradition in America

By ALLEN GUTTMANN, *Amherst College.* In tracing the main line of Conservative thought and action in America since the eighteenth century, Professor Guttmann illuminates all its ramifications—showing how Conservatism has really survived only as an important, and usually unrecognized, aspect of American literature. "A provocative book. Guttmann's scholarship is sharp."—NORMAN HOLMES PEARSON, Yale University $6.00

The Unfinished Revolution

RUSSIA 1917-1967

By the late ISAAC DEUTSCHER. "The most perceptive and illuminating work of its kind, either currently in print or likely to be published in the foreseeable future. I know of no other account which presents with such insight and in such highly readable prose a survey of the origins and course of the Russian Revolution."—FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, Williams College. "A must for anyone interested in world affairs . . . an important and stimulating contribution." —*The Economist* $3.75

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

STATE GOVERNMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

John C. Buechner, University of Colorado

166 pages 1967 Paper $1.95

COMMUNIST CHINA IN WORLD POLITICS

Harold C. Hinton, The George Washington University, and The Institute for Defense Analyses

527 pages 1966 $7.50

A SURVEY OF UNITED STATES-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS

J. Lloyd Mecham, Professor Emeritus, University of Texas

487 pages 1965 $7.75

CAPITOL, COURTHOUSE, AND CITY HALL

Readings in American State and Local Government, Third Edition.

Edited by Robert L. Morlan, University of Redlands

357 pages 1966 Paper $4.95

READINGS IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Edited by Maurice E. O'Donnell, University of South Florida

304 pages 1966 Paper $2.95

SOUTH ASIA AND UNITED STATES POLICY

Norman D. Palmer, University of Pennsylvania

332 pages 1966 Paper $4.50

Houghton Mifflin

Boston / Atlanta / Dallas / Geneva, Ill. / New York / Palo Alto

Dictionary Catalog of the
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY LAW LIBRARY, New York City

One of the largest of its kind, this library today contains about 465,000 volumes. It is especially rich in legal literature of the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations and provides excellent coverage of Roman and medieval law. The abundant materials on African law include gazettes of the newly independent countries. The catalog contains about 700 periodicals and many serial analytics.

Estimated 705,000 cards reproduced in 28 volumes
Prepublication price: $1785.00; after April 30, 1968: $2230.00

Index to Periodical Articles, 1950-1964 in the Library of The ROYAL INSTITUTE of INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

This library is the leading specialist collection in Great Britain dealing with international affairs since 1918. Its index of articles from 200 periodicals includes an unusually wide range of important foreign language journals.

31,500 cards reproduced in 2 volumes *Price: $125.00*

List of FRENCH DOCTORAL DISSERTATIONS on AFRICA, 1884-1961, Boston University Libraries

Forty African states are represented on this list, which also includes entries for dissertations pertaining to the continent in general and to the former British, German and Italian areas of Africa.

2,900 cards reproduced in 1 volume *Price: $19.00*

10% addition charge on orders outside the U.S.

Descriptive material on these titles and a complete catalog of publications are available on request.

G. K. HALL & CO. 70 Lincoln Street, Boston, Massachusetts 02111

THE ORVIL E. DRYFOOS PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONFERENCE PAPERS

1964-1967

1. Congressional Reorganization (1964)
   Edited by Michael O'Leary
2. European Views of America (1965)
   Edited by Gene M. Lyons and Michael O'Leary
3. The New Federalism (1966)
   Edited by Frank Smallwood
4. Canadian-American Relations (1967)
   Edited by David A. Baldwin and Frank Smallwood

Price: $2.00 each or $7.00 for complete set

order from

PUBLIC AFFAIRS CENTER **DARTMOUTH COLLEGE**
Hanover, N.H. 03755

The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws
by Douglas W. Rae

The author defines the effect of a country's electoral system on its politics in precise and empirical terms, drawing his data from elections in twenty countries over a period of twenty years. His measure of party fractionalization and his categorization of various kinds of electoral laws represent important advances over the existing literature. $5.00

Party Democracy
Politics in an Italian Socialist Federation
by Samuel H. Barnes

Through an intensive empirical study of a single political party in an Italian province, Mr. Barnes investigates some broad theoretical questions of participation and democracy in political parties. The author brings to data analysis both the statistical tools of contemporary social science and the perception of a sensitive, informed scholar, providing in this book many leads for future research. $7.50

Columbia: The Political Dimensions of Change
by Robert H. Dix

Mr. Dix characterizes the various regimes which have evolved in Colombia to meet the challenges of modernization, beginning with Alfonso Lopez' "revolution on the march" of 1934. The book constitutes a thorough, up-to-date analysis of the political dynamics and recent history of an important Latin American nation. $10.00

Peasant Communism in Southern Italy
by Sidney G. Tarrow

In Southern Italy, where a heritage of poverty, oppression, and crime has created a unique political setting, the Communist Party's programs of regional rebirth and land reform offered the peasant his first hope of breaking out of his long isolation. The Party's mixture of success and failure in adapting a liberal, Western form of Marxism to an agrarian society has much to tell us about the future of peasant communism throughout the world. $8.75

Yale Paperbounds

Children and Politics
by Fred I. Greenstein
$1.75 (cloth $5.00)

The Insanity Defense
by Abraham S. Goldstein
$1.95 (cloth $6.00)

available through your bookstore
Yale University Press
New Haven and London
in Canada: McGill University Press



New from the University of Chicago Press

The Future of Germany

Karl Jaspers

Introduction by Hannah Arendt

Translated and edited by E. B. Ashton

In her introduction, Hannah Arendt points out that this book is politically the most important to appear in Germany after the Second World War. The original edition, *Wohin treibt die Bundesrepublik?*, has been at the top of the best-seller list in Germany for over a year. Americans will find Jaspers' ideas about the relationship of Germany to the United States and Russia and about the reunification of Germany especially interesting. A postscript to this edition includes Jaspers' thoughts on the "great coalition."

1967 LC:67-25510 208 pages, $4.95

The Making of a Workers' Revolution

Russian Social Democracy, 1891-1903

Allan K. Wildman

Hoover Institution Publications

This is the first major social study of the formative years in the development of Russian Social Democracy, focusing on the interaction during the 1890's between intellectuals and workers. The author assesses the historical importance of the movement in preparing the way for the Bolshevik-Menshevik split, and in the mobilizing of social forces which shaped the 1905 Revolution. He concentrates on memoirs, underground publications, and police sources, to give an accurate cross-section of the social make-up of the movement, participants' motivations, and techniques of action. "History of Menshevism" series, Leopold H. Haimson, General Editor.

1967 LC:67-25086 271 pages, $7.95

America's Failure in China, 1941-50

Volume 1 and Volume 2

Tang Tsou

"A torrent of books has poured from the presses in recent years on the failure which changed the shape of half the world. But it has taken Professor Tang Tsou, China-born but now an American citizen, to produce the best study, an absolutely first-rate analysis of both Chinese and United States policy in that critical period from 1941-50."—*Newsweek*. "This is our best narrative of the diplomatic-political side of the demise of Kuomintang China. . ."—Oscar Gass, *Commentary*

1963 LC:63-13072 614 pages, $12.50
1967 Paper vol. 1, vol. 2, each $2.45

The Modernity of Tradition

Political Development in India

Lloyd I. Rudolph and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph

In this firsthand study of modern India, the Rudolphs explore tradition's vast potential for change and its relationship to an industrializing national society. They show that the introduction of political democracy has mobilized and transformed castes in much the same way that modern American politics draws support from ethnic and religious communities in the U.S.A. A study of Gandhi reveals how he harnessed the traditional Hindu values of asceticism, non-violence, and compliance to the needs of a modern mass movement.

1967 LC:67-25527 280 pages, $8.75

University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

ATHERTON PRESS

70 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10011

POPULAR GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA

CHARLES S. HYNEMAN, *Indiana University*, with the collaboration of
CHARLES E. GILBERT, *Swarthmore College*

This new book is a comprehensive analysis of the critical concepts and political practices on which American democracy is founded. Experienced teachers will rapidly discover *Popular Government in America* to be a highly stimulating work for their courses in American Government, Political Parties, and Democratic Thought; few indeed are the books intended for students in these fields that are as successful in giving the reader not only rich and thorough information, but also a method for understanding and evaluating the democratic character of our political system.

Contents: Introduction by Charles E. Gilbert

Part I. DEMOCRATIC IDEALS. 1. Democracy: Goals and Methods 2. The Democratic Society

Part II. POPULAR GOVERNMENT. 3. Two Systems of Demand and Response 4. The Citizen's Role 5. The Right to Vote 6. The Citizen's Education 7. Political Activity and Electoral Behavior

Part III. THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITY. 8. The Elective Principle 9. The Legislature and the Executive 10. Control of Administration

Part IV. LIMITED GOVERNMENT. 11. Government by Law 12. Constitutional Guarantees 13. Free Speech and Subversion: An Historical Episode 14. Free Speech and Subversion: A Contemporary Solution

Part V. DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL. 15. The Negroes' Challenge 16. Organized Protest and Resistance 17. On the Preservation of Democratic Foundation.

Bibliography Index *Just published* *$8.50*

POLITICAL THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Edited by DAVID E. SPITZ, *Ohio State University*

The often stormy interaction between established political concepts and institutions and contemporary movements for reform is examined by thirteen eminent political scientists —Hannah Arendt, Paul Kecskemeti, David Kettler, Guenter Lewy, Julian H. Franklin, E. V. Walter, Christian Bay, Michael Walzer, C. B. Macpherson, Mulford Q. Sibley, Peter Bachrach, Judith N. Shklar, and David Spitz. *Just published* *$8.95*

DEMOCRACY: *The Contemporary Theories*

Edited, with Introductions, by M. REJAI, *Miami University*

A long-needed work—the first comprehensive textbook-reader covering the entire range of twentieth-century views of democratic theory, placing these newer conceptions in context and comparing them with such classic theories as those developed by Locke, Rousseau, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Mill. *1967* *$6.95*

ATHERTON PRESS

70 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10011

THE RADICAL LIBERAL: *New Man in American Politics*

ARNOLD S. KAUFMAN, *University of Michigan*

Foreword by HANS J. MORGENTHAU

This explosive book offers the first systematic articulation of the unease now felt by most Americans who consider themselves liberals. With powerful emphasis on the growing gap between the rhetoric of "official" liberalism and the reality of people's lives, Kaufman provides intellectuals—young and old—with a true liberal manifesto for our day.

Contents: Foreword by Hans J. Morgenthau. Preface. 1. Liberalism and Its Dilemmas 2. The Need for a Turn Toward Radicalism 3. The Politics of Pseudo-Realism 4. The Politics of Self-Indulgence 5. The Alternative: Democracy and the Politics of Radical Pressure 6. Liberalism and Black Power 7. Liberalism and Higher Education 8. Liberalism and Foreign Policy *Just published* $5.95

POLITICAL SCIENCE AND IDEOLOGY

WILLIAM E. CONNOLLY, *Ohio University*

In this re-evaluation of the true function of political science, the author lays down guidelines for the construction of fruitful political interpretations in the large areas where ideological assumptions and claims cannot be adequately tested.

Just published $5.95

THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN AID

MICHAEL KENT O'LEARY, *Syracuse University*

This authoritative study of the many complex factors that go into the making of American foreign aid policy provides a detailed picture of the attitudes of the general public, the political parties, the pressure groups, and Congress itself toward the issue of foreign aid. *Just published* $5.95

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM AND AMERICAN POLICY

BERNARD S. MORRIS, *Indiana University*

A superb, lucid, timely, and scholarly analysis.—LOUIS L. GERSON, *University of Connecticut*

A most valuable analysis of world Communism which demonstrates how reality differs from the frozen images held by many Americans. It ought to be read before any debate on Vietnam.—FRANK MUNK, *Portland State College*

Some of the most lucid reflection on what has happened to international communism. . . . Excellent and merciless in debunking stereotypes, cutting through layers of misconceptions which have predominated in academic and government thinking on communist affairs.—ALEXANDER DALLIN, *Columbia University* $5.95

more from Atherton Press

ATHERTON PRESS

70 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10011

SCIENCE AND IDEOLOGY IN SOVIET SOCIETY

GEORGE FISCHER, *Columbia University,* RICHARD T. DE GEORGE, *University of Kansas,* LOREN R. GRAHAM, *Russian Institute,* HERBERT S. LEVINE, *University of Pennsylvania*

Focusing on sociology, philosophy, cybernetics, and economics in the Soviet Union, the authors of this important book shed new light on the difficult question: What is the interaction between science and ideology? The disciplines discussed clearly reveal specific trends in Soviet science and its interaction with the established ideology.

Just published $6.95

EQUALITY: *Nomos IX*

Edited by J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College,* and JOHN W. CHAPMAN, *University of Pittsburgh*

Eighteen outstanding political scientists, jurists, and philosophers address themselves to the fundamental concepts of equality, the sources of beliefs about equality, and the political and legal applications of equality. The ninth yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy. *1967* $6.95

REPRESENTATION: *Nomos X*

Edited by J. ROLAND PENNOCK, *Swarthmore College,* and JOHN W. CHAPMAN, University *of Pittsburgh*

A discussion in depth by internationally respected scholars. Contributions by Pitkin, Diggs, Cohen, Frankena, Mansfield, Kramnick, Nordlinger, Sobolewski, Black, Brown, Dexter, Dixon, Stokes, Riker and Shapley, Nozick, Witherspoon, Zakrzewski, and Apter.

Spring 1968 $6.95

COUNTERREVOLUTION: *How Revolutions Die*

JAMES H. MEISEL, *University of Michigan*

It ought to be required reading for every American liberal.—ADOLF A. BERLE

I have been equally delighted with its interesting and lively style and the wise and valuable content.—PRESTON SLOSSON, *University of Michigan*

Even as the historical crow flies, it is a very long way from Elijah and King David to the Buddhists in Vietnam and General de Gaulle in France. When the route includes sidetrips to such fascinating figures as Cicero, Cromwell, Sieyes, Trotsky, and T. E. Lawrence, surely only a competent navigator would journey all the way between the covers of a single volume . . . he has pushed the study (of revolution) far beyond the stages effected by such pioneers as Crane Brinton.—*Virginia Kirkus Service* $6.50

Order now through your bookstore or directly from Atherton Press. Requests for sixty-day examination copies must be made on your institutional letterhead.

PUBLICATIONS from VAN NOSTRAND

forthcoming . . .

ASIAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS: Readings on China, Japan, India, and Pakistan

Betty B. Burch, Tufts University; and *Allan B. Cole*, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Available Spring, 1968.

This is a book of selected readings for undergraduate and graduate students of Asian politics and comparative politics in general. A unique feature is that the selections are drawn exclusively from writers native to each country.

THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM AND ITS FUNCTIONS: Selected Readings

Edited by *Robert W. Gregg* and *Michael Barkun*, both of The Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University. Available Spring, 1968, about $4.50 paperbound.

THE STRATEGY OF FOREIGN AID

Lloyd D. Black, Northern Illinois University.
Available Spring, 1968, about $2.75 paperbound.

NATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY: The Presidential Reports

Reuben E. Slesinger, University of Pittsburgh.
Available February, 1968, about $3.75 paperbound.

This sourcebook examines the Reports of the Council of the Economic Advisers and The President's Annual Economic Reports to illustrate their influence in formulating United States economic policy.

---

recently published . . .

THE SOVIET CRUCIBLE, The Soviet System in Theory and Practice, *Third Edition*

Edited with introductory notes by *Samuel Hendel*, The City University of New York. 1967, 480 pages, $5.95 (paper).

"*The Soviet Crucible*, edited by Samuel Hendel, provides a uniquely valuable selection o original Marxist and Soviet sources, together with substantial selections from many of the most penetrating analysts of Soviet power and society. This well-chosen compendium is an extremely useful supplement to courses on Russian history or Soviet politics." *Philip E. Mosely, Columbia University*

CONDUCT OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, *Third Edition*

Elmer Plischke, University of Maryland. 1967, 704 pages, $9.75.

Send for your on-approval copies. Write College Department,

Van Nostrand
120 Alexander Street
Princeton, New Jersey 08540

COLUMBIA  COLUMBIA

URBAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS: A FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF METRO TORONTO

HAROLD KAPLAN

Metropolitan Toronto, a federation of thirteen municipalities created by the province of Ontario in 1953, was the first working North American example of what has been called the "metropolitan federation plan." This book is a history and an analysis of this experience, a breakthrough in the drive for reorganization of municipal governments in metropolitan areas. The author concludes with an account of the 1966 reorganization of the Metro system and some predictions about the functional significance of these reforms.

This is number VII in the Metropolitan Politics Series, edited by Wallace S. Sayre. $8.50

CANADA AND THE QUEST FOR PEACE

PAUL MARTIN

Since World War II Canada has played an increasingly important role in international affairs. This book is an examination of her efforts and policies in three important areas—The United Nations and its peace-keeping efforts, the search for a solution to the Vietnamese conflict, and the economic development of underdeveloped countries.


This is the first of the Jacob Blaustein Lecture series. $3.95

DEFENSE OF THE REALM: BRITISH STRATEGY IN THE NUCLEAR EPOCH

R. N. ROSECRANCE

Great Britain's defense posture, by any measure, has grown absolutely since 1945. But today, her influence is much reduced from yesteryear. This study, drawing on extensive interviews with top American and British officials, surveys the strength and weaknesses of Britain's defense in the contemporary period, with special emphasis on the first postwar decade. Today, the author concludes, Great Britain is stronger than she seems, and could yet seem stronger than she is. $7.50

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS
440 West 110th Street
New York, N. Y. 10025



COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

COLUMBIA  COLUMBIA

STRATEGIC PERSUASION: ARMS LIMITATIONS THROUGH DIALOGUE

JEREMY J. STONE

The greatest hope for the resolution of the problems of arms and war, in this author's view, is the preservation and improvement of meaningful communication between the two major powers of the world, the Soviet Union and the United States.

This dialogue can be more than a necessary preliminary to formal agreements—in many cases it can substitute for treaties by arriving at tacit agreements or informal understandings. The book analyzes the nature of the exchanges, including the problems of bureaucracy and human persuasion that are not peculiar to arms race management. It suggests direct and indirect approaches to arms control discussions, and treats such diverse issues as the problem of announcing one's strategic successes without exacerbating the arms race, the problem of staffing quiet United States-Soviet discussions (such as the Pugwash conferences), and the prospects for "breakthroughs" in the dialogue. $6.95

SCANDINAVIAN POLITICAL STUDIES: VOLUME II

PERTTI PESONEN, *Editor*

This is the second volume of an annual series published in English by the political science associations of the Scandinavian countries. Included are essays in the following areas: conceptual analysis, emergence and support of political parties, party behavior, and the public image and public opinion. In addition, there are reviews of recent political developments in the Scandinavian countries and summaries of recent studies in political research. $8.00

THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE

GABRIELLA ROSNER

This book is the first detailed study of the United Nations Emergency Force, which was established in November, 1956, at the height of the Suez crisis. Miss Rosner has included in this comprehensive analysis the plans and efforts of the past to create an international military force, the circumstances which led to UNEF, the functions and powers conferred on it, and its composition, organization, and control. She also examines many of the problems that arose consequent to the establishment of UNEF, including its legal status, constitutional basis, and financial situation. $7.50

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

440 West 110th Street

New York, N. Y. 10025



COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

COLUMBIA  COLUMBIA

SIMPLE MODELS OF GROUP BEHAVIOR

OTOMAR J. BARTOS

This is a pioneering textbook in the new field of mathematical social theory. Its aim is to explain why and how the behavioral scientist can benefit from the use of mathematical models. The author believes that social scientists can profitably apply existing mathematical theories to human behavior. Two major theories are discussed in detail, the theory of Markov chains and the theory of games. Social processes such as voting, formation of friendships, and mobility are well described by the theory of Markov chains, while the theory of games prescribes the wisest choices for persons attempting to resolve a social conflict, whether it be a couple's argument over whether to go to a prize fight or to the ballet, or an important question of military strategy.

Otomar Bartos is Professor of Sociology at the University of Pittsburgh. $8.00

THEORY AND METHODS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH

JOHAN GALTUNG

An integrated view of the problems of theory formation and methodology in the social sciences. The author compares and relates most of the approaches used by contemporary social scientists and presents the common factors in data collection, processing and analysis, hypothesizing and theory construction.

A summary chapter on theory formation elaborates on the ultimate phase of the research process and provides formal criteria for evaluating the significance of the many levels and varieties of theories.

Johan Galtung is Director of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway. $10.00

A POPULAR GUIDE TO GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS: Third Edition

W. PHILIP LEIDY

A completely revised and up-dated edition of this valuable reference work—a selected, classified, and annotated list of pamphlets and books of general interest published by the various federal agencies. Included are descriptions of the materials, their prices, and information on how and where to get them. The approximately 3,000 entries are arranged by subject matter. $12.00

FEASIBLE PLANNING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE


ROBERT MORRIS AND ROBERT H. BINSTOCK

"The book provides fresh insights and interesting illustrative material on a neglected phase of social planning. It merits careful reading by social planners, social workers, and others interested in the effective administration of welfare programs in the United States."—*Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.* $5.00

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

440 West 110th Street

New York, N. Y. 10025



COLUMBIA COLUMBIA

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE

Supreme Court Decision-Making from a New Perspective

by Richard M. Johnson

The author defines decision-making in a broad sense to include not only the Court and its rulings but also the numerous channels through which its decisions are transmitted. Using data collected in a special survey of parents, school officials, and influential community members of a rural school district in Illinois, the author examines the social and psychological variables that affected compliance with the Court's recent rulings on religious practices in public schools.

x + 176 pages $5.95

AFRICA AND THE COMMON MARKET

by P. N. C. Okigbo

This book examines the problems posed for African economies (particularly those of Nigeria and other former British territories) by the establishment of the European Economic Community and by Britain's decreasing demands for imports. The author places Nigeria's experiences with the E.E.C. in the context provided by the special trade concessions granted the former French colonies at the time of the establishment of the Common Market and by the gradual development of trade relationships between the African dependencies of France and Belgium and the E.E.C.

xv + 183 pages $5.50

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY PRESS

1735 Benson Avenue, Evanston, Illinois 60201

INDIAN JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

(Official Organ of the Indian Institute of Public Administration)

Widely subscribed by civil servants and academicians in India and abroad, it is the only national quarterly Journal on Public Administration brought out in India. The Journal publishes articles from scholars and experienced civil servants on problems of Public Administration in India and abroad.

Some of the Recent Articles

1. Development Administration—New Dimensions (J. N. Khosla) ..... Vol. XIII, No. 1.
2. Citizen and Administration—Mutual Response (D. G. Karve) ..... Vol. XII, No. 3.
3. Administrative Accountability to Parliament (S. L. Shakdher) ..... Vol. XII, No. 3.
4. Promotion and Incentives in Public Services (P. K. Dave) ..... Vol. XII, No. 3.
5. Understanding our Bureaucracy (Ramaswamy R. Iyer) ..... Vol. XII, No. 4.
6. The Administrative Challenge to Panchayati Raj (Iqbal Narain) ..... Vol. XII, No. 3.

Subscription:

Annual: Rs. 12.00 or £1 10s.
Single Copy: Rs. 3.00 or 7s. 6d.

Our July-Sept. Issue will be a Special Number
On
ADMINISTRATION OF FOOD PRODUCTION

published by
Indian Institute of Public Administration
Indraprastha Estate, Ring Road
New Delhi-1.

Important titles from RONALD

GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

Webb S. Fiser, State University of New York at Albany; **Stuart Gerry Brown,** University of Hawaii; and **John S. Gibson,** Tufts University

Just Published—This textbook surveys concisely but comprehensively the framework of the American governmental system. Intergovernmental relations are developed as cooperative action between levels of government rather than as compartmentalized treatments of federal, state and local systems. Going beyond discussion of politics, parties, and pressure groups, this book shows how the political process unfolds around concrete policy issues in the context of changing historical developments. Particular attention is given to such currently important problems as urban renewal, metropolitan areas, poverty, race relations, law enforcement, agriculture, and education. Instructor's Supplement available. *1967. 803 pp.* *$8.50*

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

John M. Pfiffner, University of Southern California; and **Robert Presthus,** York University, Toronto

Just Published—This famous textbook examines administration at all levels of government. It integrates descriptive-institutional materials of administrative science with behavioral analyses of administration in action. It analyzes such aspects as the historical and institutional framework, separation of powers, role of executives (particularly that of the modern specialist), and the problem of obtaining superior talent. Covers decision-making and the data-processing revolution, and incorporates recent research into group behavior, individual motivation, and leadership dynamics. *5th Ed., 1967. 567 pp.* *$8.00*

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

Donald C. Blaisdell, The City College of The City University of New York

This textbook acquaints the student with the theory and practice of international organization. It also serves to identify problems in international organization and to open fresh paths for further inquiry. The governmental structures that the world's nation-states have agreed to establish, their procedures, staffs, and finances are examined together with methods for meeting threats or breaches of the peace. Analyzes the success of these organizations in maintaining peace, promoting respect for human rights, and fundamental freedoms, and dealing with problems of general welfare. Questions at the end of each chapter. *1966. 531 pp.* *$7.50*

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

Russell M. Ross, University of Iowa; and **Kenneth F. Millsap,** Assistant City Manager, Iowa City, Iowa

This text provides a thorough treatment of the governmental activities of the 50 states and their local governmental units. Although predominant emphasis is on administrative aspects of state and local government, the book also presents material on the structure of governmental units below the national level. The role of counties, the position of the municipalities and special districts, and the peculiar problems of metropolitan areas are examined in detail. The importance of intergovernmental coordination is stressed, as is the growing relationship between the national and local governments. *1966. 705 pp., illus.* *$8.50*

ESTABLISHED 1900

The Ronald Press Company

79 Madison Avenue · New York, N.Y. 10016

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

For Your Courses

THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED, Second Edition

By John C. Livingston and Robert G. Thompson,
both, Sacramento State College

The Second Edition of this successful text has been sharpened and clarified by establishing, in the first four chapters, the democratic frame of reference needed before proceeding to an examination of American practices and institutions. The authors then pose questions about the nature of democracy and present their answers as well as those propounded by liberal, conservative, and "brokerage" theory.

1966, 608 pages, $7.50

POLITICS U.S.A.: Cases on the American Democratic Process Second Edition

Edited by Andrew M. Scott and Earle Wallace,
both, University of North Carolina

Each selection in this book represents the study of a given case in the democratic process and provides the student with insight into the actual working of American politics. About 70 per cent of the material in the Second Edition is new, and there are two new chapters.

1965, 576 pages, paper, $4.50

A BILL BECOMES A LAW: Congress Enacts Civil Rights Legislation, Second Edition

By Daniel M. Berman, The American University

The way in which a bill proceeds through Congress to become law is the subject of this revised edition, illustrated by the Civil Rights Acts of 1960 and 1964. The student is able to compare the factors that resulted in a weak bill of 1960 with those that contributed to the strong 1964 bill.

1966, 146 pages, paper, $1.95

Write to the Faculty Service Desk for examination copies.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
866 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022

Three Excellent Texts on International Relations

THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Second Edition

by Norman J. Padelford, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
and George A. Lincoln, United States Military Academy

Shifting relationships within the power blocs, accelerated technological change, the mounting world population, agitation for nationhood and economic betterment, the slow progress toward larger community—these and other vital elements of the international political environment receive detailed consideration in this extensively rewritten and updated Second Edition of a successful and widely adopted text.

1967, 617 pages, $8.95

FORGING WORLD ORDER:
The Politics of International Organization

By Jack C. Plano, Western Michigan University, and
Robert E. Riggs, University of Minnesota

This textbook investigates modern international organization by drawing upon both a process and an institutional and problems approach to political behavior. This synthesis of approaches reveals to students the interaction of political institutions and the individuals who shape them. Emphasizing the problems and institutions of the 1960's, the authors discuss the setting for the contemporary scene, the international organization as a political process, and the problem-solving aspect of global and regional organization.

1967, 600 pages, $8.95

THE UNITED NATIONS:
International Organization and Administration

Edited by Maurice Waters, Wayne State University

This valuable collection contains readings, sources, speeches, and documents relating to all phases of the United Nations. Set in the context of the historical development and the theoretical considerations of international organizations, the material is structured to show both the external and internal features of the U.N.

1967, 588 pages, paper, $4.95

Write to the Faculty Service Desk for examination copies.

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
866 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10022

NEW FROM BOBBS-MERRILL

GOVERNMENTAL REORGANIZATIONS
Cases and Commentary

EDITED BY FREDERICK C. MOSHER

Thirteen studies of governmental reorganizations, by as many investigators, and an extended theoretic essay summarizing their implications by Professor Mosher.

750 PAGES — $12.00 CLOTHBOUND ON APPROVAL

VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Cases in Federalism, 1889-1959

JOHN D. SPRAGUE

A statistically imaginative and sophisticated study, evaluating two common descriptions of Supreme Court decision-making against data extended in time.

256 PAGES — 77 TABLES — $2.95 SOFTBOUND

forthcoming in spring, 1968

THE POLITICS OF COMMUNITY CONFLICT
The Fluoridation Decision

ROBERT L. CRAIN, ELIHU KATZ, and DONALD B. ROSENTHAL

A study of the politics of fluoridation, with emphasis on effectiveness of community leadership structures, using the methodology of survey research.

250 PAGES — $2.95 SOFTBOUND

INFORMATION RETRIEVAL
Applications in Political Science

KENNETH JANDA

". . . an excellent, practical, case study approach to important retrieval problems for political science. . . ."—*Ralph L Bisco*

350 PAGES — $2.95 SOFTBOUND

POLITICAL POWER IN THE SOVIET UNION
A Study of Decision-Making in Stalingrad

PHILIP D. STEWART

An analysis of the structure of influence in decision-making at the regional level of the Soviet Communist Party through intensive study of a single Party committee—the Stalingrad obkom.

350 PAGES — $2.95 SOFTBOUND

COMMUNIST PARTY-STATES
International and Comparative Studies

EDITED BY JAN TRISKA

Analytical and theoretical essays by Robert North, David Finley, Edward Miles and John S. Gillooly, Charles D. Cary, Dennis C. Pirage, R. Judson Mitchell, John C. Shippee, Bruce R. Sievers, Ole R. Holsti, Richard A. Brody, and John F. Vesecky, Jack L. Kange, Maurice D. Simon and Jan Triska on various aspects of the politics of the world communist system.

512 PAGES — $4.95 SOFTBOUND

THE **BOBBS-MERRILL** COMPANY, INC.
A SUBSIDIARY OF HOWARD W. SAMS & CO., INC.
4300 WEST 62nd STREET • INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA 46268

Publishers of the Reprint Series In Politics and Government

WESTMINSTER WORKSHOP
A Student's Guide to the British Constitution, 2nd revised and enlarged edition.
By R.K. Mosley
This completely revised and enlarged edition contains fresh material on opinion polls, party organization, the Parliamentary Commissioner, the Department of Economic Affairs and recent developments in Local British Government. This text is a straightforward account of how British political institutions work today. The emphasis is on current institutions rather than historical development.
Of interest to teachers and students of social studies, government and civics.
October 1967 *230 pages* *Flexi-covered* **$4.00**

PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
By A.J. Anthony Morris
The evolution of the British Constitution in the nineteenth century is the subject of this volume. The book traces the tenuous beginnings of the principle of parliamentary democracy to the emergence of industry and trade as challenges of the power of agriculture.
Of interest to: teachers and students of social studies, history and government in senior high schools, community and junior colleges.
October 1967 *188 pages* *Flexi-covered* **$3.50**

new and recent
POLITICAL SCIENCE TEXTS
from Pergamon

FROM SCHUMACHER TO BRANDT
The Story of German Socialism 1945-1965
By D. Childs
A comprehensive guide to the post-war development of the German Social Democratic Party. The volume also examines certain fundamental questions which socialists, and all interested in politics, have long discussed. In addition, the book analyzes carefully the development of post-war Germany in a way to engage the general reader as well as the specialist. This scholarly and controversial work should be of great interest to all concerned with politics, directly or indirectly.
1966 *192 pages* *Flexi-covered* **$2.95**

For copies on approval, write:
College Division
PERGAMON PRESS
44-01 21st Street/Long Island City/N. Y. 11101

BROWN UNIVERSITY PRESS Providence, Rhode Island 02912

The Democrats and Labor in Rhode Island, 1952-1962
Changes in the Old Alliance
Jay S. Goodman
Is the labor–Democratic-party alliance as permanent as it seems to be? In a behavioral study that describes the group-party relationship from the perspective of each set of participants, Jay S. Goodman has addressed himself to this question in terms of the Democratic party and organized labor in one small industrialized state in which the situation is highly relevant to the national scene. $5.00

Yazoo
Law and Politics in the New Republic
The Case of *Fletcher* v. *Peck*
C. Peter Magrath
"A model treatment of a constitutional case" — RICHARD B. MORRIS, *The American Historical Review*. "Professor Magrath has not merely written a 'revision' of a famous constitutional case; his book is an important and elegant explication of the legal, political and economic problems that came to a head in one of the most famous, if not most innovating, decisions of Chief Justice Marshall." — *The Times Literary Supplement*
$6.00

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

systematic, analytic, and dynamic . .

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM: Notes and Readings

Edited by BERNARD E. BROWN, *Brooklyn College of the City University of New York,* and JOHN C. WAHLKE, *University of Iowa*

"A collection of outstanding readings, organized intelligently."
Henry J. Abraham, University of Pennsylvania

"This is an excellent collection of essays."
Ole R. Holsti, Stanford University

"An interesting and well put together book."
Frank M. Covey, Jr., Loyola University, Chicago

"Most useful book of readings available for basic American Government."
Robert D. Smith, Western Michigan University

"An excellent collection of materials organized, at long last, through the use of a coherent conceptual framework."
David E. Ingersoll, University of Delaware

The American Political System encourages the student to view the United States as one political system among many. The materials selected explore each major part of the political system: consensus and legitimacy, political dynamics (including groups, parties and ideological currents), decision-making and political change. By viewing and analyzing the American political system in terms of these categories, the student will be able more easily to compare the United States with other nations, to identify the similarities and differences, and to separate the unique and the universal.

Among the Many Adopters . . .

University of Illinois
University of Maryland
University of California, Berkeley
University of Arizona
Brooklyn College
Syracuse University
Duke University
University of Oregon
U.C.L.A.
University of Iowa
University of Colorado
University of Hartford
University of Southern California
University of Delaware
University of Florida
University of Georgia
University of Kentucky
Tulane University
University of Minnesota
University of Missouri at Kansas City
Rutgers, The State University
City University of New York
University of North Carolina
McGill University

682 pages *Paperbound* *Text price: $4.75*

Published in The Dorsey Series in Political Science
Consulting Editor: *Norton E. Long,* Brandeis University

DORSEY PRESS

WRITE TODAY FOR YOUR EXAMINATION COPY

THE DORSEY PRESS · HOMEWOOD, ILLINOIS

Scott Foresman College Division

Theory and Practice in Political Behavior

THE CITIZEN AND THE ADMINISTRATOR IN A DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY

An Empirical Study in Delhi State, India

S. J. ELDERSVELD, The University of Michigan
V. JAGANNADHAM, The Indian Institute of Public Administration
A. P. BARNABAS, The Indian Institute of Public Administration

Utilizing survey data to test basic theoretical propositions about the developing Indian democracy, this book deals with various aspects of the Indian bureaucracy, both at it was inherited from the British and as it has been influenced by current social and political attitudes. The authors' pilot study of citizen perception of and contacts with five administrative agencies, together with a study of administrators' role perception and behavior, is based on over 600 interviews with a random sample of citizens in urban and rural areas and over 200 interviews with a random sample of administrators. The book begins with an introductory theoretical chapter, moves through a presentation of basic data on the public's evaluations of and responses to the agencies and their administrators, and describes the administrators' social and professional backgrounds, job concepts, and performance. It also highlights the importance of the quality and quantity of bureaucratic contacts, focusing especially on public involvement with the Community Development and various agricultural projects. A final chapter summarizes the meaning of this analysis for the problems, prospects, and paradoxes of administration in the Indian democracy. *Ready January 1968, 176 pages, $6.00*

THE POLITICAL IMAGINATION

Dialogues in Politics and Political Behavior

EDGAR LITT, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

An annotated reader stressing the behavioral and cultural dimensions of political science. Integrating the contributions of empirical political science with the classic and humanistic concerns of political man, the readings emphasize the role of political beliefs and ideologies in an appraisal of politics. Selections are organized to convey the importance of dialogue and debate in intellectual and scholarly writings on politics and cover, in addition to political beliefs and ideologies, political resources of democratic societies, modern and comparative political institutions and processes, and the public policies of education. *1966, 544 pages, softbound, $4.25*

SCOTT, FORESMAN AND COMPANY College Division

Glenview, Illinois Atlanta Dallas Palo Alto Oakland, N.J.

Major Foreign Powers

FIFTH EDITION

by GWENDOLEN M. CARTER and JOHN H. HERZ

A classic in comparative government, now in its Fifth Edition, *Major Foreign Powers* offers a comprehensive, comparative, and up-to-date study of politics and government in Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Germany, and France. 701 pages, $9.50

Coming in the spring:
Four separate paperbound volumes, reprints of the main sections of *Major Foreign Powers, Fifth Edition.*

Western Political Theory

FROM ITS ORIGINS TO THE PRESENT

by LEE CAMERON McDONALD

This distinguished new textbook presents in one volume an analysis in depth of the works of some 21 major political theorists from Plato to the present. The author provides the historical and biographical background of each theorist and then makes a coherent, scholarly interpretation of his work, quoting at length from original sources and citing secondary materials on critical issues and controversial questions.

640 pages. $8.95 (probable). Publication: April 1968

Political Patterns in Today's World

SECOND EDITION

by D. W. BROGAN and DOUGLAS V. VERNEY

A concise introduction to political ideologies and systems in the modern world, thoroughly revised to meet the needs of beginning students. The authors, two noted political scientists, describe how liberal-democracy and communism actually operate in the United States, Britain, France, Sweden, and the Soviet Union; in addition, they explore non-Soviet communist patterns in Eastern Europe, China, and Cuba. A concluding section focuses on the political problems of the new nations. With annotated bibliography.

Paperbound. 288 pages. $2.95 (probable). Publication: March 1968

Please mention THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW *when writing to advertisers*

Announcing . . .

Politics and Government in the United States

SECOND EDITION

by EMMETTE S. REDFORD, DAVID B. TRUMAN, ALAN F. WESTIN, and ROBERT C. WOOD

The Second Edition of this highly regarded introductory textbook is a major revision, both in content and format. As a result of the authors' careful reworking of each section, the new edition is substantially shorter than the first. Every chapter has been thoroughly revised or newly written to present the most up-to-date information and interpretation and to focus sharply on the major themes and key political concepts. New introductions and summaries reinforce the important points discussed in each chapter.

Highlighting each chapter are brief quotations, set off from the text narrative, that show the range of political opinion in this country and illustrate the American political process in action. The revised illustration program for the Second Edition includes new and up-to-date political cartoons.

Accompanying the Second Edition:

A completely new *Instructor's Manual,* which includes analyses of the key points in each chapter, suggestions for class discussion, lecture topics, and annotated bibliographies.

A separate *Test Booklet,* reserved for those who adopt the textbook, that contains objective and essay questions, as well as topics for term papers.

Politics and Government in the United States, Second Edition, will be available in two editions:

National, State, and Local Edition: 816 pages, $9.50 (probable)
National Edition: 720 pages, $8.50 (probable)
Publication: March 1968

To receive further information about our new publications or to request examination copies of textbooks you wish to consider for class use, please write the office nearest you.



Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
New York / Chicago / San Francisco / Atlanta

INDEX TO ADVERTISERS

Allyn & Bacon, Inc. 1256, 1272
American Association of Law Libraries 1251
Appleton-Century-Crofts 1268, 1269
Atherton Press 1283, 1284, 1285
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc. 1294
Brown University Press 1295
University of California Press 1262
Cambridge University Press 1234, 1235
University of Chicago Press 1282
Columbia University Press 1287, 1288, 1289
Commentary Reports ..... Cover III
Congressional Quarterly 1237
Dartmouth College 1280
Dorsey Press 1296
Free Press 1248, 1249
General Politics Quarterly 1238
G. K. Hall & Company 1280
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1298, 1299
Harper & Row 949
Harper Torchbooks 1232
Harvard University Press 1257
D. C. Heath & Company 1255
Houghton-Mifflin Company 1279
University of Illinois Press 1259
Indian Journal of Public Administration 1290
Johns Hopkins Press 1270, 1271
Journal of Constitutional & Parliamentary Studies 1261
J. B. Lippincott Company 1250
Little, Brown & Company ..... Cover II
McGraw-Hill Book Company 1266
Macmillan Company 1292, 1293
Northwestern University Press 1290
Oxford University Press 1274, 1275, 1276, 1277, 1278
Peacock Publishers 1244
Pegasus 1245
Pergamon Press 1295
Frederick A. Praeger 1236, 1254
Prentice-Hall, Inc. ..... Cover IV
Princeton University Press 952, 1233
Rand McNally & Company 1239, 1240, 1241, 1242, 1243
Random House & Alfred A. Knopf 1252, 1253
Ronald Press Company 1291
St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1247
Scott, Foresman & Company 1297
Charles Scribner's Sons 1263, 1264, 1265
Stanford University Press 1258
Teachers College Press 1246
Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association 1273
Vanderbilt University Press 1246
D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 1286
University Press of Virginia 1267
Wesleyan University Press 1260
World Law Fund 1238
Yale University Press 1281

The most important articles to appear in "one of the world's best edited periodicals" (C. P. Snow) are now being used in colleges throughout the world.

You can have samples free

List the five Commentary Reports, on your letterhead, that you would consider for classroom adoption and we'll send them right out.

Special Reports:

☐ **The Dominican Revolt**—Theodore Draper New 64-page paperback based on his administration-shaking article in Commentary $2.50

☐ **American Response to the Six-Day War** Robert Alter, Arthur Hertzberg, Milton Himmelfarb, Martin Peretz $1.00

☐ **Liberal Anti-Communism Revisited.** A symposium, Paul Goodman, Michael Harrington, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Lionel Trilling etc. 75c

Quantity discounts for classroom purchases: 25-49 copies less 10%; 50-99 copies less 15%; 100-299 copies less 20%; 300-499 copies less 30%; 500-1,000 copies less 40%; more than 1,000 copies less 50%.

☐ ***The Problem of the New Left**, T. Kahn 50c
☐ ***Church and State — How High the Wall?** M. Himmelfarb 40c
☐ ***Black Power & Coalition Politics**, Bayard Rustin 40c
☐ ***In Defense of Black Power**, D. Danzig 40c
☐ **The Unremembered Genocide (Armenian)**, Marjorie Housepian 40c
☐ ***Jews and Germans**, Gershom Scholem 50c
☐ ***The Failure of the Warren Report**, A. M. Bickel 50c
☐ **Communism in Asia**, Donald S. Zagoria 35c
☐ **Will Soviet Jewry Survive?** E. Wiesel 40c
☐ ***The President & the Negro:** The Moment Lost, D. P. Moynihan 60c
☐ **The John Birch Society:** Fundamentalism on the Right, A. Westin 50c
☐ **Negroes and Jews:** The New Challenge to Pluralism, N. Glazer 40c
☐ **My Negro Problem — And Ours**, Norman Podhoretz 35c
☐ **The Negro and the New York Schools**, Midge Decter 45c
☐ **Chinese Visions & American Policies**, B. Schwartz 40c
☐ **Future of Capitalism**, R. L. Heilbroner 50c
☐ **China's Strategy**, Donald S. Zagoria 35c
☐ **Mutual Aid and the Negro**, J. Slawson 40c
☐ **Big Business & the Democrats**, David Bazelon 35c
☐ **Vatican II and the Jews**, F. E. Cartus 40c
☐ **From Protest to Politics:** The Future of the Civil Rights Movement, Bayard Rustin 40c
☐ **The Watts "Manifesto" & the McCone Report**, B. Rustin....40c
☐ **Pius XII, the Jews and the German Catholic Church**, Guenter Lewy 50c
☐ **P.S. 165: Portrait of an Integrated School**, Richard Schickel 40c
☐ **Five Years of Castro's Cuba**, Theodore Draper.....40c
☐ **The Failure of Urban Renewal.** H. J. Gans 40c
☐ **Up from Apathy** — The Woodlawn Experiment: Self-Help in a Slum Neighborhood, C. E. Silberman 35c
☐ **The State of Soviet Jewry**, Maurice Friedberg; and **Soviet Anti-semitism** — Exchange between Bertrand Russell and Aron Vergelis 50c
☐ **The Meaning of Negro Strategy**, David Danzig 35c
☐ **Jewish Resistance to the Nazis**, Oscar Handlin; **Hannah Arendt on Eichmann**, Norman Podhoretz 50c
☐ **Conservatism After Goldwater**, David Danzig 35c
☐ ***The Arab Refugees:** A Zionist View, Marie Syrkin 40c
☐ ***The Myth of the Jewish World-Conspiracy**, N. Cohn 50c
☐ ***Counterrevolutionary America**, Robert L. Heilbroner 50c
☐ ***Bonn Is Not Weimar:** Reflections on the Radical Right in Germany, Walter Laqueur 50c
☐ **The Shape of American Politics**, Richard N. Goodwin 60c
☐ **The Lessons of the Long Hot Summer**, Bayard Rustin 50c

*Companion Commentary Study Guides have been published for these articles. A sample Guide will be included with the material that we send to you.


Write to: Robert Gladstone

Commentary Reports

165 E. 56th St., New York, N. Y. 10022

Write for the Commentary Magazine Classroom Subscription Plan too.

16 APR 1968



FOUR POLITICAL SCIENCE TEXTS

DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL ANALYSIS: An Introduction to the Contemporary Study of Politics

• Cyril Roseman, San Francisco State College, Charles G. Mayo, University of Southern Californ and F. B. Collinge, San Francisco State College

This is a book of 30 readings and analysis which introduces and illustrates the diversity of twentie century political science. It provides the reader with the basic insights into (1) the ingredients a social science (2) the contemporary view of power and (3) the contemporary communications model of politics. *1966, 384 pp., Clothbound $7.50*

GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE, 6th Edition, 1966

• James MacGregor Burns, Williams College and
J. W. Peltason, University of Illinois

The theme of the 6th edition continues to be government by the people, and the problems relatin to this central idea. Emphasis remains on case studies, historical background, contrasting ap proaches to the mechanics and problems of modern government, and the maintenance of a health balance between human interest detail and generalization. Includes a 16 page color insert on th history of political campaigning. Both a National and National-State-Local edition are available, as well as a Teacher's Manual by Lucius J. Barker, University of Illinois. *1966, National Edition 782 pp., $9.25; National-State-Local Edition: 943 pp., $9.75.*

GUIDE TO AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 2nd Edition, 1966

• James A. Burkhart, Stephens College and
Raymond L. Lee, Indiana State University, Pennsylvania

This is a workbook and study guide for Burns and Peltason's *Government by the People,* 6th edition. Three major sections include (1) *Guideposts,* following Burns and Peltason's major sections (2) *Glossary,* offering terms and definitions for each chapter (3) *Big Questions,* including objective questions for each chapter and discussion questions for classroom activity. *1966, 235 pp., Paperbound $3.50*

POLITICS THROUGH LITERATURE

• Henry M. Holland Jr., Alfred University

This is an anthology of Western literature which aids students to understand politics as a proce It features (1) examples of the subtle manner in which human motives determine the choice o political alternatives (2) how the structure of society affects both individuals and politics and (3 how ideas, individuals and interests generate political action. *April 1968, Approx. 384 pp., Paper bound $4.50*

For Approval Copies, Write: Box 903

• PRENTICE-HALL, ENGLEWOOD CLIFFS, N.J. 076